STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

The Campaign for Fairer Gambling: Consultation response to the DCMS Gambling Act 2005: Triennial Review of Gaming Machine Stake and Prize Limits

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The Campaign for Fairer Gambling: Triennial Review Submission

Introduction

This document is a consultation response to the DCMS Gambling Act 2005: Triennial Review of Gaming Machine Stake and Prize Limits. This response is primarily related to B2 gaming machines in betting shops, which have been more commonly known as Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs). The term FOBTs refers to the machines and is used throughout the document. The term "B2 content" refers to the non-B3 content on FOBTs throughout the document.

The answers to selected questions in the Review can be found towards the end of the document. All document content, all identified reference links and all appendices are supporting evidence to the answers.

Summary

B2 content should be removed from FOBTs. This could result in the removal of the B2 machine classification in its entirety.

Respondent details

The respondent is the Campaign for Fairer Gambling[1], which also operates the Stop the FOBTs[2] Campaign. The Campaign is non-profit with no commercial benefit or motive. It was co-founded and co-funded by Derek Webb and Hannah O'Donnell, who have profited from gambling through the creation and marketing of gambling game content, related litigation proceeds and associated asset sales. They have now sold all house-advantage based gambling game content and have retired from that business. Their business entities Prime Table Games in the UK and the US retains the rights to PTG Poker, which is an improvement to card-room player(s) against player(s) poker. This is not being marketed and has never generated any revenue.

Two retained Campaign consultants have also contributed to this response. Matt Zarb-Cousin became addicted to FOBTs at the age of 16. He appeared on a Dispatches TV programme explaining how he was allowed to gamble under-age in school uniform. Adrian Parkinson was a regional manager with Tote Sport responsible for the roll-out of the FOBTs. He witnessed first-hand that gamblers converting to FOBTs were becoming addicted. He appeared on a Panorama TV programme explaining that some shop staff were becoming addicted to FOBTs.

This response has been co-ordinated by bcsAgency, who represent the Campaign.

Background information

History of FOBTs

Over 10 years ago there was a tax on betting shop turnover, which also applied to FOBT turnover. This tax was removed and a gross profit tax was introduced[3]. As part of that deal, bookmakers agreed to locate their telephone betting onshore rather than offshore[4]. The bookmakers have since generally reneged on that deal[5], thereby reducing their tax payments in the UK.

Removing the betting duty on machines meant that games with lower house advantages could be introduced. Prior to this, machines in licensed betting shops were not generating substantial revenue. By putting roulette on the machines, they became an overnight success. Campaign Consultant Adrian Parkinson was responsible for the two Tote betting shops, Kidlington in Oxford and Addington in London, that were among the first dozen shops to test roulette on FOBTs. Each shop went from hundreds of pounds to tens of thousands pounds cash take on FOBTs within one week.

The machines were called Fixed Odds Betting Terminals, or FOBTs. The odds were fixed at pre-set amounts (as opposed to fixed in the sense of rigged). They were considered betting terminals because the betting took place within the premises on terminals that were, crucially, linked to a server located outside the premises. If FOBTs were simply gaming machines with the software inside them they would have been in breach of the law.

In 2002 the Gaming Board for Great Britain expressed concerns over the introduction on FOBTs, claiming that the machines were sophisticated tools, with no legal limits on prize money and could fuel the danger of addiction in the betting world. The introduction of casino-style games on FOBTs could have been interpreted as a covert attempt by bookmakers to introduce casino-style gaming into a bookmaking environment.

Peter Dean, Chair of the Gaming Board for Great Britain told a leisure machine association convention: "Their proliferation is a breach of the spirit and intent of current legislation.There are special dangers associated with machines because of their potentially addictive characteristics." [Appendix A]

In fact, the Gaming Board for Great Britain, the regulator at the time, filed litigation against William Hill related to FOBTs, but did not proceed with the case. To ensure they retained FOBTs, bookmakers argued that gambling was where the gambler was, in the shop, not at

the out-of-shop server. But they had taken an entirely opposite position regarding their remote (internet, online or mobile) gambling entities.

These entities argued that gambling was at the server, not where the gambler was, and some had obtained “paid legal opinions” to support this position. This meant that these entities could justify doing business anywhere, regardless of the view taken by the relevant authority pertaining to its legality. So bookmakers took opposite legal positions to maximise their commercial opportunities and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) ignored this anomaly.

The bookmakers agreed to draw up a Code of Conduct in order to avoid legal issues. Suppliers of FOBTs assisted the bookmakers and set up conditions that would have no impact on the profitability of FOBTs. The main conditions were to set a maximum stake of £100, a maximum prize of £500 and a maximum of four FOBTs per shop.

Other conditions in the Code of Conduct included restricting the casino table game content to roulette only and not allowing credit or debit card transactions on FOBTs. However, these conditions were circumvented as blackjack and other casino table games were added and the ability to make a service counter deposit by credit or debit card for remote loading onto the machine was already planned.

During the Code of Conduct prior to formal legalisation, FOBTs were “put on probation” according to DCMS[6]. But DCMS did not explain who the probationer was, or how the probation would be conducted. The so-called “probation” was vacuous and unsubstantiated, its purpose to espouse the pretence that adequate monitoring of FOBTs would take place. DCMS wanted to ensure the proliferation of gaming machines that had occurred overseas did not happen in Britain, so the Code of Conduct limited each shop to four FOBTs. But DCMS did not have to legalise FOBTs, and could have refused betting licenses to bookmakers on that basis.

Following the final implementation of the 2005 Gambling Act in 2007, FOBTs had become known as B2 machines. The software could now be contained within the machine itself, so the betting terminals had evolved into gaming machines.

In 2011, the DCMS select committee recommended lifting the cap of four FOBTs per betting shop. Despite visiting just one betting shop during their inquiry, the committee visited both Australia and Macao. One committee member was Philip Davies MP, who has since been

the subject of an inquiry carried out by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards related in part to non-declaration of a financial benefit from Ladbrokes when questioning the CEO of Ladbrokes in that committee hearing[7].

The select committee had two special advisors. One of them, Peter Collins, was an academic advocate of super-casinos. His Salford research facility receives annual funding from bookmakers. The other special advisor was Steven Donahue, son of Lord Donahue, who with Philip Davies MP is a member of the All Party Betting and Gaming Group. The government sensibly rejected the committee's proposal to remove the restriction of four FOBTs per betting shop.

Another significant aspect of the approval of FOBTs was the research commissioned by the bookmakers' trade association, the Association of British Bookmakers (ABB). The research was independently and professionally conducted and independently and professionally peer-reviewed [Appendix B].

However, the peer-reviewers noticed a discrepancy in the weighting, which was subsequently questioned. The survey in the betting shop had been conducted on the busiest days. Whilst this might make sense from a time and cost perspective, it meant the research was skewed. Simply, on Saturday, premium racing and sports attract the casual gamblers who bet once a week on those activities. FOBT gamblers and core over the counter gamblers are just as likely to be in a betting shop on any other day.

Therefore, the research was over-representative of "over the counter" gamblers and under-representative of FOBTs gamblers, the very group that the survey was designed to be researching. Therefore, the research commissioned by the ABB was flawed.

The ABB is now asking DCMS to maintain the status quo on FOBTs. But the reality is DCMS should never have allowed this status quo in the first place. So the status quo should not be the recommended government policy.

Actions of the ABB against the Campaign

The ABB has made representations to the DCMS in the pre-consultation stage and will certainly do so in the Triennial Review itself. But these representations must be put into some context. It should always be remembered that the ABB is a trade organisation acting solely in the commercial interests of its members.

Firstly, the ABB has written to MPs and national newspaper editors criticising the Campaign. One of their assertions is to state or imply that the Campaign has some form of commercial benefit, interest or motive. These egregious defamatory statements are false, unsubstantiated, without foundation or rational evidentiary basis.

It is easy to understand that the ABB assertion that the Campaign has a commercial benefit is false. Even if casinos would benefit from restrictions imposed on FOBTs, an assumption that the Campaign does not accept, then the only asset of relevant value that the Campaign founders have is a small stake in a small casino supply business. From public information it is easy to estimate that the value of Gala Coral casinos is around 5,000 times greater than the British casino supply related equity of the Campaign founders.

So for each £100,000 that the Campaign has spent, which would need to be recovered before any theoretical commercial benefit was realised, the value of Gala Coral casinos would need to appreciate by £500 million. The majority of Gala Coral casinos were recently sold for less than £180 million. Neil Goulden is Chairman Emeritus of Gala Coral and Chair of the ABB. There is no possible logical explanation that Neil Goulden can offer that could claim that both the sale of Gala Coral casinos was at a rational value and that the Campaign founders have a commercial benefit motive.

Secondly, the ABB have asserted that the recently produced Campaign statistics [Appendix C] on FOBTs are inflated as they refer to the gross amount gambled, otherwise called the turnover. Ladbrokes, in their annual reports for several years, have declared their machine turnover. The turnover is also part of the data that the Responsible Gambling Trust (RGT) has commissioned NatCen to examine as part of their 18 month research project into “high stake, high prize gaming machines”. The turnover is therefore a significant data point.

Furthermore, the ABB does not want to talk about the funds placed into B2s. This amount is less than the turnover and represents the actual funds placed into the machine. The payback to players is estimated to be under 82% of player funds placed into FOBTs. ABB have

continually stated that FOBTs payback 97%, but this of course relates to gross amount gambled, the turnover and not the actual funds paid into the machine.

Geofutures has confirmed the validity of the Campaign's statistics[8]. The Campaign's analysis is based on the financial period April 2011 to March 2012. The mapping of betting shops across the UK and apportioned by Parliamentary constituency was carried out by Geofutures[9] based on data sourced from the Gambling Commission. The full explanation of the analysis is in [Appendix D].

Thirdly, the ABB recently declared it was in a "lethal war" with campaigners[10]. This terminology is entirely misplaced as the Campaign is not against bookmakers, betting shops, gaming machines or gaming machines in betting shops. It is in favour of sensible restrictions on B2 casino content on FOBTs, where it is possible to stake up to £100 every 20 seconds.

Fourthly, accompanying an ABB letter sent to MPs and national newspaper editors were two ABB documents entitled "The truth about betting shops" and "The truth about gaming machines in betting shops". The letter made assertions about the Campaign and the Campaign statistics.

The Campaign responded with letters to MPs and the media refuting the ABB claims. Subsequently the Campaign answered the attached ABB documents with the documents entitled **"The real truth about betting shops"** and "**The real truth about gaming machines in betting shops"** accompanied by cover letters to MPs and the media. The two Campaign documents are presented as evidence. [Appendix E]. The summaries at the foot of each of those documents are very relevant.

Fifthly, there must be real concern by everyone with an interest in media freedom relating to part of an article by Dirk Vennix, CEO of the ABB, in the bookmakers' trade publication Betview [Appendix F]. The ABB have been claiming that the Campaign's analysis is false and should not be printed, which is against the Campaign's right to free press.

The ABB Campaign: "Back your local bookie"[11]

A recent edition of the Racing Post featured a full page advert for ABB "Back your local bookie" Campaign. It referred to anti-betting shop campaigners and how restricting gaming machines would lead to shop closures and job losses. It also referred to the eight million customers and 40,000 employees in what was termed a "retail" sector. The advert included a request to inform MPs about the importance of bookmakers and visit their website by 8th April and provided a template letter for supporters to use.

The Triennial Review includes FOBTs for the purpose of investigating evidence of associated problem gambling, primarily with B2 content. The comment made in the template letter regarding problem gambling refers to the theoretical drop in FOBT problem gamblers of 25% in the 2007 to 2010 "Gambling Commission Surveys", which are actually called the British Gambling Prevalence Surveys. At the same time, the ABB will be asserting that secondary evidence based on BGPS statics is invalid because of the small sample used. These are totally contrasting duplicitous positions by the ABB.

The template letter also claims: "…campaigners want to stop us enjoying.. EGMs [FOBTS]". However, unless staff members are also FOBT gamblers - Coral and Betfred are currently instructing staff to play FOBT in demo mode for 15 minutes every day - then this content cannot apply to those respondents.

The template letter also asserts that campaigners are anti-betting, anti-betting shop and are demanding a reduction in maximum prizes payout per spin to £100. The Campaign for Fairer for Gambling is not anti-betting, anti-betting shops or even anti-machines in betting shops and has never advocated a £100 maximum prize. The Campaign is concerned about the £100 stakes on B2 content and advocates a reduction to £2 in line with B3 content, where the maximum payout will remain at £500.

It is also deceptive to induce betting shop customers to respond with this template letter as they may infer from ABB campaign literature that their odds are being reduced, by the false claim related to prize reduction.

The template letter totally ignores the increase in betting shops in recent years, the movement of tertiary shops to more prime, high street locations, the increase in FOBTs and the increase in FOBT revenue.

There has been an increase in the number of betting shops over the last two years, from around 8,500 to 9,100. Furthermore, bookmakers William Hill, Paddy Power, Ladbrokes and

Coral are planning a further 245 licenses in 2013 to facilitate the further the proliferation of FOBTs.

Many members of industry staff are feeling coerced by management into supporting the "Back Your Local Bookie" Campaign.

These template letters provide no empirical evidence at all that might be considered by DCMS. This is a coercive and misleading campaign set up by the ABB in response to the "Stop the FOBTs", which has both facilitated genuine grassroots concern about B2 content on FOBTs and present within this consultation relevant ***Empirical Evidence*** demonstrating the link between FOBTs and problem gambling.

Over a year ago, Dirk Vennix of the ABB stated that the introduction of Machine Gaming Duty at 20% "will put 2,600 betting shops and 11,000 jobs at risk"[12]. This point was repeated by Chair of the ABB Neil Goulden as recently as December 2012.

The 20% rate was introduced in February 2013 and there has not been any announcements of shops closures. In fact there are additional betting shops planned for 2013, as the following table showing PLC bookmakers illustrates. These projected numbers of new licences when factored into Gambling Commission industry data 2012 indicate 13% estate growth across the four major bookmakers since 2009.

Additional betting shops planned for 2013:

Bookmaker	New Licences 2012	Proposed New Licences 2013
William Hill	50	45
Ladbrokes	69	100
Coral	61	55
Paddy Power	35	40
Totals	**215**	**240**
Figures sourced from respective bookmaker's Annual Reports 2011/12 Excludes Betfred and independent operators		

The ABB are still willing to claim on this dedicated website that there is no empirical evidence linking FOBTs to problem gambling, which is simply false. The link between FOBTs and problem gambling is substantiated in this document under the section titled ***Empirical Evidence***.

Support for the ABB from people including even MPs may have therefore been derived through misleading representation. Support from betting shop staff has been obtained through some degree of coercion, as internal memos have been circulated ensuring members of staff support “Back your local bookie” irrespective of their views on FOBTs. Caution should apply when taking into account responses from this website source that are supportive of the status quo.

The DCMS and Gambling

Page two of the Triennial Review document states that the aim of DCMS is to champion the leisure industry. However the role of government should be to regulate rather than “champion” the gambling sector and ensure the licensing objectives are rigorously upheld.

At its heart gambling is a consumer affairs matter, and player protection should be at the core of gambling regulation. Local authorities also have a significant role in licensing, but have so far been unable to effectively exercise this role due to current legislation and the position of the Gambling Commission.

Multiple other areas of government responsibility are impacted by problem gambling. There is only one NHS clinic dedicated to problem gambling. There is inadequate awareness throughout the NHS of the benefits of cognitive behavioural therapy in helping problem gamblers.

Family life is impacted by problem gambling losses across generations. A young unemployed male with a gambling problem is unlikely to make a good partner, husband or father. Social services are left to pick up the pieces of relationships that breakdown and resulting housing requirements.

Problem gambling also leads to crime. A young unemployed male with a gambling problem will have a propensity to resort to cash crime in order to provide funds. These are the types of crime that have the most impact on communities and place a strain on the whole judicial system.

DCMS has not yet taken any meaningful initiative to positively interact with other government departments to address these issues.

DCMS commissioned a 2007 Scoping Study into the impact of the 2005 Gambling Act, which advised that FOBTs should be "closely monitored"[13] because they contained features closely associated with problem gambling, but no monitoring by DCMS specific to FOBTs has since occurred.

The Gambling Commission and the "Primary Gambling Activity"

It is very clear that the vast majority of the turnover in betting shops is now on FOBTs. The turnover is the activity on the premises, with the win or loss being the consequence of the activity. The turnover on race and sports betting can just as easily be recycled turnover as turnover on FOBTs can. For example, a gambler could enter the shop with £50, turnover £250 before losing all of their initial starting funds of £50. This scenario could occur on either FOBTs or by betting over the counter.

It is also clear that the gross profit on FOBTs is growing and is now is in excess of the gross profit derived from traditional over the counter betting. Ladbrokes latest annual report[14] shows 83% of turnover is on FOBTs and over 50% of gross profit is on FOBTs. This is in marked contrast to their Irish business where only 23% of turnover is machines and 8% of gross profit is machines. The significant difference is that B2 content is not allowed on machines in Ireland.

There are two major expenses for bookmakers in operating FOBTs. The first is the machine tax at 20% of their gross profit and the second is machine supplier fees of 10% or more of gross profit. There are very few other expenses apportioned specifically to FOBTs. Single-manning of shops shows FOBTs do not require extra staff in order to operate them. So the net profit contribution from machines is far higher than the net profit contribution from traditional, over the counter betting.

However the shop license is granted for betting not gaming, as defined by the Betting, Gaming & Lotteries Act 1963[16]. The 2005 Gambling Act section 68 states: "**A general betting operating licence authorises the holder, by virtue of this subsection, to provide facilities for betting on the outcome of a virtual race, competition or other event or process other than a game of chance."[16]**

No rational business owner or judge would think that the best indicators of the primary activity were anything other than turnover, gross profit and net profit. But the Gambling Commission has influence over this and appears to be acting as the protector of FOBTs for bookmakers, rather than the regulator.

The Gambling Commission has created betting shop Licensing Conditions and Codes of Practice[17]. These state that turnover and profit are not the only measures of the primary gambling activity. This interpretation significantly inhibits the likelihood of achieving the licensing objectives set out in the Gambling Act 2005. If, in fact, the licensing objectives are being breached because of FOBTs, then the Conditions and Codes actually facilitate the breach of those objectives.

Local Authority (LA) responsibility

Newham Council recently objected to a new betting shop application on the grounds that the primary gambling activity would be FOBT "gaming" rather than over the counter "betting" This is the first case of its kind and is due to be heard at magistrates court in June this year[18]. The only support for the bookmaker position is to rely on the Gambling Commission's interpretation of the primary gambling activity, even though this is not legally binding.

The Government of Ireland when examining betting and gaming took the opposite view to that of the UK Government in their report "Regulating Gaming in Ireland" – these sections are referenced in [Appendix G].

There is poor compliance with enforcement of underage gambling as evidenced by Local Authority test purchase visits to betting shops[19]. The last commissioned test purchasing of betting shops was carried out by the Gambling Commission in 2009[19]. The first results showed a 98% failure rate among national bookmakers (Ladbrokes, Hills, Tote, Coral and Betfred). These results were followed through with a second set of tests later in the year and these showed a continuing high failure rate, reduced this time to 35%.

Following these results Nick Tofiluk, the Director of Regulation at the Gambling Commission, said "Test purchase exercises, by both the Commission and licensing authorities, will continue."

However, the Gambling Commission Licensing Authority Statistics 2009-12[20] indicate such test purchasing has neither been carried out by any LA nor the Gambling Commission since. FOBTs in betting shops are a contributory factor in contravening the protection of young and vulnerable people under the three licensing objectives, with no remedial action taken.

In a Trading Standards'[21] crackdown on underage gambling in 2009, 26 out of 39 Blackpool betting shops failed to stop children playing FOBTs.

As well as a licensing issue, it is also a planning one. Under current planning laws, betting shops are classified as A2 financial services, which means they are treated the same way as banks, building societies and estate agents, so LAs are powerless to prevent betting shops clustering on the high street. In many instances, betting shops open in A3, A4 and A5 premises without planning consent.

Article 4 directions are not a viable mechanism to prevent the proliferation of betting shops and have been described as “costly, cumbersome and bureaucratic” by the Local Government Association as LAs would be required to compensate operators for a loss of profits, which they cannot afford to do. A survey commissioned by the Local Government Authority and carried out by ComRes[22] showed that 68% of respondents were critical of the current planning laws governing betting shops.

Betting Shops, FOBTs and Crime

The latest Gambling Commission Licensing Authority Statistics 2009/12[23] have been used by the ABB[24] to represent how little crime and anti-social behaviour occurs in betting shops.

But these statistics are not influenced by crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour as these particular activities are reported to the Police. Examples of complaints to Licensing Authorities are claims that machines do not pay out correctly, corresponding with the fair and open objective, and reports of illegal gambling or under-age gambling, which relates to both the crime and the protecting of vulnerable people objective respectively.

Occasionally, the Police will complain about a betting shop being the source of extreme levels of crime and disorder, but these are generally when there is an acceptance between Police and the bookmaker that issues at that shop have gone too far.

Of more relevance is the total number of LA visits by sector shown below. Excluding “others”, which account for establishments not requiring operator licences, the total number of visits to betting shops account for 62% of all LA visits.

LA visits to licenced premises:

Sector	LA visits
Track	56
Casino	50
Bingo	207
Betting	1,864
AGC	636
FEC	190
Total	**3,003**

This number of visits is of course reflective of the number of sites compared to other sectors. However, there are four definitions of a visit, (1) pre-planned visits, (2) visits following a complaint, (3) follow up visits, and (4) test purchasing visits. Table 10 page 12[23] shows that no test purchasing was carried out on betting shops in 2011/12. No test purchasing has been carried out on betting shops since 2009. There were 45 visits following a complaint. This leaves 1,819 visits completed as pre-planned or follow up visits. One in five betting shops received a visit from Licensing Authorities.

It was noted in the Newham hearing on the Paddy Power application that crime and disorder would increase in an area of already high levels of unemployment and crime. Statistics produced by the Police showed an existing high concentration of crime in the area around the application and other areas of betting shop clustering across the borough[24].

Professor Linda Hancock's submission[25] to the DCMS review of the Gambling Act 2005: A Bet Worth Taking, highlighted concerns surrounding the association between FOBTs and money laundering.

The correlation between the prevalence of FOBTs in deprived areas and those of greater drug use is concerning given her conclusion: **"It is unknown the extent to which gambling regulation is successful in the maintenance of crime-free gambling. In order to use gambling machines to launder money (for example on bingo hall machines, casino machines or FOBTs) players simply feed in money via note acceptors into gaming machines, play for a short amount of time and then cash out all funds on the pretence they constitute winnings."**

The analysis carried out by Newham Council[26], in conjunction with the Metropolitan Police, concluded that **"Given the hotspots of crime/ASB (relating to gambling premises and in general) are the areas with the highest concentration of gambling premises, this suggests that establishing additional gambling premises in other areas might lead to an increase in the types of crime and disorder discussed herein."**

Types of crime and disorder that were discussed in the analysis and referenced in Newham's objection were gangs, street drinkers, vagrants, and antisocial persons being further attracted to the area. Granting the license would not only cause crime and disorder problems in the area, but such problems would also occur inside the premises. Newham contended that **"vulnerable persons who cannot afford to gamble would be attracted to the area, and upon losing money at the premises (especially on the Fixed Odds Betting Terminals) will cause crime and disorder in the premises. Examples of this may be that such vulnerable persons become aggressive and use threatening behaviour against staff, and the damaging of furniture and machines in the premises."**

In November 2012 the Panorama "Gambling Nation" programme publicized Police statistics showing that there had been a 9% increase in crime associated with betting shops since 2008[27]. Journalists from Panorama also visited 39 betting shops and recorded 23 incidents of crime and disorder during their investigation.

The same Panorama programme publicized internal memos from William Hill instructing operational staff not to report crimes of vandalism against FOBT to the Police, if the perpetrator was not known to staff [Appendix H]. This suggests that many of the crimes occurring in betting shops are not being reported to Police.

In July 2010, Haringey LA established a joint problem solving group with the Police because of evidence linking betting shops to crime and disorder. They identified that betting shops in Haringey had resulted in 262 crimes over a one year period; equating to five crimes a week. Due to the tendency for betting shops to cluster, this meant that crime was noticeably increasing in an area that already had significant crime issues. This data showed that criminal damage accounted for 74.4% of offences reported and 'Gaming Machines' were damaged in 80% of reports for criminal damage offences. Rowdy or inconsiderate behaviour was raised in 42.4% of incidents.

More recent figures from Greater Manchester Police covering Manchester City Centre showed in the year from 1st April 2012 to 21st March 2013, Police recorded 167 incidents linked to betting shops. These range from rowdy or inconsiderate behaviour (47 incidents), to criminal damage (15 incidents) and begging (five incidents). Two of the top seven repeat locations are existing William Hill shops.

Waltham Forest LA last year rejected a Betfred betting shop application again on the basis that it would perpetuate crime and disorder in the locality[26]. To claim that the number of visits following a complaint to a Licensing Authority is an indicator that betting shops “do not attract anti-social behaviour” is another untruth from the ABB.

The impact of crime and disorder does not just affect the local community. There is increasing concern among betting shop operational staff for their own safety as highlighted last year by the Guardian[29], in which staff spoke out about the increasing levels of violence associated with FOBTs.

Evidence of FOBT problem gambling

The Gambling Commission and the evidence bias

The Campaign wrote to Gambling Commission on 19 March 2013 asking that the Gambling Commission go public with the ***Empirical Evidence*** contained in this submission. The purpose of the request was to ensure those who wished to respond to the Triennial Review were aware of the ***Empirical Evidence*** so they could also include it in their response. However, the Gambling Commission responded on 26th March 2013, effectively denying that request [Appendix I].

The Gambling Commission is aware that there is evidence linking FOBTs to problem gambling. Therefore the Gambling Commission knows that the DCMS recommendation of maintaining the status quo for FOBTs is based on a flawed assumption. However, the Gambling Commission is unwilling to publicise the relevant evidence. Furthermore, the ABB has repeatedly stated that there is "no evidence" linking FOBTs to problem gambling, yet the Gambling Commission is not willing to publicly contradict them.

Philosophical Concepts of Gambling Regulation and FOBTs

The extreme "no gambling" position results in gambling being operated illegally. The extreme libertarian position of "no gambling regulation" also results in gambling being operated without legal control. Gambling requires sensible legal controls, but there is no sensible justification for FOBTs.

The bookmakers will take the position that no-one should be "deprived" of their "pleasure" by restrictions being placed on FOBTs. Yet this is merely a self-serving position to protect the status quo. In a factsheet on the "Back your local bookie" website, the ABB claim that "If demand is not met then it is likely that the 'black market' will become even bigger"[30]. This is a ridiculous claim and implies that current suppliers who operate reputably would provide their services on the black market. There is no indication of neither how nor where FOBTs would be operated illegally.

It would take 27 super-casinos to have as many gaming machines as there are now FOBTs, but all super-casinos were rejected. The Campaign is not advocating super-casinos, it is just not sensible to allow this amount of FOBTs by stealth.

Britain is the only country in the world that allows betting shops to have gaming machines which offer casino table-game style roulette at stakes up to £100. Clearly other countries do not consider this a sensible gambling model.

All gaming machines in Britain currently operate at maximum stakes of £2, except for FOBTs, which accept stakes up to £100 per spin. There is no sensible explanation as to why this anomaly is justified.

Britain has a greater range of legal gambling activities and greater ease of accessibility to those gambling activities than any other country. Placing sensible restrictions on betting shop FOBT content (one aspect of one activity at one type of premises) is not a draconian measure.

Standards of Evidence and FOBTs

There are essentially three levels of evidence being: beyond reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, and a preponderance of evidence. Governments make decisions all the time, on issues of vital importance to the country, for which the evidence does not rise to the level of beyond reasonable doubt. So that standard should not be needed in determining changes to gambling regulations.

The preponderance of evidence is the normal standard in civil proceedings and means a more than 50% probability that something is true. Civil proceedings often rely on testimony which is anecdotal under oath. The current position regarding evidence as expressed by the Gambling Commission and DCMS is that anecdote is not adequate evidence. Anecdote ***is*** a form evidence and should be taken into consideration.

One function of local government is to hear local voices. It is anecdotes that catalyse the desire to change things for the better and stimulate grass roots campaigns, such as those taking place in Newham, Haringey, Hackney and Manchester, related to FOBTs.

The ABB has argued that the debate on FOBTs should be based on empirical evidence. There should be confidence that the government sponsored British Gambling Prevalence Surveys[31] (BGPS) and the secondary research conducted should rise to the empirical standard. The ABB has always been willing to quote the BGPS when it considers that the evidence can be interpreted positively.

Logic dictates that the activity the problem gambler most frequently takes up or gambles the most on is the activity that most readily satisfies their gambling addiction. Where evidence is imperfect for whatever reason, there is no excuse for not relying on logic.

All future projections, whilst being based on past and present evidence are logic-based not evidence-based. DCMS itself is using logic-based Impact Assessments as part of the Triennial Review process. Equally DCMS should use logic as an adequate evidence standard, if there is any evidence gap.

Since it has become clear that there is adequate ***Empirical Evidence***, the ABB has started referring to causal evidence, without explaining what this means or how this could be obtained. It would be impossible to design an experiment which was both ecologically valid and ethically sound that definitively proved or disproved causality in respect of any gaming activity. Researchers could not be responsible for enabling gambling addiction. So the available anecdotal and ***Empirical Evidence*** must be deemed adequate.

The Campaign has requested the donation of a live terminal with access to live data from SG Gaming, the main supplier of FOBTs, for independent research to be carried out by Cambridge University. This would enable ecologically valid studies assessing, for example, player interaction with FOBTs. However, the request has been refused. Email exchanges referencing this request and refusal are available.

Social Impacts and Problem Gambling - the DCMS Chapter 4 points

In Chapter 4 of the DCMS Triennial Review the licensing objectives are identified at **4.1**. At **4.2** DCMS relies on advice from the Gambling Commission on the association with crime and the fair and open objectives. However the continued growth of FOBT gambling will mean these objectives are not met.

The fair and open objective is interpreted by the Gambling Commission so narrowly that it is meaningless. In the context of a FOBT game, if the rules and the payback are on a help screen and if the game is played according to those rules then the game is fair and open. This interpretation is a minimum legal standard not an objective. It ignores the concept that one game or game delivery method can be fairer than another. This is contrary to the position of the previous regulator, the Gaming Board for Great Britain. The casino player advice leaflets then implied that British odds were generally favourable compared to international odds.

The American Gaming Association, with no legal requirement for games to be fair and open, explains how machines work in its responsible gambling literature available at casinos. It explains that speed of play is a factor and that the faster a person plays the more the person should expect to lose. It also explains how a player at a 10% advantage machine will win back $90 for each $100 wagered, but also explains that if the $90 is re-wagered the player will win back 90% of $90 or $81. It also explains that the machine always comes out ahead in the long run [Appendix J].

Many FOBT roulette gamblers have probably never played in a casino. They would think that FOBT roulette was just as fair as casino roulette. This is not the case as FOBT roulette is 4.5 times faster than casino roulette so the FOBT roulette player on average loses 4.5 times faster. There is no Gambling Commission explanation to the player relating to this.
One committed FOBT roulette gambler filed a lawsuit claiming that FOBT roulette was unfair because it only paid back about 50% of funds placed in the machine and did not pay back 97%. This was a lack of understanding by that gambler, as the 97% relates to the spin and the gross wager. This highlights why the bookmakers do not wish to publicize how much cash has been inserted into FOBTs, or disclose their “cash retention percentage”. There is no Gambling Commission explanation to the gambler relating to this, either.

In respect of the crime association with FOBTs there are multiple references as above. However the most serious aspect is that damage to FOBTs on premises is no longer being fully reported as highlighted by Panorama Gambling Nation documentary last November[21] in which internal memos requesting staff not to report criminal damage to the Police were publicized. So there is no accurate record of FOBT association with crime and this objective is clearly being breached.

Knowing the lack of Gambling Commission enforcement of the licensing objectives, it is easy to understand why there has also been an inadequate delivery of the prevention of problem gambling objective.

The government’s assumption that the status quo on B2 content on FOBTs implies no increase in risk to player protection is false. It assumes that there are no players that have not already been exposed to FOBTs, no players who will increase their engagement with FOBTs, no growth in the number of FOBTs, no extension in the hours of operation of FOBTs and no changes in game content on FOBTs that could cause extra risk. Evidence of the growth in the number of FOBTs can be cited in William Hill, Ladbrokes, Gala Coral and Paddy Power’s plans to open another 245 units in 2013.

There is ample evidence that FOBTs are strongly associated with problem gambling as in the following professional academic research documents which are described in a video called *The Evidence* at stopthefobts.org and are presented in this document in a section titled *Empirical Evidence.*

There is no support for the **DCMS 4.8 statement** that "stringent controls" or "protections for consumers" are having any impact on under-age or problem gambling. There are currently no financial or criminal penalties imposed and no regulatory action taken, enabling betting shops to retain profits gained illegally from under-age gamblers. FOBTs are also often located near the door of a betting shop, so it is very difficult for staff to implement age checks before FOBTs are played.

The **DCMS statement in 4.9** is misleading as the "rigorous requirements" alluded to do not stand up to scrutiny. LA licensing responsibility in respect of the 2005 Gambling Act licensing objectives is impossible to deliver. There is no dedicated funding and minimal training. If an LA asserts that there is problem gambling related to betting shop FOBTs, based on anecdotal evidence, this is dismissed by DCMS and the Gambling Commission as not being robust enough.

Bookmakers have been actively converting "over the counter" customers to FOBT gamblers by offering how-to-play sessions, free play and tournaments, supported by aggressive marketing. This, in turn, has led to the sharp increase in FOBT turnover and revenue, which has facilitated lone staffing.

Lone and inadequate staffing has had an impact on a betting shop's capacity to spot crime, such as money laundering. It has also created difficulties in implementing industry policies such as "self-exclusion", designed to protect vulnerable people. Self-exclusion is offered to problem gamblers wishing to effectively ban themselves from betting shops. However, some shops have a significant number of self-excluded customers, so the policy is very difficult to implement.

Moreover, the lone member of staff is expected to check whether anyone in the betting shop has self-excluded, ensure FOBTs are not being used to launder money, clean the toilets, take bets over the counter and, crucially, ask people for ID as they walk in.

Therefore, FOBTs and the impact FOBTs have had on the sector make it very difficult for a member of staff to ensure the licensing objectives set out in the Gambling Act 2005 are fulfilled, ensuring young and vulnerable people are protected.

For this reason, Community, the union that represents betting shop staff, have repeatedly condemned FOBTs because of their impact on the working conditions of their members and have called for action on FOBTs, which it claims are linked to rising levels of **"violence, abuse and anti-social behaviour"** [Appendix K].

Impact Assessment Evidence of DCMS bias

The DCMS Impact Assessment was prepared on 28th June 2011. The evidence base used includes statistics up to the end of March 2011. The Triennial Review will be considering matters working from an evidence base that will be nearly two years out of date.

At **point 13**, DCMS states that the betting sector has recently experienced "**small"** growth. The Triennial Review relates to FOBTs only, not over-the-counter race and sports betting. The reality is that the growth of FOBT revenue is significant. The revenue growth from the year ending March 2009 to the year ending March 2012 is from £1.070 billion to £1.446 billion, showing a growth of £376 million. Total adult gaming centre revenue from the year ending March 2012 was £352 million. The **"small"** FOBT betting shop revenue growth is greater than the total arcade revenue and greater than the total combined revenues of bingo and casino gaming machines over the same period.

At **point 32**, DCMS acknowledges that increasing or decreasing stake and prize limits for certain gaming machines could affect the individual balance between the sectors. But at **point 158**, DCMS claims that there is no evidence of adult gaming centres and bingo premises losing gamblers to betting shops. DCMS is therefore willing to acknowledge something for which it says there is no evidence.

From the gambling sector aspect there would likely be an opportunity for pubs, bingo and arcades to halt the decline in machine play at their facilities, which they attribute to the presence of FOBTs in betting shops.

Gross Gaming Machine Yield by Sector:

Sector	Gross Gaming Yield (Gaming Machines)				
	2008-09	**2009-10**	**2010-11**	**2011-12**	**Change**
Arcades	480.35	456.68	392.07	351.86	-26.75%
Betting Shops	1,070.36	1,181.94	1,301.66	1,446.49	35.14%
Bingo Halls	231.54	209.43	197.46	230.37	-0.51%
Casinos	114.60	117.35	118.61	128.99	12.56%
Total	**1,896.85**	**1,965.40**	**2,009.80**	**2,157.71**	**13.75%**
Betting shop machine share of total gaming machine yield	***56.43%***	***60.14%***	***64.77%***	***67.04%***	***18.80%***
Source: Gambling Commission 2011/12 statistics[32]					

The British Beer and Pub Association, in their submission to the DCMS review of the 2005 Gambling Act[33] stated regarding competition to pub machines from FOBTs: **"the Gambling Act 2005 reinforced competition from Category B2 machines, commonly known as Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs). FOBTs have had a marked impact on Category C machine takings, enticing customers from the softer gaming environment of the pub into venues with B2 machines which offer much higher stakes and prizes."**

During the run-up to the introduction of the Gambling Act, the BBPA predicted that the Act would produce a significant loss of income from pub gaming machines within five years, primarily as a result of increased completion from other forms of gambling and gaming (particularly B2 machines). Unfortunately this looks to have been proved as: **"total sector turnover has decreased by approximately £110m since the introduction of the Act, and overall it has been reduced from over £1bn in 2001 to less than £800m at the current time."**

According to recent BBPA data (**point 20** in the DCMS evidence base) there has been a further decline of £200 million to £600 million per year as of the year ending March 2011.

At **point 93 DCMS**, referring to casinos, recognises that it is incongruous that machines offering games based on roulette or blackjack are limited in stakes and prizes but are next to the same product, namely automated table games, with no restrictions on stakes and prizes.

The games on B1 are not the same product as casino games. The only casino games on machines in casinos are on FOBTs. There are only 43 FOBTs in total in all casinos, as casinos have ample roulette product without the need to offer FOBTs. DCMS ignores the real incongruity which is that around 34,000 FOBTs in betting shops offer stakes up to £100 when all other machine maximum stakes are £2.

At **point 99**, DCMS acknowledges the importance of FOBTs to betting shop viability and notes the decline in other revenues. However if betting shops need FOBTs to be viable then they are not genuine and viable betting businesses and are in breach of licence, as betting should be the primary gambling activity.

At **point 101**, DCMS asserts that there is "no evidence" linking FOBTs to problem gambling. This is incorrect for two reasons. Firstly, there is ample anecdotal evidence. Secondly, there is also ***Empirical Evidence*** identified under that heading in this document, evidence that is publicly available.
At **point 145**, DCMS ignores consumer costs as they are "taken to equal the level of consumer benefit". This methodology ignores the fact that problem gambler losses create the opposite of consumer benefit.

The Responsible Gambling Strategy Board (RGSB)

The RGSB is funded by the Gambling Commission. Brian Pommeroy, the retiring Chair as of April 1st, was previously Chair of the Gambling Commission. The new Chair, Sir Christopher Kelly, was appointed by the Gambling Commission.

The following individuals are members of the RGSB:

- Christopher Bell was Chief Executive of Ladbrokes from 2003 to 2010. He is also Vice Chair of the Association of British Bookmakers. Christopher Bell sits on the Expert Research Panel.
- Russell Hoyle, was Chair of Inspired Gaming Group, an FOBT supplier, until 2010. Inspired was sold to Vitruvian in 2010. Russell Hoyle then became a Special Partner in Vitruvian.
- David Miers was a Special Advisor to the Joint Committee on the Draft Gambling Bill, the instrument that preceded the 2005 Gambling Act that legitimised FOBTs. David Miers is the Chair of the Expert Research Panel.

The Responsible Gambling Trust (RGT)

The Responsible Gambling Trust (RGT) is gambling sector funded. Primary funders are bookmakers in the ABB.

The following individuals are members of the RGT:

- Chair Neil Goulden is also Chair of the ABB and Chairman Emeritus of Gala Coral. Professor Jim Orford of Gambling Watch UK has called for the resignation of Neil Goulden as RGT Chair[34a], based on a statement made by Neil Goulden published on the Politics Home website[34b]. Furthermore, Neil Goulden, as Chair of the ABB, has presided over the ABB disseminating misleading statements about the Campaign, as identified already in this document.
- Trustee Carl Leaver is the Group Chief Executive of Gala Coral.
- Trustee Richard Glynn, Chief Executive of Ladbrokes, is reported to be in line for a very substantial bonus if Ladbrokes' share price is above a certain level at a certain date[34c]. Ladbrokes have also published misleading information on their corporate website about the Campaign for Fairer Gambling.
- Trustee Gerald Sutcliffe MP was the DCMS minister Responsible for Gambling at time of the 2007 enactment of the 2005 Gambling Act. Despite a Scoping Study into the impact of the Act suggesting FOBTs be "closely monitored"[34d], DCMS monitoring of FOBTs was never conducted. Gerald Sutcliffe MP was also a member of the DCMS select committee, which recommended increasing the allowed number of FOBTs per betting shop.
- Marc Etches, the RGT Chief Executive, was previously an advocate for super-casinos. He claimed that certain machines should not be widespread because of the potential for harm to vulnerable persons. This clearly shows that Marc Etches understands that problem gambling is, at least in part, product related.
- Jonathan Parke, the Director of Commissioning, was a co-editor of the Routledge International Handbook of Internet Gambling, published in 2012. A chapter he co-contributed to identifies the ***Empirical Evidence One*** research as identified in this document. But the RGT has not publicly recognised this research.

Future B Machine Research

The RGSB has recommended research into all B machines, including B3 machines with stakes up to £2 maximum and B machines in arcade, bingo and casino premises in addition to betting shops. So this is not FOBT research itself, although the only research that is of interest from the Review implementation perspective is the non-B3 content on FOBTs.

The RGT will commission the research as recommended by the RGSB. The proposed time-scale of this B machine research is that a final delivery of the results is unlikely to be until late 2014 at the earliest.

The RGSB has failed to make any recommendations to investigate the amounts lost by problem gamblers by activity or the percentage of losses relative to total losses at an activity. It has also failed to make any recommendation to investigate if there is any association of problem gambling by gambling activity, using a controlled involvement methodology. These are the subject matters of the ***Empirical Evidence*** in this submission.

With the existing ***Empirical Evidence,*** no dedicated FOBT-only research and no guarantee of unbiased B machine research, any delay on Review action on FOBTs by DCMS is inexcusable.

ABB influence over research

The two independent bodies associated with recommending and commissioning research have so far avoided any specific research into FOBTs only. They have also avoided publicly mentioning the ***Empirical Evidence*** that they are aware of.

These two bodies collectively include the Chair of the ABB, the Vice-Chair of the ABB, senior executives from leading ABB companies, a Special Partner in the owner of an FOBT supplier and an MP who is an FOBT advocate. Furthermore, the Vice Chair of the ABB sits on the Machines Expert Panel.

With this level of ABB influence over the research bodies there cannot possibly be any guarantee that the current and future B machine research can have any meaningful value.

Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle of good governance requires the removal of a product suspected of harm and then conducting the appropriate research. DCMS are ignoring this principle in recommending the status quo for B2s. Hugh Robertson, the Minister responsible for gambling at DCMS, referenced this principle on his website following his debut speech at the Dispatch Box.

Hugh Robertson has said in Parliament that he would act if there was evidence. The ***Empirical Evidence*** we identify in this document is irrefutable. The government must act responsibly and place the maximum restrictions that are possible without primary legislation on betting shop FOBTs.

Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling

Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling in Response to Philip Davies MP's Complaint to the ASA

On the 6th December 2012, the Campaign was the subject of a complaint by Philip Davies MP to the Advertising Standards Authority relating to advertisements it had taken out in The House magazine.

The complaint objected to a number of assertions the Campaign had made relating to FOBTs, including the following statements:

- "FOBTs… are the scourge of the high street"
- "FOBTs with their addictive roulette content"
- "FOBTs… have since [the Gambling Act 2005] multiplied to such an extent that they are now known as 'the crack cocaine of gambling'"
- "Now is the time to take a stand on FOBTs and protect the thousands of families who fall foul of FOBT addiction each year"
- "The reason so many new betting shops are opening on our high streets is to offer more FOBTs on which it is possible to stake up to £100 every 20 seconds. It is now time to act to protect poorer communities during a time of recession"

The Campaign has responded to the complaint and submitted the evidence as disclosed in [Appendix L]. The ASA has not yet resolved the complaint and at the time of the advertisement, The Campaign had not yet discovered the ***Empirical Evidence*** documents.

This ASA evidence supports this submission to the Triennial Review by providing comprehensive historical evidence that informs the Campaign's position on FOBTs.

Recent media stories regarding FOBTs and problem gambling

A problem gambler in Norwich, blamed bookmaker tournaments and free plays for his addiction[35]. Similarly, a semi-professional footballer lost £12,000 of his fiancée's money through an addiction to FOBTs [36] and a problem gambler took part in a hunger strike to draw attention to those affected by betting shops and FOBTs[37].

Parliamentary concern regarding FOBTs and problem gambling

An Early Day Motion was submitted by 39 Members of Parliament on 5th February 2013 stating[38]: **"That this House is concerned at the spread of fixed odds betting terminals (FOBTs) in betting shops and that £40 billion a year is now gambled and re-gambled on them; notes that most money is paid into machines in poorer areas of the country, accounting for 50 per cent of the profits of betting shops; is disappointed that the present Government scrapped the British Gambling Prevalence Survey set up as part of the Gambling Act 2005; and calls on the Government to restore a national gambling survey, funded by the gambling industry, to monitor and combat addiction, to strengthen local authority control over planning consent for betting shops by introducing a separate use class for them, to reduce the limits on the number of FOBTs and to reduce the maximum permitted individual stake that can be gambled on them."**

It has been shown that expenditure per head on FOBTs is closely related to the availability of FOBTs in the community[39]. This appears to be related to variations in the constraints placed upon such gambling by geography, society and regulation. On the basis of individual data the proportion of the population playing FOBTs, the median expenditure on FOBTs, the frequency of use of FOBTs and the duration of use of FOBTs are all positive related to the density of FOBTs in the local population.

Anecdotal Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling

Since the launch of our stopthefobts.org website we have been receiving testimonial evidence from problem gamblers and bookmaking industry employees. Many of these contacts, due to either the implications of their addiction or concerns about their employment, have provided their name and contact details to us and permission to use their testimonials, but with the guarantee of anonymity.

A selection of these testimonials are attached in [Appendix M] as further anecdotal evidence of the impact FOBTs have, firstly on players and secondly on those working within the industry.

GamCare Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling

Gamcare, the industry sponsored support and advice service for problem gamblers, recently published their 2011/12 call statistics[40]. They show how prominent problem gambling callers are in younger age groups as follows:

- 66% of all callers under the age of 35
- 33% of all callers under the age of 25

The two most prominent gambling locations for problem gambling activity calls to Gamcare are betting shops 46% and internet 34%. This should come as no surprise as these two sectors were not regulated until the 2007 implementation of the 2005 Gambling Act. These statistics show dramatically how the Act has failed to deliver the licensing objective in these areas.

Gamcare identifies 13 different gambling activities. The following table shows the three most prominent gambling activities of problem gambling calls to Gamcare.

Problem Gambling Calls to Gamcare helpline 2011-12:

Type of gambling activity	All locations	In betting shops as a % of all locations	In betting shops
Betting	34%	54%	18%
FOBTs/roulette machine	28%	90%	25%
Fruit/slot machine	17%	90%	15%

So by activity and location, the most prominent activity of problem gambling callers were FOBTs/roulette machines in betting shops at 25%. Yet this is not the full picture. There are virtually no fruit/slot machines in betting shops other than FOBTs. With the B3 content on FOBTs having more actual choice of games than the B2 content, it would be very easy for a gambler to define an FOBT as fruit/slot machine, even if the main game played on it was roulette. Taking the 90% of fruit/slot machine calls from betting shops, results in 15% of calls

also being related to FOBTs. The conclusion is that 40% of problem gambler calls to Gamcare result from FOBTs in betting shops.

Concern about the increasing prevalence of problem gambling related to FOBTs was first highlighted by Gamcare in 2005, just three years after their introduction. In a report by the Guardian[41], Peter Collins, then Chair of Gamcare, said: **"Our counsellors are receiving a significant numbers of calls from people who indicate they have developed a problem in betting shops since the introduction of FOBTs. We are not in a panic. But there is a concern."**

This was at the same time that bookmakers were saying there was no evidence that FOBTs are associated with problem gambling.

In 2004, Gamcare produced advice to readers on its website[42].
"One significant difference to fruit machines is that if you want to stop playing and cash in you do not collect money directly from the machine. Instead a ticket is printed displaying the remaining credit (plus or minus any winnings or losses), which you then take to the shop counter to exchange. It is possible that this increases the likelihood that you will gamble until all your money has been lost."

A Gamcare counsellor interviewed by Ipswich Star this year[43] said the following: **"These machines have a very high capacity to become compulsive. Because people win very quickly they are more likely to put their winnings straight back into the machine. People lose touch with reality, they don't realise how much they are spending."**
The article goes on to state that **"of her client case load, which fluctuates between 35 and 40 people in Ipswich and Lowestoft, most have a problem with these machines [FOBTs]."**

Gamcare estimate that the cost to the economy of problem gambling is £3.6 billion per annum, based on an estimated average annual social cost per problem gambler of around £8,000 per year[44] and using the 2011 prevalence figure of 450,000 problem gamblers. Recently appointed President of Gamcare, Lord Sharman in said in a speech to Gamcare conference in November 2012[45]:

"Leaders need to make difficult judgements. Not all – indeed not many – will be informed by <u>definitive</u> evidence. The "evidence-based decision-making" mantra can too easily become the refuge of the indecisive or the cowardly. Before calling for

more evidence, for costly and time-consuming research, there are I believe three key questions to be answered: Are the questions or issues being researched of sufficient importance to affect the decision? Is the research capable of providing definitive answers to these questions? Is there the will to take the action consistent with the findings, regardless of which way they point?"

When considering the proposed research into Category B machines in relation to FOBTs, the answer to those three questions is "**No**".

The NatCen Evidence of Problem Gambling

Research entitled "Examining machine gambling in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey" was commissioned by the Gambling Commission and conducted by NatCen[46]. The NatCen research was co-authored by Heather Wardle, who also co-authored the ***Empirical Evidence Two*** research. The NatCen research identifies the ***Empirical Evidence One*** research but does not elaborate on its findings. The NatCen research identifies and attributes three Gambling Commission employees for their "comments and contributions throughout the project".

It also includes a summary of machines in bookmakers and the most significant evidence-based comments are: **"The changing profile of those who play machines in bookmakers has some (potentially) important implications for responsible gambling strategies. Typically those who are younger, receive lower incomes or who are unemployed are more vulnerable to gambling related harm. This reflects the changing profile of that group."**

However the NatCen research then makes a non-evidence-based policy recommendation as follows. "Therefore the profile of those who play machines in bookmakers should continue to be monitored."

However, an evidence-based policy recommendation should be: **"Sensible restrictions should be applied to machines in betting shops to comply with the licensing objective of prevention of harm to the young and vulnerable."**

In summary the NatCen evidence, commissioned by the Gambling Commission, and based on the BGPS, did not reveal any of the evidence revealed by the ***Empirical Evidence*** disclosed on the following page.

Empirical Evidence One – Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling

Based on the 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS), a piece of research was published in the European Journal of Public Health in August 2011 entitled **"Disordered gambling and gambling involvement in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2007"**[47]. This information was published online on 5 November, 2009.

The research compared the fifteen activities in the BGPS 2007 including FOBTs. Under the section Measures, it called FOBTs "**virtual gaming machines (e.g. virtual roulette, keno, bingo etc) at a bookmaker's location."**

The section headed "Discussion" states that "**Virtual gaming machines had the strongest association with gambling related problems**. " The level of association is identified as being **four-fold.**

In July 2010, a summary of this research entitled **The WAGER, Vol.15(5) – The 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey: Considering Gambling Involvement**[48] was published by the **Brief Addiction Science Information Source (BASIS) under The Division of on Addiction, Cambridge Health Alliance**, a Harvard Medical School teaching affiliate. This information was published online on 16th June 2010.

The section headed "Results" contained two sentences of which one was: "**When controlling for involvement, gambling via virtual gaming machine (e.g. virtual roulette, virtual bingo, virtual keno) was the only gambling type that remained significantly and positively associated with disordered gambling."**

To clarify this, of the fifteen different British gambling activities**, FOBTs is the only gambling activity significantly and positively associated with disordered gambling,** but where "positively" means "definitely" not "favourably" [Appendix N].

Empirical Evidence Two – Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling

Based on the 2010 BGPS, a piece of research was conducted entitled **"What proportion of Gambling is Problem Gambling? Estimates from the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey"**[49].

It was co-authored by Heather Wardle, Jim Orford and Mark Griffiths. Heather Wardle was also a co-author of the NatCen research commissioned by the Gambling Commission. The Gambling Commission and the RGSB have had access to this research.

A summary of the research entitled **"People with Gambling Problems are Making a Massive Contribution to Gambling Profits"** was written by Jim Orford of Gambling Watch UK, a co-author of the research, and published online on 24 August 2012[50].

This research compared fifteen different gambling activities, and estimated that **the percentage of FOBT losses from problem gamblers was 23%.** This is over **double** the estimated percentage of losses by problem gamblers at other leading collated gambling activities.

It also estimated that the actual amount **lost on FOBTs by problem gamblers in 2010 was at least £297 million**. This is a greater amount than the estimated losses by problem gamblers on several other leading gambling activities combined [Appendix N].

Economic Evidence of FOBT impacts

The purpose of the Triennial Review in respect of FOBTs was to enable consideration of FOBT problem gambling. Now that the ABB knows that the public are aware of the empirical evidence of FOBT problem gambling that must be considered, their last line of defence is to cite a supposed economic benefit of FOBTs.

There are a number of sources of economic information about the betting sector. These are from respected independent sources such as Mintel and Deloitte. However these are broad-brush pictures of the betting sector as a whole, including remote (internet, online and mobile) betting and offshore telephone betting. Therefore they are not focussed on the subject matter of machines, or more specifically the type of content on machines.

Regarding British problem gambling, there is a dearth of research analysing the socio-economic cost. With the total revenue from FOBTs exceeding any other licensed gambling activity, the demographic of FOBT gamblers being accented towards young, unemployed or low income males and the evidence of FOBT problem gambling, it is possible to infer a latent socio-economic cost of FOBT gambling.

Using the Gamcare statistic obtained from a US average cost of £8,000 per year per problem gambler, an estimate of only 100,000 FOBT problem gamblers equates to a FOBT socio-economic cost of £800 million. Taking the minimum Gamcare statistic of 25% of problem gambling callers being FOBT gamblers, and a base of at least 450,000 problem gamblers from the BGPS 2010, there is now likely to be far more than 110,000 FOBT problem gamblers.

But this is only part of the picture. If the funds lost by gamblers on FOBTs were used locally through other economic activities then there would be different economic consequences. Governments use this type of analysis all the time to construct budgets – if a pound is spent on one activity it cannot be spent on another activity. The British public understands all too well how these decisions impact them in their daily lives. It is therefore important to consider this when properly analysing the impact of FOBTs.

Economic Report – Evidence of the Economic Costs of FOBTs

This is the main subject matter of a report entitled: **“The Economic Impact of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals”** [Appendix O]. This report was commissioned by the Campaign, and conducted by Howard Reed of Landman Economics, whose credentials are highlighted in [Appendix P].

The report concludes: **"The most important finding from this report is that increases in spending on FOBTs are likely to destroy jobs in the UK economy rather than create them. For every additional £1 billion spent on FOBTs, an estimated 7,000 jobs are created in the gambling industry. However, at the same time consumer spending on goods and services falls by £1 billion, which reduces employment in other industries by around 20,000. The reason for this is that FOBTs are a very "labour unintensive" form of consumer spending."**

Additional important findings of the report are as follows:

£1 of expenditure on FOBTs supports fewer jobs than the “average” £1 of consumer expenditure, an increase in spending on FOBTs *will reduce overall employment and economic activity*.

FOBTs deliver particularly high profits for bookmaking firms because wage costs required to support FOBTs are so low relative to the amount of revenue that they generate. Furthermore, the jobs created in the UK betting sector are on average lower paid than jobs created by consumer expenditure on other goods and services.

Over a ten year period, the impact of the expansion of FOBTs in terms of reduced wage payments to people working in the local economies where FOBTs are established is to reduce the total wage bill in these areas by around £650 million by 2023/24.

Responses to DCMS consultation questions

Responses to DCMS consultation questions

The Campaign for Fairer Gambling has provided responses for questions 2, 3, 13 and 14. All of the previous supporting text and evidence should also be considered as being part of these answers.

Question 2: The government would like to hear about any types of consumer protection measures that have been trialled internationally, which have been found to be most effective and whether there is any consensus in international research as to the most effective forms of machine-based interventions. The government would also like to hear views about any potential issues around data protection and how these might be addressed.

DCMS interest in international measures of gambling consumer protection is in marked contrast to DCMS interest in international problem gambling socio-economic research. At **point 177** of the impact assessment DCMS, on advice from the Gambling Commission, criticises international research as not being applicable or transferable to a British context.

The same impact assessment references the Scottish Executive[51] which concluded that: **"Availability and convenience are strongly associated with problem gambling. Electronic gaming machines (EGMs) that are located outside casinos and are widely dispersed throughout the community in bars, hotels and clubs can encourage impulsive gambling and are associated with the highest rates of problem gambling worldwide."**

FOBTs are both very convenient and accessible, with numbers approaching 34,000 across 9,128 betting shops[21]. The contrasting approach taken by DCMS to when taking different forms of evidence into consideration reflects an inconsistency that implies a reluctance to utilise the full regulatory scope that is required. There is ample evidence, particularly relating to problem gambling, which would justify the removal of B2 content from FOBTs in order to prevent harm.

There is also a great deal of international research that shows mixed results for machine based interventions. A study carried out in Australia in 2009[52] reached the following conclusion: **"while the use of signs placed on electronic gaming machines as part of a responsible gambling campaign fulfils all the recommendations of both legislators and industry, it is unlikely to prove effective as a harm minimisation strategy."**

Bookmakers may try and portray an increased level of social responsibility by introducing voluntary time and stake restrictions, as Ladbrokes announced last year. The success of this would be similar to the bookmakers' introduction of a voluntary self-exclusion policy which even they now admit is flawed.

Paddy Power on their website resources display an article[53] entitled: "The truth about Roulette Machines", which states: **"Roulette machines, however, are designed to be addictive and they are designed to take your cash."**

Question 3: The government would like to hear from gambling businesses, including operators, manufacturers and suppliers, as to whether they would be prepared to in the future develop tracking technology in order to better utilise customer information for player protection purposes in exchange for potentially greater freedoms around stake and prize limits.

There is very little point in tracking technology to collate information if this information is not then correctly utilised. According to Jim Ryan (the ex-CEO of Bwin.Party) the company has around a million unique players a month. The software analysis identified an average of 71 problem gamblers a month. But in the knowledge that problem gamblers are nominally 1% of gamblers, it should have identified at least 10,000 problem gamblers per month. Quite simply the software was designed to identify a minimal number of problem gamblers, which enabled Bwin.Party to claim that they are espousing greater social responsibility without jeopardising their profits from problem gamblers.

Unlike online operators, the tracking of FOBT gamblers is inherently difficult due to the cash nature of their operation and relies on the uptake of loyalty card schemes, which are designed by bookmakers as a reward and spend driver. The actual tracking of gamblers once signed up, and detection of problem gambling patterns, becomes another resource cost to the bookmaker at the same time jeopardising 23%[50] of their established income.

DCMS cannot rely on operators self-policing problem gambling. This is just a recipe for failure.

Question 13. The government is calling for evidence on the following points:

- ***a) Does the overall stake and prize limit for B2 machines, in particular the very wide range of staking behaviour that a £100 stake allows, give rise to or encourage a particular risk of harm to people who cannot manage their gambling behaviour effectively?***
- ***b) If so, in what way?***
- ***c) Who stakes where, what are the proportions, what is the average stake?***

These three questions are addressed in the entirety of this consultation response, however the Campaign obviously does not have the same access to data that the bookmakers do.

At a minimum, to answer this question, the bookmakers should provide the following information in their consultation responses. The figures should represent a period of time, such as a year, or on an average per day basis.

Table 1: Figures that bookmakers' should provide in their Q13 response:

Figures to be provided by bookmakers	Totals
Total funds placed into FOBT machines	
Total turnover on FOBT machines	
Total profit on FOBT machines	

With the Table 2 statistics below, using the known spin speed rates, statistics for each content type can easily be calculated to provide the Table 3 statistics. Hour utilised is not the hours the machine is open it is the hours that gambling activity is taking place on the machine.

Table 2: Figures that bookmakers' should provide in their Q13 response:

Figures to be provided by the bookmakers:	Content				
	B3	**Non-B3**	**Roulette**	**Non-roulette/ Non-B3**	**All**
Turnover					
Profit					
Average amount per spin					
Average number of spins					

Table 3: Figures that bookmakers' should provide in their Q13 response:

Figures to be provided by the bookmakers:	Content				
	B3	**Non-B3**	**Roulette**	**Non-roulette/ Non-B3**	**All**
Hours per machine utilised per day					
Turnover per hour utilised					
Profit per hour utilised					
Funds placed into machine per hour utilised					

In the event that the betting sector does not volunteer to provide the above data in Review submissions, there cannot be any confidence whatsoever in the proposed B machine research which, in the initial phase, is based on data collection.

Bookmakers have previously provided figures that are misleading. Although they have stated what the average wager amount is on FOBTs, because B3 wagers are a £2 maximum this reduces the total average wager amount and gives a false impression of a lower average wager on roulette, or B2 casino content, than is the case. They have also stated what the average amount lost per machine per hour is, but because they include all hours the machine is operational, rather than only the time the machine is utilised, this gives a false impression of gamblers losing at a lower rate than is the case.

The demographic attracted to FOBTs is disproportionately young males (16-34), either unemployed or on low income, and more likely to be in poorer areas. The proportion of the 16-34 group using FOBTs is increasing. NatCen research based on the 2007 and 2010 BGPS[54] concluded there has been an increase from 9% to 14% within the 16-34 groups. This is accompanied by a decline of 12% to 5% for the same group on traditional slot machines in locations other than bookmakers.

This profile is more likely to have a misplaced desire or perception that gambling can be an easy way to make money. The ability to trade up the stake feeds into the money-making perception. The ability to trade-up the stake is most relevant on roulette, which for many years accounted for well over 90% of FOBT turnover and profit.

With the introduction of more B3 games onto the platform there is an increase in B3 play on FOBTs. But over 80% of the profit is still derived from roulette, and roulette turnover still close to 90% (the roulette house advantage at 2.7% for the original FOBT versions is less than typical B3 house advantages).

Although there could be over 70 different games on FOBTs, of which say ten could be roulette variations, the vast majority of wagers will be staked on a few 2.7% roulette variations. Some of the less popular roulette variations have higher house advantages by incorporating extra bet or bonus features.

If the gambler wants an opportunity for a maximum payout of £500, the B3 content provides that opportunity at a maximum stake of £2. If the gambler wants a maximum payout of £500 on roulette, the wager required is £13.85 on a single number with a total payback of £498.60.

Observation has shown that very few players ever bet the maximum amount per number and that players are very unlikely to bet on just one number. Therefore maximising the win in one spin is not a B2 roulette player objective.

The novice FOBT gambler will be inclined to gamble on roulette first. It is an easy game with no skill in either number or outside bet selection. But the entry level stake of £1 or £2 per spin is soon likely to be increased with familiarity. So the novice player betting initially either red or black or a few numbers is tempted to trade up to betting more numbers. There is also a propensity to wager more on some numbers than others, another wager trade-up feature. There is the illusion of skill and control in picking numbers and in referencing previous winning numbers.

So far, many of the above comments could also apply to live casino table game roulette. It should be however understood that roulette is only around 65% of casino table game turnover, so the FOBT gambler is far more focused on roulette than the casino gambler. It is important to note also that the pace of the game at a live casino table game is far slower than on FOBTs. FOBTs allow spins every 20 seconds, equivalent to 180 spins per hour. Some casinos offer automated roulette, which has a mechanical ball and wheel procedure. These are set at 50 spins per hour. Virtually every casino has roulette terminals linked to live table roulette, so they are at the same speed as the live table.

A typical live roulette game might, in some cases, be quicker than 60 spins per hour with only one player, but with a full table of six or seven players, this speed could reduce to as low as 30 spins per hour. Obviously the majority of casino players experience the slower game pace as they are more likely to be playing when other players are playing. Taking 45 spins per hour as an average it can be argued that B2 roulette with 180 spins per hour is 4.5 times faster than live casino roulette.

The consequence is that the FOBT roulette gambler playing the same stakes as a casino roulette gambler loses at a rate 4.5 times faster. The demographic of the FOBT roulette gambler is likely to be poorer than the demographic of the casino roulette gambler.

One of the main attractions that machine gamblers look for is something known as “time on device”. Both the fast pace and the higher-staking propensity each diminish the time on device for the FOBT roulette gambler. This helps to explain the frustration FOBT roulette gamblers feel and the associated abuse of staff and damage to machines and premises.

In addition, there are a number of other comparative factors that are relevant. The casino live table game roulette player has greater engagement than with just the game. There is an ability to look around the casino when seated at the table, converse with other players and converse with the dealers and staff. The act of placing a variety of wagers on the table wheel is part of the activity.

There is also longer time between spins to make the decision to quit. The decision to change your money up for chips also requires a break in play, which allows the player time to think. There is a view of a shared horizontal spin of the ball and wheel, but often with imperfect sightlines.

By contrast the FOBT roulette gambler is facing a wall focussed solely on the machine. There is minimal interaction with other gamblers and often no interaction with staff. The touch screen wagering and repeat wager buttons allow wagers to be completed very quickly.

The spin of the ball and the wheel is on the vertical screen directly in sight, unlike live roulette, this does not represent a real roulette wheel spin. The random number generator has predetermined the result prior to the spin starting, as soon as the player presses “bet”.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this methodology, but the consequence is that some gamblers have a perception of near-misses by observing the spins, and for some gamblers near-misses can be as stimulating as wins. So this “entertainment” feature is actually a driver of continued play, and is referenced in “The Psychology of the Near Miss”[55] which says*:* **“Near misses are widely believed to encourage future play even in games of chance where the probability of winning remains constant, particularly instant lotteries and slot machines, are contrived to ensure a higher frequency of near misses than would be expected by chance alone”.**

Taking into consideration the speed on FOBT roulette is 4.5 faster than an average casino table roulette game, there is less opportunity to decide to stop.
Roulette is a fascinating game in that it allows the gambler to choose their hit frequency. By observation, the typical minimum numbers wagered is around five or six, being a hit win

frequency of around 15%. The absolutely irrational roulette wager spread is to have a 100% hit frequency by wagering on every number, which would produce a guaranteed loss of 2.7% per spin. One might argue that the more numbers that a gambler bets, the more likely it is that the gambling is disordered. By observation, FOBT roulette players are typically wagering on around twelve to twenty-four numbers per spin.

The concept of a non-win hit frequency is facilitated by roulette. A gambler with an outlay of £36 in total could have £1 on a winning number resulting in a payback of £36 so breaking level. The concept of a losing hit frequency is a similar illustration, but where the gambler has wagered a total amount of, for example, £54 but only has £1 on the winning number, and therefore experiences a loss of £18 despite having a winning number. For gamblers with a variety of wagers and a variety of wager amounts, hit frequency is far higher than win frequency. This encourages repetitive wagering and is facilitated by the “repeat bet” button, which does not require the gambler to re-stake their previous wager on the board.

A reasonable estimate of the total average roulette wager per spin is now close to £15, which is around £45 per minute or £2,700 per hour. Therefore the average profit per hour, based on a 2.7% house advantage, is now around £73. Based on only 90 minutes roulette play, profits from roulette players are around £110 per day per FOBT. This focus shows how few players are creating so much FOBT profits in so little time.

Profit of around £110 per day on roulette translates to a total profit of over £135 per day per FOBT, when the other content is taken into account.

Proponents of FOBTs will argue that the stake of £15 per spin every 20 seconds is similar to a B3 outlay. B3 games are set to be able to spin every 2.5 seconds, the equivalent of eight spins per 20 seconds. Wagers can be far lower than £2, but a maximum stake B3 player is therefore wagering £16 per 20 seconds.

But during those eight spins there will have been multiple small payback opportunities. Based on the general margin that B3 content operates at (between 8% and 12%) it is feasible that £14 of the £16 staked would be returned in small wins. This also explains why bookmakers encourage staff to get B3 players to make way for higher staking roulette gamblers. It was also the driver behind their request to have more terminals per shop. They could then isolate B3 content on stand-alone terminals therefore maximizing revenue from the more profitable higher staking roulette games.

The average stake FOBT roulette gambler has far greater funds at risk than a maximum stake B3 gambler. Furthermore, the average stake FOBT roulette gambler needs far more funds to start with than the maximum stake B3 gambler. So whilst some gamblers will gamble on both activities, roulette has far greater demand on gambler funds than the B3 content.

The operator experience is that FOBT payback is 97% because the operator can look at turnover and profit. The gambler experience is different though, as the gambler does not know or record the turnover.

The return of stake payback is not experienced by the gambler as a 97% payback. The gamblers will re-bet stakes or winnings returned from one spin to the next. In this respect the payback becomes 97% of 97% of 97% and so on, if returns are available and are re-bet.

Similarly the operator experience is that the FOBT retention is around 18% of funds placed in FOBTs, equating to an average of 82% of funds being returned to the player. This figure is calculated based on Ladbrokes Annual Report[14] and Tote Sport FOBT estate figures 2009. In 2009 Tote Sport FOBTs returned a margin based on stakes of 3.12% with a retention of 16.77%. In 2012, Ladbrokes reported a margin based on stakes of 3.44%. An increase in the margin reflects an increased retention; using the Tote Sport margin to retention ratio it is feasible that Ladbrokes' retention is now in excess of 18%.

Just as the gambler experience of return of stake payback is different to the operator, the return of funds payback is also a different experience, as the 82% applies to a session per FOBT. A gambler cashing out on a FOBT, but then gambling with returned funds on another FOBT, experiences a return on funds of 82% of 82%. It does not matter whether this is the same FOBT, another FOBT in the same shop, or a FOBT in another shop. A composite experience of all FOBT gamblers having four different FOBT sessions within a period of FOBT gambling is a return on funds of 82% of 82% of 82% of 82%, equating to 45% of funds.

In this context it is clear that the clustering of betting shops in close proximity in central easy access locations encourages FOBT gamblers to have multiple FOBT sessions. There is no data source that can measure this behaviour. The only appropriate methodology would be to carry out detailed survey questioning of FOBT gamblers.

d) What characteristics or behaviours might distinguish between high spending players and those who are really at risk?

The BGPS defines gamblers losing over £61.50 per month, with a mean loss of nearly £210 per month, as being in the top 10% of gamblers by spend and the most at-risk gamblers. With the average FOBT roulette estimated loss rate of around £73 per hour, the average stake FOBT roulette gambler, spending three hours per month gambling at a loss of £219 per month, is on a par with the mean loss of the at-risk gambler. Also a daily average stake FOBT roulette gambler gambling only six minutes per day and losing an average of only £7.30 per day is similarly on a par with the mean loss of the at-risk gambler.

The BGPS also defines gamblers spending over seven hours a month or more gambling, with a mean hours spent gambling per month of 31 hours, as being in the top 10% of gamblers by time and as being at-risk gamblers. The average stake FOBT roulette gambler spending 7 hours a month gambling and losing £73 per hour would be losing £511 per month, whereas the average stake FOBT roulette gambler spending the mean at-risk time gambling of 31 hours per month would be losing £2,263 per month.

The BGPS noted that the top 10% of each of the at-risk categories by loss and time contained 4% that were not in the other category and, therefore, 6% were in both categories. It is very likely that the majority of the mean and higher gamblers in each category are in the top 6% at-risk by both measures. But there is a startling difference between the average stake FOBT gambler producing a mean monthly loss of £219, and a mean by time of £2,263. This contrast is primarily reflective of how fast FOBT roulette losses are compared to other gambling activities. (The mean loss by stake and the mean loss by time, over the same period, of all at-risk gamblers by all activities would be far closer to parity.)

Based on an approximate adult population of 50 million and the participation of FOBT gambling of 4% there are an estimated two million FOBT gamblers. With Gambling Commission statistics showing FOBT profits of £1,447 million in year ending March 2012, this produces an average FOBT gambler loss of over £720 per year. This equates to over £60 per month, placing an average loss FOBT gambler at the entry level to the at-risk by loss criteria. **There is no gambling activity licensed by the Gambling Commission that has a higher loss per gambler than FOBTs.**

The broad reality is that ultimately all B2 roulette gamblers are at risk. The content is very compelling and can convert an infrequent betting shop visitor into a regular gambler. Many gamblers can handle gambling losses for a period of time, but there are too many potential catalysts that can trigger the switch to problem gambling. Loss of a job, bereavement, relationship breakdowns and illness are just some examples. Similarly a current high-spend gambler can just as easily be affected by such life-style changes, particularly economic ones.

Some problem gamblers look like infrequent high-stake gamblers. This is because they have a degree of control for a period of time allowing them to build their funds. When the control slips they are just as able to lose far more in a session as would be the case if they were everyday problem gamblers.

Campaign Consultant Adrian Parkinson saw the identification of problem gamblers that were previously viewed as high spending players in 2006, with the introduction of voluntary self-exclusion. Players who were manually tracked for high spend or wins and perceived as high rollers, started to self-exclude because they were in fact problem gamblers.

e) If there is evidence to support a reduction in the stake and/or prize limits for B2 machines, what would an appropriate level to achieve the most proportionate balance between risk of harm and responsible enjoyment of this form of gambling?

All the evidence disclosed conclusively demonstrates the dangers of gambling on B2 content. The Campaign position is that there is no scope for compromise. B2 FOBT content should be restricted to £2 per spin in line with all other category B machines. There is evidence that at least 23%[50] of revenue from FOBTs is derived from problem gamblers. There is evidence that revenue is derived from the most at risk, vulnerable, low income groups [46]. Even if there is a group of B2 FOBT content players who can be identified as low frequency, such as less than once a month, and low spend, such as less than a £100 per year loss, they are not involved in the activity enough to suggest that restricting FOBTs and the opportunity to partake in B2 gambling might be considered removing their enjoyment.

f) What impact would this have in terms of risks to problem gambling?

The restriction of B2 FOBT game content to £2 per spin would result in a reduction in levels of problem gambling. Some B2 revenue would be re-distributed to traditional sports and race betting and B3 game content. A £2 maximum stake would result in harm minimization instantly and effectively. It is not just the problem gambler today that must be considered, it is also the future problem gambler. Research into harm minimization measures in Australia comments in its summary of measures: **"There is some evidence that the following change to electronic gaming machines could have a substantial impact on the harm caused by excessive involvement: (h) reduction of the maximum bet size for any one game".**

g) What impact (positive and negative) would there be in terms of high street betting shops?

From a crime perspective there would be a decline in criminal damage in betting shops, and a decline in abuse of betting shop staff. There would be an elimination of the majority of money legitimisation through placing funds into machines in order to claim that funds were machine winnings. There would also be a reduction in cash-crime to obtain funds to feed FOBT addiction.

From a planning perspective there would be reduction in applications for new betting shop licences, which would appease local communities and councils, of which an increasing number are taking determined stands against the proliferation of betting shops and B2 machines. Newham[26] is just one example. Other examples include Forfar[56], Glasgow[57], Westminster City Council[58], Harrow[59], Croydon[60] and Bexhill[61]. Conservative Westminster City Council have also recently launched a task force to deal with the impact of betting shops in their borough[62].

There would still be some new applications for premises in premium high street locations due to relocation of tertiary and secondary shops. The only betting shops likely to be severely affected would be those that are in areas of high clustering such as Barking Road, Newham which has as many as 14, with an application for a 15th shop pending. Some of these shops will be very reliant on FOBT revenue and will predominantly be new licences granted within the last six years. The primary gambling activity within these shops, in terms of turnover, will be well over 83% FOBTs. Areas of high clustering are likely to be areas of high drug use, criminality and problem gambling.

Bookmakers have manipulated the semantics of the Licensing Conditions and Code of Practice to beam live racing from countries like Argentina and Brazil to justify keeping shops open later, specifically ones where they have been targeting late night worker FOBT players[63].

Combined with single manning of shops that are transacting most of their revenue on FOBTs, you have a situation where operational employees are working 12 to 14 hour days[64]. Amending the Code to stipulate UK only racing would bring betting shops once again in line with its core business, which is race and sports betting.

When FOBTs where introduced in 2002, a substitution of revenue from over the counter business to FOBTs occurred. That has been the most significant contributory factor to single-manning of betting shops. A reversal of this substitution is likely if a £2 stake cap is applied to FOBTs.

Despite the 35% growth in revenue since 2008/9 of 35%, there has been an actual decline in people employed directly in the sector.

Decline in betting sector employees:

Betting sector employees:			
2008-09	**2009-10**	**2010-11**	**2011-12**
60,247	57,319	54,129	54,449
Source: Gambling Commission Industry Data 2011/12 [32]			

Therefore there would be some betting shop closures and consolidations, but this should result in no single-manning of shops. Extra staffing, driven by increased over the counter activity would result in increased operational numbers and therefore better age and sobriety verification of gamblers.

The ABB's assertion that FOBT gambling will be conducted illegally if there are restrictions on FOBTs is firstly, incongruous with the ABB's false assertion that the Campaign founders could generate a commercial benefit from any restrictions imposed on FOBTs and secondly, it does not stand up to either historical or contemporary scrutiny.

Britain has a good record of closing down venues that facilitated illegal gambling. There were over 1,000 facilities for casino gambling prior to the introduction of the original Gambling Act in 1968, which permitted only 120 selected casinos. There was no ongoing issue of illegal casino operation.

There has never been any illegal British FOBT gambling as far as the Campaign is aware. The police, Local Authorities and the Gambling Commission are capable of addressing any illegal machine gambling.

In an existing area of betting shop clustering and high FOBT density, Green Lanes in Haringey, the Gambling Commission and Local Authority Licensing officers successfully removed illegal “black horse” gaming machines from working men’s and snooker clubs[89].

This ABB assertion exposes another contradiction. For argument’s sake, if FOBT gamblers are just casual non-addicted gamblers then there is no reason to think that they would want to gamble illegally when there are so many legal gambling opportunities. The argument that restrictions would lead to illegal use of FOBTs implicitly suggests that the product is addictive.

Question 14: a) Are there other harm mitigation measures that might offer a better targeted and more effective response to evidence of harm than reductions in stake and/or prize for B2 machines?

b) If so, what is the evidence for this and how would it be implemented?

c) Are there any other options that should be considered?

The answer to these combined questions is that there is no alternative that has any merit.

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Appendix

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C: Campaign for Fairer Gambling spreadsheet with 2011/12 analysis

D: Explanation of Campaign for Fairer Gambling analysis

E: The real truths documents

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J: American Gaming Association leaflet

K: Community Union article on impact of FOBTs

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STOP THE FOBTs
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Appendices

STOP THE FOBTs
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Appendix A

Monday, 30 December, 2002, 17:22 GMT

Bookies new betting games in court

By Laura Cummings
BBC News Online business reporter

Bookmakers and casino regulators are going to the High Court in order to decide the future of new betting terminals introduced in the wake of the government's changes to betting tax.

Bookmakers had until now been enjoying a boost to profits from new betting machines.

These allow punters to place immediate bets on races around the world - rather than simply those shown in the betting shop - as well as on a variety of games such as bingo and roulette.

The new terminals were described as a "lifesaver" by some in the betting industry, which had been hit by cancelled races and competition from new online betting sites.

But the Gaming Board, which regulates casinos and bingo halls, has suggested some of the games are too closely imitating casino games while escaping much of the regulation.

> **"The bookmaker is making it easier for a punter to lose more money, more quickly"**
>
> Andrew Burnett, Merrill Lynch

Analysts have also criticised the bookmakers for introducing more ways for customers to lose money.

'Harder gambling'

The new machines - formally known as Fixed Odds Betting Machines - can host up to six games at a time and include a number of inter-changeable betting platforms.

See also:

06 Oct 02 | Business
Is UK the new gambling capital?
15 Dec 02 | UK
Bingo 'best bet for a million'
14 Oct 02 | Business
Can bingo bounce back?
24 Jul 02 | UK
The gambling habits of Britons
28 Oct 02 | Business
Camelot 'eyes sports betting'
16 Sep 02 | Business
Tax break slows fall in pools betting

Internet links:

Gaming Board for Great Britain
British Casino Association
British Betting Office Association

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So, while one customer may bet on a horse race abroad and play a game of roulette, another may be offered a football game, bingo, and a more traditional fruit machine game.

"Our concern is that by offering coin-accepting electronic-roulette-style bets, the Licensed Betting Office is offering a 'harder' form of gambling," said analyst Andrew Burnett at Merrill Lynch.

"There are special dangers associated with machines because of their potentially addictive characteristics"

Peter Dean, Gaming Board for Great Britain

"By harder gambling, we simply mean the bookmaker is making it easier for a punter to lose more money, more quickly."

The High Court will decide whether the new games constitute 'bets' or 'games', with the latter needing more substantial control.

Lifeline

The betting industry argues that the machines provide vital funds and help remove the flat-cap image of betting shops.

Warwick Bartlett, chairman of Global Betting and Gaming Consultants, told BBC News Online:

"These new products are very important to bookmakers when racing is cancelled."

A run of bad weather and the cancellation of races because of the foot and mouth crisis severely dented bookmaker profits last year.

"Because of their overheads, bookmakers can't trade for very long without turnover," added Mr Bartlett.

Tom Kelly, the director-general of the Betting Office Licensees Association told BBC News Online that the new games as "an expanding part of the business", but said they currently represent less than 3% of bets placed.

'Breach of spirit'

The Gaming Board claims the machines are sophisticated tools, with no legal limits on prize money, which could fuel the danger of addiction in the betting world.

"Their proliferation is a breach of the spirit and intent of current legislation," said Peter Dean, chairman of the Gaming Board for Great

Britain.

Mr Dean told a recent convention of the leisure machine association, BACTA:

"There are special dangers associated with machines because of their potentially addictive characteristics."

Analysts have warned that the High Court may agree with the gaming regulator.

Mr Burnett said: "The introduction of casino-style games such as coin-operated roulette may be seen as a covert attempt by bookmakers to introduce casino-style gaming into a bookmaking environment."

"The introduction of casino-style games ...may be seen as a covert attempt by bookmakers to introduce casino-style gaming into a bookmaking environment."

Andrew Burnett

Competition

The betting industry disputes claims that the new machines, with their roulette and bingo games, are a direct threat to the gaming industry, or that they are creating a dangerous addiction.

Mr Kelly added that " a number of shops don't even have them" and that the main game at the centre of the court case is a roulette-style game.

"We are not open at the same time as casinos," said Mr Bartlett.

"And it's not as if they're in a pub - they're in betting shops, where people have already come to place a bet."

The High Court case is likely to take months or even years to resolve.

What now?

The issue centres on whether these games constitute a casino-style gaming machine.

If so, bookmakers are in danger of breaking the 1968 Gaming Act by housing such technology and staff should undergo much more rigorous training.

"This intellectual debate has the potential to remain unresolved in the courts for months," said Mr Burnett.

But in the meantime, betting shops have been asked to stop installing the new machines and their success is now limited.

"Whatever the outcome of the Gaming Board's initiative, we must put some doubt on the size, growth and endurance of FOBT (fixed odds betting terminal) revenues in the future," said Mr Burnett.

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STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

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Appendix B

Fixed Odds Betting Terminals, the Code of Practice, and problem gambling

A second report for the Association of British Bookmakers Limited

SUMMARY (SECTION 1) ONLY

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9 June 2006

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1 SUMMARY

1.1 Aims and methods of the research

1.1.1 This report was commissioned in May 2005 by the Association of British Bookmakers Limited (ABB). It is the follow-up to a substantially similar report completed in pre-publication form in December 2004 and published in April 2005.

1.1.2 The basic aims of the research this year, as it was last year, were those which ABB had agreed in 2004 with the DCMS:

> "To measure and explain levels of problem gambling amongst FOBT users, in the context of benchmarks of other gambling activities (particularly machines) both within and outside of the betting shop".
>
> "Assess the effectiveness of the FOBT Code of Practice, and the individual elements within it, in providing protection against problem gambling."

1.1.3 We have measured levels of problem gambling among FOBT users in the context of other forms of gambling inside and outside the betting shop. We have been able to compare FOBT usage with usage of fruit machines and jackpot machines. We have been able to assess what FOBT users think about the effectiveness of the provisions of the Code, and to draw conclusions from their responses.

1.1.4 The research method used this year was in all major respects the same as we used last year, and the survey work was again conducted by MORI (now Ipsos MORI). It involved Omnibus surveys to provide a gambling context across Great Britain, followed by a survey of betting shop customers to provide more detailed evidence about FOBT usage and problem gambling.

1.1.5 More specifically:

- the problem gambling screen used was identical to that which we used last year (the DSM-IV test)
- the MORI Omnibus surveys were identical in scale and scope to those conducted last year

1.1.6 The differences were that:

- we did not re-run the qualitative research (focus groups) because there was no need. Focus groups were used in the 2004 research to guide us in designing the quantitative surveys, and it had already been agreed that the 2005 surveys would be as near-identical as possible to those of 2004.
- we used a larger sample for the survey of betting shop customers, to alleviate the risk that we would have sub-samples too small for some analyses.

- the wording of questions reflected the passage of 12 months since the first round of research

- the FOBT Code of Practice had undergone minor changes.

1.1.7 None of these differences undermines comparability between the Round 1 and Round 2 research.

1.1.8 As regards the gambling landscape in Great Britain, no major new forms of gambling have emerged in the year between our Round 1 and Round 2 reports. The Omnibus survey results set out in Section 3 and Appendix 7 suggest that there has been some consumer switching between gambling forms, but not very much.

1.1.9 The Gambling Act 2005 is now on the statute books. However, many provisions of the Act do not become effective until 2006 or 2007, and at the time this report was being drafted, the impact of the new legislation had not been felt.

1.2 The Omnibus surveys

1.2.1 MORI carried out six "waves" of Omnibus survey between June and September 2005, covering a total of approximately 12,000 adults in Great Britain – adults defined in this study as those aged 18 or more. Waves 1 and 2 covered all commercially available forms of gambling in Great Britain plus private wagering between individuals – 18 gambling forms in all. Waves 3 to 6 excluded lotteries, scratch cards, football pools and bingo, leaving 13 forms of gambling which might broadly be termed "betting and gaming". Using 18 forms of betting in waves 1 and 2 gave us a usefully broad gambling context. In waves 3 to 6 our decision to leave out what can be broadly termed "mass gambling" (especially the National Lottery, which has very high rates of participation) enabled us to focus on a more specific sub-set which we refer to as "betting and gaming". For analysis purposes it is useful to treat waves 1 and 2 separately from waves 3 to 6, rather than amalgamate all six.

Waves 1 and 2

1.2.2 Of the 4,106 respondents (weighted)[1] in waves 1 and 2, 42 per cent spend their own money on one or more of 18 forms of gambling at least once per month (i.e. count as regular gamblers in this study). As in the previous study, we chose gambling once per month or more often as the benchmark for "regular gambling" because in our view, and that of ABB, and with the agreement of DCMS, it captured all but those people who gamble only very occasionally or only on big annual events such as the Derby or the Grand National. Forty five per cent of adult men and 39 per cent of adult women are regular gamblers by this definition.

[1] For the details of the weighting please see MORI's Technical Note, Appendix 2.

1.2.3 The National Lottery is overwhelmingly the most popular form of gambling among regular gamblers and adults generally. Eighty nine per cent of regular gamblers and 37 per cent of adults spend their own money on the National Lottery at least once per month.

1.2.4 Among regular gamblers other more popular forms of gambling then rank a long way behind:

- 12 per cent buy scratch cards
- 8 per cent buy tickets for other lotteries
- 8 per cent play bingo
- 7 per cent bet at betting shops
- 6 per cent do football pools
- 5 per cent play fruit machines

1.2.5 The average number of forms of gambling used by regular gamblers in waves 1 and 2 is 1.47.

1.2.6 Among regular gamblers, 68 per cent spend under £5 per week, 16 per cent spend from £5 to £9.99, and 10 per cent spend from £10 to £20.99 per week. The average spend per week is £5.46, up slightly from £5.27 in 2004. (In this round of research, as in last year's, "spend" was defined as amounts staked. In the gambling context there is no single, universally accepted definition of spend; furthermore, we acknowledge that there is some risk in relying on the memories of respondents who are confronted with questions about what they spend.)

1.2.7 Even among regular gamblers, awareness of FOBTs is low. Seventy eight per cent say they had never heard of or seen one. Two per cent said they did not know if they had or had not, leaving 20 per cent who had heard of or come across one. Of regular gamblers who had seen or heard of FOBTs, 81 per cent said they had never used one, 3 per cent said they had tried them but did not use them any more, and a further 17 per cent said they were users.

1.2.8 Only 7 per cent of those who are aware of FOBTs say they are regular users, i.e. use them at least once per month. This suggests that regular FOBT users are a very small fraction (1.4 per cent) of regular gamblers and an even smaller fraction (0.6 per cent) of the adult population, although we caution that this analysis is based on very small numbers.

1.2.9 Omnibus waves 1 and 2 indicate a (central) problem gambling rate of 0.4 per cent.[2] We estimate that the 95 per cent confidence interval is 0.2 to 0.6 per cent. In 2004 the central rate was 0.5 per cent, with a 95 per cent confidence interval of 0.3 to 0.7 per cent. We conclude that the problem gambling rate across the adult population has probably not increased, and may have decreased.

Waves 3 to 6

1.2.10 Of 7,705 respondents (weighted), 7 per cent were regular gamblers (i.e. use at least one of the forms of gambling specified at least once per month). Among regular gamblers:

- 37 per cent bet at betting shops
- 32 per cent play fruit machines
- 16 per cent are involved in private betting or playing games for money with friends or colleagues
- 10 per cent play jackpot machines
- 8 per cent bet on-course
- 7 per cent use FOBTs
- 6 per cent participate in on-line betting (as distinct from on-line poker and on-line casinos).

1.2.11 As regards spend:

- 48 per cent say they spend no more than £4.99 per week
- 18 per cent say they spend between £5 and £9.99 per week
- 20 per cent say they spend between £10 and £20.99.

1.2.12 The average spend in waves 3 to 6 is £12.18 (compared with £20.74 in 2004 and with £5.46 in waves 1 and 2).

1.2.13 Almost half of regular gamblers (47 per cent) said they had never seen or heard of a FOBT and 2 per cent said they did not know. Even among regular betting shop customers, 19 per cent said they were unaware of FOBTs.

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[2] Problem gamblers, and therefore problem gambling rates, are defined solely by respondents who reply positively to three or more questions in the DSM-IV screen.

1.2.14 Of the 51 per cent of regular gamblers who said they were aware of and/or had seen a FOBT, only 13 per cent said they were regular FOBT users, i.e. used them at least once per month. Seventy three per cent said they never used them.

1.2.15 Regular FOBT users are a small percentage of regular gamblers (7 per cent) and a very small fraction of adults (0.5 per cent).

1.2.16 Among those who use FOBTs at least once per month, only 6 per cent played four times per week or more. The biggest group of users was those who played once per week, at 35 per cent.

1.2.17 Waves 3 to 6 revealed a rate of problem gambling of 0.23 (0.2) per cent, lower than the figure of 0.37 (0.4) per cent identified in the Round 1 research. However, given the limitations inherent in sampling, we can say no more than that the prevalence of problem gambling has probably not increased and may have decreased.

1.2.18 The rate of non-completion of the problem gambling questionnaire in the Omnibus surveys varied a little from last year. In waves 1 and 2 the non-completion rate fell from 26 per cent last year to 23 per cent this year. In waves 3 to 6 the rate rose from 17 per cent last year to 20 per cent this.

1.3 Betting shop interviews

1.3.1 MORI conducted 130 interviewing shifts in a representative sample of 65 betting shops between August and October 2005. The interviewing yielded 1,545 interviews, a 63 per cent increase on Round 1.

Betting shop customers

1.3.2 Betting shop customers are predominantly male (86 per cent), predominantly aged over 35 (72 per cent, with 37 per cent over 55), and predominantly in lower socio-economic groups, with 67 per cent in C2DE, compared with 22 per cent in C1 and 8 per cent in AB. Sixty two per cent began gambling regularly, with their own money, though not necessarily in betting shops, before they were 21 (26 per cent before they were 18). Seventy three per cent have been visiting betting shops for at least five years and 62 per cent for at least ten years.

1.3.3 Because research in betting shops was carried out on the busiest days of the week, so that sufficient customers would be available for interview, the frequency of betting shop visits was weighted to the pattern identified by the Omnibus waves in order to provide a representative distribution of frequency of visits. On this basis 65 per cent of betting shop customers visit once, twice or three times per week, 26 per cent visit between less than once per week but at least once per month, and 9 per cent visit four times per week or more. Sixty nine per cent of betting shop customers spend under 30 minutes in the shop at each visit.

1.3.4 In summary, a typical betting shop customer is a mature male, from one of the lower socio-economic groups, who started betting early in life and has been visiting betting shops for over ten years. He is likely to visit a betting shop about twice per week, and to spend about half an hour there on each visit.

1.3.5 The gambling preferences of betting shop customers are that 73 per cent bet regularly (at least once per month) on horses, 50 per cent buy National Lottery tickets, 39 per cent bet on-course, 37 per cent bet on football matches, 27 per cent do football pools, and 25 per cent bet on dogs. Other forms of gambling then follow some way behind: 14 per cent of betting shop customers buy other lottery tickets, 14 per cent do numbers betting, and 9 per cent use FOBTs, i.e. have not merely tried them once or twice. FOBTs thus rank ninth overall.

1.3.6 The average weekly spend of a betting shop customer, on all forms of gambling, inside and outside the betting shop, is £39.70, up by 7 per cent from £36.95 last year. The distribution of spend is that 33 per cent of customers spend under £10 per week, 51 per cent spend between £10 and £49.99 per week, and 16 per cent spend £50 or more per week.

FOBT users

Patterns of usage

1.3.7 FOBT users are a small subset of all betting shop customers – 6 per cent use a FOBT "always/every time" when they visit a betting shop, 3 per cent use them "usually or most times", and 5 per cent use them "sometimes", and 6 per cent use them "rarely". Over three quarters of betting shop customers have either never used a FOBT or no longer use one.

1.3.8 Regular FOBT users, defined as those who use a FOBT "always/every time" or "usually or most times", are overwhelmingly likely to be male (93 per cent), are predominantly younger (58 per cent under 35, including 28 per cent under 25) and are predominantly in lower socio-economic groups (60 per cent C2/D/E).

1.3.9 One in six regular FOBT users (17 per cent) said they had begun visiting betting shops because of FOBTs, and one in five (22 per cent) said they now visited betting shops more often because of FOBTs. Fifty five per cent said that FOBTs had made no difference to the frequency with which they visit betting shops.

1.3.10 Among the "always/every time" respondents, 58 per cent play one session per betting shop visit, 24 per cent play two sessions, and 7 per cent play three. Among those who use FOBTs "usually" or "most times", 42 per cent play one session, 33 per cent play two, and 11 per cent play three. Thus, under one in ten regular FOBT users play more than three sessions per visit.

1.3.11 Among regular FOBT users, two thirds spend no more than 30 minutes on a session. Among all FOBT users, regardless of frequency of use, 82 per cent spend no more than 30 minutes per FOBT session.

1.3.12 The main reasons given by betting shop customers for not using FOBTs were "I don't like machine games" (24 per cent) and "They're too complicated" (21 per cent). Only 2 per cent said they thought FOBTs were addictive.

Spend

1.3.13 Fifty one per cent of all FOBT users said their overall gambling spend had stayed the same since they had begun using FOBTs. Thirty four per cent said it had increased and 14 per cent said it had decreased. More frequent FOBT usage is not correlated with higher spend on gambling: those who use FOBTs (in the words of the survey) "rarely" or "sometimes" when they visit a betting shop have an average weekly gambling spend almost twice that of FOBT users who play "always/every time".

1.3.14 As regards spend on FOBTs, 53 per cent of all FOBT users said their spending had stayed the same, 29 per cent said it had increased and 17 per cent said it had decreased.

1.3.15 Among regular FOBT users, 20 per cent said their expenditure had increased a great deal and 20 per cent said it had increased a little. Just over 60 per cent said that it had stayed the same or had decreased.

1.3.16 Asked to think back to their last FOBT session, 24 per cent of all FOBT users said they had first staked under £5, 48 per cent under £10 and 71 per cent under £16. The average first stake in a FOBT session for those who played "usually or most times" was £16.13, and for those who played "always/every time" it was £22.72.

1.3.17 Among all FOBT users, 76 per cent had a win on their last session. Of these, 36 per cent kept all the winnings they had accumulated, 39 per cent kept some and re-staked the rest, and 24 per cent re-staked everything they had won.

The FOBT Code of Practice

1.3.18 General awareness of the provisions contained in the Code is still generally low, with under half of users aware of even one provision. Awareness of the provision of GamCare material has risen from last year, though only to modest levels.

1.3.19 Among regular FOBT users, opposition has intensified to the maximum payout and to the fact that, among casino games, only roulette is allowed. Support has strengthened for the limit on stakes, albeit only a little. For all other elements of which regular FOBT users were in favour last year, the net balance of support has decreased.

1.3.20 Among occasional FOBT users the picture is slightly different. There has been a slight swing away from support for limiting the payout to £500, and a stronger swing away from support for the idea that roulette should be the only casino game allowed.

1.3.21 As regards GamCare warnings, the extent of support has fallen among both groups, although there is still a substantial net balance of support.

1.3.22 It would appear, overall, that the provisions of the Code may have had an effect on occasional users, where the numbers who play less often or for shorter times or for less money outweigh the numbers who do the opposite. Among regular users, the numbers increasing their activity or spend outweighs those reducing it.

1.3.23 We cannot distinguish in this research between effects "since the Code came in" and effects "because of the Code". When assessing effects we must also recognise that some features of the Code, for example the minimum time lapse of 20 seconds between bets and limits on stakes and payouts, are ineluctable. Furthermore, at least 45 per cent of users began using FOBTs after the Code became operational and are thus probably unaware of a pre-Code world – and the figure of 45 per cent could be an under-estimate because some bookmakers began implementing the Code before April 1 2004.

1.3.24 In responding to our brief – to assess the effectiveness of the FOBT Code of Practice – we can only say that the evidence of this round of research is that the Code is neither more nor less effective than was apparent in the first round. In the Round 1 research we concluded that the Code was, on balance, marginally beneficial, and we have no reason to conclude differently now.

1.3.25 We cannot estimate from this research what would happen if the Code were not there. We think it must be possible that the Code is beneficial in ways not obvious to FOBT users.

Problem gambling among betting shop customers

1.3.26 As in the Round 1 research, problem gambling was identified by means of a questionnaire derived directly from the DSM-IV screen. We emphasise that we are here dealing only with problem gambling among people who regularly visit betting shops, not among any wider section of the population.

1.3.27 The problem gambling questionnaire produced an overall non-response rate of 20 per cent. This was lower than the 25 per cent rate obtained in 2004.

1.3.28 The rate of problem gambling identified among betting shops customers this year was 5.31 per cent, compared with 8.25 per cent last year. The confidence interval around this year's central rate of 5.31 per cent is 4.19 per cent to 6.43 per cent; the confidence interval round last year's central rate of 8.25 per cent is 6.50 per cent to 10.01 percent. The highest value this year is not substantially different from last year's lowest value, but there is a difference. The statistics do therefore suggest that the prevalence of problem gambling among betting shop customers has fallen. We can say with greater certainty that it has not increased.

1.3.29 Problem gamblers among betting shop customers have the following demographic characteristics:

- 92 per cent are male
- 14 per cent are aged 18 to 24, 22 per cent are aged 25 to 34, 43 per cent are 35 to 54, and 21 per cent are 55 or over
- 4 per cent are in socio-economic groups AB, 27 per cent in C1, 23 per cent in C2, and 41 per cent in DE
- sixty seven per cent have been visiting betting shops for 10 years or more and 72 per cent for 5 years or more (i.e. well before FOBTs became available).

1.3.30 Thirty per cent of problem gamblers said they had started gambling regularly, using their own money, below the age of 16 (i.e. possibly illegally). A further 17 per cent said they had started at age 16 or 17, also possibly illegally, depending on where the gambling took place and/or what form it took.[3] A further 39 per cent started while they were aged 18 to 20. Thus 85 per cent of problem gamblers began regular gambling while still no more than 20.

1.3.31 Almost sixty per cent of problem gamblers visit betting shops twice or more per week (35 per cent visit 2 or 3 times per week, and a further 24 per cent 4 times per week or more).

1.3.32 Eighty per cent of problem gamblers bet on horses, 50 per cent buy National Lottery tickets, 47 per cent bet on dogs, 42 per cent use FOBTs, 38 per cent bet on football matches, 37 per cent bet at racecourses or dog tracks, 32 per cent use fruit machines, and 22 per cent use jackpot machines.

1.3.33 The average number of betting shop activities in which problem gamblers participate is 2.5. Outside the betting shop, the average number is 2.4. There is some overlap in relation to fruit machines, which are accessible both inside and outside betting shops, so it is not possible simply to sum the two averages, but we are confident that the average number of forms of gambling practised by problem gamblers among betting shop customers is at least 4 and may be closer to 5.

1.3.34 Just under half of problem gamblers (45 per cent) say they use FOBTs, whether frequently or infrequently. Thirty three per cent say they have never used one, 6 per cent say they have used FOBTs but no longer do, and 13 per cent say they have used them only once or twice.

1.3.35 The gambling preferences of problem gamblers have changed somewhat as between this year and last. Horseracing is still overwhelmingly the favourite pursuit, though at 80 per cent this year compared with 87 per cent last. Greyhound racing still ranks second, though also down, at 47 per cent this year compared with 63 per cent last, and FOBT

[3] Paragraph 1.3.30 refers to all forms of gambling, not just to those available in a betting shop.

usage ranks third at 45 per cent. FOBT usage is one of a group of three activities, along with betting on football, and fruit machines, which have all risen considerably in usage. FOBTs rank only third and form part of what one might think of as a "second rank cluster" of gambling pursuits which sit a long way behind the favourite betting pursuit, namely horseracing.

1.3.36 The econometric analysis we conducted – a calculation of marginal effects derived from a logit model – suggests that no one form of gambling is more associated with problem gambling than any other. The strongest associations are:

- the age at which regular gambling started (the lower the age at which gambling starts, the greater the chance of problem gambling)
- marital status (those who are married or living with a partner are less likely to be problem gamblers)
- frequency of betting shop visits (the more frequent, the greater the likelihood)

1.4 Conclusions

1.4.1 The evidence of this research is that problem gambling rates among adults in Great Britain have not increased and may have fallen. Problem gambling rates among betting shop customers have almost certainly fallen.

1.4.2 We begin by emphasising that the research method employed here defines, at best, association, not cause and effect, between problem gambling and any particular form of gambling.

1.4.3 FOBTs form part of a range of gambling pursuits inside and outside the betting shop that appeal to problem gamblers – and most of these same pursuits, notably the National Lottery, horserace betting, on-course betting, football pools, and betting on football matches appeal to non-problem gamblers too. The survey identified no forms of gambling that appeal only to non-problem gamblers.

1.4.4 FOBTs are not more associated with problem gambling than any other form or forms of gambling. Indeed, our econometric modelling suggests that no form of gambling considered in this research is significantly associated with problem gambling.

1.4.5 The FOBT Code of Practice is a highly specific form of regulation, in that it deals only with FOBTs and with certain features of their supply and use. (By way of contrast, the rule that no one under the age of 18 may enter a betting shop is unspecific in relation to any particular form of betting that takes place there.) We emphasise that we did not expect FOBT users to be familiar with the Code *by name*. We asked them about restrictions on usage which we had expected they would be aware of, if at all, only by virtue of using FOBTs.

1.4.6 FOBT users who happen also to be problem gamblers are a very small fraction of the adult population and of betting shop customers. We know from Omnibus waves 1 and 2 that of the 42 per cent of the adult (18+) population who gamble regularly, only 7 per cent visit betting shops. Of that 7 per cent, only about 5 per cent are problem gamblers. To put this another way, if we started with 1,000 adults, 420 would be regular gamblers, 29 would regularly visit betting shops and 1.5 would be problem gamblers. The problem gamblers participate, on average, in at least four forms of gambling.

1.4.7 From the survey of betting shop customers we know that a typical problem gambler (among betting shop customers) is overwhelmingly likely to be male, and likely to be in one of the older groups and in one of the lower socio-economic groups. He is highly likely to have started gambling before the age of 20, likely to have frequented betting shops for at least 10 years, and likely to visit a betting shop at least twice per week.

1.4.8 From the same survey we know that regular FOBT users are also overwhelmingly likely to be male and predominantly in lower socio-economic groups. But they are predominantly younger, are among the less frequent betting shop visitors, and have been visiting betting shops for fewer years. Except in gender and socio-economic grouping the two profiles are different.

1.4.9 The evidence of this research is that, after 16 to 18 months in operation, the provisions of the FOBT Code are not well known to FOBT users, regardless of how frequently they play. There could be at least two reasons for this:

- those betting shop customers who have used FOBTs only since the Code came into effect might be unaware of its provisions because they had never used FOBTs under any other régime. Almost half of FOBT users fall into this category, and the percentage is likely to increase as new users appear.

- alternatively (or in addition) FOBT users might well play by choice within the regulations imposed by the Code and feel no constraint exerted by it. If this is so for a majority of users, the Code will bite only on the minority, so that its effects of could be considered marginal.

1.4.10 Overall, we regard the effects of the Code as probably marginal, but, at the margin, probably beneficial. We think the Code may be better viewed as part of a package of measures and promotions that bookmakers, gambling charities and the Government have taken to deter problem gambling. It is beyond the scope of this research to disentangle the effects of each element of the package, but among betting shop customers it has been effective.

STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
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Appendix C

Estimates for period April 2011 to March 2012					33016	£43,024,865,195	£8,001,115,282	£1,368,190,713	£314,683,864	£273,638,143
Westminster constituency name	**Region**	**11/2012 general and by-election win**	**11/2012 Member of Parliament**	**Count of betting shop licenses**	**Count of FOBTs**	**GROSS AMOUNT GAMBLED (amount FOBTs gamblers wagered)**	**GROSS AMOUNT CASH (amount gamblers put into FOBTs)**	**GROSS GAMBLING YIELD (amount gamblers lost on FOBTs)**	**PROBLEM GAMBLER CONTRIBUTION (amount FOBTs problem gamblers lost)**	**MACHINE PROFIT SHARE TAX (amount Government takes from FOBTs gamblers)** Machine Gaming Duty introduced 2013. These are shown as indication of tax revenue)
Aberavon	Wales Euro Region	Hywel Francis (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£35,565,748	£6,613,981	£1,130,991	£260,128	£226,198
Aberconwy	Wales Euro Region	Guto Bebb (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,575,428	£6,615,781	£1,131,299	£260,199	£226,260
Aberdeen North	Scotland Euro Region	Frank Doran (Labour)	Labour	32	117	£126,318,316	£23,490,775	£4,016,922	£923,892	£803,384
Aberdeen South	Scotland Euro Region	Anne Begg (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£82,331,706	£15,310,808	£2,618,148	£602,174	£523,630
Airdrie and Shotts	Scotland Euro Region	Pamela Nash (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£86,252,263	£16,039,895	£2,742,822	£630,849	£548,564
Aldershot	South East Euro Region	Gerald Howarth (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,653,454	£17,230,291	£2,946,380	£677,667	£589,276
Aldridge-Brownhills	West Midlands Euro Region	Richard Shepherd (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,439,903	£6,590,578	£1,126,989	£259,207	£225,398
Altrincham and Sale West	North West Euro Region	Graham Brady (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,585,109	£6,617,582	£1,131,606	£260,269	£226,321
Alyn and Deeside	Wales Euro Region	Mark Tami (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,124,132	£8,763,435	£1,498,547	£344,666	£299,709
Amber Valley	East Midlands Euro Region	Nigel Mills (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£39,377,670	£7,322,865	£1,252,210	£288,008	£250,442
Angus	Scotland Euro Region	Michael Weir (SNP)	SNP	8	29	£31,373,064	£5,834,289	£997,663	£229,463	£199,533
Arfon	Wales Euro Region	Hywel Williams (Plaid Cymru)	PC	8	29	£31,381,669	£5,835,889	£997,937	£229,526	£199,587
Argyll and Bute	Scotland Euro Region	Alan Reid (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£35,594,789	£6,619,382	£1,131,914	£260,340	£226,383
Arundel and South Downs	South East Euro Region	Nick Herbert (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,163,363	£4,307,573	£736,595	£169,417	£147,319
Ashfield	East Midlands Euro Region	Gloria De Piero (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£63,004,272	£11,716,584	£2,003,536	£460,813	£400,707
Ashford	South East Euro Region	Damian Green (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£57,908,409	£10,768,932	£1,841,487	£423,542	£368,297
Ashton-under-Lyne	North West Euro Region	David Heyes (Labour)	Labour	24	87	£94,067,564	£17,493,266	£2,991,349	£688,010	£598,270
Aylesbury	South East Euro Region	David Lidington (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,490,090	£12,922,719	£2,209,785	£508,251	£441,957
Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock	Scotland Euro Region	Sandra Osborne (Labour)	Labour	32	118	£127,006,699	£23,618,790	£4,038,813	£928,927	£807,763
Banbury	South East Euro Region	Tony Baldry (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,326,727	£8,615,146	£1,473,190	£338,834	£294,638
Banff and Buchan	Scotland Euro Region	Eilidh Whiteford (SNP)	SNP	13	47	£50,911,315	£9,467,718	£1,618,980	£372,365	£323,796
Barking	London Euro Region	Margaret Hodge (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£17,960,283	£3,339,982	£571,137	£131,362	£114,227
Barnsley Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Dan Jarvis (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,660,080	£11,652,576	£1,992,591	£458,296	£398,518
Barnsley East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Michael Dugher (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£54,857,687	£10,201,605	£1,744,474	£401,229	£348,895
Barrow and Furness	North West Euro Region	John Woodcock (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,677,290	£11,655,777	£1,993,138	£458,422	£398,628
Basildon and Billericay	Eastern Euro Region	John Baron (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£75,280,931	£13,999,612	£2,393,934	£550,605	£478,787
Basingstoke	South East Euro Region	Maria Miller (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£57,924,226	£10,771,874	£1,841,990	£423,658	£368,398
Bassetlaw	East Midlands Euro Region	John Mann (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,253,204	£8,787,438	£1,502,652	£345,610	£300,530
Bath	South West Euro Region	Don Foster (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£52,117,568	£9,692,039	£1,657,339	£381,188	£331,468
Batley and Spen	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Mike Wood (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,433,753	£8,077,154	£1,381,193	£317,674	£276,239
Battersea	London Euro Region	Jane Ellison (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£119,767,934	£22,272,633	£3,808,620	£875,983	£761,724
Beaconsfield	South East Euro Region	Dominic Grieve (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,169,690	£4,308,749	£736,796	£169,463	£147,359
Beckenham	London Euro Region	Bob Stewart (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£83,837,554	£15,590,843	£2,666,034	£613,188	£533,207
Bedford	Eastern Euro Region	Richard Fuller (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£121,574,441	£22,608,580	£3,866,067	£889,195	£773,213
Bermondsey and Old Southwark	London Euro Region	Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	42	154	£251,512,662	£46,772,530	£7,998,103	£1,839,564	£1,599,621
Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk	Scotland Euro Region	Michael Moore (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	12	44	£47,137,039	£8,765,835	£1,498,958	£344,760	£299,792
Berwick-upon-Tweed	North East Euro Region	Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£31,390,274	£5,837,489	£998,211	£229,588	£199,642
Bethnal Green and Bow	London Euro Region	Rushanara Ali (Labour)	Labour	45	165	£269,404,244	£50,099,737	£8,567,055	£1,970,423	£1,713,411
Beverley and Holderness	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Graham Stuart (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£39,162,550	£7,282,860	£1,245,369	£286,435	£249,074
Bexhill and Battle	South East Euro Region	Gregory Barker (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,131,804	£9,694,686	£1,657,791	£381,292	£331,558
Bexleyheath and Crayford	London Euro Region	David Evennett (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£71,860,760	£13,363,580	£2,285,172	£525,590	£457,034
Birkenhead	North West Euro Region	Frank Field (Labour)	Labour	5	18	£19,602,787	£3,645,431	£623,369	£143,375	£124,674
Birmingham Edgbaston	West Midlands Euro Region	Gisela Stewart (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£39,388,426	£7,324,865	£1,252,552	£288,087	£250,510
Birmingham Erdington	West Midlands Euro Region	Jack Dromey (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,942,039	£12,448,870	£2,128,757	£489,614	£425,751
Birmingham Hall Green	West Midlands Euro Region	Roger Godsiff (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,960,324	£12,452,271	£2,129,338	£489,748	£425,868
Birmingham Hodge Hill	West Midlands Euro Region	Liam Byrne (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£63,021,481	£11,719,784	£2,004,083	£460,939	£400,817
Birmingham Ladywood	West Midlands Euro Region	Shabana Mahmood (Labour)	Labour	43	157	£169,277,730	£31,479,718	£5,383,032	£1,238,097	£1,076,606
Birmingham Northfield	West Midlands Euro Region	Richard Burden (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£63,038,691	£11,722,985	£2,004,630	£461,065	£400,926
Birmingham Perry Barr	West Midlands Euro Region	Khalid Mahmood (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£70,879,806	£13,181,157	£2,253,978	£518,415	£450,796
Birmingham Selly Oak	West Midlands Euro Region	Steve McCabe (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,190,971	£9,519,724	£1,627,873	£374,411	£325,575
Birmingham Yardley	West Midlands Euro Region	John Hemming (Liberal Democrats)	Lib-Dem	19	70	£74,797,137	£13,909,643	£2,378,549	£547,066	£475,710
Bishop Auckland	North East Euro Region	Helen Goodman (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,408,845	£13,837,434	£2,366,201	£544,226	£473,240
Blackburn	North West Euro Region	Jack Straw (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,368,124	£14,573,721	£2,492,106	£573,184	£498,421
Blackley and Broughton	North West Euro Region	Graham Stringer (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,649,476	£12,394,464	£2,119,453	£487,474	£423,891
Blackpool North and Cleveleys	North West Euro Region	Paul Maynard (Conservative)	Conservative	13	47	£50,925,298	£9,470,319	£1,619,424	£372,468	£323,885
Blackpool South	North West Euro Region	Gordon Marsden (Labour)	Labour	30	110	£117,778,062	£21,902,587	£3,745,342	£861,429	£749,068
Blaenau Gwent	Wales Euro Region	Nick Smith (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£50,939,281	£9,472,919	£1,619,869	£372,570	£323,974
Blaydon	North East Euro Region	David Anderson (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,667,761	£12,397,864	£2,120,035	£487,608	£424,007
Blyth Valley	North East Euro Region	Ronnie Campbell (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£50,953,264	£9,475,519	£1,620,314	£372,672	£324,063
Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	South East Euro Region	Nick Gibb (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£104,235,135	£19,384,078	£3,314,677	£762,376	£662,935
Bolsover	East Midlands Euro Region	Dennis Skinner (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£31,502,136	£5,858,292	£1,001,768	£230,407	£200,354
Bolton North East	North West Euro Region	David Crausby (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£54,872,745	£10,204,405	£1,744,953	£401,339	£348,991
Bolton South East	North West Euro Region	Yasmin Qureshi (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£98,013,935	£18,227,153	£3,116,843	£716,874	£623,369
Bolton West	North West Euro Region	Julie Hilling (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,445,584	£8,079,354	£1,381,570	£317,761	£276,314
Bootle	North West Euro Region	Joe Benton (Labour)	Labour	31	114	£123,037,740	£22,880,703	£3,912,600	£899,898	£782,520
Boston and Skegness	East Midlands Euro Region	Mark Simmonds (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£66,978,609	£12,455,671	£2,129,920	£489,882	£425,984
Bosworth	East Midlands Euro Region	David Tredinnick (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£39,399,182	£7,326,865	£1,252,894	£288,166	£250,579
Bournemouth East	South West Euro Region	Tobias Ellwood (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£86,862,613	£16,153,398	£2,762,231	£635,313	£552,446
Bournemouth West	South West Euro Region	Conor Burns (Conservative)	Conservative	22	81	£127,398,499	£23,691,651	£4,051,272	£931,793	£810,254
Bracknell	South East Euro Region	Phillip Lee (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,509,071	£12,926,248	£2,210,388	£508,389	£442,078
Bradford East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	David Ward (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	13	47	£50,967,246	£9,478,120	£1,620,758	£372,774	£324,152
Bradford South	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Gerry Sutcliffe (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£50,981,229	£9,480,720	£1,621,203	£372,877	£324,241
Bradford West	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	George Galloway (Respect)	Respect	24	87	£94,041,749	£17,488,466	£2,990,528	£687,821	£598,106
Braintree	Eastern Euro Region	Brooks Newmark (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,699,249	£11,845,825	£2,025,636	£465,896	£405,127
Brecon and Radnorshire	Wales Euro Region	Roger Williams (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£19,608,165	£3,646,431	£623,540	£143,414	£124,708
Brent Central	London Euro Region	Sarah Teather (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	40	146	£239,470,439	£44,533,099	£7,615,160	£1,751,487	£1,523,032
Brent North	London Euro Region	Barry Gardiner (Labour)	Labour	38	139	£227,496,917	£42,306,444	£7,234,402	£1,663,912	£1,446,880
Brentford and Isleworth	London Euro Region	Mary McLeod (Conservative)	Conservative	34	124	£203,549,873	£37,853,134	£6,472,886	£1,488,764	£1,294,577
Brentwood and Ongar	Eastern Euro Region	Eric Pickles (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,716,649	£11,849,061	£2,026,189	£466,024	£405,238
Bridgend	Wales Euro Region	Madeleine Moon (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,050,561	£8,749,753	£1,496,208	£344,128	£299,242
Bridgwater and West Somerset	South West Euro Region	Ian Liddell-Grainger (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£57,940,044	£10,774,815	£1,842,493	£423,773	£368,499
Brigg and Goole	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Andrew Percy (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£23,497,530	£4,369,716	£747,221	£171,861	£149,444
Brighton Kemptown	South East Euro Region	Simon Kirby (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,528,053	£12,929,778	£2,210,992	£508,528	£442,198
Brighton Pavilion	South East Euro Region	Caroline Lucas (Green)	Green	19	70	£110,086,083	£20,472,149	£3,500,737	£805,170	£700,147
Bristol East	South West Euro Region	Kerry McCarthy (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£46,339,381	£8,617,499	£1,473,592	£338,926	£294,718

Bristol North West	South West Euro Region	Charlotte Leslie (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£75,301,494	£14,003,436	£2,394,588	£550,755	£478,918
Bristol South	South West Euro Region	Dawn Primarolo (Labour)	Labour	19	70	£110,025,976	£20,460,971	£3,498,826	£804,730	£699,765
Bristol West	South West Euro Region	Stephen Williams (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	25	92	£144,731,477	£26,914,976	£4,602,461	£1,058,566	£920,492
Broadland	Eastern Euro Region	Keith Simpson (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£11,581,682	£2,153,786	£368,297	£84,708	£73,659
Bromley and Chislehurst	London Euro Region	Bob Neill (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£71,841,132	£13,359,930	£2,284,548	£525,446	£456,910
Bromsgrove	West Midlands Euro Region	Sajid Javid (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,449,583	£6,592,379	£1,127,297	£259,278	£225,459
Broxbourne	Eastern Euro Region	Charles Walker (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£115,848,452	£21,543,747	£3,683,981	£847,316	£736,796
Broxtowe	East Midlands Euro Region	Anna Soubry (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£31,510,741	£5,859,892	£1,002,042	£230,470	£200,408
Buckingham	South East Euro Region	John Bercow (Speaker)	Speaker	5	18	£28,954,204	£5,384,466	£920,744	£211,771	£184,149
Burnley	North West Euro Region	Gordon Birtwistle (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	13	47	£50,995,212	£9,483,320	£1,621,648	£372,979	£324,330
Burton	West Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Griffiths (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,315,437	£8,055,151	£1,377,431	£316,809	£275,486
Bury North	North West Euro Region	David Nuttall (Conservative)	Conservative	19	69	£74,429,282	£13,841,235	£2,366,851	£544,376	£473,370
Bury South	North West Euro Region	Ivan Lewis (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,686,046	£12,401,265	£2,120,616	£487,742	£424,123
Bury St. Edmunds	Eastern Euro Region	David Ruffley (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£57,955,862	£10,777,757	£1,842,996	£423,889	£368,599
Caerphilly	Wales Euro Region	Wayne David (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,162,854	£8,770,636	£1,499,779	£344,949	£299,956
Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross	Scotland Euro Region	John Thurso (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	0	0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0
Calder Valley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Craig Whittaker (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£39,173,306	£7,284,860	£1,245,711	£286,514	£249,142
Camberwell and Peckham	London Euro Region	Harriet Harman (Labour)	Labour	35	128	£209,536,634	£38,966,462	£6,663,265	£1,532,551	£1,332,653
Camborne and Redruth	South West Euro Region	George Eustice (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£28,962,113	£5,385,937	£920,995	£211,829	£184,199
Cambridge	Eastern Euro Region	Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	20	73	£115,816,817	£21,537,864	£3,682,975	£847,084	£736,595
Cannock Chase	West Midlands Euro Region	Aidan Burley (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£55,128,738	£10,252,011	£1,753,094	£403,212	£350,619
Canterbury	South East Euro Region	Julian Brazier (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£57,971,679	£10,780,698	£1,843,499	£424,005	£368,700
Cardiff Central	Wales Euro Region	Jenny Willott (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	21	77	£82,376,881	£15,319,209	£2,619,585	£602,505	£523,917
Cardiff North	Wales Euro Region	Jonathan Evans (Conservative)	Conservative	13	47	£51,009,195	£9,485,920	£1,622,092	£373,081	£324,418
Cardiff South and Penarth	Wales Euro Region	Stephen Doughty (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,449,718	£13,845,035	£2,367,501	£544,525	£473,500
Cardiff West	Wales Euro Region	Kevin Brennan (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,704,332	£12,404,665	£2,121,198	£487,875	£424,240
Carlisle	North West Euro Region	John Stevenson (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£58,743,825	£10,924,290	£1,868,054	£429,652	£373,611
Carmarthen East and Dinefwr	Wales Euro Region	Jonathan Edwards (Plaid Cymru)	PC	4	15	£15,665,020	£2,913,144	£498,148	£114,574	£99,630
Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire	Wales Euro Region	Simon Hart (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£39,184,062	£7,286,861	£1,246,053	£286,592	£249,211
Carshalton and Wallington	London Euro Region	Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	16	59	£95,814,347	£17,818,107	£3,046,896	£700,786	£609,379
Castle Point	Eastern Euro Region	Rebecca Harris (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£57,987,497	£10,783,640	£1,844,002	£424,121	£368,800
Central Ayrshire	Scotland Euro Region	Brian H Donohoe (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£70,492,590	£13,109,148	£2,241,664	£515,583	£448,333
Central Devon	South West Euro Region	Mel Stride (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,176,018	£4,309,926	£736,997	£169,509	£147,399
Central Suffolk and North Ipswich	Eastern Euro Region	Daniel Poulter (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,182,345	£4,311,103	£737,199	£169,556	£147,440
Ceredigion	Wales Euro Region	Mark Williams (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	3	11	£11,748,765	£2,184,858	£373,611	£85,930	£74,722
Charnwood	East Midlands Euro Region	Stephen Dorrell (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,459,264	£6,594,179	£1,127,605	£259,349	£225,521
Chatham and Aylesford	South East Euro Region	Tracey Crouch (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,352,035	£8,619,852	£1,473,995	£339,019	£294,799
Cheadle	North West Euro Region	Mark Hunter (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£31,398,878	£5,839,090	£998,484	£229,651	£199,697
Chelmsford	Eastern Euro Region	Simon Burns (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,547,034	£12,933,308	£2,211,596	£508,667	£442,319
Chelsea and Fulham	London Euro Region	Greg Hands (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£119,800,649	£22,278,717	£3,809,661	£876,222	£761,932
Cheltenham	South West Euro Region	Martin Horwood (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	13	48	£75,322,057	£14,007,260	£2,395,241	£550,906	£479,048
Chesham and Amersham	South East Euro Region	Cheryl Gillan (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,745,045	£6,461,359	£1,104,892	£254,125	£220,978
Chesterfield	East Midlands Euro Region	Toby Perkins (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£63,055,901	£11,726,185	£2,005,178	£461,191	£401,036
Chichester	South East Euro Region	Andrew Tyrie (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,146,039	£9,697,334	£1,658,244	£381,396	£331,649
Chingford and Woodford Green	London Euro Region	Iain Duncan Smith (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£119,735,220	£22,266,550	£3,807,580	£875,743	£761,516
Chippenham	South West Euro Region	Duncan Hames (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£52,160,275	£9,699,981	£1,658,697	£381,500	£331,739
Chipping Barnet	London Euro Region	Theresa Villiers (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£65,872,364	£12,249,948	£2,094,741	£481,790	£418,948
Chorley	North West Euro Region	Lindsay Hoyle (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,457,416	£8,081,555	£1,381,946	£317,848	£276,389
Christchurch	South West Euro Region	Christopher Chope (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,003,314	£10,786,581	£1,844,505	£424,236	£368,901
Cities of London and Westminster	London Euro Region	Mark Field (Conservative)	Conservative	121	443	£724,398,079	£134,712,625	£23,035,859	£5,298,248	£4,607,172
City of Chester	North West Euro Region	Stephen Mosley (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£70,511,951	£13,112,749	£2,242,280	£515,724	£448,456
City of Durham	North East Euro Region	Roberta Blackman-Woods (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,759,959	£10,927,291	£1,868,567	£429,770	£373,713
Clacton	Eastern Euro Region	Douglas Carswell (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,734,048	£11,852,297	£2,026,743	£466,151	£405,349
Cleethorpes	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Martin Vickers (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£58,776,093	£10,930,291	£1,869,080	£429,888	£373,816
Clwyd South	Wales Euro Region	Susan Elan Jones (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£11,751,992	£2,185,458	£373,713	£85,954	£74,743
Clwyd West	Wales Euro Region	David Jones (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,604,470	£6,621,182	£1,132,222	£260,411	£226,444
Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill	Scotland Euro Region	Tom Clarke (Labour)	Labour	26	95	£102,074,321	£18,982,242	£3,245,963	£746,572	£649,193
Colchester	Eastern Euro Region	Bob Russell (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	15	55	£86,886,339	£16,157,810	£2,762,986	£635,487	£552,597
Colne Valley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Jason McCartney (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£39,194,818	£7,288,861	£1,246,395	£286,671	£249,279
Congleton	North West Euro Region	Fiona Bruce (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,175,761	£8,773,036	£1,500,189	£345,044	£300,038
Copeland	North West Euro Region	Jamie Reed (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,792,227	£10,933,291	£1,869,593	£430,006	£373,919
Corby	East Midlands Euro Region	Andy Sawford (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£59,066,505	£10,984,297	£1,878,315	£432,012	£375,663
Coventry North East	West Midlands Euro Region	Bob Ainsworth (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£59,082,639	£10,987,298	£1,878,828	£432,130	£375,766
Coventry North West	West Midlands Euro Region	Geoffrey Robinson (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£55,143,796	£10,254,811	£1,753,573	£403,322	£350,715
Coventry South	West Midlands Euro Region	Jim Cunninhgham (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£70,899,167	£13,184,757	£2,254,594	£518,557	£450,919
Crawley	South East Euro Region	Henry Smith (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£98,444,295	£18,307,185	£3,130,529	£720,022	£626,106
Crewe and Nantwich	North West Euro Region	Edward Timpson (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£54,887,804	£10,207,206	£1,745,432	£401,449	£349,086
Croydon Central	London Euro Region	Gavin Barwell (Conservative)	Conservative	30	110	£180,584,266	£33,582,337	£5,742,580	£1,320,793	£1,148,516
Croydon North	London Euro Region	Steve Reed (Labour)	Labour	30	110	£180,093,548	£33,491,081	£5,726,975	£1,317,204	£1,145,395
Croydon South	London Euro Region	Richard Ottaway (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£59,883,967	£11,136,317	£1,904,310	£437,991	£380,862
Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East	Scotland Euro Region	Gregg McClymont (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£54,902,862	£10,210,006	£1,745,911	£401,560	£349,182
Cynon Valley	Wales Euro Region	Ann Clwyd (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,469,248	£8,083,755	£1,382,322	£317,934	£276,464
Dagenham and Rainham	London Euro Region	Jon Cruddas (Labour)	Labour	5	18	£29,933,805	£5,566,637	£951,895	£218,936	£190,379
Darlington	North East Euro Region	Jenny Chapman (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,470,155	£13,848,836	£2,368,151	£544,675	£473,630
Dartford	South East Euro Region	Gareth Johnson (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,751,448	£11,855,532	£2,027,296	£466,278	£405,459
Daventry	East Midlands Euro Region	Chris Heaton-Harris (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£11,813,301	£2,196,859	£375,663	£86,402	£75,133
Delyn	Wales Euro Region	David Hanson (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£35,614,150	£6,622,982	£1,132,530	£260,482	£226,506
Denton and Reddish	North West Euro Region	Andrew Gwynne (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£51,023,178	£9,488,521	£1,622,537	£373,184	£324,507
Derby North	East Midlands Euro Region	Chris Williamson (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£35,468,944	£6,595,979	£1,127,912	£259,420	£225,582
Derby South	East Midlands Euro Region	Margaret Beckett (Labour)	Labour	25	92	£98,444,175	£18,307,162	£3,130,525	£720,021	£626,105
Derbyshire Dales	East Midlands Euro Region	Patrick McLoughlin (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£15,751,068	£2,929,146	£500,884	£115,203	£100,177
Devizes	South West Euro Region	Claire Perry (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£28,970,022	£5,387,408	£921,247	£211,887	£184,249
Dewsbury	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Simon Reevell (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,188,668	£8,775,437	£1,500,600	£345,138	£300,120
Don Valley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Caroline Flint (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£51,051,143	£9,493,721	£1,623,426	£373,388	£324,685
Doncaster Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Rosie Winterton (Labour)	Labour	29	106	£113,852,127	£21,172,501	£3,620,498	£832,714	£724,100
Doncaster North	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Ed Miliband (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£70,531,312	£13,116,349	£2,242,896	£515,866	£448,579
Dover	South East Euro Region	Charlie Elphicke (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,364,689	£8,622,205	£1,474,397	£339,111	£294,879
Dudley North	West Midlands Euro Region	Ian Austin (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,266,111	£8,789,838	£1,503,062	£345,704	£300,612
Dudley South	West Midlands Euro Region	Chris Kelly (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£39,409,938	£7,328,866	£1,253,236	£288,244	£250,647
Dulwich and West Norwood	London Euro Region	Tessa Jowell (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£101,774,937	£18,926,567	£3,236,443	£744,382	£647,289
Dumfries and Galloway	Scotland Euro Region	Russell Brown (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,490,591	£13,852,636	£2,368,801	£544,824	£473,760
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale	Scotland Euro Region	David Mundell (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£39,205,574	£7,290,861	£1,246,737	£286,750	£249,347
Dundee East	Scotland Euro Region	Stewart Hosie (SNP)	SNP	13	47	£51,065,126	£9,496,322	£1,623,871	£373,490	£324,774
Dundee West	Scotland Euro Region	James McGovern (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,511,027	£13,856,437	£2,369,451	£544,974	£473,890
Dunfermline and West Fife	Scotland Euro Region	Thomas Docherty (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,694,499	£11,658,977	£1,993,685	£458,548	£398,737

Dwyfor Meirionnydd	Wales Euro Region	Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru)	PC	4	15	£15,669,322	£2,913,944	£498,284	£114,605	£99,657
Ealing Central and Acton	London Euro Region	Angie Bray (Conservative)	Conservative	23	84	£137,921,233	£25,648,510	£4,385,895	£1,008,756	£877,179
Ealing North	London Euro Region	Stephen Pound (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£89,825,951	£16,704,475	£2,856,465	£656,987	£571,293
Ealing, Southall	London Euro Region	Virendra Sharma (Labour)	Labour	22	81	£131,888,672	£24,526,665	£4,194,060	£964,634	£838,812
Easington	North East Euro Region	Grahame Morris (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,711,709	£11,662,177	£1,994,232	£458,673	£398,846
East Devon	South West Euro Region	Hugo Swire (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£28,977,931	£5,388,878	£921,498	£211,945	£184,300
East Dunbartonshire	Scotland Euro Region	Jo Swinson (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	12	44	£46,982,153	£8,737,032	£1,494,032	£343,627	£298,806
East Ham	London Euro Region	Stephen Timms (Labour)	Labour	34	125	£204,662,168	£38,059,982	£6,508,257	£1,496,899	£1,301,651
East Hampshire	South East Euro Region	Damian Hinds (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,174,511	£9,702,628	£1,659,149	£381,604	£331,830
East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow	Scotland Euro Region	Michael McCann (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,531,464	£13,860,237	£2,370,101	£545,123	£474,020
East Lothian	Scotland Euro Region	Fiona O'Donnell (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£70,550,673	£13,119,950	£2,243,511	£516,008	£448,702
East Renfrewshire	Scotland Euro Region	Jim Murphy (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£51,079,109	£9,498,922	£1,624,316	£373,593	£324,863
East Surrey	South East Euro Region	Sam Gyimah (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,768,847	£11,858,768	£2,027,849	£466,405	£405,570
East Worthing and Shoreham	South East Euro Region	Tim Loughton (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,786,247	£11,862,004	£2,028,403	£466,533	£405,681
East Yorkshire	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Greg Knight (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£66,722,617	£12,408,066	£2,121,779	£488,009	£424,356
Eastbourne	South East Euro Region	Stephen Lloyd (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	16	59	£92,678,762	£17,234,998	£2,947,185	£677,852	£589,437
Eastleigh	South East Euro Region	Chris Huhne (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	10	37	£58,019,132	£10,789,523	£1,845,008	£424,352	£369,002
Eddisbury	North West Euro Region	Stephen O'Brien (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£15,673,625	£2,914,744	£498,421	£114,637	£99,684
Edinburgh East	Scotland Euro Region	Sheila Gilmore (Labour)	Labour	26	95	£101,934,493	£18,956,239	£3,241,517	£745,549	£648,303
Edinburgh North and Leith	Scotland Euro Region	Mark Lazararowicz (Labour)	Labour	34	125	£134,213,211	£24,958,948	£4,267,980	£981,635	£853,596
Edinburgh South	Scotland Euro Region	Ian Murray (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,481,079	£8,085,955	£1,382,698	£318,021	£276,540
Edinburgh South West	Scotland Euro Region	Alistair Darling (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,551,900	£13,864,038	£2,370,750	£545,273	£474,150
Edinburgh West	Scotland Euro Region	Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	17	62	£66,740,902	£12,411,466	£2,122,361	£488,143	£424,472
Edmonton	London Euro Region	Andy Love (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£59,867,610	£11,133,275	£1,903,790	£437,872	£380,758
Ellesmere Port and Neston	North West Euro Region	Andrew Miller (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,808,361	£10,936,292	£1,870,106	£430,124	£374,021
Elmet and Rothwell	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Alec Shelbrooke (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£39,216,330	£7,292,861	£1,247,079	£286,828	£249,416
Eltham	London Euro Region	Clive Efford (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£89,850,487	£16,709,038	£2,857,245	£657,166	£571,449
Enfield North	London Euro Region	Nick de Bois (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£77,849,157	£14,477,212	£2,475,603	£569,389	£495,121
Enfield, Southgate	London Euro Region	David Burrowes (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£65,854,371	£12,246,602	£2,094,169	£481,659	£418,834
Epping Forest	Eastern Euro Region	Eleanor Laing (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£98,471,185	£18,312,185	£3,131,384	£720,218	£626,277
Epsom and Ewell	South East Euro Region	Chris Grayling (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,704,070	£17,239,704	£2,947,989	£678,038	£589,598
Erewash	East Midlands Euro Region	Jessica Lee (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£63,073,110	£11,729,385	£2,005,725	£461,317	£401,145
Erith and Thamesmead	London Euro Region	Teresa Pearce (Labour)	Labour	19	70	£113,810,616	£21,164,781	£3,619,178	£832,411	£723,836
Esher and Walton	South East Euro Region	Dominic Raab (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,729,378	£17,244,411	£2,948,794	£678,223	£589,759
Exeter	South West Euro Region	Ben Bradshaw (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£75,342,620	£14,011,084	£2,395,895	£551,056	£479,179
Falkirk	Scotland Euro Region	Eric Joyce (Labour)	Labour	28	102	£109,625,024	£20,386,408	£3,486,076	£801,797	£697,215
Fareham	South East Euro Region	Mark Hoban (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£11,584,845	£2,154,375	£368,398	£84,732	£73,680
Faversham and Mid Kent	South East Euro Region	Hugh Robertson (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£17,372,523	£3,230,680	£552,446	£127,063	£110,489
Feltham and Heston	London Euro Region	Seema Malhotra (Labour)	Labour	30	111	£181,074,984	£33,673,593	£5,758,184	£1,324,382	£1,151,637
Filton and Bradley Stoke	South West Euro Region	Jack Lopresti (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,034,950	£10,792,464	£1,845,511	£424,468	£369,102
Finchley and Golders Green	London Euro Region	Mike Freer (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£125,928,082	£23,418,205	£4,004,513	£921,038	£800,903
Folkestone and Hythe	South East Euro Region	Damian Collins (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£86,910,066	£16,162,223	£2,763,740	£635,660	£552,748
Forest of Dean	South West Euro Region	Mark Harper (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,188,672	£4,312,279	£737,400	£169,602	£147,480
Fylde	North West Euro Region	Mark Menzies (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£31,407,483	£5,840,690	£998,758	£229,714	£199,752
Gainsborough	East Midlands Euro Region	Edward Leigh (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£23,626,602	£4,393,719	£751,326	£172,805	£150,265
Garston and Halewood	North West Euro Region	Maria Eagle (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,759,187	£12,414,866	£2,122,942	£488,277	£424,588
Gateshead	North East Euro Region	Ian Mearns (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£98,148,385	£18,252,156	£3,121,119	£717,857	£624,224
Gedling	East Midlands Euro Region	Vernon Coaker (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,204,954	£9,522,325	£1,628,318	£374,513	£325,664
Gillingham and Rainham	South East Euro Region	Rehman Chishti (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,566,015	£12,936,838	£2,212,199	£508,806	£442,440
Glasgow Central	Scotland Euro Region	Anas Sarwar (Labour)	Labour	64	233	£250,571,483	£46,597,504	£7,968,173	£1,832,680	£1,593,635
Glasgow East	Scotland Euro Region	Margaret Curran (Labour)	Labour	29	106	£113,540,203	£21,114,494	£3,610,578	£830,433	£722,116
Glasgow North	Scotland Euro Region	Ann McKechin (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,389,636	£14,577,722	£2,492,790	£573,342	£498,558
Glasgow North East	Scotland Euro Region	Willie Bain (Labour)	Labour	36	131	£140,946,459	£26,211,096	£4,482,097	£1,030,882	£896,419
Glasgow North West	Scotland Euro Region	John Robertson (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£82,422,056	£15,327,610	£2,621,021	£602,835	£524,204
Glasgow South	Scotland Euro Region	Tom Harris (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£82,467,231	£15,336,011	£2,622,458	£603,165	£524,492
Glasgow South West	Scotland Euro Region	Ian Davidson (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£82,534,994	£15,348,613	£2,624,613	£603,661	£524,923
Glenrothes	Scotland Euro Region	Lindsay Roy (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,201,575	£8,777,837	£1,501,010	£345,232	£300,202
Gloucester	South West Euro Region	Richard Graham (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,754,687	£17,249,117	£2,949,599	£678,408	£589,920
Gordon	Scotland Euro Region	Malcolm Bruce (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£19,613,543	£3,647,431	£623,711	£143,453	£124,742
Gosport	South East Euro Region	Caroline Dineage (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,584,996	£12,940,368	£2,212,803	£508,945	£442,561
Gower	Wales Euro Region	Martin Caton (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£11,755,219	£2,186,058	£373,816	£85,978	£74,763
Grantham and Stamford	East Midlands Euro Region	Nick Boles (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,279,018	£8,792,238	£1,503,473	£345,799	£300,695
Gravesham	South East Euro Region	Adam Holloway (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,803,646	£11,865,239	£2,028,956	£466,660	£405,791
Great Grimsby	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Austin Mitchell (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£82,557,581	£15,352,813	£2,625,331	£603,826	£525,066
Great Yarmouth	Eastern Euro Region	Brandon Lewis (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£104,263,607	£19,389,373	£3,315,583	£762,584	£663,117
Greenwich and Woolwich	London Euro Region	Nick Raynsford (Labour)	Labour	30	110	£180,338,907	£33,536,709	£5,734,777	£1,318,999	£1,146,955
Guildford	South East Euro Region	Anne Milton (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,821,045	£11,868,475	£2,029,509	£466,787	£405,902
Hackney North and Stoke Newington	London Euro Region	Diane Abbott (Labour)	Labour	36	132	£215,523,395	£40,079,789	£6,853,644	£1,576,338	£1,370,729
Hackney South and Shoreditch	London Euro Region	Meg Hillier (Labour)	Labour	31	114	£186,096,666	£34,607,450	£5,917,874	£1,361,111	£1,183,575
Halesowen and Rowley Regis	West Midlands Euro Region	James Morris (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,478,625	£6,597,779	£1,128,220	£259,491	£225,644
Halifax	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Linda Riordan (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,824,495	£10,939,292	£1,870,619	£430,242	£374,124
Haltemprice and Howden	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	David Davis (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£23,503,984	£4,370,916	£747,427	£171,908	£149,485
Halton	North West Euro Region	Derek Twigg (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£82,580,169	£15,357,014	£2,626,049	£603,991	£525,210
Hammersmith	London Euro Region	Andrew Slaughter (Labour)	Labour	41	150	£245,457,200	£45,646,427	£7,805,539	£1,795,274	£1,561,108
Hampstead and Kilburn	London Euro Region	Glenda Jackson (Labour)	Labour	27	99	£161,863,370	£30,100,907	£5,147,255	£1,183,869	£1,029,451
Harborough	East Midlands Euro Region	Edward Garnier (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£31,519,346	£5,861,492	£1,002,315	£230,532	£200,463
Harlow	Eastern Euro Region	Robert Halfon (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,603,977	£12,943,898	£2,213,406	£509,083	£442,681
Harrogate and Knaresborough	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Andrew Jones (Conservative)	Conservative	16	58	£62,728,919	£11,665,378	£1,994,780	£458,799	£398,956
Harrow East	London Euro Region	Bob Blackman (Conservative)	Conservative	19	70	£113,841,695	£21,170,561	£3,620,166	£832,638	£724,033
Harrow West	London Euro Region	Gareth Thomas (Labour)	Labour	25	92	£149,669,025	£27,833,187	£4,759,475	£1,094,679	£951,895
Hartlepool	North East Euro Region	Iain Wright (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,411,148	£14,581,722	£2,493,475	£573,499	£498,695
Harwich and North Essex	Eastern Euro Region	Bernard Jenkin (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,194,999	£4,313,456	£737,601	£169,648	£147,520
Hastings and Rye	South East Euro Region	Amber Rudd (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£75,363,183	£14,014,908	£2,396,549	£551,206	£479,310
Havant	South East Euro Region	David Willets (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,188,747	£9,705,276	£1,659,602	£381,708	£331,920
Hayes and Harlington	London Euro Region	John McDonnell (Labour)	Labour	22	81	£131,996,630	£24,546,742	£4,197,493	£965,423	£839,499
Hazel Grove	North West Euro Region	Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£19,618,921	£3,648,431	£623,882	£143,493	£124,776
Hemel Hempstead	Eastern Euro Region	Mike Penning (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£86,933,792	£16,166,635	£2,764,495	£635,834	£552,899
Hemsworth	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Jon Trickett (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,777,472	£12,418,267	£2,123,524	£488,410	£424,705
Hendon	London Euro Region	Matthew Offord (Conservative)	Conservative	24	88	£143,721,521	£26,727,160	£4,570,344	£1,051,179	£914,069
Henley	South East Euro Region	John Howell (Conservative)	Conservative	0	0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0
Hereford and South Herefordshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Jesse Norman (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,327,269	£8,057,352	£1,377,807	£316,896	£275,561
Hertford and Stortford	Eastern Euro Region	Mark Prisk (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,779,995	£17,253,824	£2,950,404	£678,593	£590,081
Hertsmere	Eastern Euro Region	James Clappison (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£81,071,772	£15,076,505	£2,578,082	£592,959	£515,616
Hexham	North East Euro Region	Guy Opperman (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£23,510,437	£4,372,116	£747,632	£171,955	£149,526
Heywood and Middleton	North West Euro Region	Jim Dobbin (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£70,570,033	£13,123,550	£2,244,127	£516,149	£448,825

High Peak	East Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Bingham (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,488,305	£6,599,580	£1,128,528	£259,561	£225,706
Hitchin and Harpenden	Eastern Euro Region	Peter Lilley (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,066,585	£10,798,347	£1,846,517	£424,699	£369,303
Holborn and St. Pancras	London Euro Region	Frank Dobson (Labour)	Labour	57	209	£341,245,376	£63,459,666	£10,851,603	£2,495,869	£2,170,321
Hornchurch and Upminster	London Euro Region	Angela Watkinson (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,947,044	£4,453,310	£761,516	£175,149	£152,303
Hornsey and Wood Green	London Euro Region	Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	29	106	£173,616,068	£32,286,497	£5,520,991	£1,269,828	£1,104,198
Horsham	South East Euro Region	Francis Maude (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,754,536	£6,463,124	£1,105,194	£254,195	£221,039
Houghton and Sunderland South	North East Euro Region	Bridget Phillipson (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,840,629	£10,942,292	£1,871,132	£430,360	£374,226
Hove	South East Euro Region	Mike Weatherley (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,805,303	£17,258,530	£2,951,209	£678,778	£590,242
Huddersfield	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Barry Sheerman (Labour)	Labour	26	95	£101,794,665	£18,930,236	£3,237,070	£744,526	£647,414
Huntingdon	Eastern Euro Region	Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,838,445	£11,871,711	£2,030,063	£466,914	£406,013
Hyndburn	North West Euro Region	Graham Jones (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,093,091	£9,501,522	£1,624,760	£373,695	£324,952
Ilford North	London Euro Region	Lee Scott (Conservative)	Conservative	27	99	£161,642,546	£30,059,842	£5,140,233	£1,182,254	£1,028,047
Ilford South	London Euro Region	Mike Gapes (Labour)	Labour	30	111	£180,829,625	£33,627,965	£5,750,382	£1,322,588	£1,150,076
Inverclyde	Scotland Euro Region	Iain McKenzie (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,572,336	£13,867,838	£2,371,400	£545,422	£474,280
Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey	Scotland Euro Region	Danny Alexander (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	12	44	£47,214,482	£8,780,237	£1,501,421	£345,327	£300,284
Ipswich	Eastern Euro Region	Ben Gummer (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£115,911,723	£21,555,513	£3,685,993	£847,778	£737,199
Isle of Wight	South East Euro Region	Andrew Turner (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£81,093,917	£15,080,623	£2,578,787	£593,121	£515,757
Islington North	London Euro Region	Jeremy Corbyn (Labour)	Labour	30	110	£179,602,829	£33,399,824	£5,711,370	£1,313,615	£1,142,274
Islington South and Finsbury	London Euro Region	Emily Thornberry (Labour)	Labour	32	118	£192,623,217	£35,821,160	£6,125,418	£1,408,846	£1,225,084
Islwyn	Wales Euro Region	Chris Evans (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,227,390	£8,782,637	£1,501,831	£345,421	£300,366
Jarrow	North East Euro Region	Stephen Hepburn (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,492,911	£8,088,155	£1,383,075	£318,107	£276,615
Keighley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Kris Hopkins (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,623,830	£6,624,782	£1,132,838	£260,553	£226,568
Kenilworth and Southam	West Midlands Euro Region	Jeremy Wright (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£23,633,056	£4,394,919	£751,531	£172,852	£150,306
Kensington	London Euro Region	Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Conservative)	Conservative	26	95	£155,655,786	£28,946,514	£4,949,854	£1,138,466	£989,971
Kettering	East Midlands Euro Region	Philip Hollobone (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£51,218,937	£9,524,925	£1,628,762	£374,615	£325,752
Kilmarnock and Loudoun	Scotland Euro Region	Cathy Jamieson (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,432,660	£14,585,723	£2,494,159	£573,656	£498,832
Kingston and Surbiton	Scotland Euro Region	Ed Davey (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	23	84	£90,172,821	£16,768,981	£2,867,496	£659,524	£573,499
Kingston upon Hull East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Karl Turner (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,454,172	£14,589,723	£2,494,843	£573,814	£498,969
Kingston upon Hull North	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Diana Johnson (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,746,128	£11,668,578	£1,995,327	£458,925	£399,065
Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Alan Johnson (Labour)	Labour	27	98	£105,855,050	£19,685,325	£3,366,191	£774,224	£673,238
Kingswood	South West Euro Region	Chris Skidmore (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,764,026	£6,464,889	£1,105,496	£254,264	£221,099
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	Scotland Euro Region	Gordon Brown (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£86,323,253	£16,053,096	£2,745,079	£631,368	£549,016
Knowsley	North West Euro Region	George Howarth (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£11,758,445	£2,186,658	£373,919	£86,001	£74,784
Lanark and Hamilton East	Scotland Euro Region	Jimmy Hood (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£86,346,916	£16,057,497	£2,745,832	£631,541	£549,166
Lancaster and Fleetwood	North West Euro Region	Eric Ollerenshaw (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£58,856,763	£10,945,293	£1,871,645	£430,478	£374,329
Leeds Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Hilary Benn (Labour)	Labour	35	127	£137,031,280	£25,483,010	£4,357,595	£1,002,247	£871,519
Leeds East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Geroge Mudie (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,592,773	£13,871,638	£2,372,050	£545,572	£474,410
Leeds North East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Fabian Hamilton (Labour)	Labour	7	25	£27,413,785	£5,098,002	£871,758	£200,504	£174,352
Leeds North West	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Greg Mulholland (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£35,633,511	£6,626,583	£1,133,146	£260,623	£226,629
Leeds West	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Rachel Reeves (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,872,897	£10,948,293	£1,872,158	£430,596	£374,432
Leicester East	East Midlands Euro Region	Keith Vaz (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£70,879,806	£13,181,157	£2,253,978	£518,415	£450,796
Leicester South	East Midlands Euro Region	Jonathan Ashworth (Labour)	Labour	29	106	£114,164,050	£21,230,508	£3,630,417	£834,996	£726,083
Leicester West	East Midlands Euro Region	Liz Kendall (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,232,919	£9,527,525	£1,629,207	£374,718	£325,841
Leigh	North West Euro Region	Andy Burnham (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,475,684	£14,593,724	£2,495,527	£573,971	£499,105
Lewes	South East Euro Region	Norman Baker (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£46,377,343	£8,624,559	£1,474,800	£339,204	£294,960
Lewisham East	London Euro Region	Heidi Alexander (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£137,733,124	£25,613,528	£4,379,913	£1,007,380	£875,983
Lewisham West and Penge	London Euro Region	Jim Dowd (Labour)	Labour	22	81	£132,032,616	£24,553,434	£4,198,637	£965,687	£839,727
Lewisham, Deptford	London Euro Region	Joan Ruddock (Labour)	Labour	28	102	£167,629,307	£31,173,169	£5,330,612	£1,226,041	£1,066,122
Leyton and Wanstead	London Euro Region	John Cryer (Labour)	Labour	22	81	£131,708,742	£24,493,205	£4,188,338	£963,318	£837,668
Lichfield	West Midlands Euro Region	Michael Fabricant (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£31,527,950	£5,863,093	£1,002,589	£230,595	£200,518
Lincoln	East Midlands Euro Region	Karl McCartney (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£66,996,894	£12,459,072	£2,130,501	£490,015	£426,100
Linlithgow and East Falkirk	Scotland Euro Region	Michael Connarty (Labour)	Labour	26	95	£101,948,476	£18,958,839	£3,241,962	£745,651	£648,392
Liverpool Riverside	North West Euro Region	Louise Ellman (Labour)	Labour	52	189	£203,645,261	£37,870,873	£6,475,919	£1,489,461	£1,295,184
Liverpool Walton	North West Euro Region	Steve Rotheram (Labour)	Labour	33	120	£129,200,921	£24,026,838	£4,108,589	£944,976	£821,718
Liverpool Wavertree	North West Euro Region	Luciana Berger (Labour)	Labour	31	115	£123,371,176	£22,942,710	£3,923,203	£902,337	£784,641
Liverpool West Derby	North West Euro Region	Stephen Twigg (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,497,196	£14,597,724	£2,496,211	£574,128	£499,242
Livingston	Scotland Euro Region	Graeme Morrice (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£66,795,757	£12,421,667	£2,124,105	£488,544	£424,821
Llanelli	Wales Euro Region	Nia Griffith (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£31,416,088	£5,842,290	£999,032	£229,777	£199,806
Loughborough	East Midlands Euro Region	Nicky Morgan (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,497,985	£6,601,380	£1,128,836	£259,632	£225,767
Louth and Horncastle	East Midlands Euro Region	Peter Tapsell (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,339,100	£8,059,552	£1,378,183	£316,982	£275,637
Ludlow	West Midlands Euro Region	Philip Dunne (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£11,816,528	£2,197,460	£375,766	£86,426	£75,153
Luton North	Eastern Euro Region	Kelvin Hopkins (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£46,389,997	£8,626,912	£1,475,202	£339,296	£295,040
Luton South	Eastern Euro Region	Gavin Shuker (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£115,785,182	£21,531,981	£3,681,969	£846,853	£736,394
Macclesfield	North West Euro Region	David Rutley (Conservative)	Conservative	7	25	£27,421,314	£5,099,402	£871,998	£200,559	£174,400
Maidenhead	South East Euro Region	Theresa May (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,082,403	£10,801,289	£1,847,020	£424,815	£369,404
Maidstone and The Weald	South East Euro Region	Helen Grant (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,202,983	£9,707,923	£1,660,055	£381,813	£332,011
Makerfield	North West Euro Region	Yvonne Fovargue (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,107,074	£9,504,123	£1,625,205	£373,797	£325,041
Maldon	Eastern Euro Region	John Whittingdale (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£28,985,840	£5,390,349	£921,750	£212,002	£184,350
Manchester Central	North West Euro Region	Lucy Powell (Labour)	Labour	50	182	£195,758,971	£36,404,300	£6,225,135	£1,431,781	£1,245,027
Manchester Gorton	North West Euro Region	Gerald Kaufman (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,303,588	£14,561,720	£2,490,054	£572,712	£498,011
Manchester Withington	North West Euro Region	John Leech (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	18	66	£70,589,394	£13,127,151	£2,244,743	£516,291	£448,949
Mansfield	East Midlands Euro Region	Alan Meale (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£39,420,694	£7,330,866	£1,253,578	£288,323	£250,716
Meon Valley	South East Euro Region	George Hollingbery (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£40,535,886	£7,538,252	£1,289,041	£296,479	£257,808
Meriden	West Midlands Euro Region	Caroline Spelman (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,350,932	£8,061,752	£1,378,560	£317,069	£275,712
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney Co Const	Wales Euro Region	Dai Havard (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,121,057	£9,506,723	£1,625,650	£373,899	£325,130
Mid Bedfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	Nadine Dorries (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£28,993,748	£5,391,820	£922,001	£212,060	£184,400
Mid Derbyshire	East Midlands Euro Region	Pauline Latham (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£19,688,835	£3,661,432	£626,105	£144,004	£125,221
Mid Dorset and North Poole	South West Euro Region	Annette Brooke (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£29,001,657	£5,393,291	£922,253	£212,118	£184,451
Mid Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	George Freeman (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,402,652	£8,629,265	£1,475,604	£339,389	£295,121
Mid Sussex	South East Euro Region	Nicholas Soames (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,098,220	£10,804,230	£1,847,523	£424,930	£369,505
Mid Worcestershire	West Midlands Euro Region	Peter Luff (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£27,564,369	£5,126,005	£876,547	£201,606	£175,309
Middlesbrough	North East Euro Region	Andy McDonald (Labour)	Labour	31	113	£121,370,562	£22,570,666	£3,859,584	£887,704	£771,917
Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland	North East Euro Region	Tom Blenkinsop (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£54,917,921	£10,212,806	£1,746,390	£401,670	£349,278
Midlothian	Scotland Euro Region	David Hamilton (Labour)	Labour	5	18	£19,624,299	£3,649,431	£624,053	£143,532	£124,811
Milton Keynes North	South East Euro Region	Mark Lancaster (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£75,383,746	£14,018,732	£2,397,203	£551,357	£479,441
Milton Keynes South	South East Euro Region	Iain Stewart (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,873,244	£11,878,182	£2,031,169	£467,169	£406,234
Mitcham and Morden	London Euro Region	Siobhain McDonagh (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£125,721,981	£23,379,877	£3,997,959	£919,531	£799,592
Mole Valley	South East Euro Region	Paul Beresford (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£29,009,566	£5,394,761	£922,504	£212,176	£184,501
Monmouth	Scotland Euro Region	David Davies (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£27,428,844	£5,100,802	£872,237	£200,615	£174,447
Montgomeryshire	Wales Euro Region	Glyn Davies (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£11,761,672	£2,187,258	£374,021	£86,025	£74,804
Moray	Scotland Euro Region	Angus Robertson (SNP)	SNP	8	29	£31,424,693	£5,843,890	£999,305	£229,840	£199,861
Morecambe and Lunesdale	North West Euro Region	David Morris (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£39,227,086	£7,294,862	£1,247,421	£286,907	£249,484
Morley and Outwood	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Ed Balls (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£31,433,298	£5,845,490	£999,579	£229,903	£199,916
Motherwell and Wishaw	Scotland Euro Region	Frank Roy (Labour)	Labour	27	99	£106,000,256	£19,712,328	£3,370,808	£775,286	£674,162
Na h-Eileanan an Iar	Scotland Euro Region	Angus MacNeil (SNP)	SNP	1	4	£3,916,255	£728,286	£124,537	£28,643	£24,907

Neath	Wales Euro Region	Peter Hain (Labour)	Labour	10	36	£39,237,842	£7,296,862	£1,247,763	£286,986	£249,553
New Forest East	South East Euro Region	Julian Lewis (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£40,546,958	£7,540,312	£1,289,393	£296,560	£257,879
New Forest West	South East Euro Region	Desmond Swayne (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,415,306	£8,631,618	£1,476,007	£339,482	£295,201
Newark	East Midlands Euro Region	Patrick Mercer (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,507,666	£6,603,180	£1,129,144	£259,703	£225,829
Newbury	South East Euro Region	Richard Benyon (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£11,578,518	£2,153,198	£368,197	£84,685	£73,639
Newcastle upon Tyne Central	North East Euro Region	Chinyelu Onwurah (Labour)	Labour	38	138	£148,776,818	£27,667,268	£4,731,103	£1,088,154	£946,221
Newcastle upon Tyne East	North East Euro Region	Nicholas Brown (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,763,338	£11,671,779	£1,995,874	£459,051	£399,175
Newcastle upon Tyne North	North East Euro Region	Catherine McKinnell (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£35,643,191	£6,628,383	£1,133,453	£260,694	£226,691
Newcastle-under-Lyme	West Midlands Euro Region	Paul Farrelly (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,291,925	£8,794,639	£1,503,883	£345,893	£300,777
Newport East	Wales Euro Region	Jessica Morden (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,905,165	£10,954,294	£1,873,184	£430,832	£374,637
Newport West	Wales Euro Region	Paul Flynn (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,780,547	£11,674,979	£1,996,421	£459,177	£399,284
Newton Abbot	South West Euro Region	Anne-Marie Morris (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,890,643	£11,881,418	£2,031,722	£467,296	£406,344
Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Yvette Cooper (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£90,247,037	£16,782,782	£2,869,856	£660,067	£573,971
North Ayrshire and Arran	Scotland Euro Region	Katy Clark (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£90,271,776	£16,787,383	£2,870,642	£660,248	£574,128
North Cornwall	South West Euro Region	Dan Rogerson (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£46,427,960	£8,633,971	£1,476,409	£339,574	£295,282
North Devon	South West Euro Region	Nick Harvey (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£46,440,614	£8,636,325	£1,476,812	£339,667	£295,362
North Dorset	South West Euro Region	Robert Walter (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,773,517	£6,466,654	£1,105,798	£254,334	£221,160
North Durham	North East Euro Region	Kevan Jones (Labour)	Labour	6	22	£23,516,891	£4,373,317	£747,837	£172,003	£149,567
North East Bedfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	Alistair Burt (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,783,008	£6,468,419	£1,106,100	£254,403	£221,220
North East Cambridgeshire	Eastern Euro Region	Steve Barclay (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£17,377,268	£3,231,562	£552,597	£127,097	£110,519
North East Derbyshire	East Midlands Euro Region	Natascha Engel (Labour)	Labour	6	22	£23,639,509	£4,396,119	£751,736	£172,899	£150,347
North East Fife	Scotland Euro Region	Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	6	22	£23,523,344	£4,374,517	£748,042	£172,050	£149,608
North East Hampshire	South East Euro Region	James Arbuthnot (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,792,498	£6,470,184	£1,106,401	£254,472	£221,280
North East Hertfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	Oliver Heald (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,622,959	£12,947,427	£2,214,010	£509,222	£442,802
North East Somerset	South West Euro Region	Jacob Rees-Mogg (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,201,326	£4,314,633	£737,802	£169,694	£147,560
North Herefordshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Bill Wiggin (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£11,810,074	£2,196,259	£375,560	£86,379	£75,112
North Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	3	11	£17,386,758	£3,233,327	£552,899	£127,167	£110,580
North Shropshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Owen Paterson (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,304,833	£8,797,039	£1,504,294	£345,988	£300,859
North Somerset	South West Euro Region	Liam Fox (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£40,558,031	£7,542,371	£1,289,745	£296,641	£257,949
North Swindon	South West Euro Region	Justin Tomlinson (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,641,940	£12,950,957	£2,214,614	£509,361	£442,923
North Thanet	South East Euro Region	Roger Gale (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,114,038	£10,807,172	£1,848,026	£425,046	£369,605
North Tyneside	North East Euro Region	Mary Glindon (Labour)	Labour	27	98	£105,709,844	£19,658,322	£3,361,573	£773,162	£672,315
North Warwickshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Dan Byles (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£39,431,450	£7,332,866	£1,253,920	£288,402	£250,784
North West Cambridgeshire	Eastern Euro Region	Shailesh Vara (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,217,219	£9,710,571	£1,660,508	£381,917	£332,102
North West Durham	North East Euro Region	Pat Glass (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£15,677,927	£2,915,544	£498,558	£114,668	£99,712
North West Hampshire	South East Euro Region	Sir George Young (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£40,569,103	£7,544,430	£1,290,097	£296,722	£258,019
North West Leicestershire	East Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Bridgen (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,517,346	£6,604,980	£1,129,452	£259,774	£225,890
North West Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	Henry Bellingham (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,231,455	£9,713,218	£1,660,960	£382,021	£332,192
North Wiltshire	South West Euro Region	James Gray (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,207,653	£4,315,809	£738,003	£169,741	£147,601
Northampton North	East Midlands Euro Region	Michael Ellis (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,317,740	£8,799,439	£1,504,704	£346,082	£300,941
Northampton South	East Midlands Euro Region	Brian Binley (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£70,860,445	£13,177,556	£2,253,362	£518,273	£450,672
Norwich North	Eastern Euro Region	Chloe Smith (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,129,856	£10,810,114	£1,848,529	£425,162	£369,706
Norwich South	Eastern Euro Region	Simon Wright (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	22	81	£127,502,895	£23,711,065	£4,054,592	£932,556	£810,918
Nottingham East	East Midlands Euro Region	Chris Leslie (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£78,733,828	£14,641,729	£2,503,736	£575,859	£500,747
Nottingham North	East Midlands Euro Region	Graham Allen (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£39,442,206	£7,334,866	£1,254,262	£288,480	£250,852
Nottingham South	East Midlands Euro Region	Lilian Greenwood (Labour)	Labour	25	92	£98,417,285	£18,302,162	£3,129,670	£719,824	£625,934
Nuneaton	West Midlands Euro Region	Marcus Jones (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£51,246,902	£9,530,126	£1,629,651	£374,820	£325,930
Ochil and South Perthshire	Scotland Euro Region	Gordon Banks (Labour)	Labour	10	36	£39,248,598	£7,298,862	£1,248,105	£287,064	£249,621
Ogmore	Wales Euro Region	Huw Irranca-Davies (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,504,742	£8,090,356	£1,383,451	£318,194	£276,690
Old Bexley and Sidcup	London Euro Region	James Brokenshire (Conservative)	Conservative	19	70	£113,779,537	£21,159,002	£3,618,189	£832,184	£723,638
Oldham East and Saddleworth	North West Euro Region	Debbie Abrahams (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,135,040	£9,509,323	£1,626,094	£374,002	£325,219
Oldham West and Royton	North West Euro Region	Michael Meacher (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£54,932,979	£10,215,607	£1,746,869	£401,780	£349,374
Orkney and Shetland	Scotland Euro Region	Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	1	4	£3,915,179	£728,086	£124,503	£28,636	£24,901
Orpington	London Euro Region	Jo Johnson (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£77,870,422	£14,481,166	£2,476,279	£569,544	£495,256
Oxford East	South East Euro Region	Andrew Smith (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£133,152,959	£24,761,778	£4,234,264	£973,881	£846,853
Oxford West and Abingdon	South East Euro Region	Nicola Blackwood (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,145,673	£10,813,055	£1,849,032	£425,277	£369,806
Paisley and Renfrewshire North	Scotland Euro Region	Jim Sheridan (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£82,602,757	£15,361,214	£2,626,768	£604,157	£525,354
Paisley and Renfrewshire South	Scotland Euro Region	Douglas Alexander (Labour)	Labour	34	124	£133,116,100	£24,754,924	£4,233,092	£973,611	£846,618
Pendle	North West Euro Region	Andrew Stephenson (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£39,259,354	£7,300,862	£1,248,447	£287,143	£249,689
Penistone and Stocksbridge	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Anglea Smith (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£15,682,230	£2,916,344	£498,695	£114,700	£99,739
Penrith and The Border	North West Euro Region	Rory Stewart (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£27,436,373	£5,102,203	£872,477	£200,670	£174,495
Perth and North Perthshire	Scotland Euro Region	Pete Wishart (SNP)	SNP	9	33	£35,652,872	£6,630,183	£1,133,761	£260,765	£226,752
Peterborough	Eastern Euro Region	Stewart Jackson (Conservative)	Conservative	22	81	£127,363,700	£23,685,179	£4,050,166	£931,538	£810,033
Plymouth, Moor View	South West Euro Region	Alison Seabeck (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£23,213,980	£4,316,986	£738,205	£169,787	£147,641
Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport	South West Euro Region	Oliver Colville (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,660,921	£12,954,487	£2,215,217	£509,500	£443,043
Pontypridd	Wales Euro Region	Owen Smith (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,921,299	£10,957,294	£1,873,697	£430,950	£374,739
Poole	South West Euro Region	Robert Syms (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,908,042	£11,884,653	£2,032,276	£467,423	£406,455
Poplar and Limehouse	London Euro Region	Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour)	Labour	31	114	£186,603,741	£34,701,748	£5,933,999	£1,364,820	£1,186,800
Portsmouth North	South East Euro Region	Penny Mordaunt (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,881,228	£17,272,649	£2,953,623	£679,333	£590,725
Portsmouth South	South East Euro Region	Mike Hancock (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	24	88	£138,942,218	£25,838,377	£4,418,363	£1,016,223	£883,673
Preseli Pembrokeshire	Wales Euro Region	Stephen Crabb (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£15,686,532	£2,917,145	£498,832	£114,731	£99,766
Preston	North West Euro Region	Mark Hendrick (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£86,370,579	£16,061,897	£2,746,584	£631,714	£549,317
Pudsey	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Stuart Andrew (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£31,441,902	£5,847,091	£999,852	£229,966	£199,970
Putney	London Euro Region	Justine Greening (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£77,827,893	£14,473,257	£2,474,927	£569,233	£494,985
Rayleigh and Wickford	Eastern Euro Region	Mark Francois (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,161,491	£10,815,997	£1,849,535	£425,393	£369,907
Reading East	South East Euro Region	Robert Wilson (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£104,235,135	£19,384,078	£3,314,677	£762,376	£662,935
Reading West	South East Euro Region	Alok Sharma (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£81,049,627	£15,072,387	£2,577,378	£592,797	£515,476
Redcar	North East Euro Region	Ian Swales (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	19	69	£74,613,209	£13,875,439	£2,372,700	£545,721	£474,540
Redditch	West Midlands Euro Region	Karen Lumley (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£27,571,898	£5,127,406	£876,786	£201,661	£175,357
Reigate	South East Euro Region	Crispin Blunt (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,679,902	£12,958,017	£2,215,821	£509,639	£443,164
Rhondda	Wales Euro Region	Chris Bryant (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,937,433	£10,960,295	£1,874,210	£431,068	£374,842
Ribble Valley	North West Euro Region	Nigel Evans (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£19,629,677	£3,650,431	£624,224	£143,571	£124,845
Richmond (Yorks)	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	William Hague (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,516,574	£8,092,556	£1,383,827	£318,280	£276,765
Richmond Park	London Euro Region	Zac Goldsmith (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£83,860,454	£15,595,102	£2,666,762	£613,355	£533,352
Rochdale	North West Euro Region	Simon Danczuk (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,633,646	£13,879,239	£2,373,350	£545,870	£474,670
Rochester and Strood	South East Euro Region	Mark Reckless (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£98,498,075	£18,317,186	£3,132,239	£720,415	£626,448
Rochford and Southend East	Eastern Euro Region	James Duddridge (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£121,740,526	£22,639,466	£3,871,349	£890,410	£774,270
Romford	London Euro Region	Andrew Rosindell (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£41,907,327	£7,793,292	£1,332,653	£306,510	£266,531
Romsey and Southampton North	South East Euro Region	Caroline Nokes (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£29,017,475	£5,396,232	£922,756	£212,234	£184,551
Ross, Skye and Lochaber	Scotland Euro Region	Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	7	26	£27,443,902	£5,103,603	£872,716	£200,725	£174,543
Rossendale and Darwen	North West Euro Region	Jake Berry (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,528,405	£8,094,756	£1,384,203	£318,367	£276,841
Rother Valley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Kevin Barron (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,066,974	£8,008,946	£1,369,530	£314,992	£273,906
Rotherham	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Sarah Champion (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£70,473,230	£13,105,548	£2,241,049	£515,441	£448,210
Rugby	West Midlands Euro Region	Mark Pawsey (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£51,260,885	£9,532,726	£1,630,096	£374,922	£326,019
Ruislip Northwood and Pinner	London Euro Region	Nick Hurd (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£89,801,415	£16,699,912	£2,855,685	£656,808	£571,137

Runnymede and Weybridge	South East Euro Region	Philip Hammond (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£86,957,519	£16,171,047	£2,765,249	£636,007	£553,050
Rushcliffe	East Midlands Euro Region	Kenneth Clarke (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,527,026	£6,606,780	£1,129,759	£259,845	£225,952
Rutherglen and Hamilton West	Scotland Euro Region	Tom Greatrex (Labour)	Labour	32	116	£125,285,741	£23,298,752	£3,984,087	£916,340	£796,817
Rutland and Melton	East Midlands Euro Region	Alan Duncan (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£23,645,963	£4,397,319	£751,942	£172,947	£150,388
Saffron Walden	Eastern Euro Region	Alan Haselhurst (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£29,025,384	£5,397,703	£923,007	£212,292	£184,601
Salford and Eccles	North West Euro Region	Hazel Blears (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£98,202,165	£18,262,157	£3,122,829	£718,251	£624,566
Salisbury	South West Euro Region	John Glen (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,453,268	£8,638,678	£1,477,214	£339,759	£295,443
Scarborough and Whitby	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Robert Goodwill (Conservative)	Conservative	16	58	£62,797,757	£11,678,179	£1,996,969	£459,303	£399,394
Scunthorpe	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Nic Dakin (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,835,618	£11,685,220	£1,998,173	£459,580	£399,635
Sedgefield	North East Euro Region	Phil Wilson (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,837,339	£11,685,540	£1,998,227	£459,592	£399,645
Sefton Central	North West Euro Region	Bill Esterton (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,240,297	£8,785,038	£1,502,241	£345,516	£300,448
Selby and Ainsty	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Nigel Adams (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£27,451,431	£5,105,003	£872,956	£200,780	£174,591
Sevenoaks	South East Euro Region	Michael Fallon (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,465,922	£8,641,031	£1,477,616	£339,852	£295,523
Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	David Blunkett (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,149,023	£9,511,923	£1,626,539	£374,104	£325,308
Sheffield Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Paul Blomfield (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£90,049,127	£16,745,978	£2,863,562	£658,619	£572,712
Sheffield Hallam	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	4	15	£15,690,834	£2,917,945	£498,969	£114,763	£99,794
Sheffield Heeley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Meg Munn (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£47,253,204	£8,787,438	£1,502,652	£345,610	£300,530
Sheffield South East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Clive Betts (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,953,567	£10,963,295	£1,874,723	£431,186	£374,945
Sherwood	East Midlands Euro Region	Mark Spencer (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£39,452,962	£7,336,867	£1,254,604	£288,559	£250,921
Shipley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Philip Davies (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,662,552	£6,631,983	£1,134,069	£260,836	£226,814
Shrewsbury and Atcham	West Midlands Euro Region	Daniel Kawczynski (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,330,647	£8,801,840	£1,505,115	£346,176	£301,023
Sittingbourne and Sheppey	South East Euro Region	Gordon Henderson (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,177,309	£10,818,938	£1,850,038	£425,509	£370,008
Skipton and Ripon	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Julian Smith (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£23,491,077	£4,368,516	£747,016	£171,814	£149,403
Sleaford and North Hykeham	East Midlands Euro Region	Stephen Phillips (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£19,694,213	£3,662,433	£626,276	£144,043	£125,255
Slough	South East Euro Region	Fiona Mactaggart (Labour)	Labour	28	102	£162,099,255	£30,144,774	£5,154,756	£1,185,594	£1,030,951
Solihull	West Midlands Euro Region	Lorely Burt (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	11	40	£43,362,763	£8,063,952	£1,378,936	£317,155	£275,787
Somerton and Frome	South West Euro Region	David Heath (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	4	15	£23,220,307	£4,318,162	£738,406	£169,833	£147,681
South Basildon and East Thurrock	Eastern Euro Region	Stephen Metcalfe (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,925,442	£11,887,889	£2,032,829	£467,551	£406,566
South Cambridgeshire	Eastern Euro Region	Andrew Lansley (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,226,634	£4,319,339	£738,607	£169,880	£147,721
South Derbyshire	East Midlands Euro Region	Heather Wheeler (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£23,620,148	£4,392,519	£751,121	£172,758	£150,224
South Dorset	South West Euro Region	Richard Drax (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,208,944	£10,824,821	£1,851,044	£425,740	£370,209
South East Cambridgeshire	Eastern Euro Region	James Paice (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£29,033,293	£5,399,174	£923,259	£212,350	£184,652
South East Cornwall	South West Euro Region	Sheryll Murray (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£29,041,201	£5,400,644	£923,510	£212,407	£184,702
South Holland and The Deepings	East Midlands Euro Region	John Hayes (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,374,595	£8,066,153	£1,379,312	£317,242	£275,862
South Leicestershire	East Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Robathan (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£19,699,591	£3,663,433	£626,447	£144,083	£125,289
South Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	Richard Bacon (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,232,961	£4,320,516	£738,808	£169,926	£147,762
South Northamptonshire	East Midlands Euro Region	Andrea Leadsom (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£15,755,370	£2,929,946	£501,021	£115,235	£100,204
South Ribble	North West Euro Region	Lorraine Fullbrook (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,672,232	£6,633,784	£1,134,377	£260,907	£226,875
South Shields	North East Euro Region	David Miliband (Labour)	Labour	21	76	£82,218,768	£15,289,806	£2,614,557	£601,348	£522,911
South Staffordshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Gavin Williamson (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£15,759,673	£2,930,746	£501,158	£115,266	£100,232
South Suffolk	Eastern Euro Region	Tim Yeo (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£29,049,110	£5,402,115	£923,762	£212,465	£184,752
South Swindon	South West Euro Region	Robert Buckland (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£98,524,965	£18,322,186	£3,133,094	£720,612	£626,619
South Thanet	South East Euro Region	Laura Sandys (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,698,883	£12,961,547	£2,216,424	£509,778	£443,285
South West Bedfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	Andrew Selous (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,942,841	£11,891,125	£2,033,382	£467,678	£406,676
South West Devon	South West Euro Region	Gary Streeter (Conservative)	Conservative	1	4	£5,789,259	£1,076,599	£184,098	£42,343	£36,820
South West Hertfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	David Gauke (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,960,241	£11,894,361	£2,033,936	£467,805	£406,787
South West Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	Elizabeth Truss (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£29,057,019	£5,403,586	£924,013	£212,523	£184,803
South West Surrey	South East Euro Region	Jeremy Hunt (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,478,576	£8,643,384	£1,478,019	£339,944	£295,604
South West Wiltshire	South West Euro Region	Andrew Murrison (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,491,230	£8,645,738	£1,478,421	£340,037	£295,684
Southampton Itchen	South East Euro Region	John Denham (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£121,840,177	£22,657,998	£3,874,518	£891,139	£774,904
Southampton Test	South East Euro Region	Alan Whitehead (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£86,981,245	£16,175,460	£2,766,004	£636,181	£553,201
Southend West	Eastern Euro Region	David Amess (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£75,404,309	£14,022,556	£2,397,857	£551,507	£479,571
Southport	North West Euro Region	John Pugh (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	14	51	£54,948,037	£10,218,407	£1,747,348	£401,890	£349,470
Spelthorne	South East Euro Region	Kwasi Kwarteng (Conservative)	Conservative	19	70	£109,995,923	£20,455,382	£3,497,870	£804,510	£699,574
St. Albans	Eastern Euro Region	Anne Main (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,259,927	£9,718,513	£1,661,866	£382,229	£332,373
St. Austell and Newquay	South West Euro Region	Stephen Gilbert (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£46,503,885	£8,648,091	£1,478,824	£340,129	£295,765
St. Helens North	North West Euro Region	Dave Watts (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,839,060	£11,685,860	£1,998,282	£459,605	£399,656
St. Helens South and Whiston	North West Euro Region	Shaun Woodward (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£86,441,569	£16,075,099	£2,748,842	£632,234	£549,768
St. Ives	South West Euro Region	Andrew George (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£28,946,295	£5,382,995	£920,492	£211,713	£184,098
Stafford	West Midlands Euro Region	Jeremy Lefroy (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,536,707	£6,608,581	£1,130,067	£259,915	£226,013
Staffordshire Moorlands	West Midlands Euro Region	Karen Bradley (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£19,704,969	£3,664,433	£626,618	£144,122	£125,324
Stalybridge and Hyde	North West Euro Region	Jonathan Reynolds (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£54,978,154	£10,224,008	£1,748,305	£402,110	£349,661
Stevenage	Eastern Euro Region	Stephen McPartland (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£75,424,872	£14,026,380	£2,398,511	£551,658	£479,702
Stirling	Scotland Euro Region	Anne McGuire (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,840,781	£11,686,180	£1,998,337	£459,617	£399,667
Stockport	North West Euro Region	Ann Coffey (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,163,005	£9,514,524	£1,626,984	£374,206	£325,397
Stockton North	North East Euro Region	Alex Cunningham (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£98,229,055	£18,267,158	£3,123,684	£718,447	£624,737
Stockton South	North East Euro Region	James Wharton (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£51,176,988	£9,517,124	£1,627,428	£374,308	£325,486
Stoke-on-Trent Central	West Midlands Euro Region	Tristram Hunt (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£63,090,320	£11,732,586	£2,006,272	£461,443	£401,254
Stoke-on-Trent North	West Midlands Euro Region	Joan Walley (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£43,386,426	£8,068,353	£1,379,688	£317,328	£275,938
Stoke-on-Trent South	West Midlands Euro Region	Robert Flello (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£35,546,387	£6,610,381	£1,130,375	£259,986	£226,075
Stone	West Midlands Euro Region	William Cash (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£31,536,555	£5,864,693	£1,002,862	£230,658	£200,572
Stourbridge	West Midlands Euro Region	Margot James (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£39,463,718	£7,338,867	£1,254,946	£288,638	£250,989
Stratford-on-Avon	West Midlands Euro Region	Nadhim Zahawi (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£27,579,427	£5,128,806	£877,026	£201,716	£175,405
Streatham	London Euro Region	Chuka Umunna (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£107,791,141	£20,045,370	£3,427,758	£788,384	£685,552
Stretford and Urmston	North West Euro Region	Kate Green (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£74,388,409	£13,833,634	£2,365,551	£544,077	£473,110
Stroud	South West Euro Region	Neil Carmichael (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,801,989	£6,471,949	£1,106,703	£254,542	£221,341
Suffolk Coastal	Eastern Euro Region	Therese Coffey (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,516,539	£8,650,444	£1,479,226	£340,222	£295,845
Sunderland Central	North East Euro Region	Julie Elliott (Labour)	Labour	30	109	£117,455,383	£21,842,580	£3,735,081	£859,069	£747,016
Surrey Heath	South East Euro Region	Michael Gove (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£75,445,435	£14,030,204	£2,399,165	£551,808	£479,833
Sutton and Cheam	London Euro Region	Paul Burstow (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	16	59	£95,788,176	£17,813,240	£3,046,064	£700,595	£609,213
Sutton Coldfield	West Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Mitchell (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,398,258	£8,070,553	£1,380,065	£317,415	£276,013
Swansea East	Wales Euro Region	Sian James (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£15,695,137	£2,918,745	£499,105	£114,794	£99,821
Swansea West	Wales Euro Region	Geraint Davies (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£54,993,212	£10,226,808	£1,748,784	£402,220	£349,757
Tamworth	West Midlands Euro Region	Christopher Pincher (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,410,090	£8,072,754	£1,380,441	£317,501	£276,088
Tatton	North West Euro Region	George Osborne (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£27,458,960	£5,106,403	£873,195	£200,835	£174,639
Taunton Deane	South West Euro Region	Jeremy Browne (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£46,529,193	£8,652,797	£1,479,628	£340,315	£295,926
Telford	West Midlands Euro Region	David Wright (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£39,474,474	£7,340,867	£1,255,288	£288,716	£251,058
Tewkesbury	South West Euro Region	Laurence Robertson (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,288,398	£9,723,807	£1,662,771	£382,437	£332,554
The Cotswolds	South West Euro Region	Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,811,479	£6,473,714	£1,107,005	£254,611	£221,401
The Wrekin	West Midlands Euro Region	Mark Pritchard (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£39,366,914	£7,320,865	£1,251,868	£287,930	£250,374
Thirsk and Malton	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Anne McIntosh (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,266,111	£8,789,838	£1,503,062	£345,704	£300,612
Thornbury and Yate	South West Euro Region	Steve Webb (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	6	22	£34,820,970	£6,475,479	£1,107,307	£254,681	£221,461
Thurrock	Eastern Euro Region	Jackie Doyle-Price (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£75,260,368	£13,995,788	£2,393,280	£550,454	£478,656
Tiverton and Honiton	South West Euro Region	Neil Parish (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£52,302,634	£9,726,455	£1,663,224	£382,541	£332,645
Tonbridge and Malling	South East Euro Region	John Stanley (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,541,847	£8,655,150	£1,480,031	£340,407	£296,006

Tooting	London Euro Region	Sadiq Khan (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£137,695,503	£25,606,532	£4,378,717	£1,007,105	£875,743
Torbay	South West Euro Region	Adrian Sanders (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	18	66	£104,206,664	£19,378,783	£3,313,772	£762,168	£662,754
Torfaen	Wales Euro Region	Paul Murphy (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,190,971	£9,519,724	£1,627,873	£374,411	£325,575
Torridge and West Devon	South West Euro Region	Geoffrey Cox (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£23,157,036	£4,306,396	£736,394	£169,371	£147,279
Totnes	South West Euro Region	Sarah Wollaston (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,554,501	£8,657,504	£1,480,433	£340,500	£296,087
Tottenham	London Euro Region	David Lammy (Labour)	Labour	32	117	£191,576,351	£35,626,479	£6,092,128	£1,401,189	£1,218,426
Truro and Falmouth	South West Euro Region	Sarah Newton (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,567,155	£8,659,857	£1,480,836	£340,592	£296,167
Tunbridge Wells	South East Euro Region	Greg Clark (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£40,580,175	£7,546,489	£1,290,450	£296,803	£258,090
Twickenham	London Euro Region	Vincent Cable (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	14	51	£83,814,654	£15,586,585	£2,665,306	£613,020	£533,061
Tynemouth	North East Euro Region	Alan Campbell (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£39,270,110	£7,302,863	£1,248,790	£287,222	£249,758
Uxbridge and South Ruislip	London Euro Region	John Randall (Conservative)	Conservative	19	70	£113,748,459	£21,153,222	£3,617,201	£831,956	£723,440
Vale of Clwyd	Wales Euro Region	Chris Ruane (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,969,701	£10,966,295	£1,875,236	£431,304	£375,047
Vale of Glamorgan	Wales Euro Region	Alun Cairns (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£31,450,507	£5,848,691	£1,000,126	£230,029	£200,025
Vauxhall	London Euro Region	Kate Hoey (Labour)	Labour	33	121	£197,563,112	£36,739,807	£6,282,507	£1,444,977	£1,256,501
Wakefield	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Mary Creagh (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,985,835	£10,969,296	£1,875,750	£431,422	£375,150
Wallasey	North West Euro Region	Angela Eagle (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£15,660,718	£2,912,344	£498,011	£114,542	£99,602
Walsall North	West Midlands Euro Region	David Winnick (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,274,868	£9,535,326	£1,630,541	£375,024	£326,108
Walsall South	West Midlands Euro Region	Valerie Vaz (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,288,850	£9,537,927	£1,630,985	£375,127	£326,197
Walthamstow	London Euro Region	Stella Creasy (Labour)	Labour	28	103	£167,856,309	£31,215,756	£5,337,894	£1,227,716	£1,067,579
Wansbeck	North East Euro Region	Ian Lavery (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£50,897,332	£9,465,118	£1,618,535	£372,263	£323,707
Wantage	South East Euro Region	Edward Vaizey (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£40,591,248	£7,548,548	£1,290,802	£296,884	£258,160
Warley	West Midlands Euro Region	John Spellar (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£62,987,062	£11,713,384	£2,002,989	£460,687	£400,598
Warrington North	North West Euro Region	Helen Jones (Labour)	Labour	10	36	£39,151,794	£7,280,860	£1,245,027	£286,356	£249,005
Warrington South	North West Euro Region	David Mowat (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£66,558,050	£12,377,462	£2,116,546	£486,806	£423,309
Warwick and Leamington	West Midlands Euro Region	Chris White (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,343,554	£8,804,240	£1,505,525	£346,271	£301,105
Washington and Sunderland West	North East Euro Region	Sharon Hodgson (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£46,982,153	£8,737,032	£1,494,032	£343,627	£298,806
Watford	Eastern Euro Region	Richard Harrington (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,906,536	£17,277,356	£2,954,428	£679,518	£590,886
Waveney	Eastern Euro Region	Peter Aldous (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£87,004,972	£16,179,872	£2,766,758	£636,354	£553,352
Wealden	South East Euro Region	Charles Hendry (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£58,367,120	£10,854,236	£1,856,074	£426,897	£371,215
Weaver Vale	North West Euro Region	Graham Evans (Conservative)	Conservative	16	58	£62,842,502	£11,686,500	£1,998,392	£459,630	£399,678
Wellingborough	East Midlands Euro Region	Peter Bone (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£43,421,921	£8,074,954	£1,380,817	£317,588	£276,163
Wells	South West Euro Region	Tessa Munt (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	12	44	£69,717,864	£12,965,077	£2,217,028	£509,916	£443,406
Welwyn Hatfield	Eastern Euro Region	Grant Shapps (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£98,417,405	£18,302,184	£3,129,673	£719,825	£625,935
Wentworth and Dearne	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	John Healey (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£54,812,512	£10,193,204	£1,743,038	£400,899	£348,608
West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine	Scotland Euro Region	Sir Robert Smith (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£19,575,897	£3,640,430	£622,514	£143,178	£124,503
West Bromwich East	West Midlands Euro Region	Tom Watson (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£59,050,371	£10,981,297	£1,877,802	£431,894	£375,560
West Bromwich West	West Midlands Euro Region	Adrian Bailey (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,302,833	£9,540,527	£1,631,430	£375,229	£326,286
West Dorset	South West Euro Region	Oliver Letwin (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,906,385	£6,491,363	£1,110,023	£255,305	£222,005
West Dunbartonshire	Scotland Euro Region	Gemma Doyle (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£86,133,947	£16,017,892	£2,739,060	£629,984	£547,812
West Ham	London Euro Region	Lyn Brown (Labour)	Labour	42	154	£251,443,961	£46,759,754	£7,995,918	£1,839,061	£1,599,184
West Lancashire	North West Euro Region	Rosie Cooper (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£59,001,969	£10,972,296	£1,876,263	£431,540	£375,253
West Suffolk	Eastern Euro Region	Matt Hancock (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£121,607,658	£22,614,757	£3,867,124	£889,438	£773,425
West Worcestershire	West Midlands Euro Region	Harriett Baldwin (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£15,746,766	£2,928,346	£500,747	£115,172	£100,149
Westminster North	London Euro Region	Karen Buck (Labour)	Labour	24	88	£143,682,264	£26,719,860	£4,569,096	£1,050,892	£913,819
Westmorland and Lonsdale	North West Euro Region	Tim Farron (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£31,459,112	£5,850,291	£1,000,400	£230,092	£200,080
Weston-Super-Mare	South West Euro Region	John Penrose (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£63,681,850	£11,842,590	£2,025,083	£465,769	£405,017
Wigan	North West Euro Region	Lisa Nandy (Labour)	Labour	24	87	£93,964,306	£17,474,064	£2,988,065	£687,255	£597,613
Wimbledon	London Euro Region	Stephen Hammond (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£107,761,698	£20,039,895	£3,426,822	£788,169	£685,364
Winchester	South East Euro Region	Steve Brine (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£34,735,555	£6,459,594	£1,104,591	£254,056	£220,918
Windsor	South East Euro Region	Adam Afriyie (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,736,846	£12,968,606	£2,217,632	£510,055	£443,526
Wirral South	North West Euro Region	Alison McGovern (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£11,764,899	£2,187,858	£374,124	£86,048	£74,825
Wirral West	North West Euro Region	Esther McVey (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£7,832,510	£1,456,572	£249,074	£57,287	£49,815
Witham	Eastern Euro Region	Priti Patel (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£40,524,814	£7,536,193	£1,288,689	£296,398	£257,738
Witney	South East Euro Region	David Cameron (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£46,314,073	£8,612,792	£1,472,788	£338,741	£294,558
Woking	South East Euro Region	Jonathan Lord (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£69,471,109	£12,919,189	£2,209,181	£508,112	£441,836
Wokingham	South East Euro Region	John Redwood (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£17,367,777	£3,229,797	£552,295	£127,028	£110,459
Wolverhampton North East	West Midlands Euro Region	Emma Reynolds (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,330,799	£9,545,727	£1,632,319	£375,433	£326,464
Wolverhampton South East	West Midlands Euro Region	Patrick McFadden (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£51,176,988	£9,517,124	£1,627,428	£374,308	£325,486
Wolverhampton South West	West Midlands Euro Region	Paul Uppal (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£82,670,519	£15,373,816	£2,628,923	£604,652	£525,785
Worcester	West Midlands Euro Region	Robin Walker (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£47,356,461	£8,806,640	£1,505,935	£346,365	£301,187
Workington	North West Euro Region	Tony Cunningham (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£11,745,538	£2,184,258	£373,508	£85,907	£74,702
Worsley and Eccles South	North West Euro Region	Barbabra Keeley (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£58,727,691	£10,921,290	£1,867,541	£429,534	£373,508
Worthing West	South East Euro Region	Peter Bottomley (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£92,628,146	£17,225,585	£2,945,575	£677,482	£589,115
Wrexham	Wales Euro Region	Ian Lucas (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£62,844,223	£11,686,820	£1,998,446	£459,643	£399,689
Wycombe	South East Euro Region	Steve Baker (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£86,838,886	£16,148,986	£2,761,477	£635,140	£552,295
Wyre and Preston North	North West Euro Region	Ben Wallace (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£31,321,435	£5,824,688	£996,022	£229,085	£199,204
Wyre Forest	West Midlands Euro Region	Mark Garnier (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£35,556,068	£6,612,181	£1,130,683	£260,057	£226,137
Wythenshawe and Sale East	North West Euro Region	Paul Goggins (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£98,255,945	£18,272,158	£3,124,539	£718,644	£624,908
Yeovil	South West Euro Region	David Laws (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£52,103,332	£9,689,392	£1,656,886	£381,084	£331,377
Ynys Mon	Wales Euro Region	Albert Owen (Labour)	Labour	7	25	£27,406,256	£5,096,602	£871,519	£200,449	£174,304
York Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Hugh Bayley (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£97,879,486	£18,202,150	£3,112,568	£715,891	£622,514
York Outer	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro Re	Julian Sturdy (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£7,830,359	£1,456,172	£249,005	£57,271	£49,801

Estimates for April 2012 to March 2013					**33016**	**£1,526,900,836**
Westminster constituency name	**Region**	**11/2012 general and by-election win**	**11/2012 Member of Parliament**	**Count of betting shop licenses**	**Count of FOBTs**	**GROSS GAMBLING YIELD (amount gamblers lost on FOBTs)**
Cities of London and Westminster	London Euro Region	Mark Field (Conservative)	Conservative	121	443	£25,708,019
Holborn and St. Pancras	London Euro Region	Frank Dobson (Labour)	Labour	57	209	£12,110,389
Bethnal Green and Bow	London Euro Region	Rushanara Ali (Labour)	Labour	45	165	£9,560,833
Bermondsey and Old Southwark	London Euro Region	Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	42	154	£8,925,883
West Ham	London Euro Region	Lyn Brown (Labour)	Labour	42	154	£8,923,444
Glasgow Central	Scotland Euro Region	Anas Sarwar (Labour)	Labour	64	233	£8,892,481
Hammersmith	London Euro Region	Andrew Slaughter (Labour)	Labour	41	150	£8,710,981
Brent Central	London Euro Region	Sarah Teather (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	40	146	£8,498,519
Brent North	London Euro Region	Barry Gardiner (Labour)	Labour	38	139	£8,073,593
Hackney North and Stoke Newington	London Euro Region	Diane Abbott (Labour)	Labour	36	132	£7,648,667
Camberwell and Peckham	London Euro Region	Harriet Harman (Labour)	Labour	35	128	£7,436,204
East Ham	London Euro Region	Stephen Timms (Labour)	Labour	34	125	£7,263,215
Liverpool Riverside	North West Euro Region	Louise Ellman (Labour)	Labour	52	189	£7,227,126
Brentford and Isleworth	London Euro Region	Mary McLeod (Conservative)	Conservative	34	124	£7,223,741
Vauxhall	London Euro Region	Kate Hoey (Labour)	Labour	33	121	£7,011,278
Manchester Central	North West Euro Region	Lucy Powell (Labour)	Labour	50	182	£6,947,251
Islington South and Finsbury	London Euro Region	Emily Thornberry (Labour)	Labour	32	118	£6,835,967
Tottenham	London Euro Region	David Lammy (Labour)	Labour	32	117	£6,798,815
Poplar and Limehouse	London Euro Region	Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour)	Labour	31	114	£6,622,343
Hackney South and Shoreditch	London Euro Region	Meg Hillier (Labour)	Labour	31	114	£6,604,347
Feltham and Heston	London Euro Region	Seema Malhotra (Labour)	Labour	30	111	£6,426,134
Ilford South	London Euro Region	Mike Gapes (Labour)	Labour	30	111	£6,417,426
Croydon Central	London Euro Region	Gavin Barwell (Conservative)	Conservative	30	110	£6,408,719
Greenwich and Woolwich	London Euro Region	Nick Raynsford (Labour)	Labour	30	110	£6,400,011
Croydon North	London Euro Region	Steve Reed (Labour)	Labour	30	110	£6,391,304
Islington North	London Euro Region	Jeremy Corbyn (Labour)	Labour	30	110	£6,373,889
Hornsey and Wood Green	London Euro Region	Lynne Featherstone (Liberal Democra	Lib-Dem	29	106	£6,161,426
Birmingham Ladywood	West Midlands Euro Region	Shabana Mahmood (Labour)	Labour	43	157	£6,007,464
Walthamstow	London Euro Region	Stella Creasy (Labour)	Labour	28	103	£5,957,090
Lewisham, Deptford	London Euro Region	Joan Ruddock (Labour)	Labour	28	102	£5,948,963
Slough	South East Euro Region	Fiona Mactaggart (Labour)	Labour	28	102	£5,752,708
Hampstead and Kilburn	London Euro Region	Glenda Jackson (Labour)	Labour	27	99	£5,744,337
Ilford North	London Euro Region	Lee Scott (Conservative)	Conservative	27	99	£5,736,500
Kensington	London Euro Region	Sir Malcolm Rifkind (Conservative)	Conservative	26	95	£5,524,037
Harrow West	London Euro Region	Gareth Thomas (Labour)	Labour	25	92	£5,311,574
Newcastle upon Tyne Central	North East Euro Region	Chinyelu Onwurah (Labour)	Labour	38	138	£5,279,911
Bristol West	South West Euro Region	Stephen Williams (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	25	92	£5,136,346
Hendon	London Euro Region	Matthew Offord (Conservative)	Conservative	24	88	£5,100,504
Westminster North	London Euro Region	Karen Buck (Labour)	Labour	24	88	£5,099,111
Glasgow North East	Scotland Euro Region	Willie Bain (Labour)	Labour	36	131	£5,002,021
Portsmouth South	South East Euro Region	Mike Hancock (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	24	88	£4,930,893
Ealing Central and Acton	London Euro Region	Angie Bray (Conservative)	Conservative	23	84	£4,894,659
Lewisham East	London Euro Region	Heidi Alexander (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£4,887,983
Tooting	London Euro Region	Sadiq Khan (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£4,886,648
Leeds Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Hilary Benn (Labour)	Labour	35	127	£4,863,076
Edinburgh North and Leith	Scotland Euro Region	Mark Lazararowicz (Labour)	Labour	34	125	£4,763,066
Oxford East	South East Euro Region	Andrew Smith (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£4,725,439
Paisley and Renfrewshire South	Scotland Euro Region	Douglas Alexander (Labour)	Labour	34	124	£4,724,131
Lewisham West and Penge	London Euro Region	Jim Dowd (Labour)	Labour	22	81	£4,685,679
Hayes and Harlington	London Euro Region	John McDonnell (Labour)	Labour	22	81	£4,684,402
Ealing, Southall	London Euro Region	Virendra Sharma (Labour)	Labour	22	81	£4,680,571
Leyton and Wanstead	London Euro Region	John Cryer (Labour)	Labour	22	81	£4,674,185

Liverpool Walton	North West Euro Region	Steve Rotheram (Labour)	Labour	33	120	£4,585,186
Norwich South	Eastern Euro Region	Simon Wright (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	22	81	£4,524,925
Bournemouth West	South West Euro Region	Conor Burns (Conservative)	Conservative	22	81	£4,521,220
Peterborough	Eastern Euro Region	Stewart Jackson (Conservative)	Conservative	22	81	£4,519,985
Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock	Scotland Euro Region	Sandra Osborne (Labour)	Labour	32	118	£4,507,315
Aberdeen North	Scotland Euro Region	Frank Doran (Labour)	Labour	32	117	£4,482,885
Finchley and Golders Green	London Euro Region	Mike Freer (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£4,469,037
Mitcham and Morden	London Euro Region	Siobhain McDonagh (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£4,461,722
Rutherglen and Hamilton West	Scotland Euro Region	Tom Greatrex (Labour)	Labour	32	116	£4,446,241
Liverpool Wavertree	North West Euro Region	Luciana Berger (Labour)	Labour	31	115	£4,378,295
Bootle	North West Euro Region	Joe Benton (Labour)	Labour	31	114	£4,366,462
Southampton Itchen	South East Euro Region	John Denham (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£4,323,962
Rochford and Southend East	Eastern Euro Region	James Dudridge (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£4,320,425
West Suffolk	Eastern Euro Region	Matt Hancock (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£4,315,710
Bedford	Eastern Euro Region	Richard Fuller (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£4,314,531
Middlesbrough	North East Euro Region	Andy McDonald (Labour)	Labour	31	113	£4,307,296
Chelsea and Fulham	London Euro Region	Greg Hands (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£4,251,581
Battersea	London Euro Region	Jane Ellison (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£4,250,420
Chingford and Woodford Green	London Euro Region	Iain Duncan Smith (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£4,249,259
Blackpool South	North West Euro Region	Gordon Marsden (Labour)	Labour	30	110	£4,179,802
Sunderland Central	North East Euro Region	Julie Elliott (Labour)	Labour	30	109	£4,168,351
Ipswich	Eastern Euro Region	Ben Gummer (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£4,113,568
Broxbourne	Eastern Euro Region	Charles Walker (Conservative)	Conservative	20	73	£4,111,323
Cambridge	Eastern Euro Region	Julian Huppert (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	20	73	£4,110,200
Luton South	Eastern Euro Region	Gavin Shuker (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£4,109,077
Leicester South	East Midlands Euro Region	Jonathan Ashworth (Labour)	Labour	29	106	£4,051,545
Doncaster Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Rosie Winterton (Labour)	Labour	29	106	£4,040,475
Harrow East	London Euro Region	Bob Blackman (Conservative)	Conservative	19	70	£4,040,105
Erith and Thamesmead	London Euro Region	Teresa Pearce (Labour)	Labour	19	70	£4,039,002
Old Bexley and Sidcup	London Euro Region	James Brokenshire (Conservative)	Conservative	19	70	£4,037,899
Uxbridge and South Ruislip	London Euro Region	John Randall (Conservative)	Conservative	19	70	£4,036,796
Glasgow East	Scotland Euro Region	Margaret Curran (Labour)	Labour	29	106	£4,029,406
Brighton Pavilion	South East Euro Region	Caroline Lucas (Green)	Green	19	70	£3,906,823
Bristol South	South West Euro Region	Dawn Primarolo (Labour)	Labour	19	70	£3,904,690
Spelthorne	South East Euro Region	Kwasi Kwarteng (Conservative)	Conservative	19	70	£3,903,623
Falkirk	Scotland Euro Region	Eric Joyce (Labour)	Labour	28	102	£3,890,461
Streatham	London Euro Region	Chuka Umunna (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£3,825,378
Wimbledon	London Euro Region	Stephen Hammond (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£3,824,333
Motherwell and Wishaw	Scotland Euro Region	Frank Roy (Labour)	Labour	27	99	£3,761,822
Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Alan Johnson (Labour)	Labour	27	98	£3,756,669
North Tyneside	North East Euro Region	Mary Glindon (Labour)	Labour	27	98	£3,751,516
Great Yarmouth	Eastern Euro Region	Brandon Lewis (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£3,700,190
Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	South East Euro Region	Nick Gibb (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£3,699,180
Reading East	South East Euro Region	Robert Wilson (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£3,699,180
Torbay	South West Euro Region	Adrian Sanders (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	18	66	£3,698,169
Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill	Scotland Euro Region	Tom Clarke (Labour)	Labour	26	95	£3,622,495
Linlithgow and East Falkirk	Scotland Euro Region	Michael Connarty (Labour)	Labour	26	95	£3,618,029
Edinburgh East	Scotland Euro Region	Sheila Gilmore (Labour)	Labour	26	95	£3,617,533
Huddersfield	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Barry Sheerman (Labour)	Labour	26	95	£3,612,571
Dulwich and West Norwood	London Euro Region	Tessa Jowell (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£3,611,870
South Swindon	South West Euro Region	Robert Buckland (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£3,496,533
Rochester and Strood	South East Euro Region	Mark Reckless (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£3,495,578
Epping Forest	Eastern Euro Region	Eleanor Laing (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£3,494,624
Crawley	South East Euro Region	Henry Smith (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£3,493,670
Derby South	East Midlands Euro Region	Margaret Beckett (Labour)	Labour	25	92	£3,493,666
Welwyn Hatfield	Eastern Euro Region	Grant Shapps (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£3,492,716
Nottingham South	East Midlands Euro Region	Lilian Greenwood (Labour)	Labour	25	92	£3,492,711
Wythenshawe and Sale East	North West Euro Region	Paul Goggins (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£3,486,986
Stockton North	North East Euro Region	Alex Cunningham (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£3,486,031
Salford and Eccles	North West Euro Region	Hazel Blears (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£3,485,077
Gateshead	North East Euro Region	Ian Mearns (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£3,483,168
Bolton South East	North West Euro Region	Yasmin Qureshi (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£3,478,397

York Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Hugh Bayley (Labour)	Labour	25	91	£3,473,625
Carshalton and Wallington	London Euro Region	Tom Brake (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	16	59	£3,400,336
Sutton and Cheam	London Euro Region	Paul Burstow (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	16	59	£3,399,407
Ashton-under-Lyne	North West Euro Region	David Heyes (Labour)	Labour	24	87	£3,338,345
Bradford West	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	George Galloway (Respect)	Respect	24	87	£3,337,429
Wigan	North West Euro Region	Lisa Nandy (Labour)	Labour	24	87	£3,334,680
Watford	Eastern Euro Region	Richard Harrington (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,297,141
Portsmouth North	South East Euro Region	Penny Mordaunt (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,296,243
Hove	South East Euro Region	Mike Weatherley (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,293,549
Hertford and Stortford	Eastern Euro Region	Mark Prisk (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,292,651
Gloucester	South West Euro Region	Richard Graham (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,291,753
Esher and Walton	South East Euro Region	Dominic Raab (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,290,854
Epsom and Ewell	South East Euro Region	Chris Grayling (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,289,956
Eastbourne	South East Euro Region	Stephen Lloyd (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	16	59	£3,289,058
Aldershot	South East Euro Region	Gerald Howarth (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,288,160
Worthing West	South East Euro Region	Peter Bottomley (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£3,287,262
North Ayrshire and Arran	Scotland Euro Region	Katy Clark (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£3,203,637
Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Yvette Cooper (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£3,202,759
Kingston and Surbiton	Scotland Euro Region	Ed Davey (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	23	84	£3,200,125
Sheffield Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Paul Blomfield (Labour)	Labour	23	84	£3,195,735
Eltham	London Euro Region	Clive Efford (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£3,188,686
Ealing North	London Euro Region	Stephen Pound (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£3,187,815
Ruislip Northwood and Pinner	London Euro Region	Nick Hurd (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£3,186,944
Waveney	Eastern Euro Region	Peter Aldous (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£3,087,702
Southampton Test	South East Euro Region	Alan Whitehead (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£3,086,860
Runnymede and Weybridge	South East Euro Region	Philip Hammond (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£3,086,018
Hemel Hempstead	Eastern Euro Region	Mike Penning (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£3,085,176
Folkestone and Hythe	South East Euro Region	Damian Collins (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£3,084,334
Colchester	Eastern Euro Region	Bob Russell (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	15	55	£3,083,492
Bournemouth East	South West Euro Region	Tobias Ellwood (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£3,082,650
Wycombe	South East Euro Region	Steve Baker (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£3,081,808
St. Helens South and Whiston	North West Euro Region	Shaun Woodward (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£3,067,708
Preston	North West Euro Region	Mark Hendrick (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£3,065,188
Lanark and Hamilton East	Scotland Euro Region	Jimmy Hood (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£3,064,348
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	Scotland Euro Region	Gordon Brown (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£3,063,509
Airdrie and Shotts	Scotland Euro Region	Pamela Nash (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£3,060,989
West Dunbartonshire	Scotland Euro Region	Gemma Doyle (Labour)	Labour	22	80	£3,056,790
Richmond Park	London Euro Region	Zac Goldsmith (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£2,976,107
Beckenham	London Euro Region	Bob Stewart (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£2,975,294
Twickenham	London Euro Region	Vincent Cable (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	14	51	£2,974,481
Wolverhampton South West	West Midlands Euro Region	Paul Uppal (Conservative)	Conservative	21	77	£2,933,878
Paisley and Renfrewshire North	Scotland Euro Region	Jim Sheridan (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£2,931,473
Halton	North West Euro Region	Derek Twigg (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£2,930,671
Great Grimsby	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Austin Mitchell (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£2,929,869
Glasgow South West	Scotland Euro Region	Ian Davidson (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£2,929,068
Glasgow South	Scotland Euro Region	Tom Harris (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£2,926,663
Glasgow North West	Scotland Euro Region	John Robertson (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£2,925,060
Cardiff Central	Wales Euro Region	Jenny Willott (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	21	77	£2,923,457
Aberdeen South	Scotland Euro Region	Anne Begg (Labour)	Labour	21	77	£2,921,853
South Shields	North East Euro Region	David Miliband (Labour)	Labour	21	76	£2,917,845
Isle of Wight	South East Euro Region	Andrew Turner (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£2,877,926
Hertsmere	Eastern Euro Region	James Clappison (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£2,877,140
Reading West	South East Euro Region	Alok Sharma (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£2,876,354
Nottingham East	East Midlands Euro Region	Chris Leslie (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,794,169
Liverpool West Derby	North West Euro Region	Stephen Twigg (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,785,771
Leigh	North West Euro Region	Andy Burnham (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,785,008
Kingston upon Hull East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Karl Turner (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,784,244
Kilmarnock and Loudoun	Scotland Euro Region	Cathy Jamieson (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,783,481
Hartlepool	North East Euro Region	Iain Wright (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,782,718
Glasgow North	Scotland Euro Region	Ann McKechin (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,781,954
Blackburn	North West Euro Region	Jack Straw (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,781,191
Manchester Gorton	North West Euro Region	Gerald Kaufman (Labour)	Labour	20	73	£2,778,900

Orpington	London Euro Region	Jo Johnson (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,763,528
Enfield North	London Euro Region	Nick de Bois (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,762,773
Putney	London Euro Region	Justine Greening (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,762,019
Surrey Heath	South East Euro Region	Michael Gove (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,677,468
Stevenage	Eastern Euro Region	Stephen McPartland (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,676,738
Southend West	Eastern Euro Region	David Amess (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,676,008
Milton Keynes North	South East Euro Region	Mark Lancaster (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,675,279
Hastings and Rye	South East Euro Region	Amber Rudd (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,674,549
Exeter	South West Euro Region	Ben Bradshaw (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£2,673,819
Cheltenham	South West Euro Region	Martin Horwood (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	13	48	£2,673,089
Bristol North West	South West Euro Region	Charlotte Leslie (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,672,360
Basildon and Billericay	Eastern Euro Region	John Baron (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,671,630
Thurrock	Eastern Euro Region	Jackie Doyle-Price (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£2,670,900
Birmingham Yardley	West Midlands Euro Region	John Hemming (Liberal Democrats)	Lib-Dem	19	70	£2,654,461
Rochdale	North West Euro Region	Simon Danczuk (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,648,659
Redcar	North East Euro Region	Ian Swales (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	19	69	£2,647,933
Leeds East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Geroge Mudie (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,647,208
Inverclyde	Scotland Euro Region	Iain McKenzie (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,646,483
Edinburgh South West	Scotland Euro Region	Alistair Darling (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,645,757
East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow	Scotland Euro Region	Michael McCann (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,645,032
Dundee West	Scotland Euro Region	James McGovern (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,644,307
Dumfries and Galloway	Scotland Euro Region	Russell Brown (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,643,582
Darlington	North East Euro Region	Jenny Chapman (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,642,856
Cardiff South and Penarth	Wales Euro Region	Stephen Doughty (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,642,131
Bury North	North West Euro Region	David Nuttall (Conservative)	Conservative	19	69	£2,641,406
Bishop Auckland	North East Euro Region	Helen Goodman (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,640,681
Stretford and Urmston	North West Euro Region	Kate Green (Labour)	Labour	19	69	£2,639,955
Bexleyheath and Crayford	London Euro Region	David Evennett (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,550,252
Bromley and Chislehurst	London Euro Region	Bob Neill (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,549,556
Coventry South	West Midlands Euro Region	Jim Cunninhgham (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£2,516,126
Birmingham Perry Barr	West Midlands Euro Region	Khalid Mahmood (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£2,515,439
Leicester East	East Midlands Euro Region	Keith Vaz (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£2,515,439
Northampton South	East Midlands Euro Region	Brian Binley (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£2,514,752
Manchester Withington	North West Euro Region	John Leech (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	18	66	£2,505,133
Heywood and Middleton	North West Euro Region	Jim Dobbin (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£2,504,446
East Lothian	Scotland Euro Region	Fiona O'Donnell (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£2,503,759
Doncaster North	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Ed Miliband (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£2,503,072
City of Chester	North West Euro Region	Stephen Mosley (Conservative)	Conservative	18	66	£2,502,385
Central Ayrshire	Scotland Euro Region	Brian H Donohoe (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£2,501,697
Rotherham	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Sarah Champion (Labour)	Labour	18	66	£2,501,010
Windsor	South East Euro Region	Adam Afriyie (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,474,877
Wells	South West Euro Region	Tessa Munt (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	12	44	£2,474,203
South Thanet	South East Euro Region	Laura Sandys (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,473,530
Reigate	South East Euro Region	Crispin Blunt (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,472,856
Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport	South West Euro Region	Oliver Colville (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,472,182
North Swindon	South West Euro Region	Justin Tomlinson (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,471,509
North East Hertfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	Oliver Heald (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,470,835
Harlow	Eastern Euro Region	Robert Halfon (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,470,162
Gosport	South East Euro Region	Caroline Dineage (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,469,488
Gillingham and Rainham	South East Euro Region	Rehman Chishti (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,468,814
Chelmsford	Eastern Euro Region	Simon Burns (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,468,141
Brighton Kemptown	South East Euro Region	Simon Kirby (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,467,467
Bracknell	South East Euro Region	Phillip Lee (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,466,794
Aylesbury	South East Euro Region	David Lidington (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,466,120
Woking	South East Euro Region	Jonathan Lord (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£2,465,446
Lincoln	East Midlands Euro Region	Karl McCartney (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£2,377,639
Boston and Skegness	East Midlands Euro Region	Mark Simmonds (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£2,376,990
Birmingham Hall Green	West Midlands Euro Region	Roger Godsiff (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,376,342
Birmingham Erdington	West Midlands Euro Region	Jack Dromey (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,375,693
Livingston	Scotland Euro Region	Graeme Morrice (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,370,501
Hemsworth	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Jon Trickett (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,369,852
Garston and Halewood	North West Euro Region	Maria Eagle (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,369,203

Edinburgh West	Scotland Euro Region	Michael Crockart (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	17	62	£2,368,555
East Yorkshire	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Greg Knight (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£2,367,906
Cardiff West	Wales Euro Region	Kevin Brennan (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,367,257
Bury South	North West Euro Region	Ivan Lewis (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,366,608
Blaydon	North East Euro Region	David Anderson (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,365,959
Blackley and Broughton	North West Euro Region	Graham Stringer (Labour)	Labour	17	62	£2,365,310
Warrington South	North West Euro Region	David Mowat (Conservative)	Conservative	17	62	£2,362,065
Chipping Barnet	London Euro Region	Theresa Villiers (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,337,731
Enfield, Southgate	London Euro Region	David Burrowes (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,337,093
South West Hertfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	David Gauke (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,269,872
South West Bedfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	Andrew Selous (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,269,255
South Basildon and East Thurrock	Eastern Euro Region	Stephen Metcalfe (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,268,637
Poole	South West Euro Region	Robert Syms (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,268,020
Newton Abbot	South West Euro Region	Anne-Marie Morris (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,267,402
Milton Keynes South	South East Euro Region	Iain Stewart (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,266,785
Huntingdon	Eastern Euro Region	Jonathan Djanogly (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,265,550
Guildford	South East Euro Region	Anne Milton (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,264,932
Gravesham	South East Euro Region	Adam Holloway (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,264,315
East Worthing and Shoreham	South East Euro Region	Tim Loughton (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,263,697
East Surrey	South East Euro Region	Sam Gyimah (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,263,080
Dartford	South East Euro Region	Gareth Johnson (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,262,462
Clacton	Eastern Euro Region	Douglas Carswell (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,261,845
Brentwood and Ongar	Eastern Euro Region	Eric Pickles (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,261,227
Braintree	Eastern Euro Region	Brooks Newmark (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,260,610
Weston-Super-Mare	South West Euro Region	John Penrose (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£2,259,992
Stoke-on-Trent Central	West Midlands Euro Region	Tristram Hunt (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£2,239,000
Erewash	East Midlands Euro Region	Jessica Lee (Conservative)	Conservative	16	59	£2,238,389
Chesterfield	East Midlands Euro Region	Toby Perkins (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£2,237,778
Birmingham Northfield	West Midlands Euro Region	Richard Burden (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£2,237,167
Birmingham Hodge Hill	West Midlands Euro Region	Liam Byrne (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£2,236,557
Ashfield	East Midlands Euro Region	Gloria De Piero (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£2,235,946
Warley	West Midlands Euro Region	John Spellar (Labour)	Labour	16	59	£2,235,335
Wrexham	Wales Euro Region	Ian Lucas (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,230,266
Weaver Vale	North West Euro Region	Graham Evans (Conservative)	Conservative	16	58	£2,230,205
Stirling	Scotland Euro Region	Anne McGuire (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,230,144
St. Helens North	North West Euro Region	Dave Watts (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,230,083
Sedgefield	North East Euro Region	Phil Wilson (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,230,022
Scunthorpe	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Nic Dakin (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,229,961
Scarborough and Whitby	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Robert Goodwill (Conservative)	Conservative	16	58	£2,228,617
Newport West	Wales Euro Region	Paul Flynn (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,228,006
Newcastle upon Tyne East	North East Euro Region	Nicholas Brown (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,227,396
Kingston upon Hull North	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Diana Johnson (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,226,785
Harrogate and Knaresborough	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Andrew Jones (Conservative)	Conservative	16	58	£2,226,174
Easington	North East Euro Region	Grahame Morris (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,225,563
Dunfermline and West Fife	Scotland Euro Region	Thomas Docherty (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,224,953
Barrow and Furness	North West Euro Region	John Woodcock (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,224,342
Barnsley Central	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Dan Jarvis (Labour)	Labour	16	58	£2,223,731
Croydon South	London Euro Region	Richard Ottaway (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,125,210
Edmonton	London Euro Region	Andy Love (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£2,124,630
Coventry North East	West Midlands Euro Region	Bob Ainsworth (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,096,772
Corby	East Midlands Euro Region	Andy Sawford (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,096,199
West Bromwich East	West Midlands Euro Region	Tom Watson (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,095,627
West Lancashire	North West Euro Region	Rosie Cooper (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,093,909
Wakefield	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Mary Creagh (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,093,337
Vale of Clwyd	Wales Euro Region	Chris Ruane (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,092,764
Sheffield South East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Clive Betts (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,092,191
Rhondda	Wales Euro Region	Chris Bryant (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,091,619
Pontypridd	Wales Euro Region	Owen Smith (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,091,046
Newport East	Wales Euro Region	Jessica Morden (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,090,474
Leeds West	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Rachel Reeves (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,089,328
Lancaster and Fleetwood	North West Euro Region	Eric Ollerenshaw (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£2,088,756
Houghton and Sunderland South	North East Euro Region	Bridget Phillipson (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,088,183

Halifax	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Linda Riordan (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,087,611
Ellesmere Port and Neston	North West Euro Region	Andrew Miller (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,087,038
Copeland	North West Euro Region	Jamie Reed (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,086,466
Cleethorpes	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Martin Vickers (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£2,085,893
City of Durham	North East Euro Region	Roberta Blackman-Woods (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,085,320
Carlisle	North West Euro Region	John Stevenson (Conservative)	Conservative	15	55	£2,084,748
Worsley and Eccles South	North West Euro Region	Barbabra Keeley (Labour)	Labour	15	55	£2,084,175
Wealden	South East Euro Region	Charles Hendry (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,071,379
South Dorset	South West Euro Region	Richard Drax (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,065,766
Sittingbourne and Sheppey	South East Euro Region	Gordon Henderson (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,064,643
Rayleigh and Wickford	Eastern Euro Region	Mark Francois (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,064,082
Oxford West and Abingdon	South East Euro Region	Nicola Blackwood (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,063,520
Norwich North	Eastern Euro Region	Chloe Smith (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,062,959
North Thanet	South East Euro Region	Roger Gale (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,062,397
Mid Sussex	South East Euro Region	Nicholas Soames (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,061,836
Maidenhead	South East Euro Region	Theresa May (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,061,275
Hitchin and Harpenden	Eastern Euro Region	Peter Lilley (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,060,713
Filton and Bradley Stoke	South West Euro Region	Jack Lopresti (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,059,591
Eastleigh	South East Euro Region	Chris Huhne (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	10	37	£2,059,029
Christchurch	South West Euro Region	Christopher Chope (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,058,468
Castle Point	Eastern Euro Region	Rebecca Harris (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,057,907
Canterbury	South East Euro Region	Julian Brazier (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,057,345
Bury St. Edmunds	Eastern Euro Region	David Ruffley (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,056,784
Bridgwater and West Somerset	South West Euro Region	Ian Liddell-Grainger (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,056,223
Basingstoke	South East Euro Region	Maria Miller (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,055,661
Ashford	South East Euro Region	Damian Green (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£2,055,100
Coventry North West	West Midlands Euro Region	Geoffrey Robinson (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,956,987
Cannock Chase	West Midlands Euro Region	Aidan Burley (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£1,956,453
Swansea West	Wales Euro Region	Geraint Davies (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,951,643
Stalybridge and Hyde	North West Euro Region	Jonathan Reynolds (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,951,109
Southport	North West Euro Region	John Pugh (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	14	51	£1,950,040
Oldham West and Royton	North West Euro Region	Michael Meacher (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,949,506
Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland	North East Euro Region	Tom Blenkinsop (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,948,971
Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East	Scotland Euro Region	Gregg McClymont (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,948,437
Crewe and Nantwich	North West Euro Region	Edward Timpson (Conservative)	Conservative	14	51	£1,947,902
Bolton North East	North West Euro Region	David Crausby (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,947,368
Barnsley East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Michael Dugher (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,946,833
Wentworth and Dearne	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	John Healey (Labour)	Labour	14	51	£1,945,230
Tiverton and Honiton	South West Euro Region	Neil Parish (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,856,158
Tewkesbury	South West Euro Region	Laurence Robertson (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,855,653
St. Albans	Eastern Euro Region	Anne Main (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,854,642
North West Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	Henry Bellingham (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,853,632
North West Cambridgeshire	Eastern Euro Region	Shailesh Vara (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,853,126
Maidstone and The Weald	South East Euro Region	Helen Grant (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,852,621
Havant	South East Euro Region	David Willets (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,852,116
East Hampshire	South East Euro Region	Damian Hinds (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,851,611
Chippenham	South West Euro Region	Duncan Hames (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£1,851,106
Chichester	South East Euro Region	Andrew Tyrie (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,850,600
Bexhill and Battle	South East Euro Region	Gregory Barker (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,850,095
Bath	South West Euro Region	Don Foster (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£1,849,590
Yeovil	South West Euro Region	David Laws (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£1,849,085
Wolverhampton North East	West Midlands Euro Region	Emma Reynolds (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,821,668
West Bromwich West	West Midlands Euro Region	Adrian Bailey (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,820,676
Walsall South	West Midlands Euro Region	Valerie Vaz (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,820,180
Walsall North	West Midlands Euro Region	David Winnick (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,819,684
Rugby	West Midlands Euro Region	Mark Pawsey (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£1,819,187
Nuneaton	West Midlands Euro Region	Marcus Jones (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£1,818,691
Leicester West	East Midlands Euro Region	Liz Kendall (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,818,195
Kettering	East Midlands Euro Region	Philip Hollobone (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£1,817,699
Gedling	East Midlands Euro Region	Vernon Coaker (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,817,202
Birmingham Selly Oak	West Midlands Euro Region	Steve McCabe (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,816,706
Torfaen	Wales Euro Region	Paul Murphy (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,816,706

Stockton South	North East Euro Region	James Wharton (Conservative)	Conservative	13	48	£1,816,210
Wolverhampton South East	West Midlands Euro Region	Patrick McFadden (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,816,210
Stockport	North West Euro Region	Ann Coffey (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,815,714
Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	David Blunkett (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,815,217
Oldham East and Saddleworth	North West Euro Region	Debbie Abrahams (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,814,721
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney Co Const	Wales Euro Region	Dai Havard (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,814,225
Makerfield	North West Euro Region	Yvonne Fovargue (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,813,729
Hyndburn	North West Euro Region	Graham Jones (Labour)	Labour	13	48	£1,813,233
East Renfrewshire	Scotland Euro Region	Jim Murphy (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£1,812,736
Dundee East	Scotland Euro Region	Stewart Hosie (SNP)	SNP	13	47	£1,812,240
Don Valley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Caroline Flint (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£1,811,744
Denton and Reddish	North West Euro Region	Andrew Gwynne (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£1,810,751
Cardiff North	Wales Euro Region	Jonathan Evans (Conservative)	Conservative	13	47	£1,810,255
Burnley	North West Euro Region	Gordon Birtwistle (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	13	47	£1,809,759
Bradford South	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Gerry Sutcliffe (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£1,809,263
Bradford East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	David Ward (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	13	47	£1,808,766
Blyth Valley	North East Euro Region	Ronnie Campbell (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£1,808,270
Blaenau Gwent	Wales Euro Region	Nick Smith (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£1,807,774
Blackpool North and Cleveleys	North West Euro Region	Paul Maynard (Conservative)	Conservative	13	47	£1,807,278
Banff and Buchan	Scotland Euro Region	Eilidh Whiteford (SNP)	SNP	13	47	£1,806,781
Wansbeck	North East Euro Region	Ian Lavery (Labour)	Labour	13	47	£1,806,285
Worcester	West Midlands Euro Region	Robin Walker (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,680,624
Warwick and Leamington	West Midlands Euro Region	Chris White (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,680,166
Shrewsbury and Atcham	West Midlands Euro Region	Daniel Kawczynski (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,679,708
Northampton North	East Midlands Euro Region	Michael Ellis (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,679,250
North Shropshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Owen Paterson (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,678,792
Newcastle-under-Lyme	West Midlands Euro Region	Paul Farrelly (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,678,334
Grantham and Stamford	East Midlands Euro Region	Nick Boles (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,677,876
Dudley North	West Midlands Euro Region	Ian Austin (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,677,418
Thirsk and Malton	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Anne McIntosh (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,677,418
Bassetlaw	East Midlands Euro Region	John Mann (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,676,960
Sheffield Heeley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Meg Munn (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,676,960
Sefton Central	North West Euro Region	Bill Esterton (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,676,501
Islwyn	Wales Euro Region	Chris Evans (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,676,043
Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey	Scotland Euro Region	Danny Alexander (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	12	44	£1,675,585
Glenrothes	Scotland Euro Region	Lindsay Roy (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,675,127
Dewsbury	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Simon Reevell (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,674,669
Congleton	North West Euro Region	Fiona Bruce (Conservative)	Conservative	12	44	£1,674,211
Caerphilly	Wales Euro Region	Wayne David (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,673,753
Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk	Scotland Euro Region	Michael Moore (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	12	44	£1,672,837
Alyn and Deeside	Wales Euro Region	Mark Tami (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,672,379
Bridgend	Wales Euro Region	Madeleine Moon (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,669,768
East Dunbartonshire	Scotland Euro Region	Jo Swinson (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	12	44	£1,667,340
Washington and Sunderland West	North East Euro Region	Sharon Hodgson (Labour)	Labour	12	44	£1,667,340
Truro and Falmouth	South West Euro Region	Sarah Newton (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,652,612
Totnes	South West Euro Region	Sarah Wollaston (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,652,163
Tonbridge and Malling	South East Euro Region	John Stanley (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,651,714
Taunton Deane	South West Euro Region	Jeremy Browne (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£1,651,265
Suffolk Coastal	Eastern Euro Region	Therese Coffey (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,650,816
St. Austell and Newquay	South West Euro Region	Stephen Gilbert (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£1,650,367
South West Wiltshire	South West Euro Region	Andrew Murrison (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,649,918
South West Surrey	South East Euro Region	Jeremy Hunt (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,649,469
Sevenoaks	South East Euro Region	Michael Fallon (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,649,020
Salisbury	South West Euro Region	John Glen (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,648,571
North Devon	South West Euro Region	Nick Harvey (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£1,648,122
North Cornwall	South West Euro Region	Dan Rogerson (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£1,647,673
New Forest West	South East Euro Region	Desmond Swayne (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,647,224
Mid Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	George Freeman (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,646,774
Luton North	Eastern Euro Region	Kelvin Hopkins (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£1,646,325
Lewes	South East Euro Region	Norman Baker (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£1,645,876
Dover	South East Euro Region	Charlie Elphicke (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,645,427
Chatham and Aylesford	South East Euro Region	Tracey Crouch (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,644,978

Bristol East	South West Euro Region	Kerry McCarthy (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£1,644,529
Banbury	South East Euro Region	Tony Baldry (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,644,080
Witney	South East Euro Region	David Cameron (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,643,631
Rossendale and Darwen	North West Euro Region	Jake Berry (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,544,771
Richmond (Yorks)	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	William Hague (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,544,351
Ogmore	Wales Euro Region	Huw Irranca-Davies (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,543,931
Jarrow	North East Euro Region	Stephen Hepburn (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,543,511
Edinburgh South	Scotland Euro Region	Ian Murray (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,543,091
Cynon Valley	Wales Euro Region	Ann Clwyd (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,542,671
Chorley	North West Euro Region	Lindsay Hoyle (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,542,252
Bolton West	North West Euro Region	Julie Hilling (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,541,832
Batley and Spen	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Mike Wood (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,541,412
Wellingborough	East Midlands Euro Region	Peter Bone (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,540,992
Tamworth	West Midlands Euro Region	Christopher Pincher (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,540,572
Sutton Coldfield	West Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Mitchell (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,540,152
Stoke-on-Trent North	West Midlands Euro Region	Joan Walley (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,539,732
South Holland and The Deepings	East Midlands Euro Region	John Hayes (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,539,312
Solihull	West Midlands Euro Region	Lorely Burt (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	11	40	£1,538,892
Meriden	West Midlands Euro Region	Caroline Spelman (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,538,473
Louth and Horncastle	East Midlands Euro Region	Peter Tapsell (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,538,053
Hereford and South Herefordshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Jesse Norman (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,537,633
Burton	West Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Griffiths (Conservative)	Conservative	11	40	£1,537,213
Rother Valley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Kevin Barron (Labour)	Labour	11	40	£1,528,395
Romford	London Euro Region	Andrew Rosindell (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£1,487,241
Wantage	South East Euro Region	Edward Vaizey (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£1,440,535
Tunbridge Wells	South East Euro Region	Greg Clark (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£1,440,142
North West Hampshire	South East Euro Region	Sir George Young (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£1,439,749
North Somerset	South West Euro Region	Liam Fox (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£1,439,356
New Forest East	South East Euro Region	Julian Lewis (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£1,438,963
Meon Valley	South East Euro Region	George Hollingbery (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£1,438,570
Witham	Eastern Euro Region	Priti Patel (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£1,438,177
Telford	West Midlands Euro Region	David Wright (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£1,400,902
Stourbridge	West Midlands Euro Region	Margot James (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£1,400,520
Sherwood	East Midlands Euro Region	Mark Spencer (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£1,400,138
Nottingham North	East Midlands Euro Region	Graham Allen (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£1,399,757
North Warwickshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Dan Byles (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£1,399,375
Mansfield	East Midlands Euro Region	Alan Meale (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£1,398,993
Dudley South	West Midlands Euro Region	Chris Kelly (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£1,398,611
Bosworth	East Midlands Euro Region	David Tredinnick (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£1,398,230
Birmingham Edgbaston	West Midlands Euro Region	Gisela Stewart (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£1,397,848
Amber Valley	East Midlands Euro Region	Nigel Mills (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£1,397,466
The Wrekin	West Midlands Euro Region	Mark Pritchard (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£1,397,085
Tynemouth	North East Euro Region	Alan Campbell (Labour)	Labour	10	37	£1,393,649
Pendle	North West Euro Region	Andrew Stephenson (Conservative)	Conservative	10	37	£1,393,267
Ochil and South Perthshire	Scotland Euro Region	Gordon Banks (Labour)	Labour	10	36	£1,392,886
Neath	Wales Euro Region	Peter Hain (Labour)	Labour	10	36	£1,392,504
Morecambe and Lunesdale	North West Euro Region	David Morris (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£1,392,122
Elmet and Rothwell	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Alec Shelbrooke (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£1,391,740
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale	Scotland Euro Region	David Mundell (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£1,391,359
Colne Valley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Jason McCartney (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£1,390,977
Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire	Wales Euro Region	Simon Hart (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£1,390,595
Calder Valley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Craig Whittaker (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£1,390,214
Beverley and Holderness	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Graham Stuart (Conservative)	Conservative	10	36	£1,389,832
Warrington North	North West Euro Region	Helen Jones (Labour)	Labour	10	36	£1,389,450
South Ribble	North West Euro Region	Lorraine Fullbrook (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,265,965
Shipley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Philip Davies (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,265,621
Perth and North Perthshire	Scotland Euro Region	Pete Wishart (SNP)	SNP	9	33	£1,265,278
Newcastle upon Tyne North	North East Euro Region	Catherine McKinnell (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£1,264,934
Leeds North West	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Greg Mulholland (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£1,264,591
Keighley	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Kris Hopkins (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,264,247
Delyn	Wales Euro Region	David Hanson (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£1,263,903
Clwyd West	Wales Euro Region	David Jones (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,263,560

Argyll and Bute	Scotland Euro Region	Alan Reid (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	9	33	£1,263,216
Altrincham and Sale West	North West Euro Region	Graham Brady (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,262,873
Aberconwy	Wales Euro Region	Guto Bebb (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,262,529
Aberavon	Wales Euro Region	Hywel Francis (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£1,262,186
Wyre Forest	West Midlands Euro Region	Mark Garnier (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,261,842
Stoke-on-Trent South	West Midlands Euro Region	Robert Flello (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£1,261,499
Stafford	West Midlands Euro Region	Jeremy Lefroy (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,261,155
Rushcliffe	East Midlands Euro Region	Kenneth Clarke (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,260,812
North West Leicestershire	East Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Bridgen (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,260,468
Newark	East Midlands Euro Region	Patrick Mercer (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,260,124
Loughborough	East Midlands Euro Region	Nicky Morgan (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,259,781
High Peak	East Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Bingham (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,259,437
Halesowen and Rowley Regis	West Midlands Euro Region	James Morris (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,259,094
Derby North	East Midlands Euro Region	Chris Williamson (Labour)	Labour	9	33	£1,258,750
Charnwood	East Midlands Euro Region	Stephen Dorrell (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,258,407
Bromsgrove	West Midlands Euro Region	Sajid Javid (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,258,063
Aldridge-Brownhills	West Midlands Euro Region	Richard Shepherd (Conservative)	Conservative	9	33	£1,257,720
West Dorset	South West Euro Region	Oliver Letwin (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,238,786
Thornbury and Yate	South West Euro Region	Steve Webb (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	6	22	£1,235,754
The Cotswolds	South West Euro Region	Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,235,418
Stroud	South West Euro Region	Neil Carmichael (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,235,081
North East Hampshire	South East Euro Region	James Arbuthnot (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,234,744
North East Bedfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	Alistair Burt (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,234,407
North Dorset	South West Euro Region	Robert Walter (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,234,070
Kingswood	South West Euro Region	Chris Skidmore (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,233,734
Horsham	South East Euro Region	Francis Maude (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,233,397
Chesham and Amersham	South East Euro Region	Cheryl Gillan (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,233,060
Winchester	South East Euro Region	Steve Brine (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£1,232,723
Stone	West Midlands Euro Region	William Cash (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,119,194
Lichfield	West Midlands Euro Region	Michael Fabricant (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,118,889
Harborough	East Midlands Euro Region	Edward Garnier (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,118,584
Broxtowe	East Midlands Euro Region	Anna Soubry (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,118,278
Bolsover	East Midlands Euro Region	Dennis Skinner (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£1,117,973
Westmorland and Lonsdale	North West Euro Region	Tim Farron (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£1,116,446
Vale of Glamorgan	Wales Euro Region	Alun Cairns (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,116,141
Pudsey	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Stuart Andrew (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,115,835
Morley and Outwood	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Ed Balls (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£1,115,530
Moray	Scotland Euro Region	Angus Robertson (SNP)	SNP	8	29	£1,115,225
Llanelli	Wales Euro Region	Nia Griffith (Labour)	Labour	8	29	£1,114,919
Fylde	North West Euro Region	Mark Menzies (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,114,614
Cheadle	North West Euro Region	Mark Hunter (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£1,114,309
Berwick-upon-Tweed	North East Euro Region	Alan Beith (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	8	29	£1,114,003
Arfon	Wales Euro Region	Hywel Williams (Plaid Cymru)	PC	8	29	£1,113,698
Angus	Scotland Euro Region	Michael Weir (SNP)	SNP	8	29	£1,113,392
Wyre and Preston North	North West Euro Region	Ben Wallace (Conservative)	Conservative	8	29	£1,111,560
Dagenham and Rainham	London Euro Region	Jon Cruddas (Labour)	Labour	5	18	£1,062,315
South West Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	Elizabeth Truss (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,031,199
South Suffolk	Eastern Euro Region	Tim Yeo (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,030,918
South East Cornwall	South West Euro Region	Sheryll Murray (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,030,637
South East Cambridgeshire	Eastern Euro Region	James Paice (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,030,357
Saffron Walden	Eastern Euro Region	Alan Haselhurst (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,030,076
Romsey and Southampton North	South East Euro Region	Caroline Nokes (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,029,795
Mole Valley	South East Euro Region	Paul Beresford (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,029,515
Mid Dorset and North Poole	South West Euro Region	Annette Brooke (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£1,029,234
Mid Bedfordshire	Eastern Euro Region	Nadine Dorries (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,028,953
Maldon	Eastern Euro Region	John Whittingdale (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,028,673
East Devon	South West Euro Region	Hugo Swire (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,028,392
Devizes	South West Euro Region	Claire Perry (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,028,111
Camborne and Redruth	South West Euro Region	George Eustice (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£1,027,831
Buckingham	South East Euro Region	John Bercow (Speaker)	Speaker	5	18	£1,027,550
St. Ives	South West Euro Region	Andrew George (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£1,027,269
Stratford-on-Avon	West Midlands Euro Region	Nadhim Zahawi (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£978,761

Redditch	West Midlands Euro Region	Karen Lumley (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£978,494
Mid Worcestershire	West Midlands Euro Region	Peter Luff (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£978,226
Tatton	North West Euro Region	George Osborne (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£974,486
Selby and Ainsty	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Nigel Adams (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£974,218
Ross, Skye and Lochaber	Scotland Euro Region	Charles Kennedy (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	7	26	£973,951
Penrith and The Border	North West Euro Region	Rory Stewart (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£973,684
Monmouth	Scotland Euro Region	David Davies (Conservative)	Conservative	7	26	£973,417
Macclesfield	North West Euro Region	David Rutley (Conservative)	Conservative	7	25	£973,150
Leeds North East	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Fabian Hamilton (Labour)	Labour	7	25	£972,882
Ynys Mon	Wales Euro Region	Albert Owen (Labour)	Labour	7	25	£972,615
Hornchurch and Upminster	London Euro Region	Angela Watkinson (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£849,852
Rutland and Melton	East Midlands Euro Region	Alan Duncan (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£839,167
North East Derbyshire	East Midlands Euro Region	Natascha Engel (Labour)	Labour	6	22	£838,938
Kenilworth and Southam	West Midlands Euro Region	Jeremy Wright (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£838,709
Gainsborough	East Midlands Euro Region	Edward Leigh (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£838,480
South Derbyshire	East Midlands Euro Region	Heather Wheeler (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£838,251
North East Fife	Scotland Euro Region	Menzies Campbell (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	6	22	£834,815
North Durham	North East Euro Region	Kevan Jones (Labour)	Labour	6	22	£834,586
Hexham	North East Euro Region	Guy Opperman (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£834,357
Haltemprice and Howden	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	David Davis (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£834,128
Brigg and Goole	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Andrew Percy (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£833,899
Skipton and Ripon	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Julian Smith (Conservative)	Conservative	6	22	£833,670
South Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	Richard Bacon (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£824,510
South Cambridgeshire	Eastern Euro Region	Andrew Lansley (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£824,285
Somerton and Frome	South West Euro Region	David Heath (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	4	15	£824,061
Plymouth, Moor View	South West Euro Region	Alison Seabeck (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£823,836
North Wiltshire	South West Euro Region	James Gray (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£823,612
North East Somerset	South West Euro Region	Jacob Rees-Mogg (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£823,387
Harwich and North Essex	Eastern Euro Region	Bernard Jenkin (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£823,163
Forest of Dean	South West Euro Region	Mark Harper (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£822,938
Central Suffolk and North Ipswich	Eastern Euro Region	Daniel Poulter (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£822,714
Central Devon	South West Euro Region	Mel Stride (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£822,489
Beaconsfield	South East Euro Region	Dominic Grieve (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£822,265
Arundel and South Downs	South East Euro Region	Nick Herbert (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£822,040
Torridge and West Devon	South West Euro Region	Geoffrey Cox (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£821,815
Staffordshire Moorlands	West Midlands Euro Region	Karen Bradley (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£699,306
South Leicestershire	East Midlands Euro Region	Andrew Robathan (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£699,115
Sleaford and North Hykeham	East Midlands Euro Region	Stephen Phillips (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£698,924
Mid Derbyshire	East Midlands Euro Region	Pauline Latham (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£698,733
Ribble Valley	North West Euro Region	Nigel Evans (Conservative)	Conservative	5	18	£696,634
Midlothian	Scotland Euro Region	David Hamilton (Labour)	Labour	5	18	£696,443
Hazel Grove	North West Euro Region	Andrew Stunell (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£696,252
Gordon	Scotland Euro Region	Malcolm Bruce (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£696,061
Brecon and Radnorshire	Wales Euro Region	Roger Williams (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£695,870
Birkenhead	North West Euro Region	Frank Field (Labour)	Labour	5	18	£695,679
West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine	Scotland Euro Region	Sir Robert Smith (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	5	18	£694,725
Barking	London Euro Region	Margaret Hodge (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£637,389
North Norfolk	Eastern Euro Region	Norman Lamb (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	3	11	£617,035
North East Cambridgeshire	Eastern Euro Region	Steve Barclay (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£616,698
Faversham and Mid Kent	South East Euro Region	Hugh Robertson (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£616,530
Wokingham	South East Euro Region	John Redwood (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£616,362
South Staffordshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Gavin Williamson (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£559,292
South Northamptonshire	East Midlands Euro Region	Andrea Leadsom (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£559,139
Derbyshire Dales	East Midlands Euro Region	Patrick McLoughlin (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£558,987
West Worcestershire	West Midlands Euro Region	Harriett Baldwin (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£558,834
Swansea East	Wales Euro Region	Sian James (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£557,002
Sheffield Hallam	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	4	15	£556,849
Preseli Pembrokeshire	Wales Euro Region	Stephen Crabb (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£556,696
Penistone and Stocksbridge	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Anglea Smith (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£556,544
North West Durham	North East Euro Region	Pat Glass (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£556,391
Eddisbury	North West Euro Region	Stephen O'Brien (Conservative)	Conservative	4	15	£556,238
Dwyfor Meirionnydd	Wales Euro Region	Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru)	PC	4	15	£556,085

Carmarthen East and Dinefwr	Wales Euro Region	Jonathan Edwards (Plaid Cymru)	PC	4	15	£555,933
Wallasey	North West Euro Region	Angela Eagle (Labour)	Labour	4	15	£555,780
Ludlow	West Midlands Euro Region	Philip Dunne (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£419,354
Daventry	East Midlands Euro Region	Chris Heaton-Harris (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£419,240
North Herefordshire	West Midlands Euro Region	Bill Wiggin (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£419,125
Wirral South	North West Euro Region	Alison McGovern (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£417,522
Montgomeryshire	Wales Euro Region	Glyn Davies (Conservative)	Conservative	3	11	£417,408
Knowsley	North West Euro Region	George Howarth (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£417,293
Gower	Wales Euro Region	Martin Caton (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£417,179
Clwyd South	Wales Euro Region	Susan Elan Jones (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£417,064
Ceredigion	Wales Euro Region	Mark Williams (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	3	11	£416,950
Workington	North West Euro Region	Tony Cunningham (Labour)	Labour	3	11	£416,835
Fareham	South East Euro Region	Mark Hoban (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£411,132
Broadland	Eastern Euro Region	Keith Simpson (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£411,020
Newbury	South East Euro Region	Richard Benyon (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£410,908
Wirral West	North West Euro Region	Esther McVey (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£277,966
York Outer	Yorkshire and the Humber Euro R	Julian Sturdy (Conservative)	Conservative	2	7	£277,890
South West Devon	South West Euro Region	Gary Streeter (Conservative)	Conservative	1	4	£205,454
Na h-Eileanan an Iar	Scotland Euro Region	Angus MacNeil (SNP)	SNP	1	4	£138,983
Orkney and Shetland	Scotland Euro Region	Alistair Carmichael (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	1	4	£138,945
Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross	Scotland Euro Region	John Thurso (Liberal Democrat)	Lib-Dem	0	0	£0
Henley	South East Euro Region	John Howell (Conservative)	Conservative	0	0	£0

STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
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Appendix D

Appendix D - Explanation of the analysis for the Campaign for Fairer Gambling

According to the Gambling Commission, based on basic data provided by bookmakers, there were 33,284 FOBTs located across the UK in betting shops. The declared “gross gambling yield”, or gross profit, achieved on FOBTs was £1.42 billion in 2012. Therefore the average weekly profit per FOBT was £825, up from £760 in 2011.

Based on the declared number of operating betting shops of 9,128, the average density of FOBTs is 3.65 per shop. Regional variations in density and profit per terminal have been factored in to our analysis using data sourced from Tote Sport retail 2009. The profit per terminal has been factored across all betting shops within each parliamentary constituency to produce the gross gambling yield.

Compared to our 2010/11 analysis in which a margin of 3.12% was returned based on Tote Sport retail figures from 2009, the margin has been enhanced to 3.18%. This increased margin has been sourced from industry contacts that will remain confidential. This increase is likely to have been driven by improved B3 game performance supported by the aggressive marketing of such games. We have used a margin of 3.18% to calculate the gross amount gambled.

Using analysis carried out by Professor Jim Orford, Heather Wardle and Dr Mark Griffiths[11] and published on the Gambling Watch UK website, their conclusion that 23% of profits derived from FOBTs are contributed by problem gamblers has been applied to both the gross gambling yield and to each Parliamentary constituency. This has produced an estimate of the impact of FOBTs on problem gambling in each constituency.

Based on the growth of the gross gambling yield on FOBTs, cited in Gambling Commission Industry Statistics[12], it was possible to forecast a growth of 11.16% in 2012/13 to provide estimates relating to this year.

The actual gross gambling yield that was achieved on FOBTs in 2011/12 was £1.42 billion, whereas we had estimated £1.36 billion. This difference is caused by approximately 1.8% of betting shops not being mapped by Geofutures due to postcode anomalies. This is an acceptable level of error.

To give an indication of the level of tax revenue that will be returned to Government from FOBTs with the introduction on 1st February 2013 of Machine Gaming Duty at 20%, we have factored this in based on the 2011/12 figures. The previous system during this period was based on Amusement Machine License Duty charges and V.A.T.

It is important to note that by the end of March 2013 these figures and analysis will be one year out of date. This analysis is not sourced using direct data from bookmakers. Bookmakers do not openly publish this data, which is why we have produced these averaged estimates. It does not reflect the exact level of FOBTs financial activity in each Parliamentary constituency. Rather these are estimates based on the number of betting shops in each constituency. There may be slight discrepancies from constituency to constituency, but the principles of the analysis are sound.

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Appendix E

STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

Dear Sir/Madam,

Re: The REAL Truths about gaming machines in betting shops

You may recall that you received a letter on 24th January 2013 from the Association of British Bookmakers (ABB) attacking our Campaign. We answered that letter with our response in a letter on 27th January 2013. However, attached to the ABB letter were two documents entitled 'The Truth about Betting Shops' and 'The Truth about Gambling Machines in Betting Shops'. We have now countered these documents with the enclosed documents with the word 'REAL' inserted into the titles prior to 'Truth'.

In general, the statements in the ABB documents are either not specifically relevant to Fixed Odd Betting Terminal (FOBT) content in betting shop machines, or if the ABB statements are related to FOBTs, then they are misleading. It is these 'B2', electronic gaming machines with roulette content, that are specifically the subject of our Campaigns.

These alleged facts have been used by ABB to discredit the Campaign and mislead the reader. By claiming that our figures are inaccurate, the ABB has also prevented the media publishing stories and encouraged them to withhold stories which cover our statistical analysis. We note that Mr Vennix, Chief Executive of the ABB, acknowledges this directly in his article in the March 2013 copy of 'Bet View' (page 12).

Now the odd MP is being used by the ABB, and any betting shop visits will no doubt be ABB controlled to show the MP whatever the ABB wants them to see. We trust that the media and MPs will have the good sense to see through this ABB manipulation; however we need to present our information to give you a balanced view.

t: 0203 600 0167
info@fairergambling.org info@stopthefobts.org fobts@bcsagency
www.stopthefobts.org /stopthefobts www.fairergambling.org
represented by bcsAgency t: 0115 948 6900

The harm caused by FOBTs to the young and vulnerable, in breach of the 2005 Gambling Act licensing objective, is a very serious matter. Please take the time to read through our REAL Truth documents and ask yourself the following question -

Who is telling the REAL truth – the ABB or the Campaign?

Please do not allow the ABB to silence you with their false assertions against us, our Campaigns and the solid statistics and evidence that we are disclosing. If this media pressure continues we will refer the matter to the relevant authorities to investigate. For the latest statistics on FOBT gambling estimations in your area, please visit www.stopthefobts.org or contact us at info@stopthefobts.org.

We appreciate your support and look forward to working with you to bring this matter to the attention of MPs and the general public.

Yours faithfully,

Derek Webb
Campaign founder and funder

STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

Excerpt from Bet View, March 2013 page 12.

DIRK VENNIX COLUMN

abb
association of british bookmakers ltd

ABB chief executive Dirk Vennix on why the betting industry needs your support right now

In last month's column I ended by noting the Government had launched its consultation on electronic gaming machines. If you will excuse the pun, the stakes could not be higher. We need your support.

The Government is asking for evidence to support a reduction in the levels of stakes and prizes on gaming machines in betting shops – in response to the consultation the Government could reduce the stake to just £2.

This could have a major impact on the jobs of betting shop staff and lead to many shops closing.

Opponents of machines in betting shops have been providing alarmist and misleading figures to the media – you may have seen or heard about some of the stories. We are pleased that many newspapers, once provided with the facts, have balanced, amended or retracted those stories.

More importantly, we are also continuing to tell the media why betting shops are an essential part of the high street retail mix and staff and customers are part of the local community.

The vast majority of customers are regular punters, who enjoy calling into your shop, catching up with their friends and staff, enjoying a bet or sometimes playing on a gaming machine safely and responsibly. Why should they have their leisure time taken away? And why should your livelihood be at threat solely because of anecdotal stories publicised by anti-betting campaigners? They forget that:

- Betting shops are modern leisure retail businesses and the most regulated retail outlets on the high street.
- Your customers gamble on a variety of things, from horse racing and X-Factor to slotmachine or casino style games.
- The machines have been in shops for over a decade and are popular products, bringing in new customers and giving existing customers new products to enjoy.
- Most customers will call in during their breaks or after work. You know our customers well and you know most of the people who play on machines have full time jobs.
- You take your responsibility to the local community seriously. You know how to identify someone who may be developing a gambling problem and implement procedures in place to help them – including allowing them to self-exclude themselves from the shop.
- You enforce age restrictions and most shops operate a Think 21 policy, to stop under 18s from gambling on your premises.

Please show your support and write in to the Government's consultation at: **www.culture.gov.uk/consultations/9656.**

Via to post to all MPs

Name

Address 1

Address 2

Address 3

Dear XXX,

Re: The REAL Truths about gaming machines

You may recall that you received a letter on 24th January 2013 from the Association of British Bookmakers (ABB) attacking our campaign. We answered that letter with our response in a letter on 27th January 2013. However, attached to the ABB letter were two documents entitled 'The Truth about Betting Shops' and 'The Truth about Gambling Machines in Betting Shops'. We have now countered these documents with the enclosed documents with REAL inserted into the titles prior to 'Truth'.

In general, the statements in the ABB documents are either not specifically relevant to Fixed Odd Betting Terminal (FOBT) content in betting shop machines or if the ABB statements are related to FOBTs, then they are misleading. These B2, electronic gaming machines with roulette content are specifically the subject of our Campaigns.

These alleged facts have been used to discredit the Campaign and mislead the reader. The ABB has also prevented the media publishing stories and encouraged them to withhold stories which cover our statistical analysis, by claiming that these figures are inaccurate.

Now, the odd MP is being used by the ABB after falling for an invitation to a betting shop, where a photo opportunity takes place. These betting shop visits will be ABB controlled to show the MP whatever the ABB wants them to see and nothing else. We trust that the media and MPs will have the intellect to see through this ABB manipulation, however we need to present our information to give you a balanced view.

The harm caused by FOBTs to the young and vulnerable, in breach of the 2005 Gambling Act licensing objective, is a very serious matter. Please take the time to read through our REAL Truth documents and ask yourself the following question -

Who is telling the REAL truth – the ABB or the Campaign?

Please do not allow the ABB to mislead you with their false assertions against us, our Campaigns and the solid statistics and evidence that we are disclosing. If this media pressure continues we will refer the matter to the press complaints commission to investigate. For the latest statistics on gambling spend and FOBT estimations in your area, please visit www.stopthefobts.org or contact us at info@stopthefobts.org.

We appreciate your support and look forward to working with you to bring this matter to the attention of your constituents and your party representatives.

Derek Webb, Campaign founder

The REAL Truth About Gaming Machines in Betting Shops

Comments by the Campaign for Fairer Gambling on the Association of British Bookmakers (ABB) document "The Truth about Gambling Machines in Betting Shops," which was sent to MPs and national newspapers as an attachment to a letter from Dirk Vennix, CEO of the ABB, criticising our FOBT campaign.

1. **The ABB say:**

- *Gaming machines are a popular British leisure product enjoyed safely and responsibly by the vast majority of our customers. There are currently around 140,000 gaming machines in operation in the UK across all gambling sectors. 25,000 gaming machines are in betting shops and the number has remained stable for 3 years*[1]

This statement is misleading.

During the ABB refer0enced period there has been a decrease in total machines across all sectors and particularly for machines in Amusement Gaming Centres (AGCs), the sector that has been most heavily impacted by FOBTs in betting shops. There has been an increase in betting shop FOBTs, but far more relevant is the substantial increase in FOBT revenues. All statistics are extracted from the Gambling Commission industry statistics 2009-2012 March - the same document referenced by the ABB.
Table 2 - page 6
Tables 18 and 19 - page 19
Table 47 - page 42

	2009-2010	2011-2012	Change
Machines in all sectors	**158,322**	**140,516**	**- 17,806**
Machines in AGCs	**70,438**	**42,666**	**- 27,772**
B2/B3 machines in betting shops	**34,795**	**35,662**	**+ 876**
B2/B3 betting shop machine win	**£1,177m**	**£1,447m**	**+ £270m**

(B2 machines, whether including B3 content or not, are also known as FOBTs, whereas B3 machines do not include B2 content and are not FOBTs. By reference to the Gambling Commission, only 18 of the B2/B3 machines are B3s, meaning that the B2/B3 betting shop machines and revenues are virtually all from FOBTs.)

2. **The ABB say:**

- *The average amount spent by a customer on a B2 gaming machine is circa £10 per machine per hour. The 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey shows that 70% of B2 players play once a month or less*

[1] Gambling Commission Industry Statistics April 2009 to March 2012 table 18, page 19

which is hardly reflective of an addictive product[2]. Whilst there is no empirical evidence of a causal link between gaming machines and problem gambling, the industry continually strives to make sure the public can enjoy fair and responsible gambling.

This statement is misleading.

The B2 gaming machine also includes B3 content at a maximum of £2 per spin. This dilutes the average "spent" per hour. We are not complaining about B3 content in betting shops but about the FOBT B2 content. The £10 per machine per hour refers to the number of hours the machine is open, not the number of hours the machine is utilized. We estimate that the roulette "spend" per hour utilised is well in excess of £30 (spend as used by the ABB in this context is amount lost not amount gambled). In any event, roulette gamblers on FOBTs lose several times faster than roulette gamblers in casinos playing for the same stakes due to the faster pace of FOBTs.

The fact that 70% of gamblers play once a month or less is irrelevant and the chart Table 4.1 page 58 does not draw any inference from this fact. Focus must be on the regular repeat gamblers - the 13% of FOBT gamblers gambling twice a week or more.
The following questions are relevant:

Why is it essential that there is empirical evidence of a causal link between FOBTs and problem gambling to justify restrictions on FOBTs?
Has anyone ever explained how empirical evidence of a causal link can ever be obtained in respect of any form of gambling?
How much are problem gamblers gambling on FOBTs, losing on FOBTS and what is the socio-economic cost of those problem gambler losses?

3. **The ABB say:**

- *The world's leading providers of server-based gaming (Electronic Gaming Machines) are UK companies. They supply and operate nearly 70,000 terminals in 22 countries. Innovation in betting shops drove the development of this successful British export.*

This statement is misleading.

With 35,000 machines in Britain and 35,000 machines in 21 other countries, the average number of machines per other country is only just under 1,700. Of far more relevance is the question:

Which other countries have betting shops with machines that allow roulette at the equivalent of £100 per spin with a spin every 20 seconds?

To the best of our knowledge the answer is none, so:

Why has no country adopted this British gambling mode yet?

[2] British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010 table 4.1, page 58

4. **The ABB say:**

- *The National Lottery was launched in 1994. The Henley Centre found that in 1995 betting office profits were 35 per cent lower than they would have been in the absence of the Lottery. Government revenues from betting had fallen by £82 million, 400 betting shops had closed by the end of 1995, and more than 3,400 industry jobs had been lost. Needless to say, these were very challenging times for bookmakers.*

This statement is not relevant to FOBTs.

5. **The ABB say:**

- *In response the industry innovated and introduced new products like 'magic numbers'; which allowed customers to bet on the outcome of Irish Lottery. Deregulation of Betting and Gaming Order 1996 permitted the opening of shop front, shop window marketing, the sale of snacks and refreshments and the introduction of Amusements with Prizes (AWPs) – often referred to as Fruit Machines or One Armed Bandits*

This statement is not relevant to FOBTs.

6. **The ABB say:**

- *The introduction of a Gross Profits Tax (GPT) system for the betting industry in 2001 allowed the introduction of lower margin products, which previously were not viable. Roulette was introduced to the quick draw terminals which became known as Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs) and a number of new suppliers entered the market. The products proved popular and, driven by customer demand sales increased which led to further innovation.*

This statement is misleading.

Roulette was available in casinos and on the internet. To the best of our knowledge there was no illegal roulette. It was the accessibility of high street roulette to a new player demographic, the marketing of FOBTs and the addictive nature of FOBT roulette that generated the "demand" rather than being "driven by customer demand". Many new suppliers attempted to break into the market, but most were swallowed up leaving two suppliers dominating the market.

7. **The ABB say:**

- *This was before the advent of the Gambling Act 2005 and betting terminals were not subject to any legislation or regulation. Betting shops want to attract a wide spectrum of customers to their stores; they can only do this by offering them a safe and responsible leisure experience. In 2003 the ABB and its members produced an Industry Code of Practice governing the supply and use of FOBTs in betting shops. The Code set limits governing the maximum permitted stakes and prizes, the number of machines per shop and the speed of play. And from 19 November 2003, ABB membership was only open to bookmakers who accepted and operated according to the condition of the Code.*

This statement is misleading.

The Gaming Board for Great Britain commenced legal action against William Hill in respect of FOBTs. If all the activity was on the premises then the machines were illegal. The bookmakers argued that because the result of the roulette spin was determined at a central off-site server location rather than on the premises then gambling was in the premises on an off-premises event and classified it as betting. This explanation was accepted and the legal action was dropped. However, the same companies through their remote gambling divisions were arguing exactly the opposite. Some remote gambling companies obtained "paid legal opinions" that the gambling was where the server was rather than where the player was. This could then be used to justify accessing gamblers in jurisdictions such as the US where authorities were asserting this was illegal. This explanation of where remote gambling occurs was accepted by government and the regulator, although of course it is in total contradiction to the FOBT legality question.

The questionable legality of FOBTs was the reason for the Code of Practice. This was established in conjunction with advice from the machine suppliers. The Code was designed so that there would be minimal impact on profitability. The Code was worked around to suit the bookmakers. Initially the Code was drafted so as not to allow debit and credit cards to be used on machines. This was circumvented by allowing debit and credit transactions at the counter which could then be loaded onto the machine instead. Secondly the agreement to use only roulette as casino table game content was breached by adding Blackjack.

The most shocking aspect of the introduction of FOBTs was that the ABB was allowed to commission research to show that the Code was being complied with. The research was professionally conducted and professionally peer-reviewed. However the reviewers noticed a weighting bias in respect of the in-shop surveys. Simply, the surveys were conducted on the busiest days for "efficiency" reasons. But the consequence was that the survey over-represented the casual sports and race betters gambling at the weekend and under-represented the regular everyday FOBT gamblers. So the survey was flawed.

8. **The ABB say:**

- *The Code was accepted by the Department for Culture Media and Sport, the Gambling Board and the industry. Peter Dean, Chairman of the Gaming Board of Great Britain said, "It was the best example of commercial/regulator co-operation he had seen." The legislative and regulatory measures currently in place are founded on industry best practice and voluntary measures such as the ABB Industry Code of Practice.*

The statement is misleading and amusing.

The DCMS accepted the Code. But at the same time the DCMS commissioned a study into assessing the impacts of the 2005 Gambling Act, which advised that FOBTs should be closely monitored due to their addictive potential. Of course the DCMS has not conducted any monitoring.

The fact that the regulator was unable to spot the flaw in the ABB research highlights inadequate regulatory capability.

9. The ABB say:

- *The industry fully supports the rigorous enforcement of the provisions in the 2005 Gambling Act; and is committed to the regular review of its Codes to ensure that the most up-to-date, relevant and effective processes are in place to identify and support patrons who may be at risk of or experiencing difficulties with their gambling behaviour.*

This statement is misleading.

The Gambling Act licensing objective of prevention of harm to vulnerable persons also refers to protection of the young. Bookmakers have a terrible record in this respect as evidenced by Trading Standards investigations and Dispatches and Panorama programmes. There are a number of measures that could have been implemented to address this.

a. New and refurbished premises could easily have been re-configured to enable all machines to be situated whereby the gambler would need to pass the serving counter to access the machines. All machines could be placed at 45 degrees or 135 degrees to the serving counter (rather than 90 degrees or 180 degrees) so that staff would have better visibility of machine gamblers. This practise is being adopted by Local Authorities now in respect of new licenses, but it is too late for the existing 9,000 shops already trading.

b. All machines could be operated on a no-cash play but ticket-in only basis. The ticket could only be obtained from the serving counter with identification. This method results in age verification and enables a paper trail of the cash used to purchase the ticket. Paper trail records are a deterrent to criminals and therefore have a potential impact on reduction of crime to feed FOBT addiction.

c. Staff could be trained to higher levels such as required in casinos or public houses.

d. Premises could prevented from operating with only a single staff member. Double staffing allows better staff access to the machine area to enable better age and sobriety verification.

e. There should be criminal and financial penalties imposed for allowing underage gambling. These apply in respect of alcohol sales. Matt Zarb-Cousin, our Campaign Consultant, gambled stakes of around £200,000 on FOBTs, when underage, resulting in a loss of over £5,000. As bookmakers by law should return stakes lost by underage gamblers it is our view, and the view of a prominent gambling expert who has acted as an expert witness in gambling litigation, that the bookmakers should be liable to return the estimated £200,000 stakes. However, there is limited confidence that a civil legal action would prevail, as Matt has limited supporting documentary evidence of the exact activity.

10. **The ABB say:**

- *The 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey found that: problem gambling levels for the whole gambling industry have remained at less than 1%-which is low by international standards- and the percentage of identified problem gamblers playing on B2 machines actually went down by nearly 25% from 2007 to 2010 (from 11.2% to 8.8%)*[3]

This statement is misleading.

One explanation for a decrease in problem gamblers can simply be that some gamblers have gambled to ruination and no longer have access to funds. But far more importantly, if the number of problem gamblers declined by 25%, but at the same time revenue from problem gamblers increased by nearly 50%, then the amount lost per problem gambler has increased by nearly 100%.

This indicates how addicted the real hard-core FOBT gamblers are and the high degree of probability that they will gamble to extinction.

11. **The ABB say:**

- *The 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey found that: B2 Gaming Machines (FOBTs) players are more likely to be educated to degree level or higher than to have no formal qualifications, and the overwhelming majority had GCSEs, A-Levels or another professional qualification*[4]

This statement is misleading.

This chart, Table 3.4 page 42, is not designed to show what percentage of gamblers participating in a gambling activity have certain educational qualifications. It is designed to show by educational qualifications what the participation in the gambling activity is. It does not provide any evidence to support the ABB statement.

12. **The ABB say:**

- *The 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey found that those who are unemployed are far more likely to participate in other forms of gambling than playing B2 Gaming Machines. Of those surveyed 53% said they gambled on the national lottery, 32% scratch cards, 23% slot machines, 21% horse races, 18% private betting, 18% sports betting, 16% another lottery, 15% online gambling, 14% bingo and 12% said they played on B2 gaming machines*[5]

This statement is misleading.

In this chart, Table 3.6 page 45, the reason that unemployed percentage of 12% is lower than the national lottery draw percentage of 53% is because far more players play the lottery. Only 4% of all gamblers participate in FOBTs but 59% of all gamblers participate in the National Lottery draw. So an unemployed person is slightly less likely to participate in the National Lottery draw compared to all national lottery draw gamblers (53% to 59%) a ratio of around 0.9 to 1. But an unemployed person is far

[3] British Gambling Prevalence Surveys (2007) table 5.4a page 95/(2010) table 6.4 page 96
[4] British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010 table 3.4, 42
[5] British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010 table 3.6, page 45

more likely to be an FOBT gambler compared to all FOBT gamblers (12% to 4%) a ratio of around 3 to 1. Looking at the eight other activities identified by the ABB the highest ratio is 2 to 1. Therefore FOBTs are disproportionately more attractive to unemployed gamblers than all gamblers by activity compared to all the other identified gambling activities.

13. **The ABB say:**

- *Statements such as "you can lose £18,000 an hour playing on a B2 machine" are a total fabrication. It assumes you play the maximum stake of £100 every 20 seconds and lose everything on 180 consecutive spins. The statistical probability of that happening is akin to buying a single National Lottery Ticket and scooping the jackpot 3 weeks in a row.*

This statement has some merit.

The fact is that "you can gamble £18,000 an hour playing on a B2 machine". So in theory "you can lose £18,000 an hour" and this is not a "total fabrication", but it is at the extreme of probability. In this context, "gamble" rather than "lose" is a better explanation.

14. **The ABB say:**

- *Betting shop operators are high-regulated responsible businesses that respond to customer demand. If demand is not met then it is likely that a 'black-market' will emerge. For example, 93 illegal gaming machines were seized in the London Borough of Haringey last year[6].*

This statement is misleading.

The majority of the three page cover letter by the ABB was related to asserting that our Campaign would somehow benefit commercially through FOBT restrictions. Contrarily, this ABB statement implies that FOBT restrictions would encourage a "black-market". We are not aware of any "black-market" FOBTs being seized in raids anywhere. This could be verified by reference to the Gambling Commission.

SUMMARY

The ABB statements numbered 9 onwards were preceded by the heading "Facts". It is difficult to understand why some of their statements are "truths" and others are "facts". The extracts from the BGPS are all, of course, factual. But this document had nearly 200 pages and over 100 charts. So the facts selected from the BGPS by the ABB, and the misleading ABB interpretations, show how the ABB want to spin the statistics.

Our document is not of course the WHOLE REAL Truth about Gaming Machines in Betting Shops. It is a response to the ABB document which presented fourteen statements to MPs and national newspapers. We have identified two statements that are irrelevant to FOBTs, one statement that has some merit and eleven statements that are misleading. In the circumstances, how can the public, media or politicians ever have any confidence in any ABB representation?

[6] Haringey Council – Illegal Gaming Machines seized in raids across Haringey

The REAL Truth about Betting Shops

Comments by the Campaign for Fairer Gambling on the Association of British Bookmakers (ABB) document "The Truth about Betting Shops" which was sent to MPs and national newspapers as an attachment to a letter from Dirk Vennix, CEO of the ABB, criticising our FOBT campaign.

1. **The ABB say:**

- *Betting is a popular British pastime with 8 million people visiting our shops every year, Betting shops are modern leisure retail businesses, offering customer state-of-the-art video and audio systems, comfortable furniture, alcohol-free refreshments and friendly staff.*

This statement is not directly relevant to FOBTs.

2. **The ABB say:**

- *Betting shops have been located on our nation's High Streets ever since off-course betting was first made legal in 1961. Nor is it true that bookmakers are increasing. The reality is that, over the past decade shop numbers have remained stable at about 8,700 since the turn of the century and almost half what they were at the end of the 1960s.*

This statement is not directly relevant to FOBTs.

3. **The ABB say:**

- *Betting shops are an important part of the retail mix on the high streets generating footfall, paying taxes and creating jobs. Betting shops generate more footfall than other similar sized outlets apart from post offices and pharmacies.*

This statement is misleading.

An everyday FOBT gambler could visit one shop several times in a day or several shops in a day, doing so more than once. Using betting shop visits as the measurement misleadingly inflates betting shop footfall. The statement avoids comparison with outlets such as Tesco Express or Costa Coffee, by the use of the "similar sized outlets" criteria.

4. **The ABB say:**

- *Betting shops account for less than 4% of the country's 240,000 retail units. To put this into context, this representation is 22% less than bank branches, 25% less than charity shops and 60% less than fast food outlets.*

This statement is not directly relevant to FOBTs.

5. **The ABB say:**

- *Even in areas which are commonly cited as having the most betting shops, they make up less than 3% of the retail units. For example, betting shops make up less 2.3% of retail units in Southwark, 2.7% in Lewisham, 2.7% in Hackney, 2.8% in Wood Green, 3.2% in Manchester, 3.3% in Birmingham and 3.5% in Leeds.*

This statement is not directly relevant to FOBTs.

6. **The ABB say:**

- *We play our part in supporting the UK economy, despite challenging conditions for the industry. A 3.2 billion chunk of UK GDP, 41,000 full-time-equivalent (FTE) jobs and nearly £1 billion taxes – about £400 million than we make in profit – are currently provided by UK betting shops.*

This statement is misleading.

There is no justification of the "challenging conditions for the industry" in light of the consistent annual growth of FOBT profits.

7. **The ABB say:**

- *For every £1 of GVA generated by betting shops, an additional £0.61 GVA is generated in the wider economy through indirect and induced impacts. Between 87% (Wales) and 99% (London) of the economic benefits stay local too, enriching communities, for example 99% in London and 87% in Wales*

This statement is not directly relevant to FOBTs.

8. **The ABB say:**

- *Bookmakers have already invested about £2 billion in local economies through the opening of new betting shops and the 'new–style' re-fitting of betting shops that already existed before the most recent changes in the industry*

This statement is not directly relevant to FOBTs.

9. **The ABB say:**

- *Betting shops contribute to local services paying more than £58 million in business rates each year.*

This statement is not directly relevant to FOBTs.

10. **The ABB say:**

- *Betting shops provide a total of 55,000 full and part time jobs, which equates to nearly one in ten jobs in the leisure industry. Some 31,000 or 56% of those 55,000 jobs are filled by women, making betting shops one of the most female-friendly industries in the UK. Betting shops also contribute substantially to youth employment in the UK. Cebr estimates that, this year, betting shops employ 14,000 young people aged 18-24. This means that 25% of betting shop employees are aged 18-24, compared to 8% of employees across the economy as a whole.*

This statement is correct but should be taken in context.

The contrast of 41,000 full time equivalent jobs with 55,000 full and part time jobs indicate that the number of full-time jobs could easily be as low as 27,000 or less. The high proportion of women and youth employed is likely to reflect low-wage jobs.

11. **The ABB say:**

- *Bookmakers are one of the most regulated retailers on the high street. Operators require two licenses: an operator's licence from the Gambling Commission and a premises license from a local licensing committee. A license will not be granted if it can be proved that a betting shop would cause crime or have a negative impact on young and vulnerable people.*

This statement is misleading.

Bookmakers' shops are gambling premises not retailers. A license grant rather than a renewal is for a new shop so it is difficult to prove what will happen in a shop that does not exist. A license renewal could be denied but unfortunately the opinion of the Gambling Commission (GC) would be taken into consideration. As GC itself is in denial of the level of harm to young and vulnerable persons by FOBTs the burden of proof is difficult to achieve. In fact, the GC is not even willing to regard turnover or net profit as factors to determine the primary use of the premises. Simply, a betting license should be granted or renewed for premises where the primary activity is betting, not FOBTs gaming, but shop turnover is now over 80% on FOBTs, so there is no incentive to.

12. **The ABB say:**

- *Betting shop operators take their responsibility to the local communities in which they operate very seriously. Betting shops want to continue to attract a wide spectrum of customers to their stores; they can only do this by offering them a safe and responsible leisure experience. That is why significant resources are invested into responsible gambling procedures and the training of staff.*

This statement is misleading.

Race-by-race and sports gamblers in betting shops are in decline. Bookmakers have been happy to convert those gamblers to telephone or online gambling, where there is a lower tax liability as these facilities are based offshore. They have also been actively converting over-the-counter gamblers to

become FOBT gamblers by offering how-to-play sessions, free play and tournaments. Also, betting shops are regularly refusing or reducing requested over-the-counter race or sports wagers out of fear that these gamblers may be particularly skilled. The central trading room staff levels to competently handle high over-the-counter wagers has been cut back and even eliminated. There is no staff incentive to report any problem gambling, suspicious activity or violence or damage on the premises. Staff training is conducted to a lower level than in a casino or a public house.

13. **The ABB say:**

- *The 2010 Gambling Prevalence survey showed that betting is enjoyed responsibly and safely by the overwhelming majority of customers. Overall gambling industry rates of problem gambling have remained relatively low in the UK at under one per cent since 1999. One problem gambler, however, is one too many and we are very committed to tackling the issue.*

This statement is misleading.

The Survey at Table 6.4 showed that 13.3% of regular FOBT gamblers (at least once a month) are problem gamblers.

14. **The ABB say:**

- *The whole gambling industry raises voluntary contributions worth more than £5 million each year to help fund research, prevention and treatment of problem gambling. This work is overseen by the Responsible Gambling Trust which since 2009 has received over £15 million from the gambling industry.*

This statement is correct but should be taken in context.

The amount won illegally by betting shops from underage FOBT gamblers is, by our estimation, over £5 million per year. Considering that the £5 million contributed per year is from all gambling sectors, the contribution related to FOBTs is below the estimated illegal win on FOBTs.

15. **The ABB say:**

- *The vast majority of gambling in the UK does not take place in a betting shop. In the year to March 2011/2012 58.1% of 4,000 adults surveyed said they had participated in at least one form of gambling in the previous four weeks. The most popular gambling activity was National Lottery tickets (48.0% of respondents), followed by National Lottery scratch cards (13%) and tickets for society or other good cause lotteries (10.6%). Betting on horse races or virtual horse races with a bookmaker (4.3%) gambling on fruit or gaming machines (3.4%) and private betting with family, friends or colleagues (3.3%) were the next most popular activities*[1].

This statement is misleading.

It is the volume of gambling activity and the loss per gambler that are the most informative measures.

[1]Gambling Commission Industry Statistics April 2009 to March 2012 table 6, page9.

The gross turnover on FOBTs is far higher than on any of the other identified activities. The loss per FOBT gambler is far higher than the loss per gambler at any of the other identified activities.

SUMMARY

Of the fifteen ABB statements we have identified that seven statements are not directly relevant to FOBTs, two statements needed more context and six statements are misleading.

The general thesis of the ABB, as a thread through all statements is that, by implication, there is an economic benefit of FOBT gambling. But this is incorrect.

FOBT gambling losses from savings, borrowings, or proceeds of crime are of no economic benefit. FOBT gambling losses from disposable income may be of economic benefit. But there is no empirical evidence to suggest that an alternative use of the disposable income would not result in equal or greater economic benefit.

Also, as there has never been any analysis of the socio-economic cost of FOBT problem gambling and as many other economic activities do not have the associated socio-economic cost of FOBT problem gambling, it is impossible for anyone to rationally assert that there is any net economic benefit of FOBTs.

STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

Appendix F

STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

Excerpt from Bet View, March 2013 page 12.

DIRK VENNIX COLUMN

abb
association of british bookmakers ltd

ABB chief executive Dirk Vennix on why the betting industry needs your support right now

In last month's column I ended by noting the Government had launched its consultation on electronic gaming machines. If you will excuse the pun, the stakes could not be higher. We need your support.

The Government is asking for evidence to support a reduction in the levels of stakes and prizes on gaming machines in betting shops – in response to the consultation the Government could reduce the stake to just £2.

This could have a major impact on the jobs of betting shop staff and lead to many shops closing.

Opponents of machines in betting shops have been providing alarmist and misleading figures to the media – you may have seen or heard about some of the stories. We are pleased that many newspapers, once provided with the facts, have balanced, amended or retracted those stories.

More importantly, we are also continuing to tell the media why betting shops are an essential part of the high street retail mix and staff and customers are part of the local community.

The vast majority of customers are regular punters, who enjoy calling into your shop, catching up with their friends and staff, enjoying a bet or sometimes playing on a gaming machine safely and responsibly. Why should they have their leisure time taken away? And why should your livelihood be at threat solely because of anecdotal stories publicised by anti-betting campaigners? They forget that:

- Betting shops are modern leisure retail businesses and the most regulated retail outlets on the high street.
- Your customers gamble on a variety of things, from horse racing and X-Factor to slotmachine or casino style games.
- The machines have been in shops for over a decade and are popular products, bringing in new customers and giving existing customers new products to enjoy.
- Most customers will call in during their breaks or after work. You know our customers well and you know most of the people who play on machines have full time jobs.
- You take your responsibility to the local community seriously. You know how to identify someone who may be developing a gambling problem and implement procedures in place to help them – including allowing them to self-exclude themselves from the shop.
- You enforce age restrictions and most shops operate a Think 21 policy, to stop under 18s from gambling on your premises.

Please show your support and write in to the Government's consultation at: **www.culture.gov.uk/consultations/9656.**

t: 0203 600 0167
info@fairergambling.org info@stopthefobts.org fobts@bcsagency.com
www.stopthefobts.org /stopthefobts www.fairergambling.org
represented by bcsAgency t: 0115 948 6900

STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

Appendix G

Regulating Gaming in Ireland

Report of the Casino Committee

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM

BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH
ARNA FHOILSIÚ AG OIFIG AN tSOLÁTHAIR
Le ceannach díreach ón
OIFIG DHÍOLTA FOILSEACHÁN RIALTAIS,
TEACH SUN ALLIANCE, SRÁID THEACH LAIGHEAN, BAILE ÁTHA CLIATH 2,
nó tríd an bpost ó
FOILSEACHÁIN RIALTAIS, AN RANNÓG POST-TRÁCHTA,
AONAD 20 PÁIRC MIONDÍOLA COIS LOCHA,CLÁR CHLAINNE MHUIRIS, CONTAE MHAIGH EO
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if they register, identify and verify the identity of their customers immediately on or before entry, regardless of the amount of gaming chips purchased.[159]

4.5.6 There is little doubt that the requirements of the FATF as they relate to casinos can be met, but in order to do so the gaming regulatory authority will have to be given sufficient powers to make appropriate Regulations in this area. Various technical issues arise, such as how to track an individual's spending over a night especially in relation to table games. For example, a requirement that cash could not be used in any circumstances in a casino and that every time a customer wanted to place a bet on a table game, s/he would have to go to the cashier if s/he did not have sufficient chips and could cause severe difficulties for the conduct of table games.

Recommendation: The Committee recommends that in the establishment of any new regulatory regime, and in order to ensure the development and implementation of successful anti-money laundering strategies, the licence awarding body must have the ability to undertake in-depth background investigations into the applicant's financial, business and taxation history as well as any criminal or other relevant records. While the necessity for these powers extends beyond money laundering considerations alone, the Committee wishes to stress that action to prevent money laundering is not just limited to areas of finance, including appropriate financial procedures, but is multi-faceted and starts from basic licensing requirements with consideration of such matters as good character, criminal record, taxation, financial history, disclosure of shadow directors and shareholders etc. The Committee is also satisfied that requirements of the FATF as well as EU law can be met by casinos and that the regulatory authority, in consultation with appropriate parties and by reference to best practice in other countries, can ensure that the necessary procedures are in place.

4.6 Gaming Licence and Gaming Machine Typologies

4.6.1 Distinctions in Gaming Markets

Many jurisdictions make marked distinctions between different types of gaming. The distinction between what many perceive to be "harder" forms of gaming, such as casino games and GMs, on the one hand, and lotteries and betting on the other is particularly common. As is outlined earlier in this Report, in many countries this is reflected in separate legislation for gaming (which in those cases covers casinos and often also GMs), betting and lotteries. The statutory framework for the two types of gaming differs mainly in the form of regulation, and often in the form of supervision. Market differentiation according to the nature of different gaming environments (e.g. "super" casinos[160]; smaller casinos; remote gaming; gaming arcades etc.) and assorted forms of gaming (e.g. table games; card games; gaming machines; 'amusement-with-prizes' machines etc.) is necessary in order to provide a meaningful and transparent regulatory structure. Consistency necessitates a structure that can be easily applied regardless of the composition of any gaming operation. It must be simple to follow with clear parameters outlining exactly the limits on gaming activity permitted across a broad spectrum of varying classes of operating licences.

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159 See Directive 2005/60/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 26th October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing. Available online: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_309/l_30920051125en00150036.pdf

160 The term "super casino" is not particularly helpful as it is a relative term which can only be properly understood when placed in a particular context. The term cannot be used [illegible]

4.6.2 Today in Ireland there are six basic categories of gambling:

(a) Casino-Style Table Gaming – Including Blackjack; Poker; Roulette; Brit Brag; Kalooki; Punto Banco; 3-5-7 Poker etc.

(b) Gaming Machines – Electronic Gaming Machines (EGMs); "Slots"; FOBTs[161]; AWPs; Automatic Table Games etc.

(c) Remote Gaming – Internet, interactive and mobile gaming

(d) Bingo

(e) Sports and other Betting

(f) Lottery

4.6.3 As stated earlier, the Casino Committee is concerned with the regulation of "Gaming"[162] and so the Committee has focussed its attention on the first three categories of gambling i.e. casinos; gaming machines (in casinos, gaming arcades and stand alone at other venues); and remote gaming.

4.6.4 In broad layman's terms, the difference between **"gaming"** and **"betting"** is that in "betting" the individual placing a stake on a particular event has no part or influence, directly or indirectly, on the outcome of the event/process being bet upon. Whereas in "gaming" the individual participates in the event/process. The legal difference between the two can, at times, appear quite blurred, but there is a distinction. This legal distinction, however, needs to be developed and refined.[163] These legal definitions are critically important to good regulation. Unless these definitions are properly drafted, gaming operators will, no doubt, find a technical method to defeat the intent of the legislature. For example, a technical method might be constructed whereby a customer could play a casino-style game, e.g. roulette, on a machine in such a way as to constitute a bet as it is currently defined or interpreted in law.

4.6.5 The Committee's exploration of the differences between gaming and betting leads it to the conclusion that these areas should remain separate as they raise distinct regulatory issues. The Committee is also of the view that to treat gaming and betting as one area would lead to a cross-over between the two environments which would permit gaming in betting premises and vice versa. The Committee does not consider that this is desirable especially having regard to the number of betting premises in the State (approximately 1,170) and the potential for the proliferation of GMs.

4.6.6 The Committee is aware that many bookmakers operate 'lucky numbers' (a lottery based system) and 'virtual races' and is aware of the importance of these areas to the income stream of bookmakers. These are, however, important issues of detail which can be considered by the Interim Gaming Regulatory Authority, or whichever body is established to take this work forward. These issues do not detract from the Committee's view on the principle of the separation of gaming and betting.

Recommendation: The Committee recommends that "gaming" and "betting" be treated as two completely separate types of gambling activity, which raise very distinct regulatory issues and which should be treated separately in any regulatory arrangement. The Committee considers that this is fundamental for the regulation of gaming. The Committee recommends that there should be no betting of any kind permitted on or in any licensed gaming premises. Likewise, there should be no gaming activity of any kind permitted on or in any betting or bookmakers' premises.

The distinction between gaming and betting may be clarified in legislation to facilitate compliance with the above recommendation.

161 Definitional issues become extremely important when attempting to classify distinct categories of gambling activity. What constitutes each distinct category of gambling activity i.e. "casino"; "gaming arcade"; "gaming"; "gaming machine"; "amusement hall"; "amusement machine"; "betting" etc., requires further in-depth analysis and detailed consideration. See Appendix no. 21 for an illustrative list of definitions. This list is by no means exhaustive and requires further development. The central point in the development of separate legal definitions is the nature of the gambling activity actually being engaged in.

162 See Chapter One.

163 Section 1 of the Betting Act 1931 only states that 'the word "bet" includes "wager, and cognate words shall be construed accordingly.

4.6.7 The Casino Committee has not been requested to explore the possibilities for the further regulation of the betting market in Ireland. While the activities of both the gaming and betting markets obviously have direct impact on one another, this is of no immediate relevance to the design of a regulatory structure exclusively for gaming.[164]

Generally speaking, the toughest conditions and the most intensive supervision regimes are applied to games in a casino environment. The conditions for GMs in a non-casino environment are generally less strict, although this particular market is considered to be a problem in many countries because it represents a low threshold form of gaming and because the wide distribution of GMs over many venues makes strict supervision more difficult. However, this can be prevented by restrictive licensing arrangements and firm and continuous monitoring of industry codes of practice.

4.6.8 Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs)[165]

The Committee notes that Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs) were introduced into the betting office environment in Great Britain in 2001. United Kingdom Customs and Excise figures show a fourfold leap in the betting industry turnover to £29.4 billion since the first roulette FOBTs began appearing in 2001.[166] However, the introduction of such machines does raise fundamental public policy issues.

'Fixed odds betting' is defined to some extent in section 10(1) of the UK Betting Gaming and Duties Act 1981. Under this definition a bet is made at fixed odds only where each of the persons making the bet know or can know at the time the bet is made the amount they will win subject to certain exceptions.[167]

4.6.9 Definitional issues become extremely important when attempting to classify distinct categories of gambling activity. What constitutes each distinct category of gambling activity i.e. 'gaming'; 'betting'; 'casino'; 'gaming arcade'; 'gaming machine' etc., requires further in-depth analysis and detailed consideration.[168] However, aside from the related consequences of increased accessibility to convenience gambling and potential increased incidence of problem gambling, the central issue that arises in permitting the operation of FOBTs in bookmakers' premises is not just one of legal definition, but primarily one of public policy i.e. the public good.

4.6.10 The central point in the deconstruction of this definitional quagmire should be the nature of the gambling activity actually being undertaken. For example, the playing of roulette should be treated as gaming irrespective of whether it takes place on a machine in a gaming establishment or on a FOBT.

4.6.11 The Committee is not opposed to the use of modern touch screen or other technology in bookmakers' shops for betting purposes. It is, however, strongly opposed to the spread of gaming machines into a betting environment. Modern style FOBTs can be configured to run most types of games and the Committee has seen Irish developed machines, for use in bookmakers' premises, which can play casino games, including card games, as well as allow participants to engage in online sports betting. These machines also allow a player to play games like roulette in a real casino environment 'streamed' over the Internet. The key point is that with technological convergence there is little essential difference between computers and most modern electronic gaming machines. Technology i.e. hardware/software and availability of multiple gaming suites, dictates the player experience.

4.6.12 There are approximately 1,170 bookmakers' offices in this State. The prospect of FOBTs in each bookmaker's office, even if limited in number to a maximum of four per office (as in Great Britain), or fewer, has potentially serious repercussions in terms of problem gambling as can be seen from studies in numerous other jurisdictions where a proliferation of gaming machines was permitted. Machines in bookmakers' offices raise exactly the same regulatory issues as in gaming environments. According

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164 The impact of gaming on the horse and greyhound betting sector is discussed elsewhere in this Report.

165 FOBTs are software-driven, often touch screen, terminals, usually of about the same size and shape as a stand alone floor-standing cash dispenser. FOBT users can hazard stakes on a variety of gambling products and services whose outcome is driven by a random number generator operated by an independent third party and located remotely. Gambling products on offer by means of FOBTs generally include virtual horse and greyhound racing and can be configured to play casino-style games such as roulette.

166 This figure includes all betting shop products as well as internet and telephone betting.

to GamCare[169] in the United Kingdom, a recent unpublished survey by Mintel for the Association of British Bookmakers has revealed dramatic increases in the use of FOBTs by problem gamblers (Europe Economics-Mintel 2006). The research examined patterns of gambling participation amongst betting shop visitors and found that, between 2004 and 2005, the use of FOBTs among problem gamblers had escalated from 12% to 40%. According to GamCare's own research, FOBTs remained the second most problematic mode of gambling[170] affecting 25% of their clients.

4.6.13 It is the view of the Committee that, if permitted, the proliferation of this type of GM outside of licensed casinos and gaming arcades with the potential social consequences, would require very strict licensing and regulation by the gaming regulatory authority. Betting offices, operating as gaming establishments, might even be required to reapply for planning permission in accordance with zoning regulations. In line with the demarcation between "gaming" and "betting", it is the opinion of the Committee that no sports or other betting services be provided for in either casinos or gaming arcades of any type and that the converse should also apply.

4.6.14 The public policy issues around the placement of FOBTs in bookmakers' offices can be summarised under five headings:

(a) **Social:** The placement of such machines in an unregulated environment such as a bookmaker's office is socially undesirable because there is ample evidence that permitting the proliferation of such machines outside of gaming arcades may give rise to negative social consequences.

(b) **Tax:** Bookmakers attract a favourable tax rate of 1%. Gaming, worldwide, attracts a higher tax rate.

(c) **Planning:** The possible planning consequences arising from the placement of such machines in bookmakers' offices and the conversion of those offices to combination betting/gaming arcades were not considered by the Committee during their deliberations. The question therefore arises as to whether such activities might constitute a change of use under the planning regulations.

(d) **Regulatory:** If bookmakers can engage in gaming then, logically, gaming establishments should be permitted to engage in betting. Gaming and Betting require different regulatory approaches. The Committee is of the view that these activities should remain separate for the reasons that are outlined in this Report.

(e) **Political:** It is undesirable that such sweeping changes should be made to public policy, with potentially significant adverse social consequences, in the absence of appropriate decisions on these matters by the Executive and the Oireachtas.

4.6.15 In addition, in order to avoid a proliferation of GMs in unregulated environments the Committee recommends that GMs be permitted in casinos and gaming arcades only. They should not be permitted in shops, take-aways, restaurants, hotels, public houses or any other premises. The placement of such GMs outside of a tightly regulated environment is not desirable and may give rise to social problems as well as a proliferation of machines which it will be impossible to regulate or control. The Committee notes that in many other jurisdictions, such as New South Wales in Australia, where GMs were allowed to proliferate, Governments are now attempting to reduce the numbers of such machines.

Recommendation: It is the opinion of the Committee that contemporary fixed odds betting terminals (FOBTs) are to be treated as gaming machines. Gaming machines should not be permitted in bookmakers' offices. The term/label "fixed odds betting terminal" is now somewhat superseded by the fact that many of these machines offer gaming services in addition to betting e.g. roulette etc., and so should be classified as electronic gaming machines. It should be noted that the Committee is not opposed to the introduction of new technology into betting or bookmakers' offices provided that the service being provided utilising such technology is exclusively that of betting.

169 GamCare, a registered charity in the UK, is the national centre for information, advice and practical help regarding the social impact of gambling. *See http://www.gamcare.org.uk*

170 Second only to off and on course betting (mainly off course) which continued to be the most problematic gambling mode for 45% of clients, an increase of 11% on 2004. See *GamCare Care Services 2005 Report.*

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Appendix H

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represented by bcsAgency t: 0115 948 6900

PROCEDURES FOR

DAMAGED GAMING MA

A significant proportion of reports to police refer to criminal damage against gaming machines in Licensed Betting Offices. Arrest and conviction rates in relation to such crime is low, despite the police time involved in responding to crimes of this nature. This guide is intended to reduce the number of reports to police, whilst maximising the opportunity for conviction and ensuring communication escalation is relevant to the incident.

In circumstances where a gaming machine has been damaged, the following should

DAMAGED GAMING

be used as a guide as to whether police should be informed. Please note informing police is still the responsibility of the shop team. However, all cases of machine damage must be reported to the Security Support Line.

First, if the perpetrator of the damage still on site, contact police.

Police should be contacted if customer is well known to shop staff, who if required, would be able to identify the individual to police. This would include details such as the

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Appendix I

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Philip Graf
Gambling Commission
Victoria Square House
Victoria Square
Birmingham
B2 4BP

19th March 2013

Dear Philip,

Re: NatCen machine gambling research

On March 13 2013 the Gambling Commission (GC) made public a piece of research it had commissioned from NatCen entitled "Examining machine gambling in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey" (BGPS). The GC describes it as a secondary analysis to inform the DCMS Triennial Review of stakes and prizes and the Responsible Gambling Strategy Board (RGSB) input onto that consultation.

We are pleased that this NatCen research was conducted and note some interesting findings. However this letter relates to a more pertinent issue than the NatCen research itself.

On March 7 2013 we wrote to Hugh Robertson, the minister responsible for gambling at the DCMS, copying in yourself and a number of others. That letter identified two pieces of research that are also secondary analyses based on the BGPS. On March 11 2013 we made this research evidence accessible at our website www.stopthefobts.org and explained it in a short video.

The first piece of research, as noted on page 77 in Appendix C References of the NatCen research, is entitled "Disordered gambling, type of gambling and gambling involvement in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2007" which we describe in the video as the *2007 evidence*. This research showed that, of the identified fifteen gambling activities, the only activity with a strong association with disordered gambling was fixed odds betting terminals (FOBTs).

The second piece of research was authored by Jim Orford, Mark Griffiths and Heather Wardle, which we describe in the video as the *2010 evidence* (Heather Wardle is the lead author of the NatCen research as commissioned by the GC). Jim Orford provides a summary of this research at his Gambling Watch UK website http://www.gamblingwatchuk.org/research. This second piece of research showed that of fifteen identified gambling activities, the amount of problem gambler estimated losses on FOBTs was significantly higher than on any other activity, and that the percentage of problem gamblers estimated losses on FOBTs was substantially greater than all other activities except one.

We are confident that the GC should regard BGPS data as reliable and should consider these two pieces of research evidence in the same regard as the NatCen research. We are therefore confident that the GC would now wish to give adequate public exposure and explanation of these two pieces of research evidence, to ensure that the DCMS Triennial Review and the RGSB are as fully informed as possible, at least in respect of this empirical evidence of betting shop B2 / FOBT problem gambling.

To enable any party that may wish to include reference to these two pieces of research evidence in their submission to DCMS, which is due to close on April 9 2013, we request that the GC proceeds publicising an explanation of this research evidence by March 25 2013 at the latest.

Yours sincerely,

Derek Webb
Founder, Campaign for Fairer Gambling Founder and funder
www.fairergambling.org

Cc: Lord Sharman Gamcare Chair, Sir Brian Pomeroy CBE Responsible Gambling Strategy Board Chair, Rt Hon Hugh Roberson MP, Rt Hon Maria Miller MP, Rt Hon Don Foster MP, Rt Hon Clive Efford MP and Rt Hon David Lammy MP, Professor Jim Orford

GAMBLING COMMISSION

Mr Derek Webb
Campaign for Fairer Gambling
c/o bcsAgency
88-90 North Sherwood Street
Nottingham
NG1 4EE

26 March 2013

Dear Derek,

Re: NatCen machine gambling research

Thank you for your letter dated 19 March 2013 to Philip Graf, Chair of the Gambling Commission. Philip has asked me to reply on his behalf.

In your correspondence you request that the Gambling Commission (the Commission) gives public exposure to two pieces of research, "Disordered gambling, type of gambling and gambling involvement in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2007" (La Plante *et al*) and a further piece, "What Proportion of Gambling is Problem Gambling? Estimates from the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey", authored by Jim Orford, Mark Griffiths and Heather Wardle.

I should start by making clear that unlike the secondary analysis "Examining machine gaming in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey", the two pieces of research that you refer to were not commissioned by the Gambling Commission. While we note the findings of those analyses with interest, we would also draw attention to the fact that there are many hundreds of published papers in the field of gambling research – and we would encourage anyone with an interest to make use of whatever evidence they consider appropriate.

As you will be aware, we have established the Responsible Gambling Strategy Board (RGSB), one of the roles of which is to provide advice on the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence base. The RGSB, whose incoming chair is Sir Christopher Kelly, is considering the available evidence in formulating its advice to the Commission on the triennial review, including the pieces of research you identify. The Commission does have a copy of the second piece of research you mention in your letter (Orford *et al*), but as you will be aware, this piece of research has not been published formally.

I should say, however, that the Commission has worked very closely with all three of the authors, and continues to do so, and affords them great respect. We are also very pleased that the data that the Commission generated through its prevalence surveys is being used – we have made it available publicly for this purpose.

Victoria Square House
Victoria Square
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www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk

Please contact me if I can be of further help.

Yours sincerely,

Amanda Fox
Gaming Machines and Social Responsibility

cc. Rt Hon Clive Efford MP, Rt Hon Don Foster MP, Philip Graf , Rt Hon David Lammy MP, Rt Hon Maria Miller MP, Professor Jim Orford, Sir Brian Pomeroy, Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Lord Sharman.

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Appendix J

OTHER FACTORS BEHIND WINNING AND LOSING

While the house advantage is useful for understanding the casino's expected win (or a player's expected loss) per bet, there are other factors that can influence the amount a player might spend when gambling in a casino.

Length of Time Played, Speed of Play and Amount Wagered: Because the odds always favor the house, the longer or faster a person plays a casino game, the more the person should expect to lose. In the same way, the more a person wagers, the more the person should expect to lose. For instance, if the "hold percentage" (or house advantage) for a typical slot machine is 10 percent, then, on average, a player will win back $90 for each $100 wagered. However, if this player then re-wagers the $90, the player will again win back, on average, 90 percent of the $90, or $81. As the betting continues, over time players are more and more likely to lose money, rather than win. An individual may lose more or less than the average, but the machine always comes out ahead in the long run.

Skill: The chances of winning are maximized when games involving an element of skill (in playing or betting) — such as blackjack or video poker — are played at the highest level. However, with few exceptions, it's important to remember that the house continues to have a statistical advantage in every play of every game, even against a skillful player.

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Appendix K

We're bookies, not bouncers, bet shop staff tell MPs

A PROPOSAL by MPs to increase the number of gambling machines allowed in betting shops will lead to an increase in violence and abuse suffered by staff, Community has warned.

A report by the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee on gambling, published in July, proposed increasing the current limit of four fixed-odds betting terminals (FOBTs) per shop.

Community argues that there is a direct connection between FOBTs – casino-style machines that allow punters to bet more than £15,000 an hour – and violence and abuse of staff. Increasing the number would only make matters worse. There are already about 32,000 FOBTs in UK betting shops.

The union also points out that the spread of single-staffed betting shops makes it harder for staff to manage effectively the use of FOBTs and the behaviour of some customers.

Community Campaign Manager Ryan Slaughter said: "Our members want to be bookies not bouncers.

"Betting shop workers up and down the country will look upon this report with dismay and outrage because they experience physical and verbal violence on a daily basis due to the presence of FOBTs.

"It is even more shocking that the committee has backed calls from industry companies for more FOBTs in shops when the same companies openly stop workers from reporting violent FOBT-related incidents to the police.

Members of the union often complain about the problems caused by FOBTs. Community is analysing the results of a survey of betting shop workers on violence and abuse.

The union has also made freedom of information requests to all police authorities to establish the levels of crime or under-reporting of incidents in betting shops.

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Appendix L

Appendix L - Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling in Response to Philip Davies MP's Complaint to the ASA

On the 6th December 2012, the Campaign was the subject of a complaint by Philip Davies MP to the Advertising Standards Authority relating to advertisements it had taken out in The House magazine.

The complaint objected to a number of assertions the Campaign had made relating to FOBTs, including: "FOBTs… are the scourge of the high street"; "FOBTs with their addictive roulette content"; "FOBTs… have since [the Gambling Act 2005] multiplied to such an extent that they are now known as 'the crack cocaine of gambling'"; "Now is the time to take a stand on FOBTs and protect the thousands of families who fall foul of FOBT addiction each year"; and "The reason so many new betting shops are opening on our high streets is to offer more FOBTs on which it is possible to stake up to £100 every 20 seconds. It is now time to act to protect poorer communities during a time of recession".

The Campaign responded to the complaint, and submitted the evidence as disclosed in this section. The ASA has not yet resolved the complaint, and at the time of the advertisement, The Campaign had not yet discovered the ***Empirical Evidence*** documents. This ASA evidence supports this submission to the Triennial Review by providing comprehensive historical evidence that informs the Campaign's position on FOBTs.

In response to the complaint relating to the assertion that "FOBTs… are the scourge of the high street", there are a number of sources. An article for the Guardian[1] by Rowenna Davis, dated 24th July 2012, which stated: **"Business owners tell me proliferation [of betting shops] deters people from visiting their high streets and damages growth."**

An article for the Independent[2] by Martin Hickman, dated 5th November 2012, similarly opined: **"Roulette machines in high street bookmakers are blamed for creating a new generation of problem gamblers."**

The Tottenham Journal[3] quoted resident Helen Riley in an article dated the 3rd December 2012, who said: **"There are many children in this area and I am concerned about the effect of anti-social behaviour linked to gambling establishments."**

The Daily Mail, quoting Harriet Harman MP in their article[4] on the 6th August 2012, stated: "**'If we had known then what we know now [about the clustering of betting shops], we wouldn't have allowed this. It's not just ruining the high street, it's ruining people's lives."**

The Dispatches documentary, "Britain's High Street Gamble"[5] also found evidence of anti-social behaviour, and stated in its synopsis: **"Britain's high streets are struggling to survive, but one business is booming: betting shops. In one London high street there are now 10 within yards and the locals are fed up."**

The Rt. Hon. Harriet Harman MP published a report in November 2011[6] entitled: "The Problem of Betting Shops Blighting High Streets and Communities in Low Income Areas." In the report, she stated: **"The evidence from my own constituency in Camberwell and Peckham and across the country clearly illustrates the need to end the domination gambling firms are extending over our high streets."**

On her constituency blog, Diane Abbott wrote[7] on the 17th January 2012: **"I want to talk about the scourge of betting shops, partly because I have campaigned on the issue for some time and partly because they are a particular issue in Hackney and other inner-city areas".**

Similarly, The Portas Review[8], commissioned by the government and published in December 2012, argued that: **"…the influx of betting shops, often in more deprived areas, is blighting our high streets…".**

The complaint regarding the assertion that "FOBTs…are the scourge of the high street" implied that this opinion was entirely fabricated by the Campaign. Yet there is ample evidence to substantiate the notion that this is a widely held view.

Responding to the complaint relating to “FOBTs with their addictive roulette content”, it is firstly indisputable that FOBTs have roulette content and this accounts for around 90% of the turnover on FOBTs[9], and all gambling is addictive just as, for example, alcohol is addictive. Because a significant proportion of the population do not get addicted to gambling, just as a significant proportion of the population are not alcoholics, does not mean gambling is not addictive.

Furthermore, a Scoping Study for the 2005 Gambling Act, published in 2007[10] stated: **“FOBTs are increasingly association with problem gambling in players”** and **“the international research evidence demonstrates that FOBTs possess the characteristics of those forms of gambling most associated with gambling problems, namely high event frequency and opportunity for rapid reinvestment.”**

A Daily Mail article[11] dated 5th August 2012 refers to “roulette machine addiction” and quotes Gareth Wallace of the Salvation Army, who states: **“Studies have shown FOBTs are eight times more addictive than other forms of gambling.”**

This view is supported by the Guardian, who published the following claims[12] in an article dated 9th May 2009: **“According to Gamcare, a charity funded by the gambling industry, one in four calls to its helpline now concern the new craze [FOBTs]. It also warns that gambling debts are soaring and young people are especially addicted to the machines.”**

Research on the social impact of gambling for the Scottish Executive[13] published in 2006 concluded: **“Certain features of games are strongly associated with problem gambling. These include games that have a high event frequency (i.e. that are fast and allow for continual staking), that involve an element of skill or perceived skill, and that create ‘near misses’ (i.e. the illusion of having almost won). Size of jackpot and stakes, probability of winning (or perceived probability of winning), and the possibility of using credit to play are also associated with higher levels of problematic play. Games that meet these criteria are electronic gaming machines and casino table games.”**

Contrary to what the complaint implies, the statement “FOBTs with their addictive roulette content” is a widely held view, and the Campaign sought to reflect that.

Responding to the third complaint, which relates to the statement: “FOBTs… have since [the Gambling Act 2005] multiplied to such an extent they are now known as the ‘crack cocaine of gambling’”, there are a number of supportive sources.

Firstly, Tim Batstone, the president of the British Amusement and Catering Trade Association is quoted in a Daily Telegraph article[14] dated 5th March 2005 stating there are 20,000 FOBTs in the UK. According to the Gambling Commission Industry Statistics 2008-2011[15], which were available at the time the complaint was submitted, there were 33,939 FOBTs in the financial year ending 2011. So the assertion that FOBTs have multiplied is indisputable.

An article in the September 2012 edition of Euroslot magazine[16] claims there to have been 17,000 FOBTs in 2007 compared to 32,000 in 2012, alluding to an even more significant increase. The term “crack cocaine of gambling” is a widely used descriptor of FOBTs, and despite what the complaint implies, the phrase was not coined by the Campaign, nor does it preclude FOBTs from being called anything else.

The phrase was in fact coined by then Guardian journalist Matthew Norman in 2003[17], and it was subsequently used by Racing Post journalist Jim Cremin shortly after[18]. The Daily Mail also refers to the “crack cocaine of gambling” in their article “The £46bn cost of Britain’s roulette machine addiction” [19].

During a select committee inquiry into the Gambling Act 2005, the Salvation Army stated[20]: **“We regard Fixed Odds Betting Terminals as the ‘crack cocaine of gambling’ and would like to see restrictions rather than further liberalistion.”**

Dave Allen, of the A&S Leisure Group, also referred to FOBTs as “the crack cocaine of gambling” during the same inquiry[21], an inquiry led by the Department for Culture Media and Sport’s select committee, of which Philip Davies MP is a member.

The notion that this is a phrase originated by the Campaign, and the idea that Philip Davies MP was not already aware of it, is entirely unlikely given its widespread use.

The fourth complaint related to the statement: “Now is the time to take a stand on FOBTs and protect the thousands of families who fall foul of FOBT addiction each year.”

A Daily Mail article dated 25th September 2012 implies that Don Foster, David Cameron, Nick Clegg, George Osborne and Danny Alexander agree with the statement that now is the time to take a stand on FOBTs[22].

Gamcare receives 100,000 callers who cite FOBT addiction, and predicts that each problem gambler affects at least four others[23].

Based on an analysis of the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey, Professor Jim Orford estimates that 23% of profits derived from FOBTs come from people with gambling problems[24].

So the original statement that was the subject of the complaint cannot be disputed. Self-exclusion was a policy introduced by the betting industry in 2007, in response to the requirements of the Gambling Commission’s Code of Practice[25], but it was operationally unsuccessful in dealing with problem gambling.

Gambling Commission figures show that the number of self-exclusion had increased by 45% in two years, from around 11,500 in 2008/9 to 20,823 in 2010/11[26]. The figures reflect an increasing consumer usage of self-exclusion but little evidence to support the positive impact it had on reducing problem gambling, as the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010 showed around 450,000 people in the UK had a gambling problem[27].

An article by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism[28] argued that: **“gambling addicts have found self-exclusions are often ineffectual at helping them manage their problem. When their own self-control lapses, many problem gamblers have found they have been allowed to bet again unchallenged in betting shops from which they have excluded themselves. The Gambling Commission records 10,468 ‘known breaches’ of self- exclusion in 2009-10 – more than double the reported breaches of just a year before.”**

This may be attributed to the lack of a regulatory penalty for failing to uphold the policy. The noted impact of families is supported by the failure of betting shops to enforce an adequate age verification policy to prevent underage gambling.

A Gambling Commission report in 2009[29] concluded: **"recent mystery shopping exercise undertaken by the Commission throughout England that revealed a disturbing failure rate. The exercise covered all the major betting operators in Great Britain, accounting for around 80% of betting shops, and the initial results show that in 98 of the 100 shops visited a 17 year old was allowed to place a bet at the counter."**

A study later in 2009[30] found there to be a 35% failure rate on age verification, yet despite this the Gambling Commission has declined to impose any financial penalties on operators. The Sun newspaper's article on the 29th July 2012[31] corroborates this view, as young people were allowed to gamble on FOBTs in six of the twelve betting shops they tried. The BBC Panorama programme "Gambling Nation", broadcast on the 5th November 2012, also highlighted the impact of problem gambling on families [32].

The final complaint related to the assertion: "The reason so many new betting shops are opening on our high streets is to offer more FOBTs on which you can bet up to £100 nearly every 20 seconds. It is now time to act to prevent exploitation of poorer communities during a time of recession."

Philip Davies MP objected to the validity of this statement, despite agreeing with it on the 18th October 2011 during his select committee's inquiry into the Gambling Act 2005, when he said: **"Linking that to clustering, some people in Parliament have been concerned at the number of betting shops that have sprung up on a particular high street or in a city centre or whatever it might be. Am I right in thinking that that is in some way linked to the issue of machines? In effect, just for argument's sake take Shipley as an example, there is a demand in Shipley, perhaps, for-I had better make the maths easy so I can work it out-20 machines in Shipley and therefore, because each bookmaker is only allowed four, the upshot of that is that there will be five bookmakers in Shipley whereas, for example, if each betting shop was allowed six machines there might be three or four. There will be 20 machines, however many you allow in each shop, and**

this is governing the number of shops that there are on a high street or in a town."

Furthermore, the Gambling Data Report published in November 2012[33], suggested that the growth and net profitability of FOBTs justifies moving betting shops to more prominent high street locations to offer the maximum of four FOBTs per betting shop. FOBTs can accept £100 wagers every 20 seconds, and this can be cited in the Code of Practice[34], so our response to that aspect of the complaint is indisputable. It is clear that imposing restrictions on the maximum stake on FOBTs would result in a constriction of new betting shops opening on the high street.

The Campaign has presented a substantial amount of additional evidence in the Triennial Review submission that was not included in the ASA evidence. Therefore any decision against the Campaign by the ASA should not have any impact on DCMS consideration of the additional evidence, including the ***Empirical Evidence***.

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Appendix M

Appendix M: Anecdotal Evidence of Problem Gambling

Since the launch of our stopthefobts.org website the campaign for Fairer Gambling has been receiving testimonial evidence from problem gamblers and bookmaking industry employees. Many of these contacts, due to either the implications of their addiction or concerns about their employment, have provided their name and contact details to us and permission to use their testimonials, but with the guarantee of anonymity.

A selection of these testimonials are enclosed below as further anecdotal evidence of the impact FOBTs have, firstly on players and secondly on those working within the industry.

Colin Ross a retired-Bookmaker from Aberdeen, December 2012:
“I know a great deal about the betting game and now as an independent Scottish-football odds compiler and Scottish football punter, I cringe and want to scream out loud as I watch another sad case succumb to the disease that is the FOBTs.

“I loved the betting shop buzz "independent and hands-on". I cared about my customers - some of my punters were also my friends - quiet words in guys ears if I thought betting was a tad excessive, which could have led to social and family problems !!

“YOU SIMPLY VALUED YOUR CUSTOMERS! Prior to 2007, some years before, the buzz was waning, the industry demanded, longer hours, 7 day, 7 night trading. The fun was diluting and FOBTs were emerging - the emergence of these machines scared me. Such was the impact, shops opened next to shops, next to shops. The proliferation of cluster shops was born, the rest is history - FOBTs have taken over.

“In the mid - to late 90's and into the early 2000's betting shops had a ball, fun places to be and betting tax abolished. Punters are often the optimists and generally relate to winners and profitable days. Chat involves smiles, laughs, run of the mill banter. “ALMOSTS, SO CLOSE , BEAT A SHORT HEAD , CONCEDED AN INJURY TIME GOAL”, but all good fun and within reason.

“FOBT players seldom smile, reasoning is non-apparent, they are caught up in the moment and certainly lack cohesive dialogue. The furrowed brows and nervous demeanour often leads to mild violence with regular disgusting expletives!!! It is very safe to say I am no Psychologist - it is also very very safe to say the atmosphere, friendships and camaraderie

of bookies and punters of the ‘90s has been totally eradicated by the compulsive and addictive FOBT - THE BOOKIES CASH COWS !!

“It pains me - but today's betting shops are no longer nice places - FOBTs have seen to that.”

Anonymous testimonial, February 2013:
“I would like to suggest that FOBT terminals should be banned by the Government, or at least capped or controlled in a way they are not currently. However as the revenues (20%) of which I believe go to the taxman are so high, then I can understand why the Government has not done anything about these yet.

“I have played these machines since they hit our high streets approximately 10 years ago. You can win big on them, but on the flipside you can also lose big and that's the main problem. Most wins a player manages to collect are soon given back in the long run as the machines are so addictive. One week I was over 10,000 pounds up. It was soon lost in the next fortnight.

“The main problem is the capping at 100 pounds a spin, although this limits how much a player can lose it also limits how much a player can win. For example if a player goes 2,000 pounds in the most they can win back in one spin is 500 pounds. This makes the player chase their losses and it’s very hard to claw back any loss this large.

“One point I would also add is that in a casino if you bet on the even chances and zero green comes in you receive half your stake back. In bookmakers this is not the case, you lose everything. This is yet another edge the machines have over a player. I used to go to casinos but after many losses I self-excluded myself to stop the rot so to speak. In a casino you have to physically make the trip, sign in, and you have time to see what's happening on a live wheel. In a bookmaker you can find one anywhere, they don't sign you in and it's very easy to spin a lot of money off very quickly indeed. I would suggest the machines in the bookies have to be banned.

“Problem gambling is increasing hugely because of these machines and it's ruining people's lives. They are so addictive and there are many people getting drawn into playing them through sickly 'free spin' promotions the bookmakers use to lure in their prey. I hope this helps.”

Anonymous testimonial, February 2013 17:03:04 GMT

“Dear Adrian,

“I have seen and welcomed your stopthefobts website and campaign. I would like to tell you about my experiences with FOBT. I worked for Ladbrokes for 23 years, for 17 years I managed their busiest shop in Coventry in an economically challenged area.

“For the majority of my career I was happy, I had built up a good relationship with the customers. It was a high slippage, moderate turnover, and high profit margin shop. With only a few exceptions the customers viewed their gambling as an enjoyable pastime which they were willing to spend money on in the hope that one day they get a decent win on their Yankee or lucky 15, which they invariably did.

“The introduction of FOBT gradually changes the dynamics of the shop. First to suffer were those traditional customers who became addicted to these machines. I was horrified to see customers whose daily spend over the counter might be £10-£20 risking similar amounts of money on a single spin of a roulette wheel. When the main local employee closed it was sad to see peoples redundancy packages vanish into these machines. It was depressing to watch people that I had known for a long time lose lots of money on these machines rejecting any offers of help.

“If these machines were making my job depressing, the next development was for them to make my job, at times, frightening. In my first 14 years in that shop I had no need to call the police during trading hours. In the last 3 years there were two armed robberies, machines smashed up, doors kicked in, and underage and self- exclude people refusing to leave the shop. You see the machines had become one of the focal points of the local gangs and disaffected youth of the area. Individually these people were fine to deal with, but collectively they were a nightmare. Locals told me that they were responsible for both armed robberies although I have no proof of this.

“You may imagine my horror, then, when in December 2011 Ladbrokes proposed a new operating model. Some aspects of the new operating model were worthy, such as moving a vast number of the workforce away from minimum wage levels. However the company was not willing to pay for this worthy aspect (despite it being the first wage increase for 3 years), the cost wold be met by single staffing shops from 5pm to 10pm. I rejected the new terms and conditions to my contract and in September 2012 my contract of employment were terminated by Ladbrokes due to my failure to agree to the new terms. I submitted a claim of

unfair dismissal to the Employment Tribunal. This claim has been accepted and the case will be heard in Birmingham in the middle of June.

“I believe it may be difficult for me to win the case as Ladbrokes will argue that there was a substantial business reason for the new operating model and that over 99% of affected employees signed up for the new terms (although the choice was either accepting the returns, getting a wage increase and a cash payment or not accepting, not getting a wage increase or cash payment and facing contract termination). However I intend to fight the case to the best of my ability.

“On the question of FOBT I intend to argue that they are responsible for a proliferation of violence and bad behaviour in betting shops, and also that it is impossible to manage problem gambling and underage gambling on these machines. I need evidence and witnesses to support these arguments and I was hoping that you may be able to help me or provide some advice. Of course please don't hesitate to ask if you feel I can do anything to help your campaign. I look forward to hearing from you shortly.”

Anonymous testimonial, February 2013

“My addiction began in 1999, when I was 15 years old and in the final year of formal schooling. After lessons had finished, I would visit the Ladbrokes at the end of the school road and play a fruit machine. This simply began as curiosity. (I recall now, with some irony, that the name of the machine was ‘Pipe Dreams’.) I was never challenged on my age.

“The addiction worsened when I began sixth form, aged 16, and started to earn my own money working in a local store. My behaviour became so effectively conditioned by these fruit machines that I began to steal from both that shop and my parents in order to fund my habit. It was around this time that I began to experience suicidal thoughts as a result of my gambling.

“By the end of sixth form, my addiction to these machines had led to my moving from AS Level scores of ABB to A Level scores of CCD. Nonetheless, I narrowly secured a place at university. (I have a verbal IQ of 140, and was granted admittance to an Analytical Philosophy BA based on a personal statement.)

“In order to maintain my addiction, I deferred this place at university by two years. I began working for William Hill as soon as I turned 18, despite having already been well known to most of the local staff in these shops as a (previously underage) problem gambler. It was around this time (2001/2) that FOBTs were introduced.

“My first FOBT experience saw me win over £900 over the course of a few hours. I was—remarkably—only betting on three numbers and didn’t really understand the mathematics of roulette. (To this day I remain convinced that, early in their introduction, FOBTs were in fact fixed to win, in order to create addicts.) This was the basis for what would become a full-blown addiction. In 2001, I left William Hill by mutual agreement (i.e I was not ‘sacked’ due the nature of my problem) when I was caught laying a ‘late bet’ in order to fund a FOBT playing session. (I should stress, there is nothing in my nature that could be described as ‘dodgy’ – I was a rubbish thief because there is no malice or will-to-deceive in me at all.)

“In 2002, I secured a role in the Civil Service as a Case Officer; A significant achievement for a 19 year old. Fortunately, my journey to work (and place of work) meant that I was not given the opportunity to enter a betting shop. This changed when I transferred to Angel, Islington in 2003. Here, I would generally lose most of my wages in the local Ladbrokes within the first working week of each month. The rest of the month’s working days were often spent without my having eaten until I got home. It was at this time that suicide became a realistic option, and I began to dedicate time to imagining the best way of going about this.

“In 2004 I entered university. Due to the location of my campus, and the other distractions of University life, I managed—thankfully--to avoid betting shops altogether. Though lost quite a bit of my money in fruit machines.

“After having graduated with a high 2:1, I rejoined the Civil Service at a higher grade in 2008. This was when my addiction to FOBTs really stated to take hold. I began to undertake intense sessions of gambling where I would lose anything up to £300 in the space of a couple of hours. My bank statements from the last few years testify to the irregularity of my behaviour: I often lost around £100 in (approximately) 15 minute time periods that included 4 or five trips to the cash point. (The corollary being that I was in fact spending more time walking to and from the cash point that I was spending at the machine.)

“Now with a good job and good credit history, I was able to take loans in order to fund my addiction. (My present debt level stands at £8,500.) Alongside the money problems, I also began to become acutely aware of the psychological issues I was suffering as a result of my

addiction. I had already experienced suicidal thoughts as a result of gambling, but now the effect of this activity on my behaviour was becoming more externalised. I began to notice, for instance, that immediately before and after, and especially during FOBTs sessions, I was completely incapable of constructing intelligible sentences (either to fellow punters or to shop staff.) My thoughts—whilst I was playing the machines—had become muddled, confused. In the worst instances, it was as though my consciousness had become detached from my body and I was being forced to watch myself self-harm.

“More worryingly, whenever I had just experienced a heavy loss, I began to develop a deep desire to harm or attack those who had profited from my loss. (Namely, industry bosses.) Once I had calmed down, this scared me; I have never committed—nor wished to commit—a violent act, and have absolutely no criminal record.

“It was only once I looked into the psychology of gambling, and specifically the techniques of Operant Conditioning, that I understood what had been happening to my brain: how I had been manipulated, exploited from a very young age. This self-education was enough to prevent my ever entering bookies again. It is seven months since I last used a FOBT, and there is absolutely no possibility—given what I now know about what the industry is really all about—that I will use one again.

Anonymous testimonial, February 2013

“Firstly, thank you for starting this campaign. I am with it 100% and offer my services in any shape or form that can assist. I lived in NZ for a number of years, and have always gambled but never thought I had an addiction. 2 years ago I returned and started playing these machines. It is a similar story as you will hear all the time. It starts with small bets, and eventually 100 pound spins losing thousands. I won't go into it too much, but these machines are terrible and I know and have seen many more people like me that can't walk past a bookies without donating money to the bookies relief appeal. I am now in remission and have counselling. These things very nearly killed me, and I’ve lost most of my family. I am sick to death of bookmakers opening new shops and advertising constantly. This country is turning into 1 big casino. I am happy to provide further info if required. Thank you for taking the time to do this.”

Anonymous testimonial, March 2013

“I work for Betfred and we have been told to write to our MPs to stop the new FOBT regulations, telling us that we will all lose our jobs if they have to close the shops. We work on our own every day from 6pm-10pm and it can be terrifying!!

“Please do something these people are making our lives a misery (I mean the bookies, not the punters). We have FREE TOURNAMENTS every month and sometimes even more frequently just to get customers hooked and if you don’t get enough people interested you get a b*ll*cking.

“If somebody gets caught out on the Think 21 you just get a slap on the wrist from the boss. The adverts on TV make gambling look glamorous, there is nothing glamorous about a high street betting shop. All the bookies are the same it breaks there heart when a punter signs the ”self exclusion form”. Bookies are a licence to print money and they don’t care how they get it. I am glad that I am near retirement.

Anonymous testimonial, March 2013

“Hi Matt,

“I just found your campaign website. It is refreshing to see you take the issue of FOBT's to hear and I would like to participate and offer support.

“I live in Gosport, Hampshire and my MP is Caroline Dinenage (conservative). I am 32 and I have been a recovering gambling addict for many years.

“One issue is with the Betfred in Gosport high street now offering a cash machine in its lobby conveniently located beside 3 of the 4 FOBT's. I know gambling requires cash but in my opinion this is 'too convenient'. I know from experience I could start to lose my head through frustration and max my daily limit out or even worse ask for cash-back from the cashier on my debit card. From a business perspective great for revenue but shameless on responsibly.

“Many times I have been in this shop and the Ladbrokes down the high street and notice that most of the gambling activity is on these FOBT machines and not horse or dog racing. I am sure there is a pattern across the nation that the majority of the business done in betting shops is through the FOBT's.

“I know the Gaming Commission says as long as there is a demand for these machines there is no issue but I believe with the advertising in the shop windows they are creating new

addicts all the time. My interpretation is the government could say a drug dealer is only allowed to enter a community if it can prove he can provide a sustainable clientele and provide us (the government) with our piece of the pie in tax. The reality is that both activities are harmful because the money is not going into the retail shops and restaurants in the community and can harm families. Isn't it time for the government to admit that casino games are harmful and belong in a casino. Bookmakers should be only offering odds on races and sports in my humble opinion.

“I believe there is a unhappy silent gambling public out there that needs to know the government are prepared to be more responsible and do something to lesson the flavour of gambling in the high streets. Many like a social punt on the horses but the power of FOBT's are a powerful distraction away from this. Action is surely required!

“Please also if you have time check out James Petherick on Facebook and Youtube, he has something called Diary of a compulsive gambler and it shows a handheld camera account of his day-to-day struggle with gaming addiction. Here is a link
http://www.youtube.com/user/JamesPetherick
Many thanks for your time and kind regards,
Anonymous”

NB: All accounts are taken directly from the original correspondence and have not been corrected or the content edited in any way.

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Appendix N

Appendix N: Empirical Evidence of FOBTs and problem gambling

Empirical Evidence One – Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling

Based on the 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS), a piece of research was published in the European Journal of Public Health in August 2011 entitled **"Disordered gambling and gambling involvement in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2007"**. This information was published online on 5 November, 2009.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3139098/

The research compared the fifteen activities in the BGPS 2007 including FOBTs. Under the section Measures, it called FOBTs "**virtual gaming machines (e.g. virtual roulette, keno, bingo etc) at a bookmaker's location."**

The section headed "Discussion" states that "**Virtual gaming machines had the strongest association with gambling related problems**. " The level of association is identified as being **four-fold.**

In July 2010, a summary of this research entitled **The WAGER, Vol.15(5) – The 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey: Considering Gambling Involvement** was published by the **Brief Addiction Science Information Source (BASIS) under The Division of on Addiction, Cambridge Health Alliance**, a Harvard Medical School teaching affiliate. This information was published online on 16th June 2010.
http://www.basisonline.org/2010/06/the-wager-vol-155-the-2007-british-gambling-prevalence-survey-considering-gambling-involvement.html

The section headed "Results" contained two sentences of which one was: "**When controlling for involvement, gambling via virtual gaming machine (e.g. virtual roulette, virtual bingo, virtual keno) was the only gambling type that remained significantly and positively associated with disordered gambling."**

To clarify this, of the fifteen different British gambling activities**, FOBTs is the only gambling activity significantly and positively associated with disordered gambling,** but where "positively" means "definitely" not "favourably".

Empirical Evidence Two – Evidence of FOBT Problem Gambling

Based on the 2010 BGPS, a piece of research was conducted entitled **"What proportion of Gambling is Problem Gambling? Estimates from the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey"**.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14459795.2012.689001

It was co-authored by Heather Wardle, Jim Orford and Mark Griffiths. Heather Wardle was also a co-author of the NatCen research commissioned by the Gambling Commission. The Gambling Commission and the RGSB have had access to this research.

A summary of the research entitled **"People with Gambling Problems are Making a Massive Contribution to Gambling Profits"** was written by Jim Orford of Gambling Watch UK, a co-author of the research, and published online on 24 August 2012.
http://www.gamblingwatchuk.org/research-new/95-people-with-gambling-problems-are-making-a-massive-contribution-to-gambling-profits

This research compared fifteen different gambling activities, and estimated that **the percentage of FOBT losses from problem gamblers was 23%.** This is over **double** the estimated percentage of losses by problem gamblers at other leading collated gambling activities.

It also estimated that the actual amount **lost on FOBTs by problem gamblers in 2010 was at least £297 million**. This is a greater amount than the estimated losses by problem gamblers on several other leading gambling activities combined.

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Disordered gambling, type of gambling and gambling involvement in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2007

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Abstract

Go to:

Background: The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between types of gambling and disordered gambling, with and without controlling for gambling involvement (i.e. the number of types of games with which respondents were involved during the past 12 months). **Methods:** We completed a secondary data analysis of the 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS), which collected data in England, Scotland and Wales between September 2006 and March 2007. The sample included 9003 residents, aged 16 or older, recruited from 10 144 randomly selected addresses. 5832 households contributed at least one participant. Post-facto weighting to produce a nationally representative sample yielded 8968 observations. The BGPS included four primary types of measures: participation in gambling (during the past 12 months and during the past 7 days), disordered gambling assessments, attitudes toward gambling and descriptive information. **Results:** Statistically controlling for gambling involvement substantially reduced or eliminated all statistically significant relationships between types of gambling and disordered gambling. **Conclusions:** Gambling involvement is an important predictor of disordered gambling status. Our analysis indicates that greater gambling involvement better characterizes disordered gambling than does any specific type of gambling.

Keywords: gambling, internet, internet gambling, games, PG.

Introduction

Go to:

Pathological gambling (PG) is a public health problem that is associated with a number of mental and physical health, interpersonal and financial problems.[1–3] For example, among those with co-occurring mental illness, 75% of PGs in the USA have mental illness that preceded their PG, about 23% have mental illness that followed, and about 2% had these problems emerge concurrently.[1] Research also suggests that PG is associated with domestic violence, suicide and suicidal ideation, financial troubles, criminal behavior and other problems.[3,4] These public health issues warrant continued empirical attention to gambling and gambling-related problems.

The aetiology of PG is uncertain; however, research has shown a tendency to focus on types of games as a potential primary cause. For example, a recent examination of correlates of British Internet gambling reported higher rates of disordered gambling among internet gamblers than among non-internet gamblers.[5] Consequently, Griffiths *et al.* concluded that Internet gambling probably is more likely to contribute to gambling problems than non-internet gambling activities, explaining that this might be the case because internet gambling is less protective (e.g. year-round 24/7 access from home) of vulnerable gamblers than other types of games. Similarly, researchers and others often point to fruit/slot machines as being particularly dangerous to individuals because of their potential to promote rapid gambling (for a review, see reference 6).

Although internet gambling and fruit/slot machine gambling contribute to the overall costs associated with excessive gambling, the scientific approach to whether specific games are the primary cause of PG has been uneven; as a result of this situation, so has the evidence. As Welte *et al.*[7] emphasized, research that tests how well different games predict gambling problems or discriminate individuals with gambling problems from those without provides more reliable information about the relationship between games and gambling problems than research that simplistically reports the prevalence of gambling problems among individuals who participate in, or prefer, a specific type of gambling. The latter type of research is problematic because it yields findings that researchers and others cannot generalize to the general population or even to the general population of gamblers. Further, the patterns of results (i.e. risk pattern by game) generated by the two types of studies differ noticeably (see reference 7 for more information).

Recent research suggests that relying exclusively on game types as an explanatory factor for disordered gambling might mask other important contributing factors, such as the range of gambling involvement (involvement). Specifically, using a nationally representative sample of US youth, Welte *et al.*[7] recently reported that, although a number of different types of gambling could discriminate individuals with and without gambling-related problems, the pattern of risk was not consistent with popular theories of risk (e.g. rapid-cycling technology-based forms of gambling being the most risky) often identified by less sophisticated analyses. Furthermore, Welte *et al.* demonstrated that controlling for involvement minimized or eliminated the discriminative relationships between types of games and measures of gambling disorder. The authors concluded that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the most rapid play games might not be the most problematic for US youth, and further, that overall involvement might be a more potent predictor of gambling-related problems than any specific game type.

The Welte *et al.*[7] research is limited by its use of a US youth-only sample, who have few legal gambling options in the USA. The current study extended these findings by utilizing an adult, non-US sample. Specifically, we examined data from the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2007 (BGPS) to determine the relative ability of games to predict gambling-related disorder, with and without controlling for involvement. We expected that involvement would attenuate or eliminate the associations of games with gambling-related disorder.

Methods

Go to:

This research utilized data from the BGPS 2007, produced by the National Centre for Social Research, sponsored by the Gambling Commission, and supplied by the UK Data Archive.[8] The data are Crown copyright. The following is a brief overview of the BGPS methodology, as described more fully in multiple sources.[5,9,10]

Participants

The BGPS is a publicly available dataset of interviews from a sample of 9003 residents of England, Scotland and Wales. For the current study, we used weighted data of 8968 observations characteristic of the general population. The weighted sample comprised 52% women and 48% men. With respect to age, 14% of the sample was aged 16–24, 35% was 25–44, 31% was 45–64 and 19% was aged 65 and over.

Procedures

The BGPS recruited 32 households from each of 317 geographic primary sampling units selected with a probability that was proportional to the number of addresses within them. All residents of selected households aged 16 and older were eligible to participate in the survey, indicating that their household had been selected as eligible for participation in the study and that researchers would soon visit their home.

Researchers visited dwellings a minimum of five times to recruit eligible residents to participate. During a successful contact visit, researchers completed a brief household survey and distributed hard copies (i.e. paper–pencil based) of the study survey. Participants could complete the study survey immediately, at a later point at which time researchers would collect the survey, or online. About 7% of the sample completed the surveys online. Researchers made a minimum of two reminder phone calls to residents who had promised to complete the survey, but had not done so. The overall response rate for the study was 52%.[9]

Measures

The BGPS included four primary types of measures. First, the survey included the assessment of participation in gambling types during the past year and the past 7 days, including: national lottery tickets, scratch cards, other lotteries, football pools, bingo, fruit/slot machines, virtual gaming machines (e.g. virtual roulette, keno, bingo, etc.) at a bookmaker's location, casino table games, online gambling, online betting with bookmaker, betting exchange, horse race, dog race, betting on any other event or sport in a bookmaker's, by phone or at the venue, spread betting, private betting and 'other' types of betting. Second, the survey contained two assessments of disordered gambling, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-IV (DSM: 11) and the Canadian Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI: 12). For the DSM assessment within the BGPS 2007 study, investigators report that they adapted the DSM-IV criteria into question format (e.g. when you gamble, how often do you go back another day to win back money you lost?).[9] Response options were very often, fairly often, occasionally and never. Positive responses included answering fairly often or very often to criteria 1–7 (i.e. chasing losses, ruminating about gambling, tolerance, withdrawal, gambling to escape, lying to others about gambling and inability to cut back) and answering occasionally, fairly often or very often to criteria 8–10 (i.e. committing a crime to finance gambling, risking relationships/jobs and asking others for money to gamble). Third, the survey included a series of variables representing gambling-related attitudes (e.g. agree or disagree that people should have the right to gamble). Fourth, non-gambling information included a variety of demographic (e.g. gender, age, socio-economics) and health-related information (e.g. do you have a long-standing health illness).

For the current study, we focused on game type, gambling problems and demographic information. For game type, we used the above-defined categories with one exception. We combined online gambling, online betting with a bookmaker and use of a betting exchange into an 'Internet gambling' category. This data reduction replicated that employed by Griffiths *et al.*[5] on this dataset. This is a conservative measure because the combination of three categories of activities creates a variable that by definition represents greater involvement. This notation also applies to other gambling activity categories that can represent multiple gambling opportunities (e.g. casino table games). For gambling problems, we used the past year DSM-IV assessment and considered aspects of the endorsement of symptoms (i.e. % endorsing any symptoms, % endorsing 3+ symptoms, mean number of symptoms endorsed). We used the cutoff 3+ symptoms to create a categorical variable called disordered gambling status (i.e. reporting 3+ DSM gambling symptoms during the past 12 months or not). We operationally defined gambling involvement as the number of types of gambling for which an individual reported being involved during the past 12 months.

Analysis plan

The Cambridge Health Alliance Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved this secondary data analysis.

We used weighted data for all analyses. Specifically, the BGPS created a weighting variable correcting for dwelling and household selection probabilities, age, gender and individual non-response within participating households.[13] The application of the weighting variable yields findings that can be generalized to the general population surveyed.

We conducted three primary sets of analyses. First, we calculated for the full sample, and by gender, participation rates for each game type. We used chi-square analyses to determine whether those rates varied by gender. Second, for each type of game, we calculated for the sample of individuals who had played the game during the past 12 months and, by gender, the proportion reporting any gambling symptoms during the past 12 months, the proportion reporting 3+ gambling symptoms during the past 12 months, the mean number of gambling symptoms reported during the past 12 months and the mean number of gambling types played during the past 12 months. Third, we conducted a series of logistic regressions, which used participation in each gambling type to predict disordered gambling status among past 12 month gamblers. We conducted these logistic regressions first without controlling for involvement and then added involvement as a control.

Results

Go to:

Gambling participation and problems

Table 1 shows the participation in all types of gambling by gender and for the full sample. The top five gambling types with respect to participation were: the national lottery, scratch cards, betting on horses, fruit/slot machines and 'other' lottery. Also popular were private betting, bingo and other sports betting (other than online betting or betting on horses or dogs).



Table 1
Participation in all types of gambling by gender (weighted N = 8968)

We observed a number of gender differences for gambling participation. Only the rate of playing scratch cards ($\chi^2(1) = 1.32$) and other lottery ($\chi^2(1) = 0.00$) was the same among women as it was among men. A greater number of men than women participated in national lottery ($\chi^2(1) = 11.21$), football pools ($\chi^2(1) = 92.67$), fruit/slot machines ($\chi^2(1) = 159.80$), virtual gaming machines ($\chi^2(1) = 58.24$), casino table games ($\chi^2(1) = 104.64$), Internet gambling ($\chi^2(1) = 148.92$), betting on horses ($\chi^2(1) = 125.27$), betting on dogs ($\chi^2(1) = 69.58$), other sports betting ($\chi^2(1) = 193.78$), spread betting ($\chi^2(1) = 36.55$), private betting ($\chi^2(1) = 161.64$) and other types of betting ($\chi^2(1) = 4.16$). A greater number of women than men participated in bingo ($\chi^2(1) = 104.88$).

About 0.6% (N = 51) of the full sample reported 3+ DSM gambling symptoms during the past year and about 0.3% (N = 27) reported 5+ DSM gambling symptoms during the past year. Table 2 shows gender stratified prevalence rates for gambling-related problems reported by individuals who participated in various types of gambling. Individuals who participated in spread betting and used virtual gaming machines had the highest likelihoods of reporting any DSM gambling symptoms during the past 12 months, as well as reporting 3+ DSM gambling symptoms during the past 12 months. These types of games also were associated with the highest mean numbers of DSM gambling symptoms and mean number of types of gambling during the past year (i.e. involvement).



Table 2

Prevalence of any gambling symptoms, prevalence of disordered gambling, mean gambling symptoms and involvement for gamblers who played each type of gambling (weighted N = 8968)

The top five prevalence rates of any DSM gambling symptoms by types of game were: virtual gaming machines, spread betting, casino table games, other sports betting and betting on dogs. The top five prevalence rates of 3+ DSM gambling symptoms by the type of game were: spread betting, virtual gaming machines, other types of betting, casino table games and betting on dogs. The top five types of games for the mean number of DSM gambling symptoms were: spread betting, virtual gaming machines, casino table games, Internet gambling and betting on dogs. The top five types of games for the mean number of types of gambling during the past year (i.e. involvement) were: spread betting, virtual gaming machines, casino table games, internet gambling and other sport betting.

Predicting gambling-related problems

In this section, we use 'predict' in a technical sense to indicate a relationship between the logistic regressions 'predictor' variables and outcome (see reference 14, pp. 623–4), and not to suggest these predictor variables cause gambling problems. Among the full sample, participants engaged in an average of 1.67 types of gambling (SD = 1.93) in the past 12 months. About 62% reported gambling in the past year. Among gamblers (i.e. those participants who engaged in at least one type of gambling in the past 12 months), that average increased to 2.47 (SD = 1.88).

Table 3 shows a series of logistic regressions illustrating how well each type of gambling contributes to the prediction of gambling-related problems (i.e. 3+ DSM-IV criteria). Bivariate analyses showed that all types of gambling, except for the National Lottery, contributed significantly to the prediction of gambling-related problems and all increased risk for gambling-related problems. The top five odds ratios were for: virtual gaming machines, spread betting, Internet gambling, betting on dogs, and casino table games.



Table 3

Logistic regression analyses predicting disordered gambling status from type of game, with and without controlling for involvement

Subsequent regressions that added involvement (i.e. number of types of games played in the past 12 months) showed that involvement contributed significantly to the prediction of gambling-related problems in all models. The addition of involvement greatly reduced the contribution of games to the prediction of gambling-related problems in each model. For almost all games, the addition of the involvement variable rendered the significant positive association between gambling type and gambling-related problems non-significant. The exception was virtual gaming machines, which maintained a significant positive relationship to disordered gambling status after adjusting for involvement. Two games, private betting and betting on horses, had a reversal of association. After controlling for involvement, individuals who engaged in private betting or betting on horses were significantly *less* likely to have gambling-related problems than people who did not.

Discussion

In this study, we provide a comprehensive analysis of participation with different games among British residents aged 16 and older. We placed a special emphasis on the nature and strength of the associations between types of games and gambling-related problems. The types of games that had the strongest associations with gambling-related problems did not include all of the games that the conventional wisdom might expect. For example, fruit/slot machines were not included among the top five game types for gambling-related problems. Virtual gaming machines had the strongest association with gambling-related problems, but few people (i.e. 2.6%) endorsed that they had played these games during the past 12 months. These findings suggest that popular perceptions of risk associated with specific types of gambling for the development of gambling-related problems might misrepresent actual risk.

Regardless of the type of game, past 12-month participation was associated with disordered gambling; however, for the most part, such associations disappear, or at least become weakened, when statistical analyses control for the range of gambling involvement. Our findings with a primarily adult British sample are consistent with Welte *et al.*'s (2009) results for US youth. Taken together, these two sets of findings suggest that researchers and others use caution when interpreting results showing that people who play specific types of games have a higher rate of gambling-related problems than others. In fact, these studies reveal that some games might be indicators of unhealthy involvement, rather than critical factors for gambling-related problems themselves.

One interesting, and perhaps unanticipated, finding was that the nature of the relationships between private betting and betting on horses and gambling problems changed when we considered the influence of involvement: engaging in these types of gambling, but not other types, seemed to protect players against developing gambling problems. This finding suggests that the apparent risk between gambling activities and developing gambling-related problems resides, perhaps primarily or even entirely, among individuals who have high rates of involvement. For others who do not have high rates of involvement, playing these types of games might reflect social setting characteristics (e.g. norms) that encourage control and preclude excessive gambling.

These findings hold some disparate possibilities for theories of gambling exposure. On one hand, these findings might imply that more opportunities to gamble create more opportunities for involvement and, therefore, might yield more gambling-related problems. On the other hand, these findings might suggest that more opportunities to gamble will have little to no impact on the prevalence and incidence of gambling-related problems because individuals are more or less prone to involvement. Increases in gambling opportunities will not influence individuals who are less prone to involvement, but only those likely to become, or who already are, involved. There is some evidence to support the latter view because the rate of gambling disorders has changed little during the past 35 years despite the extraordinary growth of gambling opportunities and access around the world.[15]

Strengths and weaknesses of the study

Notable strengths of this study include the analysis of multiple game types simultaneously and the incorporation of a measure of involvement into analyses that examine the association between type of game and gambling-related problems. Controlling for involvement allows a more sophisticated understanding of the risk unique to some types of games and provides a level of analytic sophistication more advanced than the majority of available research.[7] By controlling for involvement, this research shows that involvement is a potent predictor of gambling-related problems that exceeds the potency of types of games. In fact, controlling for involvement drastically reduces the ability of games to discriminate statistically individuals who have gambling-related problems from those who do not. Another strength of this study is that it advances this more sophisticated methodology and line of inquiry from a US adolescent sample to a British primarily adult sample. This broader study sample helps to avoid problems related to legal access to different types of gambling observed among the US sample and concerns about different gaming interests by age cohorts.

Nevertheless, this study is not without limitations. First, the analyses rely on self-report data and not actual gambling activity. Self-report is vulnerable to weaknesses, including faulty memory, factual errors and self-presentation biases. Second, we only included one measure of involvement (i.e. number of types of games played during the past 12 months). Other measures of involvement (e.g. intensity of play, involvement in clusters of games, etc.) might provide weaker or stronger attenuation of the association between types of games and gambling-related problems. Third, this study relied on retrospective reports of behavior and therefore cannot establish any causal patterns. Fourth, many of the game-type variables represent multiple types of games by definition (e.g. casino table games, internet gambling, etc.). This approach is conservative and only presents as a limitation because of the inability to distinguish the effects of subtypes of games. Fifth, a small number of people played some types of games; consequently, increases in the sample size might alter the findings for games played by small numbers of people.

Future research should include the longitudinal assessment of real-time gambling data and multiple measures of involvement to yield a better determination of whether involvement is a moderator, mediator or both, of disordered gambling. Other important directions include examinations of game clustering, to determine whether subtypes of involvement are possible, the determination of whether there might be a critical level of involvement (e.g. 5 types, 10 types) that has optimal sensitivity and specificity for determining disordered gambling status and, finally, a consideration of age-related effects.

Concluding thoughts

The range of gambling involvement frequently is a better predictor of disordered gambling status than type of gambling. This finding is important because it represents a deviation from the tendency to focus on specific games, such as fruit/slot machines as central to gambling-related problems. This research does not suggest that differentiating between types of games is completely unimportant; clearly, there are differences in the popularity of games. These and similar results[7] suggest the need to reconsider the conventional assumptions related to the influence of game types and direct more attention toward global behavioral characteristics, such as the range of involvement.

Funding

Go to:

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Conflict of interest: During the past 5 years, the authors of this paper have received honoraria and fees for a variety of activities, including gambling-related symposia, speaking events, education events, research, and consulting. HJS has served as an expert witness for gambling and other addiction-related legal cases. The authors have no other personal or employment-related competing interests. The sponsor had no role in this research. We conducted this research independently from the sponsor.

Key points

- The aetiology of PG is uncertain, but research has attempted to determine whether specific game types (e.g. slot machines, internet gambling) are associated with increased risk for developing disordered gambling.
- Recent research suggests that past findings linking game types to risk for disordered gambling failed to consider the range of gambling involvement among people who play specific games and when the extent of involvement is considered, game type influences diminish. Nevertheless, this recent research is limited by its reliance on a US youth sample.
- The current study extends recent research by testing the associations between specific games, range of involvement and disordered gambling among a nationally representative British adult sample.

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The Brief Addiction Science Information Source (BASIS)

The BASIS provides a forum for the free exchange of information related to addiction, and public access to the latest scientific developments and resources in the field. Our aim is to strengthen worldwide understanding of addiction and minimize its harmful effects. The Division on Addiction, Cambridge Health Alliance, a Harvard Medical School teaching affiliate.

Wednesday, June 16, 2010

The WAGER, Vol. 15(5) – The 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey: Considering Gambling Involvement

Conventional wisdom suggests that specific gambling activities, such as Internet gambling, are especially "addictive." However, recent research suggests that the relationship between gambling and disordered gambling is more complicated than playing specific types of games. Using a United States youth sample, research suggests that gambling involvement (e.g., the number of games one plays), is a better predictor of disordered gambling than participation in any particular game (Welte, Barnes, Tidwell, & Hoffman, 2009). This week the WAGER reviews a study that further explored this phenomena by examining the association between disordered gambling and gambling involvement within the 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey (LaPlante, Nelson, LaBrie, & Shaffer, 2009).

Methods

- LaPlante et al. (2009) conducted secondary data analyses of the British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS)1 using weighted data of 8968 observations characteristic of the general population.
  - The researchers operationally defined the following variables.
    - Disordered gambling (i.e., endorsing 3+ DSM-IV pathological gambling symptoms in the past year).
    - Gambling involvement (i.e., the number of types of gambling for which an individual reported being involved during the past year).
  - The authors conducted a series of logistic regressions using participation in each gambling type to predict past year disordered gambling.
    - Consistent with Welte et al's. analytic strategy (2009), these logistic regressions were conducted first without controlling for involvement and then added involvement as a control. Table 1 lists the corresponding odds ratios.

Table 1: Odd ratios for predicting disordered gambling from type of game with and without controlling for involvement (adapted from LaPlante et al. 2009)

	Odds ratios not controlled for involvement	Odds ratios controlled for involvement
Spread betting	21.84***	0.70
Virtual gaming machines	24.01***	4.26**
Internet	9.58***	1.53
Betting on dogs	9.39***	1.95
Casino table games	8.15***	0.79
Other sports betting	6.60***	0.77
Fruit/slot machines	5.75***	1.19
Other betting	7.24**	2.93
Football pools	4.56***	0.44
Bingo	4.92***	1.76
Private betting	3.36***	0.36*
Scratch cards	3.91***	1.09
Betting on horses	2.77***	0.46*
Other lottery	3.00***	0.85
National lottery	1.85	1.04

*P<0.05; **P<0.01; ***P<0.001

Results

- When not controlling for involvement, participation in nearly every gambling type was statistically significant and positively associated with disordered gambling.
- When controlling for involvement, gambling via virtual gaming machines (e.g., virtual roulette, virtual bingo, virtual keno) was the only gambling type that remained significantly and positively associated with disordered gambling.

Limitations

- This BGPS gathers self-reported data without corroboration; therefore, this study is subject to the problems commonly associated with self-report.
- The authors only used one measure of gambling involvement.

Discussion

LaPlante et al. (2009) examined associations between participation in a particular gambling type and disordered gambling. The results indicated that when the authors controlled for gambling involvement, the association between participation in a particular gambling type and disordered gambling weakened for all types, and for 13 of 14 types, this association was no longer meaningful. These findings are consistent with an emerging body of research that suggests gambling involvement is a better predictor of gambling problems than participation in a particular game (e.g., Welte et al., 2009). One limitation of this research is that the authors used only one measure of gambling involvement (i.e., the number of types of gambling for which an individual reported being involved during the past year). More research is necessary to examine other -- and multiple -- measures of involvement to more accurately refine the meaning of gambling involvement.

-Ryan Martin

What do you think? Please use the comment link below to provide feedback on this article.

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1The National Centre for Social Research (2008) produced the 2007 British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS). The BGPS is a publicly available dataset representing interviews from 9,003 residents, randomly selected from households in England, Scotland and Wales; the response rate was 52% (Wardle et al., 2007). The BGPS assessed various gambling-related and demographic measures, including the following: past year gambling participation for 15 gambling types (e.g., lottery, online gambling, etc.) and past year DSM-IV pathological gambling criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

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

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Examining machine gambling in the British Gambling Prevalence Survey

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Date : 01/03/2013

Prepared for: The Gambling Commission

Contents

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Executive Summary

This report has been produced to explore machine gambling in more depth using the British Gambling Prevalence Survey series. It aims to examine how machine play has changed over time and what different types of machine players exist.

The report was commissioned by the Gambling Commission in spring 2012 to inform the then-forthcoming triennial review of gaming machines stake and prize levels, to provide context and information for the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and for the Responsible Gambling Strategy Board's (RGSB) input to that consultation. RGSB will find this report useful to inform its broader understanding of the characteristics of gaming machine players. It provides helpful context for RGSB's Machines Expert Group which works closely with the Responsible Gambling Trust to better understand what might help reduce gambling-related harm among machine players.

Gambling machines have been the subject of intense scrutiny, which has increased since the commissioning of this report. However, little empirical information about the profile of those who play machines or how machine players may vary from one another is available. This report aims to fill that gap using evidence from the British Gambling Prevalence Survey series. Main aims were:

a) to assess how patterns of machine play have changed since 1999, and
b) to explore whether different types of machine player exist and, if so, to examine their profile, behaviour, motivations and attitudes.

Key findings are summarised below.

Slot machines:

- The definition of slot machines used in this report is the same as that used in the main British Gambling Prevalence Survey series. Since 2007, this has excluded any machine played in bookmakers.[1]

[1] In 1999, the questionnaire asked about play of slot/fruit machines in any venue, including bookmakers, as this was prior to the introduction of what was (then) called 'fixed odd betting terminals'. In 2007 and 2010, the questionnaire was updated and information about playing machines in bookmakers was collected separately to playing on slot machines in other venues. See Wardle et al., 2011 for further details.

- Since 1999, prevalence of past year participation on slot machines has decreased among men but increased among women. Similar patterns were observed among past week play.
- The sharpest decrease in past week slot machine play was among men aged 16-34. Estimates fell from 12% in 1999 to 5% in 2010.
- The profile of slot machine players in 2010 was different to that observed in previous years. The gap between men and women narrowed, they were somewhat older and tended to be in lower income groups.
- In 2010, slot machine players were more engaged in gambling generally and in machine gambling specifically than previously. In 2007, 15% of slot machine players gambled at least once a week. This increased to 21% in 2010.

Machines in a bookmakers office:

- The definition of playing machines in a bookmakers used in this report is any reported play of machines whilst in a bookmakers regardless of which games were played on the machine. This is the same definition which has been used in the BGPS series to look at trends over time.
- Prevalence of past year participation on bookmakers' machines has increased since 2007. Greatest increases were observed among men aged 16-34, where past year estimates increased from 9% in 2007 to 14% in 2010.
- The profile of people who played machines in bookmakers remained similar in 2007 and 2010, though the gap between men and women widened, the age profile became younger and a greater proportion were from lower income groups, though this was related to age.
- In both survey years, those who played machines in bookmakers were very engaged in both gambling generally and machines gambling specifically. In 2010, 73% of this group had gambled at least once a week.
- Bookmaker machine players showed higher levels of gambling engagement than slot machine players. 35% of bookmakers' machine players had played machines at least once a week. The equivalent estimate among slot machine players was 21%.

Machine player types

- Using 2010 data, five distinct groups of machine players were identified through statistical analysis. These were: those who mainly played in pubs, those who only played in amusement arcades, those who mainly played in bookmakers, those who played in other venues and those who played in multiple venues.
- **Mainly pub machine players** were male, younger and consumed higher levels of alcohol. Compared to other machine players, they were more likely to have

somewhat lower levels of engagement with gambling generally. This was the largest group of machine players (46%).

- **Amusement arcade only players** were disproportionately female, older, and compared with other machine players generally less engaged in gambling overall. They typically held negative attitudes towards gambling and had started to gamble at a younger age (under 16). 19% of machine players were in this group.
- **Mainly bookmakers machine players** were male and, compared with other machine players, were more likely to be from non-white ethnic groups and to have started gambling at a later age (16 or over). This group had high levels of involvement with gambling generally and machine gambling specifically, as well as more positive attitudes towards gambling. This group accounted for 14% of machine players.
- **Other venue machine players** were a catch-all group for players who were not elsewhere categorised. This included those who played machines in a bingo hall and/or at a casino. Their profile varied, being more likely to be female and from non-white ethnic groups than other machine players. 12% of machine players were in this group.
- **Multi-venue machine players** were generally male and compared with other machine players, were more likely to be younger, not in paid work and to have started gambling at an earlier age. They held the most positive attitudes towards gambling and along with mainly bookmaker machine players had high levels of involvement with gambling generally. Problem gambling status also positively predicted membership of this group. The odds of being a multi-venue machine player were 6.5 times higher among problem gamblers. This was the only group where this association was observed.

Overlaps in machine play

- The existence of a multi-venue machine player group shows that overlaps in types of machines and venue of play exist, though there is some evidence that this is changing.
- In 2010, 18% of slot machine players had also played machines whereas in 2007 only 13% reported the same.
- Among bookmaker machine players the converse was true, with participation in slots among this group falling from 73% in 2007 to 62% in 2010. Whilst this illustrates a great deal of overlap in behaviour, it also shows the increasing proportion of machine players interested in playing machines in bookmakers alone.
- These patterns were specifically observed among younger men, with the steepest rates of decrease in slot machine play being seen among those aged

16-34 and the greatest increase in bookmaker machines play being evident among this age group.

Recommendations

- Continued attention to the changing profile of slot machine players is warranted. For example, the increase in proportion of past year slot machine gamblers among the lowest income group should be monitored as income is a risk factor for the experience of gambling-related harm.
- The changing profile of those who play machines in bookmakers has some (potentially) important implications for responsible gambling strategies. Typically, people who are younger, receive lower incomes or who are unemployed are more vulnerable to gambling-related harm. This corresponds to the changing profile of this group. That said, data showed there were some notable reductions in endorsement of certain types of gambling problems. Further monitoring of this changing profile should be made to assess *if* this translates into increased risk of harm.
- 'Multi-venue' machine players can be viewed as a group at greater risk of experiencing gambling-related harm. This suggests that a joined up, cross-operator and venue approach to the development of strategies aimed at preventing gambling-related harm would be beneficial.

1 Report and analytic conventions

The following conventions are used in this report:

- Unless otherwise stated, the tables are based on the responding sample for each individual question (i.e. item non-response is excluded). Therefore bases may differ slightly between tables.
- The group to whom each table refers is shown in the top left hand corner of each table.
- The data used in this report have been weighted. Both weighted and unweighted base sizes are shown at the foot of each table. The weighted numbers reflect the relative size of each group of the population, not the number of interviews achieved, which is shown by the unweighted base.
- The British Gambling Prevalence Survey series uses a stratified and clustered sample design. These complex sample design features have been taken into account in analysis through using the complex survey module in PASW v18 and/or the survey commands in Stata. In all cross tabulations, an adjusted Wald's F test was used to test for statistically significant differences in variables.
- The following conventions have been used in the tables:

    - No observations (zero values)

    0 Non-zero values of less than 0.5% and thus rounded to zero

    [ ] An estimate presented in square brackets warns of small sample base sizes. If a group's unweighted base is less than 30, data for that group are not shown. If the unweighted base is between 30-49, the estimate is presented in square brackets.

    * Estimates not shown because base sizes are less than 30.

- Because of rounding, row or column percentages may not exactly add to 100%.
- A percentage may be presented in the text for a single category that aggregates two or more percentages shown in the table. The percentage for that single category may, because of rounding, differ by one percentage point from the sum of the percentages in the table.
- Some questions were multi-coded (allowing the respondent to give more than one answer). The column percentages for these tables sum to more than 100%.

- The term ‘significant’ refers to statistical significance (at the 95% level) and is not intended to imply substantive importance.
- Only results that are significant at the 95% level are presented in the report commentary, though all results are presented in the tables. Readers should therefore be guided by the commentary to identify statistically significant results. Where appropriate, footnotes have been added to the base of tables to highlight this to readers.

2 Introduction

Slot machines are one of the most popular forms of gambling today. Only lotteries, scratchcards and betting on horse races are more popular. In 2010, 13% of adults (aged 16 and over) had gambled on slot machines in the past year. In the early 2000's, a new type of machine, the (then called) fixed-odds betting terminal, was introduced into bookmakers. Although the impact of slot machines upon gambling behaviour had attracted much attention prior to this, since the introduction of these machines in bookmakers this interest has (arguably) increased, attracting a great deal of interest from a range of stakeholders. This includes focus on whether machines are clustering in certain areas and whether machines are associated with greater levels of gambling-related harm or not.

The rhetoric surrounding machine gambling (especially by media) tends to assume that machine gamblers are a relatively homogenous group and have similar levels of risk of harm. However, the British machine gambling market is diverse and therefore one would expect the profile and behaviour of machine players to be equally diverse. To date, there has been very little exploration of this and what research has been conducted was qualitative in nature. This report aims to address this gap as little is known about the profile of people who play machines, how engagement with machine gambling has changed and how machine players may vary from one another.

The British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS) 2010 is the third study of its kind to be conducted in the last 12 years; previous surveys were carried out in 1999 and 2007. It therefore provides the opportunity to examine (any) changes in machine gambling by survey year. In 2010, further questions were added to collect greater detail about the location where people played machines. New questions about gambling motivations and gambling volume were also included. To date, this additional data has not been specifically examined among machine players.

The purpose of this report was to use data from the BGPS series to fully examine:

a) how patterns of machine play have changed since 1999, and

b) whether different types of machine players exist and, if so, to explore their profile.

This report is divided into two parts. Part 1 examines changes in machine play and profile of machine players across the BGPS series. Results are outlined in Chapter 3.

Part 2 uses 2010 data only to examine sub-groups of machine players, their profile, behaviour, motivations and attitudes. Results are summarised in Chapter 4.

3 Changes in machine gambling across the BGPS series

This chapter looks at:

- Participation in machine gambling by survey year.
- The profile of machine gamblers by survey year.
- Levels of involvement in other forms of gambling among machine players by survey year.

In this chapter two groups of machine players are considered: those who played slot machines in venues other than bookmakers and those who played machines in bookmakers. This distinction is made as a consequence of the BGPS questionnaire design as in 2007 and 2010 data about play of machines in bookmakers was collected separately from other slot machine play.[2] However, such a distinction is useful given that the former have attracted the most attention in recent months and it is of interest to numerous bodies (such as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Responsible Gambling Strategy Board) to explore the evidence separately for this type of machine play. This distinction also provides groups whose definitions are comparable over time so that comparisons can be made across the BGPS series. However, we recognise that in making this distinction, the slot machine category includes machine play conducted in a range of venues and across a range of machine categories. The second part of this report (Chapter 3) looks at play in different venues in more detail.

For reasons of clarity, results for slot machine players (Section 3.1) are presented first followed by results for those who play machines in bookmakers (Section 3.2). Overlaps in play of these two broad 'types' of machine and how this has changed are considered in Section 3.3.

[2] In 1999, the questionnaire asked about play of slot/fruit machines in any venue, including bookmakers as this was prior to the introduction of the (then) called 'fixed odd betting terminals'. In 2007 and 2010, the questionnaire was updated and information about playing machines in bookmakers was collected separately to playing on slot machines in other venues. See Wardle et al., 2011 for further details.

3.1 Slot machines

Summary

- There have been some significant changes in the profile of past year slot machine gamblers.
- Slot machine gambling remained a male dominated activity but there has been an increase in the proportion of female slot machine gamblers since 1999.
- Slot machine play remained popular among the youngest age groups. However, the overall profile aged slightly with a lesser proportion being aged 16-34 in 2010.
- A greater proportion of slot machine gamblers were in the lowest income groups compared with previous years.
- In 2010 slot machine players were more engaged in gambling than previously. They gambled on more activities than before and there is evidence that some were gambling more often on these activities.
- Slot machine players displayed greater engagement with machine gambling specifically – reporting greater frequency of playing slots and also increasing their play of machines in bookmakers.
- Mean DSM-IV scores for past year slot machine gamblers increased significantly in the past decade. This may be associated with a changing profile of slot machine players. In 2010, slot machine players were generally more engaged in gambling, both with machines and with other forms of gambling, taking part in more activities more often.
- Examination of specific DSM-IV criteria showed an increase in endorsement for some items among slot machine gamblers such as: chasing losses, preoccupation with gambling and gambling with more money to get the same excitement. These might be constructive areas to target when thinking about ways to reduce gambling-related harm in the future.
- Continued attention to the profile of slot machine players, such as the changing income profile of slot machine players, is warranted.

3.1.1 Slot machine participation in the past 12 months, by survey year

Since 1999 there has been a small but significant decrease in the prevalence of past year slot machine gambling overall. Estimates fell from 14% in 1999 to 13% in 2010. However, this masks an interesting pattern by sex. Among men past year slot machine gambling decreased from 20% in 1999 to 16% in 2010. Among women estimates increased from 8% in 1999 to 10% in 2010. The difference by sex can be seen clearly in Figure A.

Figure A: Past year prevalence of playing slots, by survey year and sex



In all survey years younger age groups were more likely than older age groups to have played slot machines in the past year. In 2010, about 1 in 4 (23%) of those aged 16 to 34 had played slot machines in the past 12 months, whereas around 1 in 8 (12%) of those aged 35 to 54 or 1 in 24 (4%) of those age 55 or over reported the same. There was no significant change in prevalence rates by age group across survey years.

(**Table 1)**

Table 1 Prevalence of slot machine play in the past 12 months, by age, sex and survey year

All aged 16 and over *1999, 2007, 2010*

Past year slot machine play	1999 Age group				2007 Age group				2010 Age group			
	16-34	35-54	55+	Total	16-34	35-54	55+	Total	16-34	35-54	55+	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Male	36	17	5	20	35	18	6	19	29	15	5	16
Female	16	7	3	8	17	11	4	10	17	9	4	10
All	26	12	4	14	26	14	5	15	23	12	4	13
Bases												
Weighted	*2548*	*2653*	*2481*	*7700*	*2748*	*3161*	*3046*	*8972*	*2400*	*2710*	*2644*	*7754*
Unweighted	*2305*	*2878*	*2479*	*7680*	*2356*	*3237*	*3366*	*8978*	*2094*	*2782*	*2877*	*7753*

3.1.2 Participation in the past week, by survey year

Table 2 shows past week participation in slot machine gambling by survey year, age and sex. As with past year participation, overall rates of past week slot machine gambling decreased by survey year. Estimates fell from 6% in 1999 to 2% in 2010. Similar patterns were observed for men and women, though men were more likely than women to have played slot machines in the past seven days.

Table 2 Prevalence of slot machine play in the last 7 days, by age, sex and survey year

All aged 16 and over *1999, 2007, 2010*

Past week slot machine play	1999 Age group				2007 Age group				2010 Age group			
	16-34	35-54	55+	Total	16-34	35-54	55+	Total	16-34	35-54	55+	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Male	18	6	3	9	11	4	2	6	8	3	1	4
Female	4	2	1	2	3	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
All	12	4	1	6	7	3	2	4	5	2	1	2
Bases												
Weighted	*2548*	*2653*	*2481*	*7700*	*2761*	*3163*	*3054*	*8996*	*2400*	*2710*	*2644*	*7754*
Unweighted	*2305*	*2878*	*2479*	*7680*	*2362*	*3240*	*3375*	*8996*	*2094*	*2782*	*2877*	*7753*

Notably there was a stronger downward trend among past week participation rates than past year participation rates. Gambling within the past seven days is often considered a proxy measure for frequency. This contrast is interesting. Among men, rates of overall participation and more frequent slot machine gambling were lower in 2010 than in previous years. Among women, overall participation rates were higher in 2010 but there is some indication that women gambled less frequently on slots than previously.

The overall decline in past week slot machine gambling was observed among all age groups (see Figure B). However, the reduction in rates was most notable among those aged 16-34, where past week play fell from 12% in 1999 to 5% in 2010. That said, in all survey years the broad pattern was that the youngest age groups were more likely to be past week slot machine gamblers. In 2010, 5% of those aged 16-34 had played slot machines in the past week compared with 1% of those aged 55 or over. This pattern is similar to that observed for past year participation. Taken together with past year participation rates, this suggests that slot machine gambling is typically undertaken most commonly and most frequently by the youngest age groups.

(Table 2, Table 1)

Figure B: Percentage of adults playing slot machines in the past week, by survey year and age



3.1.3 Changes in the demographic and socio-economic profile of slot machine gamblers since 1999

This section explores whether the demographic and socio-economic profile of past year slot machine gamblers has changed since 1999.

The profile of slot machine players is examined by a number of demographic, socio-economic and lifestyle characteristics including; sex, age group, marital status, ethnic group, highest educational qualification, NS-SEC of Household Reference Person (HRP)[3], main economic activity of the HRP[4], equivalised household income, whether the individual has experienced a long standing illness, general health status, smoking status and alcohol consumption.[5] Comparisons are limited to where the same

[3] NS-SEC is a classification of social position that has similarities to the Registrar General's Social Class. Respondents are assigned to an NS-SEC category based on the current or former occupation of the Household Reference Person.
[4] The Household Reference Person is the person in the household in whose name the accommodation is owned or rented. In the case of joint ownership/rental it is the person with the highest income.
[5] All items were entered into a regression model to test for confounding variance in the sample population.

demographic/socio-economic information was collected in each survey year. This analysis is shown in Tables 3 and 4.

Profile of slot machine gamblers by survey year

Analyses showed a significant difference in the sex and age distribution of slot machine players by survey year.

Although in all survey years, a greater proportion of slot machine players were male, by 2010 the gap between men and women narrowed. In 1999, 30% of slot machine players were women. By 2010, this had risen to 38%.

In 2010, the typical slot machine player was older than 1999. Mean age rose from 33 in 1999 to 35 in 2010 (median age estimates increased from 30 to 32). In 1999, nearly two thirds (63%) of slot machine gamblers were aged 16-34. By 2010, this had fallen to 56%. However, this may be an artefact of underlying changes in who responded to each survey year or in the population profile of Great Britain (see Appendix B).

In 2007 and 2010 participants were asked about their household income and this measure was adjusted according to the number of people living in the household. The proportion of slot machine players in the lowest income group increased from 26% in 2007 to 33% in 2010 (see Figure C).

Figure C: Percentage of slot machine players in each equivalised household income tertile, by survey year



Analyses did indicate some variation in the profile of slot machine gamblers by marital status and educational qualification across survey years. For marital status, estimates varied with no clear pattern. Looking at educational qualifications, slot machine players were more likely to have professional or degree level qualifications in 2010 than in 1999

but this is also true of all BGPS participants as a whole. As changes in the profile of slot machine gamblers fall in line with overall changes in the profile of BGPS participants, it is likely that this reflects changes within the responding population as opposed to being 'real' changes among slot machine players.

No differences were identified by ethnicity, economic activity, or NS-SEC of Household Reference Person, with the majority being White/White British or from households where the HRP was in paid employment.

(Table 3)

Table 3 Profile of slot machine gamblers, by demographic, socio-economic characteristics and survey year

Past year slot machine gamblers *1999, 2007, 2010*

Demographic/socio-economic profile of slot machine players[a]	1999	2007	2010
	%	%	%
Sex			
Male	70	65	62
Female	30	35	38
Age group			
16-34	63	54	56
35-54	29	34	33
55+	8	11	11
Mean age	33	36	35
Standard error of the mean	0.4	0.4	0.4
Marital status			
Married/living as married	55	47	55
Separated/Divorced	5	7	5
Single, never married	39	44	38
Widowed	1	2	2
Ethnicity			
White	b	91	90
Asian or Asian British	b	4	5
Black or Black British	b	2	3
Other ethnic group	b	3	2
Highest educational qualification			
Professional qualification or above	26	27	33
O or A levels or equivalent	53	59	52
Other	5	0	1
None	16	14	15
Main economic activity of HRP			
Paid work	82	79	78
Unemployed	4	2	3
Longterm disability	4	3	3
Looking after family/home	3	5	4
Retired	5	8	6
Full time education	2	2	3
Other	-	1	2
Equivalised household income tertile			
1st (lowest)	b	26	33
2nd	b	34	40
3rd (highest)	b	41	27

Table 3 Cont…

Past year slot machine gamblers *1999, 2007, 2010*

Demographic/socio-economic profile of slot machine players[a]	**1999**	**2007**	**2010**
	%	%	%
NS-SEC of household reference person (HRP)			
Managerial and professional occupations	b	38	37
Intermediate occupations	b	10	10
Small employers and own account workers	b	12	13
Lower supervisory and technical occupations	b	12	14
Semi-routine occupations	b	29	26
Bases[c]			
Weighted	*1072*	*1297*	*992*
Unweighted	*1007*	*1233*	*944*

[a] The profile of slot machine players varied significantly between survey years by age, sex, marital status, educational qualifications and household income. Statistically significant differences were not observed for other characteristics.

[b] 'b' indicates this question was not included in 1999.

[c] Bases shown for all who gambled on slot machines in the past year, bases may vary for individual characteristics.

Table 4 shows analysis of a number of health and lifestyle factors. Among slot machine gamblers rates of alcohol consumption were broadly similar in 2007 and 2010. Furthermore, the profile of slot machine gamblers did not vary by survey year for the other health characteristics considered including general health, long standing illness and smoking status. Broad patterns were that around 2 in 5 slot machine players were current smokers, which is higher than smoking rates among the general population, around 3 in 4 had consumed alcohol in the seven days prior to interview and the majority were in good health.

(Table 4)

Table 4 Health and lifestyle characteristics of slot machine gamblers, by survey year

All past year slot machine gamblers	*2007, 2010*	
Health and lifestyle profile of slot machine players[a]	**2007**	**2010**
	%	%
General Health		
Very good/good	81	82
Fair	16	15
Very bad/bad	3	3
Longstanding illness		
Limiting longstanding illness	9	10
Non limiting longstanding illness	8	10
No limiting illness	83	80
Smoking status		
Current cigarette smoker	38	41
Not current cigarette smoker	62	59
Alcohol consumption in last 7 days		
Did not drink in last 7 days	22	24
Drank 1-4 units on heaviest drinking day	27	30
Drank 5-9 units on heaviest drinking day	21	19
Drank 10-14 units on heaviest drinking day	14	15
Drank 15-19 units on heaviest drinking day	7	4
Drank 20 or more units on heaviest drinking day	9	9
Bases[b]		
Weighted	*1297*	*992*
Unweighted	*1233*	*944*

[a] The profile of slot machine players did not vary significantly between survey years by any of the health and lifestyle characteristics shown in this table.

[b] Bases shown for all who gambled on slot machines in the past year, bases may vary for individual characteristics.

3.1.4 Gambling involvement among slot machine gamblers, by survey year

Past year and past week participation in other activities, by survey year

It is widely recognised that most regular gamblers do not gamble on one activity only but take part in a range of activities. This is also evident for slot machine gamblers. In each of the BGPS series, over half of all slot machine gamblers had taken part in at least four or more activities within the past year. Table 5 (and Figure D) shows the extent to which this is true for each survey year.

The number of other gambling activities which slot machine gamblers had engaged in has significantly increased since 1999. In 1999, 9% of slot machine gamblers had taken part in seven or more activities. In 2010, this had more than doubled to 21%. Examination of the mean number of activities undertaken in the past year by slot machine players also reflects this pattern, increasing from 4 in 1999 to 5 in 2010.

However, analyses showed that since 1999, the mean number of activities undertaken in the past week remained relatively flat. In both 1999 and 2010, slot machine gamblers had gambled, on average, on approximately two activities in the past week.

Figure D: Number of activities undertaken by slot machine gamblers in the past year, by survey year

Base: All past year slot machine gamblers



Frequency of gambling, by survey year

Each of the BGPS series collected information about how engaged people were with gambling. In 2007 and 2010 this included measurement of gambling frequency in the past 12 months. Data on gambling frequency in the past 12 months is summarised in Table 5 by survey year. Two measures of frequency have been calculated: frequency of gambling on any activity in the past 12 months and frequency of gambling on any machine in the past 12 months.[6]

Examination of overall gambling frequency among slot machine players shows some interesting findings. Firstly, the frequency with which slot machine gamblers engaged in any form of gambling increased by survey year. In 2007, just over half (53%) of slot

[6] Frequency of gambling on any machine was calculated by combining two measures; frequency of gambling on a slot machine within the past 12 months and frequency of gambling on any machine in a bookmaker within the past 12 months. Frequency of gambling on any machine was the most common occurrence of either.

machine players had gambled at least once a week on their most frequent activity. In 2010, nearly two thirds (63%) reported the same. Very frequent participation in any gambling activity by slot machine players followed a similar trend. In 2007, 3% of slot machine players had gambled nearly every day on their most frequent form of gambling. This doubled to 6% in 2010.

Figure E: Frequency of playing any machine in the past 12 months, by survey year

Base: All past year slot machine gamblers



The frequency with which slot machine gamblers played any machines also increased by survey year (see Figure E). In 2007, 15% of slot machine players gambled at least once a week on any machine. In 2010, this increased to 21%. Likewise, very frequent gambling on any machine followed a similar pattern. In 2007, 6% of slot machine gamblers played machines at least twice a week. This increased to 9% in 2010.

(Table 5)

Table 5 Behaviour of slot machine players, by survey year

Past year slot machine gamblers *1999, 2007, 2010*

Gambling behaviour profile of slot machine players	1999 %	2007 %	2010 %
Number of activities undertaken in past year			
1 to 3	48	41	33
4 to 6	43	43	47
7 or more	9	16	21
Mean number of activities in past year			
Mean	3.9	4.4	4.8
Standard error of the mean	.07	.09	.09
Number of activities undertaken in past week			
1 to 3	85	87	88
4 to 6	13	11	10
7 or more	1	2	3
Mean number of activities in past week			
Mean	2.2	2.1	2.1
Standard error of the mean	.06	.05	.06
Frequency of gambling (past 12 months)			
Every day/almost every day	a	3	6
2 or more days a week	a	22	23
Once a week	a	28	33
Once a month, less than once a week	a	21	19
Once a year, less than once a month	a	26	19
Frequency of play on any machine (past 12 months)			
2 or more days a week	a	6	9
Once a week	a	9	12
Once a month, less than once a week	a	18	20
Once a year, less than once a month	a	65	59
Participated in last year, frequency not known	a	1	-
Bases			
Weighted	*1072*	*1297*	*992*
Unweighted	*1007*	*1233*	*944*

[a] 'a' indicates this question was not included in 1999.

Types of activity participated in, by survey year

In each survey participants were asked about gambling activities they had undertaken in the past year. Activities differed according to the range of gambling activities known to exist at that time. For example, in 2007 activities reflected the increasing prominence of online gambling (both games and betting) and the introduction of machines in bookmakers. Slot machine players' participation in other gambling activities for each survey year are shown in Table 6.

Among slot machine players, changes in participation in other gambling activities display similar patterns to that observed among the population as a whole. For example, significant increases in participation were found for: buying tickets for other lotteries, buying scratchcards, playing table games in a casino, playing machines in bookmakers and betting on sports or other events with a bookmaker. Activities which were less popular among slot machine players in 2010 were: buying tickets for the National Lottery draw, playing football pools and betting on the horses with a bookmaker.

(Table 6)

Table 6 Participation in gambling activities among slot machine players, by survey year

Past year slot machine gamblers *1999, 2007, 2010*

Participation in other activities by slot machine players	**1999** %	**2007** %	**2010** %
National Lottery Draw	86	79	79
Other lotteries	15	20	37
Scratchcards	54	49	57
Bingo	16	18	17
Football pools	14	7	12
Machines in bookmakers	a	13	18
Table games in a casino	11	16	16
Online fruit/slots/instant wins	a	11	22
Online with a bookmaker	a	12	9
Horse races (with a bookmaker, not online)	33	40	32
Dog races (with a bookmaker, not online)	13	16	13
Sports or other events (with a bookmaker, not online)	10	20	27
Spread betting	a	3	3
Betting exchanges	a	4	2
Private betting	36	34	36
Bases[b]			
Weighted	*1072*	*1297*	*992*
Unweighted	*1007*	*1233*	*944*

[a] 'a' indicates that this activity was not included in 1999.

[b] Bases shown for all who gambled on slot machines in the past year, bases may vary for individual activities.

3.1.5 Change in problem gambling rates among slot machine gamblers by survey year

The main BGPS 2010 report showed problem gambling rates (as measured by the American Psychological Association's Diagnostic Statistics Manual IV of common mental disorders) among all past year slot machine gamblers (cf. Table 6.4 in the BGPS 2010 report). However, this did not examine how endorsement of specific items or mean DSM-IV scores may have changed among slot machine players. This analysis is shown in Table 7.

Firstly, the proportion of slot machine players who were problem gamblers has not significantly increased since 1999. Estimates were 3% in 1999 and 4% in 2010.[7] However, there was a significant increase in the mean DSM-IV scores among slot machine gamblers by survey year. Mean DSM-IV scores were 0.21 in 1999 increasing to 0.34 in 2010. This highlights how those who gamble on slot machines experienced slightly more difficulties with their gambling since 1999. This is in keeping with earlier findings as difficulties with gambling (as indicated by mean DSM-IV scores) are commonly associated with increased engagement with gambling.

Examination of specific DSM-IV item responses also shows some interesting findings. Since 1999 there was a significant increase in the endorsement of specific items by slot machine gamblers. These were: chasing losses, preoccupation with gambling and gambling with more money to get the same excitement. In 1999, 5% of all past year slot machine players reported experiencing a preoccupation with gambling. In 2010, this had increased to 8%. Likewise the proportion of past year slot machine gamblers chasing losses increased from 4% in 1999 to 6% in 2010. Finally the proportion of past year slot machine gamblers reporting that they gambled with more money to get the same excitement doubled from 2% in 1999 to 4% in 2010.

(Table 7)

[7] This lack of significance may be an artefact of the small base sizes, as the BGPS series was not designed to identify changes in problem gambling rates among sub-groups.

Table 7 Problem gambling scores (DSM-IV) and item endorsement of slot machine players, by survey year

All past year slot machine gamblers aged 16 and over			*1999, 2007, 2010*
Problem gambling score and item responses among slot machine players	**1999**	**2007**	**2010**
	%	%	%
Problem gambling status (DSM-IV)			
Non-problem gambler	97	97	96
Problem gambler	3	3	4
Mean DSM-IV score (out of 10)			
Mean	0.21	0.25	0.34
Standard error of the mean	0.03	0.03	0.03
Endorsement of DSM-IV items [a]			
Chasing losses	4	7	6
A preoccupation with gambling	5	5	8
A need to gamble with increasing amounts of money	2	2	4
Being restless or irritable when trying to stop gambling	2	2	3
Gambled as escapism	2	2	3
Lying to people to conceal extent of gambling	1	2	2
Having tried but failed to cut back on gambling	2	2	2
Having committed a crime to finance gambling[b]	1	1	1
Having risked or lost a relationship/job/educational opportunity because of gambling[b]	1	1	2
Reliance on others to help a financial crisis caused by gambling[b]	2	2	3
Bases[c]			
Weighted	*1057*	*1193*	*992*
Unweighted	*993*	*1139*	*944*

[a] Unless otherwise specified, endorsement means the participant reported that they always or often engaged in this behaviour.

[b] Endorsement means that the participant reported that they occasionally, fairly often, very often engaged in this behaviour.

[c] Bases shown are for all who gambled on slot machines in the past year, bases may vary for individual items.

3.1.6 Slot machines: discussion

This section aimed to explore the profile and behaviour of slot machine players in more depth using data from the British Gambling Prevalence Survey series. It examined who gambles on slot machines, what else they gamble on, experience of gambling-related harm and how each has changed over time.

This chapter lends some insight into the changing profile of slot machine gamblers since 1999. Slot machine gambling has remained a male dominated activity. However, a growing proportion of women slot machine gamblers were identified. This may be related to the general upturn in female gambling rates observed since 1999 or could be related to efforts to increase female interest in slots (such as promoting slots at bingo halls). However, there was a notable decline in participation among men and among those aged 16-34. This may be related to the removal of slots from convenience

locations, such as taxi offices, fast food shops, and the rise of the gastro-pub phenomena meaning there may be fewer 'opportunistic' players in 2010 than in 1999. Credence is given to this theory by the increase in regular play observed among slot machine players in 2010, whereby those who do play, play more often. It suggests that the profile of slot machine players may have altered since 2007 and without more 'opportunistic' players in the sample, the profile becomes more skewed towards those for whom slot machine gambling is a more regular past time. However, this is just one possible explanation, and whilst plausible, needs further examination and corroborating evidence.

The increase in proportion of past year slot machine gamblers among the lowest income group is of note as it represents an increase in participation among a (potentially) 'at-risk' group. Furthermore, although levels of problem gambling remained relatively flat across survey years, an increase in mean DSM-IV scores suggests an upturn in gambling-related difficulties. Since 1999, chasing losses, a preoccupation with gambling and gambling with more money to get the same excitement all received increased endorsement by slot machine gamblers.

Several factors were identified which may underpin the slightly raised mean DSM-IV scores and endorsement for specific DSM-IV item responses by survey year. For example, since 1999 the number of other gambling activities undertaken by slot machine players has increased significantly. Analyses also revealed an increase in frequency of gambling on any activity and frequency of gambling on any machine among slot machine players. This means that slot machine players in 2010 were more engaged in gambling generally and machine gambling specifically than previously. All of which may be related to the different profile of slot machine players noted above.

That said, both frequency of participation and number of gambling activities undertaken are commonly related to problem gambling. Therefore these trends should be monitored and considered when developing future responsible gambling strategies and approaches.

3.2 Machines in bookmakers

Summary

- Since 2007, the proportion of people playing machines in bookmakers in the past year has increased from 3% to 4%. The largest increases were observed among men aged 16-34 where past year prevalence rates increased from 9% to 14%.

- In 2010, compared with 2007, bookmaker machine players were less likely to be in the highest income groups, though this was likely to be a function of their somewhat younger age.

- There was a small increase in the proportion of people who played machines in bookmakers from households where the Household Reference Person was unemployed or in full-time education.

- Since 2007, there have been few changes in how often bookmaker machine players either gamble on other activities or gamble on machines. However, a high proportion of bookmaker machine players were very regular gamblers, gambling on their most frequent activity at least once a week.

- A smaller but notable proportion of bookmaker machine gamblers were very regular machine players, gambling on any machine at least once a week within the past year. This, along with the average number of other gambling activities undertaken in by this group, suggests that this group are, typically, very engaged in gambling. This suggests that further attention be given to understanding the profile and behaviours of this group.

- The changing profile of those who play machines in bookmakers has some (potentially) important implications for responsible gambling strategies. Typically, those who are younger, receive lower incomes or who are unemployed are more vulnerable to gambling-related harm. This reflects the changing profile of this group. That said, data showed there were some notable reductions in endorsement of certain types of gambling problems. It will be important to monitor this changing profile and to assess *if* this translates into increased risk of harm in the future. Therefore the profile of those who play machines in bookmakers should continue to be monitored.

The sections that follow examine changes in participation in machine gambling at bookmakers. Data relating to this activity was only included in the 2007 and 2010 surveys. Therefore comparisons are restricted to these years. As with slot machine players, we examine the profile of this group, their levels of gambling engagement, experience of gambling-related harm and how each has changed since 2007.

3.2.1 Participation in the past 12 months, by survey year

As with slot machines, participation rates for gambling on machines in bookmakers were examined across the BGPS series for two time periods: participation in the past 12 months and participation in the past seven days.

Since 2007, there has been a significant increase in the prevalence of past year gambling on machines in bookmakers overall. Estimates rose from 3% in 2007 to 4% in 2010.

Past year prevalence by survey year varied by sex. Among men, past year rates of gambling on machines in bookmakers increased from 4% in 2007 to 6% in 2010. Among women estimates remained at 1% in 2007 and 2010 respectively. This is shown in Figure F. This shows that the increase in participation is attributably solely to men.

Figure F: Past year prevalence of gambling on machines in bookmakers, by survey year and sex



Among men, increases in participation were generally observed among all age groups, but the sharpest increase was among those aged 16-34. Past year prevalence rates rose from 9% in 2007 to 14% in 2010. Among women, there were no differences in past year participation rates by age group.

Despite these changes among younger men, the pattern of participation by age remained the same. In both survey years, younger age groups were much more likely than older age groups to have gambled on machines in bookmakers in the past year. In 2010, 9% of those aged 16-34 had played machines in bookmakers in the past 12 months. The equivalent estimate among those aged 35-54 was 2%, whilst less than 1% of those aged over 55 reported the same.

(Table 8)

Table 8 Prevalence of playing machines in bookmakers in the past 12 months, by age, sex and survey year

All aged 16 and over *2007, 2010*

Past year play of machines in bookmakers	2007 Age group				2010 Age group			
	16-34 %	35-54 %	55+ %	Total %	16-34 %	35-54 %	55+ %	Total %
Male	9	3	1	4	14	4	1	6
Female	3	1	0	1	3	1	0	1
All	6	2	1	3	9	2	0	4
Bases								
Weighted	*2748*	*3161*	*3046*	*8972*	*2400*	*2710*	*2644*	*7754*
Unweighted	*2356*	*3237*	*3366*	*8978*	*2094*	*2782*	*2877*	*7753*

3.2.2 Participation in the past week, by survey year

Table 9 shows rates of gambling on machines in bookmakers in the past seven days by age and sex.

Since 2007, there has been no significant change in the prevalence of past week gambling on machines in bookmakers by survey year. Prevalence estimates were 1% in 2007 and 1% in 2010. Gambling within the past seven days is often considered a proxy measure for frequency. Therefore, frequency of gambling on machines in bookmakers has remained stable. This pattern was the same for men and women.

Finally, since 2007 there was no change in past week gambling prevalence on bookmakers' machines by age group. In both 2007 and 2010 past week play was more prevalent among the youngest age groups. For example, in 2010, 1% of those aged 16 -34 had played on machines in bookmakers in the past seven days. Equivalent estimates for those aged 55 or over were less than 1%.

(Table 9)

Table 9 Prevalence of playing machines in bookmakers in the last 7 days, by age, sex and survey year

All aged 16 and over *2007, 2010*

Past week play of machines in bookmakers	2007 Age group				2010 Age group			
	16-34	35-54	55+	Total	16-34	35-54	55+	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Male	3	1	1	2	3	1	0	1
Female	1	0	0	0	0	0	-	0
All	2	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
Bases								
Weighted	*2761*	*3163*	*3054*	*8996*	*2400*	*2710*	*2644*	*7754*
Unweighted	*2362*	*3240*	*3375*	*8996*	*2094*	*2782*	*2877*	*7753*

3.2.3 Changes in the demographic and socio-economic profile of bookmaker machine gamblers, since 2007

This section examines whether the demographic and socio-economic profile of those who have gambled on machines on bookmakers has changed since 2007.

The profile of bookmaker machine players was examined by a number of demographic, socio-economic and lifestyle characteristics including: sex, age group, marital status, ethnic group, highest educational qualification, NS-SEC of HRP, main economic activity of the HRP, equivalised household income, whether the individual has experienced a long standing illness, general health status, smoking status and alcohol consumption. This analysis is shown in Tables 10 and 11.

Profile of people who gamble on machines in bookmakers, by survey year

The sex and age distribution of people who played on machines in bookmakers varied significantly by survey year.

In both 2007 and 2010 the profile of people who played on machines in bookmakers was predominantly male. However, in 2010 the gap between men and women had widened. In 2007, 73% of people who played machines in bookmakers were men (meaning that around 1 in 4 were women). By 2010 this had increased to 85% (meaning that only around 1 in 7 were women).

The typical person who gambled on machines in bookmakers was slightly younger in 2010 than in 2007. In 2007, 67% were aged 16-34, in 2010 this increased to 74% (see

Figure G). The mean age of bookmaker machine players also fell from 32 in 2007 to 30 in 2010, though this was at the margins of statistical significance (median age was 27 in 2007 and 26 in 2010).

Figure G: Age group profile of people who gamble on machines in bookmakers, by survey year



The economic activity of household reference person (HRP) among bookmaker machine players was examined by survey year. Since 2007, there was an increase in the proportion of players who lived in households were the HRP was unemployed or in full-time education. However, this could be associated with the changing age profile of bookmaker machine players and consequently who they live with. Results were checked in a logistic regression model and economic activity remained significant once age was taken into account. The same was true of educational attainment, with the proportion of bookmaker machine players educated to professional or degree level qualifications increasing.

Participants were asked about their household income and this measure was adjusted according to the number of people living in the household. Among people who gambled on machines in bookmakers, the proportion of people in the highest income group decreased by survey year. In 2007, 39% were among the highest income group, equivalent estimates in 2010 were 27%. However, once age was taken into account, this was no longer significant. No differences were identified in ethnicity or NS-SEC of Household Reference Person (similar to social class).

(Table 10)

Table 10 Profile of bookmakers' machine players, by demographic, socio-economic characteristic and survey year

All past year bookmakers' machine players *2007, 2010*

Demographic/socio-economic characteristics of bookmakers' machine players[a]	**2007**	**2010**
	%	%
Sex		
Male	73	85
Female	27	15
Age group		
16-34	68	74
35-54	25	22
55+	7	3
Mean age	32	30
Standard error of the mean	0.70	0.56
Marital status		
Married/living as married	33	39
Separated/divorced	8	4
Single, never married	57	56
Widowed	2	-
Ethnic group		
White	91	91
Asian or Asian British	4	2
Black or Black British	3	3
Other ethnic group	2	4
Highest educational qualification		
Professional qualification or above	20	29
GCSEs, O or A levels	61	56
Other	0	0
None	19	14
Main economic activity of HRP		
Paid work	74	71
Unemployed	2	6
Long-term disability	5	3
Looking after family/home	6	3
Retired	6	1
Full-time education	6	14
Other	2	2
Equivalised household income tertile		
1st (lowest)	35	40
2nd	27	33
3rd (highest)	39	27

Table 10 Cont…

All past year bookmakers' machine players		*2007, 2010*
Demographic/socio-economic characteristics of bookmakers' machine players[a]	**2007**	**2010**
	%	%
NS-SEC of household reference person (HRP)		
Managerial and professional occupations	28	34
Intermediate occupations	9	8
Small employers and own account workers	16	12
Lower supervisory and technical occupations	12	13
Semi-routine occupations	35	34
Bases [b]		
Weighted	*233*	*281*
Unweighted	*202*	*243*

[a] The profile of bookmakers' machine players varied significantly between survey years by age, sex, economic activity of the HRP, educational qualifications and household income. Statistically significant differences were not observed for other characteristics.

[b] Bases shown for all who gambled on bookmakers' machines in the past year, bases may vary for individual characteristics.

The profile of people who had gambled on machines in bookmakers did not change by survey year for other health variants/indicators including general health, long standing illness, smoking status or alcohol consumption. Like slot machines players, people who played machines in bookmakers were more likely to be current smokers and drinkers and be in good health.

(Table 11)

Table 11 Health and lifestyle characteristics of bookmakers' machine players, by survey year

All past year bookmakers' machine players		*2007, 2010*
Health and lifestyle characteristics of bookmakers' machine players[a]	**2007** %	**2010** %
General Health		
Very good/good	80	84
Fair	15	12
Very bad/bad	5	4
Longstanding illness		
Limiting longstanding illness	10	11
Non limiting longstanding illness	8	6
No limiting illness	82	83
Smoking status		
Current cigarette smoker	44	48
Not current cigarette smoker	56	52
Alcohol consumption in last 7 days		
Did not drink in last 7 days	21	22
Drank 1-4 units on heaviest drinking day	23	19
Drank 5-9 units on heaviest drinking day	16	22
Drank 10-14 units on heaviest drinking day	13	13
Drank 15-19 units on heaviest drinking day	8	7
Drank 20 or more units on heaviest drinking day	19	18
Bases[b]		
Weighted	*233*	*281*
Unweighted	*202*	*243*

[a] The profile of bookmakers' machine players did not vary significantly between survey years by any of the health and lifestyle characteristics shown in this table.

[b] Bases shown for all who gambled on machines in bookmakers in the past year, bases may vary for individual characteristics.

3.2.4 Gambling involvement among people who gamble on machines in bookmakers, by survey year

Past year and past week participation in other activities, by survey year

This section presents information about gambling involvement among people who have gambled on machines in bookmakers in the past year. Participation is measured by the number of other gambling activities undertaken and the type of activities engaged in. Data is presented in Table 12.

Since 2007, there was no significant change in the number of activities undertaken by bookmaker machine gamblers in the past year. In 2010, the vast majority of bookmaker machine players had taken part in at least four or more gambling activities in the past year (91%). Estimates in 2007 were similar (88%). This suggests that people who gamble on machines in bookmakers were very engaged in gambling generally and remained so across survey years.

Bookmaker machine gamblers took part in significantly fewer activities in the past week in 2010 than in 2007. In 2007, 38% had undertaken four or more activities in the past week. In 2010, 22% reported the same. Conversely the proportion of those engaging in one to three activities increased from 63% in 2007 to 78% in 2010. Mean number of activities undertaken in the past week similarly reflected a downward trend, decreasing from 3.3 in 2007 to 2.6 in 2010. This is shown in Figure H.

(Table 12)

Figure H: Number of activities undertaken by bookmaker machine gamblers in the past week, by survey year



Frequency of gambling, by survey year

Gambling volume (i.e., how much of an activity someone does) can be measured in a variety of ways, one of these being how often a person takes part in an activity. Within the BGPS 2007 and 2010 two measures of gambling frequency were computed: frequency of gambling on any activity in the past 12 months and frequency of gambling on any machine[8] in the past 12 months.

Firstly, no significant differences were found by survey year in the frequency which bookmakers machine gamblers engaged in any form of gambling activity, or gambled on any machine (see Figure I). In 2007, 68% of bookmaker machine players had gambled on their most frequent activity at least once a week. Equivalent estimates in 2010 were 73%. Therefore in 2010, approximately three quarters of past year bookmaker machine gamblers could be considered very regular gamblers.

(Table 12)

[8] Frequency of gambling on any machine was calculated by combining two measures; frequency of gambling on a slot machine within the past 12 months and frequency of gambling on any machine in a bookmaker within the past 12 months. Frequency of gambling on any machine was the most common occurrence of either.

Figure I: Bookmaker machine gamblers: frequency of gambling on most frequent activity by survey year



Table 12 Behaviour of bookmakers machine players, by survey year

Past year bookmakers' machines gamblers		*2007, 2010*
Gambling behaviour profile of bookmakers' machine players	**2007 %**	**2010 %**
Number of activities undertaken in past year		
1 to 3	12	9
4 to 6	35	40
7 or more	54	51
Mean number of activities in past year		
Mean	7.0	6.8
Standard error of the mean	0.14	0.11
Number of activities undertaken in past week		
1 to 3	63	78
4 to 6	29	16
7 or more	8	6
Mean number of activities in past week		
Mean	3.3	2.6
Standard error of the mean	0.1	0.1
Frequency of gambling (past 12 months)		
Every day/almost every day	9	11
2 or more days a week	34	33
Once a week	24	29
Once a month, less than once a week	18	16
Once a year, less than once a month	14	11
Frequency of play on any machine (past 12 months)		
2 or more days a week	19	19
Once a week	16	19
Once a month, less than once a week	28	25
Once a year, less than once a month	35	36
Participated in last year, frequency not known	2	0
Bases[a]		
Weighted	*233*	*281*
Unweighted	*202*	*243*

[a] Bases shown are for all who gambled on bookmakers' machines in the past year, bases may vary for individual gambling behaviours may vary.

Types of activity participated in, by survey year

The BGPS measured participation in all gambling activities in the past year. Participation in each gambling activity among bookmaker machines players in each survey year is presented in Table 13.

Significant increases in past year participation among bookmaker machine gamblers were found for: playing football pools, playing online games such as fruit or slot machines or instant wins and betting on sports or other events with a bookmaker. With the exception of football pools, these were similar to patterns of gambling behaviour

observed among all gamblers, with online gambling and betting on other events and sport becoming more popular.

Table 13 Participation in gambling activities among bookmakers machine players, by survey year

Past year bookmakers' machines gamblers *2007, 2010*

Participation in other activities by bookmakers' machine players	**2007 %**	**2010 %**
National Lottery Draw	76	78
Other lotteries	28	33
Scratchcards	54	61
Bingo	25	15
Football pools	17	23
Machines in bookmakers	74	62
Table games in a casino	38	41
Online fruit/slots/instant wins	34	43
Online with a bookmaker	31	19
Horse races (with a bookmaker, not online)	58	46
Dog races (with a bookmaker, not online)	40	27
Sports or other events (with a bookmaker, not online)	42	57
Spread betting	12	11
Betting exchanges	11	8
Private betting	53	51
Bases		
Weighted	*233*	*281*
Unweighted	*202*	*243*

Activities identified as being less popular among people who gambled on machines in bookmakers in 2010 were: playing bingo, gambling on slot machines, betting online with a bookmaker, betting on horse races with a bookmaker and betting on the dog races with a bookmaker.

Of interest is the significant decrease in betting on horse races with a bookmaker and betting on dog races with a bookmaker among those playing machines in bookmakers. Trends for each of these are contrary to those observed among the general population as reported in the BGPS 2010 (page 27). That said, in 2007, 42% of bookmaker machine gamblers reported betting on sports or other events with a bookmaker. This increased to 57% in 2010, indicating a great deal of correspondence between these activities.

In 2007, 35% of bookmaker machine players had gambled on any machine at least once a week. In 2010, 38% reported the same. This suggests that there is a subset of bookmaker machine gamblers who are heavily engaged in machine gambling specifically.

(Table 13)

3.2.5 Change in problem gambling rates among bookmaker machine gamblers by survey year

As detailed in Section 3.1.5, problem gambling rates were calculated according to the DSM–IV criteria and were assessed using 10 items (Table 14). Associations between bookmaker machine gambling, problem gambling and any key differences by survey year are discussed below.

Firstly, the proportion of bookmaker machine gamblers who were problem gamblers had not changed significantly since 2007. Estimates were 11% in 2007 and 9% in 2010. Mean DSM-IV scores also remained static by survey year. In 2010, mean DSM-IV scores among bookmaker machine players were 0.7.

Among bookmaker machine gamblers examination of specific DSM-IV item responses shows a significant decrease in endorsement for some criteria by survey year. These were: chasing losses and lying to friends and family to conceal the extent of gambling. In 2007, 17% of all past year bookmaker machine players reported chasing losses. Approximately half this proportion (9%) reported the same in 2010. Similarly, the proportion of past year bookmaker machine gamblers who had lied to friends or family to hide the extent of their gambling decreased from 10% in 2007 to 4% in 2010.

In summary, rates of problem gambling or mean DSM-IV scores did not change significantly by survey year. However, examination of specific DSM-IV criteria revealed there has been a change in endorsement for some items among bookmaker machine gamblers. Changes indicate a promising downward tend in the proportion of bookmaker machine gamblers reporting chasing losses or lying to hide the extent of their gambling. That said, some caution should be made when interpreting these results as base sizes are small and only c.250 bookmaker machine players were interviewed in each survey year.

(Table 14)

Table 14 Problem gambling scores (DSM-IV) and item endorsement of bookmakers' machine players, by survey year

All past year bookmakers' machine gamblers	*2007, 2010*
Problem gambling score and items responses among bookmakers' machine players	**2007** %	**2010** %
Problem gambling status (DSM-VI)		
Non-problem gambler	89	91
Problem gambler	11	9
Mean DSM-IV score (out of 10)		
Mean	0.9	0.7
Standard error of the mean	0.1	0.1
Endorsement of DSMI-V items [a]		
Chasing losses	17	10
A preoccupation with gambling	18	17
A need to gamble with increasing amounts of money	8	8
Being restless or irritable when trying to stop gambling	7	7
Gambled as escapism	9	6
Lying to people to conceal extent of gambling	10	5
Having tried but failed to cut back on gambling	7	4
Having committed a crime to finance gambling [b]	2	1
Having risked or lost a relationship/job/educational opportunity because of gambling [b]	5	3
Reliance on others to help a financial crisis caused by gambling [b]	7	8
Bases[c]		
Weighted	*213*	*281*
Unweighted	*186*	*243*

[a] Unless otherwise specified, endorsement means the participant reported that they always or often engaged in this behaviour.

[b] Endorsement means that the participant reported that they occasionally, fairly often, very often engaged in this behaviour.

[c] Bases shown are for all who played machines in bookmakers in the past year, bases may vary for individual items.

3.2.6 Machines in bookmakers: discussion

This section aimed to explore the profile and patterns of behaviour among bookmaker machine players in more depth using the British Gambling Prevalence Survey series. It examined who gambles on machines in bookmakers, what else they gamble on, patterns of gambling-related harm and how each has changed over time. This chapter presents important insight into current rates of participation, the profile of bookmaker machine gamblers and how each has evolved since 2007.

Firstly, we saw some notable increases in prevalence among young males, with around 1 in 7 men aged 16-34 having played these machines in bookmakers in the past year. However, no variation was found by survey year for women. It would be interesting to see how this pattern evolves and whether these machines continue to be a male dominated activity.

The changing age profile of people who had played these machines in bookmakers was also of interest. Since 2007, the age profile of bookmaker machine gamblers became younger. Given that younger age groups have higher rates of gambling-related harm, this pattern should continue to be monitored.

Other significant changes were that greater proportions were in middle or lower income groups, though this was related to age. This suggests a somewhat changing profile of those who play machines in bookmakers with the broad pattern showing greater proportions of players coming from groups that may be considered to have increased risk of gambling-related harm.

That said, data did not show any changes in problem gambling rates among people who gamble on machines in bookmakers and there were some notable reductions in endorsement of certain types of gambling problems. However, it will be important to monitor this changing profile and to assess *if* this translates into increased risk of harm in the future. It is also important to note that, typically, bookmaker machine players were very engaged with both gambling generally and there was a subset that were very engaged in machine play. This profile had neither increased or decreased since 2007 and bookmaker machine players continued to display high levels of gambling involvement.

3.3 Overlap in machine play

The analysis presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 allowed us, for the first time, to make important distinctions between slot machine gamblers and people who gamble on machines in bookmakers.

As would be expected, given that slot machines are more widely available across a range of venues, the prevalence of slot machine gambling was greater than the prevalence of playing machines in bookmakers. In 2010 estimates were 13% and 4% respectively.

However, changes in participation rates for both forms of machine gambling were interesting. Prevalence estimates for slot machine gambling have decreased whilst prevalence estimates for gambling on machines in bookmakers have increased. A key question, therefore, is what (if any) levels of substitution or addition are evident between these forms of machine play. This data can not answer these questions definitively but can shed some light on them. For example, in 2007, 13% of slot machine players had also played machines in bookmakers. In 2010, this had increased to 18%, meaning that in 2010 an increasing proportion of slot machine players were also trying machines in bookmakers. Conversely, the proportion of bookmaker machine players also playing slots decreased from 74% in 2007 to 62% in 2010.

The different patterns over time by age and sex in slot machine and bookmakers' machines play are also of note. Among men, prevalence of slot machine play decreased whilst prevalence of playing machines in bookmakers increased. This converse pattern was specifically observed among younger men. The steepest rates of decrease in slot machine play were observed among those aged 16-34 whilst the greatest rates of increase in bookmakers' machines play were also evident among this age group. From this data, we cannot draw conclusions that some young men are swapping slots in other venues for machines in bookmakers but it would be of interest to monitor how these patterns progress and, where possible, to understand more about how, why and under what circumstances different groups of people choose to play different types of machines.

4 Profile of machine players in 2010

This section explores the profile of machine players in greater depth using the BGPS 2010 data only. In 2010, new questions were asked of machine players about their venue of play. This allowed us to examine how different groups of machine players, based on venue preference, may vary from one another and to explore their profile. In this chapter we first describe our findings which identified different groups of machine players. We then examine whether these different 'types' of machine player varied by demographic, socio-economic, lifestyle and gambling characteristics.

4.1 Types of machine players

4.1.1 Definition of machine players

In this chapter machine players are defined as anyone who had played a slot or fruit machine for money in the past year or who had played a machine in bookmakers in the past year. In total, 1,047 machine players were interviewed in BGPS 2010. The prevalence of playing any type of gambling machine in the past year was 14%. There was some overlap between those playing slots machine and those playing machines in a bookmaker with 18% of slot machine players also playing machines in bookmakers, see Section 3.3.

4.1.2 Typologies of machine players

We constructed a typology of machine players based on their reported venue of play in the past year. The aim was to examine what types of machine player might exist by examining preferences for play in different venues. Examining venue of play also works as a crude proxy for machine type (i.e., those who played machines in a bookmakers are playing a certain category of machine).

Machine players were asked to report all the places they had played machines in the past year. Available answer options were:

- Pub or bar
- Amusement arcade
- Bingo club
- Bookmakers[9]
- Sports or social club
- Casino
- Motorway service station
- Somewhere else.

[9] Those who had only played machines in a bookmakers were included in this category in the analysis that follows.

Using this information, machine gamblers were classified into five mutually exclusive groups, using Latent Class Analysis (LCA). LCA is a statistical approach used to categorise individuals into different classes based on their responses to a series of questions. After examining several different models, it was agreed by the research team that a five class model best fit the data (a detailed explanation of this methodology can be found in Appendix A).

The five class solution offered the best statistical 'fit' of the data whilst providing a solution that made substantive sense and was easily interpretable. The resulting classes were also relatively homogenous. The factors determining membership of each group are shown in the table below, followed by information about the size of each class (Table B).

Table A LCA classification of machine player classes by venue of play

Base: 1047	**LCA classes:**				
Where played machines:	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5
	%	%	%	%	%
In a pub	100	0	0	0	100
In an amusement arcade	10	100	9	1	76
In an bingo hall	1	0	0	17	17
In a bookmaker	19	0	100	0	71
In a sports or social club	3	0	1	27	41
In a casino	1	1	7	34	30
In a motorway service station	1	0	0	5	25
Somewhere else	1	0	0	0	0

4.1.3 Defining each machine player type

As can be seen from Tables A and B, five distinct types, or classes, of machine player were evident in the data. Membership of each class varied based on venue of machine play and were defined as follows:

- **Class 1:** had all played machines in pubs in the past year. 19% of this group also played machines in a bookmaker's and 10% played machines in an amusement arcade. We have called this group '**mainly pub'** machine players.

- **Class 2:** had all played machines in an amusement arcade and less than 1% also played machines in a casino. We have called this group **'amusement arcade only'** machine players.

- **Class 3:** had all played machines in bookmakers. Less than 10% respectively also played machines in an amusement arcade (9%) and a casino (7%). We have called this group **'mainly bookmaker'** machine players.

- **Class 4:** had played machines in a variety of different venues. One third (34%) played machines in a casino, 27% played machines in a sports club and 17% played machines in bingo hall. This group represents a catch-all category for people who play machines in other venues which are typically less popular than bookmakers, pubs or amusement arcades. We have called this group **'other venue'** machine players.

- **Class 5:** had all played machines in a pub in the past year and the vast majority also played machines in bookmakers or in an amusement arcade. Playing machines in a variety of other venues was also popular among this group. We have called this group **'multi-venue'** machine players.

Table B shows the relative size of each class, with mainly pub machine players representing 46% of all machine gamblers and multi-venue machine players accounting for 9% of machine gamblers.

Table B Size of classes of machine player types		
Base: 1047	*Percent*	*Unweighted base size*
	%	*n*
Class 1 – mainly pubs	46.0	482
Class 2 – amusement arcade only	18.5	194
Class 3 – mainly bookmakers	14.0	147
Class 4 – other venues	12.4	130
Class 5 – multi-venues	9.0	94
Total – all machine players	**100**	**1047**

4.1.4 Considerations

The groups described above represent groups of people and the analysis that follows looks at the profile of these groups. While this provides insight into the different types of machine player that may exist and how the vary from each other, it is important to remember that overlap remains between player types and venues. This means that at any one point in time the patronage of a venue may consist of more than one type of player. For example, the patronage of an amusement arcade could include 'amusement arcade' only and 'multi venue' players. This is discussed in more depth in Section 4.3.2. Furthermore, it should be noted that these machine player types are derived based on the data available to us. It may be possible that focus on regular gamblers, for example, produces different groups of machine player types. Therefore, this analysis highlights the potential groups of machine players that may be evident within the British population which have been identified using this source of data. This, we believe, provides useful insight into the diversity of behaviour and helps to better understand heterogeneity of machine play.

4.2 Profile of machine player types

To examine the profile of each machine player type, a series of logistic regression models were run to identify the characteristics which distinguished one type of machine player from another and predicted membership of each group.

The purpose of this analysis was to examine differences between each type of machine player. Therefore, to address this issue, regression models were developed in two stages:

- Firstly, a model was run to identify the characteristics associated with being a machine player overall compared with other (non-lottery only) gamblers. This identifies the key factors which distinguish machine gamblers from other types of gamblers.
- Secondly, a series of models were run to identify the characteristics which distinguished machine player types from each other.

This process allows us to trace key patterns and associations of both machine players generally and of specific machine player types. (Full details on how these models were developed and how they should be interpreted is given in Appendix B, Sections B and C.)

4.2.1 Factors associated with machine gambling overall

The following characteristics were entered into a logistic regression model:

- Age
- Sex
- Ethnicity
- Personal income quintile
- Whether in paid work or not
- Educational qualification
- Smoking status
- Alcohol consumption in past 7 days
- Problem Gambling Severity Index group[10]
- Whether parents gambled
- Age first gambled
- Number of gambling activities undertaken in the past 7 days.

Age, sex, ethnicity, smoking status, alcohol consumption, problem gambling status, age first gambled and number of activities undertaken in the past 7 days were all significantly associated with machine gambling. This means that these features differentiate machine players from other gamblers.

The broad patterns were that the odds of being a machine gambler were lower among older age groups and decreased with advancing age, indicating that machine players are typically younger than other gamblers. Among gamblers, men were more likely than women to be machine players and those with higher rather than lower alcohol

[10] Problem Gambling Severity Index was used in the regression models rather than DSM-IV as it gives greater discrimination about levels of harm rather than being a binary measure of whether someone is a problem gambler or not. As the RGSB's strategy focuses on gambling-related harm more broadly, it was felt this would be useful analysis to present.

consumption or who were current smokers were also more likely to be machine players. This means that smoking and heavy drinking are predictive of machine gambling and that these patterns persist even when the younger age profile of machine players is taken into account. Among gamblers, those from non-white ethnic groups were less likely to be machine players.

Machine players also varied from other gamblers according to their self-reported gambling behaviour. The odds of being a machine player were higher among those who took part in at least one form of gambling in the past seven days and odds increased as the number of activities undertaken increased (see Figure J). This means that among gamblers, those who gamble most frequently are more likely to be machine players.

Figure J: Odds of being a machine player by number of gambling activities undertaken in past 7 days



Problem gambling status, as measured by the PGSI, was also significantly associated with machine gambling even after gambling involvement (as measured by the number of activities participated in) was taken into account. The odds of being a machine player were 5.42 times higher among PGSI problem gamblers than non-problem gamblers. Finally, the odds of being a machine player were lower among those who had started gambling at a later age.

This demonstrates that, compared with other gamblers, gambling behaviour such as higher involvement with gambling, earlier gambling onset and problem gambling status are predictive of machine play.

(Table 15)

Table 15 Odds of being classified a machine gambler

All past year gamblers (excluding lottery only) *2010*

Socio-demographic, lifestyle and gambling characteristics	*Odds ratio*	*95% CI - lower*	*95% CI - upper*
Sex (p<0.01)			
Female	1		
Male	1.37	1.16	1.62
Age group (p<0.01)			
16-24	1		
25-34	0.76	0.58	1.00
35-44	0.40	0.31	0.52
45-54	0.34	0.25	0.45
55-64	0.19	0.13	0.27
65 and over	0.11	0.07	0.17
Ethnic group (p<0.05)			
White	1		
Non-white	0.66	0.46	0.94
Past week alcohol consumption (p<0.01)			
Does not drink/did not drink in past week	1		
Drank 1-4 units on heaviest drinking day	1.27	1.04	1.55
Drank 5-9 units on heaviest drinking day	1.42	1.11	1.81
Drank 10-14 units on heaviest drinking day	1.55	1.18	2.03
Drank 15+ units or more on heaviest drinking day	1.73	1.22	2.46
Smoking status (p<0.01)			
Non-cigarette smoker	1		
Current cigarette smoker	1.37	1.14	1.65
Number of activities undertaken in past 7 days (p<0.01)			
0	1		
1	1.39	1.13	1.71
2	1.79	1.40	2.29
3 or more	4.18	3.05	5.73
Age first gambled (p<0.01)			
15 or younger	1		
16-17	0.76	0.61	0.95
18-20	0.68	0.55	0.83
21 or older	0.49	0.35	0.69
PGSI categorization (p<0.01)			
Non-problem gamblers (PGSI score=0)	1		
Low risk gambler (PGSI score=1-2)	2.61	2.05	3.32
Moderate risk gambler (PGSI score 3-7)	3.29	2.00	5.42
Problem gambler (PGSI score 8+)	5.42	2.67	11.03
Base (unweighted)	*1043*		

4.2.2 Factors associated with machine gambling types

As described in the preceding section, a number of factors distinguish machine players from other gamblers. The next stage of analysis was to examine the extent to which these factors distinguished *between* machine player types.

Firstly, basic cross tabulations of machine player types by various gambling behaviour characteristics showed some notable differences. As shown in Figure K and Table 16,

levels of engagement in other gambling activities varied significantly between machine player types. For example, 37% of multi-venue players had taken part in three or more activities in the past 7 days whereas only 4% of amusement arcade only players reported the same.

Figure K: Percentage of machine players taking part in 3 or more gambling activities in the past 7 days, by machine player type

Base: Machine players



This highlights a broad pattern by which both multi-venue players and mainly bookmaker players had the highest levels of engagement both with gambling generally and with machines specifically. For example, 18% of mainly bookmaker machine gamblers and 16% of multi-venue machine gamblers played machines on two or more days per week. Equivalent estimates among amusement arcade only or other venue gamblers were 3% respectively. Likewise, mainly bookmaker and multi-venue machine players were more likely to be in the high time/high spend gambling volume groups[11] and were more likely to have spent greater amounts of money and time on machine gambling specifically.

(Table 16)

[11] For the 2010 BGPS report, data about money spent and time spent gambling was collated for all regular (at least monthly) gamblers. Four mutually exclusive groups were then identified – non-high time/non-high spend gamblers; high time/non-high spend gamblers; high spend/non-high time gamblers and high time and high spend gamblers. See Chapter 4 of the main BGPS report for further details (Wardle et al., 2011).

Table 16 Gambling behaviour, by machine player types

All machine players *2010*

Gambling behaviour characteristics	Machine player type					All machine players
	Mainly pub	Amusement arcade only	Mainly bookmakers'	Other venues	Multi-venues	
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Time spent playing machines on a gambling day tertile						
1st (lowest)	67	a	57	[73]	33	61
2nd	10	a	6	-	25	10
3rd (highest)	23	a	36	[27]	42	29
Money spent playing machines in a month tertile						
1st (lowest)	55	a	45	[69]	23	50
2nd	24	a	6	[11]	31	21
3rd (highest)	21	a	49	[20]	45	30
Machine gambler volume sub-groups						
Non-high time/Non-high spend	68	a	41	[71]	38	58
High time only	11	a	10	[9]	17	12
High spend only	10	a	23	[2]	20	13
High time and high spend	12	a	27	[18]	25	17
Gambling volume sub-groups (all activities)						
Non-high time/Non-high spend	70	90	44	74	44	66
High time only	6	5	11	6	6	7
High spend only	9	2	7	8	16	8
High time and high spend	15	3	37	11	35	19
Highest frequency of playing machines						
2+ days per week	8	3	18	3	16	9
Once a week	12	2	17	6	26	12
Once a month, less than once a week	23	9	19	22	29	21
At least once in past year, less than once a month	56	86	46	69	29	58
Highest frequency of gambling (all activities)						
Every day/almost every day	6	2	13	6	8	7
4-5 days per week	4	1	7	4	11	4
2-3 days per week	20	15	26	15	24	20
Once a week	33	29	26	41	32	32
Once a month, less than once a week	21	18	15	15	20	19
At least once in past year, less than once a month	17	35	14	18	5	19
Number of gambling activities in past year						
1	3	11	2	7	-	4
2	9	22	6	14	2	11
3	17	24	11	20	7	16
4	19	20	19	25	4	18
5	19	15	23	15	8	18
6	14	6	11	12	12	12
7	19	2	29	6	67	21
Number of gambling activities in past week						
0	32	51	26	26	20	33
1	32	31	29	40	22	31
2	19	14	15	19	21	18
3	9	3	14	11	16	10
4+	8	1	15	4	21	9

Table 16 Cont…

All machine players *2010*

Gambling behaviour characteristics	Machine player type					All machine players
	Mainly pub	Amusement arcade only	Mainly bookmakers'	Other venues	Multi-venues	
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Number of venues played machines in past year						
1 venue	65	98	83	98	-	71
2 venues	35	2	16	1	-	19
3 venues	-	-	1	1	54	5
4 venues	-	-	1		31	3
5 venues	-	-	-	-	11	1
6 venues	-	-	-	-	4	-
Bases (weighted)						
Regular machine players	*228*	*27*	*90*	*39*	*77*	*460*
Past year machine players	*520*	*190*	*169*	*126*	*108*	*1112*
Bases (unweighted)						
Regular machine players	*209*	*25*	*79*	*38*	*67*	*418*
Past year machine players	*482*	*194*	*147*	*130*	*94*	*1047*

[a] 'a' indicates that base sizes are too small to present these results.

[ ] indicates that base sizes are small and some caution should be applied when interpreting these results.

This brief analysis demonstrates that there are further differences *within* machine gamblers and that not all machine gamblers are the same. A set of logistic regression models were developed to explore this in more detail, using the same set of characteristics described in Section 3.2.1.

Factors associated with being a 'mainly pub' machine player

Age, sex, alcohol consumption, cigarette smoking status and problem gambling status were significantly associated with being a mainly pub machine player. This means that these factors differentiate mainly pub machine players from other types of machine player.

Perhaps, unsurprisingly, among all machine players, men, those with the highest levels of alcohol consumption and those who were current cigarette smokers were all more likely to be mainly pub machine players. Whereas among machine players, those who were 'moderate risk' or 'problem gamblers' were less likely to be mainly pub machine players. Those aged 55 and over were also less likely to be mainly pub machine players.

(Table 17)

Table 17 Odds of being classified a 'mainly pub' machine gambler

2010

Socio-demographic, lifestyle and gambling behaviour characteristics	*Odds ratio*	*95% CI - lower*	*95% CI - upper*
Sex (p<0.01)			
Female	1		
Male	1.62	1.21	2.18
Age group (p<0.01)			
16-24	1		
25-34	1.32	0.86	2.00
35-44	1.09	0.69	1.71
45-54	0.77	0.46	1.29
55-64	0.49	0.27	0.87
65 and over	0.22	0.09	0.54
Past week alcohol consumption (p<0.05)			
Does not drink/did not drink in past week	1		
Drank 1-4 units on heaviest drinking day	1.39	0.97	1.99
Drank 5-9 units on heaviest drinking day	1.41	0.92	2.15
Drank 10-14 units on heaviest drinking day	1.64	1.01	2.65
Drank 15+ units or more on heaviest drinking day	2.37	1.46	3.84
Smoking status (p<0.01)			
Non-cigarette smoker	1		
Current cigarette smoker	1.63	1.20	2.23
PGSI categorisation (p<0.01)			
Non-problem gamblers (PGSI score=0)	1		
Low risk gambler (PGSI score=1-2)	0.89	0.62	1.29
Moderate risk gambler (PGSI score 3-7)	0.53	0.31	0.91
Problem gambler (PGSI score 8+)	0.21	0.08	0.57
Base (unweighted)	*481*		

Factors associated with being a 'amusement arcade only' machine player

Age, sex, number of gambling activities undertaken in the past year and age first gambled were significantly associated with being an amusement arcade only machine player.

Arguably, this group had the most varied demographic and gambling behaviour profile when compared with other machine players. For example, men were less likely than women to be amusement arcade only machine players. When compared with those aged 16-24, odds were also higher among most other age groups and were 7.04 times higher among those aged 65 and over (see Figure L), demonstrating the older age profile of this group.

Figure L: Odds of being an amusement arcade only machine player, by age group



Among machine players, those who had participated in one or more form of gambling in the past seven days were less likely to be amusement arcade only machine players. In fact, the odds displayed an inverse relationship with the odds of being an amusement arcade only player decreasing as the number of activities undertaken in the past week increased. However, similar to mainly pub players, those who had first gambled at a later age were less likely to be amusement arcade only machine players.

This means that compared with other machine players, amusement arcade only machine gamblers are more likely to be female, to be older and less likely to be involved in other forms of gambling.

(Table 18)

Table 18 Odds of being classified an 'amusement arcade only' machine gambler

2010

Socio-demographic, lifestyle and gambling characteristics	*Odds ratio*	*95% CI - lower*	*95% CI – upper*
Sex (p<0.01)			
Female	1		
Male	0.25	0.17	0.37
Age group (p<0.01)			
16-24	1		
25-34	1.12	0.63	1.97
35-44	3.28	1.74	6.20
45-54	2.14	1.12	4.09
55-64	2.20	1.01	4.77
65 and over	7.04	2.76	17.94
Smoking status (p<0.05)			
Non-cigarette smoker	1		
Current cigarette smoker	0.62	0.40	0.98
Number of gambling activities undertaken in past week (p<0.01)			
0	1		
1	0.55	0.37	0.83
2	0.40	0.22	0.73
3 or more	0.13	0.06	0.29
Age first gambled (p<0.01)			
15 or younger	1		
16-17	0.62	0.37	1.02
18-20	0.39	0.24	0.63
21 or older	0.78	0.37	1.66
Base (unweighted)	*192*		

Factors associated with being a 'mainly bookmaker' machine player

Age, sex, age first gambled and ethnicity were significantly associated with being a mainly bookmaker machine gambler meaning that these factors differentiate this group from other machine players. For example, men were more likely than women to be 'mainly bookmaker' machine players. Overall age was predictive of being a mainly bookmaker machine player, but the only category which differed from the reference group of those aged 16-24 was those aged 65 and over, who were less likely to be mainly bookmaker machine players.

Compared with other machine players, those from non-White ethnic groups were more likely to be mainly bookmaker machine players.

Unlike both mainly pub and amusement arcade only machine players, those who had first gambled from an older age (age 16 upwards) were more likely to be mainly bookmaker machine players. Indeed, the odds of belonging to this group increased as age of first gambling increased.

None of the other gambling behaviour characteristics differentiated this type of machine player from other types of machine players.

(Table 19)

Table 19 Odds of being classified a 'mainly bookmaker' machine gambler

Socio-demographic, lifestyle and gambling characteristics	*Odds ratio*	*95% CI - lower*	*95% CI - upper*
Sex (p<0.01)			
Female	1		
Male	2.79	1.65	4.72
Age group (p<0.051)			
16-24	1		
25-34	0.67	0.40	1.11
35-44	0.61	0.32	1.19
45-54	1.03	0.54	1.96
55-64	0.53	0.24	1.18
65 and over	0.26	0.09	0.82
Ethnic status (p<0.05)			
White	1		
Non-White	2.39	1.06	5.40
Age first gambled (p<0.01)			
15 or younger	1		
16-17	1.86	1.18	2.93
18-20	2.12	1.30	3.46
21 or older	3.09	1.27	7.51
Base (unweighted)	*147*		

Factors associated with being a 'other venue' machine players

Only age, sex and ethnicity differentiated this type of machine player from other groups. Men were less likely to be an 'other venue' machine player whereas those who were older were more likely to be this type of machine player. This association may be driven by the inclusion of people who played machines in bingo halls within this group. Like mainly bookmaker machine players, those who were non-White were more likely to be an 'other venue' machine player.

(Table 20)

Table 20 Odds of being classified an 'other venue' machine gambler

2010

Socio-demographic, lifestyle and gambling characteristics	*Odds ratio*	*95% CI - lower*	*95% CI - upper*
Sex (p<0.05)			
Female	1		
Male	0.61	0.38	0.96
Age group (p<0.01)			
16-24	1		
25-34	0.73	0.34	1.56
35-44	0.93	0.46	1.88
45-54	2.61	1.26	5.42
55-64	5.46	2.35	12.73
65 and over	3.74	1.38	10.13
Ethnic status (p<0.05)			
White	1		
Non-White	2.35	1.07	5.15
Base (unweighted)	*130*		

Factors associated with being a 'multi-venue' machine players

Factors predicting membership of the multi-venue group included age, educational qualifications and employment status. The relationship with age was that, among machine players, those aged 35-64 were less likely than those aged 16-24 to be a 'multi-venue' machine player (see Figure M). However, among machine players, those not in paid employment were more likely than those in paid employment to be a 'multi-venue machine player. Educational qualifications were associated with membership of this group, although the odds associated with different levels of attainment varied with no clear pattern.

Figure M: Odds of being a multi-venue machine player, by age group



Number of gambling activities undertaken in the past seven days, problem gambling status and age first gambled were significantly predictive of membership of the multi-venue group. This means that these factors differentiate this group from other machine players. Compared with other machine players, those who gambled on two or more activities in the past seven days were more likely than those who had not gambled in the past seven days to be a multi-venue machine player. Odds were lower among those who were at least 16 the first time they gambled, meaning that multi-venue machine players were likely to have tried gambling at a younger age than other machine players. Finally, the odds of being a multi-venue machine player were 6.45 times higher among problem gamblers and 4.17 times higher among moderate risk gamblers than non-problem gamblers. This illustrates how problem gambling status differentiates this group of machine players from the other groups and that problem gambling status, along with high levels of gambling involvement, is a predictor of being a multi-venue machine player.

(Table 21)

Table 21 Odds of being classified a 'multi-venue' machine gambler

All machine players *2010*

Socio-demographic, lifestyle and gambling characteristics

	Odds ratio	*95% CI - lower*	*95% CI - upper*
Age group (p<0.01)			
16-24	1		
25-34	0.72	0.38	1.38
35-44	0.25	0.11	0.59
45-54	0.15	0.06	0.39
55-64	0.06	0.01	0.51
65 and over	0.46	0.08	2.76
Employment status (p<0.05)			
In paid work	1		
Not in paid work	2.10	1.03	4.28
Educational qualifications (p<0.05)			
Professional qualifications or higher	1		
A-level/o-level or equivalent	0.97	0.55	1.70
Other/none	0.29	0.10	0.82
PGSI categorisation (p<0.01)			
Non-problem gambler (PGSI score=0)	1		
Low risk gambler (PGSI score=1-2)	1.84	0.96	3.50
Moderate risk gambler (PGSI score 3-7)	4.17	1.98	8.79
Problem gambler (PGSI score 8+)	6.54	2.23	19.17
Number of activities undertaken in past 7 days (p<0.01)			
0	1		
1	1.23	0.58	2.59
2	2.56	1.20	5.42
3 or more	4.11	1.81	9.36
Age first gambled (p<0.05)			
15 or younger	1		
16-17	0.52	0.29	0.91
18-20	0.35	0.17	0.70
21 or older	0.37	0.08	1.68
Base (unweighted)	*94*		

4.3 Motivations and attitudes among machine player types

4.3.1 Motivations

Having established that the profiles of machine player types vary, motivations for gambling and attitudes towards gambling were also examined.

Questions about why people gambled were included for the first time in BGPS 2010. Participants were asked to report why they gambled in general rather than why they gambled on specific products. Therefore, the information that follows does not necessarily refer to reasons for playing machines but rather refers to broader reasons for engagement in gambling.

Overall, gambling because 'it's fun' was the reason given most often by all machine player types. Estimates varied from 49% of mainly bookmaker machine players to 71% of 'multi-venue' machine players who said that they often or always gambled for this reason. This was closely followed by gambling to win big money, which also motivated many of each machine player type.

Other reasons for gambling were endorsed by each machine player type to differing extents. For example, whilst multi-venue players were much more likely than other groups to state that they often or always gambled because it was fun (71%) or exciting (42%), 21% also stated that they gambled to escape boredom and 16% said that they gambled because they were worried about not winning if they didn't play.

Mainly bookmaker machine players had quite distinct motivations for gambling. They too generally reported gambling because it was fun (49%), to win big money (46%) or to make money (46%), indicating that monetary motivations for gambling are important for this group. However, this group were most likely to report that they always or often gambled because of a sense of achievement when they won (40%) or for the mental challenge (38%). Overall, relatively few machine players stated that they gambled to impress others, or because it helps when they were feeling tense. However, mainly bookmaker players were most likely to state that they gambled for these reasons (6% and 4% respectively). This means that around 1 in 20 mainly bookmakers' machine players gamble to relieve tension or try to impress others.

For other machine player types, reasons for gambling varied without distinct pattern, except for the main observation that machine players, like many others, tend to gamble for the fun, for the money and for the excitement.

(Table 22)

Table 22 Motivations for gambling among machine player sub-types

All machine players *2010*

Motivations for gambling	Machine player sub-type					All
	Mainly pub	Amusement arcades only	Mainly bookmakers	Other venues	Multiple venues	
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Chance of winning big money						
Never/sometimes	49	54	54	46	45	50
Often/always	51	46	46	54	55	50
Because it's fun						
Never/sometimes	47	43	51	46	29	45
Often/always	53	57	49	54	71	55
Escape boredom/fill my time						
Never/sometimes	91	87	87	90	79	89
Often/always	9	13	13	10	21	11
I'm worried about not winning if I don't play						
Never/sometimes	92	91	93	91	84	91
Often/always	8	9	7	9	16	9
Compete with others						
Never/sometimes	95	98	87	98	92	94
Often/always	5	2	13	2	8	6
It's exciting						
Never/sometimes	72	75	66	75	58	71
Often/always	28	25	34	25	42	29
Mental challenge or to learn about the game						
Never/sometimes	91	92	79	96	82	89
Often/always	9	8	21	4	18	11
Sense of achievement when I win						
Never/sometimes	79	83	60	76	62	75
Often/always	21	17	40	24	38	25
Impress other people						
Never/sometimes	99	99	96	97	97	98
Often/always	1	1	4	3	3	2
Be Sociable						
Never/sometimes	85	89	81	86	76	84
Often/always	15	11	19	14	24	16
Helps when I'm feeling tense						
Never/sometimes	98	99	94	97	96	97
Often/always	2	1	6	3	4	3
To make money						
Never/sometimes	66	72	54	68	59	65
Often/always	34	28	46	32	41	35
Hobby or pastime						
Never/sometimes	81	83	71	76	66	78
Often/always	19	17	29	24	34	22
To relax						
Never/sometimes	91	93	82	86	84	89
Often/always	9	7	18	14	16	11
It's something I do with my family or friends						
Never/sometimes	79	74	74	74	70	76
Often/always	21	26	26	26	30	24
Bases						
Weighted	*519*	*188*	*169*	*125*	*108*	*1108*
Unweighted	*481*	*192*	*147*	*129*	*94*	*1043*

4.3.2 Attitudes

Attitudes towards gambling were assessed using the ATGS-8 developed for the BGPS 2010. This presented participants with eight statements, four of which represented positive views of gambling and four of which represented negative views of gambling. Participants were asked to rate agreement to each one. An overall attitude score was calculated from these responses. A score of 24 represents neutral attitudes to gambling, a score of less than 24 represents somewhat negative attitudes to gambling and a score of more than 24 represents positive attitudes to gambling.

Unsurprisingly, given the varying levels of gambling engagement and motives observed between these groups, attitudes towards gambling also varied by machine player type.

Multi-venue machine players had the most positive attitudes towards gambling with a mean attitude score of 25.6. Mainly pub and mainly bookmaker machine players also, on average, held positive attitudes towards gambling with average attitude scores of 24.4. On the whole, amusement arcade only and other venue players had somewhat negative attitudes towards gambling with mean scores of 22.6 and 23.4 respectively.

Given this, responses to specific attitude items showed the general pattern that multi-venue players tended to agree with the positive aspects of gambling and disagree with the negative aspects of gambling more strongly than other groups. The converse was true for amusement arcade only gamblers.

However, there were some interesting anomalies to this pattern. For example, mainly bookmaker machine gamblers agreed in greatest number that people should have the right to gamble whenever they want. Somewhat paradoxically this group also agreed in equal numbers with their amusement arcade only and other venue counterparts that there were too many opportunities for gambling nowadays (around 3 in 4 of each group agreed with this statement). Interestingly, mainly bookmaker machine players were the least likely to agree that most people who gambled did so sensibly.

(Table 23)

Table 23 Attitudes towards gambling among machine player sub-types

All machine players *2010*

Endorsement of each attitude statement and mean scores	Machine player type					All
	Mainly pub	Amusement arcades only	Mainly bookmaker	Other venues	Multi-venues	
	%	%	%	%	%	%
People should have the right to gamble whenever they want						
Strongly agree/agree	69	55	80	59	74	68
There are too many opportunities for gambling nowadays						
Strongly agree/agree	61	74	73	73	64	67
Gambling should be discouraged						
Strongly agree/agree	22	42	23	30	18	26
Most people who gamble do so sensibly						
Strongly agree/agree	37	36	28	36	43	36
Gambling is dangerous for family life						
Strongly agree/agree	41	60	48	53	33	46
On balance, gambling is good for society						
Strongly agree/agree	19	16	20	12	22	18
Gambling livens up life						
Strongly agree/agree	27	24	37	26	39	29
It would be better if gambling were banned altogether						
Strongly agree/agree	5	8	9	10	6	7
Mean attitude score	24.4	22.6	24.4	23.4	25.6	24.1
Standard error of the mean	.18	.33	.36	.37	.44	.14
Bases						
Weighted	*519*	*188*	*169*	*125*	*108*	*1108*
Unweighted	*481*	*192*	*147*	*129*	*94*	*1043*

What this highlights is the complex relationship between attitudes and behaviour. The 'amusement arcade only' group are most interesting in this respect. They are past year gamblers, engaging with machines at a very specific venue type, but even so typically have more negative attitudes towards gambling. This may seem contradictory but could indicate the presence of 'a third person effect' whereby certain players think that, on the whole, gambling is not positive but that it doesn't apply to them (i.e., the risks are greater for other people) or could simply indicate that the excitement and fun offered by the activity outweighs their negative attitudes to gambling in general. Further work is needed to unpack this relationship.

4.4 Discussion

4.4.1 Summary of findings

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in machine gambling in Great Britain, and specifically, its relationship to gambling-related harm. The rhetoric surrounding machine gambling (especially by media) tends to assume that machine gamblers are a relatively homogenous group and have similar levels of risk of harm. However, the British machine gambling market is diverse and therefore one would expect the profile and behaviour of machine players to be equally diverse. Yet to date, there has been

very little exploration of this. What research has been conducted was produced prior to the introduction of the (then called) fixed odd betting terminals in bookmakers. This report aimed to address this gap and based on analysis of where people play machines has identified five potentially distinct groups of machine players, each with a different profile, motivations and attitudes towards gambling.

Those who mainly played machines in a pub made up around 46% of the past year machine players. Their profile and patterns of involvement in other gambling activities were therefore similar to all machine players generally, with the exceptions that they were more likely to be male, to be younger and consume more alcohol than other machine players. Interestingly, this group had an inverse relationship with problem gambling status, meaning that comparative to other machine players problem gambling status was less likely to predict membership of this group. In some ways, this group are the epitome of the causal machine player. Some did play machines fairly often (i.e., once a week or more) but they typically played less regularly than this and were less engaged in other forms of gambling than some other machine players.

The amusement arcade only group were particularly interesting. This was the only group where the proportion of women outnumbered the proportion of men. This group also tended to be older than other machine players. They had the lowest levels of engagement in machine gambling and also of gambling more generally, though notably, problem gambling status did not differentiate this group from other machine players. This is surprising given lower levels of gambling engagement observed among amusement arcade only players and, perhaps, is an artefact of smaller base sizes observed among this group; they accounted for less than 20% of all machine players. As noted above, they had very specific attitudes towards gambling, being more negative than positive, though interestingly around two thirds of this group reported playing machines at least once a month. That said, their volume of play was low which may lend support to the presence of a 'third person' effect when they were thinking about gambling more broadly when answering attitudinal questions.

The mainly bookmaker machine group made up 14% of all machine players the majority of whom were men. They were much more likely to be from non-white ethnic groups than other machine players. Interestingly, they were the only group whose membership was predicted by starting to gamble at an older age, rather than younger age. They were strongly engaged in other forms of gambling and with machine gambling itself, having the highest frequency of machine play of all groups (18% played on two or more days per week) and having higher proportions in the high time/high spend group. Many of these are typically viewed as risk-factors for the experience of gambling-related harm and certainly high levels of gambling involvement suggest that attention be given to this sub-group of machine player. That said, 46% of this group also played on machines less than once month, further highlighting how different patterns of play are evident *within* these groups. This reminds us that even within machine player types, there is a

heterogeneity of play patterns – some are very engaged in machine gambling, others less so. This range may help account for the somewhat varying motivations and attitudes towards gambling evident among this group, with mainly bookmaker machine players being least likely to agree that most people gamble sensibly and stating equally to those with more negative attitudes that there were too many opportunities for gambling nowadays.

Other venue machine players were a catch all group and we acknowledge that with a larger sample size it would have been useful to separate out bingo hall machine players and casino machine players. As such, their profile was somewhat varied. They tended to have lower levels of engagement in gambling and machine gambling generally and more negative attitudes towards gambling.

Finally, the multi-venue machine group made up around 9% of all machine players. This group were disproportionately male, younger and were heavily engaged in gambling (over two thirds had taken part in seven or more different gambling activities in the past year). Like mainly bookmaker machine players, they too had a greater proportion within the high time/high spend gambling groups. They were the only group where, compared with other machine gamblers, problem gambling status positively predicted membership of this group. Indeed 59% of this group were categorised as low risk, moderate risk or problem gamblers. They also had the most positive attitudes towards gambling, which is unsurprising given their high levels of engagement.

Multi-venue machine players can and should be viewed as a key group (potentially) vulnerable to the experience of gambling-related harm. This also suggests that a more strategic and joined-up approach across operators and venues regarding prevention and education about gambling-related harm may be beneficial. If those who play in multi-venues represent a specific vulnerable group for the experience of gambling-related harm, then having the same messages and same strategies implemented consistently across all operators and all venue types gives a greater chance to intervene with this group, who make up around 1 in 10 machine players.

4.4.2 Considerations

We caution operators to review these results with care, For example, just because amusement arcade only gamblers were less engaged with gambling generally and machine gambling specifically, does not imply that the risk of gambling-related harm should be discounted among amusement arcade players overall. Rather, it needs to be viewed in context of the whole population of people who play machines at each venue. To demonstrate this, the chart opposite shows the proportion of amusement arcade gamblers and bookmaker machine gamblers who were categorised as each machine player type. As can be seen, 48% of people who played machines in bookmakers in the

past year and 56% of those who played machines in an amusement arcade were categorised as mainly bookmakers' or amusement arcade only machine players respectively. However, 22% and 24% of each group were also multi-venue machine players. This further highlights the diversity of machine players and the levels of overlap of player types found in different venues.



All bookmakers machine players All amusement arcade machine players

As with any research, some limitations should be borne in mind when reviewing these results. Firstly, machine player types are based on those who played machines in the past year. It is likely that more regular machine players have different venue and machine preferences and that a different typology may be apparent among more regular machine players. Secondly, as noted above, the other venue group was not particularly satisfactory as we were unable to separate out casino and bingo machine players. Thirdly, it is possible that there is some classification error between groups. We did not have information about how often people played at each venue, therefore it is possible that someone who played machines in a pub once in the past year but plays machines regularly elsewhere has been classified as a multi-venue machine player, for instance. Our data does not allow us to identify such situations. Finally, our objective was not to examine which types of machines in which venues are more harmful than others (indeed, this would be difficult to do with the data available to us) but rather to examine how machine players vary from one another. We therefore caution against over-interpreting these results.

That said, these results show that multi-venue and mainly bookmaker machine players are the two types of past year machine gamblers who appear to be more engaged with gambling generally and more engaged with machine gambling specifically. The majority of each were male and younger. Together, this fits the 'typical' profile of those more

likely to experience gambling-related harm and suggests that attention is given to these groups in relation to the development of responsible gambling strategy and practice.

Appendix A Latent Class Analysis

A typology of machine players was constructed using Latent Class Analysis (LCA). This approach categorises individuals into different groups, or 'latent classes' based on responses to a series of questions.

LCA was chosen as the best method of identifying types of machine players after data were explored in a number of ways. Firstly, machine venue data were examined through a series of cross tabulations to explore if machine players could be grouped without using cluster, factor or other data reduction techniques. However, given the range of combinations of machine play in different venues, mutually exclusive and meaningful groups suitable for analysis could not be identified. For example, participants were asked to report all the venues where they had played machines in the past 12 months. This gave rise to a large number of unique combinations of venues of play, some of which had base sizes as small as 9 people (i.e., 9 participants had played machines in a pub and somewhere else in the past year). This variety would not allow meaningful analysis to be produced and groups would have to be merged. Because of this, we decided to use a statistical technique to create manageable and meaningful groups.

We examined correlation coefficients between venues of play and produced factor analysis to group various measures of machine play. However, this did not yield satisfactory results, with only two factors (or groupings) of machine variables being evident – slot machine play and play in bookmakers. Inspection of the data suggested that more meaningful groups may be apparent than this dichotomy.

We explored the use of LCA to examine 'latent classes' of machine players. LCA consists of a) identifying the number of classes that best fit the data and b) generating probabilities for each individual that they belong to each class. Once this is done, an individual is assigned to the class for which they have the highest probability of membership.

A key aspect of LCA is the identification of the number of 'latent classes' which best fit the data. In order to do this, a number of models, each containing a pre-specified number of classes, were produced. In this case, the models tested ranged from those with 2 classes to those with 7 classes. The results from each model were then compared to select the most appropriate results based on both statistical and substantive considerations.

When determining which LCA model best fits the data, there are a number of considerations to take into account. The first is examination of various statistics of goodness of fit. Recommended guidelines are that a model which fits the data well

should have lower BIC, AIC and AIC3 values, although BIC has been highlighted as the most robust and consistent statistic to consider (McLachan & Peel, 2000; Roeder & Wasserman, 1997).

The fit statistics for all models are shown in Figure A1.

Based on these statistics alone a five and six class solutions fit the data well.

Figure A1: Fit statistics for 2-7 class solutions

Base: Fit statistics



To further examine which is preferable, class size, probabilities of membership and parsimony were considered. In relation to class size, one needs to have sufficient members of a class to enable analysis to be produced. Our six class solution yielded a sixth class with only 60 members making analysis of this group problematic. Furthermore, it is important that classes do not have large proportions of members where the probability of membership is low (for example, if a number of individuals allocated to a particular class have a low probability of being a member of that group, then doubts over how valid that class is may be raised). The five class solution showed that the average probability of membership for each class was between 0.84 and 0.999 (see Table A.1). Finally, the principle of parsimony suggests that a model with fewer parameters should be preferred over a model with more parameters, so long as it fits the data well.

Table A.1 Average probability of membership of each group		
Base: 1047	*Mean probability of membership*	*Standard deviation*
Class 1 – mainly pubs	0.87	0.18
Class 2 – amusement arcade only	0.99	0.04
Class 3 – mainly bookmakers	0.99	0.02
Class 4 – other venues	0.999	0.01
Class 5 – multi-venues	0.84	0.15

This, combined with the fit statistics and the observed class sizes suggested that a five class solution fit the data well.

In addition to these considerations, it is also important that the resulting classes have a meaningful interpretation. We observed that each class was distinctive from the others and did have a meaningful interpretation, though we acknowledge that class 4 – other venues - is a 'catch all' group of machine players not elsewhere categorised. With a bigger sample size it may have been possible to separate out further.

Appendix B Logistic Regression Models

A) Modelling changes over time

Part 1 of this report looks at changes in the profile of machine players since 1999 and highlights the differences noted. However, when looking at how the profile of a sub-population (in this case machine players) has changed between survey years, it is important to assess whether the changes are 'real' or whether they may be an artefact of a) broader underlying population changes since 1999 or b) changes in who responded to the survey. To examine this, two logistic regression models were developed to look at how the responding profile of each survey year varied according to a range of demographic, socio-economic and health and lifestyle characteristics. The first model compared the responding profile of BGPS 1999 with BGPS 2010 by age, sex, educational qualifications and marital status. These were the only variables that were comparable between survey years.

Survey year was the outcome variable and the model examined the odds of being classified within a certain demographic group in 2010 compared with 1999. The results showed that there were no differences by sex, thereby meaning we can be confident that the changing profile of machine players by sex are 'real' changes. However, there were some differences observed by age, educational qualifications and marital status. Participants in 2010 were slightly older than in 1999. As each survey was weighted to reflect the age profile of the population apparent at that time, this probably reflects underlying changes in the age profile of Great Britain. In 2010, participants were slightly more likely to be single, separated or divorced than married when compared with the marital status of participants in 1999, whilst in 2010 more participants were educated to professional qualification/degree level. Comparison of the profile of BGPS 2010 participants by educational attainment with equivalent estimates from contemporaneous surveys also indicates that this is likely to reflect broader changes at a population level.

A second model was run to examine differences in the profile of participants between 2007 and 2010 as there was a greater level of comparable data available. This showed that in 2010, the responding sample was less likely to have drunk alcohol in the preceding 7 days and were more likely to be in poor health. Ethnicity and smoking status did not vary between survey years. These differences should be borne in mind when interpreting results and have been noted, where appropriate, within this report.

B) Models predicting membership of each machine group

The final regression models presented in this report (Chapter 3) were carefully developed and tested. Models were built and tested in iterative fashion, starting with age and sex, and then expanded to examine the impact of inclusion of various other

explanatory factors. Models were first run for demographic and socio-economic characteristics only and then for gambling behaviour characteristics only (with age and sex as controls). The final models included both socio-demographic and gambling behaviour variables combined. For each model, variables were included which were either shown to be associated with machine play in the main BGPS series (or within this report) or were likely to differentiate machine players from other gamblers (such as age first gambled). Much emphasis has been placed on the need to account for broader gambling engagement when looking at the relationship between certain forms of gambling behaviour and problem gambling (cf. Wardle et al., 2011; LaPlante et al., 2011). In this report, number of activities undertaken in the past week was used a proxy for gambling engagement, though results were similar when number of gambling activities undertaken in the past year was used instead.

These models were run on a subset of the BGPS data (machine players only). Therefore, it was important to retain as many observations as possible within each model. To do this, variables were examined to ensure that there were sufficient numbers of each machine player type within individual variable categories to allow the model to run without dropping cases. Where needed, some variable categories were combined (i.e., economic activity was dichotomised into 'paid work' vs. 'not paid' work) to enable inclusion of this variable into the model. However, some variables could not be included as categories could not be combined in a meaningful way. For example, nearly all machine players reported that their general health was good or fair. Across all machine player types, very few reported that their health was bad meaning that there was not sufficient differentiation in self-reported general health to warrant including this characteristic. However, to ensure that excluding general health from the model would not effect other associations, models were tested including and excluding general health and it did not affect overall results.

The same sets of variables were entered into all models so that results could be compared between machine player groups. These were:

- Age
- Sex
- Ethnicity
- Personal income quintile
- Marital status
- Whether in paid work or not
- Educational qualification
- Smoking status
- Alcohol consumption in past 7 days
- Problem Gambling Severity Index group
- Whether parents gambled
- Age first gambled
- Number of gambling activities undertaken in the past 7 days.

Only variables which were significant in the final model are shown in Tables 16 to 21.

C) Interpreting logistic regression models

For all models presented in Tables 16 to 21, the independent variable is significantly associated with the outcome variable if $p<0.05$. The odds associated with the outcome variable are presented for each category of the independent variable. Odds are expressed relative to a reference category, which is given a value of 1. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates higher odds of the outcome of interest (i.e., being a machine player). An odds ratio less than 1 indicates lower odds of the outcome of interest. 95% confidence intervals are also shown for each odds ratio. If the interval does not include 1, there is a significant difference between the odds ratio for the category and that of the reference category.

Appendix C References

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PEOPLE WITH GAMBLING PROBLEMS ARE MAKING A MASSIVE CONTRIBUTION TO GAMBLING PROFITS

WRITTEN BY PROFESSOR JIM ORFORD ON 24 AUGUST 2012.

The Channel 4 Dispatches TV programme shown on 6th August included a first public airing of some alarming figures about the amounts of money being spent on different forms of gambling by people with gambling problems. The figures were based on a peer-reviewed paper accepted for publication in the academic journal *International Gambling Studies*. The authors of the paper are Jim Orford, Heather Wardle and Mark Griffiths. The paper reports secondary analysis of data from the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey. Responses to questions about frequency of gambling and average monthly spend on different forms of gambling were used to derive estimates of the percentage of all spend attributable to people with gambling problems. Estimates were calculated in two different ways and two different problem gambling screens (DSM-IV and PGSI) were used, yielding four separate estimates in all. These were averaged to produce one 'best estimate' of the percentage of all losses coming from the pockets of people with gambling problems. Although these estimates must be treated as approximations only, they are likely to be of the right order. This is the first time such estimates have been calculated for Britain and they suggest that people with gambling problems are making a huge contribution to total gambling spend, particularly in the cases of certain forms of gambling.

What the Dispatches team then did was to combine those estimates with the total net takings (Gross Gambling Yield) from some of the major forms of British gambling (figures available from the Gambling Commission) in order to arrive at estimates of the total amounts of money being taken annually from people with gambling problems. The figures are startling. Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs or B2 machines) may be costing people with gambling problems in the region of a quarter of a billion pounds a year! (23% of the gross gambling yield £1,295m). Other forms of gambling which appear to take in the region of £50m to £75m annually from people with gambling problems include table games in casinos, betting on dog races, betting on horse races, and slot machines in arcades.

	GGY £m	% of losses from PGPs	amount of losses from PGPs £m
FOBTs in betting shops	1,295	23	297
Table games in casinos	685	11	76
Betting on dog races	275	27	75
Betting on horse races	810	7	57
Slot machines in arcades	396	12	47
Football pools	324	6	18
Bingo	386	4	16

(GGY - Gross gambling yield; PGPs - People with gambling problems)

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Campaign for Fairer Gambling

Appendix O

Landman Economics

The Economic Impact of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals

A report by Howard Reed (Director, Landman Economics)

April 2013

Contents

Executive Summary

Landman Economics was commissioned by the Campaign for Fairer Gambling to conduct a research project on the economic impact of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs) in betting shops.

FOBTs only began to be installed in betting shops in the early 2000s but have grown quickly since then as a source of revenue. In 2011/12 FOBT gambling overtook traditional Over-the-Counter (OTC) betting as the main source of revenue from betting shops for the first time. Currently gross revenue from FOBTs is growing at around 7% per year in real terms.

Only a small proportion of the UK population use FOBTs – around 4 percent of adults in the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS). However, FOBT users tend to be more frequent gamblers than OTC betting customers. FOBT users are also increasingly likely to be young men (aged under 35), unemployed and/or from low income households. FOBTs are also much more likely to contact gambling helplines due to gambling addiction or other related problems than are OTC betting customers.

The Association of British Bookmakers has claimed that increased regulation of FOBTs would lead to substantial job losses in the betting sector. However, this view does not take account of the *overall* impact of a shift in consumer spending towards FOBTs and away from other goods and services. Each pound which a consumer spends on FOBTs (net of winnings) is by definition a pound which is not spent elsewhere in the economy. This report conducts an analysis of the economic impact of FOBTs by estimating the amount of employment supported by a certain quantity of expenditure on FOBTs compared with the employment supported by the same quantity of consumer expenditure on other goods and services in the economy.

Because expenditure on FOBTs supports relatively little employment compared with consumer expenditure elsewhere in the economy, this report finds that £1bn of "average" consumer expenditure supports around 20,000 jobs across the UK as a whole, whereas £1bn of expenditure on FOBTs supports only 7,000 jobs in the UK gambling sector. This implies that, other things being equal, **an increase of £1bn in consumer spending on FOBTs destroys just over 13,000 jobs in the UK.** The results in this report suggest that, if current rates of growth of FOBT expenditure are maintained:

- Gross industry revenues from FOBTs will double in real terms over the next ten years, resulting in a gain of over 11,000 jobs for the gambling sector by 2023/24 but a reduction of over 22,000 jobs for the economy as a whole. At the end of the period covered by the forthcoming Triennial Review of Gaming Machine Stake and Prize Limits, overall UK employment is forecast to fall by just over 5,000.

- At the end of the ten year period, the total annual wage bill in areas where FOBTs are established will be around £650 million lower (in today's prices) than if FOBT use remained at its 2013 level.
- At the end of the ten year period net tax receipts will also be around £50 million per year less due to the expansion of FOBTs. Revenue from Machine Games Duty is forecast to increase by around £340 million but this is more than offset by reduced receipts from income tax and National Insurance contributions (due to lower employment) and reduced VAT receipts (due to lower consumer spending on other goods and services).

Introduction

Landman Economics has been commissioned by the Campaign for Fairer Gambling to conduct a research project on the economic impact of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs) in betting shops. FOBTs – also known as "B2 gaming machines"[1] – are electronic terminals situated in betting shops (a maximum of four machines per outlet under current rules).

With the UK Government's Triennial Review of Gaming Machine Stake and Prize Limits imminent (DCMS, 2013), there is a clear debate to be had about whether the current maximum stake level for FOBTs (£100) and the current level of regulation of FOBT play is appropriate. The Association of British Bookmakers (ABB), which represents the gambling industry, has claimed that increased regulation of FOBTs would lead to substantial job losses in the gambling sector (a recent ABB advertisement in the *Racing Post* claimed that more stringent regulations on FOBTs could cost up to 40,000 jobs). The main aim of this research report is to make a wider assessment of the impact of FOBTs on the UK economy as a whole (rather than just the gambling sector). Looking at the economy as a whole, does an increase in the number of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals in an area create jobs and act as a spur to economic growth? Or does a shift in consumer expenditure from other goods and services to FOBTs tend to siphon resources out of local economies, destroying more jobs than are created?

This report is structured as follows. Section 1 uses statistics from the Gambling Commission and from bookmaking companies' own annual reports to chart the increase in FOBTs over time and the shift from more traditional "Over the Counter" betting activity to FOBTs in the sector. Section 2 uses recent research on FOBT users to assess the number of people in the adult population using FOBTs, the level of gambling expenditure undertaken by regular users and the extent of "problem" gambling arising from FOBT use. Section 3 assesses the impact of FOBTs on local economies by comparing the number of jobs and the amount of economic output supported by a given amount of expenditure on FOBTs with the number of jobs and the amount of economic output supported by other types of consumer expenditure. This section also looks at the overall impact of increased FOBTs on tax revenues and the public finances. Section 4 assesses the limitations of the analysis and asks whether a more in-depth treatment of certain aspects of the impact of FOBTs might affect the results, and if so, in what way. Section 5 offers conclusions.

[1] Gaming machines are classified into a number of categories according to the maximum stake and maximum winnings legally allowed in each category. See Gambling Commission (2012) Appendix 3.

1 The shift from Over The Counter betting to FOBTs in betting shops

Fixed Odds Betting Terminals only began to be installed in betting shops in the early 2000s but the growth in the number of FOBTs and the revenue from them has been very substantial since then, to the extent that FOBTs have now overtaken more traditional Over The Counter (OTC) betting activities (such as bets on horseracing, etc.) as the main source of revenue generation for bookmakers.

Industry statistics from the Gambling Commission show that in the three years between 2008/09 and 2011/12, the number of FOBTs in betting shops in the UK[2] increased from 31,484 to 33,345 – a rate of growth of around 2% per year. Meanwhile, the Gross Gambling Yield[3] (GGY) from FOBTs increased from £1,051 million to £1,430 million – a rate of growth of around 11% per year (around 7% per year in real terms). (This implies that each machine is being played more intensively even as the number of machines increases.)

At the same time, the number of people employed in the bookmaking industry fell from 60,247 to 54,449 (a rate of decline of just over 3 percent per year.)

In the financial year 2009/10, Gross Gambling Yield from OTC betting was £1.46bn whereas Gross Gambling Yield from FOBTs was £1.19bn. By 2011/12, the equivalent figures were £1.39bn for OTC and £1. 45bn for FOBTs. 2011/12 was the year in which machine gambling overtook OTC betting as the main source of revenue for the (off-line) betting sector for the first time.

The high rate of growth in revenue from FOBTs is reflected in the annual reports of the leading bookmaking firms. For example, accounts information from William Hill plc indicates that its revenue from FOBTs is growing at an annual rate of around 14%; the equivalent figure for Ladbrokes is just over 10%.[4]

At the same time the overall number of betting shops in the UK has been growing – despite a rapid decline in OTC betting volumes. Between March 2010 and March 2012 the number of outlets grew from 8,822 to 9,128 – an increase of just under 4 percent (Gambling Commission, 2012). Given that FOBTs are the only part of the betting shop operation which is currently growing in terms of revenues, it is likely that the increase in the number of betting shops is being driven by the restriction of maximum 4 FOBTs per outlet.

[2] Include footnote explaining what the classifications of gambling machines are in terms of maximum stakes.
[3] Gross Gambling Yield is defined by Gambling Commission (2012) as “the amount retained by operators after the payment of winnings but before the deduction of the costs of the operation.”
[4] See Gambling Data (2012).

2 FOBT users, expenditure on gambling and problem gamblers

Number and frequency of gamblers

The 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey (BGPS) is the most recent detailed study of gambling behaviour in the UK to date. 4 percent of adults surveyed in the 2010 BGPS had played Fixed Odds Betting Terminals at some point in the year prior to the survey. Analysis of frequency of participation by gambling product shows that more than 50% of adults who used FOBTs use the machines more than once a month. In general the frequency of use of OTC betting products was much lower (for example, for horserace betting the equivalent figure is 25%).

Data from the bookmakers William Hill reported by the market research group Gambling Data (2012) suggests that FOBT users are a minority of customers in betting shops, with OTC customers outnumbering FOBT users by around 4 to 1.

Characteristics of FOBT users

Research published in March 2013 by the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen, 2013) uses the two most recent waves of the British Gambling Prevalence Survey (in 2007 and 2010) to examine the characteristics of FOBT users compared with other gamblers as well as the general population. The results from the research show several particular trends:

- There was an increase in the prevalence of FOBT use between 2007 and 2010[5] but this was entirely due to increased use of FOBTs by men. Male FOBT use increased from 4% of the adult population in 2007 to 6% in 2010; for women, FOBT use was constant at 1%.
- Increased FOBT use between 2007 and 2010 was focused on young men. Among men aged between 16 and 34, past-year prevalence rates for machine gambling increased from 9% in 2007 to 14% in 2010.
- There was an increase between 2007 and 2010 in the proportion of FOBT users from low-income households and also an increase in players from households where the survey respondent was unemployed or in full-time education.

[5] The NatCen research also looks at the earliest wave of the BGPS in 1999, but FOBTs had not been introduced into UK bookmaker outlets at this point and so the 1999 wave contains no information relevant to the current project.

- In both years, a high proportion of FOBT users were very regular gamblers, gambling on their most frequent activity at least once a week. (This proportion increased from 68% in 2007 to 73% in 2010.)

Expenditure on Gambling

Data from the 2010 British Gambling Prevalence Survey suggests that average spend per regular gambler (defined as people who gamble with a frequency of once per month or more) is around three times higher for gamblers using FOBTs (£1,208 per year) than for OTC gamblers (£427 per year).

Landman Economics's own analysis of data from the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS - the main source of household-level survey data on expenditure in the UK) suggests that between 2005-06 and 2009-10, betting expenditure (including expenditure on gaming machines) by the ten percent of households with any gambling expenditure whose weekly expenditure on gambling was largest, increased from 66% of total gambling expenditure to 81% of total gambling expenditure. In other words the heaviest gamblers have become responsible for a greater proportion of total gambling expenditure in recent years. At the same time the proportion of households in the EFS with any gambling expenditure at all reduced from 14% to 10% of the population. The data suggest that a hard core of heavy gamblers is becoming responsible for a larger and larger proportion of industry revenues.

Problem gamblers and helplines

Statistics from the gambling helpline www.gamcare.org.uk show that in the 2011/12 financial year, 28 percent of calls to the helpline were from gamblers who were experiencing problems as a result of FOBTs or roulette machines. This compared with around 34 percent of callers who were experiencing problems as a result of betting (including online betting and racecourse betting as well as OTC betting at betting shops). This means that FOBT users were much more likely to call the helpline than people involved in other forms of gambling were. In terms of the location which helpline callers were doing their gambling from, betting shops were the most common gambling location for callers in 2011/12 (46% of callers), followed by the internet (34% of callers).

3 The economic impact of increased expenditure on FOBTs

This section estimates the overall economic impact of increased expenditure on FOBTs on economic conditions in the localities where the FOBTs are located.

The impact on jobs and economic output

As Section 1 of this report showed, with OTC betting in decline, Fixed Odds Betting Terminals are currently the only real growth area for the betting sector. The growth in FOBTs business has led industry representatives to lobby against greater controls on FOBTs (for example, a reduction in the maximum stake, currently £100 for B2 machines) on the grounds that restrictions on FOBTs would reduce growth and lead to job losses in the industry.

However, it makes no sense, economically speaking, to consider the impact of increased expenditure on FOBTs on the betting sector in isolation from the rest of the economy. Each pound which a consumer spends on FOBTs (net of winnings) is, by definition a pound which is not spent elsewhere in the economy. Hence the question of whether increased expenditure on FOBTs generate increased economic activity or not is really a question about whether each pound spent on FOBTs supports more economic activity than a pound spent elsewhere in the economy.

The basic approach taken in this report to calculating the impact of FOBTs on the economy is to estimate the amount of employment supported by a certain quantity of consumer expenditure on FOBTs compared with the employment supported by the same quantity of consumer expenditure on a weighted basket of other goods and other services in the economy. Thus, rather than asking the question “how much economic activity is created by Fixed Odds Betting Terminals?” the analysis here asks, “what is the change in economic activity if consumer expenditure shifts from other goods and services to FOBTs?” In terms of the aggregate economic impacts of FOBTs on the UK economy, the latter question is much more appropriate than the former.

Note that the focus here is explicitly on *local* economies; the analysis draws a distinction between expenditure on wages, which (if betting shop employees live reasonably locally) is likely to be “re-circulated” into the local economy via consumers spending a proportion of what they earn, and profits for the betting industry, which (given that most betting shops are owned by large-scale national chains) are not likely to be re-spent in the local economy.

The analysis in this section proceeds by attempting to calculate what proportion of Gross Value Added (GVA - a measure of economic output used by the UK Office for

National Statistics – essentially equal to net industry revenue after subtracting costs of production) from FOBTs is accounted for by wage costs. This "share of wages in GVA for FOBTs" is compared with the proportion of GVA from consumer expenditure in the UK economy as a whole which is accounted for by wage costs (the "share of wages in GVA for overall consumer expenditure"). To the extent that £1 of expenditure on FOBTs supports fewer jobs than the "average" £1 of consumer expenditure, an increase in spending on FOBTs *will reduce overall employment and economic activity*.

The following assumptions are made about the amount of employment supported by Fixed Odds Betting Terminals:

- It is assumed that each set of 4 FOBTs supports one full-time job at the average hourly wage rate for people working in the gambling industry on an hourly rate (rather than a salaried basis). According to the 2012 Labour Force Survey[6], the average hourly wage rate for these employees is £7.25 per hour – above the National Minimum Wage but not by much. In practice, it is likely that FOBTs, as a completely automated gambling format, support less employment than this, but given that there is a maximum of 4 FOBTs per betting shop it seemed reasonable to apportion at least some cleaning and maintenance time for each shop to maintain the FOBTs and the environment around them, as well as allowing for some of the tasks undertaken by counter staff in betting shops to support FOBT play (e.g. use of debit cards rather than cash to fund play, "selling" the machines to customers by offering free play sessions and tournaments as marketing tools, and so on.)
- Gross Value Added from FOBTs is estimated by taking measured GVA for the entire gambling industry (including bookmaking, casinos, betting and online gambling) from the Office for National Statistics' Annual Business Survey dataset (ONS, 2012) and apportioning GVA in line with the share of total gross revenue from FOBTs as a share of total industry revenue[7].

Table 1 shows the calculation of the share of wages in Gross Value Added for the Fixed Odds Betting Terminals industry and compares this with the share of wages in GVA across UK private sector industries as a whole[8].

[6] The Labour Force Survey is the most comprehensive source of data on wages in the UK, based on a survey of around 60,000 households per year.
[7] Statistics from Gambling Commission (2012) show that FOBTs account for approximately 52% of total gross revenue for the gambling industry.
[8] The UK public sector – principally health and education – has been excluded from the analysis because most of what the sector produces is not sold at market prices and hence is not an relevant destination for consumer expenditure.

Table 1. Share of wages in Gross Value Added for FOBTs compared with average across UK private sector industries

Industrial sector	Gross Value Added (£bn)	Employment costs (£bn)	Share of wages in GVA (%)
FOBTs	1.224	0.126	10.3
Entire UK private sector	920.009	450.199	48.9

Notes:

FOBTs GVA calculation based on 2011 Annual Business Survey estimate of GVA for the gambling industry (SIC2007 code 92), allocated pro-rata to FOBTs on the basis of data from Gambling Commission (2012) showing that betting shop activities (including OTC betting and FOBTs but excluding online betting) and account for approximately 52% of total gross revenue for the gambling industry, while FOBTs account for 51% of gross revenue from betting shops. Employment costs for FOBTs calculated assuming one full-time employee per set of 4 FOBTs at annual wage of £15,080.

Entire UK private sector GVA and employment costs calculations calculation based on data from 2011 ONS Annual Business Survey for SIC2007 industries B (mining), C (manufacturing), D (electricity and gas), E (water), F (construction), G (wholesale and retail trade), H (transport and storage), I (accommodation and food services), J (information and communication), K (finance and insurance), L (real estate), M (professional services), N (administration) and R (arts and entertainment) summed together.

Table 1 shows that the total share of wages in Gross Value Added for Fixed Odds Betting Terminals, under our assumptions, is around 10 percent – much lower than the share of wages in Gross Value Added for the UK private sector overall, which is approximately 49 percent. The implication of these figures is that consumer expenditure on FOBTs supports very little employment compared with an average basket of consumer spending on goods and services. If one pound of consumer spending is diverted from other goods and services to FOBTs, it is likely to support only one-fifth as much employment as it would have done, on average, if that pound had been used to buy other goods and services. The corollary of this finding is that FOBTs deliver particularly high profits for bookmaking firms because wage costs required to support FOBTs are so low relative to the amount of revenue that they generate.

In terms of overall employment generation, what is the impact on local economies of a shift of consumer spending into FOBTs? Taking into account average wages in the gambling industry compared to average wages across the UK private sector, this analysis finds that £1bn of “average” consumer expenditure supports around 20,000 jobs across the UK as a whole, whereas £1bn of expenditure on FOBTs supports only around 7,000 jobs in the UK betting sector. This implies that, other things being equal, **an increase of £1bn in consumer spending on FOBTs destroys just over**

13,000 jobs in the UK. Furthermore, the jobs created in the UK betting sector are on average lower paid (average full-time annual salary around £15,000) than jobs created by consumer expenditure on other goods and services (average full-time annual salary around £25,000).

This is important in terms of the likely expansion of the FOBTs industry over the period covered by the Triennial Review, if rules governing maximum stakes stay as they currently are. Table 2 extrapolates the trend in Gross Gambling Yield from the period 2008/09 to 2011/12 to provide estimates of total gambling yield from FOBTs in 2013/14 (at the start of the Triennial Review period), by 2016/17 (the end of the current Triennial Review period) and 2023/24 (ten years from now). The Table shows the implied growth in GGY from 2013/14 onwards, and the implied loss of jobs across the economy as a whole resulting from this expansion of FOBTs in the betting sector.

Table 2. Implied growth in FOBTs business and economic impact at current rates of growth

Year	Total annual GGY from FOBTs (£bn)	Growth since 2013/14 (£bn)	Number of extra jobs in betting sector	Number of jobs lost in other sectors	Overall jobs impact (UK economy)
2013/14	1.7				
2016/17	2.1	0.4	2,700	-7,900	-5,200
2023/24	3.4	1.7	11,400	-33,700	-22,300

Notes: all figures at April 2013 prices.

Source: author's own calculations

Table 2 suggests that Gross Gambling Yield from FOBTs will double in real terms over the next ten years, resulting in a gain of over 11,000 jobs in the betting sector but a loss of almost 34,000 jobs elsewhere in the economy, leading to an overall net reduction of just over 22,000 jobs for the economy as a whole by 2023/24. By the end of the three year period covered by the Triennial Review, Gross Gambling Yield is forecast to expand by £400 million, leading to a gain of just under 3,000 jobs for the betting sector but a loss of almost 8,000 jobs elsewhere in the economy, leading to an overall net reduction of just over 5,000 jobs for the UK as a whole.

Over the ten year period, the impact of the expansion of FOBTs in terms of reduced wage payments to people working in the local economies where FOBTs are established is to reduce the total wage bill in these areas by around £650 million by 2023/24. This is due to a combination of two factors: (a) the reduction in the total number of jobs supported by consumer spending as a result of switching spending

from other goods and services into FOBTs, and (b) the fact that jobs arising as a result of the expansion of FOBTs are relatively low-wage compared with jobs supported by other types of consumer spending.

Impact of increased FOBTs on tax receipts

One important aspect of the economic impact of increased numbers of FOBTs is their impact on tax receipts. This report models three main revenue impacts of a shift in consumer expenditure towards FOBTs:

(1) Increased receipts of Machine Games Duty (MGD) – this is paid at a rate of 20% on gross revenues from category B2 gaming machines.
(2) Reductions in VAT receipts arising from reduced consumption on goods and services elsewhere in the economy, the majority of which attracts VAT at the standard rate of 20%[9].
(3) Reductions in income tax and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) arising from reduced overall employment in the UK economy (as explained above), meaning that there are fewer people in work to pay income tax and NICs to the UK Exchequer.

Table 3 adds these tax revenue impacts together to calculate the total impact of the expansion of FOBTs on tax revenue over the 3-year period of the Triennial Review (up to 2016/17) and over a 10-year period (up to 2023/24).

Table 3. Impact of increase in FOBTs on per-year tax revenues over a 3-year and 10-year period

Change in tax revenue	2016/17 (£m)	2023/24 (£m)
Machine Games Duty	+78	+336
Income tax and NICs	-49	-210
VAT	-41	-175
Total	-12	-50

Notes: Machine Games Duty revenues calculated as 20% of the increase in Gross Gambling Yield over 3 and 10 years using GGY figures in Table 2.

Income tax and NICs revenues calculated assuming that the average wage of additional workers taken on in the betting sector is £15,000 per year, whereas the average wage of workers made redundant in other sectors of the economy is £25,000 per year.

Reduced VAT revenue calculated on the basis that 52 percent of consumer expenditure shifted from other goods and services to VAT would have attracted VAT at the standard rate of 20% (House of Commons Library, 2012).

[9] The House of Commons Library (2012) reports that approximately 52 percent of overall consumer expenditure is subject to the standard rate of VAT of 20%. This assumption has been used in the calculations in Table 3. Note that gambling expenditure on FOBTs does not attract VAT as it is subject to Machine Games Duty instead.

Table 3 shows that although the expansion in FOBTs over the period covered by the Triennial Review is estimated to lead to increased revenue of around £80m, this is accompanied by a reduction in income tax and NICs revenue of around £50m and reduced VAT revenue of around £40m, meaning that total tax revenue decreases by £12m. By 2023/24, further expansion of FOBTs in line with current trends is projected to lead to a £50 million net loss for the Exchequer.

4 Limitations of the analysis

The analysis of the economic impact of FOBTs presented in this paper has not attempted to capture every aspect of the impacts because of the inherent difficulties of modelling some aspects of the economic impacts. This final section discusses how the results might change if it were possible to take account of some of these other aspects of the economic impacts of FOBTs.

Impact of increased profits

The economic analysis in this report has only looked in detail at the consequences of lower levels of wages supported by gamblers' spending on Fixed Odds Betting Terminals compared with consumer spending on most other goods and services. The corollary of this is that profits derived from FOBTs in the betting sector tend to be higher (for a given amount of gambling spend) than for most other consumer goods and services industries. If these increased gambling profits were recycled into the local economy then this might create additional employment through another route. However, in practice it is unlikely that this will happen. To the extent that profits are distributed to shareholders as dividends, the shareholders are mainly likely to be large institutional investors (some of which will not be based in the UK) or high net-worth individuals. Neither of these groups is likely to reinvest significant amounts in the local economies where FOBTs have become established in high street bookmakers' over the last decades, because they are unlikely to be based in these local areas.

Other local spending by businesses

Some businesses contribute to the local economy through their supply chain – the goods and services which they purchase. A good example of this would be if a supermarket or grocery store sells products sourced from local suppliers – an increase in retail sales of these items would then lead to an additional positive "multiplier" effect on the local economy as demand for local products would increase in turn.

For betting shops, this kind of multiplier effect is likely to be very limited – indeed close to non-existent – as the amount of products purchased from local suppliers is minimal. The large bookmaking firms which control the vast majority of the betting shop sector source most of the materials used in the shops centrally including cleaning materials, shop display materials, and the equipment used in the shop (the

FOBT machines are primarily supplied by companies owned by SG Gaming, a US-based company). Thus to the extent that growth in FOBTs displaces other economic activity which is based on "buying local", it is likely that growth in FOBTs in the betting sector is likely to have an even more negative impact on the local economy than we have forecast earlier in this section. However, these local supply chain effects are difficult to model with any accuracy[10], which is why this analysis has focused on the employment impacts, which are more straightforward to model.

The cost of treatment for problem gambling

One of the key external costs arising from gambling activity is the cost of treating gambling addicts and other problem gamblers[11]. This is a key topic for further research. Given that the proportion of problem gamblers among FOBT users appears to be higher than for other forms of gambling, any expansion in the number of FOBTs in the UK betting sector is likely to lead to an increased incidence of problem gambling. Because of the limited UK research on the costs which problem gambling imposes on the NHS, local authorities, and on the problem gamblers themselves and their families, this study has not attempted to include these "negative externalities" arising from increased use of FOBTs in the calculations of the economic impact of FOBTs. However, if it were possible to include these additional costs the result would be that increased FOBT activity would have even more of a negative impact than the results in this study indicate.

Potential links between gambling behaviour and criminal activity

The potential links between gambling behaviour and criminal activity is an under-researched area in the UK[12] and so this report has not attempted to include any estimate of the costs of criminal activity in the analysis. However, some indicative evidence is available from police statistics obtained by the BBC's current affairs programme *Panorama* in November 2012 under the Freedom of Information Act. The police statistics show that between 2008 and 2011, violent crime in betting shops rose by 9%. Betting shop managers told *Panorama* that they believed one cause of the rise in violent crime was FOBTs due to the relatively high stakes involved.

[10] See new economics foundation (2002) for an example of modelling local supply chain effects.
[11] There have been previous attempts to estimate the cost of treatment for problem gamblers in the United States: see for example Thompson and Quinn (1999). In the UK the evidence base on the costs of problem gambling is thinner.
[12] There is some research in the United States, for example Kindt (2003).

5 Conclusions

This research project has attempted to estimate the economic impact of future growth in the number of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTs) in use in betting shops in the UK over the period covered by DCMS's Triennial Review, as well as longer-term impacts over the next decade.

The report first established that gambling industry revenue from FOBTs is growing at a rapid pace – around 7 percent per year in real terms, adjusting for inflation. There is also a slight upward trend in the number of people using FOBTs (which is entirely accounted for by increased numbers of men rather than women). FOBT users are currently a minority of customers in betting shops but they are much more likely to be frequent and heavy gamblers than is the case for traditional "Over the Counter" bettors. FOBT users are also more likely to experience symptoms associated with "problem" gambling (e.g. gambling addiction) than OTC betting shop customers.

The most important finding from this report is that increases in spending on FOBTs are likely to *destroy* jobs in the UK economy rather than creating them. For every additional £1 billion spent on FOBTs, an estimated 7,000 jobs are created in the betting sector. However, at the same time consumer spending on other goods and services falls by £1 billion, which reduces employment in other industries by around 20,000. The reason for this is that FOBTs are a very "labour-unintensive" form of consumer spending. The fact that the machines are automated means that FOBTs support very few jobs compared with expenditure on other goods and services. Furthermore, a shift of consumer spending from other goods and services into FOBTs reduces overall tax revenue accruing to the Exchequer. Revenue from Machine Games Duty increases but not by enough to offset falls in revenue from income tax, National Insurance contributions, and VAT.

The implication of this analysis is that while relaxing the restrictions on maximum gambling stakes and maximum number of machines per betting shop would be good for the betting sector (in terms of increased revenue and some increase in employment) it would be bad for the rest of the economy (because many more jobs would be lost elsewhere in the economy than would be created in the betting sector. Even if current restrictions are not relaxed and the current rate of growth in FOBTs continues over the next decade this is likely to lead to a net loss of over 20,000 jobs across the UK. The clear implication for policymakers is that *increasing* restrictions on FOBTs – for example, reducing the maximum stake down from £100 to a lower figure – would help increase UK employment because it would result in a shrinkage of the number of FOBTs in use in betting shops and divert consumer spending into other areas of the economy which are more conducive to employment growth.

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STOP THE FOBTs
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

LET'S BE FAIR
Campaign for Fairer Gambling

Appendix P

About Landman Economics

Landman Economics is an economic research consultancy which specialises in econometric modelling work and policy analysis. Director Howard Reed has almost two decades of research experience in economic analysis, in particular microsimulation modelling and use of large-scale UK datasets such as the Family Resources Survey, Labour Force Survey and Expenditure and Food Survey.

2008. Howard's jobs prior to founding Landman Economics in 2008 included:

- Chief Economist at the Institute for Public Policy Research, one of the UK's leading "think tank" research institutions (2004-08);
- Programme Director at the highly-regarded Institute for Fiscal Studies, with special responsibility for the IFS's TAXBEN tax-benefit microsimulation model (1995-2004).

Landman Economics's recent projects have involved a wide range of clients from the public, private and voluntary sectors. Examples of projects undertaken in the last two years include:

- A research project for Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) modelling the public finance impacts and the wider economic costs and benefits of increases in tobacco taxation, taking into account a range of factors including the costs of smoking to the NHS and the impact of reductions in smoking prevalence on income tax and National Insurance receipts due to a healthier workforce living longer working lives.
- Research for the Welsh Government in collaboration with the economic modelling consultancy Virtual Worlds, building a dynamic forecasting model for social care expenditure which uses a sample of data from the Welsh segment of the British Household Panel Survey and simulates the care needs of an ageing population over the next 25 years. The model can be used to model the distributional effects and costs of alternative systems of social care funding in Wales.
- A research report called *In The Eye Of the Storm: Britain's Forgotten Families* produced for the NSPCC, Action for Children and Children's Society. The report measures the number of families with children who are most vulnerable to adverse economic conditions, using a number of different definitions of 'vulnerability', and estimates how these families will be affected over the period up to 2015 by the changes to tax and benefits, cuts to public services and the on-going effects of the post-2008 economic downturn.
- A research report for the TUC, *Where Have All the Wages Gone*? which examines the reasons for the decline in wages as a share of UK Gross

Domestic Product between 1980 and 2011, the explanations for this shift, and the potential consequences for attempts to restart economic growth in the wake of the severe recession of 2008-09.

- A research project in collaboration with nef consulting (the consultancy arm of the New Economics Foundation) using a range of innovative techniques to measure the total economic, social and environmental contribution which The Crown Estate makes to the UK economy. The research is due to be launched as The Crown Estate report *Our Contribution* in May 2013.
- The design and maintenance of a tax-benefit microsimulation model which is now used by several organisations including the Institute for Public Policy Research, the Resolution Foundation, and the Child Poverty Action Group to assess the effects of changes to the UK tax, benefit and tax credit system on the distribution of household incomes and the amount of revenue raised by the Exchequer net of transfer payments. Recently a new phase of research funded by the Nuffield Foundation has added a wealth module to the model meaning that it can be used to assess the distributional impact of changes to elements of the tax system such as Inheritance Tax and Stamp Duty (for the first time in any UK model as far as is known).
- A collaborative research project with the Newcastle-based consultancy TBR Economics for Creative Skillset (the Sector Skills Council for industries such as TV, film and video games) which involved building a forecasting model for skills needs in these industries over the next decade.

More information on Landman Economics' recent work and current activities is available at www.landman-economics.co.uk