



Home Office

**The Home Office response to the Independent Chief
Inspector's report on**

'An inspection of e-Borders'

Border Force thanks the Independent Chief Inspector for his report on the e-Borders Programme and for providing this report in advance of publication.

1. Recommendation 1:

REDACTED

2. Recommendation 2: That Border Force issues clear instructions to frontline staff on the actions they must take when they receive alerts about the arrivals of individuals who are the subject of either a deportation order or exclusion order.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in full.

Work has begun at the National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC) to address this issue. This guidance will be integrated into the Border Force Operating Mandate.

3. Recommendation 3:

REDACTED

4. Recommendation 4: Ensures that multi matches are dealt with by joint teams of Police and Border Force staff to ensure that high profile matches are not missed.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in part.

Work is ongoing to determine how Border Force and the Police can best work together in the NBTC and this recommendation will inform that work.

5. Recommendation 5: Completes work to determine how best to mandate advance passenger information from General Aviation operators into the e-Borders systems, in advance of travel.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in full.

Work has begun to mandate advance passenger information through updates to the Commissioners' Directions (CDs). The passengers CDs have already been amended to provide Border Force with the ability to request Advance Passenger Information (API) for flights landing at and departing from UK airfields. Further work continues on the Aircraft CDs which will allow Border Force to mandate the submission of information relating to the aircraft, flight information and crew.

6. Recommendation 6: Introduces a process to identify non-compliance with reporting requirements for General Aviation flights and takes appropriate action in such cases.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in full.

At present Border Force has the ability to identify flights which have failed to submit a General Aviation Report (GAR) to Border Force by cross referencing against the Civil Aviation Tracking system (CATS). Border Force is currently working to automate the process, including further cross referencing with National Air Traffic Control. This will subsequently allow us to either educate or take action against those who fail to comply. This is part of the wider Data Quality work being delivered by the Border Systems Programme.

7. Recommendation 7: Introduces a reporting and risk assessment process for General Maritime traffic based on the e-Borders system and a process to provide for interception of vessels on a risk basis.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in part.

Border Force is currently running a trial on General Maritime Cruise data and will be looking to launch a similar Pilot into General Maritime Commercial data later in the year. Both trials will draw advance passenger information into Semaphore and issue the appropriate alert to the respective region.

Border Force has begun work on the development of the General Maritime Risk Assessment Tool (GMRAT) which will allow regions to risk assess maritime movements in the same way as is done with the General Aviation Risk Assessment Tool (GARAT), allowing us to determine the risk rating of that particular movement and action the appropriate response. Once the results of the two trials have been reviewed, Border Force will look to roll out these tools nationally for cruise ships and commercial shipping. The next stage will be to consider whether a similar method of risk assessment and intervention for General Maritime (Leisure) is practical and to make recommendations.

8. Recommendation 8: Stops issuing immigration alerts, apart from those that are categorised as 'high profile' or where advance notification of the arrival of a passenger will assist in resourcing and deployment decisions.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in part.

We are developing a pilot to allow risk and assurance testing to take place ahead of any firm decision to cease issuing any specific category of alert.

9. Recommendation 9: Provides clear instructions in the Border Force Operating Mandate about how commodity alerts issued by NBTC should be categorised and dealt with.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in full.

An instruction will be issued to all staff clarifying this matter which will be incorporated into the Border Force Operating Manual in due course.

10. Recommendation 10: Provides a technical solution to ensure NBTC operators cannot log off the Semaphore system without having de-selected all unprocessed matches.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in full.

Border Force will implement a technical solution to address this issue.

11. Recommendation 11: Issues clear guidance to frontline staff about the requirement to provide accurate and reliable alert feedback.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in full.

An approved instruction has already been issued to Border Force staff. Processes are also in place to follow up if feedback is not provided in relation to an alert within agreed timescales.

12. Recommendation 12: Prioritises the work to cleanse the Warnings Index of outdated and irrelevant data and ensures it is kept up-to-date going forward.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in full.

It is Government Policy not to comment on the Warnings Index.

13. Recommendation 13: Works with HMRC to produce an extract from Centaur which is suitable for the purpose of identifying commodity threats.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in full.

Work has already commenced with HMRC to produce a revised extract in line with Border Force requirements.

14. Recommendation 14: Ensures that advance passenger data is used to prevent the arrival of those clearly not admissible (those subject to deportation orders and exclusion) when identified by the e-Borders system.

Border Force accepts this recommendation in part.

Border Force will use API data to prevent arrival where legislation permits this.