EU Diplomats

Dr Lee Rotherham

Foreword by Sir Antony Acland KG, GCMG, GCVO
Contents

Foreword by Sir Antony Acland 4

Executive Summary 5

1. The Nature of EU Diplomacy 6
   1.1 An Historical Perspective 6
   1.2 Current Role 9
   1.3 Future Developments 13

2. The Cost of EU Diplomacy 16
   2.1 Budgets 16
   2.2 Assets 20
   2.3 Pay, Perks and Privileges 21

3. Cause and Effect 23
   3.1 Selling Integration 23
   3.2 Funding Local Support 23

   4.1 Representing Federalism in the Federal Capital 25
   4.2 In Your Name 26
   4.3 Other Levers of Integration 29

5. Conclusion 31
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**Sir Antony Acland,** the author of the foreword, enjoyed a long and highly distinguished career in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Posts included Private Secretary to Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, 1972-75; Ambassador to Luxembourg, 1975-77; Ambassador to Spain, 1977-79; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1980-82, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, FCO, and Head of Diplomatic Service, 1982-86; and, pertinent to this paper, Ambassador to Washington, 1986-91. His honours and awards include: KG, GCMG 1986, and GCVO 1991.
Foreword

Twenty years ago, when I was serving as British Ambassador in Washington, the diplomacy of the European Communities’ member states was run as a solidly intergovernmental affair. Embassies carried out the function they were intended to do; operating as the voice of their national capitals, cooperating where it was appropriate, and acting independently where it was in the national interest. The representative of the EC fitted into the equation in a relatively straightforward fashion. He very capably carried out his main duty of explaining to businessmen and politicians what the Single Market was about, and how it was an opportunity for international trade rather than an excuse for protectionism.

Times have moved on. More and more competences have shifted away from national capitals and towards Brussels, through the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, and by their reinterpretation by the European Court of Justice. In this context, the EU Constitution in the form of the Treaty of Lisbon simply takes the process one step further.

It is a shift recognised by the institutions in Brussels. Their ambition for an ever-greater role for the European External Action Service as the servant of an ever-closer union will not be assuaged by pretending to ignore the reality.

This short paper comes at a timely moment, at a period when the Treaty of Lisbon remains unratified and many of its consequences properly unexplored, not least the financial ones. Members of the public will surprised at just how active the EU’s own diplomatic corps already is today. Dr Rotherham’s careful and detailed research correspondingly deserves the widest attention. The issues which need to be addressed are: Is there not enormous and unnecessary overstaffing? Is there not a risk of great overlap of diplomatic effort leading to misunderstanding? What is the returned value for the massive expenditure and added cost to the taxpayer?

Sir Antony Acland KG, GCMG, GCVO
Executive Summary

Brussels has developed an identity on the world stage in its own right. The EU now has a budget of **€3.9 billion (£3.4 billion) a year** to be spent on its international affairs programme, called the External Relations programme.

This is distinct from its international development budget. It spends another **€28 million (£25 million)** (excluding actual civil service wages) on having a Common Foreign and Security Policy supremo.

EU embassies already exist in name; their property portfolio outside of the EU comes to **€63 million (£55 million)** (see section 2.2).

Staff enjoy considerable remuneration. Already-generous wages can include additional weighting, up to 45% above those paid to their colleagues back in Brussels. This would work out pre-tax as up to **€278,000 (£244,000)** annually, even if we calculate in practice your average EU ambassador in Africa is perhaps only on **€190,000 (£167,000)** modified basic salary.

This excludes perks such as adoption grants, expat allowances, entertainment allowances and own-car grants if they don’t get a chauffeur (see section 2.3).

These high wages come as the EU’s diplomats are increasingly playing a lead role in international organisations and negotiations, stepping in on behalf of the delegates from member states. The EU Constitution merely takes developments yet another step further (see section 1).

As a net contributor to the budget, this means that the UK taxpayer is increasingly paying for someone else to run our foreign policy. Yet there would be national outrage if it emerged that British taxes were funding American diplomats (see section 4).

These developments are taking place despite repeated bland assurances by Government ministers and our own chief diplomats that such an evolution is not happening, and that the EU is not developing diplomatic pretensions to go along with its aspirations. The facts tell a different story, one that those in the know hope will be hidden by the long game.
1. The Nature of EU Diplomacy

1.1 An Historical Perspective

The EU has steadily been evolving as a diplomatic power in its own right. To demonstrate this, we need to look at the broad sweep of the development of an EU diplomatic corps over time; where it came from, how few of them there originally were, how little they did, and how these details compare with trends today.¹

**1954** European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) information office opens in Washington. It is manned entirely by US nationals until 1958.

**1956** ECSC opens a liaison office for Latin America, in Santiago de Chile. First full diplomatic mission in London also opens (the UK at this stage not being a member).

**1964** New semiautonomous non-profit agency established. The European Agency for Cooperation (EAC) is funded under a Commission grant, to recruit and manage, under renewable contracts, the heads of mission and staff to man the Commission offices in the associated countries. In this era of De Gaulle, these personnel are thus engaged as contract staff, and generally do not enjoy diplomatic status.

Many of these staff are in fact former colonial administrators from Member States, or development professionals from the private sector.

21 offices are run, essentially as offshoots of DG VIII rather than the whole Commission.

**1971** European Court of Justice (*AETR Judgement*) rules that external activity by member states is limited by internal competences, and cannot outside of the EEC run counter to directives already made for within the EEC. The Commission’s international role will thus automatically expand with legislation and harmonisation.

**1972** Washington legation becomes full embassy as legislation recognizing full diplomatic status passes Congress.

**1973** By this year, some 320 people are serving in these offices; 120 Europeans (mainly civil engineers and agronomists) and 200 local staff.

¹ Greatly facilitated by data contained in *Taking Europe to the World: 50 years of the European Commission’s External Service*, European Commission, 2004
1975 Lomé Convention. Development aid spurs representation. The number of missions in these countries (now upgraded to full delegations of the Commission) doubles to 41 in three years; diplomatic immunity for lead staff first given.\(^2\)

1977 European Commission sits in on G7 meetings.

1980 By this year, there are 50 delegations around the world, with over 1,000 personnel working in them. This is around the same figure as the Belgian Foreign Office.

1981 Commission opens a delegation in Australia, principally to deal with nuclear fuel and in order to defend the Common Agricultural Policy.

1982 Report to the Council on the external competences of the Community. This contains the acknowledgement that: “The Commission has a nucleus of a foreign service. Its external delegations are doing work directly comparable to Member State embassies.”

1988 Reform: absorption of staff into the Commission mainstream. Number of officials serving in delegations rises overnight from 165 to 440. The local staff number 1,440. There are 89 missions, on all continents except Antarctica.

1990 By this year, the majority of posts are considered full diplomatic missions by their host countries, and many heads of delegation (as the former ‘delegates’ were now referred to) are being accredited at Head of State level, with credentials signed by the President of the Commission, carrying the rank and courtesy title of ambassador.

1991 The European Communities becomes the 161st Member of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the oldest of the UN's specialised agencies. This is the first time that the future EU will enjoy a status comparable to a Member Nation in a UN body.

EC Membership also crucially introduces the concept of the "alternative exercise of membership rights" between the EC and the Member States, which applies not only to voting rights but also to speaking rights. This means that the Commission speaks, negotiates and votes on issues of Communities competence, while the presidency speaks, negotiates and votes on issues of Member State competence.

1993 The Treaty of Maastricht specifically refers to the External Service for the first time (raising the question as to its earlier legal basis). Under the new Common Foreign and Security Policy, delegations now have a more proactive political role.

\(^2\) Recruitment remains haphazard. Anecdotally, one senior figure recalls basing selection on performance in a staff football match.
1998 Amsterdam Treaty creates the new post of High Representative. This effectively generates a second parallel EU foreign service, representing Council and Commission combined, as opposed to just working for the Commissioner for External Relations.

1999 Javier Solana appointed High Representative. The position quickly accues extra responsibilities, as existing posts are combined with his (for instance key roles at the WEU and European Defence Agency).

Appointment of Special Envoys begins apace. There is a small but growing number of officials detached from Member States’ foreign services being placed in delegations, with obvious risks of these ‘going native’.

Meanwhile, under the policy of ‘deconcentration’, responsibility for implementation of assistance programmes is devolved to local offices. €6.5 billion from the EU budget is administered in this way by the European Commission.

2002 The High Representative becomes one of the partners in the Quadripartite Commission for the Middle East (current envoy: Tony Blair).

2003 Delegation network is by now accredited to over 150 countries. Manned by more than 5 000 staff, it is one of the largest European diplomatic services in its own right. Embassies are often housed in more than one building, with 50–100 staff working within them.

Within Europe, Commission embassies are openly involved in supporting Yes campaigns for accession countries, in other words intervening on the pro-integration side in internal democratic debates.\(^3\)

2005 “It is plain from the DG External Relations website that the outcome of the referendums in 2005 in the Netherlands and France does not seem to have given the Commission pause for thought” (retrospective from House of Commons EU Select Committee, 27\(^{th}\) Report).\(^4\)

EU staff serving abroad has gone up by a third since 2000.

2006 Full accreditation to the Vatican (and in the following year full accreditation to the Order of the Knights of Malta) demonstrates the extent of diplomatic representation.

Delegation in Iraq.

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\(^3\) Estonia is cited by the Commission as a case study of where the Commission embassy “contributed towards stimulating the debate over pros and cons of EU accession.” In reality, this was achieved by the Commission battle bus driving around the country distributing pro-accession material, while being pursued by Mr Arne Otter: a hefty Estonian Eurosceptic in a clapped-out Volvo protesting at the bias.

\(^4\) http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmeuleg/41-xxvii/4112.htm

2008 Measures for a delegation in Uzbekistan and permanent representation at the Council of Europe, as well as the upgrading of offices in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Yemen, Nepal, Togo, Djibouti and Liberia.

1.2 Current Role

The official mandate of these embassies is as follows:

- Presenting, explaining and implementing EU policy;
- Analysing and reporting on the policies and developments of the countries to which they are accredited;
- Conducting negotiations in accordance with a given mandate

In practice, this involves:

- Managing EU grants;
- Taking over from British and other diplomats in an increasing number EU policy areas ceded by treaties and agreements;
- Selling tendentious EU policies to foreign governments and their publics (PR role on issues);
- Creating a network of foreign supporters for an EU federal state overseas (propaganda role on long term objectives)

To achieve this, the twin branches of the EU’s foreign service now enjoy an astonishing level of representation in the diplomatic community, for a broad array of issues. As our guidebook from the Commission earlier referenced explains, the change has been quite a dynamic one, becoming a mandate of:

"...promoting the Community’s interests as embodied in the common policies, notably the common trade policy, but also many others, including the development, agricultural, fisheries, environmental, transport and health and safety policies. It also means involvement in areas such as justice and home affairs, in which the European Community does not have exclusive powers."

Trade of course is the cornerstone. The Commission has correspondingly enjoyed the privilege of attendance at the meetings of its trade counterparts from other regional groupings around the world. This extends to other regional groupings such as the
African Union. Beyond this, there is the World Trade Organisation. All 27 EU member states are individually members of the WTO, but the EU negotiates and acts within the WTO as a single body.

But Communities’ interests do not stop with sending a trade commissioner or others to world meetings in billion dollar negotiations. There is notably the growing Communities presence at the United Nations.

In Rome, delegates attend the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and are especially active in the World Food Programme (WFP). The EC is the second largest donor to WFP after the US and enjoys a privileged position of permanent observer in WFP Executive Board. On a case by case basis, staff also attend the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

The delegation in Kenya is meanwhile also responsible for EC relations with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT).

External Delegations of the Commission have also obviously been established in New York. The EU is collectively very active during the annual session of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), presenting or sponsoring each year several human rights resolutions. The EU, including the European Commission, participates actively in the session of the Working Group on the Right to Development of the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), such as at the annual Executive Committee meeting, at Standing Committee sessions, at Global Consultations on asylum policy and at other gatherings between UNHCR and major donors.

Other New York UN bodies in which the Communities jointly or the Commission singly have been active are extraordinarily numerous. These include:

- **UNCTAD** – UN Conference on Trade and Development. Though only an Observer, the European Commission is the single biggest contributor to UNCTAD’s Trust Fund for technical assistance.

- **ILO** – International Labour Organisation. A cooperation agreement concluded during Jacques Delors’ European Commission Presidency was followed in May 2001 by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Several ILO projects enjoy EC co-financing.

- **WHO** – World Health Organization. The EC and the WHO concluded an exchange of letters in 2001 to strengthen and increase cooperation, dialogue and coordination. On the **Convention on Tobacco Control**, for the first time, negotiations have been taking place on a legally binding instrument transferring negotiating powers to the European Commission on behalf of the EU. This has major implications on other EC policies, such as agriculture, taxation, development, and smuggling.
• **WIPO** – World Intellectual Property Organization. In December 2000 the Communities took part in the negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances at WIPO.

• **Other groups** also see a developing role, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

**UNEP**, the Regional Office for Europe, meanwhile hosts the secretariat of several important Multilateral Environment Agreements (MAE) such as CITES (trade in endangered species), Basel (hazardous waste) and Rotterdam (chemicals); it is also active on policy analysis of trade and environment. There is also what is described as “close contact” with **UPU** – the Universal Postal Union (a UN Specialized Agency dealing with international postal relations) located in Bern; **IBE** – the International Bureau of Education (an information centre for UNESCO Member States); **UNAIDS** – a UN inter agency program on HIV/AIDS; and **GIHD**, the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining.⁵

Then there are the international organisations that are not part of the UN structure. For instance, in Vienna, the Delegation also follows discussions and exchanges information with locally-sited international organisations. Work includes liaison with:

- **The Wassenaar Arrangement** on the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The European Commission is involved through EC Regulation 1334/2000, setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use goods and technologies.

- **The Nuclear Suppliers Group** (NSG) cooperates on non-proliferation. The European Commission participates as an observer.

- **The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation** (CTBTO) declares an occasional interest.

Again, there is the permanent Delegation of the European Commission to the international organisations in Paris. Paris hosts certain UN offices. Notably, since 1964, the European Commission has held observer status with UNESCO. But there are other bodies as well.

The European Commission operates a Permanent Delegation to the OECD. While the EC does not contribute to the budget nor vote on legal acts when they are put to the Council, the representative may, however, be elected as a member of the bureau of subsidiary bodies, and participates fully in the preparation of texts, including legal acts, with an unrestricted right to make proposals and suggest changes.

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⁵ The details on many of these delegations are to be found on their respective Commission websites
Then there is OPEC. In addition to on-going working-level contacts, the European Commission participates in the annual Ministerial-level meetings between OPEC and the EU Troika.

In essence, what this demonstrates is that the EU has come a long way in terms of its diplomatic service. It has a status today in its own right as a collective entity at many international organizations, albeit short of full membership. That would, after all, mean that national seats would have to be surrendered – though in effect, on a case-by-case basis, that is precisely what is already happening today. Furthermore, across the world, the service has over 100 delegations (not counting the ‘internal’ delegations the Commission has in EU Member State capitals). One MEP with South American links recounts how this translates on the ground:  

“I recently visited the commission’s mission to Lima - hardly, you might think, a critical posting. Yet it had a staff of 50, more than any of the 25 national delegations. In part, this reflects the shift in power between the national capitals and Brussels. European embassies in a city like Lima used to be chiefly concerned with trade, aid and visas. The first two of these are now under EU jurisdiction; and although the granting of visas is still up to national consulates, Brussels increasingly decides who qualifies. When I asked the Euro-diplomats what was left for their national counterparts to do, they grinned conspiratorially and muttered something about promoting tourism.”

But this effectively only relates to the expansion of the Commission’s interests. There is also the development of the office of the High Representative – the voice of the Council in concert.

This can best be witnessed in the growth of the Special Envoys system. The EU presently has eleven Special Representatives (EUSRs) in different regions of the world. These exist to support the work of Javier Solana as EU High Representative in the regions concerned. Their mission is to “play an important role in the development of a stronger and more effective EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and in the EU’s efforts to become a more active, more coherent and more capable actor on the world stage. They provide the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a ‘voice’ and ‘face’ for the EU and its policies.”

The eleven EUSRs currently cover Afghanistan, the African Great Lakes Region, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav

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Republic of Macedonia, the Middle East, Moldova, the South Caucasus and the Sudan. Some EUSRs are resident in their country or region of activity while others commute.

These are potentially very broad brush, with positions that can over time act as a sponge. Others, more narrowly defined, can be powerful in a different way. Paddy Ashdown’s Balkan role famously saw him described as a latter-day pasha, with some critics saying he had the role of an EU provincial governor.

On top of these positions, there is also an EU Special Envoy for Burma, and the High Representative’s Personal Representatives – on non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Human Rights in the area of CFSP, Parliamentary Affairs in the area of CFSP, for Energy and Foreign Policy, and a Special Adviser for African peacekeeping capabilities. In February, a Personal Representative for Belgrade was added to the list.

1.3 Future Developments

Some might argue that these assets are simply complementing the ability of national governments to do their own job, and that it is money well spent. However, the millions spent seem less beneficial when one looks at where the process is actually going, especially through the impetus of the EU Constitution/Treaty of Lisbon.

One aspect of this is rationalization. There is a move to join the High Representative Office and Commission foreign delegations, thus creating a seamless single structure and a single EU Foreign Service (called the External Action Service).\(^7\) This makes sense, until you realize that the reason why they were separated under the existing treaties was part of a compromise in order not to give Brussels that much power. The centre of gravity shifts away from the Council of Ministers. In other words, the EU’s foreign office will not be at the service of the nation states, but will supplant them.

Take the example of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation. Both the EC and the individual EU Member States participate in all meetings of FAO’s main Governing Bodies, all the FAO Technical Committees (Agriculture, Commodity Problems, Fisheries, Forestry and World Food Security). Detailed arrangements have long been in place determining who leads in which competences. Currently, the European Commission is not allowed to hold offices or to be members of the three restricted FAO Governing Bodies of the FAO.

But with the expansion of the EU since 2004, the EU now represents 27 out of the 43 states of the European regional group. In this situation, the logical next step is to

\(^7\) Measures have already been taken to establish the EEAS despite the fact that there is no legal basis for it (thanks to three failed referenda). If nothing else, this provides an insight into the momentum involved.
formally adopt one single voice, and the Commission is already formally acquiring just that very authority in UN institutions.

A key device particularly likely to be exploited is the concept of the joint action in areas of common concern. Already, this allows for governments to name a theme or a country as an issue, after which point policy is decided by Qualified Majority and the High Representative implements it.

The British Government downplays its significance. Yet to June 2007, on 141 occasions EU Common Positions were agreed or amended covering aspects of policy towards Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Belarus, Burma, Burundi, Cuba, North Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the component parts of Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Transnistria, Nigeria, Indonesia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.

A key set of clauses underlines this under the Lisbon Treaty. Article 19 of Title V repeats some material already in the treaties, but also expands on it:

*Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union's positions in such forums. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall organise this coordination.*

*In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the Union's positions.*

2. [...] Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed. Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union's position.

A question quite naturally arises. Under the Constitution, the EU will also gain for the first time its own distinct legal personality. How will that affect its diplomatic standing? For instance, how will it affect its status in the UN’s Economic Commission for Europe? Would it seek to expand upon the Western European Union defence role and request a
chair for the High Commissioner within NATO? What happens when a group decision has been made on a given subject, and the High Commissioner points out that as soon as the subject is under discussion at a Commonwealth meeting, Britain, Malta and Cyprus should offer up their seat and keep quiet? The issue is one of legal confusion and diplomatic opportunity for the integrationists, as with so much of the Treaty of Lisbon. The response of British ministers has displayed both galling indifference and ignorance of the small print.

We assess that the EU Constitution will guarantee an ever-increasing role for the Corps of Brussels diplomats, as EU staff take over seats previously occupied by representatives from the national foreign office or other civil servants. Thus, the dual seat system evolves into a single seat. The delegate representing the British national interest (be it on economic policy, what little is already left to Whitehall of international trade, farming, consumer safety or whatever) is replaced by someone whose loyalty is not to the British government, voter, and taxpayer.

Or we can put it another way. Of the 1970s, one Euro-diplomat says, “We were expected to be models of discretion and self-effacement particularly vis-à-vis our own Member States’ representatives”. But a current senior EU diplomat openly notes, “What, after all, makes foreign policy so special that it can only be carried out by a national State or through intergovernmental cooperation, which invariably bends and snaps under stress whenever more specific national interests emerge?” The ambition is evident.

On the cards to assist in this is a diplomatic training college, just like there is presently a European Police Training college. Reports have already emerged of an ongoing programme (actually illegal under the existing treaties) preparing for the next generation of EU diplomats that has been taking place at nine universities and diplomatic academies. Seventeen member states are also reported to have quietly taken on diplomatic training of Commission personnel alongside their own national diplomats, while another 23 diplomats have been involved in long exchange programmes designed to “create a sense of common European purpose.” This programme accompanies the establishment of courses for national diplomats designed to generate a sense of European identity amongst our own national representatives. Around 530 EU diplomats are reported to have received extra training in preparation for a greatly increased role once the Lisbon Treaty is ratified.8

So we have intent, motive, and capability. The shift of diplomatic power to Brussels will continue apace.

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8 These details emerged in *European Voice* as recently as 19 March 2009
2. The Cost of EU Diplomacy

Diplomacy for many people is an abstract. It does not visibly impinge upon their pocket or raid their wallet, until that is of course that the price of fulfilling an international obligation filters through in terms of taxes. After all, an agreement to cut carbon emissions, or change energy supplies, or raise tariffs on imported foods, may sound distant, but the net cost to a country can be measured in billions and it filters through in tax bills and in consumer prices.

Such an abstract task as costing international agreements made by the EU in our name is very difficult to measure, not least as it is impossible to tell from the sidelines what tweaks or opt-outs a British minister might have made to the end agreement. In other TaxPayers’ Alliance research we have, for instance, attempted to cost the Common Agricultural Policy; this one area of international trade alone costs the UK £10 billion a year.9

Instead, in this paper we focus on the more immediate and practical costs: that of having three foreign offices working for you – one headquartered in Whitehall, and another two in Brussels.10

2.1 Budgets

First, there are the costs associated with running the office of the High Representative.11 There is a difficulty here – the budget conflates diplomatic activities with those he undertakes with his military hat on, since there is a considerable degree of crossover. As a result, the following budget list include some spending by the military committee. On the other hand, it also excludes other costs, such as the rent paid on meeting rooms, a warehouse and parking spaces in New York and Geneva for the European Council for its CFSP meetings. It also excludes pay for European Council civil servants detailed to this role, whose numbers and pay grades are not distinguished from the salary total for the European Council of €325 million.

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9 Rotherham, L. 'Food for thought: How the Common Agricultural Policy costs families nearly £400 a year,' TaxPayers’ Alliance, March 2009
10 Working for the High Representative, and the Commission’s External Services
11 Sourced from the published EU Budget
Costs for the European Council side of the equation include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost, €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allowances of the national experts seconded in connection with the ESDP/CFSP</td>
<td>2,518,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building rent</td>
<td>4,480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitting out work on buildings</td>
<td>330,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work to make premises secure</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning and maintenance of buildings</td>
<td>880,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water, gas, heating and electricity</td>
<td>430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caretaking and security</td>
<td>1,860,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditure, eg bins</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and software</td>
<td>7,996,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT consultants</td>
<td>5,397,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment maintenance</td>
<td>763,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecomms</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel expenses</td>
<td>862,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting expenses</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and public events</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms and accessories</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total including other lines</strong></td>
<td><strong>28,424,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This makes a known total annual cost of €28,424,000 to run Javier Solana’s office (excluding European Council staff costs).

To this we have to add the costs that accompany the Directorate General of the Commission dealing with External Services:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost, €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff employed by External Relations</td>
<td>148,812,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External staff and management expenditure</td>
<td>54,024,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of appropriations for 2008. This covers rent, annual lease payments and acquisition of immovable property. ¹²</td>
<td>70,631,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment, furniture, services</td>
<td>6,450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Expenditure budget: Outsourcing, IT and similar support, administrative management, studies and publications, consultants</td>
<td>111,284,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹² Building costs have noticeably jumped €12 million on the previous year, presumably in preparation for an increased role after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.
Total evident Chapter 19 01 costs come to €391,201,000.

These are the basic admin costs. Then there are the costs of administering policy. The following programmes are directly budgeted as falling under Title 19 expenditure for External Relations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost, €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02 Relations with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
<td>179,320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Monitors</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD non-proliferation disarmament</td>
<td>11,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution, in the future possibly to include counter terrorism missions</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unforeseen measures</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory studies</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Special Representatives</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU police deployment</td>
<td>37,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
<td>163,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Relations with Industrialised Non-Member Countries</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Crisis response and global threats to security</td>
<td>194,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 European Neighbourhood Policy and Relations with Russia</td>
<td>1,184,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Including:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean countries</td>
<td>664,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian territories</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 Relations with Latin America</td>
<td>322,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Relations with Asia, Central Asia and Middle Eastern countries</td>
<td>778,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Policy Strategy and Coordination for External Relations Policy Area</td>
<td>27,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total cost of the whole of the Title 19 expenditure for all the External Relations package, staff and programmes combined, comes to €3.3 billion. That is out of a potential €3.9 billion set aside.

It is important to note that a number of the projects funded are noble ones, and no doubt merit support from the international community. But there have been some real controversies. EU aid for Palestine, for example, has come under immense criticism for enriching local politicians, being raided by extremists, and supporting hate education.13

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13 The TaxPayers’ Alliance ‘Palestinian Hate Education Since Annapolis’, March 2009
CFSP aid to Russia has seen €1 billion of grants for cleaning up nuclear power plants seriously under question from the auditors. Humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe has supported the regime by being converted at the official exchange rate through the national central bank, while simultaneously thousands of tonnes of beef have been allowed preferentially into the EU in the face of the farm seizure programme. From a broader policy perspective, ill-considered EU development aid packages have created ecological problems, over issues ranging from mangrove swamps through deforestation to gorilla habitat. One wonders if these programmes would have been more successfully run by national representatives subject to closer ministerial scrutiny.

The key point to note however is how the role is being taken over from national governments by the EU – and not by intergovernmental bodies such as the Council of Europe, and certainly not by the UN. For instance, after 9/11 the Commission was able to immediately reinvigorate an agenda on security, one that had seemingly been permanently binned only a few months previously on the grounds of personal freedoms and national responsibility. Nor can we forget the role played by aid as advancing the flag during the Cold War. In this case, the flag has twelve stars on it.

Chapter 19 11 (Policy Strategy and Coordination for the External Relations Policy Area) is a case in hand. €10 million goes on selling EU policy abroad under budget line 19 11 02. €3 million goes on selling the EU’s foreign activities to its own citizens, under the Prince programme. The latter is in order to “address a weak public perception of external assistance. The objective is to make clear that external assistance is an integral part of what the EU does and is one of the crucial policies that define the EU and its role in the world.”\textsuperscript{14} The programme is guided by the Inter-institutional Group on Information, bringing together the Commission, Council and EP.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} EU Budget 2008, p. II/793.
\textsuperscript{15} EU PR is covered in considerable depth in the publications Federalist Thought Control (Rotherham/Ball/Oulds, Bruges Group, 2002) and The Hard Sell (Rotherham/Mullally, Open Europe, 2009)
2.2 Assets

We exclude in this section buildings owned within the EU, even where delegations service international organizations as well as domestic capitals.

In addition to parts of buildings that are on the books (multiple floors in an office block, for instance), there are understood to be 28 whole office buildings, 28 heads of delegation official residences, 25 official staff residences, 1 parking space and 1 plot of land owned by the Service.

The total value of buildings owned comes to €62,595,523. Many of these are recent purchases, from a period when the FCO on the contrary was selling off its own stock to save money.

The top ten property assets run as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Year of Purchase</th>
<th>Value of property (Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Tokyo
d | 2006             | 34,008,000                |
| Abuja (property 2) | 2005             | 4,581,000                  |
| Dar es Salaam   | 2002             | 3,756,000                  |
| Beijing         | 1995             | 3,274,000                  |
| Mexico City     | 1995             | 1,781,000                  |
| Ouagadougou     | 1997             | 1,496,000                  |
| Washington DC   | 1997             | 1,412,000                  |
| Canberra (2)    | 1990             | 775,000                    |
| Nairobi         | 2005             | 740,000                    |
| Phnom Pen       | 2005             | 668,000                    |

There are over 120 ambassadorial residencies, with a level of luxury typically at least equivalent to national ambassadors. In Moscow, it is a listed 18th-century mansion. The two-storey yellow mansion is a listed building, known for its pre-revolutionary aristocratic history. The attractive new Addis Ababa residence has grounds that can host several hundred guests, demonstrating pretensions on a par with the oldest established embassies.

Support staff are another perk that comes with the building. Some have butlers. One former head of the EU delegation in Sweden meanwhile was accused by auditors of making her chauffeur drive her dog around.

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16 Understood to be the work offices, located in the city centre. The EU ambassador’s residence is reportedly rented, in the upmarket Moto Azuba area where the President of Nissan lives; but even then the rent is said to be twice the market rate.
Controversy extends to delegations based within the EU as well. Reports have also suggested that the moves to co-locate the EP and Commission offices in London are, as predicted, already carrying a major financial burden. 17 “Europe House” on Smith Square is reportedly costing the EU taxpayer £24 million. £5.2 million is going in refurbishment costs for the eight floor building.

This comes as British legations are facing further potentially disastrous cuts due to the weakness of Sterling.

2.3 Pay, Perks and Privileges

Staff operating from overseas embassies are on the same basic pay grade as their counterparts back in Brussels, ranging from €2,300 per month to around €16,000 per month. There are also sickness and pension rights, parental and maternity leave, €313 monthly child allowance, ill widow bonus, orphan’s pension, 20 weeks’ adoption leave, childbirth or adoption grant of €200, and so on; and taxation at a generally preferential rate. 18

EU diplomatic staff may in particular qualify for:

- Extra leave (distance allowance on top of a higher rate of 3.5 days per month)
- First class travel to and from role, including family
- Annual leave family travel payments
- Long distance family ticket bonus 19
- Health insurance for all family 20
- Increased education allowance for school children (up to €1900 per month)
- Increased education allowance for children not yet old enough to be in education (up to €380, from €64 per month normally)
- Removal expenses
- High Risk insurance
- Accommodation – either supplied, or accommodation bills covered
- Standard household allowance (family or marriage/partner allowance)
- Daily subsistence allowance when the official has moved into an official residence, €27 - €33, lasting 4-6 months 21
- Daily subsistence allowance when in the field
- Furniture removal or storage allowance
- Shift bonus

17 News of the World, 1st March 2009
18 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/personnel_administration/statut/tocen100.pdf
19 Under Article 8 of Annex VII, payment is based on kilometrage on a notional train distance. Over 725km, a bonus payment of €166 applies, €332 if over 1450km. Thus the allowance for a family of four (Commission official, wife, two teenagers) returning to Rome from Washington DC (7200 km), appears to come to €6094 – around €1500 per person, payable annually.
20 Including common law and same-sex partners
21 Article 10 of Annex VII
- Standby allowance if on call
- Difficult posting weighting
- Understaffing weighting
- Expatriation allowance, not less than €40 per month, for staff living in a foreign country
- Entertainment allowance
- Cumulative bonus for each consecutive difficult posting (‘dump allowance’)
- High Risk allowance
- Choice of currency of payment: Euro or local; or if there is an Exchange Rate collapse, in any currency of his choosing
- Installation/resettlement allowance, one or two months’ salary with the option of payment in local currency with extra weighting (where labour and resources will be cheap)
- Staff car or generous mileage allowance
- Own car annual allowance of €892 for senior personnel without an official car
- Extra per diem payments if role is mission-orientated

Given the baseline of €84 for the daily allowance and €117 for the hotel ceiling (as at 2004), we estimate a Eurodiplomat with a glum posting could drown his sorrows with a possible bonus of a living allowance worth around €110 a day and spend €160 a night in a nice suite at the Hotel Colonial - on top of his salary, which if he is an ambassador in Africa might be in the order of €190,000. This potential salary boost of €20,000 in cash and €30,000 in kind is regardless of actual seniority. Added to the other allowances, the payments involved can be very rewarding.

For the record, UK-based EU staff who are eligible are understood to be paid a daily allowance of €87, with a hotel allowance of up to €149 per night.

We contrast these conditions with those, say, of a member of the armed forces on deployment overseas, whose ‘leave clock’ for instance does not stop ticking if there are transport problems, and who might even end up with actual home time of only three or four days over six months. An EU civil servant flying more than 2000km gets a standard 6 days extra leave by contrast, and one extra day even if he is just driving 50km.

Intriguingly, Article 2 of the special third country provisions of the Staff Regulations seems to allow for preferential placements on the basis of favouritism regardless of actual vacancies (indeed contrary to Article 4 of the general regulations), but also the reverse option of despatching troublesome types to the Sahara.
3. Cause and Effect

3.1 Selling Integration

Part of the mission of being an EU diplomat is proving that there is such a thing as “Europe”. It is the politics of raising the EU flag higher than the others, of convincing hosts that Brussels is the future.

In particular, targets comprise the Old Commonwealth, the United States, Japan, and certain countries grouped in the South China Sea and in the Arabian Peninsular.

Take, for instance, an agreement concluded in December 2006. This covers higher training, education and youth exchanges with Canada. This is in fact a highly contentious matter. Education is an area that has long been a fierce battleground between Ottawa and the provinces, not least over Québec’s rights to push a francophone agenda with its exchange programmes. Furthermore, there is real controversy in this agreement developing into a challenge to Commonwealth-centred activity. In other words, taxpayer money is undermining Britain’s strong traditional links.

Article 3 of the agreement is a particular issue. This spells out the objectives of the agreement. These include broader mutual understanding of languages, cultures and institutions – which in the case of Canadian students, will be those of the EU and not reinvigorating old ties. The “issues relevant to European Union/Canada relations” by definition skew the centre of gravity of the debate. As with other federal linkages, reference to political evolution will inevitably endorse federalism as a common solution, with the Dominion’s post-1867 history being heavily drawn upon to suggest models for future EU integration. Academic balance will prove especially challenging to maintain when it comes to funding the seminars, training courses, job shadowing and study visits for “young leaders and other youth actors” to explore the meaning of citizenship.

3.2 Funding Local Support

Local organizations are financed to support this trend. For example, there is the New Zealand European Union Centres Network. The network links together seven university locations that teach EU studies. The obvious and recurring threat is the risk of affecting academic neutrality. This in part follows from the “High level public Europa lectures”, the “Visiting European-in-residence practitioners’ programme”, the “Visiting EU Teaching Fellowships”, and assorted internships, publications and media activities that are open to potential bias. The creation of the funded “European-in-residence” is a

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22 This confusingly seems to count as one “EU Centre” See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eu-centres/eu-centres_en.pdf. There are notably 11 such centres in the United States, 3 in Australia, 3 in Japan, 4 in Canada, and 3 in Korea; 27 in all.
particular issue – an informal academic lecturer, media target, and briefer of government, inevitably a person who has already featured in the EU’s grants and information networks.\textsuperscript{23} FRENZ, meanwhile, is the associated programme to provide a permanent EU intermediary for academics to go through.

From the feedback provided by its interns who went to the European Parliament, it seems to form graduates and postgrads whose gratitude quite naturally and understandably also extends into a positive view of European integration.

We are not saying that all academic programmes funded by the EU’s embassies overseas are outrageously biased. However, some too obviously are. Moreover, we do suggest that the system lends itself to colouring the perceptions of those who participate, in just the same way as if the Soviet Union were funding a programme on Peace Studies, or the Women’s Institute on Gender Studies, the Saudi Government on Religious Studies, or Conrad Black on Media Studies. Such programmes should be left to member states and to the Council of Europe to support.

\textsuperscript{23} The case is proven in the general application of the Monnet professorships
4. Washington DC: A Case Study

4.1 Representing Federalism in the Federal Capital

The example of Washington DC provides an appropriate case for review. This was the site of the very first representation set up on behalf of the Brussels machinery, and today forms a prestige post.

A major shift in emphasis followed the Maastricht Treaty, when the State Department realized there was more to the EU than simply trade. That realization has grown with EU enlargement.

It is no coincidence that the current chosen incumbent happens to be no less than a former Prime Minister of a member state, John Bruton.24

The EU embassy takes up three floors, or half a building, in an expensive part of Washington. This is in addition to the Ambassador’s Residence. It has five press officers (“spokespersons”) and ten other staff on “public diplomacy” duties.

It is the Residence that takes pride of place, however. Reportedly built for a steel and railway tycoon in 1923 and today valued at £1.4 million, it has several bedrooms, a good sized dining room, and a fine polished marble hall. A small Italianate garden lies at the rear, with a couple of classical statues in bronze, cherry trees and a swimming pool.25 A Belgian chef is in attendance.

While not in the league of some of the nation state embassies (foremost amongst them the British and French) with centuries of existing baggage and investment, the location is more than a simple out of town flat for an ordinary bureaucrat. The significance of the site is more than symbolic. To quote a former Home Secretary:

"It is absurd to pretend that Mr Bruton is just the humble head of a trade mission, doing his best to persuade Americans to buy more champagne, cuckoo clocks and pasta machines. It is as plain as a pikestaff that while the External Action Service has not been formally set up, considerable sums of money are being spent now in preparation for its coming into existence, and people like John Bruton are bedding themselves down.

24 John Bruton was Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of the Republic of Ireland, 1994-1997
25 Sunday Times, 23 April 2006, and eyewitness reports. The venue is obviously not as magnificent as the established embassies, but even the EU budget has its limits.
A review of some of the speeches and articles by Mr Bruton apparently confirms this interpretation. The “Weekly Message from the Ambassador” of 27th March 2007, for example, had a very integrationist tone for its American audience:

"I believe that this enlargement of the European Union has only been possible because there is an overarching ideal that guides the entire project. That ideal is one of unifying Europe, of building an ‘ever closer Union’ in Europe. If the creation of the European Union had been viewed merely a diplomatic or financial negotiation or a mere mercantilist balancing of interests, it would never have succeeded as well as it has.

The challenge of the European Union for the next fifty years will be to convince two further generations of Europeans that ‘an ever closer Union’ in Europe is a valid idea for their time too, and that they too should be willing to take risks, and make sacrifices, to achieve it."

To put it bluntly, this is not the message that will have been emerging from the mouths of diplomats from a number of EU member states, especially our own.

4.2 In Your Name

There are two key publications that are sent out by the EU embassy in the United States, on a bi-monthly basis. *eufocus* is an eight page magazine that acts as the general mouthpiece for the public and broad brush interested parties. *euinsight*, on the other hand, is a monthly flyer (albeit no less glossy) directed at the legislators themselves.

Both do more than simply explain EU policy positions to a professional audience. *eufocus* fixes each issue on a theme. We can review a number of these from retrieved archives. In May 2005, that theme was the joint US-EU struggle over terrorism, where it is the EU that described as carrying out the key action and forming the Americans’ obvious partner. There is a photograph in exceedingly poor taste of a commemorative service in Washington a year after the Madrid bombings, where the EU Ambassador appears to have muscled in as joint leader of the service beside the Spanish Ambassador. In November, the focus is on “The EU: a Community of Values”. This explains how people misunderstand the EU, “which is sometimes mistakenly identified

\[\text{26} \] Lord Waddington, House of Lords Hansard, 18 May 2006 col. 391. The venue was in fact purchased by the ECSA as far back as 1971 for use by the Head of Delegation, and transferred to the Commission in 1997 (source: External Service). As such it proves a remarkably early pointer of status and intent.
as only a geographic entity or common market, established to spur intra-European economic integration”. The message here is of how the EU is an entity based on values and standards, a unity for good in the world with moral depths. This is underlined with a photograph of Commission President Barroso meeting religious leaders.

In January 2006, the focus shifts to the development of the EU as a military power, including power projection through EU policing agencies. Particular emphasis is placed on the morality of EU engagements as a means of last recourse, presumably to make the best of a lack of real capability by playing up the reader’s views on US deployments under Bush.

In March, this was expanded to examine “The European Union and Human Rights, a Global Commitment”. This included such dictums as “The European Union is one of the world’s most successful efforts to advance peace between nations”, and “Speaking for 25 European nations and bringing together their considerable voice and influence, the European Union is a leader in global efforts to protect human rights. And after 50 years of peace and prosperity in Europe, the EU itself stands today as proof of the profound and lasting benefits that can flow from respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law”.

September’s issue looked at Energy, reporting a speech at Georgetown University at which the talk is one of partnership between the United States and the EU, expressed as a corporate entity (despite treaty competences).

July’s issue was particularly unusual in that it was translated into Spanish. It covered the EU’s position on Latin America. Naturally, Hispanic Americans are taught how it is “Europe” that enjoys historic links with the region, and the EU that is carrying out the relevant measures and activities.

In March 2007, the articles dwelt on accession: “Today, after five enlargements, the 27-member EU, prosperous and vibrant, stands as a unifying force for peace and freedom, democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and equality, both at home and abroad.” Nuancing is not a prerequisite for the editors of this publication. The same hard sell is to be found in euinsight, intended for a more select and powerful audience. Each carries a section entitled “Ambassador’s Corner”, which is particularly opinionated, though the quotes section also provides an opportunity for some hard selling. One example is a Barroso quote that carries the message “The United States, a united Europe – this is really the indispensable partnership”. Forget the Special Relationship.

In May 2005, the Ambassador ignores the niceties of ongoing referenda by declaring:

"The EU grew out of the carnage and devastation of the war and has proven to be the world’s greatest peace process, uniting old enemies and
friends alike in a common effort to ensure peace, freedom, and prosperity for all of Europe. The Constitution is an important step forward for European democracy.”

In August, the headline was how the “EU Acts in Wake of London Terror Attack”, neglecting to inform readers as to how many of the proposals were recycled ones that had previously been blocked on grounds of proportionality, democracy, and competence creep. It is the EU rather than national police agencies taking the lead. This must have proved a savvy sales pitch to US legislators keen to see action from whatever camp, of whatever nature, and to apportion kudos for any activity in the war on terror. In an echo of the concept of a single telephone line to Europe from the White House, Bruton simplistically observes that, “With the EU members acting as one, the United States does not have to establish policies and practices with 25 separate European countries.” No wonder with comments like these, he is able to go on the record by November and declare, “I personally am very thankful for continued American support of European integration, which has led to an unprecedented area of peace and prosperity on the European continent, one that continues to radiate outward towards Europe’s neighbours.”

September 2006 saw two bulletins, probably intended as catch up for the congressional holidays. On terrorism, we read how “European [not national] authorities have quashed numerous other terrorist plots, frozen bank accounts worth hundreds of millions of euros, and have detained and tried hundreds of terrorism suspects” through actions taken in the EU “in coordinated fashion under a vigorous counterterrorism strategy”. The other issue deals with “The European Union, Leading Provider of Development & Humanitarian Aid”, which leaves it to a footnote to explain “European Union aid includes European Commission and Member State funding”.

Many of these points are summarised on the CD Rom The European Union is Just a Click Away. This serves as an introduction to the Delegation website, and links in to central sites as well. The three constant themes that emerge from the showy presentations are, firstly, that the United States is dealing with a singular entity rather than member states, thus selling the Commission’s corporate role; secondly, that the EU and the United States are partners, and by extension equals; and thirdly, that the United States and its exporters in particular need the EU because that single entity is a force in the world upon which the US markets, and its policymakers, must depend.

In addition to the bulletins, there is an assortment of specialist local literature. The European Union is a leaflet that details, with pie charts, how “the relationship between the United States and Europe is the world’s strongest, most comprehensive, and strategically important partnership”. Those pie charts tot up figures relating to the member states to provide statistics on how the EU entity is the largest foreign investor in the United States. In fact, that position from the figures printed is demonstrably held
by the United Kingdom alone. *Travelling in Europe* provides a wall map, accompanied by background text for the voyager. These messages, naturally, are not simply factual, because the traveller has so much for which to be thankful towards the EU. This includes the series of founding anniversary events that the tourist should keep an eye open for.

*The European Union: a Guide for Americans* is a further targeted publication. The tone is set with its cover emblazoned with the EU flag, currency, ballot box, quote from the Treaty, Eisenhower and Monnet in discussion, and Bush and Barroso walking side by side (we might expect a new edition shortly). The most supporters of sovereign states can get out of it is a photo of an EU China Summit on page 21, where Tony Blair is standing in the background part hidden by Peter Mandelson centre stage, and the Luxembourg Prime Minister standing in the Oval Office flanked by Solana and Barroso. “Few bonds in the world,” opines Ambassador Bruton in the foreword, “are as strong as those between the European Union and the United States.” We hear too of how “the European Union and the United States increasingly share the opportunities and responsibilities of world leadership”. “Partners” is very much the recurring key word, with the (bilateral, not multilateral) partnership increasing with the emergence of CFSP. That partnership is extended to the historical context, as we find it stressed just how EU accession aid is just like the Marshall Plan, and that EU enlargement is an historic step towards a “long-cherished goal, supported by all U.S presidents since Eisenhower”.

In case you missed it on the front cover, the EU flag appears 42 times. At least a Eurosceptic delegate to the Youth Convention on the Future of Europe is photographed, though her views and name are not identified.

The Embassy also runs activities such as the “Euro Challenge“. This was described as “an innovative academic competition for young American high school students”, though in fact it is a copy of a project organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It tests their knowledge of European economic affairs and the Euro, and “encourages students to learn about the European Union today”, or rather the Eurozone economies. It even has its own facebook page.27 100 schools are hoped to participate next year, from a launch figure in 2006 of ten.

### 4.3 Other Levers of Integration

The US embassy, like all the others, uses external actors and agencies to get its integrationist message across. There are of course the activities pursued through the “EU Centres of Excellence in the United States”, which we have already encountered, and which act as the foci for Commission outreach activity from 14 universities. There is the Transatlantic Business Dialogue bringing together EU and US businessmen; the

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Transatlantic Consumers’ Dialogue for consumer lobbyists; and the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue. This latter links Congress with the European Parliament rather than national parliamentarians, and includes teleconferences.

The Embassy is also engaged in coordinating events with the Member States national embassies, co-opting their own networks and resources. One case in point was the embassies open day organised to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the ECSC. This was widely publicised on the Metro through adverts prominently carrying the EU flag and strap line. It so happened that this event clashed with the commemorative functions arising from the 400th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Jamestown colony by English settlers, marked by a visit from the Queen.

The year before, ambassadors had joined John Bruton in visiting high schools in the Washington area “to educate some of the next generation of Americans about European unity, its strength in diversity, and the important bond between the United States and Europe”.

But then, symbolism is everything. Rather cleverly, the delegation’s logo has even been chosen so as to mirror the “Betsy Ross” revolutionary flag of the young United States, with the EU flag standing above red and white bars. The subconscious message is of a parallel federal development, one which deserves to find a natural amount of sympathy, support and understanding.28

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28 And again, coincidentally, where the British are the opposition to federalism! It is a very clever piece of symbolism and spin
5. Conclusion

If we compare and contrast where the ECSC stood in the 1950s and the extent of the Communities’ representations today, it is obvious that there has been a sea change – not just in terms of scale and resource, but also in the mandate and activity. Our earlier timeline demonstrates how far we have already travelled towards an integrated EU diplomatic service. Some will argue that EU policy is the result of a meeting at the Council of Ministers, and that as the UK has a voice there, it is merely a matter of a 'pooling of resources'. But a voice is not the same as management or actual control, especially where an issue is no longer decided by unanimity. To put it another way, anyone who has ever stored a pint of milk in a student fridge knows what happens to pooled resources.

As we have since from the assumption of member states’ roles in the FAO in 1991, EU officials have already long been representing national governments in international meetings. The system already long exists so that a Commission official becomes the common delegate where "complete power with respect to that subject is transferred and that no residual power remains with the Member States." In other institutions, the nature of the job share has been more muddied, not least where the negotiations have included areas not covered by the EU treaties. Yet as the competences expand with each passing treaty, and as the European Court of Justice is invited to explore where the boundaries of the Single Market lie, the slice of the pie left to national diplomats will gradually get ever smaller, and the case for more hot seating – indeed, replacement seating – ever stronger.

This is foreseen. The EU’s embassy in Washington provides just one example of taxpayer-funded Eurocrats ‘selling Brussels abroad’. As far as the brand managers are concerned, it is the EU that is the natural partner of the United States. The message relayed is that its federal evolution makes the EU some sort of latterday offspring of the Jefferson experiment in government. Historic US support for the ECSC and early integration is highlighted to encourage more of the same in the future. By such deceptive straplines are the sympathies of the Capitol to be won.

Yet the embassy at Washington provides merely one example of EU diplomats at work. The effect globally can be multiplied a hundredfold. Readers of this paper are invited to explore the reality for themselves by looking at the legations’ websites across the world, and review the style, the content, and the grants that go out to win hearts and minds. Brussels is being sold as the up-and-coming superpower. The EU foreign service is both the agent and the beneficiary. We, the taxpayer, are paying for it.

29 Commentary on Resolution 791. The explanation of votes by the various delegates spells the issue out: it is a clear and revolutionary power shift under Article II.