

TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITORING COMMISSION

Presented to Parliament pursuant to the Northern Ireland (Monitoring
Commission etc.) Act 2003

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 4 November 2010

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Presented to the Government of the United Kingdom and the
Government of Ireland under Articles 4 and 7 of the International
Agreement establishing the Independent Monitoring Commission

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HC 565

London: The Stationery Office

£14.75

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This publication is also available on <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/>

ISBN: 9780102969306

Printed in the UK by The Stationery Office Limited
on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office

ID P002398770 11/10

Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum.

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1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 We present this report on the continuing activities of paramilitary groups under Articles 4 and 7 of the International Agreement establishing the Independent Monitoring Commission¹.
- 1.2 In accordance with the terms of the International Agreement this report comes six months after our previous full report on paramilitary activity of May 2010². Since then we have presented an ad hoc report on the murder of Bobby Moffett in Belfast in May 2010³. This report focuses mainly on the six month period 1 March to 31 August 2010.
- 1.3 Two things have continued to be central to all our work:
- First is the objective of the Commission set out in Article 3 of the International Agreement;

The objective of the Commission is to carry out [its functions] with a view to promoting the transition to a peaceful society and stable and inclusive devolved Government in Northern Ireland.

- Second are the principles about the rule of law and democratic government which we published in March 2004 and which we set out in Annex II.

- 1.4 We repeat three points we have made before about the nature of our work:

¹ The text of Articles 4 and 7 is in Annex I.

² IMC Twenty-Third Report, May 2010.

³ IMC Twenty-Fourth Report, September 2010.

- We have explained how we approach our task⁴. We believe that our methods are fair and thorough; we take great care in our assessments; and we have always tried to learn from the experience gained in each report and from what people have said to us about them. We welcome frank comment, as much on this report as on its predecessors;
- The report addresses the situation in Northern Ireland as a whole, and we appreciate that the situation varies very considerably from place to place. We recognise that we cannot capture in detail the experience of every locality, and that people may therefore find the picture we paint does not tally with what they encounter in their area;
- The views we express in our reports are ours alone. We are independent and expect to be judged by what we say. We do not make statements of official policy. It is for the two Governments and, so far as is appropriate, given the devolution of policing and justice, the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive, to decide how to respond to our reports.

1.5 In our Eighteenth and Twentieth Reports we referred to the implications for the continuation of the IMC of the peace process drawing to a close and more normal arrangements for security and the administration of justice taking over, since when we have had the devolution of policing and justice⁵.

⁴ IMC Fifth Report, May 2005, paragraphs 1.9-1.13.

⁵ IMC Eighteenth Report, May 2008, paragraph 6.6; IMC Twentieth Report, November 2008, paragraph 5.2.

2. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES

2.1 We set out below our assessment of the current activities and state of preparedness of paramilitary groups. We focus on the six months from 1 March to 31 August 2010. The assessment extends those we have given in previous such reports, to which the reader can refer for a comprehensive account of our views over the six and a half years since we started reporting in April 2004⁶. Our First Report gave an account of the origins of the groups and their structures at that time and in Annex III of our Twenty-First Report we surveyed the changes in dissident activity over the six years from the Spring of 2003 to the Spring of 2009.

A. REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY GROUPS

Dissident Republicans Generally

2.2 In our Twenty-Third Report we said that dissidents had remained highly active and dangerous, being responsible for the only paramilitary murder committed in the period under review and for numerous other violent incidents in which people might have died. In particular, the activities of the two factions of Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) were “dangerously lethal”. We also noted that despite their severity these events were different both operationally and contextually from the earlier Provisional IRA (PIRA) campaign.

2.3 Our examination below of the activities of the various dissident groups shows that they continued to pose a substantial and potentially lethal threat, particularly against members of the security forces, and so far as Great Britain is concerned

⁶ We have produced two kinds of reports under Article 4. Of the 19 hitherto, 15 have covered the activities of all the groups. These were our First (April 2004), Third (November 2004), Fifth (May 2005), Seventh (October 2005), Eighth (February 2006), Tenth (April 2006), Twelfth (October 2006), Thirteenth (January 2007), Fifteenth (April 2007), Seventeenth (November 2007), Eighteenth (May 2008), Twentieth (November 2008), Twenty-First (May 2009), Twenty-Second (November 2009) and Twenty-Third (May 2010). The four other reports under Article 4 were ad hoc ones. The first two of these were produced at our own initiative: our Fourth (February 2005) which dealt with the Northern Bank robbery and our Sixth (September 2005) which dealt with the UVF/LVF feud. The third ad hoc report was at the request of the British and Irish Governments: our Nineteenth (September 2008) which dealt with the issue of the leadership of PIRA. The fourth was at our initiative: our Twenty-Fourth (September 2010) which dealt with the murder of Bobby Moffett in Belfast in May 2010.

the Government raised the threat level from moderate to substantial⁷. Dissident activities were a very serious matter by virtue of their range, their frequency and their nature. Dissidents were violent and on numerous occasions attacked members of the security forces in ways which could have led to the loss of life or to very serious injury. Over the past two and a half years dissidents steadily increased the number of improvised explosive devices they deployed and the proportion of these which detonated. During the period under review the number deployed was roughly double that of the previous six months and the number detonated went up nearly fourfold. The material found by An Garda Síochána (AGS) since the end of this period is a cause for further concern. Dissidents were also ruthless in attacking members of their own communities whom they suspected of involvement in drug dealing or other anti-social behaviour. And as in the past, members were heavily involved in a wide range of serious crime.

- 2.4 Of the groups, the two factions of RIRA, especially Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH), were by far the most active and dangerous⁸. It is however essential to keep things in perspective. It remains our view, as we said in our report six months ago, that in terms of weapons, money, personnel and support the present dissident campaign in no way matches the range and tempo of the PIRA campaign of the Troubles.
- 2.5 The high level of dissident activity would undoubtedly have led to many more deaths, injuries and destruction had it not been for the operations of the law enforcement and security agencies North and South and their ever closer cross-border co-operation. In the North and South combined, some three times the number of dissidents have been charged with terrorist offences, including membership, from January to October 2010 as in the whole of 2009, and the number of arrests nearly doubled.
- 2.6 As we have commented before, an important factor for terrorists of any affiliation is the quality rather than just the number of their active adherents. And as we have said in previous reports, former republican terrorists have in some instances, as

⁷ Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, October 2010, paragraph 4.A.2.p.

⁸ See paragraph 2.23 below.

individuals, provided assistance to dissidents. Dissidents can also of course learn from their mistakes, as we believe they have sometimes been able to do.

2.7 The number and range of the attacks show the extent of targeting by the various dissident groups. Those targeted included not only members of the PSNI and their families, as well as the British Army. It extended also to those associated with the security forces such as a Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) civilian security guard (by RIRA), the Army barracks within which the British Security Service premises are located (by RIRA), the transport infrastructure (we cannot presently attribute the attack on the railway to a particular group), and the sports centre in which a count was being held for the UK General Election in May 2010 (by RIRA). Others targeted were people whom dissidents suspected were involved in anti-social behaviour; for example, in April a journalist in Belfast was given a list of ten names and addresses, at all of which hoax devices were subsequently found. Behind targeting of this kind lies extensive intelligence gathering.

2.8 As in earlier reports, we have found that it has not always been possible to ascribe some dissident activities to a particular group. In some cases, as emerges below, we think the dissidents responsible were not affiliated to any particular group. We note the following:

- In late April a driver was forced to take a package to Lurgan PSNI station. He managed to dump it on the way. The following day an unexploded pipe bomb was found near the gate of the same station;
- A viable pipe bomb found on the railway between Lurgan and Portadown in early May;
- A pipe bomb explosion outside the home of the father of a PSNI officer from the nationalist community in May which caused damage to the house but no injury. In this case we believe that unaffiliated dissidents were responsible;

- The shooting of an eighteen year old male in the leg in a park in Newry in late May;
- On the same day in early June pipe bomb attacks in Strabane and Derry, one against a house and the other against a vehicle;
- A viable pipe bomb near PSNI officers attending disorders in the Ardoyne area of Belfast in July. A police vehicle drove over the device which failed to explode;
- Also in July, an unsuccessful attempt to hijack a vehicle in Lurgan during which shots were fired;
- In early August, shots fired by dissidents targeting people allegedly involved in anti-social behaviour in Derry;
- Shots fired at PSNI officers dealing with disorders in Lurgan in the middle of August. There were no injuries;
- In the middle of August a vehicle belonging to a member of Newry District Policing Partnership was petrol bombed and a hoax explosive device placed near the route of the Apprentice Boys' parade in Derry.

In May the PSNI discovered £100,000 in a house in Lurgan which we believe was meant for dissident use.

2.9 More generally, dissidents were associated with disorders in a number of places over the six months under review. It is not always possible to ascribe precise responsibility, especially because these incidents tend to attract others. But we do believe that dissidents were involved in planning and carrying out, and so were in part responsible for, disorders on 1 July 2010 in Craigavon in which at least six vehicles were hijacked and burnt and a hoax device was placed on the railway. They were similarly engaged in the disorders which occurred in a number of places over 11–13 July. During these disorders numerous vehicles were hijacked and

there were gun, explosive and other attacks on PSNI officers, fifty-six of whom were injured. The disorders were the most serious for five years, and we draw attention again, as we have before, to the clear dissident intent to undermine normal community policing.

2.10 In our Twenty-Second Report we referred for the first time to Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD), a fringe dissident organisation in Derry⁹. We reported on them again six months later¹⁰. The stated aim of the organisation is to “clean up” (their term) nationalist areas, especially from the effects of drugs. In the six months under review here RAAD has been considerably more active than before, though the range of its activities has been relatively limited and it operates mainly in the Derry and Strabane areas. In this period:

- In March 2010 RAAD members committed an armed robbery in Derry, netting a considerable sum of money;
- In separate attacks in April in Derry and Strabane masked members of RAAD shot two men in the legs. On the same day as the second of these incidents a pipe bomb was thrown through the window of a car and another partially exploded pipe bomb was found at a house, both in Derry. Over the following two days pipe bombs for which we believe RAAD was responsible exploded at properties in Derry and Limavady;
- In May RAAD attacked a man in his home in Strabane where he had moved from Derry after being threatened by RAAD. Both his arms were broken and he was shot in the elbow. We believe it likely that RAAD members were responsible for a pipe bomb which damaged a vehicle on the same day in Strabane. And four days later another RAAD pipe bomb exploded outside a home in Strabane;
- In June RAAD was responsible for a pipe bomb thrown at a home in Derry;

⁹ IMC Twenty-Second Report, November 2009, paragraph 2.11.

¹⁰ IMC Twenty-Third Report, May 2010, paragraph 2.8.

- In July in Strabane RAAD shot a taxi driver in both thighs. In the same month the PSNI arrested suspected members in possession of equipment capable of being used for criminal purposes.

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

- 2.11 In our Twenty-Third Report we said that CIRA had not been as active or as violent as RIRA though it had been responsible for a large number of incidents. It had undertaken a range of activities designed to enhance the organisation's terrorist capability, had engaged in major crimes, had instigated public disorder, and had used violence and intimidation against people allegedly involved in anti-social activity. We concluded that it remained a major threat.
- 2.12 There have been continuing power struggles within CIRA during the period under review. Nevertheless it remained very active, and although it did not operate at the same heightened pitch as RIRA it threatened and might have taken lives on a number of occasions.
- 2.13 We believe that CIRA was responsible for the following nine attacks on members of the security forces:
- Planting a vehicle-borne explosive device outside Crossmaglen PSNI station in early April 2010. Only thirty minutes warning was given, using a previously unknown code-word, and the device was viable although it did not function;
 - In the middle of April another vehicle-borne device was discovered outside Newtownhamilton PSNI station following a warning. Like the earlier incident, the device did not function but was viable;
 - In early May a pipe bomb exploded near Lurgan PSNI station, causing little damage to the premises but some to nearby offices;

- In the middle of May there were two related explosive devices in Lurgan. The first, claimed by CIRA, was eventually found to be a hoax. Disorders arose after the police went to investigate during which a pipe bomb was thrown, causing minor injuries to six police officers. Other officers were attacked with petrol bombs. We believe that CIRA was responsible for the pipe bomb;
- On 11 July during serious disorders in Belfast a police officer was seriously injured in the arm and chest by shotgun pellets for which we believe a CIRA associate was responsible. Two days later, also during disorders in Belfast, police officers came under fire. Again, we believe a CIRA associate was responsible;
- A week later in July the exploded remains of a pipe bomb were found in the grounds of Woodbourne PSNI station in Belfast. In August another pipe bomb was found at the same PSNI station; it did not explode though it was viable;
- Also in August, following a vaguely framed warning, a suspect explosive device was found at a school in Lurgan; it was later found to be a hoax. An hour later a device exploded near the school. There had been no warning of this and three children, including a two year old, suffered shock as a result. The device went off where a cordon had been set up while the school device was being dealt with, as had cordons on previous occasions. We judge this to have been a CIRA attack on the police.

These attacks demonstrate the extensive targeting undertaken by CIRA.

2.14 In parallel with these attacks, in the six months under review CIRA continued to seek to enhance the capability of the organisation by:

- Training members in a variety of skills, including the construction of explosive devices;

- Recruiting new members, mostly young males with no previous terrorist experience;
- Seeking to acquire weapons.

In March in Armagh and in August in Dundalk the PSNI and AGS respectively arrested a total of seven people in possession of material of use in terrorist attacks. All have been charged with terrorist offences and subsequent searches led to the discovery of further such material. The PSNI arrested three members in Belfast in May while they were attempting to hijack a vehicle.

2.15 CIRA members were also responsible for three of the thirteen republican shootings referred to in paragraph 3.5 below. One incident in June involved shooting a man in the chest as he tried to run away from masked members of CIRA who had tried to stop him in the street in Belfast. In another incident in Belfast in July a man was abducted and shot in both knees.

2.16 Members of CIRA continued to be involved in a wide range of serious crime, including extortion, robbery, “tiger kidnapping”, smuggling (mainly of tobacco) and fuel laundering. Amongst the incidents were a “tiger kidnapping” in Belfast in May which led to the robbery of £10,000 and an armed robbery in June in Belfast, after which the PSNI made two arrests and firearms were discovered.

2.17 We conclude that during the six months under review CIRA remained a very major threat. It undertook a number of attacks on the police which could have resulted in death or serious injury and it continued to try to enhance the capability of the organisation. Its members were involved in violent and a wide range of other crime.

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)

2.18 In our Twenty-Third Report we said that the decommissioning of weapons in December 2009 and February 2010 had been a major step forward for INLA, providing as it did evidence that it was giving effect to its October 2009

announcement that the “armed struggle” was over. We noted however that members continued to be involved in serious crime.

2.19 The position is essentially unchanged. We have no evidence that INLA is engaged in terrorist-type activity. In that respect therefore it appears to be living up to the statement it made in October 2009 that it had ended what it termed the “armed struggle”. But its members continued to be involved in a range of crime, some of it serious. As we said six months ago, it is our responsibility to monitor and report on any illegal activity by a paramilitary organisation and its members and we continue to watch developments closely¹¹.

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)

2.20 We said in our Twenty-Third Report that PIRA had maintained its political course and that we believed it would continue to do so.

2.21 This remains our view. In addition to having nothing to report by way of illegal paramilitary activity on the part of the organisation, we note the efforts of senior figures in the republican movement to try to control the disorders which took place in North Belfast during the Twelfth of July parades this year, and to mobilise their supporters to oppose future disorders. They also acted to avoid a return to the use of violence against perceived anti-social behaviour despite some community pressure.

Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

2.22 We said in our Twenty-Third Report that RIRA had been responsible for a ruthless and intensive campaign of violence directed mainly against the PSNI and that it constituted much the most serious threat during the six months under review. It had committed and publicly claimed the one paramilitary murder of that period, had undertaken sixteen attacks on PSNI officers, premises and associates and had sought to enhance its operational capability. It had undertaken shootings and

¹¹ IMC Twenty-Third Report, May 2010, paragraph 2.19.

assaults and was heavily engaged in serious crime. We concluded that it remained an extremely serious threat.

2.23 There are two distinct factions in RIRA, each with its own structure and “army council”. One of the factions continued to use the name Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH)¹². Together the two were responsible for a very major campaign of violence directed particularly against members of the security forces. It was the most serious paramilitary threat over the six months under review.

2.24 We believe that the two RIRA factions were responsible for eighteen attacks on members of the security forces or those associated with them. The number of attacks and their range show how extensive was the targeting of security force members and premises and of other premises associated with the British Government. The incidents were:

- In March 2010 officers were shot at when attending what turned out to be a hoax explosive device on the railway in South Armagh. None were injured;
- In April, minutes after the devolution of policing and justice powers, a device in a hijacked taxi exploded outside Holywood Barracks, County Down. One member of the public received minor injuries;
- Later in April a vehicle-borne device exploded outside Newtownhamilton PSNI station (where CIRA had placed a device just over a week before)¹³. Two members of the public were injured;
- Late on 6 May (the night of the UK General Election), following warnings, a viable explosive device was found in a hijacked taxi at a sports centre in Derry being used for the count. Some days later a second device was found in the centre;

¹² As we pointed out in previous reports, there has sometimes been confusion over the term “ONH”. In addition to its use by one of the RIRA factions mentioned here, it has also been used by a dissident grouping in the Strabane area.

¹³ See paragraph 2.13 above.

- At the end of May an improvised mortar exploded outside Strand Road PSNI station in Derry; there were no injuries;
- Three attacks were launched in June. The first was a 125kg home-made explosive device outside Aughnacloy PSNI station which did not go off. The next day a small pipe bomb was found behind Craigavon PSNI station; it had failed to detonate. A few days later a command wire explosive device was found in South Armagh. Although a claim was purportedly made by CIRA we believe that RIRA was responsible;
- In early July approximately thirty shots were fired from a variety of weapons at Crossmaglen PSNI station. There were no injuries;
- A week later shots were fired at AGS officers in North Louth as they tried to stop a vehicle which then crossed into Northern Ireland;
- On the following day a command wire device exploded in a culvert under a road near Newtownhamilton. Nobody was injured. We believe the device had been intended for a passing police vehicle;
- During disorders in Derry on the night of 12-13 July a masked man fired five handgun shots at a PSNI Land Rover. There were no casualties;
- In early August a device in a hijacked taxi exploded outside Strand Road PSNI station in Derry. There was substantial damage to private property but there were no injuries. Because the device exploded shortly after a warning had been given it may have been intended to catch police officers clearing the area;
- The following day a viable explosive device was found in the road having apparently been attached to the car of an Army officer. It did not explode. Within the following week there were two other attacks on vehicles. One was on the car of a PSNI officer in Kilkeel which failed to explode. The

other was on the car of a former officer now employed as a civilian guard at Cookstown PSNI station, which partially exploded.

In March the 32 County Sovereignty Movement – the political front of one of the RIRA factions - distributed leaflets in Derry urging local businesses not to serve police officers.

2.25 The two RIRA factions, like CIRA, sought over the six months to continue to enhance their capability. To this end they:

- Trained members in a variety of skills, including the construction of explosive devices;
- Recruited new members, mostly young males with no previous terrorist experience;
- Sought to acquire weapons and continued to use methods and devices that had been proven over time.

During March in two separate operations the PSNI arrested a total of nine people in possession of material of use to terrorists. In May near Dundalk officers of AGS arrested two men who also had terrorist material in their possession.

2.26 We believe that the two factions of RIRA were responsible for at least five shootings during the six months under review. The majority of the victims were people perceived to be involved in drug dealing or other anti-social behaviour. Among the incidents were three in the second week of June 2010 in Belfast in which two men in their twenties were shot in the legs and one in the chest. In March in Belfast the PSNI arrested six people suspected of being on their way to make an attack and in July, also in Belfast, officers arrested five others in similar circumstance. In three other incidents, one in April and two in May, in Coalisland, Derry and Dungannon respectively, members directed pipe bombs against alleged drug dealers; all three devices exploded.

2.27 Members continued to be involved in a wide range of serious crime, including extortion, robbery, “tiger kidnapping”, smuggling (mainly of tobacco) and fuel laundering. Amongst the incidents was one in March when a member of the public was attacked so that his vehicle could be stolen; it was later used for a hoax device in the South. Also in March hoax devices caused widespread disruption in Belfast, Derry and Ballymena. An armed robbery occurred in Dublin in June after which AGS arrested two RIRA associates.

2.28 We conclude that during the six months under review the two factions of RIRA remained a very dangerous and potentially lethal terrorist threat. We are convinced that they would have taken the lives of members of the security forces if they had been able to do so in several of the attacks referred to above. They continued to try to enhance the capability of the organisations so as to equip themselves for similar action in the future. Members were involved in a wide range of violent and other crime. The threat from both factions of RIRA, in particular ONH, remains extremely serious.

B. LOYALIST PARAMILITARY GROUPS

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

2.29 In our Twenty-Third Report we said, as we had said repeatedly in previous reports, that the LVF was a small organisation without any political purpose, that people historically linked to it were heavily involved in serious crime, and that the proceeds of these crimes were for personal rather than organisational use.

2.30 This remains our view.

Ulster Defence Association (UDA)

2.31 In our Twenty-Third Report we said that the UDA’s decommissioning of weapons represented a very major step forward and had been a determined and important break with the past. It had been significant that the leadership had been able to act in this way. We also noted that some members of the organisation remained

involved in various crimes, including assault. We found the picture within the UDA was complex, with local brigade loyalties overlaid by differences between those promoting change and others. We concluded that, while this did not detract from the importance of what had been achieved, the leadership needed to continue to address these internal tensions.

2.32 This complex and mixed picture of the UDA and its activities has continued during the six months under review. To a large extent it reflects the nature of the organisation and the tensions to which this gives rise between pursuit of a central strategy and local autonomy.

2.33 As regards terrorist-type activity, we are aware of no grounds which indicate that the UDA as an organisation was involved in sectarian attacks or inter-communal disorders during the six months under review. We have information to suggest that the organisation has recruited some young people. We are aware of attempts to justify this on the basis that it would be better to draw such people in than to leave them outside the organisation, where they might be attracted to other loyalist affiliations. However, any recruitment to the UDA is inconsistent with an organisation which is going out of business as a paramilitary group. Notwithstanding the importance of the UDA's decommissioning, we cannot rule out that some weapons were retained in parts of the organisation¹⁴. We also believe that some elements tried to obtain other weapons.

2.34 Some members of the UDA continue to be involved in a variety of other illegal activity, some of it serious. Members have assaulted people suspected of being involved in drug dealing and other anti-social activity. Many of the victims of these attacks would have been targeted in advance. Although the leadership in some areas continued to urge members to refrain, with the result that such incidents were not widespread across the organisation as a whole, we believe that on other occasions senior figures were likely to have been aware of what was happening. We also believe that during the six months members in some areas intimidated

¹⁴ See the report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, 25 February 2010. We commented on UDA decommissioning in our previous report: see IMC Twenty-Third Report, May 2010, paragraphs 2.36-2.37.

people allegedly involved in drug dealing or anti-social behaviour, in certain instances to the point where they were forced to leave the area in which they lived or Northern Ireland as a whole. As regards other forms of crime, across the organisation as a whole the overall level of reported incidents has fallen. We believe this reflects the considerable efforts of some leadership figures to discourage illegal activity on the part of members. Nevertheless, as in the past, some members were involved in serious crime.

2.35 As the preceding account indicates, there remain tensions within the organisation. We remain of the view that the leadership as a whole does not want the organisation to return to its old ways and has urged restraint in response to dissident republican activity. We also believe that the central leadership shares the perception of the UDA playing a continuing role in community affairs and development – in other words, that it does not go out of business entirely. But the tension between local autonomy and central control remains a potent factor. This makes it difficult for the organisation as a whole coherently to pursue a single policy or to present a clear message of change to the public, and where it does move as one it is often with an eye to maintaining local distinctions. One result of this was the patchy way in which change was implemented. For example, we are confident that some senior figures continued to steer their areas away from paramilitary activity and crime, and that some members were expelled from the organisation as a consequence. This is encouraging. On the other hand, in some other areas these efforts were less clearly directed and the picture is less positive.

2.36 Overall, we believe that the UDA will continue on the path along which it has been moving. But we believe that progress will remain patchy and we do not see any end to the tensions between centralism and localism which are inherent in both its history and its structure.

UDA – South East Antrim Group

2.37 In our Twenty-Third Report we referred to the decommissioning of weapons by the South East Antrim group of the UDA and said that there were no other significant matters to report, though members remained engaged in a range of serious

crimes. There were some tensions within the group between those promoting change and others, which the leadership needed to address.

2.38 It remains our view that the South East Antrim group of the UDA and the mainstream UDA act as separate organisations. We are not aware that any tensions there might be between the two led to criminal incidents.

2.39 Despite the group's decommissioning, we cannot rule out that some weapons were retained. As with the mainstream UDA, we believe this is likely to have been as an insurance policy rather than because of any clear or present intention to use them.

2.40 We believe that members of the group may have been responsible for attacks in Antrim in March and August 2010 on a member of the nationalist community. We also believe that members may have targeted people allegedly responsible for drug dealing and other crime, and that some such people were attacked. Some members, including some senior figures who were themselves involved in drug dealing and intimidation, have also been behind violence, including violence against police officers.

2.41 It is clear from this that the leadership of the South East Antrim group has major issues to address.

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC)

2.42 In our Twenty-Third Report we said that nothing had occurred during the six months under review to cause us to reconsider our earlier opinion that the UVF leadership was committed to winding the organisation down. We noted that the leadership had addressed some challenges, arising for example from concern by members about the level of dissident activity, and were confident that it would continue to do so. We concluded that the organisation remained committed to its strategy and that the leadership would continue to steer it away from paramilitary activity.

2.43 The murder of Bobby Moffett in May 2010 was the most significant event in respect of the UVF during the six months under review and we presented an ad hoc report on it¹⁵. We said that we believed the murder had been committed by members of the UVF acting as such, that these people had had sanction at central leadership level, and that senior leadership in the UVF could have prevented the murder had it determined to do so. We also commented that this called into question whether the UVF was turning into a civilian organisation, and that it remained to be seen whether the leadership was slipping back from or would press ahead with the full implementation of the May 2007 strategy.

2.44 The UVF remains a proscribed organisation and membership of it is a criminal offence in addition to any other crimes that members may commit. The PSNI is properly required to pursue those who may be guilty of such offences. As an element in the peace process the further organisational sanction of specification was created. Its affects are largely on prisoners¹⁶. We have looked further at the question of the re-specification of the UVF, which is a matter for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The implementation of the legislation on the specification is problematic. The legislation predates the establishment of the IMC and contains complex legal stipulations, amongst them the judgement of when criminal activity, including gangster-type killings, become terrorism. The UVF has clearly been involved in serious criminal activity and the issue of its re-specification must be kept under close and legally informed consideration.

2.45 During the period under review we believe that there has been some gathering of intelligence about people believed to be dissident republicans and that this has been with the sanction of the leadership. Some members have discussed the acquisition of weapons, though this is without sanction and not part of any plan.

2.46 We believe that the UVF was responsible for a number of paramilitary-style attacks on people, some for the purposes of maintaining its control in the areas in which it

¹⁵ IMC Twenty-Fourth Report, September 2010.

¹⁶ Specification relates to the arrangements for the early release of prisoners which were brought into force following the Belfast Agreement of 1998. The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act of that year made prisoners eligible for early release so long as a number of conditions were met. Key among these were that the person was not a member of a specified organisation and, if released, was not likely to become a supporter of one.

is traditionally strong. Although we have no evidence that any of these attacks were sectarian we do believe that members of the organisation were responsible for the targeting of foreign nationals in South Belfast with hoax devices. Members were also involved in disorders in West Belfast in early July 2010. The leadership continues to take steps to reduce the involvement of UVF members in crime, especially in drug dealing. Nevertheless, some remain involved in a range of offences, including drugs, robbery, the sale of counterfeit goods, intimidation and extortion. We believe that the proceeds from these crimes are generally for personal rather than organisational use.

2.47 Notwithstanding the progress made in the past three years, the organisation's role in the murder of Bobby Moffett calls into question the claim in the May 2007 statement that the UVF would become a civilian organisation. We do not doubt the wish of the leadership to pursue the 2007 strategy though there are some within the organisation who are evidently not ready to accept the restraints on their behaviour which this means. There is certainly evidence of good intentions, for example in the discouragement by the leadership of criminal activity by members. But the murder of Bobby Moffett raised fundamental concerns and the situation has not improved in the months since the murder.

2.48 The onus is now on the leadership. It needs to take positive steps to demonstrate that it is fully committed to the strategy, that this includes becoming a civilian organisation (which means among other things standing down paramilitary structures and abandoning paramilitary methods), and that it is resolutely pressing ahead with its full implementation.

So-Called "Dissident Loyalists"

2.49 In our Twenty-Third Report we noted that a few disaffected loyalists had gathered in loose affiliations, mainly in response to dissident republican activity, and that there had been some incidents and attempted attacks. We concluded that these affiliations did not amount to paramilitary groups and that they had not attracted significant support.

2.50 In the six months under review there were five pipe bomb attacks, four in Antrim and one in Bellaghy, County Derry. All the devices were viable and all took place during the week 8 to 15 August 2010. The incidents appear to have been sectarian in nature and to have been associated with the parades season. We believe they were mainly to cause disruption and attract media attention. We do not change our previous conclusion that these loyalists have neither significant capability nor cohesion, that they remain loose affiliations and that they have not attracted significant community support.

3. PARAMILITARY GROUPS: THE INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE

3.1 Article 4 requires us to monitor trends. In this Section we set out information on the six months 1 March to 31 August 2010 set against similar information for earlier six month periods.

3.2 We repeat something we have said in previous reports: we know that any statistical examination of the incidence of paramilitary violence has unavoidable limitations. These tables of statistics include only those acts of violence which come to the notice of the police, and, as we know well from other sources of information, not all incidents are so reported. It is not possible to quantify intimidation short of actual violence, which may also not be reported and which can have just as traumatic an impact. And nothing we say about the statistics can adequately convey the dreadful experiences of the victims and their families.

3.3 Over the period from 1 March 2003 to 31 August 2010 we believe that the number of *paramilitary murders* was as follows¹⁷.

	1 Mar- 31 Aug 10	1 Sept 09- 28 Feb 10	1 Mar- 31 Aug 09	1 Sept 08- 28 Feb 09	1 Mar- 31 Aug 08	1 Sept 07- 29 Feb 08	1 Mar- 31 Aug 07	1 Sept 06- 28 Feb 07	1 Mar- 31 Aug 06	1 Sept 05- 28 Feb 06	1 Mar- 31 Aug 05	1 Sep 04- 28 Feb 05	1 Mar- 31 Aug 04	1 Sept 03- 29 Feb 04	1 Mar- 31 Aug 03
CIRA			1				2								
INLA					1		1								
LVF															1
ONH						1									
PIRA															
RIRA		1	2												1
UDA										2	1	1		1	1
UVF	1										4		2	1	
Not attributable													1		2
TOTAL	1	1	3	0	1	1	3	0	0	2	5	1	3	2	5

3.4 There was one paramilitary murder, as in the previous six month period. In our Twenty-Fourth Report we attributed it to the UVF¹⁸.

¹⁷ We are aware of other killings over the past few years and recently which, according to press reports, have been claimed by RIRA. We are not currently in a position to attribute them to any organisation.

¹⁸ IMC Twenty-Fourth Report, September 2010.

The following paramilitary murder took place in the period 1 March to 31 August 2010:

Bobby Moffett, 28 May 2010

3.5 The number of *casualties of paramilitary shootings and assaults* from 1 March 2003 to 31 August 2010 was as follows:

Shooting Casualties

Responsible Group	1 Mar-31 Aug 10	1 Sept 09-28 Feb 10	1 Mar-31 Aug 09	1 Sept 08-28 Feb 09	1 Mar-31 Aug 08	1 Sept 07-29 Feb 08	1 Mar-31 Aug 07	1 Sept 06-28 Feb 07	1 Mar-31 Aug 06	1 Sept 05-28 Feb 06	1 Mar-31 Aug 05	1 Sept 04-28 Feb 05	1 Mar-31 Aug 04	1 Sept 03-29 Feb 04	1 Mar-31 Aug 03
Loyalist	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	2	14	36	36	37	39	69	34
Republican	13	29	21	7	10	6	0	8	4	2	4	7	11	19	35
TOTAL	13	30	21	9	11	7	1	10	18	38	40	44	50	88	69

Assault Casualties


Responsible Group	1 Mar-31 Aug 10	1 Sept 09-28 Feb 10	1 Mar-31 Aug 09	1 Sept 08-28 Feb 09	1 Mar-31 Aug 08	1 Sept 07-29 Feb 08	1 Mar-31 Aug 07	1 Sept 06-28 Feb 07	1 Mar-31 Aug 06	1 Sept 05-28 Feb 06	1 Mar-31 Aug 05	1 Sept 04-28 Feb 05	1 Mar-31 Aug 04	1 Sept 03-29 Feb 04	1 Mar-31 Aug 03
Loyalist	22	28	38	17	10	26	13	14	19	20	39	29	42	57	46
Republican	1	7	5	8	6	6	3	5	9	6	16	25	18	26	24
TOTAL	23	35	43	25	16	32	16	19	28	26	55	54	60	83	70

3.6 The number of casualties of shootings declined very considerably. This was the result of a reduction in the number of republican incidents, which had been at a very high level in the two previous six month periods. For the second time we report no casualties of loyalist shootings.

3.7 In contrast, the total of assault casualties is again made up almost entirely of victims of loyalist attacks, though they, like the number of victims of republican attacks, declined. Overall, there were about a third fewer casualties from assaults compared with the previous six month period.


3.8 The following graphs include the monthly figures we have previously published, updated and extended by six months to 31 August 2010.

PARAMILITARY-STYLE SHOOTINGS: NUMBER OF REPORTED CASUALTIES BETWEEN JANUARY 2003 AND AUGUST 2010



TOTALS OVER THE PERIOD: LOYALIST SHOOTING CASUALTIES - 295 REPUBLICAN SHOOTING CASUALTIES - 187

**PARAMILITARY-STYLE ASSAULTS : NUMBER OF REPORTED CASUALTIES BETWEEN
JANUARY 2003 AND AUGUST 2010**



TOTALS OVER THE PERIOD: LOYALIST PARAMILITARY ASSAULTS - 433 REPUBLICAN PARAMILITARY ASSAULTS - 169

Geographical Variations in Paramilitary Violence

3.9 In our five previous autumn reports on paramilitary activity we commented on the very considerable variation in the geographical distribution of the incidents of paramilitary violence and included maps which illustrated it¹⁹. We think that it would be helpful to continue this analysis by looking at the position over the 12 months 1 September 2009 to 31 August 2010.

3.10 The maps of Northern Ireland as a whole are produced on the same basis as those in our previous reports and so are directly comparable. The first 3 show:

- The distribution of casualties arising from shootings and assaults combined *by all paramilitary groups*;
- The distribution of casualties arising from *loyalist* shootings and assaults combined;
- The distribution of casualties arising from *republican* shootings and assaults combined.

3.11 The fourth map shows the total number of casualties from shootings and assaults by *both loyalist and republican paramilitary groups* in Belfast.

3.12 The numbers in these maps relate to the local government districts. Annex III gives a key to these districts and contains a technical note.


3.13 In broad terms these maps show that:

- The total number of casualties of loyalist and republican attacks combined over the twelve months under review was very slightly higher than in the same period in 2008-09, 101 as against 97;

¹⁹ IMC Seventh Report, October 2005, paragraphs 4.7-4.11; IMC Twelfth Report, October 2006, paragraphs 3.14-3.18; IMC Seventeenth Report, November 2007, paragraphs 3.9-3.13; IMC Twentieth Report, November 2008, paragraphs 3.9-3.13 and IMC Twenty-Second Report, November 2009, paragraphs 3.9-3.13.


- There were 10 districts with no casualties (as compared with 9 over the same period in 2008-09); 12 districts with between 1 and 5 casualties (as compared with 11); 1 district with between 6 and 9 (as compared with 5); 2 districts with between 10 and 20 (as compared with 0); and 1 district - Belfast - with 21 or more (the same);
- The casualties of loyalist attacks (51 in total in the twelve months under review as compared with 57 in 2008-09) were concentrated in Belfast and North Down. In 2008-09 the area of concentration spread slightly more widely around Belfast;
- The geographical distribution of the casualties of republican attacks (50 in total as compared with 40) is also slightly different from the previous year, though as then the concentration is in Belfast and Derry;
- Within Belfast the total number of casualties from attacks by both loyalists and republicans remained much the same - 37 against 36. The number of wards with no casualties fell from 32 to 30. As in previous analyses, the pattern has again somewhat changed. The highest numbers of casualties were in four areas – Ballymacarrett, Beechmount, Glen Road and Glencolin (in each case, 3 to 4).

Casualties as a result of paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland by Local Government District: September 2009-August 2010[†]



Total number of attacks in Northern Ireland = 101


Casualties as a result of paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland where attribution is perceived as Loyalist: September 2009-August 2010[†]



Total number of Loyalist attacks = 51


[†] The numbers on the maps refer to Local Government Districts or Wards (see the key in Annex III) – and not to acts of violence

Casualties as a result of paramilitary attacks in Northern Ireland where attribution is perceived as Republican: September 2009-August 2010[†]



Total number of Republican attacks = 50

Casualties as result of paramilitary attacks in the Belfast Local Government District by Ward: September 2009-August 2010[†]



Total number of attacks in Belfast = 36

[†] The numbers on the maps refer to Local Government Districts or Wards (see the key in Annex III) – and not to acts of violence

Conclusions

3.14 Bearing in mind what we say in Section 2 above about the extent of dissident republican activity we think it is important to draw out one general point about the figures on casualties we describe here²⁰. The number of casualties from shootings and assaults in the six months under review was considerably lower than in the recent past, and although not the lowest ones we have reported they show a much reduced level of personal injury as compared with our earlier reports. Broadly speaking, this represents a reduction in the amount of violence inflicted on people for perceived anti-social behaviour and leading to injury. At a time when attention is rightly directed to the dissident threat this trend should also be borne in mind²¹.

3.15 Our conclusions for the six months 1 March to 31 August 2010 are:

- **There was 1 paramilitary murder in the period under review;**
- **The number of casualties of republican shootings (all the result of dissident attacks) fell considerably. The number of casualties of loyalist assaults also fell;**
- **The number of casualties from both shootings and assaults decreased from 65 to 36, a decrease of 29, or 45%, compared with the previous six month period. Compared with the same six month period in 2009 it decreased from 64 to 36, a decrease of 28, or 44%;**
- **The combined figure of shooting and assault casualties from loyalist attacks – 22 – was 7 lower than in the previous six month period. This represents a decrease of 24%. Compared with the same period in 2009 there was a decrease of 16, or 42%. In the latest period the total was made up of 0 shooting casualties (1 in the preceding six months) and 22 assault casualties (28 in the preceding six months);**

²⁰ See paragraphs 2.2–2.17 and 2.22–2.28 above.

²¹ With the recent exception of Bobby Moffett, killed by the UVF, all the previous paramilitary murders since March 2006 had been committed by dissidents.

- **The combined figure of shooting and assault casualties from republican attacks – 14 – was 22 lower than in the previous six month period. This represents a decrease of 61%. Compared with the same period in 2009 there was a decrease of 12, or 46%. In the latest period the total was made up of 13 shooting casualties (29 in the preceding six months) and 1 assault casualty (7 in the preceding six months);**
- **Averaged out for all paramilitary groups, there was rather more than one casualty every week;**
- **Dissident republicans were responsible for all the 13 shooting casualties and loyalists for most of the assault casualties (96%);**
- **PIRA were not responsible for any of these incidents²²;**
- **The changes may be summarised as follows:**

Loyalist Groups

- **Shooting casualties were down from 1 to 0 compared with the preceding six month period and the same compared with the same period in 2009;**
- **Assault casualties were down by 21% from 28 to 22 compared with the preceding six month period and down by 42% from 38 to 22 compared with the same period in 2009;**

Republican Groups

- **Shooting casualties were down by 55% from 29 to 13 compared with the preceding six month period and down by 38% from 21 to 13 compared with the same period in 2009.**

²² We have noted in all our reports of this type since our Eighth in February 2006 that PIRA as an organisation had not been responsible for any of the casualties of paramilitary shootings or assaults.

- Assault casualties were down by 86% from 7 to 1 compared with the preceding six month period and down by 80% from 5 to 1 compared with the same period in 2009.

Geographical Variations

- The analysis shows, as it has in previous years, that the geographical distribution of casualties is subject to considerable variation though the areas of greatest concentration are broadly the same.

4. LEADERSHIP

- 4.1 Article 4 of the International Agreement requires us to assess whether the leadership of paramilitary groups is directing illegal activities or seeking to prevent them.
- 4.2 We continue to apply here the standards we think should be observed by people in positions of leadership in political parties and in groups associated with paramilitary groups which we originally set out five and a half years ago in the Spring of 2005²³. They are that those in leadership should articulate their opposition to all forms of illegality, should exert their influence against members of paramilitary groups who have not given up crime, and should give clear support to the criminal justice system.

Sinn Féin and PIRA

- 4.3 We repeated in our Twenty-Third Report what we had consistently said in successive reports since October 2006, namely that the leadership of the republican movement remained committed to following the exclusively political path and would not be diverted from it²⁴.
- 4.4 This remains our firm view.

The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the UVF

- 4.5 In our Twenty-Third Report we said that we were confident of the commitment of the leadership of the UVF to the pursuit of its May 2007 strategy. We saw evidence of its rising to the challenges it faced in doing so, though events in the six months then under review showed that these challenges would not quickly disappear.

²³ IMC Fifth Report, May 2005, paragraphs 1.15-1.17 and 8.9-8.10.

²⁴ See IMC Twelfth Report, October 2006, paragraph 4.4-4.5; IMC Thirteenth Report, January 2007, paragraphs 4.5-4.6; IMC Fifteenth Report, April 2007, paragraph 4.5; IMC Seventeenth Report, November 2007, paragraph 4.4; IMC Eighteenth Report, May 2008, paragraph 5.5; IMC Nineteenth Report, September 2008, paragraphs 2.6-2.14; IMC Twentieth Report, November 2008, paragraph 4.4; IMC Twenty-First Report, May 2009, paragraph 4.4; IMC Twenty-Second Report, November 2009, paragraph 4.4; and IMC Twenty-Third Report, May 2010, paragraph 4.4.

- 4.6 In our Twenty-Fourth Report we noted the question mark which the murder of Bobby Moffett raised about whether or not the leadership of the UVF would press ahead with the full implementation of the May 2007 strategy and about whether it was becoming a civilian organisation as that statement said it would. So far as the PUP was concerned, we noted the strong condemnation of the murder by members of the party and the senior resignations which there had been in protest. We said we would look carefully at how the party addressed the implications of the murder at the conference it had called.
- 4.7 As we make clear above, the question mark over whether or not the UVF is becoming a civilian organisation as the May 2007 statement committed it to do remains in place²⁵. The onus is now on the leadership of the UVF to demonstrate that it is willing and able to implement the strategy with vigour. It cannot avoid the challenge.
- 4.8 A significant element of the PUP leadership have left the party since the murder of Bobby Moffett, including its only Assembly representative. We note the decision of the PUP at its meeting on 29 September 2010 and its conference of 16 October to maintain its links with the UVF. In making this decision those who remain in the party assumed a very heavy responsibility which we hope they will prove able to fulfil. In our view the party needs now to take full account of what we said in our Twenty-Fourth Report and to exert the greatest possible influence for change on the UVF. This does not just mean ensuring that nothing comparable to the murder happens again. More fundamentally, it means holding the UVF to all the commitments to change it made in the May 2007 statement, and above all to becoming a civilian rather than a paramilitary organisation. We are aware of the comments of the new party leader, Brian Ervine, immediately after his election to the post in October 2010 that the UVF plans to civilianise itself. This further reiteration of the core point of the strategy announced three and a half years ago is welcome. But whether it is delivered is now more open to question than before.

The Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG) and the UDA

- 4.9 In our Twenty-Third Report we noted that the progress made by both the mainstream UDA and the South East Antrim group to decommission weapons

²⁵ See paragraphs 2.47–2.48 above.

reflected very well on the respective leaderships. We referred however to some continuing tensions in the two factions and to the existence of issues which both leaderships had to face.

4.10 The past six months do not lead us fundamentally to change this view. As we describe above, the mainstream UDA has still adequately to address its internal tensions²⁶. Until it does so, and until it develops, articulates and implements its way forward as a single organisation, it will be deservedly open to the criticism that reality does not match its declared aspirations. As for the South East Antrim group, it too has issues to address. It has progressed but the leadership is not showing itself able to take some of the further steps necessary if it is to demonstrate at all convincingly that it has put its past behind it.

²⁶ See paragraphs 2.35–2.36 above.

ANNEX I

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UK AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND – ARTICLES 4 AND 7

Article 4

In relation to the remaining threat from paramilitary groups, the Commission shall:

(a) monitor any continuing activity by paramilitary groups including:

- i. attacks on the security forces, murders, sectarian attacks, involvement in riots, and other criminal offences;
- ii. training, targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms or weapons and other preparations for terrorist campaigns;
- iii. punishment beatings and attacks and exiling;

(b) assess:

- i. whether the leaderships of such organisations are directing such incidents or seeking to prevent them; and
- ii. trends in security incidents.

(c) report its findings in respect of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article to the two Governments at six-monthly intervals; and, at the joint request of the two Governments, or if the Commission sees fit to do so, produce further reports on paramilitary activity on an ad hoc basis.

Article 7

When reporting under Articles 4 and 6 of this Agreement, the Commission, or in the case of Article 6(2), the relevant members thereof shall recommend any remedial action considered necessary. The Commission may also recommend what measures, if any, it considers might appropriately be taken by the Northern Ireland Assembly, such measures being limited to those which the Northern Ireland Assembly has power to take under relevant United Kingdom legislation.

ANNEX II

THE IMC'S GUIDING PRINCIPLES

These guiding principles were set out in the statement the IMC issued on 9 March 2004.

- The rule of law is fundamental in a democratic society.
- We understand that there are some strongly held views about certain aspects of the legal framework, for example the special provisions applying to terrorism, and that those holding these views will continue to seek changes. But obedience to the law is incumbent on every citizen.
- The law can be legitimately enforced only by duly appointed and accountable law enforcement officers or institutions. Any other forcible imposition of standards is unlawful and undemocratic.
- Violence and the threat of violence can have no part in democratic politics. A society in which they play some role in political or governmental affairs cannot – in the words of Article 3 – be considered either peaceful or stable.
- Political parties in a democratic and peaceful society, and all those working in them, must not in any way benefit from, or be associated with, illegal activity of any kind, whether involving violence or the threat of it, or crime of any kind, or the proceeds of crime. It is incumbent on all those engaged in democratic politics to ensure that their activities are untainted in any of these ways.
- It is not acceptable for any political party, and in particular for the leadership, to express commitment to democratic politics and the rule of law if they do not live up to those statements and do all in their power to ensure that those they are in a position to influence do the same.

ANNEX III

MAPS SHOWING THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PARAMILITARY VIOLENCE IN SECTION 3: TECHNICAL NOTE AND KEY TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT DISTRICTS

The maps following paragraph 3.13 showing the geographical distribution of paramilitary violence over the 12 months from 1 September 2009 to 31 August 2010, are based on local government District areas for Northern Ireland as a whole and on wards for Belfast. The maps below give a key by which individual areas can be identified.

Technical Note

Maps of this kind can be produced only if a valid postcode is associated with the incident. All of the 101 paramilitary attacks (which include both shootings and assaults) during the period 1 September 2009 to 31 August 2010, had a valid postcode (as verified against the 2010 Central Postcode Directory), for the location of the attack and are therefore included in this analysis. The maps use 1993 Local Government District and Ward boundaries.

The attribution of a paramilitary-style attack to either a Loyalist or Republican category is based on information available to investigating officers at the time of the attack.

Figures for the current year are provisional and may be subject to minor amendment.

Tables 1 and 2 of the Annex include a community background breakdown of the population of each Northern Ireland Local Government District and for the Belfast wards. Community background is based on a person's current religious group, if any, or the religious group in which they were brought up for people who do not regard themselves as belonging to any religion. The proportions are based on data from the 2001 Census, which took place on 29 April 2001 and have been rounded to the nearest whole number. The category 'Protestant' includes those respondents who gave their religion as Protestant or other Christian/Christian related. The category 'Catholic' includes those who gave their religion as Catholic or Roman Catholic.

Outline map of Northern Ireland by Local Government District



Table 1

<i>Local Government District</i>	<i>Map reference number</i>	<i>Population by Community Background (%) Protestant/Catholic</i>	<i>Local Government District</i>	<i>Map reference number</i>	<i>Population by Community Background (%) Protestant/Catholic</i>
Antrim	1	57/39	Down	14	35/62
Ards	2	83/13	Dungannon	15	38/61
Armagh	3	50/49	Fermanagh	16	40/59
Ballymena	4	76/21	Larne	17	72/25
Ballymoney	5	66/32	Limavady	18	42/57
Banbridge	6	66/31	Lisburn	19	63/33
Belfast	7	49/47	Magherafelt	20	35/64
Carrickfergus	8	85/9	Moyle	21	38/60
Castlereagh	9	77/18	Newry and Mourne	22	18/81
Coleraine	10	69/27	Newtownabbey	23	76/19
Cookstown	11	41/58	North Down	24	80/13
Craigavon	12	53/45	Omagh	25	30/69
Derry	13	23/75	Strabane	26	33/66

Outline map of Belfast Local Government District by Ward




Table 2

<i>Ward</i>	<i>Map reference number</i>	<i>Population by Community Background (%) Protestant/Catholic</i>	<i>Ward</i>	<i>Map reference number</i>	<i>Population by Community Background (%) Protestant/Catholic</i>
Andersonstown	1	1 / 99	Glencolin	27	1 / 98
Ardoyne	2	3 / 96	Highfield	28	94 / 4
Ballyhackamore	3	80 / 12	Island	29	90 / 5
Ballymacarrett	4	47 / 51	Knock	30	90 / 5
Ballynafeigh	5	33 / 59	Ladybrook	31	12 / 87
Ballysillan	6	91 / 4	Legoniel	32	59 / 38
Beechmount	7	4 / 92	Malone	33	38 / 56
Bellevue	8	35 / 61	Musgrave	34	37 / 60
Belmont	9	90 / 4	New Lodge	35	2 / 97
Blackstaff	10	91 / 4	Orangefield	36	91 / 3
Bloomfield	11	88 / 5	Ravenhill	37	67 / 26
Botanic	12	23 / 67	Rosetta	38	37 / 58
Castleview	13	64 / 31	Shaftesbury	39	58 / 37
Cavehill	14	45 / 51	Shankill	40	94 / 3
Cherryvalley	15	85 / 9	Stormont	41	85 / 9
Chichester Park	16	20 / 75	Stranmillis	42	44 / 48
Cliftonville	17	29 / 68	Sydenham	43	90 / 4
Clonard	18	3 / 96	The Mount	44	90 / 4
Crumlin	19	94 / 4	Upp. Malone	45	69 / 25
Duncairn	20	90 / 6	Upp. Springfield	46	3 / 97
Falls	21	3 / 97	Waterworks	47	7 / 91
Falls Park	22	2 / 98	Whiterock	48	1 / 99
Finaghy	23	50 / 45	Windsor	49	47 / 43
Fortwilliam	24	64 / 33	Woodstock	50	87 / 6
Glen Road	25	2 / 97	Woodvale	51	95 / 3
Glencairn	26	85 / 12			



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