JOINT EVALUATION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE-BUILDING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Synthesis Report

Volume 1

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The document is not confidential.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.11.11</td>
<td>Belgian NGO dealing with emergency assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Agence d’Achats des Performances – Performance Financing Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGEH</td>
<td>Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Entwicklungshilfe (Association for Development Cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCLS</td>
<td>Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF</td>
<td>Avocats Sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>Artisanal and Small Scale Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCPR</td>
<td>Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGR</td>
<td>Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe - Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>Belgian Technical Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Country Assistance Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPAC</td>
<td>Cellule d’Appui Politologique en Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Franc Congolais</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDG</td>
<td>Contrat de Gouvernance – Governance Contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEEAC</td>
<td>Communauté Économique des États d'Afrique Centrale</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPGL</td>
<td>Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPI</td>
<td>Community Empowerment Programme for Ituri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>Comité International d’Appui à la Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMICL</td>
<td>Comités mixtes de coordination locale – Mixed committees for local coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMJ</td>
<td>Commision Mixte de Justice - Mixed Justice Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
<td>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFED</td>
<td>Cellule d’Appui à l’Ordonnateur National du FED – Support Cell of the National Regulator of EDF programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMREC</td>
<td>Community Reconstruction and Reintegration of Former Combatants and Small Arms Reduction project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAP</td>
<td>Cellule provinciale d’appui à la planification</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPIAs</td>
<td>Comités Provinciaux Inter Agences - Inter-Agency Provincial Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPPB</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (FR = PCCP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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ICGLR  International Conference for the African Great Lakes Region
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTJ  International Centre for Transitional Justice
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IFRC  International Federation of the Red Cross
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IMPT  Integrated Mission Planning Team
IOM  International Organisation for Migrations
IPF  Integrated Programme Framework
IRC  International Rescue Committee
ISF  Integrated Strategic Framework
ISSSS  International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy
JICA  Japan International Cooperation Agency
JPFU  Joint Pooled Fund Unit
KiW  Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German government owned bank)
KZE  Katholische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe, Catholic Church Development Cooperation
LRA  Lord’s Resistance Army
MAG  Mines Advisory Group
MDG  Millennium Development Goals
MDRP  Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MONUC  Mission of the United Nations in Congo
MONUSCO  United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Republic of the Congo
MRC  Mouvement Révolutionnaire Congolais
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD/DAC  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee
OFDA  Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OFIDA  Office des Douanes et Accises – Customs and excises office
OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAP  Plan d’Action Prioritaire – Priority Action Plan
PARECO  Patriotes Résistants Congolais
PBC  Peace Building Commission
PBF  Peace Building Fund
PEAR  Programme of expanded assistance to returns
PGA  Parliamentarians for Global Action
PMPTR  Partnership Programme for Transition and Recovery
PNDDR  Plan National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintégation – National Plan for Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration.

PPM Programme de Partenariat Militaire
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RC Red Cross
RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RCN Réseau Citoyens-Citizens’ Network
REC Regional Economic Communities
REJUSCO Restauration du Système Judiciaire au Congo
RRM Rapid Response Mechanism
RRMP Réponse Rapide aux Mouvements de Population - Rapid Response to Population Movements
SAF Security Assessment Framework
SADC Southern African Development Community
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCA Strategic Conflict Assessment
SCP Service Civil pour la Paix – Civil Peace Service
SFÇG Search For Common Ground
SGACA Strategic Governance and Corruption Analysis
SGBV Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (now ASDI)
SSR Security Sector Reform
SSU Stabilisation Support Unit
STAREC Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War Affected Areas
SOKIMO Société de Mines d’Or de Kilo Moto
SVU Sexual Violence Unit
TF MIRECA Task Force Mineral Resources in Central Africa
TICAD III The Third Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS United Nation Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for Total Independance of Angola)
UNSSSS United Nations Support Strategy for Security and Stabilisation
UPC Union des Patriotes Congolais
US United States
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZFD</td>
<td>Ziviler Friedensdienst – Civil Peace Service</td>
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Introduction to the Evaluation

This evaluation was commissioned by a Steering Committee of bilateral cooperation donors and aid agencies
1 to review conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
Drawing on examples from a portfolio of projects funded by Steering Committee members, the evaluation is designed to provide general conclusions relevant to all international interventions in the eastern DRC.

A team of fifteen consultants representing eight nationalities was deployed to design and carry out the evaluation over a period of twelve months between 2009-2010. It was supported by four Consultative Groups, in Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu and Bunia. These groups were composed of representatives of agencies involved in peace efforts and civil society organisations, meeting under the auspices of the government.

1.2 Methodology

The analysis covers the Provinces of North and South Kivu and Ituri District, all situated on the borders of the DRC with Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The period covered by the evaluation begins at the signature of the Sun City Agreement in December 2002, when Rwanda and Uganda claimed full withdrawal from the DRC, until the revision of the mandate of MONUC in July 2010, which was subsequently replaced by MONUSCO, with a mandate emphasising civilian protection.

The database of projects submitted by the Steering Committee contained 350 projects, of which 51 were selected as a sample for review. Out of the 51 projects, 8 were the subject of field visits, while stakeholders of another 21 participated in face-to-face interviews; the others were evaluated via individual interviews with stakeholders or based on documents available.

The selected projects are grouped under themes—or sectors—of intervention. Five cross cutting themes were chosen as particularly important for measuring the effect of interventions on the conflict:

1. Humanitarian aid and the fight against sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

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1These include: The Belgian Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) attached to the UN peace-keeping mission MONUC, Mission des Nations Unies au Congo, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, UNIFEM and UNFPA.
2. Justice
3. Security sector reform and demobilisation
4. Mineral exploitation
5. Capacity building

It should be noted that the evaluation covers project performance in the above sectors in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It does not seek to verify the interventions’ results as they relate to their original technical objectives (which may refer very little to peace).

The evaluation highlights the timing and the way in which interventions interacted with the factors of peace and conflict, as we explain in section 1.3. It seeks to evaluate their performance and the coordination of policies that defined them.

1.3 Analysis of the Conflict

The recent wars of Congo constitute one of the world’s most severe crises². They drew rebel groups against each other and against armed forces of the DRC, the majority fighting for recognition and access to resources, others for forms of political autonomy. Under a United Nations mandate, an important peacekeeping force was deployed in the country. However, in spite of different peace agreements, violent conflicts continue to agitate the eastern provinces, even at the time of writing.

In the East of the country, the situation is marked by weak state structures, and the rural characteristic of armed groups, that operate in isolated regions, in difficult to access terrain. In order to constitute or reinforce themselves, or survive, these groups mobilise primarily along ethnic lines, and abandon themselves to predatory practices. However, they are often ignored.

From these general remarks, after having identified the intervention themes in relation to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the evaluation sought to identify the conflict drivers, as the many points of influence in the region, as towards the direction of conflict resolution or as an aggravation to the crisis:

- State weakness in rural areas, in particular the absence of services, erratic payment of salaries, and poor infrastructure.
- Frequent land conflicts, related to conflict between customary and modern law, the numerous population movements linked to the war, and the exploitation of natural resources (mainly forests and minerals).
- Economic and political opportunities captured by political entrepreneurs who mobilise armed groups. These groups often

² Some observers claim that up to 5.5 million people have died since August 1998 as a consequence of conflict and more than 2 million have been displaced.
splinter, and slow down the demobilisation processes and army integration or in society.

- The emergence of parallel structures for resource exploitation, such as the control of mineral resources by smugglers, armed groups and other criminal networks.

Of course, other significant factors engender instability in the East of DRC however it is on these above that the analysis was able to confidently rest upon, with the aim to verify whether they were well managed or neglected.

### 1.4 Donor Policies

International development funding in DRC has benefited from remarkable continuity throughout the evaluation period, representing an average of US$1.5 billion annually. The projects followed the rhythm of key events in the political development of the country, with increases corresponding in particular to the Sun City Agreement of 2002, national elections in 2006, and the 2008 Goma peace negotiations between the DRC government and the armed rebel groups.

According to the evaluation’s observations, donors are not attentive to the accelerators of peace and conflict in the East of the country, and their strategies are blurred and compartmentalized.

Coordination, best in the domain of humanitarian aid and to a lesser extent in development assistance, has no forum for conflict management. The main strategy, the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS), that is coordinated under STAREC, as well as priority areas such as the mining sector and land conflicts, appear to have held donor attention only at the end of the evaluation period.

The difficulty of a limited state presence impacts aid agencies, unable to establish strong relationships with local authorities. This translates into an inability to engage over the long-term.

Donors did not turn away from conflict prevention and peacebuilding, though they did put in place a multiplicity of strategic frameworks and policy initiatives, funding sources, programming guidelines, complex projects, which has resulted in a scattering of efforts.

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3 Source: OECD Development Aid Committee.
4 Program with the objective of stabilisation « Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War Affected Areas ».
5 These frameworks include, on the donors’ side, the Country Assistance Framework (CAF), and on the government side the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the Priority Action Plan (PAP), the Pacte de Gouvernance, the “5 Chantiers” of the President, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War Affected Areas (STAREC), as well as sector-specific strategies such as the Security Sector Reform strategy and the National Strategy on Combating Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV).
1.5 Humanitarian Aid and Assistance to SGBV
Admittedly, interventions designed to reduce the suffering of population, linked to conflict, are often close to the ground and effective, but they are not specifically designed for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The lack of attention to the indirect effects on the conflict reduces their positive impact. For example, in order to better address sexual violence within the context of conflict, it would have been more effective to work not only with victims but equally to organise awareness with those who commit these crimes.

In addition, the assistance is implemented by a mediation of organisations that progressively sub-contract their activities. This cascade of contracts is not well justified, and renders even more difficult a real strategic approach, as it combines several sources of financing, and complicates the return of information. It does not favour local partners, who have limited visibility regarding decisions.

1.6 Justice
In the DRC, the grave humanitarian and human rights violations has led to a profound culture of impunity, that in turn exacerbates conflicts within local communities and increases the lack of confidence in the judicial systems.

Donors have certainly participated in a more coordinated fashion regarding the reconstruction of the judicial sector in the country’s regions of the East. The evaluation, however, highlights the limited involvement of the local administrations in judicial matters and their incapacity to put in place recovery strategies. The evaluation of projects under the theme of justice reveal a relative disinterest in the face of gaps regarding land administration and property rights, even though these remain an important conflict driver.

1.7 DDR and Security Sector Reform
Assistance towards Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) is pertinent yet limited, even if the donors over the course of the year have overcome their reticence to intervene in a domain too often considered politically sensitive. The needs of this sector exceed the important resources it has received to date.

Projects are correctly designed to eliminate all links between on the one hand the army or rebel groups, and on the other ethnic or economic interests underpinning the conflict. They are supported by strong implementation mechanisms amongst many actors (including two EU civilian missions, and UN peacekeeping forces). The high political risks linked to DDR and SSR were well managed.

However, some important human and cultural aspects were neglected up until now, in particular the situation of soldiers’ families. We note a tendency to concentrate efforts on technical solutions to the detriment of a local political-
economic analysis. This is explained in part by the absence of appropriate financing instruments, this form of assistance being outside aid development.

### 1.8 Mining activities

Since 2007, the number of donors involved in the mining sector has increased\(^6\), overcoming the previous perception that the sector presented too many reputational risks. International analysis considers that the sector is at the heart of a number of conflicts; in effect, it represents the principal source of financing accessible to armed groups. In reinforcing their efforts, donors and the government of Congo focus today on transparency and responsible mining.

However trade embargoes could, paradoxically, slow down the establishment of better governance. If mining and oil will constitute in the future the main revenue source for the East of the country, observers insufficiently differentiate between the informal sector and a criminal economy, which discourages engagement by reputable and willing actors.

The provincial authorities lack human and institutional resources, which do not allow them to bring adequate support. An important but often neglected group is that of the artisanal miners and the local communities in the mining areas.

### 1.9 Capacity Building

The key driver of conflict in the DRC is the weakness of the State, even its complete absence, in several large parts of the East. The central element for peacebuilding should be the building of capacity, to create a lasting relationship on the ground. It is necessary to do much more to favour the establishment of a local administration.

This theme of capacity building remains weak, void of a solid conceptual foundation. The relationship with local partners, first and foremost the local administration, is tainted with ambivalence. Too often the relationship was avoided, or was substituted by a long series of one-off activities without a vision for institutional change.

### 1.10 Conclusions

Given that it is virtually impossible for international aid to align itself to strategies defined by the State, it is an approach ‘by project’ that prevails in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The general difficulty is the distance

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\(^6\) In particular German engagement in the mining sector of DRC gained importance following the 2007 G8 Summit resolutions in Heiligendamm (the GIZ bilateral program, the GIZ-ICGLR program at the regional level). Political support and growing resources were mobilised over the last few years for interventions aimed at improving transparency and governance of Congo’s mining sector (amongst others Germany, UK, the Netherlands, UN but also growing engagement by the United States).
that separates donors from local realities, which this type of approach does not resolve. The projects follow one another, but with very weak links between them, as the programming does not favour sequencing.

International organisations give more and more importance to the factors of conflict, direct investment in DDR, and governance within the extractive industries. But in the absence of programming that is more rooted in the field, the global effect of the efforts realised remains inferior to the sum of its parts.

Fundamentally, it is difficult to define the progresses achieved by the interventions towards conflict resolution and peacebuilding, as the contextual analysis is defective. In fact the operational instruments such as humanitarian aid fill the gap left by donor strategies.

If one considers that it is a strategic priority for the DRC’s development, conflict prevention and peacebuilding deserve an adjustment to justify the billions of Euros spent annually. It requires a renewed approach, more simplified than the current arrangements – it must start from the conditions found in the field, and establish innovative partnerships.

1.11 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Donors should position programming from an assessment of conflict drivers.

If conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes are to hold central attention for international strategies, it is important to undertake on-going analysis of the peace and conflict drivers, such as land conflicts, the social environment, the activities of armed groups and the socio-economic conditions around mines. This would necessitate more resources to undertake situational analyses in the East, but would allow for better resource use over time.

For donors:

- Earmark funds to ensure that projects have conflict-sensitive analysis, and, in the case of conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions specifically, that the root causes are part of the objectives and are clearly justified.
- Develop a cadre of consultants capable of doing conflict analysis that translates into programming priorities, and to analyse the positive and negative effects of an interventions on the conflicts.
- For donor and implementing agency sector coordination groups, ensure that pertinent conflict analysis exists that can serve as a point of reference for programming decisions. Insert the mention of conflict drivers upon which the sector may have an influence.
• Require that the monitoring and evaluation reports of implementing agencies mention analysis undertaken in terms of peacebuilding, whether as an indirect impact or as a direct outcome of the project.

For donors and implementing agencies:
• Ensure that each implementing organisation has, and revises regularly, a conflict analysis (or peace or stability transition analysis). This analysis must relate to overall programming undertaken by the implementing organisation in a direct and measurable fashion.
• Encourage on the one hand more regular field visits by donors, and on the other hand more regular public consultations by agencies. Such consultations must be documented. It is advisable to introduce a complaints or grievances mechanism for projects that is accessible to beneficiaries.
• Review programming guidelines in order to ensure that in contexts of conflict programming there is a distinction made between indirect effects on peace by specific activities, and direct effects for interventions that fit under the rubric of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
• Avoid amalgamating the treatment of conflict consequences and the prevention or re-establishment of peace. The first type of programming, can, by virtue of its objectives, have a negative effect on conflict. This effect must be part of a formal monitoring process.

Such targeting must produce a common strategy amongst the actors most intimately involved in conflict prevention to define program priorities and the choice of implementing mechanisms.

Recommendation 2: Donors should change the balance of sectors and increase joint interventions.

Donor programming must be founded on definitions of value-added of the different sector towards a broad and comprehensive peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategy adopted by all intervening actors.

For the donors:
• ISSSS should form the basis for all planning in relation to the peace objective, and in view of this, should be reviewed for a new engagement.
• The European Service for Foreign Intervention, given its political nature for crisis intervention, should be able to support civil missions and other interventions that are of a particularly sensitive nature.

For donors, agencies, NGO’s and implementing organisations:

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7 For the United States this would be the Office for Transition Initiatives and District Stability Framework.
Sectors such as SGBV prevention, and humanitarian aid, should be part of additional efforts regarding monitoring and evaluation of the effects of these interventions on the drivers of peace and conflict.

The mining sector, and those aspects of customary land laws should benefit from greater assistance.

Organisations working on natural resource governance should more accurately distinguish between the informal economy and criminal economy nature of resource extraction, and reinforce coordination around traceability and international standards regarding social responsibility of companies.

Organisations working in the mining sector should improve consultation, even coordination, with stakeholders who have already invested significantly in this sector, such as the Republic of China and multinationals.

These strategies represent an opportunity for dialogue engagement and new forms of cooperation with the state. New actors innovating creative approaches have been on the periphery of the relationships that link the government to development and stabilisation programmes.

Recommendation 3: Adopt a new relationship with the Government of DRC, and create true partnerships at the local level

A clearer definition on the part of international organisations on their relationship with the central and local government would permit the development of new forms of innovative cooperation. These must be part of a new approach.

For the donors:

- Increase the volume of financing to sectors that contribute towards the formalisation of a regulatory framework for the exploitation of natural resources.
- Increase the volume of financing for projects that seek to improve the working conditions of artisanal and small-scale miners, in addition to the living conditions of soldiers and ex-combatants’ families;
- Increase the volume of financing for anti-corruption measures, integrity systems, and of transparency, with messages formulated for the benefit of local populations.
- Identify and develop expertise in the natural resource governance sector, in addition to human rights in the mining sector.
- Prioritise projects that have limited sub-contracting mechanisms, and projects that emphasise decision-making at the local and territorial levels.
• Prioritise projects that demonstrate flexibility in their implementation, or that at least can be re-adjusted mid-way through implementation⁸.
• Prioritise projects that seek to finance local NGOs not only for implementation purposes but equally for building technical capacity for local development.
• Increase feedback loops for projects and initiatives, in particular by simplifying monitoring and evaluation systems, and in augmenting the number of studies conducted, and their publicity.

For NGOS
• The Cordaid model for financing local authorities based on results achieved should be expanded.
• Decentralise decision-making towards the field (at least to level of provincial capitals) and minimize as much as possible the amount of expenses on equipment and salaries, in order to reduce the cleavages with local authorities.
• At the project closure phase, ensure that training of staff and job placement is observed.
• Move towards a systematic identification of possible risks during project implementation, and incorporate these risks into the objective framework for capacity building.
• Develop local monitoring and evaluation systems that are accessible to the population, in particular grievance mechanisms and conflict mapping⁹.
• Prioritise programs that promote mentoring or secondment of personnel to local organisations (with a clear objective on the secondment and a minimisation of additional ‘gifts’.

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⁸ The study noted in almost all the themes evaluated a consistent lack of context analysis and strategies emanating from the local authorities, in addition to a lack of consideration towards parallel efforts being undertaken by other organisations. In addition there was a general lack of public and local consultations prior to activity design and implementation. A major observation made was the need to have more flexible project framework sand agreements that allow for changing of activities and budget allocations in order to respond to shifting dynamics in the field.

⁹ Grievance mechanisms, as promoted by the World Bank for extractive industry projects, are gaining favour with certain NGOs, as reflected in Code of Conduct for the Humanitarian Accountability Project. These systems require minimal effort and investment, ranging from public consultations during the conflict analysis phase to simple feedback sessions following evaluations conducted at the end of a project cycle.
2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Brief History of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding are core priorities in the DRC. The Congolese wars of 1996–1997 and 1998–2003 constitute together one of the most severe humanitarian disasters since World War II. Up to 5.4 million people\textsuperscript{10} have died (directly or as a result of the effects of war) since August 1998, when the second Congo War began, and 1.5 million after the December 2002 peace accord that formally ended hostilities. The conflict has reportedly caused more deaths than any other since World War II. Many of these deaths are not directly caused by violence, but rather by the consequences of the conflict and the ensuing humanitarian crisis. The mortality rate (2.2 deaths per 1000 people per month, according to the UN) remains 57% higher than the sub-Saharan average.

There exists protracted insecurity in certain provinces of eastern DRC, marked by food insecurity, crippling social services, dilapidated infrastructure and frequent displacement of local populations. The most striking observation, and this underpins the majority of the conclusions in this report, is the pervasive weakness of state structures. Over the course of the evaluation in the meetings with stakeholders, debate focused on whether there was a complete absence or simply an incredible weakness of the state in the East.

At the end of 2010, there is still an estimated 2.1 million displaced persons, of which 1.4 million are in the Kivu provinces\textsuperscript{11}, whereas over 450,000 Congolese still live as refugees in neighbouring countries. A new crisis in Equateur province has led to the displacement of about 190,000 people in 2010. The main humanitarian concern is these population displacements, but equally the violation of human rights and sexual violence, difficulties of access and transport. In general the situation is characterised by a number of time lapses, between Kinshasa, the provincial capitals, the villages connected by road or boat, and the villages in the abundant isolated areas. There are a number of locations in the country where little reliable information exists.

Beyond the instability focused mainly in eastern DRC, the conflict constitutes the greatest impediment to development. On the national level, the poverty levels remain high, and the UNDP’s Human Development Index for 2008 ranking placed the DRC 168\textsuperscript{th} out of 177 countries. After the major hostilities in 2002, GDP per capita has risen: according to the IMF’s 2009 country report, GDP growth

\textsuperscript{10} International Rescue Committee (2008), though death rates from the DRC conflict recently have been subject to debate. The 2009 Human Security Report argues that the IRC estimate is based on an inappropriately low baseline mortality rate. With a more appropriate baseline rate, the death toll would be one-third of IRC’s estimate (Human Security Report Project (2009) Human security report 2008/9, New York: Oxford University Press). The 2007 population of the DRC was estimated at 62 million.

\textsuperscript{11} As of April 2010, according to “Une fuite permanente”.
increased from 2.8% in 2003 to 6.8% in 2008. Yet this growth has been unevenly distributed, and benefits first and foremost a certain layer of urban populations. Whereas the considerable natural resources of the country increasingly attract the large energy and mining investors, they are equally conscious of the risks and accordingly adopt cautious investment behaviour.

The DRC has attracted many peace efforts. It hosts, for example, one of the largest UN peacekeeping forces in the world. The Sun City agreement in 2002, which marks the beginning of the evaluation period, set out the main conditions for peace: democracy, territorial sovereignty, political checks and balances on power, and the control of all armed groups. Since then these principles have been upheld by the donors and the government of DRC, and increasingly, by different political forces in the country. They describe in many ways the broader questions of peace for DRC.

The Mission of the United Nations in the DRC, known by its French acronym MONUC, was given an enhanced Chapter Seven mandate in 2003, under the UN Charter. Although it has gradually concentrated over the years on security, the Mission was seen as a model for the integration of different dimensions of work in conflict environments. It included investigations on human rights allegations, the coordination of humanitarian action and a stabilisation strategy for the East.

Amongst the other international initiatives to support the implementation of the peace process and promote regional stability, we note the Comité International d’Appui à la Transition (CIAT), whose mandate expired at the end of the transition period in 2006, the World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

According to international observers, this international engagement has contributed to a certain level of political stability and ensured the functioning of several transitional institutions. Equally, it facilitated the preparation of the 2006 national elections that consolidated international support and allowed for the redefinition of regional relations based on cooperation. Improved security conditions allowed for the implementation of a comprehensive Disarmament,

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12 In August 2010, only the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur had more uniformed personnel than MONUSCO. MONUC/MONUSCO military personnel was about 4000 troops in 2002, but reached more than 10,000 troops in 2003 and 16,000 troops in 2005.
13 Mandate that authorises the use of all necessary measures at its disposal to re-establish peace, which gives the right to use force and overrides the need to seek approval outside of the parties present in the defined mission.
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) program.

The national Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) plan, launched in 2003, gave combatants the choice of either returning to civilian life or joining the army. Those that opted to join the newly formed Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC in the French acronym) underwent “brassage“, a process bringing together different groups in the Congolese armed forces and combining command structures.

In addition, The DRC is a member of several sub-regional cooperation structures, notably the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Communauté économique des pays des Grands Lacs, or CEPGL) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, these entities have not proved adequate or equipped to address regional security problems as they relate to the DRC.

The Amani peace process, launched at the beginning of 2008 in Goma, aimed to define the necessary requirements for an inclusive peace, including notably the demobilisation of Kivu militias. However, absence of progress in the DDR process and further difficulties in integrating former rebel commanders into the Congolese army (FARDC) command chain, resulted in renewed mobilisation of militias, and at the end of 2010, the revival of militias that had been ‘dormant’. This phenomenon was reinforced by the terms of the agreements that pushed to recognise any person who could mobilise an armed force as a potential negotiator.

New military solutions, supported by the UN, were sought. At the beginning of 2009, the negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC from the end of 2008 culminated in a joint military offensive launched against the FDLR, the Rwandan Hutu rebel group established in eastern Congo following the genocide. The operation, called Umoja Wetu (literally “our unity”), was launched at the end of January 2009, but limited to North Kivu. By the end of March, a subsequent operation, Kimia II, composed of FARDC and combatants from former militia, assumed responsibility until the end of 2009, without clear outcomes; it has now been replaced by the operation Amani Leo launched in early 2010 with a minimal level of support from MONUC.

All these efforts have not prevented frequent clashes between armed groups, often a result of the absence of progress in security sector reform or from competing interests. These disconnections were also support by cultural, physical and information divides, which fracture even more here than in other parts of the world the terrain of fluid armed movements.

Since the signing of the peace accord, the conditions around conflict in eastern DRC have not considerably improved, with episodes of recurring violence. Large
parts of the Kivu provinces, certain parts of Ituri, and parts of Maniema province, remain in the hands of foreign or local armed groups, independent of the state.

A map of the conflict in the eastern DRC, drawn up by MONUC in 2009, represents the situation described above:

This map shows the consolidation of international efforts coordinated by the UN, in addition to the corridors used by armed groups. By basing their operations mostly outside the main towns, these armed groups are capable of blocking and hampering transport along the major traditional transport routes. This map illustrates the extent of their activities and the challenges they pose to international aid operations. To operate effectively, organisations need to be mobile and well coordinated across an extremely difficult terrain, and remain in permanent contact with local populations.

2.2 Scope of the Evaluation

At first glance, the general conditions of national stability and its development, as described above, could call into question the idea that conflict prevention and peacebuilding has had any effect. However such a judgement would ignore the key questions that justify a detailed evaluation: how significant were the contributions of international actors? Without them, would the situation have been worse? Up until which point were these actors effective? Finally, what lessons can be gleaned from their initiatives?

These questions constitute the heart of international policies in the DRC. They force the observer to measure the influence in reduction of violence, as a policy objective, on the conflict.
The evaluation was meant to concentrate on three provinces: South Kivu, North Kivu and Orientale, with particular focus in the latter on Ituri District. This choice was guided by the fact that the majority of peace efforts were concentrated in the evaluation period, and where the worst violence had occurred since 2002. It is worth noting however that even if particular conditions prevail in eastern DRC (and certainly notwithstanding similar contexts in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda), the evaluation conclusions can translate in applicability to other parts of the DRC. The conclusions can be generalised across the country, and even other conflict contexts globally. This is a result of the prevalence of similar conflict drivers, and structural conditions, found in a number of other provinces.

The evaluation questions, as presented in the Terms of Reference (see Annex 1), push for a global analysis of the implementation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives as they related to the OECD evaluation criteria. These criteria are: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, and lead to an overall understanding of performance that is presented in conclusion.

The evaluation questions are formulated as they follow in the TOR, which frames the study’s general mandate:

1. **What Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building (CPPB) policies and strategies were put in place by the agencies commissioning the evaluation? How were they defined? Did they evolve over time?** This part is addressed in particular in the Policy Report (see below 2.1), resulting in the first steps of the evaluation.

2. **What was the role of the government and other parties at the regional level?** This question seeks to define independent actions not covered by the evaluation but that still have a defining influence. A detailed analysis is presented in the annexes of this report, as well as in the analysis of recent history and causes of conflict (Volume 2).

3. **To what extent do the donors coordinate their CPPB efforts, either amongst themselves or with local institutions? Is their CPPB approach coherent?** This question is addressed in this report under the general heading of coordination, as well as in the Policy Report.

4. **To what extent did the CPPB policies, strategies and interventions provide an accurate or relevant response to the conflict and to the harm that it has caused and still continues to cause? Were the objectives defined according to the real priorities?** This question critical to the manner in which we treated the criteria of relevance in this report. In general, this criteria of relevance is defined in the OECD-DAC evaluation glossary as alignment to policy objectives and country needs.

5. **To what extent did the interventions achieve their objectives? What are the outcomes of the CPPB interventions? And are they sustainable?** This question is addressed in relation to effectiveness, defined as the degree to which intended aims have been met. We also consider sustainability under
a section focusing on impact. Sustainability is defined as the ability of a program to continue providing benefit after its closure, and thus relates to the analysis on duration of influence.

6. **How do the interventions compare to other options that donors did not choose but of which they were aware?** This question is addressed under the heading of efficiency. Admittedly, efficiency is usually defined as the achievement of the best possible results with the resources given, but this criteria is known for its difficulty in evaluating, as costs are frequently hidden and constraints are obvious. Nonetheless, the Steering Committee defined it as “opportunities not capitalised on” — referring to forms of indirect misuse or squander.

7. **What is the impact of the CPPB policies and strategies on the selected themes?** This question does not apply to the entire range of efforts to address conflict (often anecdotal in a number of evaluations), but is restricted to the question, as requested by the TOR, with certain themes, so as to define the importance of contributions to these certain domains. It should also be noted that the TOR tended to narrow the evaluation towards interventions undertaken by members of the Steering Committee.

Questions 4 to 7 are addressed in a crosscutting manner through the selected evaluation themes in the thematic chapters, as requested by the ToR.

The evaluation team was accompanied by a Steering Committee that provided advice throughout the process, and quality assurance for the different reports. Constituted in early 2009, the Steering Committee brings together members who chose to take part in the evaluation; these members provided the project database to cover and defined the framework of the evaluation.

The Steering Committee is made up of the evaluation departments of the following agencies:

- The Belgian Federal Public Service for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.
- The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
- The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (for which we use the German acronym BMZ).
- The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID).
- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
- United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).
In order to acquire a solid empirical knowledge, the evaluation team received from the Committee a database with 351 projects at various stages of implementation, from which the team was invited to select evaluation case studies. It was recommended to select 50 to 60 projects per theme, and to visit 20 to 25 interventions. From these, 5 to 6 would constitute an in-depth evaluation.

The projects covered were sometimes jointly funded or were, in other cases, supported by a single donor. However, the aim of the evaluation is not to evaluate the results of each donor, nor to compare them, but rather to see how the various parts came together as a whole.

The fact that some important donors in the DRC, such as the European Commission, the US Agency for International Development, the World Bank, Sweden and France, are not represented in the Steering Committee, does not weaken the relevance of the general conclusions, as one should consider the general results achieved.
3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Outline of the evaluation

A team of 15 individuals, comprising regional, technical and evaluation expertise, were deployed from October 2009 to September 2010. The team, representing eight nationalities, divided into three consultants per region with other technical functions performed across the evaluation’s scope. The team was divided into sub-groups who shared certain report tasks. After an initial data collection and analysis period, a core group held meetings and feedback session from October 2010 to March 2011 in Europe and the DRC.

The Synthesis Report contains the principal evaluation conclusions. It starts with a conflict analysis from 2002-2010 (Chapter 3). This section is the foundation upon which performance was analysed. The policy interventions of the Steering Committee members are outlined and evaluated in Chapter 4.

The following chapters, 5 to 9, present the most significant conclusions from the project analysis phase, grouped according to theme. They follow classic evaluation criteria: coordination, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and impact. From there, conclusions and recommendations flow, of which a general nature was chosen in order to invite greater interest not only from actors in Congo but also institutions intervening in similar conditions in other parts of the world.

In addition, during the evaluation, and in accordance with the TOR, 4 other documents were developed:

- The Preliminary Report contains an analysis of the project database to be evaluated, as was presented by the Steering Committee. It captures the evaluation methodology presented at the inception meetings in January 2010 in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu, and that were subsequently adopted by the Steering Committee.
- The Policy Report (French and English versions) presents an examination of the strategies used by the eleven member organisations of the Committee, and an analysis of overall policy coordination. A sample of 51 projects was selected during this phase, based on the database.
- The Field Mission Report describes in detail the work achieved and the final adjustments made to the project sample, as a result of constraints and circumstances encountered. This field report was sent to the Steering Committee, the consultative groups, as was the Policy Report.
- The volume 2 of supplementary annexes from the synthesis report contains detailed analysis of certain aspects deemed particularly

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15 These reports are in the annexes and on the CD Rom.
16 Bunia was not visited at this stage for reasons of time.
important for developing the conclusions\textsuperscript{17}. This second volume is designed for individuals interested in deepening their understanding of some of the foundational analysis.

The evaluation team then proceeded to establish consultative groups in Kinshasa, Goma and Bukavu, and as of May 2010, in Bunia. These consultative groups, numbering about 100 individuals\textsuperscript{18} and were chaired by representatives of the Ministers of Planning and from each of the three Provinces. They constituted an important factor for maintaining the evaluation’s relevance; they allowed the evaluation to maintain an active dialogue with the principal stakeholders\textsuperscript{19}. These groups benefited from power point presentations of the overall evaluation conclusions, and were able to discuss the development of recommendations.

All the complementary reports to the synthesis report described above, as well as the power point slides, are in the public domain, and are available on CD-Rom.

\textbf{3.2 Analytical Framework and Choice of Evaluation Themes}

This evaluation has four elements that constitute its overall framework:

1. The evaluation questions (as described in the previous section and drawn from the TOR);
2. A conflict analysis (presented in Chapter 3);
3. A project sample (the full database is found in Chapter 4); and
4. The themes of intervention based on the hypotheses developed (presented further down in this chapter).

The framework could be represented in the following way:

\textsuperscript{17} This contains a full description, project by project of the 51 sampled, the conflict analysis and analysis of the mining sector as a source of conflict in addition to the links between justice and demobilisation, and a discussion on methodology.
\textsuperscript{18} The list of members of the Consultative Groups is provided in Appendix.
\textsuperscript{19} It should be noted that the consultative groups are distinct from the conflict mapping groups.
A Fourfold Reference Framework

Table 1: Referential representation of the Evaluation

An important document guided the evaluation: a project of guidelines developed by a working group of the OECD member states. Created in 2007, it aims to formulate, based on a pilot implementation period, a series of guidelines. The present evaluation is part of this pilot phase.

This project to develop guidelines explicitly states that peacebuilding and conflict prevention are interventions with policy orientations with the intention to reduce conflict. These diverse projects and interventions concentrate (though not always) in conflict zones, chosen because they are vulnerable or because they constitute an arena of serious inter-group tensions.

Admittedly, the prevention of conflicts aims to eliminate all acts of violence, and peacebuilding is the vehicle to support efforts to avoid a return to conflict. Yet, to the degree to which a country’s ‘cycle of violence’ is not easily recognisable, it is often impossible to distinguish between the practice of conflict prevention and peacebuilding (sometimes grouped under the acronym CPPB, which we will avoid using in this report as it is not well known). Despite being distinct, these two concepts overlap to a large extent.

20 « Guidelines for the Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities – Working Document for the Pilot Phase. » OCDE 2008. A working group bringing together evaluation staff was constituted under the auspices of the OECD to provide guidance, such as was used for this evaluation, as a point of reference and for verifying further applicability. This group should meet at the beginning of 2011 to capitalise on the experience of this evaluation in addition to a couple others, and to produce a definitive guiding document. An annex was prepared and attached to this document (Annex 10).
It unfolds a difficulty to distinguish between activities—whether they are support or not by a state, by donors, and by aid organisations—that may be considered as direct contributors or alternatively as indirect contributors to the prevention of conflicts and peacebuilding.

The OECD guidelines provide a practical definition of the four categories of conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies, termed Utstein in the OECD guide, which allowed for the framing of the evaluation:

1. Interventions that encourage a culture of justice, truth and reconciliation, often indispensable in post-conflict settings where there are social relationships to heal;

2. Capacity building and good governance that are essential to safeguarding individual security needs, particularly when states are incapable or unwilling to implement appropriate measures for peacekeeping, or to facilitate sustainable peace through social service delivery;

3. The policies and actions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding often align themselves to systems promoting non-violent resolution of conflicts. Support to security and justice sectors—including actors in the judicial, penitentiary, police, parliament, defense and military—is critical, and must be considered within a long-term project-focus aimed at promoting better governance within these sectors and, ultimately, respect and dignity for the most vulnerable citizens;

4. Socio-economic development and its underlying policies are important, even during periods of hostility. It is essential to address violence and structural inequalities in order to reduce tensions and improve society’s capacity to prevent violence—which often forms part of conflict prevention work.21

These four broad categories allowed the evaluation to adopt a more global approach, by assuming that no single intervention undertaken in the DRC can be considered on its own within the framework of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The only exception may be the peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN. They were excluded from the project database, except for a few STAREC projects (this will be explained further). However, they are all tackled through the perspective of their contribution to conflict and peace dynamics.

At the heart of the categories, and in line with the TOR, the team identified certain representative themes. It should be noted that the analysis of these themes is not and should not be linked to an analysis of the sectors of cooperation that support them. They are chosen in order to allow for a more coherent approach

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towards the prevention of conflicts, not in order to evaluate the technical performance of these sectors. Their logic is not necessarily the search for peace, and a sector analysis would have unnecessarily complicated the evaluation.

The themes were chosen as a result of the indicators emerging from the first phase and the Policy Report. These indicators were developed as hypotheses in collaboration with the consultative groups over the course of two meetings before their final selection. The analysis of the suite of project activities and the discussions allowed for identification of five themes:

1. A theme revolved around the question of compartmentalisation of aid efforts, where procedures, specialisations and differing mandates calls into question the very nature of the overall, integrated nature of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The humanitarian aid and SGBV sectors were chosen together given the highly specialised focus of their activities, but equally due to their large proportion of projects within the overall database treating these sectors—something that was considered an indication of their importance in the DRC. This theme relates to the Utstein category of socio-economic development, in addition to the culture of peace and reconciliation.

2. The theme of justice is at the core of donor and UN agency policy for the DRC. It clearly illustrates the constant tension between, on the one hand, the risk of justice’s effectiveness being undermined by the State, and on the other hand, the creation of sovereign, independent judicial powers, and the popular confidence that should envelop justice initiatives. In the Utstein categories, our attention is focused on the category of justice.

3. Security sector reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) efforts underline the contrast between the technical excellence of the projects and the complex environment in which they operate, where often local interests and dynamics seek to usurp and use these processes for political benefit.

4. Mining activities equally are revealed as one area in which local predatory interests (even though they are rarely cited as sources of conflict by the population consulted) are exhibited and constitute a theme also closely linked to regional cooperation, the governance of natural resources and overall economic growth. It has been associated within the category of good governance.

5. Capacity building appeared a key theme by the evaluators from the evaluation’s outset. Following the team’s successive visits to the DRC, the evaluators became increasingly aware of the problems related to weakness—perhaps even the complete absence—of the State in the conflict zones, this problem having been raised strongly during local interviews. The marginalisation or distancing of institutions to which their complaints are directed is a significant factor of weakness for any conflict prevention and peacebuilding coalition. This theme relates to the Utstein category on the culture of justice, truth and reconciliation.
The choice of themes allowed for a structured analysis by re-grouping projects, and by subsequently applying the evaluation criteria as detailed above. Each team member was assigned to a theme during the data collection phase in the field, providing for five sub-field teams. Four people focused on quality control of reports, ensuring the reports in both languages.

3.3 Evaluation Sample and Data Collection Methods

The project sample was thus done in relation to the themes, in order to highlight the hypotheses underpinning their conception. In total, 8 projects were selected for in-depth field evaluation as outlined in the TOR, 15 for interviews, and 30 for desktop study, as requested by the TOR.

The retained sample best illustrated the hypotheses initially identified. Sampling was confirmed through interviews and meetings with the Consultative Groups in DRC in January and March 2010, and submitted to the Steering Committee and the implementing agencies. Some adjustments were made during the thematic phase in the field as a result of further gathering of information.

The project sample retained is based on the following two criteria:

- The hypotheses from the policy phase constitute the first criteria. The team first chose projects that explore to the greatest degree a hypothesis in conjunction with a theme. Thus a project focused on payment disbursements to the FARDC reveals the way in which economic dynamics of actors at the field level inter-link to the military sector. The team then sought to understand if specific project did, or did not, conform to the hypothesis of the theme under which they were classified, and finally whether patterns could be observed between the projects in terms of performance (for instance, good communication with local actors).

- The need for balance in the selection of projects: The team sought to retain projects of various sizes, in addition to projects implemented at the beginning and the end of the evaluation period (2002-2009), including funding from all the Steering Committee members, and involving various types of implementing bodies (UN, NGO, bilateral organisations, etc).

The core analysis emanates before all else from the 8 projects evaluated in depth. The team then sought replication, or contradiction, in the projects evaluated in less depth (either through visits or on the basis of documentation). The partial findings were then consolidated into broader conclusions that could be applied more generally to peace initiatives and to development interventions in the DRC.

The use of research hypotheses was designed to eliminate the possible doubt that the conclusions were indeed valid, and not linked to the project sample. In fact the careful validation of the research hypotheses by all stakeholders allowed us to
be confident that they indeed took up the principal challenges and questions facing the institutional community working in this domain.

The projects were exposed to a progressive analysis, fairly classic for evaluation, and which the data is taken up in Volume 2 of this report. Individual interviews were held with agency representatives in the capitals (Brussels, London, Berlin, Bonn, The Hague and New York), in Kinshasa, or in the three provinces. Interviewees were selected using the “snowball” methodology, where with each interview new contacts were discovered and added to the list for follow-up interviews.

Local populations, including non-beneficiary groups, were consulted in 25 villages and administrative areas, including Bunia, Goma and Bukavu. The names and locations are found in the annex section. The nature of the 8 in-depth projects was an important consideration in the choice of visits, and each sub-team (grouped by theme) spent three weeks in the field, in order to reach stakeholders most concerned by the projects. Meetings were organised either independently by the evaluators, or through the assistance of donors and their implementing partners, at times with the presence of individuals involved directly in selected project implementation, or by others who were able to contribute impartial information. All fieldwork was complemented by secondary data source studies, such as past evaluations, specific research reports, and historical documentation.

Project analysis was done according to the different evaluation criteria. It is important to note that impact analysis (impact of certain projects, or impact of themes, such as requested in the TOR) is treated in a particular manner. The team sought to analyse how an intervention diminished or heightened what is referred to as conflict drivers. In adopting such an approach founded on the context we sought to avoid an analysis on the broader objectives of interventions—certain objectives with no reference to conflict, others formulated in terms too general to serve as a reference point for impact.

This last concept of drivers is however ambivalent: an event or a tendency that could either be a driver to peace or to conflict, depending on the orientation of the analysis. It is thus critical to note that it is events or tendencies that influence in an important way the changes in dynamics at the local level. This historical positioning of different locations (by avoiding generalisations, for example on poverty in Congo as a cause of conflict) is important for correct evaluation of interventions.

This approach of impact analysis involves then a judgement of the importance of a peace effort’s impact by way of three important angles: 1) its pertinence (is the driver well identified?); its duration of influence (is the intervention properly synchronised to the driver in question?); and its outreach (what proportion of the target group affected or influencing the driver is covered by the project
intervention?). This reference to accelerators intends to give a verifiable source of information and to avoid anecdotal observations about a project’s overall impact.

Focus group discussions, on the conflict analysis occurred in 7 locations, bringing together representatives chosen for their interest and potential influence on the conflict drivers. These groups rolled out through a facilitative process that culminated in a conflict mapping, or otherwise known, as a transitions diagram, at the local level. This process is described in detail in the annex on methodology. These conflict mappings enabled the team to enhance the preliminary context analysis done in an academic manner, by a conflict specialist working within our team. Important to note is that no objections were raised as to the validity of the mappings’ conclusions during the debriefing meetings and the circulation of the draft report, whether outside of DRC or within the country itself.

### 3.4 Limitations to the Evaluation: theory of change and drivers

Very little evaluation work has been done in the domain of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and several obstacles relating to methodology impacted the quality of the evaluation.

The major challenge to the evaluation rested with the context itself:
- The objectives of the project interventions are blurry and cannot serve necessarily as a stable point of reference (either because they quickly dissolve, or because they remain too general, ambiguous or informal);
- The external forces outside the interventions evaluated, commonly difficult for an evaluation (independent of interventions, they are are nonetheless decisive on the events and can falsify the analysis) combine with deliberate actions by certain actors to undermine the overall peace initiatives;
- Data collection is exposed to risk and difficulties inherent to program implementation in conflict contexts, in particular the potential loss of information, issues of confidentiality, and access in the collection process.

General instability and issues of access to isolated regions made it impossible to do a point of reference study, to have controlled groups, clear indicators and benchmark targets from other similar situations. As a result, it is not possible to lean on traditional analysis tools for evaluation of projects and programs of another nature.

Another important challenge arises relating to the role of objectives in terms of evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In reality only a small handful of projects could concretely be considered interventions to directly influence peace and conflict. Rather, the major bulk of the projects found in the

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22 In essence, this is a process whereby the invited participants are facilitated through a discussion with a clear outcome.
database were projects predicated on technical area or sector, for examples relating to judicial or humanitarian aspects. Whereas certainly such projects’ influence on conflict could appear clearly intuitive, the reality of the documents and interviews revealed a vision much less preventive than one would have thought. It is hazardous to attempt creating a link to the overall peace objective.

The evaluation thus opted for an approach gaining increasing attention in the field of conflict evaluation, that conflict-sensitivity. It entails, when an intervention is considered ‘sensitive’, to minimise negative effects on the conflict and to maximise opportunities for peace. Therefore a project to reform the mining code may have a positive influence on peace, but is indirect, and not necessarily defined in the project documents or in the interviews. The evaluation team is thus required to capture this link and to measure its impact within the broader efforts towards peace, without making reference to a project’s objectives and its performance indicators.

Studies undertaken by the OECD working group, operating in parallel to this evaluation, have tried several approaches. Recognising the pressure for evaluations to focus on specific results, and thus to justify increasing financial expenditures in the domain of peacebuilding, the link between causality and attribution of impact remains problematic. We will return to this in the annex of Volume 2 that makes some recommendations.

The team thus avoided to fall back onto what would have been, naturally, a fifth element in the analytical framework, namely the donors’ individual strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. We opted for the use of strategies as a contextual point of reference, allowing the team to situate an intervention’s genesis within a historical description. This approach was however recommended in the TOR. In effect the model most often found in evaluation is to analyse the way in which the anticipated becomes the reality. The question is thus to know if the right type of implementation strategy contributed to overall peace. Whereas, it became apparent that these strategies in the DRC are not clear enough to allow for such an approach, on the one hand as a result of outside interferences on strategies, and on the other, a lack of transparency in the interventions.

23 Parallel studies addressing similar questions include: the evaluation of donor conflict sensitive development strategies in Sri Lanka (led by DAC-OECD, already published); evaluation of Norwegian support to the construction of peace in Haiti (led by NORAD, already published); and the multi-donor evaluation for support towards the prevention of conflict and peacebuilding in South Sudan 2005-2010 (led by the Netherlands, in preparation); These evaluations adopted different strategies. In Sri Lanka, the evaluation compiles existing evaluations and historical tendencies; whereas in Sudan it combines factors of conflict and the categories of conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies outlined in the OECD guidelines; and whereas in Haiti, the evaluation reconstructs theories leading to Norwegian program design.  
24 Worth noting is that this conclusion appears across all evaluations in the implementation phase, a phenomenon that is examined in Chapter 4 on strategy analysis.
The TOR suggested regardless of the articulation of theories of change (implicit hypotheses that explain the choice of intervention for each project), as they reflect the links between causality of interventions and the problems they seek to address. This approach would have encountered the same problem as that of analysis of strategy documents, further exposed to subjectivity of the interpretations brought from the team. The layers of actors and decision-making forums relative to the execution of projects exclude a strategic appropriation. The theory of change requires a theorist, there where we find in reality a process undergoing permanent adaptation and compromise by a large group of heroic actors.

The four elements in the framework that were thus retained by the team, and most importantly the contextual factors of conflict, became the main reference point for the evaluation. The use of conflict analysis is well founded in the project guidelines of the OECD. The factors of peace or conflict are the most important criteria in evaluating the impact of interventions and projects. The evaluation’s starting point is thus not the interventions objectives, but rather the factors of conflict or peace, and the connection to project effects.

Highlighting another angle the surprising complexity of instruments and intervention strategies, the principal task (and not budgeted for) of our work turned out to be information gathering from the donors and implementing agencies on their strategies and projects. The time devoted to this research absorbed 70% of the evaluation’s time, as opposed to concentrating efforts at the field interview level. This is due to the fragmented nature information management, and the overstretched time available from the donor focal points to provide documentation, often requiring the information-gathering process to be re-launched several times over the course of the evaluation.

In some cases, we discovered, while in the field, that one or more projects selected were part of an overall program. In other cases, we were promised additional project documents by donor agencies and/or implementing partners, but were then asked to review the official donor websites, which lacked basic information. In some cases, the team found it difficult to identify appropriate contact persons or to obtain sufficient material evidence regarding specific projects, and these are consequently given limited coverage (as is indicated in appendix). In regards to this, as remarked by one civil servant from the Belgian Embassy, it is often the projects that are the most transparent that are evaluated the most.

In some cases, the team was missing documents, which delayed the work. Some evaluations, such as one commissioned by DFID on its DRC country program, or another commissioned by the Netherlands in early 2010 on ISSSSS, were shared much too late with the team.
It needs to be noted that the list of projects does not correspond to a single logic, but is the result of the interpretation of data by the members of the Steering Committee as regards the notion of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This has had the effect of reducing the general validity of conclusions. As it was not easy to leave this empirical base, it is possible that certain conclusions (in particular on the prevalence of certain types of interventions) were slightly distorted.

Two elements of the framework, the evaluation questions and the list of projects were well-defined externally (that is given by the Steering Committee). The other two elements (conflict analysis and themes for evaluation) emanated from the team’s observations, and solidified at the evaluation’s end. For these last two, the team acknowledges that the limitations of its analysis led to an awkward integration of the conflict analysis into the evaluation’s over timeline.

The conflict drivers retained by the evaluation are often too general. Furthermore, the weakness of the state, which should have been better contextualized during the project evaluation period. Similarly the evaluation did not take into consideration the gender lens relating to the drivers, by examining for instance the potentially contrasting impacts of the conflict and projects on women and men. Such a gendered analysis would have certainly produced very specific recommendations.

In retrospect, we recognize that the conflict analysis should have been done at the national and local level during the initial Policy phase, instead of during the field visits as happened. Such an initial product would have become a stronger point of reference for analyzing critical conditions of certain conflict drivers right from the desktop study phase, and before preparation for the field visits. Instead, in trying to understand not only the conflict drivers but equally the projects and their implementation while in the field, it was difficult for the team to retrace these links with sufficient rigor, which comes out in the reading of the thematic chapters of this evaluation.
4. CONFLICT ANALYSIS

4.1 National Level Factors of Peace and Conflict

The ample literature on the conflict in the DRC shows considerably diverse views on the main sources and dynamics of conflict and on prevention priorities\(^{25}\), in particular, the role of natural resources (minerals and to a lesser extent timber)\(^{26}\).

However, there is general consensus on indirect causes that can be summarily listed as follows:

- Ethnic grievances and clashing identities\(^{27}\).
- The effects of state collapse, notably inter-elite power struggles.
- Conflicts over resources, including land and natural resources\(^{28}\).
- A regionalised war context, and particularly the impact on the DRC of the neighbouring conflicts and political strategies\(^{29}\).

Without repeating an analysis of these factors\(^{30}\), it is worth looking more precisely at the effects produced by the general lack of social services, the process of decentralization, the rule of law, and the political economy.

Since 2003, and in particular following the elections of 2006, hopes were high among Congolese that the country’s history of authoritarian rule and predatory governance would evolve more favorably. However, no firm commitment to institution-building took place, and the promises of improved service delivery (“les cinq chantiers”) produced few results over the years. These unrealised expectations engendered high levels of frustration at different levels of society, while simultaneously power is becoming increasingly tightened with a few personalities.

Decentralisation is one of the principal pieces in this evolving political landscape as it is directly related to the core issues of reform of the entire governance system, reform that includes the equitable sharing of resources among regions and between different levels of state administration\(^{31}\). The main issue of concern


\(^{26}\) For an overview of these debates, see Annex 8.


\(^{30}\) See in particular the Policy Report from this evaluation and Annex 9 from the Synthesis Report.

here is the allocation of resources to the provinces. Demands for fiscal re-
arrangements immediately followed the election of the provincial assemblies and
governors in 2006-2007. Even if according to the constitution provinces are to
manage 40 % of tax revenues, there is lack of clarity on this question, and
unilateral action by the central government has led to growing dissatisfaction
with Kinshasa32.

The DRC has a poor record as regards the promotion of democratic space and
respect for human rights. Freedom of speech is another worrying issue. It is
reported that journalists and human rights activists are regularly threatened,
illegally detained, harassed or killed, and security services, as with armed groups,
are implicated in politically motivated human rights violations33.

The presence of uncontrolled armed groups produces persistent insecurity. Since
2003, progress has been slow in reforming the Congolese army, the police and the
justice system34. Several reports have denounced the Congolese army’s
involvement in acts of violence, sexual abuse and the collection of illegal taxes
along major roads in remote areas, at market places or at mine sites35.

The peace process and efforts of demobilisation and reintegration have not
reduced the number of armed groups, who had emerged during the war in Congo. Some areas of the Kivu provinces remained over the course of the entire
evaluation period in the hands of non-state armed actors, including the Rwandan
Hutu force FDLR (estimated to be a few thousand strong). Since 2005, the smaller
but more violent Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army, has started operating
from the DRC, with its military bases in the Garamba national park. Other groups
such as the CNDP maintain links with Rwanda.

In the absence of a properly functioning state and judicial system (see further
below), the recourse to “privatised” security through armed groups and ethnic
militia raised to defend group interests or prey on weaker opponents has
complicated the peacebuilding process in DRC. It led, furthermore, to a
proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, a dynamic against
which donors have deployed considerable financing to address through the DDR
and SSR initiatives.

The Congolese justice system lacks credibility; it is deprived of equitable
procedures and rules and maintains a delicate relationship with customary law
that prevails in the majority of the territory. It is particularly inept in dealing with
complex property conflicts, especially over land ownership. As a result, frequent
displacements and predatory practices by armed groups have made land-based

33 See regular reports by Human Rights Watch, UN Human Rights Commission and Amnesty International.
Provinces”, ISS.
35 See Human Rights Watch
clashes a significant factor of conflict. With a justice system lacking political commitment, competence, independence and resources, insecurity persists: murder, torture, collection of illegal taxes, arbitrary arrests, destruction or pillaging of private property and sexual violence against girls and women, all continue to be part of daily life for many Congolese, in a climate of impunity.

Attempts to revitalise the Congolese economy have mainly focused on natural resources. A new forestry and mining code have been approved by the Congolese parliament, and mining and forestry contracts been revised. A large-scale contract with China has been signed to improve the necessary infrastructure for economic growth.

Following IMF and government forecasts, the Congolese economy should have grown by 8% a year from 2008 onwards, mainly due to increasing mineral exports. However this prediction has not been realised. Foreign investors were discouraged by a variety of factors, including the sudden drop in commodity prices in 2008-2009, slow progress and lack of transparency in the revision of mining contracts, lack of reforms in public finances, and bad publicity from the presumed relationship between resources and violence, particularly in the East.

Since the early 2000s, experts and donors have increasingly viewed conflict in the DRC as a means for powerful actors to acquire or maintain commercial advantages, often through the exploitation of natural resources and control over trading activities. Despite modest progress in the re-industrialisation of the DRC mining sector since the end of the war, still artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) accounts for 90% of the country’s production. Though this is not a direct source of conflict, the deregulated nature of the sector encourages abuse and illegality. ASM remains crucial to the country’s economy, and the World Bank estimates that between 14% and 16% of the Congolese population depend on this activity (directly or indirectly).

Numerous reports and publications have illustrated in detail Rwanda’s stake in the Congo wars, pointing to security and economic interests as the main motives for Rwanda’s support to Congolese rebel groups. Since the official of Congo’s war in 2003, Rwanda has played a key role in the Kivu provinces. A UN Group of Experts investigated the respect for the regional arms embargo formulated by the UN for all non-government armed forces since 2005: it reveals Rwanda’s logistical and military support to the rebel forces of Laurent Nkunda in North Kivu, known by their French acronym, CNDP (National Congress for the Defence of the People).

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36 Vlassenroot and Romkema (2007), Local Governance and Leadership in Eastern DRC.
38 See UN Panel of Experts (2001, 2002 and 2003). Academic publications on this issue mostly refer to empirical data provided by these reports.
Since 2009, we’ve seen modest improvements in diplomatic relations between Rwanda and the DRC, reflecting in part shifts in the relations between the Government of Rwanda and international donors, where sadly their focus has been more clearly centred on regional peace.

Since the start of the “Nkunda war” in North Kivu, resource competition has become the main paradigm and a dominant issue in advocacy, which is reflected in different programmes and initiatives by international donors. Nevertheless, some justified controversy still exists regarding the role played by natural resources. Beyond conclusions regarding the correlation between frequency of human rights abuses and proximity to mines or their commercial platforms, research analysis reveals that the relationship between resources and conflict is indirect. Furthermore, there is also a lack of sufficient empirical data on resource activities in eastern DRC, particularly on conditions in mining sites and local value chains.

4.2 Conflict determinants in eastern Congo

The team equally leaned on its own members’ observations to develop a broad analysis of the conflict drivers. The section below presents a synthesis of the analysis above, in order to identify the analytical foundation of politics and economics, the key drivers that have a specific influence on eastern Congo, and that should be taken into consideration for the prevention of conflict, if they constitute conflict drivers, or in the case of peacebuilding, if they constitute drivers to peace.

The concept of drivers is distinct from the more general terms of causes or factors of conflict, and serves to distinguish events and trends that have a relationships to the situation—in other words, they are distinct elements recognisable to all observers and that hold a strong degree of influence. Aid interventions can have an influence on drivers (such as impunity for war criminals), whereas others remain outside the international sphere of influence (for example the results of elections). For drivers susceptible to influence, it is possible to identify the critical conditions that underpin them.

**Unresolved land issues:** Unresolved issues create a very volatile context in many parts of eastern DRC. One such issue is the distribution of land. In South and

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39 For further information please refer to the annexes on conflict analysis and to the Inception Report.
41 See Garrett et al. (2009) and Jackson (2003, 2006).
42 One interesting exception is International Alert (2009).
North Kivu, the return of Tutsi landowners who left for Rwanda in the early stages of the war is leading to severe tension. These landowners are reclaiming their land, but face resistance from new occupants who settled there during the war. This latter group relies on counter-claims that these Tutsi are not returnees but in fact new arrivals.

In Ituri, struggles over land remain an important source of instability. The sources of such clashes include disputes over user rights and the attribution of land ownership. The main reasons for the rise in violence are inequality of access to land between ethnic communities, increased demographic pressure (most notably from large-scale population displacements), the absence of an institutional framework and the weak performance of the administration and justice system in the reconciliation and arbitration of land disputes.

Unequal pressure facing mining companies: In Ituri and the Kivu provinces, rivalry for control over artisanal mining activities and trading networks was a frequent source of tension between local and regional elites. During the war, armed groups increasingly gained control over this resource sector and introduced new security and taxation structures. Control over mining sites became a crucial part of military strategies, and armed confrontation was often concentrated in mining areas.

The peace process has not been able to reverse this dynamic. Instead, it has favored the creation of sophisticated parallel structures for resource extraction such as gold, cassiterite, wolframite and coltan. In a bid to assure themselves security, these structures often involve close cooperation between army commanders, and territorial administrators.

Such complex pockets of power, bringing together economics, military and politics, hinders the emergence of an economic of peace and access to international investment for the mining sector. They continually risk turning the Congolese army into a coalition of semi-autonomous military-economic structures.

Paradoxically, by discouraging foreign investment, which perceives great risk from these informal network towards its own reputation, the DRC is missing out on an important opportunity for development—a type of development through employment that would respond to the needs of ex-combatants, for instance. Whereas large-scale industrial mining may not lend itself sufficiently to the scale

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45 Garrett et al. (2009).
of employment necessary in eastern Congo, it can be encouraged to allow for social investments of a more sustainable nature than aid projects that only have a short time horizon.

The control of mine sites and the trade chains associated with it continues to be denounced as one of the principal drivers to on-going armed group mobilisation in North and South Kivu.

*Rupture in political dialogue*: Great hopes were placed in the peace process as the path towards greater stability, democratic rule and the improvement of living conditions. Few of these expectations have been met, affecting a population that remains nonetheless profoundly patriotic. Since the start of the various peace initiatives for eastern Congo, state services have not contributed to a reduction in violence nor have they supported efforts for development, peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Since 2003, the progressive return of the state has not seen the dissipation of rent-seeking practices. Beyond confirming the existence of a central state (which is accepted by the vast majority of Congolese), national elections had a limited impact on governance. In North and South Kivu, political dialogue at the provincial level is absent. Provincial assemblies suffer from members’ low capacity and high corruption levels.

Since 2003 in Ituri, attempts were made to restore the administrative apparatus and improve the justice system, but in the absence of competencies and resources, this administration has not met its principal objectives. At the local level, the administration is largely absent and incapable of responding to population needs, with a glaring lack of resources; in contrast, administrative positions are sought to increase personal benefit.

Another problem in Ituri, a district and not a province, is the decentralisation process. Whereas at the provincial level decentralisation entails a transfer of power, responsibilities and resources to the “*chefferie*”, the districts remain “de-concentrated” administrative entities with limited financial autonomy. Such unequal distributions of powers cause tensions between the various levels of bureaucracy. The new 2006 constitution envisages that Ituri will become its own province as part of the decentralisation process, yet the current administrative weakness renders it difficult in establishing structures and capacities necessary for its effective functioning.

*Slow progress in the DDR process*: Even if it has been a dominant issue from donors’ perspectives, little progress has been made regarding DDR in the eastern provinces. In particular, the relatively small number of ex-combatants

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*See also Raeymaekers, T., Sharing the spoils : the reinvigoration of Congo’s political system, *Politorbis*, 2007.*
reintegrated is indicative, in part, of the continued proliferation of armed groups and the recent heightened insecurity.

Between 2004 and 2007, Ituri underwent three main demobilisation processes (*Programme Opérationnel du Désarmement et de Réinsertion Communautaire*” (2004); National DDR Programme (2005 and 2007)), resulting in the demobilisation of more than 20,000 former combatants. Nevertheless, splinters of former militias continued to operate, and new groups have been created.

In South Kivu, a significant demobilisation process was instituted as part of the Amani peace process. By the end of this process in July 2009, less than 2,000 of the total 28,000 combatants targeted were registered in the centres of Luberizi and Kalehe, with only a minority then being processed. In 2009, a new agreement was signed, but its formulation incited further conflicts within military and political structures, causing schisms in militia leadership and consequently spurring a re-mobilisation of combatants.

These DDR efforts have not satisfied expectations for a variety of reasons. First, there has been limited long-term perspective on alternative livelihoods for combatants and their families. Second, there has been absence in progress to treat the structural causes of conflict and the concerns of communities. Last, a deficiency exists in establishing transitional justice mechanisms (which means that a small security incident can lead to serious consequences) continues to nourish defiance between communities and to trigger re-mobilisation of ethnic militia.

*Peace process paradox:* The Amani peace process initiated in Goma in January 2008 reshaped the local balance of politico-military power and influence in North and South Kivu. Rather than pacifying the province and demobilising remaining militias, it offered an additional incentive to militia formation and further complicated the security situation. The Amani talks reintroduced a rational for mobilisation and war in the region by offering rebel leaders compensation in exchange for their disarmament. As one interviewee remarked, a compensation mechanism as a disarmament incentive, actually became an incentive to create, or pretend to control, violent armed groups.

Several armed groups swelled their ranks to benefit from DDR compensation schemes (including politico-military recognition, access to demobilisation kits and other resources). The promise of DDR compensation, as described in the Amani negotiations, was used by armed groups to consolidate smaller factions into larger ones. In South Kivu alone, since the start of the Amani peace talks, roughly 20 new militias have been recorded. In North Kivu, a similar

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phenomenon exists. In March 2009, a new agreement was signed between the various armed actors, but it has not been fully implemented, particularly on questions such as the recognition and allocation of ranks within the FARDC, or the integration of Mai-Mai groups.

In summary, the main conflict drivers for eastern Congo, as identified by the team’s research and analysis, were:

- Access and ownership of land, leading to violence and insecurity in the more isolated areas;
- Absence of responsible mining sector investment, heavily discouraged in such high-risk areas;
- Appointment of political positions according to personal relations and individual identity;
- Weak public administration;
- A confused processes of decentralisation.
- Schisms, multiplications of armed groups, and the creation of false groups;
- Absence of transitional justice mechanisms, or mechanisms capable of bridging the divide between customary and modern systems;
- Development of parallel structures for resource exploitation, in particular cross-border trading networks.

4.3 Results of Conflict Mapping Workshops

In order to triangulate the conflict analysis, the team carried out, in parallel to its field research, seven participatory conflict-mapping workshops in the eastern DRC, allowing opportunity for local stakeholders to describe the conflicts in their own words. On a wall-sized map, the participants drew arrows connecting events and trends that they identified themselves. The arrows denote their judgement that one event or trend increases the probability of another event or trend. Certain events and certain trends attracted more arrows, creating nodes that denote particularly dynamic drivers of peace and conflict. It is possible to rank these nodes by counting the number of arrows. This method ensured that local knowledge was used while avoiding manipulation.

The results of these conflict mapping processes, held with seven different groups in eastern DRC, are presented below, where the numbers indicate the numbers of arrows to and from the particular events and trends cited. The greater the number of arrows, the stronger is the indication of the priority of this driver. This prioritisation is not a direct reflection of the priorities ascribed by the participants, but rather a product of their description of how a particular event or trend increases the probability of others occurring.

49 The methodology is fully described in the Inception Report, while the individual workshops are described in the Mission Report.
The team invited the participants to the workshops. Each had an average of 10 participants, representing civil society organisations, NGOs and UN agencies, Government departments, a few academics, military personnel and journalists.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict drivers</th>
<th>Conflict Mapping workshop, Shabunda, 6 May*</th>
<th>Conflict Mapping workshop, Bunia, 6 May</th>
<th>Conflict Mapping workshop, Bukavu, 13 May</th>
<th>Conflict Mapping workshop, Goma 13 May</th>
<th>Conflict Mapping workshop, Goma 21 May</th>
<th>Conflict Mapping workshop, Bunia 31 May</th>
<th>Conflict Mapping workshop, Bukavu, 22 May</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
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<td>Ownership of land / lack of progress in resolving land conflicts</td>
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<td>Goma agreements</td>
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<td>Population lack of faith in Government policies</td>
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<td>Rwandan interests (land, resources, mining)</td>
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<td>National elections</td>
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<td>Restoration of institutions in DRC</td>
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<td>Lack of education and health infrastructure</td>
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<td>Lack of work / low living conditions</td>
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<td>Competition in control of mining areas</td>
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<td>Rapid Intervention Police (behaviour of special police force)</td>
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<td>Mobilisation/proliferation of armed groups</td>
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<td>Appearance of the Maï Maï</td>
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<td>Inter-ethnic war/conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Various massacres/killings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of military capacity / lack of progress in integration of the army (Kalehe)</td>
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<td>Proliferation of weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrival of Rwandan refugees after genocide/porosity of borders</td>
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<td>Manipulation/abuses against the population</td>
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<td>Sexual violence</td>
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<td>Several military initiatives (CNDP)</td>
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<td>Extension of areas/zones in DRC 2000-2002</td>
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<td>2010: Disappointment of populations and increased insecurity</td>
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<td>Insecurity/permanent destabilisation</td>
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<td>Ignorance of the population's rights</td>
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<td>Human rights violations by FARDC during the campaign against FDLR</td>
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<td><strong>International Initiatives</strong></td>
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<td>Passivity of MONUC</td>
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<td>MONUC operations (Chapter 6)</td>
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<td>Sun City linked to international support</td>
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<td>International pressure on conflict actors</td>
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<td>International issues, colonial economy, tied aid</td>
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*Table 2: Results of Conflict Mapping Workshops held in the field*
Other issues considered central to CPPB in general, such as SGBV, improved economic conditions, and elections also featured, but less prominently. This does not mean that they are not underlying structural factors of conflict (the mapping methodology does not capture those) but rather that they are not perceived as clearly by the participants.

Whereas this observation does not contradict the drivers identified in the more academically-oriented narrative analysis, it does point to an important issue of perception: they are more contextualised, revealing more clearly particular aspects of a situation to which international actors exert a significant influence.

Admittedly the aggregation of responses would fall victim to some methodological scrutiny, yet this conflict analysis outlines a model of response that places greater priority on four key conflict drivers:

- Weak state capacity in the rural areas, as demonstrated by absence of services, irregular salary payments, and dilapidated infrastructure;
- Frequent land conflicts, linked to customary and modern interpretations of law, the frequent population movements displacement as a result of war, and the unregulated exploitation of natural resources (forests and minerals in particular);
- Economic and political opportunities captured by elite to mobilize armed groups. These mobilizations often splinter and reproduce, causing severe delays to the DDR process in general; and
- Emergence of extraction and trade chains for minerals, often controlled by armed groups, and criminal networks.

### 4.4 Conclusion Regarding Key Drivers

The evaluation uses these drivers as points of reference. They are re-grouped below in one overall table. Even though there are some divergences in perceptions between academics and the local stakeholders, there exists equally a remarkable convergence around the key drivers.

One should not forget that conflict drivers are also peace drivers. For example, if the absence of progress towards integration of armed groups into the army was reversed, and thus becomes efficient and fast, the driver “lack of progress” becomes a driver to peace. An event or a trend can be re-written and have the reverse effect on events and trends with which it is linked. This is why, they can be described as peace drivers, conflict drivers, or simply drivers of transition.

In light of the two sets of drivers, those of the researchers and those of the conflict mapping done by the population, the following comparison can be made:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Narrative Analysis of Drivers</th>
<th>Participatory Contextual Driver Mapping</th>
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| • Clashes over issues of access and ownership to land, creating bouts of insecurity in outlying areas.  
• Absence of transitional justice mechanisms, or mechanisms bridging customary and modern justice systems. | • Land ownership  
• Lack of progress in resolving land conflicts |
| • Nominations to positions of power often based on relationships and individual identity, low capacity of public administration.  
• Confused processes of decentralisation. | • Lack of Government capacity |
| • Slow process of DDR.  
• Schisms, multiplication of armed groups and the creation of false ones. | • Lack of progress in the integration of the army  
• Parallel military command structures  
• Mobilisation and proliferation of armed groups  
• Inter-ethnic war or conflict  
• Operation Amani Leo, and CNDP military initiatives |
| • Development of parallel structures for resource exploitation, in particular cross-border trading networks.  
• Lack of responsible investment in the mining sector | • Mining economy and war economy: strong links. |
| | • Internationally brokered accords and international pressure on belligerents (in particular Sun City and Goma Agreements) |
| | • Proliferation of small arms and weapons |
| | • Manipulation and abuses against the civilian population. |

From the 1st row, we have kept land ownership conflict. Frequent land related conflicts occur in areas of the East, due to the absence of land titles. Customary rights are disrupted by population movements and frequent access natural resources (mainly forests and mines).

From the 2nd row, we kept the weakness of the state. This includes a wide range of events and trends that mark the weakness of the state, in particular in rural areas, expressed as the exercise of personalised power, partisan elections based on ethnic affinities, the absence of services, erratic payment of salaries and poor infrastructure.
One critical condition that would transform this driver into a driver of peace would be if the local level partners with institutions of the state at the central level to spread the stabilising effect of national politics regarding peacebuilding.

From the 3rd, 5th, 6th and 7th rows emerge security sector issues, in particular the manner in which new groups continually emerge from the local dynamics. Involuntary incentives from peace agreements, fragmentation of armed groups and a stalling DDR process all contribute. This includes in particular the recognition awarded to self-proclaimed leaders, supported by militia.

From the 4th row, we retain the development of parallel structures for resource exploitation. This is related to control of mineral resources by smugglers, armed groups, and other criminal networks, and a web of intricate relations that are not necessarily illegal but can lead to considerable tension, even conflict.

This selection is justified as each driver represents a salient point to be considered in all activities of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

When we return to the five themes identified for the evaluation, we find a relationship between each theme and a specific driver:

- Land ownership conflict, correspondin to the theme of justice.
- The weakness of the state relates to two themes. First, the potential that humanitarian aid replaces the legitimacy and authority of the state apparatus. Aid delivery can aggravate or improve the functioning of state structures depending on how opportunities for collaboration are maximized by aid agencies. Second, the opportunity for coalition and capacity building in the delivery of social services. If properly harnessed, aid can serve as a political stabilizing factor at the national level.
- Questions relevant to the security sector describe a large range of security practices for which we have identified a theme regrouping a number of projects related to DDR and SSR.
- Natural resource exploitation relates to the theme of mining and natural resource governance.

Even if it is evident that each project could have an influence on many different transition drivers, it is useful to create a link between the theme and a key driver. In fact, it could be legitimate to ask why the evaluation of each theme (justice, resource exploitation, etc), as achieved in the next sections, does not examine its impact on the four drivers (state weakness, land, etc). To add such a level of analysis on the three drivers excluded would be interesting, but would contribute little to conclusion’s richness, and would render the observations regarding impact much more detailed.
We will as a result examine in greater detail the effects obtained by each theme on the conflict driver, which does not exclude the other drivers from interacting with the analysis at the level of impact.

1. Humanitarian aid and assistance to victims of SGBV = State weakness
2. Justice = land ownership
3. Security sector = security dynamics
4. Mining = natural resource exploitation
5. Capacity building = state weakness

The analysis concludes that instead of uniformly gathering around one cause (such as, in Sri Lanka, to take an example entirely different, power-sharing) peace and conflict in DRC is resolutely multi-polar.

In order to optimise impact, the approaches need to be fully informed and flexible, and take into account the evolution of national level factors, in addition to those of a provincial and territorial nature.
5. DONOR POLICIES

5.1 General Overview of Cooperation

The policy documents from the bilateral and multilateral agency members of the Steering Committee members\(^{50}\) show that intervention strategies and coordination modalities can be divided into two phases.

The first phase, from the Sun City Agreement of 2002 to the elections of 2006, can be described as a phase of re-engagement with the country: donors such as Belgium, re-established diplomatic relations and development programmes; others, like the U.K., increased their funding dramatically. Significant joint programmes were launched, such as the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme involving 40 national and international partners, which aimed to reintegrate some 350,000 former combatants spread across seven countries, and centred on the DRC. Donors maintain nonetheless a distance vis-à-vis the government, and resort first and foremost to projects. The evaluations concluded a low level of coordination amongst donors during this period.

The second phase is characterised by a stronger international endorsement of the DRC government, and a diversified investment across the country by donors and multilateral agencies; synergy is established between donors (for example Belgium decided not to concentrate financing in the East of the country, deemed “MONUC Zone”, leaving room for others); new approaches emerge like Germany’s natural resource governance programme and several large multi-donor programmes\(^{51}\), specifically designed to enhance conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This was accompanied by active support for peace processes – which remains the prerogative of diplomatic institutions, and as such is outside the scope of this evaluation\(^{52}\).

The chart below\(^{53}\) shows the amounts provided by bilateral and multilateral agencies in ODA to the DRC, as well as the proportion funded by the donors participating in this evaluation’s Steering Committee. International development actors spent an average US$1.5 billion per year over the last 8 years on aid in the DRC.

\(^{50}\) Policy Report. Appendix 7.

\(^{51}\) Basket programmes are trust funds established to support multi-component interventions, which can be funded by a large number of donors who accept the overall objectives and centralised management of funds. These programmes are typically managed by the UNDP and the World Bank, who have administrative procedures geared towards this type of disbursement mechanism.

\(^{52}\) Some, but not all, of the agencies that were represented on the Steering Committee requested that their diplomatic wing not be covered by the scope of the evaluation.

\(^{53}\) Source: OECD DAC website.
Table 3: Public Aid for Development in DRC. Source: OCDE DAC

The chart shows a spike in 2003 corresponding to a decision to cancel the national debt. However the overall pattern is one of sustained funding, from several sources. The aid increase in 2006 also underlines the importance given to the elections, seen as a way for the central government to re-establish its links to the population, notably with marginalised women’s groups. Quite a few projects were specifically designed to empower female voters around this event.

At the same time, a large degree of ambivalence persists over some years now regarding the attitude of donors towards the government, and vice versa. Over the course of the evaluation, we became increasingly aware of the magnitude of this cleavage, which affects not only the choice of aid instruments but equally the appropriation of results. Diplomatic representations in Kinshasa stress the need to work in partnership with the government, all while avoiding it in budget support, and in multiplying the projects to spend available budgets. Simultaneously, the government distrusts donor intentions, which it finds lacking in transparency and poorly coordinated with public policy.

The table below captures the perspectives gathered during the interviews and meetings, and forcefully articulated during the Consultative group meetings, which brought together all stakeholders.

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54 It should be noted that contributions to and from MONUC (USD 1.350 million budgeted for 2010) are non-ODA eligible, as they are considered to be “security related”. This definition of ODA is problematic for CPPB programmes, as they usually rely on a mix of both security and development funding (the work of MONUC was hence not covered by the evaluation as is further explained in methodology).

55 Plateforme de gestion de l’aide, managed by the Ministry of Interior.
Different perceptions of donors and local partners in DRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Partner Perceptions</th>
<th>Donor Perceptions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Decisions are made in capitals and Embassies and neglect all forms of consultation or grievance feedback mechanisms</td>
<td>• Lack of capacity is pervasive</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Donors complain of corruption but do not give the example of transparent funding</td>
<td>• The state is so corrupt as to become an optical illusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>• There is no funding available for state capacity. Civil society and contracts are incomparably wealthier</td>
<td>• NGOs represent the most convenient and field based set of actors for funding.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The project based approach remains the only option in such a fragile state</td>
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Table 4: Different Perceptions of Donors and Local Partners in DRC.
Source: Channel Research

This cleavage is not unique to DRC, and has been a feature of international efforts to resolve conflict crises since the 1990s, where the absence of a policy strategy vis-à-vis that state has diluted the effectiveness of interventions. Interventions in ‘fragile states’ suffer frequently from the atrophy of strategic frameworks, where development or stabilisation are reduced to the sector definitions given by the most common policy instruments: humanitarian aid, civil society, or even the military.

The DRC reflects characteristics inherent in many ‘fragile states’: isolated and removed regions; actors that combine political mobilisation with economic interests supported by violent acts; and the presence of important natural resources. A plethora of international interventions have been deployed, involving actors ranging from civilians from the EU (there are two in DRC) to Chinese construction companies to NGOs to human rights organisations based in the United States.

Equally the country is a pilot example of innovative humanitarian aid, with the ‘cluster’ approach for humanitarian action, harmonising aid with the Paris Declaration concerning fragile environments, support to border controls in a context of weak governance, and significant support towards “Track 2” mediation efforts led by regional and local organisations.

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56 It is sufficient here to make reference to the mediation missions in Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan, for example. A clear example was given in “The multi-donor evaluation of the response to the crisis in Rwanda”, Danida 1996.
Important strides have been made since 2007, with the Accra Action Plan and on development policy. However, major efforts are still needed to achieve its full adoption, and to include new important development actors such as China (where the National Bank for Development recognised in 2009 their importance above the World Bank as a donor), who remains outside the donor coordination framework. This equally could be said of civil society forces, including the Catholic Church, or even major mining companies who are contributing significant funding towards governance and development initiatives (it is estimated by Freeport MacMoRan that their social development budget will reach 10M US$ annually\textsuperscript{57}).

It should be underlined here, that this cleavage engenders a multiplication of consultation forums and projects (as opposed to real sector strategies). The PRSP\textsuperscript{58} in 2006, for example, was designed by the government in consultation with stakeholders and development partners, including the World Bank and the IMF\textsuperscript{59}. Another, the Country Assistance Framework (CAF), is a common planning tool bringing together 17 donors and multilateral agencies around 15 thematic groups. These operate on a technical level, with diverse funds depending on the sector, making an overarching harmonised approach even more difficult.

Alongside these forums that only indirectly concern peacebuilding, donors have given MONUC and the UN in general a considerable coordination role over the last decade. The diplomatic core has concentrated its efforts around this key institution, in line with the political negotiations in the region.

However, in terms of cooperation, efforts have been rather ambivalent. STAREC, the government stabilisation and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas, is the latest example (since June 2009). It was launched to establish a strategic framework capable of addressing key obstacles to peace in the eastern region of DRC and to consolidate the recent peace initiatives with other political and military ones. It identifies three main priorities of a short and medium term nature: 1) security and restoration of the state; 2) humanitarian assistance and social service delivery; and 3) economic recovery. The STAREC plan is managed by the government and funded by donors through a multi-donor fund mechanism. A Steering Committee sets the policy direction and each agency works within their respective domain.

To support this plan, the UN system and its key partners revised the Stabilisation Strategy developed in 2008 (the UNSSSS), renaming it the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS). The overall objective is to promote a

\textsuperscript{57} Personal interview with a sustainable development staff member.

\textsuperscript{58} The first PRSP dates back to 2001. The third one is underway, with a focus on sustainable development and should be finalised in 2011.

\textsuperscript{59} The IMF determines the level of assistance allocated to the DRC, and the increase in assistance to the DRC is strictly dependent on a formal programme with the IMF, which relates also to the debt cancellation.
stable and secure environment in the principal war-affected zones of eastern Congo (curiously, the terminology of conflict prevention and peacebuilding is not used, even though it is of this nature, in essence).

Nonetheless, these initiatives that propose a common strategy and structure for the interventions in eastern Congo, including ISSSS, have not attracted much attention from the international donors\(^\text{60}\). While the total funding requirements for the ISSSS were estimated at US$800 million, in mid-2010, only some US$160 million had been pledged in reference to the strategy but not having passed through the fund, and US$15 million through the fund finance mechanism.

### 5.2 Consideration of conflict analyses

Donors invested considerable efforts to unravel the main causes of the DRC conflict and improve their understanding of how international actors influenced these causes. A number of completed studies were done by donor agencies or research centres, including:

- “A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region”, by SIDA (March 2004), based on the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) methodology.
- “Aid and Conflict in the DRC”, by DFID (August 2007), also based on the SCA methodology.

Nonetheless, the findings of these studies are perceived by bilateral and multilateral agency interviewed\(^\text{61}\) to be too general to properly serve programming purposes. This has led to reliance on the part of bilateral agency staff on personal contacts and in-house analysis, such as studies focusing on the actors in DRC. These analyses, dominant in the diplomatic missions’ reports, seek to identify the capacities, intentions and probabilities that threatening players in the DRC landscape may gain and exert power. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn bear little relation to the types of assessments that are needed to define aid programme objectives or their evaluation, and are rarely constitute the real perceptions of the majority of the population. The information itself is not designed for widespread circulation so as not to threaten sources. It is thus of little use to aid agencies.

Curious gaps in financing emerged. The assumed link between resources and conflict had drawn little attention from donors before 2007. Recent traceability initiatives draw little funding. Several non-governmental actors launched

\(^{60}\) An evaluation was carried out of this fund during the field visit of the present study, but the report has not been made available to the team.

\(^{61}\) Interviews with consultants that were involved in the DFID review of Strategic Conflict Analysis, with the USAID Conflict Vulnerability Assessment, and representatives of the Netherlands, Canada and UNDP.
advocacy campaigns against “blood minerals”. But, despite the attention given by donors to this topic, very few concrete projects have been undertaken. The main explanation that donors put forward for this discrepancy is that the context is too volatile and too complex for effective programming on these issues. Questions such as the development of parallel exploitation structures of natural resources, the weakening of the formal trade economy62, and the increasing schisms of armed groups are largely neglected.

Another observation that emerges from a review of conflict analyses is a widespread lack of consideration towards gender-related issues. Few conflict monitoring and assessment frameworks consider gender relations and gender inequality between men and women as triggers or dynamics of conflict63. Often these analyses tend to disassociate aid strategies related to conflict from programmes seeking to address women empowerment and gender equality. Gender-differentiated indicators that do tend to be given more weight in conflict analysis include the “male unemployment youth” as a destabilising factor through increased criminal activity, the “high crime incidence” linked to the male youth unemployment, the erosion of “trust between ethnic groups”, linked to negative stereotypes regarding different ethnic groups, primarily amongst men.

The ToR asks about the extent to which there has been an accurate and relevant response to the conflict, and to the negative consequences it has caused and continues to engender. In reality, the elements with which to respond are missing for most of the donors and agencies evaluated, and this reflects a glaring absence, in the core documents given to the team, of a contextual analysis of the causes of conflict and the manner in which they are affected by the interventions.

This evaluation came to a similar conclusion as from Haïti64, Southern Sudan and Sri Lanka: strategic level evaluations can only be carried out on the basis of an interpretation ‘the chain of events’ or a theory of change that is rooted in conflict analysis. Funding is more influenced by interesting proposals and well-positioned agencies, than by the larger policy objectives.

This absence of theory can be found equally at the second level, that of the project or intervention. It is difficult to discern based on the documentation how implementing agencies understand the conflict, how they distinguish and prioritise the most important elements for a prevention strategy, and consider what others are doing to resolve the conflict, including the government of DRC.

62 As opposed to informal artisanal mining circuits linked to armed groups or criminal networks.
64 “(Reports) bring together factual information about the general situation in Haiti or on the projects themselves but leave many questions about results and strategic decisions made unanswered…. With the exception of a limited number of very general guiding notions, there was an absence of implementation logic. There was also a lack of any reference to a structured conflict analysis or theory of change for Haiti in Norwegian interventions” Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peace-Building in Haiti 1998-2008.
Conflict sensitivity analyses\textsuperscript{65} are extremely rare, the only example found by the evaluation done by UNICEF. None of the evaluations reviewed carried out proper impact analyses, a finding also reported for example for most of the evaluations reviewed for the Sri Lanka OECD evaluation\textsuperscript{66}.

The CAF clearly reflects, as will be seen in the next section, the dual nature (strength and weakness) of DRC’s donors: aid agencies are ready to tackle development programming in a recognised fragile environment, however they are too optimistic that these programmes can be implemented in a post-conflict context. To think that DRC has emerged from conflict and is moving into a phase of stability runs counter to the principal conclusions emanating from the team’s conflict analysis described above.

The general conclusion of this section is that conflict analysis is a critical element necessary to conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Its use is, however, not particularly evident, having few links to the diplomatic deliberations; analysis is replaced by erroneous hypotheses disconnected from the realities of eastern Congo.

\subsection*{5.3 Adequacy of approaches and coordination}

Multiple conflict drivers, in remote and geographically spread-out, demand a diversified approach, combining several instruments and programming cycles. These range from short impact projects that take place in one year, such as humanitarian assistance, to multi-year projects, such as the EUSEC mission.

Yet, when it comes to addressing the key drivers of peace and conflict, the problem arises in the multiplicity of policies and coordination mechanisms. The DRC was an active participant of the aid effectiveness agenda, and is a signatory of the Paris Declaration (2005). However it is obvious that there has been a confusing array policy frameworks and coordination mechanisms, which reduces the momentum of a number of policy dialogues, outside of the very dynamic humanitarian assistance mechanism.

The overall assessment of needs and opportunities for peacebuilding exists amongst the donor bodies. The CAF document for 2007-2010 raises in its section on “Risk Management” that: “engagement in a post-conflict context represents a high risk and a costly strategy\textsuperscript{67}”. Its authors conclude that the risks of not

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{65} Conflict sensitivity is distinguished from conflict prevention and peace-building in that the objective of an initiative may be unrelated to a conflict, but it can be assessed in terms of how it manages to reduce the negative effect it may have on its environment, and maximises the opportunities for peace.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{66} “Evaluation of Donor Supported Activities in Conflict Sensitive Development and Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka”, Chapman et al., 2009.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{67} This terminology can be found also in the report “Synthesis Report : Key findings from country consultations in Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste” Dili, Timor-Leste, 9 April 2010.}
engaging are higher than those of engaging. This emphasis on risk explains why the major part of assistance prioritises stabilisation efforts, which dominates donor strategies vis-à-vis DRC.

At the same time, as a default, the funding channels and objectives are influenced by tactical decisions, as we can observe by way of the predominance of the project implementation modality. The multiplication of budget lines, of decision-making locations (capitals, embassies, projects, contractors, national authorities, local authorities) follows the strategies. The absence of synergy in donor approaches layers on to this complexity, as indicated in the Policy Report of this evaluation.

There exists no permanent forum or coalition for donors to discuss jointly the conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and the existing mechanism, STAREC, is marginalised. By default, programming adapts under permanent political pressures from the capitals (who favour certain themes, like humanitarian aid), the procedures and availability of funds, and the presence and quality of implementing partners.

According to the 2008 study undertaken by the Paris Declaration, harmonisation and alignment is insufficient, due to a false understanding of the nature and purpose of coordination. A 2009 DFID evaluation notes:

“The CAF has been broadly successful at improving donor harmonisation, albeit from a very low base. There has been an overall increase in coherence, although separate, bilateral agendas are still apparent in certain areas, particularly security. The process has enabled donors to identify gaps in the assistance (e.g. for roads), although it has not been fully successful in establishing a clear division of labour.”

The evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration, in its case study of DRC, concludes that the country illustrates a weakness: rather than responding to the need for harmonisation, the coalitions are established with each ministry within a vision of delegating responsibilities to each member. Yet this pragmatic approach has failed to reach a consensus on areas in which there is international disagreement, such as the security sector. Decisions reflect policies communicated from donor capitals, or emerge from dominant thinking around how best to respond to the most urgent sector needs.

Transparency in general remains a challenge, and few evaluations were found. For example, the project of UNHCR funded by the Japanese government entitled

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“Return and Reintegration of Congolese Refugees in the Eastern provinces of the DRC” is succinct (10 pages in all), in spite of a substantial budget of US$ 7 million. The project has not been evaluated or audited, with no follow-up visit by the donor. The project was taken off the project list for evaluation, due to a lack of documentation provided by UNHCR, apart from the “2009 Annual report of UNHCR/South-Kivu”.

This is prevalent for many organisations such as WFP, where a recent evaluation noted:

“Certain donors (USAID, ECHO) expressed their concern about obtaining more regular and complete information concerning certain subjects, such as the periodic revision (according to major changes in the situation) of the actual number of displaced people receiving assistance in the East, the influence of these revisions and of variations in world prices on the budgets.”

This lack of feedback naturally engenders short-term interventions, favouring approaches that ignore for instance capacity building difficulties. Critical sectors, such as security, were only addressed more recently. Whereas, the potential for peacebuilding in the extractive resource sector developed rapidly within donor programming priorities as a result of international demands for minerals and petroleum, technical capacity to implement these innovative models is seriously lacking. It risks creating serious negative impacts if the policies are misaligned (see Volume 2 concerning mining). This sector, more so than others, requires a contextualised and concerted approach, which is lacking at present.

5.4 Presentation of projects

The choice of the “project implementation” approach reflects the need to bridge the gap between Government and donor priorities, offering, as it does, recourse...
to flexible programming, either to put pressure on authorities, to build their capacity, or to substitute their role.\textsuperscript{75}

This is particularly evident in the project database generated by the Steering Committee for the evaluation. The database analysis demonstrates relative consensus around several priority sectors (in particular humanitarian aid as well as peacekeeping DDR-SSR). We find that 75\% of the projects represent less than €2 million, demonstrating a proliferation of project implementation by autonomous agencies and consequently a natural difficulty in coordination.

The table found below demonstrates that the largest number of projects focus on SGBV and child protection, whereas peacekeeping and DDR receive the highest funding levels, though concentrated in a few projects. Other priorities, strategically important, such as reduction in small arms, or anti-corruption campaigns, raise few funds.

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Minimum & 10 000 \\
Maximum & 50 000 000 \\
<50 000 Euros & 47 \\
50 000 - 100 000 & 19 \\
100 000 - 200 000 & 36 \\
200 000 - 350 000 & 44 \\
350 000 - 500 000 & 35 \\
500 000 - 1 000 000 & 48 \\
1 000 000 - 2 000 000 & 47 \\
2 000 000 - 5 000 000 & 38 \\
5 000 000 - 15 000 000 & 23 \\
> 15 000 000 & 8 \\
Not available & 2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{75} For further evidence see Annex C of “Applicability of the Paris Declaration in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations – Thematic Study”, pages 72 and 73.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Average Funding</th>
<th>Total amount in Euros</th>
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Table 5 : Analysis of volumes of financement. Source : database provided by participating donors, B15
Three sectors, DDR, support to civil society and peace education, are gathered by a few projects (12 in total) whereas other sectors, in particular those dealing with humanitarian and refugee issues, are highly fragmented. Several projects also appear to align themselves with SSR and civil society.

Indirectly, this data reflects the positioning of NGOs and indicates an important influencing factor regarding donor policies, which strongly influences the result: the importance of available funding channels. Once an implementing agency proves its ability to deliver successful projects, as in the case of humanitarian aid (as opposed to artisanal mining for instance), financing is generally given. Based on the interviews, even though general donor strategies may have been meticulously designed to respond to donor policies and the country, the funds depend considerably on the mechanism used for disbursement, and thus also on the capacity of implementing agencies to design attractive proposals and execute them.

Inadequacy between the contextual analyses and the allocation of funds is evident in the priority given to humanitarian aid (second biggest recipient of funds) and land problems (which receives no funding and has a low priority in the justice sector interventions)\textsuperscript{76}. While not wanting to deny the importance of humanitarian needs, the funds (as we will return to in Chapter 5) brought to the mining sector, anti-corruption, judicial reform, land conflict resolution are significantly less.

The table below presents the breakdown by theme of the projects in the overall database (with some minor additions made by the evaluation). It reveals the predominance of the humanitarian theme, followed by a broad category that could be called “capacity building”: in decentralisation, for example. The theme related to mining is negligible.

\textsuperscript{76} It should be noted here that this data could not be entirely accurate due to the fact that the database was drawn up by the Steering Committee, by way of identifying projects that could be considered conflict prevention and peacebuilding in nature, rather than by a systematic sampling process.
Table 6. Analysis by sector of the weighting in the database.

These disproportions are explained by two characteristics of the current donor approach towards conflict prevention. The first is the absence of a framework to guide sector intervention selections, the implementation mechanisms and the objectives. Intervention selection is rather guided by the overarching policies, political initiatives determined by successive governments, budget spending imperatives, and the availability of implementing agencies.

The second characteristic brings together the tenuous nature of contextual analysis carried out, the limited use given to conflict analysis in decision-making, and, even more importantly, the multiple programme implementation channels.
6. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

6.1 Theme, Donor Approach and Conflict Driver

Description of the Theme

In considering the large funding volume in the database, humanitarian assistance and SGBV are key priorities of donor efforts towards conflict prevention and peacebuilding in DRC. Though they are not conflict prevention in nature per se, they are considered important. This was explained in two ways during the interview phase:

1. Assistance to victims and vulnerable groups contributes to a reduction in local tensions.
2. Humanitarian assistance can generate new forms of cooperation or potential tensions amongst beneficiary populations: for example, in the second case, between displaced populations who are given priority assistance, compared with host populations who are often neglected.

The overall population needs vis-à-vis these sectors in DRC are considerable. According to figures provided by Human Rights Watch, 200,000 women and girls have been raped, tortured, and put into slavery by the armed forces since 1998.

These acts of violence occur in a cultural context that, to a certain degree, is heavily influenced by traditions and customs, social and domestic practices, the low level of school enrolment among girls, and women’s ignorance of their rights. It is evident that this violence has risen significantly in the wake of the atrocities committed by the rebel groups, supported by Rwanda and other neighbouring countries.

In the face of ailing health and judicial services, families of victims revert to out-of-court settlements with the perpetrators. However, the scale of violations is such that this is no longer a realistic solution, creating a desperate climate that could be the starting ground for future conflicts.

Donor Policies

Whereas before 2006, projects were often of a palliative nature in response to urgencies, since 2006 humanitarian aid and assistance to victims are more generally formulated to enhance an environment for social reconstruction, where new behaviours and institutions are supported to emerge. Equally, initiatives focus on awareness-raising around two key issues, that of restraint during conflict and that of the protection of civilians.

77 « Etude sur la sensitivité aux conflits du Programme PEAR Plus », Search for Common Ground, October 2009
The situation in the East varies enormously from one area to the next, requiring differing approaches in terms of assistance. Humanitarian assistance in the DRC has benefited from the development of different concepts of integrated operations in the UN, whereby the Humanitarian Coordinator, located within the UN office, controls certain funds (such as the Pooled Fund)\(^{78}\). The creation of joint-funding mechanisms and clear strategies has encouraged donors to move away from earmarking their funds. This situation has contributed to better coordination amongst the agencies and to a stronger information flow to donors at the central/Kinshasa level.

A recent evaluation commissioned by OCHA\(^{79}\) noted that the system has increased the clarity of roles and recommendations made by Clusters in the eastern Provinces. The evaluation, however, also noted that the system has led to confusion in coordination amongst the sectors in Kinshasa, as well as between Kinshasa and the Provinces. This type of confusion certainly constrains good coordination between the humanitarian objectives and the aims of peace within assistance.

**Sample and Conflict Driver**
The conflict driver chosen for this theme is state weakness, with the humanitarian agencies playing an interface role from the capitals to the most remote territories, especially social service delivery (health in particular). It is important to note that impact does not relate to a change in the humanitarian conditions of the population’s environment, rather to the effect of humanitarian aid in the East. Such a rationale was often cited in interviews.

Six projects were studied. Amongst them, three were analysed in depth: 1) “Programme élargi d’assistance aux retours”, Unicef; 2) “Programme de développement du système de santé”, AAP- Cordaid; 3) « Réinstallation des victimes de guerre », OXFAM Solidarité). A further two were studied at an intermediary level: 1) « Programme multisectoriel contre le VIH/SIDA et le renforcement du système de santé, SGBV » from GTZ; and 2) « Joint prevention and response to projects SGBV » of UNFPA. One final formed a desktop study (documents review and through interviews, without field visits): it was the project by ABC, a local NGO, for the promotion of a culture of peace via literature.

### 6.2 Coordination

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\(^{78}\) The Pooled Fund was introduced in DRC in 2006 together with the cluster approach. With a budget of US$ 143.3 million for 2008, the Pooled Fund is now the most important funding source for the Humanitarian Action Plan. Its processes for project selection and resource allocation were revised several times. Currently, the Humanitarian Coordinator manages the Pooled Fund with the support of a joint UNDP-OCHA Pooled Fund Unit (JPFU). The DRC also receives CERF funding, which is used in the same way as the Pooled Fund money, except that according to CERF regulations disbursement can only be done to UN agencies.

Whilst humanitarian coordination has been well developed at the national level, the findings in the field are less positive. The analysis of coordination exposes the fragmentation and weakness of projects. In the area of health, some humanitarian actors provide free health care and medication, whereas others require a cost-share by patients and support for health centres based on performance.

This situation was encountered in the region of Shabunda, where the Cordaid-AAP project and MSF Holland implement differing policies: cost share versus universal free care.

In the agricultural sector, the free food aid distribution may disrupt local production and projects that come in support to it. This was noted in the case of the OXFAM Solidarité, a project that aimed to develop support mechanisms for sustainable farming. These mechanisms are not compatible with free distribution practices, which are occurring in parallel.

Coordination weakness extends to the local level. Local NGOs carry out projects, but most of the time as sub-contractors for international NGOs. They have relatively little funding and little say in defining intervention strategies, whether in humanitarian aid or in SGBV assistance. Document analysis reveals that at the level of their design, project proposals and preparatory studies in this theme contain few (and in many cases no) conflict analyses in the intervention areas where activities are to take place. This runs counter to universal humanitarian aid quality standards, such as the NGO and Red Cross Movement Code of Conduct\(^{80}\). It engenders a very real risk of negative effects on humanitarian actions.

Project documents and proposals generally ignore the manner in which Congolese society understands SGBV. For example, awareness-raising activities (towards men) would have a stronger impact if they were delegated to men themselves. Instead, education is by and large carried out by women towards men (in the projects evaluated), demonstrating a lack of contextual understanding.

### 6.3 Effectiveness

The interventions reviewed for this evaluation proved exceptionally good at delivering results, in spite of significant adverse conditions, a testimony to the cumulative experience of the agencies. All the projects reviewed under this theme achieved their intended objectives, formulated in humanitarian terms and often with a view to the beneficiary needs.

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\(^{80}\) Principle 8: “We will also endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance”, and principle 9: “We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance”.

For example, projects relating to SGBV achieved encouraging results in regards to access to psychosocial care. Just as awareness-raising campaigns to increase public mobilisation equally had an overall positive impact. We also observed the establishment of a learning process regarding best practices and communication.

In emergencies, humanitarian organisations take on roles that local authorities are unable to assume, and generally do it in an effective manner. The main issue confronting both humanitarian aid and SGBV programmes is the lack of integration between this assistance (humanitarian and SGBV) and the country’s social services that reveals the capacity gap left by the state. As mentioned in the joint report by the Ministry of Interior of North Kivu and UNPD, DRC is witness to a sort of “generalised privatisation of public sector services\(^{81}\)”, leaving a vacuum still not entirely filled by NGOs nor the UN.

If this evaluation turns its focus away from the objectives of both humanitarian aid and prevention of SGBV, it is evident that there is a complete lack of understanding of the projects’ impact on the conflict environment. Only one implementing agency had completed a conflict-sensitivity analysis, and the monitoring reports do not contain information on this lateral dimension of aid. This becomes more disturbing when donor strategies explicitly identified these core sectors as critical towards reducing conflicts. The real effect is taken up by our evaluation under the section on analysing impact.

6.4. Efficiency

Given the lack of qualifying criteria for interventions, in addition to the difficulties encountered by the authorities in coordinating and planning initiatives, donors face a multitude of demands for funding from local and international NGOs, in addition to humanitarian organisations.

As a rule, donors and some UN agencies sub-contract the implementation of programs to international or local NGOs, who in turn, work with community-based organisations. This mode of functioning generates a cascade of sub-contracts, producing significant overhead costs and diminishing the availability of funds for the beneficiaries themselves.

Already in 2006, an evaluation of humanitarian assistance funded by the Netherlands on the Great Lakes region highlighted this issue of sub-contracting, often overlooked by donors due to costs\(^{82}\). This is in contrast to the insufficient attention to the level of resources allocated to the different levels in the chain, which should be based on the value they add. Each level could be justified by the need for progressive levels of controls and subsidiaries, but it tends more often to

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81 “Revue bibliographique des travaux principaux sur les causes des conflits dans le Nord Kivu”, cellule provinciale d’appui à la pacification (CPAP) - North Kivu, UNDP, 2008.
indicate unwillingness on the part of donors and agencies to develop an operational capacity, preferring to keep a distance from the field.

This long chain was represented in the schema below, where each box represents an agency:

![Diagram of chains of subcontracting projects]

**Table 7: Scheme of chains of subcontracting projects.**

According to the evaluation’s analysis, this outsourcing chain would be more efficient if it responded to a capacity building approach and a monitoring of cross funding. For example, projects could target capacity building of local partners whose role in implementation and coordination would be clearly spelt out. Coordination capacity and a permanent local presence could be two fundamental criteria for receiving project funds.

Such a formalised approach vis-à-vis local actor engagement produces considerable financial gains by the simply fact that agencies working in assistance for victims of SGBV, or humanitarian agencies, have an important interface with local authorities and Congolese civil society, resulting from their presence in these remote project locations.

### 6.5 Impact

**Relevance on the conflict driver**

The weakness of the state is a particularly significant driver for humanitarian aid and SGBV given the reliance on social service structures, but in practice fails to affect this driver of peace. The relationship is often ill formulated by agencies, as
noted above, and the ramifications over the long-term are insufficiently analysed. This means that the effects on state weakness and capacity vary enormously from one actor to another, and from project to project.

UN agencies work with the Ministries and their technical departments concerned. The UNDP, which prioritises rehabilitation, supports the Ministry for Development in its coordination and project planning. Equally, at the time of the evaluation, a ministerial decree concerning the deployment of a coordination mechanism for humanitarian and development projects was being conceptualised. In North Kivu, the provincial governor had set up provincial committees for the coordination of development83, aimed directly at capacity building for monitoring aid projects.

However, the authorities are often absent at cluster meetings, despite being invited to attend. They do not take part in the selection process for projects financed by the Pooled Fund, to which they are invited as participants in the same capacity as NGOs. This is in spite of considerable willingness to be involved. Further to this, according to a recent declaration, “there is capacity within government departments and an improved approach to capacity building should capitalise on available resources.”84

Lack of public resources is the central issue. Due to low wages, civil servants conduct other economic activities outside their offices, and are therefore not always available. There is a striking difference between the equipment deployed by the NGOs and the international agencies, and that available to governmental structures. Added to this is the absence, at this level, of development plans for the local and provincial levels, in addition to the absence of visible and efficient public institutions in a large part of the territory.85

The actions do not all induce this minimising effect of the state’s authority. UNICEF and IRC have created new village committees to generate local initiatives. These committees compete with local traditional structures. By contrast, the projects studied concerning SGBV (GTZ and UNFPA) were conducted in collaboration with the authorities, whereas the AAP and Oxfam Solidarity projects relied on existing local agriculture structures, using an active capacity building approach based on rewards for performance. This last approach enabled local authorities to pilot their own initiatives.

85 « Suivi des Principes pour l’engagement international dans les Etats fragiles et les situations précaires » Rapport pays Trois : DRC, OECD, 2010
**Extent of influence on the conflict driver**

It is difficult to evaluate the extent of influence humanitarian assistance has on the capacity of the state and local chiefs. Indications suggest it is limited, as was noted in the section on relevance, showing that many agencies did not engage in strengthening these stakeholders. There is a widespread feeling amongst the population met in the course of this evaluation that humanitarian assistance is too limited and partial, and often for the sole benefit of urban elites, rather than for that of local populations, a fact reflected in other studies\(^8^6\).

Thankfully there are examples demonstrating the reverse trend. The “Program for the Development of Heath Systems,” managed by AAP\(^8^7\) - Cordaid” highlights the relevance and efficiency of using a well-established local NGO working in synergy with local authorities and international organisations.

Gender approaches are poorly considered in general, and for SGBV in particular. There are limitations in analysing the disaggregated impact of interventions on women and men. Whereas SGBV programming could be quite rich in terms of innovation, it is difficult to ignore the heavy concentration of programming towards women, and victims in particular.

Tackling impunity, community protection mechanisms, and policies of care within health centres were rarely considered. A preventative approach would equally benefit from directing activities towards potential offender groups, such as armed groups and men in general (though not exclusively the sole perpetrators). This has not been evident in most projects evaluated.

**Duration of influence on the conflict driver**

The first humanitarian assistance programs in the DRC were in 1993, in the territory of Masisi. Continuous project implementation occurred, allowing for a synchronised response to emergencies at hand, to which the state and its health services could not address. Some issues were treated too late, such as SGBV, where events started well before 2002 but to which funding was not made available until 2005.

Despite such sustained financing, bilateral financing of projects does not allow institutions to develop a long-term engagement. All the donors have funds dedicated to humanitarian assistance that could allow the Congolese state to benefit from a strategic and synchronised approach. Yet the UN and NGOs have not been able to move from a “response mode” towards “support towards the state to address conditions of chronic vulnerability”.

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\(^{86}\) «Etude sur la sensibilité aux conflits du Programme PEAR Plus», Search for Common Ground, October 2009

\(^{87}\) AAP: «Agence d’Achats des Performances» (Performance financing agency)
Equally, the large number of decision-makers and funding instruments, combined with a high turnover of expatriate personnel, makes it difficult for local authorities to develop coherent rehabilitation programmes. Interviews with donors during this evaluation revealed a unanimous opinion that budgetary decisions were essentially based on three criteria: 1) the presence of an implementing agency in a given area; 2) a well-designed project; and 3) a relatively problem-free past track record.

6.6 Conclusion

Humanitarian aid and assistance to victims in eastern DRC does not easily fit within a framed approach that would diminish conflict drivers. This is due first and foremost to the fact that projects are not analysed through a lens of conflict sensitivity, which means that each project could in fact aggravate tensions.

As the projects are not designed in function of their impact on conflict drivers, they have a variety of effects. Despite a valid conceptualisation, institutional challenges may prevail during implementation. We consider that SGBV interventions by humanitarian organisations has little impact on capacity building of the state, and that the state emerges weakened in its interaction with humanitarian agencies.

Current project proliferation hinders a strategic definition of the long-term by agencies (who focus on proposals corresponding to prevailing needs at a given time), whereas the follow-up of projects by the donors remains very limited.
7. JUSTICE

7.1 Theme, Donor Approach and Conflict Drivers

Description of the Theme
The conflict has clearly resulted in entire zones of lawlessness, which exposed even further the glaring deficiencies in the justice sector and penitentiary system. It is difficult not to conclude that the judicial system is in a lamentable state, and it suffers from an overwhelming lack of confidence from the population. It is characterised by mediocrity, whether it be a total absence of infrastructure and materials, or an absence in personnel.

Judicial sector personnel, in the best of situations, are poorly paid, if at all, lack operational and professional capacity and adequate training, and justifiably refuse to work in isolated zones where their security and basic daily needs (including housing) cannot be assured. At the same time, they express a strong desire to increase their own capacities and find their current working conditions profoundly frustrating and at times degrading.

Prisons are in a catastrophic state, with instances of starvation during the period under evaluation and detainees permanently housed in squalid conditions. This situation is aggravated by significant delays in trying defendants in custody, a direct result of the deficiencies outlined above, and by an absence of viable alternatives to imprisonment. Little has been done to address the condition of the penal system, either by the government or by the international aid community.

A progressive “normalisation” of sexual violence and other conflict-related behaviours has created an additional burden on an already faltering justice system, highlighting the need to dramatically change approaches relative to ordinary justice. Added to this, a culture of impunity that developed during the conflict and that continues to this day, is fuelled by corruption at every level of the justice system, a lack of means, and a lack of political will.

The lack of government engagement in re-building the justice system, coupled with inconsistency and lack of transparency in the administration of justice have eroded the morale of court personnel and the confidence of the general public in the institution of justice itself. This has been reflected in numerous interviews and constitutes a major source of risk for any intervention seeking to address the justice sector.

The problems are significantly worse in rural areas, where the rule of law is effectively inexistent: police forces are absent, courts no longer function, if they even exist, and local populations – already the main victims of conflict-related human rights violations – have resorted to traditional justice mechanisms. This
situation, appropriate in some situations, cannot respond adequately to all lawsuits.

**Donor Policies**

The theory of change that corresponds to this theme is that the administration of justice reduces impunity in the case of massive human rights violations. This theory equally puts forward reconciliation by the handling of lawsuits and diminishes attempts of revenge. It is further agreed that the exercising of justice dissuades recourse to non-state security actors.

The government, through its Ministry of Justice, and following its 2008 Action Plan for the justice sector, has established a roadmap for donors highlighting key areas requiring support. Since then, several large-scale multi-donor projects have targeted the restoration of justice and the rule of law, security sector reform, and the reconstruction of essential infrastructure such as prisons and courthouses.

The most significant of these initiatives, REJUSCO, formed the basis of an in-depth study for our evaluation. The European Union, UN OHCHR/ MONUC joint office, as well as the UNDP, have also made significant interventions in the justice sector, in particular in the Ituri region.

In many respects these programmes laid the groundwork for later initiatives. Two projects of the EU were implemented in Bunia by the NGO, RCN Justice et démocratie in 2004. Both were a direct response to urgent needs in the region at the time, and were extended until mid-2006.

**Sample and Conflict Driver**

The evaluation team chose to examine specifically as the conflict driver the frequent conflicts related to land rights, linked to conflicts between customary and modern law, the frequent movements of populations as a result of war, and the exploitation of natural resources (mainly timber and minerals). According to interviewees, this is the second most important factor of conflict, often neglected by the donors (the first being the lack of government capacity).

Property entitlements (in the sense of both titles and custom) are a significant source of conflict at the local and national level. Whilst basic property laws exist,

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88 A study published in August 2008 by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in DRC reinforces the idea that peace and justice are not mutually exclusive: the majority of the population of eastern DRC (85% of respondents) believes it is important to hold those who committed war crimes accountable and that accountability is necessary to secure peace (82%). The majority of the population interviewed believes that justice can be achieved, defining justice as establishing the truth (51%) and "being just/fair" (48%). According to the same study, peace is perceived by the majority of the population of eastern DRC primarily as national unity and togetherness (49%), the end of fear (47%) and the absence of violence (41%). But 33% of respondents mentioned that they would not allow victims of sexual violence to be re-integrated into their community. (ICTJ, Human Rights Center and Payson Center for International Development, 2008. *Living with Fear: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Peace, Justice and Social Reconstruction in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo*).

89 "Restauration de la Justice à l’Est de la RDC"
they are inadequately or improperly applied or blatantly ignored, often by the very authorities that are required to implement them.

This leads to enormous resentment and uncertainty. For example the distribution of publicly owned land to business elite to the detriment of indigenous groups, or Hutu immigrants (primarily agriculturalists) who must try to survive under fragile or inexistent tenure regimes in highly populated agricultural zones, at times then made homeless and landless literally overnight.

The diverse projects contribute to the restoration of institutional capacities and civil society, the reconstruction of essential infrastructure, the re-establishment of rule of law, the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms, putting an end to impunity and addressing more general issues of human rights and justice. Issues relating to property and land rights have not been treated adequately to date. For instance, the administrative system relating to land rights would require a complete reform. However, little was accomplished in this regard. Furthermore, the projects of ASF, more robust than others evaluated, integrated a strong advocacy component but the structural issues remain largely untouched.

### 7.2 Coordination

Coordination is here reviewed at the national level through joint planning and alignment to government priorities, and at the local level in terms of consultation between relevant public administration departments, civil society and other key stakeholders.

Donors actively seek to align their programmes to government policy. Objectively speaking, however, there is no concrete government policy of justice sector reform. Numerous interviewees, including local Ministry of Justice (MoJ) personnel and high-level judicial personnel, indicated that despite efforts to decentralise government decision-making, solutions are still mostly adopted in Kinshasa, without taking account of regional realities and needs. This centralisation has itself encouraged donor agencies to collaborate primarily with the central government rather than being guided by, and working with, local ministry and administrative officials.

Many donor initiatives in the justice sector have been implemented since the cessation of hostilities, yet we found few indications of genuine governmental partnership and involvement in the projects examined. This is certainly in part related to project design that emphasises implementation delivery without explicit government involvement.

Since 2004, the Comité Mixte Justice has attempted to coordinate donor initiatives in the legal system. Agency representatives and MoJ officials meet on a monthly basis to discuss anticipated and ongoing projects.
Despite dramatically conflicting views concerning the purpose of the committee\textsuperscript{90}, its functioning provided an essential entry point for the MoJ into the debate on establishing donor initiatives. Despite the divergent opinions, at times, as to the intentions of certain donors, and its relatively short existence, this committee did provide an essential mechanism for coordinating approaches.

Several local coordination structures were developed, primarily amongst large donor initiatives (UNHCR, MONUC, UNDP, REJUSCO). Thus in Goma, these international initiatives created exchange of information, demonstrating benefits such as the project on access to justice by UNFP, which was inspired by lessons and experiences from the courts initiative within the REJUSCO programme. Local civil society representatives did, however, repeatedly state in interviews that, despite their indispensable role, their involvement in these initiatives remained limited.

7.3 Effectiveness

In DRC, we lack significant statistics or studies, upon which indicators can be built, baselines established, root causes defined, change measured or results compared, in order to evaluate effectiveness. Some small studies were carried out, but in the absence of larger-scale initiatives, monitoring focuses on activities and outputs.

The 550-page UN OHCHR “mapping” study released in August 2010 is the only example of a major initiative providing a comprehensive and reasonably objective examination of abuses that occurred during the period of conflict. The report contains descriptions of 617 alleged violent incidents occurring in the DRC between March 1993 and June 2003.

Land issues are often ignored, for example, in the purchase of property or in support towards interest groups for land use. According to a report, the team learned for example that “the problem of rent was not treated proportionally despite its important in conflicts\textsuperscript{91}”. Another report demonstrated that there are projects relating to community mediation and the resolution of land disputes. But these projects remain relatively few and not well coordinated at the national level.

The team discovered a few projects supporting the dissemination of land laws, raising awareness to populations on the options for addressing land conflict in a non-violent manner. However, these initiatives were generally few and far

\textsuperscript{90} The Justice Committee is examined in more detail in Volume 2.

\textsuperscript{91} « Exercice participatif d’analyse des conflits et capacités de paix pour la planification du développement dans la province du Nord-Kivu », ministère d’État chargé de l’Intérieur, Décentralisation et Sécurité, province du Nord-Kivu, cellule provinciale d’appui à la planification (CPAP) du Nord-Kivu, April 2009
between, poorly coordinated and leading to few significant results\textsuperscript{92}. The team observed equally a “lack of interventions aimed at reducing the exploitation of land and in augmenting agricultural production through better soil use and in offering alternative solutions towards agricultural subsistence\textsuperscript{93}.”

A number of projects addressed questions of impunity. However, with several of the larger projects, like REJUSCO, the team observed a saturation of projects addressing SGBV but few addressing the question of impunity “in general”, such as the problem of land grabbing. Even if the extreme nature of sexual violence warrants a focused attention, actors in the sector are very critical of such approaches that focus on such a narrow question, as it breeds a perception of a “two-track” justice system at the expense of “ordinary” victims and persons seeking justice.

Another challenge to efficiency relates to the fact that numerous donors fall into the trap of substitution, wherein their project activities substitute the responsibility that should be taken up by the Congolese government.

For example, we list projects to construct buildings, to supply furniture to government offices, to complement staff salaries, to provide essential services such as transfer facilities for detainees. Payment for services rendered is a striking example where such payments can be considered a \textit{de facto} way of complementing meagre salaries. The real problem of remuneration rates (and the fact that salaries sometimes are not paid for several months on end) was however not strategically considered. Even though these supplements generate enormous impact in the short-term, they do not encourage ownership and responsibility by the government in the long-term towards its obligations and its population.

Many of the projects examined, in particular REJUSCO, were conceived as emergency programmes in an attempt to provide some semblance of the rule of law. In circumstances were the government was incapable of responding, we can understand the interest in a substitution approach in the short term. The problem is that unfortunately such an approach was not able to adapt or to evolve to allow for stakeholders to replace the project as a more stable system was established in the long term.

7.4 Efficiency
Each activity was examined individually by comparing the results actually obtained with their intended objectives.

The individuals responsible for implementation have been the most consistent factor in ensuring a project’s success. This is exemplified in the stark difference in

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{92} « Study on conflict sensitivity of PEAR Plus Program », \textit{Search for Common Ground}, October 2009
  \item \textsuperscript{93}ibid
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
programme results between North and South Kivu for the REJUSCO programme as described above. Hence, while the project design is crucial, the way in which it is implemented clearly determines its efficiency, and careful selection of project management personnel is a key factor in this process.

At the project design level, projects did not take into consideration the existence of considerable local challenges. Broad presumptions were made concerning the willingness and capacity of local partners, local authorities and other stakeholders to engage in the proposed activities. This created a degree of confusion that ultimately contributed to limited the results in spite of significant funding.

An example of this was the resentment expressed by local lawyers concerning Avocats sans Frontières’ (ASF) activities in South Kivu. The project was seen as having been imposed upon them without proper consultation, depriving them of clients in an already limited legal market, and forcing some to compromise their professional ethics, for example in the case of conflicts of interest.

Similarly, the overwhelming issue of corruption is addressed only indirectly, if at all, despite its clear role in obstructing attempts at justice restoration. As commented on by several people, addressing corruption within the justice sector is, admittedly, fraught with difficulty. While it can often be tackled indirectly, for example through the provision of court supplies, thereby depriving petty officials of a pretext to extract exorbitant court “fees”, it must be addressed openly and unequivocally if it is to have any lasting impact and change mentalities. Key actions include the support of accountability mechanisms (audits and investigations, professional liability procedures, etc.), and education – not only of officials concerned but also of the general public, often ignorant as to the law and their options of administrative and legal recourse.

Projects with numerous and diverse activities, such as REJUSCO, proved the most problematic in terms of efficiency. It is accepted that they were operating in environments and implementing activities with complex layers of risk, which inevitably lowered their efficiency in practice. Their infrastructure activities provide an indication of the kinds of difficulties that projects face in general in this regard. For example, significant delays in obtaining administrative approval not only affected contract pricing, but also meant that numerous building sites were unfinished at the completion of Phase I of the programme. A number of local stakeholders, including representatives of international organisations, expressed the view that communication problems had created an environment of outright resistance to cooperation on the part of local authorities, which in turn had a direct impact on the efficiency (and indeed the viability) of the project.

A large number of projects did not benefit from transition strategies or project hand-over, with quasi-catastrophic results in the case of “substitution”, leaving local authorities without the capacity to take up essential services. This prevented
feedback necessary for the improvement of future projects—and to evaluate the results, and success stories.

Follow-up was largely omitted. For example, the REJUSCO programme provided large quantities of office equipment, but no provision was made for on-going maintenance and supplies. Computers, photocopiers, and other office essentials lie idle, and personnel have reverted to their old work methods.

7.5 Impact

Relevance to the conflict driver
The projects under evaluation demonstrated variable levels of relevance vis-à-vis the key driver of land conflict. The conflict drivers that make up the range of land problems necessitate a need to, in parallel, promote agricultural reform, the rules and regulations relating to land, and the management of titles. With the exception of the RCN project in Bunia, which was studied in some detail in the context of this evaluation, there is a general absence of donor initiatives in this regard.

Yet this domain appeared as an important long-term perspective for the projects in the justice sector. Implementing agencies defended their lack of engagement on this complex cause (there exists for example in the mining sector contradicting legislation), on a lack of expertise and data, and on the importance of customary law. Several initiatives were mentioned as “in the pipeline”, increasing the pertinence of justice and its implementation as it relates to conflict.

Extent of Influence on the Conflict Driver
Target populations have appropriately included justice sector actors and officials (judiciary, prosecution, defence lawyers, court personnel, police etc.), victims (in particular women), defendants and detainees, policy-makers and governmental officials, and civil society groups. The implementing agencies selected in the sample represented a broad spectrum of sizes, approaches and specific themes—from international organisations such as the UN, through to activities implemented by small local NGOs through partnership arrangements. The majority were supportive of a focus land rights and its relationship vis-à-vis customary rights.

The logistical challenges posed by the sheer size of the DRC are enormous, resulting in many projects carried out within a restricted geographic outreach. Indeed, the key stakeholder complaint regarding the ASF project was its geographic outreach; it was principally centred in the South Kivu region, with only a few activities in the other provinces. The REJUSCO programme and UNDP project were rare exceptions, and a very good result in the sense that they were able to extend their activities and impact beyond the urban areas to reach several remote territories. Another successful example is that of CMJ that also had a strong geographic outreach. Many organisations, such as ASF, expressed a desire to expand their outreach with new projects in the future.
**Duration of Influence on the Conflict Driver**

The short-term impact of substitution activities, such as providing equipment for courts and other institutions, are easy to observe, yet their sustainability is clearly very limited. One of the most significant challenges faced by the justice sector in DRC is the lack of long-term commitment by donors.

Even where some projects have been of a long duration, for example those conducted by ASF, they are designed in reality as a string of short-term grants. The notion of hand-over or transition is not well developed. A certain number of activities could have progressively been stopped during the evaluation period, such as the transport of prisoners in the urban and secure zones, the substitution of salaries (terms as “remunerations”) and meals for detainees. A lack of flexibility and a focus on the short-term led to the prolonging of some activities unnecessarily.

This approach is to the detriment of quality partnerships, that necessitate a long-term engagement, and instead displays a tendency to focus on ‘known’ donor preferences (for example SGBV) and less on more difficult issues such as penitentiary reform.

Lack of long-range perspectives also results in frequent project interruptions due to funding difficulties, amongst other reasons as a result of funding difficulties, and any gains or momentum gained is lost in the interval between one project ending and another one beginning. The most dramatic example of this is the REJUSCO programme which initially had an end date of 2010, with a second phase to start at the beginning of 2011. Unfortunately the first phase abruptly ended in March 2010 – with virtually no hand-over or transition strategy for the remaining nine months.

### 7.6 Conclusion

There can be no peace without justice (particularly regarding impunity, the presence of local courts, and property rights) and there can be no justice without a serious reflection on constraints facing the Congolese judicial system at present at every level. Willingness to change at the local level is high, and donors and agencies are thus seeking to capitalise on this positive dynamic.

During the period concerned by the evaluation, donor adopted a strategy of ‘case by case’ (*ad hoc*), without strategic reflection, and with relatively limited funding compared to other sectors. With the exception of the ASF project, land conflicts were not been specifically addressed, either by donors or implementing agencies. Nor have projects adequately addressed the issue of governmental responsibility in their activities, whether through advocacy, government engagement or partnership.

The lack of effective government involvement in justice programmes (weak vision and policy, lack of implementation of current conventions, problems of
leadership and political interests between partners) resulted in international donors and aid agencies taking the lead in the sector.
8. SECURITY SECTOR AND DEMOBILISATION

8.1 Theme, Donor Approach, and Conflict Driver

Theme
According to numerous credible sources, the number of troops in uniform is greater than military threats would require, especially in the army’s higher ranks.\textsuperscript{94} Figures on the pre- and post-DDR headcount are not transparent.\textsuperscript{95} While members of armed groups are continually integrated into the army, some subsequently leave according to the situation’s evolution. The EUSEC census found 120,000 soldiers (as compared to the approximately 190,000 military declared by Congolese authorities) before the integration of the CNDP into the army in 2009, which swelled the ranks by an additional 27,000 soldiers. More than half of all registered troops are posted in the eastern Congo.

In several parts of the East, militia recruitment is on-going and new groups appear over the course of the evaluation period, most notably in South Irumu, Aru (Ituri), Fizi/Itombwe and Shabunda. Land pursuit by growing parts of the population, coupled with conflicts relating to land tenure in mining areas, could aggravate further community destabilisation.

Of particular concern is the large numbers of ethnic Tutsi Congolese who left for Rwanda after 1994 and who are returning to the DRC to re-claim their land, which has heavy political and ethnic implications.

Competing actors are pursuing strategies to firmly root their presence in local contexts, and to benefit from the natural resources in the region. This chapter explores the hypothesis that technical planning of aid in the SSR and DDR sectors is compromised by the opportunistic behaviour of local actors. Access to resources is the key driver to examine.

Donor Policies
Strategically, the DDR and SSR processes aimed to diminish on the one hand the relations between community members, ex-combatants and army factions on the one hand, and on the other the political, economic and ethnic interests. Following the signature of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition (GIAT, 2003)\textsuperscript{96}, donors chose to support the security sector, recognised as central to the

\textsuperscript{94} E.g. International Crisis Group (2006, p.18) La réforme du secteur de la securité en RDC, Rapport Afrique N°104 – 13 février 2006. A number of around 70.000 soldiers is generally considered to be sufficient for DRC.
\textsuperscript{95} Following the Sun City accords, all armed groups present in DRC declared a combined effective of 220.000 combatants, which inflated to 340.000 at the time of inscription for DDR. Even though this figure was readjusted to 240.000 combatants, the real number probably stood at 130.000, without the newly integrated CNDP
\textsuperscript{96} E.g. Clingendael (2010, p.1), Supporting SSR in the DRC: between a Rock and a Hard Place
war dynamics. This followed by support to a large spectrum of activities in areas as small arms trade, disarmament, and demobilisation.

Funding mechanisms in the security sector have improved in the last two years, even if soldiers are still poorly paid and disbursements of operating costs are frequently delayed. Salaries of the lowest-ranking soldiers have been raised from approximately US$10 to US$40 per month. This is a key contextual factor for conflict prevention, as poor living conditions for the FARDC, and even more so for irregular armed groups, generally heightens the risk of criminal behaviour (such as theft and looting).

Due to the high-risk associated with this activity and the possibility that funds may be misused and/or become linked to human rights abuses, donors have been reluctant to commit significant funds and/or undertake ambitious initiatives in this sector. Strict regulations limit the scope of interventions, especially as international guidelines for ODA funding prevent donors from using ODA funds for security-related matters.

**Sample and Conflict Driver**

The evaluation focuses on the financial incentives that influence and shape relationships between armed groups and local populations. Whilst the team has been unable to carry out a full political economy analysis (which certainly would be of interest), the prevalence of economic motivations by armed groups involved in the violence was noted during the validation process for the hypothesis.

Ten projects were studied as the sample, of which two were analysed in depth (the national DDR programme ‘PNDDR’; administrative army reform ‘EUSEC’), three at the intermediate level (border police ‘IOM’; COMREC community-based DDR and local development ‘UNDP’; child soldiers ‘UNICEF’) and five through a desktop review only (stabilisation strategy ISSSS ‘MONUC/UNDP’; garrison integration of brigades ‘South African Army’; support to integrated brigades ‘UNDP’; SALW reduction ‘GRIP’; Follow up to the Goma Conference Resolution ‘CAPAC’ (Cellule d’Appui Politologique en Afrique Centrale), University of Liège). Even though it falls outside the timeframe and geographic focus of this evaluation, an eleventh project was included in view of its particular focus (arms management within FARDC, ‘MAG’).

EUSEC is an example of an initiative devoted to a complete restructuring and modernisation of the army administration through a far-reaching reform of administrative and financial army procedures. It ensures an increase in the timely payment of salaries, whilst greatly enhancing morale, and thereby helping to

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97 This table makes only reference to the donors participating in this evaluation. This does however not imply that those mentioned are the sole contributor to the studied projects.

98 For a more detailed description of the projects studied, please refer to the annexes.
protect the population from the extortions often linked to weak and infrequent payment of the military.

Two other projects reviewed dealt with demobilisation at the local level by addressing the prevalence of small arms and the rights of children, all the while providing support to ex-combatants reintegration. These were PNDDR, a government-led DDR initiative, in line with the various peace accords, and the support to community-based mechanisms of child protection, under the auspices of UNICEF.

Another initiative aimed to support ex-combatant reintegration (UNDP-COMREC) involves projects generating income revenues for families. It uses high-intensity labour projects (e.g. the building of schools and clinics). Strategies are supported by careful participatory consultations at local level. Some initiatives that targeted improving living conditions for military families in North Kivu contribute to an often under-estimated aspect. The South African Army rehabilitated and equipped two integration centres (Nyaleke and Rumangabo, North Kivu). The UNDP programme improves living conditions of family members of a number of integrated brigades. Such a type of initiative helps to reduce criminal activities by soldiers and offers a response to the legitimate claims of the army that the living conditions of their staff are inhumane.

MONUC aims to better equip the FARDC to disband armed groups. The project reviewed UNSSSS/ISSSS, forms the security component of the stabilisation strategy for eastern DRC. It contributed by training, preparing troops and planning for the FARDC, wrapping up the DDR process for ineligible ex-combatants within the PNDDR framework, and even military action against the FDLR.

At a similar strategic level, capacity building and regional approaches, such as the GRIP project, supported the development of national action plans on small arms and light weapons in Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda. Support for the Border Police by IOM was equally crucial as it is the only project addressing the question of border control (an important regional dimension of the conflict) and brings attention to the regional economic interests influencing eastern DRC.

Many interventions contributed to the consolidation of peace by reducing access to arms. The MAG project focuses on the identification, destruction, and proper stocking of FARDC excess arms. It built the capacities of army logisticians to ensure secure management of weaponry.

### 8.2 Coordination

Several collaborative structures involving mainly international agencies and government structures were created to align intervention strategies with government priorities. Amongst the coordination mechanisms, we cite the
National DDR Programme (PNDDR), MONUC’s SSR group, and UNSSSS/ISSSS (UN/International Security Sector Support Strategy). Various plans emanated from these structures now consolidated under STAREC.

The DDR and SSR processes lean heavily on external support, as the DRC state budget is nearly equal to the annual costs associated with the MONUC operation, around US$1 billion a year. In 2010, the national budget officially allocated only US$195 million to defence, mostly to cover salary payments and the purchase of equipment. The DRC contribution to the second phase of PNDDR (US$2.5 million) was not made public at the time of writing.

The financial resources of the relevant DDR and SSR related in the evaluation’s database reaches EUR169.5 million, a substantial amount when considering the state’s resources and risks creating coordination difficulties with the government. As this figure only involves contributions made by the evaluation’s participating donors, actual programmes budgets may be much higher.

The coordination of DDR and SSR interventions suffered, to some degree, from differing donor interests and perceptions. According to interviewees from these programmes, this was especially apparent during the meetings preceding the creation of PNDDR for financing the MDRP. Support for SSR involves various military actors from donor countries and is driven by international defence strategies.

International strategies such as ISSSS aim to reinforce synergies. However, such plans preceded government plans (most notably STAREC) as well as the adoption of relevant national legislation. Not only does this require international agencies to adapt their strategies in order for them to be in line with national priorities, it also forces a review to ensure ownership of the process at the national level.

Since 2009, the Congolese government prioritised bilateral initiatives in SSR, at the expense of multilateral frameworks. This carried a risk of fragmentation. As several countries provide military training, we witness a proliferation of military doctrines. This could engender serious consequences when one considers the dimensions of the conflict that took shape in the 1990s as a result of the army’s fragmentation at the time.

This tendency, added to the absence of legislation governing SSR, would have required international agencies to put in place alternative coordination structures to guarantee coherence, though nothing has been done to date. The Ministry of

100 For example, the Congolese government has only recently (early 2010) presented a first draft White Paper on security sector reform, while before the transition initiatives were not guided by any type of official and coherent government policy.
Defence is working on a strategic document for army reform, which would be a crucial benchmark for donors wishing to engage in SSR.

In the case of DDR, coordination between stakeholders became weaker over the course of the programme’s implementation. According to resource persons interviewed and project documentation, DDR actors were unable to smooth out their differences in approach. In the absence of regular meetings with the respective partners, the lack of framework from financing and coordination institutions (World Bank, PNDDR) gave rise to contradictory approaches for reintegration. This created misunderstandings and an unequal treatment of ex-combatants and communities. It also engendered competition between the organisations, which harmed the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme.

### 8.3 Effectiveness

Overall, interventions in DDR succeeded in drawing a large number of combatants from armed groups (around 102,000 demobilised through PNDDR and 60,000 reintegrated into the FARDC). To a certain degree, as will be seen below, projects focusing on reintegration were especially effective for those ex-combatants able to resist (re)-recruitment into militias. The presence of child soldiers diminished significantly (more than 36,000 children benefited from UNICEF child DDR programme, and child combatants have nearly been banned from the FARDC), even if there are still cases of child recruiting on going.

However, in 2007, 40,000 combatants still awaited DDR. As compared to the initial estimate of 240,000 to be demobilised, nearly 80,000 combatants appear not to have benefited. The most likely explanation is that incorrect estimates or false declarations of troop strengths by armed groups were made. This theory finds resonance in South Kivu. Groups participating in the Amani process declared 29,364 additional combatants, of which only 5,044 presented themselves at the brassage (integration) centres and amongst them only 1,206 were reintegrated into the army whereas 1,396 demobilised.

The DDR process responded to an emergency situation, and it was put in place relatively quickly, despite delays between the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration phases. After a pilot phase implemented by UNDP, the drafting of the PNDDR took around 4 months.

Some initial steps in army and police reform (SSR) resulted in the improvement of basic military and border protection capacities. Infrastructure support contributed to the rehabilitation of camps and training centres, and the purchase of transport means, in particular for the police.

Attention to the needs of host communities was extremely limited in the PNDDR. During its first phase (CONADER), DDR excluded to a large degree specific groups who did not respond to the narrow eligibility criteria (such as women dependents of soldiers, child soldiers, or combatants that did not possess
weapons). In many cases, the heightened suspicion and jealousy on the part of the community hampered successful reintegration and building social relations. DDR could have been more effective if community concerns and longer-term planning had been more widely considered during the programme design phase.

8.4 Efficiency

Small errors of design reduced the efficiency of the projects reviewed. Certain weaknesses were inevitable given the country’s size and lack of infrastructure. However, these constraints were not clearly identified in the preparatory phases. This caused numerous delays in the implementation of activities (transport and access problems). Fund transfers proved difficult, and certain solutions envisioned ended up being poorly adapted to the context.

For example, PNDDR intended to make payments to ex-combatants via mobile phone transfers in a context where network coverage is weak and beneficiaries lacked mobile phones. There was also a lack of reliable baseline figures, as mentioned earlier, especially since the numbers of militia members were often intentionally overstated by leaders trying to profit from the DDR process.

The approach to DDR (especially under PNDDR) focused on individual ex-combatants. Part of this can be explained by the fact that PNDDR responded to an emergency situation. The process hinged on assistance to ex-combatants in exchange for their weapons (in which ‘hand-over’ was an eligibility criteria). Relinquishing a weapon for those who did not possess one, or who were responsible for other functions within their forces such as logistical support or training. A large number of combatants did ‘self-demobilisation’ and reintegrated into their communities without passing through formal channels. Either they did not have access to DDR support, or they did not want to identify themselves as ex-combatants. This has made it difficult to control, harmonise and centralise disarmament.

With regards to efficient use of funds, budgets reviewed show a relative balance between administrative overhead costs and costs associated with specific activities. Transport and logistics consumed large amounts of money (e.g. airlifts, vehicles) justifiable given the poor state of DRC infrastructure. This is particularly the case for the PNDDR programme since the World Bank budget did not initially create a budget for transportation costs associated with the relocation of ex-combatants to their home areas. Budgets were adjusted, reducing the funds left for reintegration.

Due to volatility in the situation, most projects extended the original implementation timeframes, often requiring additional funds.

A significant share of SSR funding went to physical infrastructure improvements (e.g. barracks, transport, communication, food), and was exposed to misuse or neglect. The looting that took place in Rumangabo (North Kivu) caused
significant asset loss that has been provided for by one of the projects studied in this evaluation.

The use of foreign military expertise in DDR and SSR proved beneficial (e.g. EUSEC, South African army), and especially when it came to training and monitoring adherence to procedures. However, missions were often short-term (between 4 months and one year), which reduced confidence within the beneficiary organisations. Such confidence and knowledge of the field are essential factors for a good flow of information—information necessary for an optimal use of resources.

8.5 Impact

Relevance of influence on the conflict driver

By increasing income-generation opportunities for the beneficiaries, and in formalising the transfers, aid activities improved the living conditions of combatants, thereby reducing criminal activities between armed groups and the population. As a result, all interventions evaluated were considered highly relevant.

We will focus on defining the strengths and some weakness, relative to this theme. First of all the income that beneficiaries can earn through the programmes is still limited, to sufficiently deter predatory practices. This is especially true when security is not yet assured, and underlying networks linked to political positioning and the control over resources has not been addressed. This point necessitates that DDR and SSR interventions are framed within a broader development strategy, something that is not the case.

The target group itself is difficult to access and work with, in the absence of a strong political will. A significant share of militia recruited were already vulnerable community members, lacking socio-economic support networks, and with limited income-earning capacities after demobilisation. Funds were allocated to ex-combatants as immediate support (US$100 lump sum, plus 12 months staggered payments of US$25 with income generating activities of between US$150 and US$250).

The logistical support provided to the Congolese army (notably through the rehabilitation of army camps) may ensure a long-term improvement in the living conditions of groups soldiers. The raising of salaries is a further improvement as it changes the expectations of soldiers, even if this raise has not reached a level capable of guaranteeing a normal life for its recipients (in comparison with prevailing conditions).

Other projects address the capacities of the border police (IOM), in line with the presidential decree of 2007 that reinforces the government strategy to tackle cross-border smuggling of natural resources. The brigade will also contribute to improving tax collection by the state.
Even though quite a number of projects focus on technical support and capacity building for the army, projects that are undertaken for the police in eastern DRC seem particularly well funded, concentrating to a large degree on materials. This is particularly visible in the purchase of a vast number of new vehicles, office buildings and training centres, of a quality not yet witnessed by the FARDC.

A possible explanation is that international donors focus on non-military sections of the security sector (police), on the basis of Western security conceptions that attribute to the police the main role as security provider. However, the reality in DRC shows that the army is the more powerful force on the ground and armed forces projects were under-financed.

**Extent of Influence on the Conflict Driver**

Interviews with beneficiaries, as well as with staff of implementing agencies, point to critical aspects in reintegration that reduced the coverage of populations affected by the driver concerning the pursuit of economic interests by security agents. As we shall see below, certain groups were well covered; others escaped the outreach of the projects.

Key groups were neglected in the analysis of local conflict drivers, thus removing part of the target population from the programmes’ outreach. For example, several SSR projects focusing on the FARDC considered inadequately soldiers’ family members. These dependents often live in extremely poor conditions, receiving little assistance as they are associated with the military and therefore seen by many donors as “off limits”. This hopeless situation is an often raised to justify the predatory behaviour in and around military camps.

The SSR projects prioritised the integrated brigades in eastern DRC because of the considerable presence of ex-combatants in those brigades. Even though this is legitimate in view of addressing imminent security threats (which were considered to be greater in the battalions composed of ex-combatants), impact on the reform of non-integrated brigades and battalions was sparing. This is especially so as an overall reform strategy is yet to be adopted by the government. These units pose a continued threat to stability across the Provinces.

Furthermore, the DDR projects just as the SSR projects focused mainly on lower-ranking militia and soldiers. Even if this can be largely explained by the absence of a clear mandate provided by the Congolese government to work with the military hierarchy, it does imply that impacts achieved (capacity building, behaviour change) are not necessarily felt in the upper ranks of the security and defence services.

As for the reform of the army administration, finance mechanisms were strengthened to ensure salary payments. However the motivations for not paying salaries were only marginally treated.
Lastly, reintegration programmes gave insufficient consideration to the risks involved in bringing ex-combatants back to their communities – for example failing to address issues of behaviour change and community reconciliation, or in offering money to reinsert people without sufficient longer-term prospects for work. A very weak consideration of these underlying motivations and interests could harm the prospects offered by technical assistance.

**Duration of Influence on the Conflict Driver**

DDR and SSR interventions support the 2002 Sun City accords, in addition to other supporting conventions. Overall the projects were implemented with significant delays up until 2007, yet with little negative consequences on the country. The resurgence of military operations against militias (notably the FDLR) such as Umoja Wetu, Kimia II and Amani Leo, created a new set of obstacles.

These operations had a twofold effect on the DDR and SSR processes. In some regions, activities were suspended and the redeployment of armed forces accelerated (re)-recruitment and limited progress in DDR. The CNDP command structure remained intact in many places.

This does not necessarily imply that the timing of DDR and SSR has been premature, but demonstrates the range of risks to which the programmes could not necessarily have mitigated. The planning and deployment of the programs did not allow for sufficient flexibility and contingency planning.

The sequencing and phasing of programmes was not sufficiently aligned to the rhythm of local conditions. Continued insecurity, the peace conferences in 2008, the rapid integration of CNDP and military operations against the FDLR all necessitated continuous redeployment, affecting the stability of FARDC units. This had negative consequences for SSR projects focused on training and administrative reform.

In fact, the sequenced funding approach (agreement, followed by DDR, followed by SSR) is a fraught concept as applied in DRC. International funding immediately after the Sun City peace accords (2003) favoured support to the DDR process. In later years, funds for DDR reduced whereas funding for SSR increased. This is in line with the Congolese government’s position that considered DDR completed. The problem with this sequenced approach is that it was not possible to create sufficient links between the DDR and SSR processes from the outset in order to ensure greater harmony with local conditions.

**8.6 Conclusion**

In eastern DRC, DDR and SSR were implemented in a very difficult context characterised by a fragmented peace process, continuous insecurity, political interference and weak government capacity to fully participate in the process. In
the face of this volatile context, substantial delays in implementation occurred. Also, projects proved to be rather static and did not fully exhibit the sort of flexibility and contingency planning necessary in such circumstances.

Nevertheless, the projects studied for this evaluation are relevant insofar as they address a number of structural factors. These include the high degree of militarisation of eastern DRC (through demobilisation, making the FARDC more effective and eliminating foreign armed groups), the circulation of SALW (through disarmament, stocking/management and political lobbying), and the poor functioning of the FARDC (through infrastructure support and administrative reform linked to the payment of salaries).

However, the projects focused on technical interventions (e.g. construction of infrastructure, provision of kits for income generation), and capacity building was to some extent too “procedural” (e.g. stock management, respect for administrative regulations). Hence, these projects addressed only to a limited degree conflict drivers associated indirectly with economic, ethnic, military and political interests.

Most of the projects studied in this evaluation - particularly those related to DDR - were implemented to short-term activities favoured implementation mechanisms responding to ‘technical’ needs. They were not able to develop an integrated approach and an over-arching building of peace—from the peace agreement to the rule of law. They suffered from deficiencies in communication and coordination between the technical and political offices. The objectives were designed within a political that aimed for a sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants and the improved functioning of security forces. The diplomatic and security institutions guiding the program formulations were for the most part not involved in the process of aid allocations, which engendered a number of incoherencies.

DDR generally involves programmes with a long chain of sub-contractors, including international agencies and NGOs. This management and implementation approach can is in part explained by the need to meet the capacity criteria set by donors and international organisations (local NGOs lack capacities in terms of size, means and competences). However, this logic complicates efficiency since the centralised management and definition of priorities benefits from only a limited input from local partners and equally from community-based organisations (depending on the programmes). Local partners are the last rungs in the ladder, virtually without voice, reduced to simply an implementing agent. We note the exception of the COMREC programme that was based on extensive community consultation, in addition to participatory structures at the community level.

Furthermore, in DRC, most DDR and SSR interventions are designed and implemented as emergency responses that consequently do not incorporate long-
term planning and sustainability criteria\textsuperscript{101}. This is largely caused by funding mechanisms but can interfere with process that demands a greater long-term perspective.

A tension emerged between on the one hand, short-term funding and implementation mechanisms, and on the other, the strategies developed by stakeholders locally, ignored by the international agencies. If we add to this, the local drivers underlying the continuing “re-mobilisation” and abuse of power by security agents in the DRC, one cannot help but downgrade the overall positive comments regarding programme implementation.

\textsuperscript{101} E.g. interviews held with PNDDR, COMREC.
9. MINING AND REGIONAL ASPECTS

9.1 Theme, Donor Policies, Conflict Driver

Theme
DRC’s natural resource reserves, both mineral and oil and gas, are amongst the world’s most important, even if few companies are investing at present. The principal reason evoked across the oil and gas industry is the political environment: conflict and governance. Whereas several international companies are studying the best way in which to position themselves in the sector, few are actually in operation.

Until 2007-2008, donor interventions in the mineral sector were rather limited. We cannot help but be startled by this delayed attention. The numerous calls were made for sanctions against actors involved in the exploitation and trade of natural resources, pushing even for an embargo on “conflict minerals”. These calls consistently met limited political support and for years could not mobilise significant donor resources to address the challenges.

Only recently, almost 10 years after the first calls for an embargo, a number of initiatives are beginning to take shape. Several projects were found in the database. But these involvements are not without ambivalence. In July 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, including a section on “conflict minerals”\(^\text{102}\). In spite of its good intentions, this legislation has had the effect of causing further reputation concerns for the mineral extraction, which renders, still today, international cooperation on this sector difficult.

Donor Policies
According to the theory of change put forth by the majority of interviewees, improving the governance of the mining sector will reduce incentives available to illicit groups who profit in the absence of rule of law.

Though not explicitly stated as such, theories of change exist for the majority of projects evaluated\(^\text{103}\). They can be summarised in three points: economic action, denial of the resources for war, and healthy relationships and connections\(^\text{104}\). All

\(^{102}\) This Act is predominantly aimed at economic and financial measures to address the consequences of the financial crisis, but also includes disclosures on “Conflict Materials in or Near the Democratic Republic of the Congo”. It states that the Security and Exchange Commission of the US is mandated to create rules that address potential conflict materials (for example blood diamonds) and to assess whether materials originating in or near the DRC are benefiting armed groups in the area. USAID is to develop a strategy to address the linkages between human rights abuses, armed groups, mining of conflict minerals, and commercial products, and to promote peace and security in the DRC.

\(^{103}\) The evaluation extracted these statements, reconstructed them as one-sentence theories of change and then tested them during the interview phase. See individual project annexes for the results.

\(^{104}\) See OECD DAC working guidance, Common Theories of Change.
three theories of change consider the intended change as better social and economic benefits for citizens through improved resource management.

Three broad donor approaches were identified:

- A first aims to **enhance regional cooperation**. As in most of DRC, economic conditions in the East are determined by regional dynamics, the illicit, largely artisanal mineral trade sector is equally largely oriented towards East African markets\(^{105}\), and regional actors have considerable stakes in this sector. Some initiatives have been developed to deal with this regional dimension. Some may be considered purely economic in their mandates, such as the East African Community (EAC) or COMESA. Others have a more political mandate and aim at promoting peace and security through enhanced regional cooperation. One such initiative is the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), whose key objective is the promotion of regional peace, security and development. In October 2006, the ICGLR initiated its “regional initiative against illegal exploitation of natural resources”, which aims to strengthen regional capacity to increase transparency of regional trade in natural resources. (the different components of this initiative will be further discussed in the next sections of this report.)

- A second approach is the **promotion of transparency through the introduction of traceability and certification schemes**. Most of these schemes are a direct response to increased advocacy pressure since 2008 regarding illicit mineral extraction in eastern DRC. International donors, along with industry actors, launched several traceability pilots to improve transparency on resource origins and the circumstances relating to armed groups in which mining occurs. Examples include the Centres de Négoces under joint management of the Ministry of Mines and MONUC and part of the eastern DRC Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC), and the regional certification mechanism of the ICGLR. We also find the Global e-Sustainability Initiative, and the industry-led ITRI initiative on due diligence with pilot projects in the two Kivu provinces. BGR (Germany) launched a commercial certification initiative in the Kivu region, which has started implementation. Lastly, the OECD finalised in October 2010 due diligence criteria for the mining sector (the “Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Supply Chain Management of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High Risk Areas”) of which DRC and the Great Lakes region will be a focus for implementation.

- A third approach focuses on **governance, social responsibility and the role of the private sector**. It includes initiatives to strengthen the measures required for social investment benefits to be harnessed for long-term economic development. Examples here are the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the review of the mining contracts.

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105 Vast deposits of minerals exploited in North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale, Northern Katanga and Maniema are transited or traded in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda or Tanzania.
Another initiative is *Promines*, a World Bank and DfID funded national program, aimed at improving the Congolese state’s management capacity in the mining sector.

However, despite these efforts, the fundamental drivers for mining in the eastern DRC, the complexity of this sector, and how mining influences and interacts with the broader conflict environment in the eastern DRC, have not been properly analysed and understood by the majority of donors or advocacy organisations, as we demonstrate below and in Annex 10 in Volume 2 of this evaluation. The term “conflict minerals” deserves a more critical assessment.

Four main gaps in analysis exist, and several aspects remain ill understood:

- The difference between war economies exploited by armed groups and the FARDC in this post-conflict setting versus shadow and coping economies employed by state and non-state actors including traders, public security forces, state officials and local populations;
- The gradations of mining that occurs with varying degrees of involvement by armed groups and FARDC;
- The ambiguous power and governance structures at mining sites as well as the particular position of artisanal miners (*creuseurs*) and traders (*négociants*);
- The cross-border trade dynamics and the different actors involved that would benefit from a more in-depth analysis.

**Driver and Sample**

The driver identified here is the evolution of unofficial structures to exploit natural resources, most notably the control of natural resource exploitation and trade by armed groups and criminal networks.

Six projects were chosen for evaluation (there existed very few in implementation). A key observation arose early on in the evaluation, leading to the formulation of the theme: when reviewing responses that relate to natural resources, a recognised conflict driver, the portfolio is practically empty. In fact, not a single intervention by donors participating in the evaluation existed in the eastern DRC prior to 2008-09106.

It is possible that the security risks of intervening in artisanal mining in the eastern DRC during this period were too high, due primarily to open conflict and violence107. The mining contract review process, supported in part by the Belgian

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106 Not a single intervention existed from the donors participating in this evaluation. It is worth noting that USAID from 2007-2009 supported efforts to address artisanal mining and stakeholder engagement through the Global Development Alliance (GDA) with Anglo Gold Ashanti and Pact Inc. This was in Ituri District.

107 This reasoning was evoked several times during the evaluation interviews.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and implemented by the Carter Centre, is an example of this remote connection with the principal cause of conflict.

Unfortunately, the outcome of the mining contract review process did little to increase overall economic opportunities. The review process found it blocked halfway through, diminishing further investor confidence, and reducing outside investment available for mineral development. As the global economic crisis unfolded, the few investor opportunities disappeared as limited financing resources were directed towards less risky environments.

The eastern DRC has had less large-scale mining than Katanga Province and was thus marginally less affected by the mine review process. However, for the larger companies present the uncertainty of the review process did shake company confidence, and exploration plans were put on hold.

Two key concerns explain the absence of mining projects in eastern Congo:

- Firstly, the unresolved securities of tenure due to the stalled contract review process and the potential MONUC withdrawal from Orientale and the Kivus. Only since the contracts were successfully re-negotiated for companies operating in the eastern DRC have mine development plans resumed and investor financing increased in some cases, such as Banro in South Kivu.

- Secondly, the fact that immediately following the Sun City Agreement, then the 2006 elections, donors were mainly focused on security and stability and supporting a transition towards democratic institutions. Although present from the beginning, natural resources became a greater concern after these two critical transition periods for the country finally passed. This shift is reflected in several donor strategies over the evaluation period.

Other reasons evoked included inaccessibility of mine sites (resulting from security conditions and infrastructure) and political sensitivities of the artisanal mining sector, given its links to armed group activities during the war. It should also be noted the absence of sophisticated expertise, amongst NGOs, research organisations, international agencies, in this sector.

However, these valid risks have not significantly diminished in the eastern DRC since 2008. As the conflict assessment reveals, most conflict sources remain unresolved, and insecurity levels have tended to increase. In fact, the recent change of mandate of MONUC, leading to MONUSCO, and the prospects of a

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108 AngloGold Ashanti; Mwana Africa; Moto Mines, qui a ensuite été rachetée par Randgold et AngloGold Ashanti; et Banro

109 Interview in Bukavu. May 22nd 2010.

110 This reasoning was evoked several times during the evaluation interviews.
reduction of peacekeeping troops positioned in the east have triggered growing concern among large-scale mining companies.\(^{111}\)

The focus on traceability criteria is founded on a limited analysis of security that excludes important aspects of community security, human rights and other social considerations. These considerations are essential to the overall peacebuilding process in the eastern DRC. Only most recently has the OECD due diligence project, in partnership with the ICGLR, sought to shift security definitions from “absence of armed groups” to “behaviour of military” in mines. If successful, this distinction would expand the peacebuilding agenda from military considerations to community security.

### 9.2 Coordination

It is clear that there is growing policy coherence amongst donors regarding natural resource management in DRC, with particular reference to the mining sector. Though donor analysis since 2003 has always touched upon natural resources and its potential role in driving conflict, it was not until 2005 that this analysis began gaining priority as a policy issue.

This shift can be traced in donor strategies. In late 2008, Germany re-negotiated its bilateral engagement with the DRC, and natural resources became one of its three main pillars. Since 2005, DFID prioritised natural resources, subsequently launching the Trading for Peace programme. DFID has equally explored support for responsible social development with large-scale mining companies, the Provincial Government and USAID in Katanga Province since 2006. Since then, DFID has further strengthened its policy position on the mining sector with a major upcoming investment in the mining sector through the World Bank.

Similar and complementary efforts exist for other donors. The European Commission is developing pilot projects for the artisanal sector, and it works with the Ministry of Mines; its Special Representative for the Great Lakes who is assuming the secretariat of the International Task Force on illegal exploitation and trade natural resources in the Great Lakes Region. Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is supporting the project on centres de négoces coordinated by the Ministry of Mines and MONUC/MONUSCO, alongside further support from DFID. It is equally aligning its efforts in DRC with its new global corporate social responsibility strategy.\(^{112}\)

In addition to growing convergence of objectives, donors appear increasingly realistic in their understanding of the sector’s complexity. For example, not a


single donor interviewed by the evaluation team considered advocacy campaigns demanding an embargo on the trade as presently advantageous for Congo’s development agenda. There is a general agreement that strategies must be tested to proactively engage with the sector, despite its complexity. An embargo would only have negative consequences on the livelihoods of the mining population and potentially contribute to greater insecurity in the long run.

It is interesting to note that this growing donor coherence has contributed to more effective national-level coordination on mining issues. This is most visible through the *Groupe Thématique* on mining, chaired by the National Ministry of Mines, and through the International Task Force, which since early 2010 has made efforts to align itself more closely with the work of the *Groupe Thématique*.

Since late 2009, the Ministry of Mines made significant efforts to bring donors around a coordinated intervention plan. Several conditions have contributed to this: the small but important opportunities in the eastern DRC as a result of the Nairobi Agreement; potential improvements in security conditions; the real threat of an embargo on DRC’s mineral trade; the political sensitivities of the sector; the need for strong Government leadership and coordination; and an emerging mining sector reform framework, PROMINES, supported by the World Bank and DFID\(^\text{113}\).

As one foreign civil servant stated, at no other time in recent DRC history has the level of coordination and collaboration amongst donors and the Government been so positive and significant concerning mining sector interventions\(^\text{114}\).

However, there is still a glaring need for coordination at the provincial levels, under the Government’s leadership, where new mine-related activities are taking place. This is most important at present for the various traceability and certification schemes. Though there is growing dialogue and coordination happening in Kinshasa, the Great Lakes Region, and internationally, it has yet to fully take root in the provinces. For instance, all the traceability and certification projects currently being developed or already being implemented operate in virtual isolation in the field. There is a concern that interventions will not be fully rooted in specific local mining issues, many of which have not been sufficiently analysed and understood to date.

### 9.3 Effectiveness

The projects evaluated demonstrate a strong connection between intended and realised results, indicating a good level of effectiveness \(^\text{115}\). The objective is to

\(^{113}\) Interview with one foreign official in Kinshasa. March 2010.

\(^{114}\) Interview with one foreign official in Kinshasa. March 2010.

\(^{115}\) Note that some projects evaluated are only in mid-implementation.
promote a peace through more responsible natural resource management leading to increased socio-economic dividends for local populations.

The outputs achieved so far include the following:

- The development and implementation of traceability mechanisms (including development of standards and tools for due diligence);
- The strengthening of regional dialogue and cross-border relationships (including the strengthening of capacities of regional organizations and the stimulation of regional dialogue through different fora);
- The strengthening of state capacity through more transparent fiscal and contractual management of mining sector revenues;
- The development of sound and accurate analysis of mining issues through a number of research activities; and
- The engagement of local civil society actors in issues of corporate social responsibility regarding large-scale mining activities.

There has been improved coordination at the national and international level, and the piloting of a number of project interventions in the artisanal sector in eastern DRC. However, as stated earlier, this increased coordination has yet to translate to the provincial and local levels where projects are being implemented, in order to consolidate ownership by local stakeholders.

Once again, PROMINES constitutes a more comprehensive national donor framework for interventions in the mining sector of DRC. Though not exclusive to eastern DRC, this framework will capture a number of fundamental issues related to government reform, management and capacity that are fundamental pre-conditions to the success of many of the current initiatives.

A last result achieved relates to increased regional dialogue and cooperation. It was mainly the rapprochement of the Congolese and Rwandan regimes that opened up the space for a number of initiatives at the regional level concerning trade and mining issues. This political aspect created opportunities for cross-border collaboration, and the development of joint traceability strategies, via existing regional institutions. This has reinforced the recognition by governments and economic actors of the interdependence of local and regional dimensions of the mineral trade.

9.4 Efficiency

The human and financial resources needed to efficiently implement these complex projects cannot be underestimated, and access to resources was limited during the evaluation period. GTZ’s technical assistance to the ICGLR is an important example of how limited resources can be used to boost an institution through the secondment of experts. Their value was evidenced in interviews with ICGLR staff.
It is not unrealistic to presume however that the ICGLR would not be able to sufficiently drive this initiative, with its wide scope of activities, forward without strong support. The initiative has done well to create other partnerships and synergies (e.g. the agreement with CEPGL, and the upcoming due diligence with the OECD) to address current gaps in capacity and mandate.

A further constraint to resource allocation and use is the sheer geographic size of eastern DRC and the difficulties in reaching the majority of potential project sites. At present, in the absence of ample viable implementing agencies around mine sites, there are few ways in which efficiency in this regard can be improved. However, we lack sufficient analysis of potential local capacities that could implement and monitor such projects.

Investment in local capacity building has not yet been considered.

Traceability schemes are multiplying. Field interviews with important mine stakeholders reveal a high level of confusion on how these various initiatives relate to one another.

This is in part due to the limited consultation that has taken place with community stakeholders affected by these projects, but it is also equally due to the lack of coordination occurring at the provincial level. The successful national coordination efforts should be mirrored in eastern provinces under the government’s leadership. In addition, greater outreach needs to be made by the various intervening agencies to record stakeholder concerns, clarify misunderstandings, and address them.

The risk of duplication is decreasing in the context of the trade efforts in the Great Lakes Region. Some donors are currently supporting the ICGLR, while others are concentrating efforts on the CEPGL. In order to strengthen cooperation, a memorandum of understanding was signed in March 2010 between the two regional bodies. This memorandum provides a framework for cooperation on activities in relation to security and development.

9.5 Impact

Relevance of Influence on the Conflict Driver

Article 27 of the Mining Code defines non-eligible persons in mining and mineral-trade activities as being the armed forces, police and security services.

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116 According to Article 2, “this Memorandum provides a framework for cooperation between the Parties in all activities deemed likely to benefit from this cooperation and especially those that seek to implement the provisions of the Pact in the Transborder Security and Development Basin No. 10, in the areas of conflict prevention and management, the promotion of peace and security and the creation of transborder socio-economic activities for the benefit of the people from the Member States.”
Despite this law, various public security actors are commonly involved in various aspects of the mineral trade. And whilst the majority of mine actors recognize that eventually the FARDC should no longer be present let alone doing business on mine sites, their transition out of the supply chain will take some time.

Donors are aware of the lack of expertise and institutional capacities to work in the sector. Rather than calling for an embargo, they are supporting increased transparency, accountability of miners and the formalisation of the mineral trade. This growing donor involvement is equally supported by an increased commitment on the part of the Congolese government to improve governance conditions in the mining sector. The mining industry has launched initiatives to improve traceability of minerals, whereas internationally listed companies are applying more rigorously international standards in this regard117.

Arriving at the end of this evaluation period, a number of donor synergies nonetheless have the potential to improve regulation of the mineral trade and its practices (including the presence and control of military actors in parts of this trade) and to strengthen management capacities in the sector. This evolution over the evaluation period represents a unique opportunity and case study for conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

**Extent of the Influence on the Driver**

Whilst sanctions evidently drive in large part the current participation of various mineral supply-chain actors, the risk of sanctions alone will not ensure long-term adherence to these schemes. Thus whilst the majority of traceability schemes discuss voluntary or “further phased” certification standards around social and environmental impacts, no clear incentive mechanisms are in place to ensure that these initiatives do in fact achieve the long-term intended result of changing how artisanal mining occurs in the DRC118.

For the traceability schemes, two key stakeholders in the supply chain have largely been ignored: traders and artisanal miners. For traders, they play a crucial role in the supply chain, and do have a significant potential to boycott current traceability initiatives, and thus risk driving the trade further underground.

Projects assume that artisanal consultation and representation will be handled by appropriate government technical bodies and future cooperative structures, despite strong evidence that neither of these actors have legitimate relationships with artisanal miners, nor have the capacity and means to reach this vital stakeholder group effectively.

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117 Standards such as those used by the World Bank, the Equator Principles, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.
118 The GTZ-ICGLR initiative discusses ‘voluntary’ socio-environmental clauses for a company to work towards improving mine conditions. Though not on the list of initiatives evaluated, the ITRI initiative alludes to a third-phase of the traceability scheme in which social and environmental conditions of mining will be addressed.
Few projects in this theme reach a broad coverage of conflict drivers. The available resources in PROMINES to improve government capacity, for example, will not respond to the various project facets, in particular for government bodies in isolated areas in eastern Congo.

**Duration of the Influence on the Driver**

Timing is also not as strong as it could be, when thinking of the time dimension of the significance of impact. Whilst some donors have argued that government capacity will largely be addressed by the upcoming PROMINES project, it was equally acknowledged that this project would only finalise its design and commence implementation in late 2010. In the short term, no clear plans for improving government capacity are envisaged by current donor-funded projects in the eastern DRC.

Whilst GTZ’s support towards EITI implementation in DRC is at present only targeting National Ministries, initial results from the EITI process in DRC are encouraging.

### 9.6 Conclusion

The real risk of an embargo on minerals purchased from DRC, resulting from the renewed attention on the assumed links between violence and minerals, has created a climate in which efforts to improve traceability are recognised as important and urgent by all actors (government, artisanal miners, *comptoirs, négociants*, civil society, donors and large-scale mining companies). Traceability, however, cannot be the sole focus of donor efforts if an effective and significant peacebuilding strategy for the eastern DRC is to be realised. Fundamental socio-economic conditions in the mines must also be addressed. The tendency to limit the focus on security issues risks reducing the larger impacts of interventions.

Coherence of donor policy and coordination of donor programming have vastly improved since 2007. Gaps, however, are visible at the provincial levels where current donor initiatives are happening in relative isolation with very little government coordination. This risks duplicating initiatives at the field level and limiting their impact.

With a specific focus on trading activities, limited attention has been paid to the position of artisanal miners. Those initiatives that do have a socio-economic component have only phased approaches or voluntary clauses for improving the working conditions in ASM, but there are no evident incentives nor business cases developed that would encourage buyers, traders and the Government to transform their traceability initiatives into full certification schemes that target mine working conditions and environmental impact.
Difficulties in accessing potential project sites and the high logistical costs are major hindrances to efficient project resource use, but given the remote nature of most mine sites, this cannot be drastically improved at present.

The regional dimensions to the resource trade, the role of neighbouring governments in contributing to the end of illegal exploitation and efforts to promote regional cooperation are crucial dimensions of any successful resource management strategy. Transparent cross-border trade has the potential to reduce the risks of conflict and to promote regional economic development. Government capacity is essential in all of this. The assumptions made by most projects that government has the capacity to implement and monitor the majority of these initiatives is dangerous, and risks undermining the implementation of current projects.
10. CAPACITY BUILDING

10.1 Theme, Donor Approach and Conflict Driver

**Theme**
The TOR questions the extent to which the authorities were included in programming, in particular at the provincial level. The importance of such an inclusive approach is echoed in donor policy statements\(^\text{119}\). Almost all activities have a capacity building component. Weak state capacities and, in some areas, their total absence, is a major obstacle to development of the East\(^\text{120}\). The optimism felt by the population following the elections in 2006 has since waned\(^\text{121}\).

**Donor Policies**
Donors and specialist organisations consider partnership with local administrations an essential element in peacebuilding, especially for donors who wish to intervene in the short-term, as local actors can guarantee the sustainability of interventions over the long-term.

The specific interventions studied under this theme were chosen due to the differing ways in which networks were built, in particular with the local state actors, but also with partners and stakeholders.

Several agencies described the ways in which their programs worked jointly with national authorities. Yet based on the evaluation, the capacity of these authorities is weak. The political culture of the country is very personality-based\(^\text{122}\). Establishing institutions poses challenges and the promise of service delivery improvement (as described in the *Cinq Chantiers*) remains visibly unaddressed. The unmet population expectations constitute a high source of dissatisfaction at various societal levels\(^\text{123}\). Further to this, local authorities at the lowest level of government lack the resources to guarantee social services.

**Sample and Driver**

\(^{119}\) See for example Canada (Policy Report Appendix 7, page 171) or DFID (Policy Report Appendix 7, pages 173 and 175).

\(^{120}\) Corresponding findings are described in the above chapters ‘Security Sector and Demobilisation Theme’ and ‘Justice Theme’

\(^{121}\) Mapping in Bukavu (office of EUSEC): “Faible capacités gouvernementales” with 7 connections, mapping in Goma (hotel Ilusi): “Faiblesses de l’état (impunité) et de l’armée” (12 connections), Goma (Hotel CAP): “La présence des zones de non-droit (absence état de droit)” (9), Bunia: “Mauvaise gouvernance / mauvais encadrement politique” (9), Bukavu (for Kalehe): “Absence de capacité de l’état” (3)

\(^{122}\) Rapport Politique, page 31 and International Alert, Country case study: Kivu, Democratisation and Good Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case Study of South Kivu Province, Jennifer Smith, March 2009, page 21

\(^{123}\) Rapport politique, page 31
To analyse the contribution to impact the team focused on local level networks, which can in turn have a positive impact on peace.

We selected the “Community Empowerment Programme for Ituri (CEPI)” with a budget of US$5 million, managed by UNDP and executed by UNDP, UNICEF, FAO and UNHCR. The two-year programme focuses on community rehabilitation by reinforcing a number of capacity building components, ranging from individual trainings of government officials to large-scale rehabilitation projects.

The project sample included one project within the German-funded Service Civil pour la Paix (SCP) programme financed by Germany and implemented by the German religious NGO Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (EED), which focuses on long-term secondment of German peacebuilding experts to local NGOs.

The DFID-funded Life & Peace programme had similar approaches, focusing on support to local NGOs working in peacebuilding. The Dutch-funded Search for Common Ground project “Tomorrow is a New Day” also had a strong capacity building element, but it focused on the FARDC, aiming to build capacity in the sensitisation of troops and preventing abuses.

The justice programme REJUSCO worked mainly with state structures. This initiative is the main donor intervention in the justice sector in the eastern DRC during the past years. It lasted from 2006 to 2010 with a total budget of Euro10 Million.

Further programs were assessed by desktop research: another project within the SCP program (implemented by the German NGO AGEH), a leadership training initiative focusing on the reconciliation capacities of local leaders (carried out by the Woodrow Wilson Centre and financed by DFID), a multi-donor support program for the elections (implemented by UNDP), and finally the German-funded quick impact Peace Fund and implemented by KfW.

10.2 Coordination

Capacity building is not an assistance sector, and thus does not benefit from formal coordination mechanisms. Capacity building mainly takes place within broader frameworks as described for example in the Document Stratégique de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté (DSCRP)\textsuperscript{124}, Contrat de gouvernance (CDG)\textsuperscript{125}, and Plan d’action prioritaire (PAP)\textsuperscript{126}, and at regional level in the East: Plan de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des zones sortant des conflits armés (STAREC) of 2009. The various donors confirmed that they respond to demands for new project, if they relate to the government’s overall plans.

\textsuperscript{124} 2006; http://www.ministereduplan.cd/pdf/DSCRPVfinale.pdf
\textsuperscript{125} March-December 2007
\textsuperscript{126} http://www.ministereduplan.cd/pdf/PAPmaj100907.pdf
10.3 Effectiveness

The evaluation identified a number of examples where networks contributed to overall program objectives:

- Informal consultations with program stakeholders during the design phase and during the execution of a program (informal meetings, site visits).
- Formal consultations during the design phase and during the implementation of a program (organised, structured and facilitated consultation meetings at each stage to discuss the activities).
- Involvement in program structures (e.g. through a membership in a programme steering committee).
- Contractual relationships with local partners for the execution of a program (e.g. the case of the UNDP-managed CEPI programme, which is carried out by international and local NGOs).
- Joint program ownership (e.g. in the case of REJUSCO and KfW Peace Fund).
- A long-term partnership with a commitment to support the partner organisation on a long-term basis, including capacity building (e.g. in the case of the German funded SCP\(^{127}\)-programme).

Some interesting examples were provided by REJUSCO and CEPI. These were large-scale interventions (REJUSCO with a budget of about Euro10 million for a period of four years and CEPI with a budget of Euro5 million for a period of two years), and program designers made an effort to establish structures for joint program ownership (in the case of REJUSCO\(^{128}\)) or at least a joint steering structure (in the case of CEPI)\(^{129}\). Another example is the SFCG programme. The organisation found the right entry point in Kinshasa to work in a sensitive environment such as the national army. Other examples could be found in the Life & Peace programme where various local contacts were used to have access to the programme area and to the target group (including conflict actors).

Capacity building requires an understanding of how organisational change is supposed to happen. It first requires an understanding of the needs of the organisation, the need for external inputs, the pre-conditions for change, as well as an understanding of the wider context\(^{130}\).

\(^{127}\) Service Civile pour la Paix- Civil Peace Service or in German: Ziviler Friedensdienst-ZFD

\(^{128}\) The basis of the programme is a financing agreement between the EU (represented by the EC) and the Congolese government. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice are the Maître d’Ouvrage of the programme.

\(^{129}\) The provincial government is part of the Steering Committee of CEPI.

Access to experience is another important aspect for capacity building. However, the programmes devoted few efforts to verifying the impact of capacity building or the collection of data for an evaluation of results. The Search for Common Ground programme is one example, and to a certain degree that of EED. SFCG undertook regular surveys and evaluation to analyse activity results, and amongst other things we find an evaluation of the various capacity building efforts done within the programme. EED has started a similar process.

Another effectiveness element is the capacity of programmes to adjust implementation over the course of the programme. For instance REJSCO was approved at the Kinshasa level before the decentralisation process was launched in DRC. The provincial governments in eastern Congo took up the programme as their own but it was too late to influence its design. This is further evidence of the difficulty in delivering ambitious programmes over several years in an evolving environment. REJUSCO had no influence on the decentralisation process but it would have adjusted its consultation process in line with the changes occurring in the environment.

### 10.4 Efficiency

The evaluation identified a number of factors hampering engagement with local actors:

- Weak willingness on the part of the state to invest in the long-term: difficult to hope for coordination when the state does not play its role.
- Centralisation: decentralisation to the provincial level was recently initiated. This had consequences for the governance structure of REJUSCO, for example, where the role of the provincial MOJ was never clearly defined. There is a general need to strengthen the capacity of local authorities, as well as to support decentralisation through planning and implementation.
- Lack of trust: international actors do not trust local actors and vice versa.
- Civil society fragmentation: civil society is made up of many small organisations that lack the means to interact adequately with international actors and governmental authorities, and they tend to compete for funds.

Capacity can also be a collective quality. There are only few organisations based in Kinshasa with a national network.

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131 See for example: Church Ch., Rogers M., Sindayigaya A., Search for Common Ground, Center Lokole, Bukavu, Evaluation Report, November 2003, p32-36
132 See for example the SCP publication : Djateng F., Kayser Ch., Mavinga M. J. Démystifier l’Impact: Notre Travail pour le Changement, 2007 p18, that limits capacity building to training and exchanges experiences.
o Lack of long-term engagement: donor interventions were relatively short term and with a high staff turnover, the continuity in building up relations with local actors is challenged.

According to the documents analysed and the interviews undertaken, in several cases capacity building was achieved, notwithstanding the constraints, with a predominantly technical angle\textsuperscript{136} with a view to treating specific concerns around project activity implementation. It did not however seek to build networks for cooperation at the local level to prevent conflicts.

For example in the cases of REJUSCO, CEPI, and the Peace Fund, material assistance was favoured over a focus on capacity building\textsuperscript{137}. Rebuilding infrastructure with material support was prioritised

This type of capacity building normally does not require the organisation to undergo a fundamental process of change. It does not influence the cultural aspects or the vision, values and other fundamental aspects of the institution\textsuperscript{138}.

Certain initiatives were costly: the reconstruction of infrastructure in the case of REJUSCO and CEPI, but equally the development of programming networks for CSP and Life and Peace, that required considerable travel costs between the provinces. There were in general no alternatives for these types of costs. They are indicative of the underlying conditions and circumstances of eastern Congo (security, distances, etc).

The team did observe several instances in which materials were never used, or already damaged. This occurred in aid programs and in material provisions made by REJUSCO to local authorities for which they were not consulted prior and were found of no value for the (offices were piled up with furniture). Alternative approaches with a long-term perspective (knowledge transfer, methodological transfers, lobbying at the local level) accompanied by appropriate material provision would give better results.

\textsuperscript{136}For example: the programme CEPI, the programme SPEC, REJUSCO, and the Peace Fund financed by Germany

\textsuperscript{137} See for example a recent study on EU assistance in one of the key intervention sectors in DRC: “EU programmes have focused on technical projects, rather than addressing reform of the security system, its mission, its behaviour, its culture and its relationship to the civilian population. (…) But unless the fundamental role of the security system in the DRC is transformed, technical capacity building endeavours, (…), risk increasing the ability of elements within the security system to abuse the population, and therefore jeopardise steps towards peace and democracy in the DRC.” Davies L. (2009) Country case study: DRC Justice-Sensitive Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo, p32

\textsuperscript{138} Simister, Smith, Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity Building: Is it really that difficult? INTRAC, January 2010
10.5 Impact

Relevance to the Conflict Driver

The projects evaluated concentrated efforts at the local level and on important actors. The CSP program was designed to strengthen participatory structures that address conflicts in DRC and the region. From the perspective of inculcating a culture of peace and citizenry, the churches of DRC play an important role in social construction\(^\text{139}\) that was well leveraged.

Some initiatives looked at strengthening capacities that would assist organisations in reinforcing relationships amongst themselves, i.e.: create local networks. This type of capacity building does not generally bear fruit as quickly, is more complex and continuous\(^\text{140}\). This approach was found in EED programming, CSP, and for some initiatives financed by Life and Peace. However such types of interventions involve few transfers of materials. The team found other models where material support went directly to civil society (Life and Peace and CSP programs), an approach that should hold greater relevance to the interventions.

Extent of Influence on the Conflict Driver

The degree of participation of mid-level local authorities remains weak, limiting impact. In the case of REJUSCO, this affected the provincial governments and Comités mixtes de coordination locale, and in the case of CEPI, the local community development committees who were meant to serve at the local level.

The assessment of the selected interventions showed that consultation processes with local authorities and community representatives were part of most intervention approaches. Yet these were often focused on information sharing rather than processes leading to local ownership. They often occurred after program design. The potential for local ownership was mentioned but not fully capitalised on by the international agencies and local partners.

During the evaluation team’s field visits, many respondents confirmed that consultation processes with local authorities and communities were often deficient\(^\text{141}\). Consultation processes with local authorities often lay bare the


\(^{141}\) The finding is supported by the very little attention given to consultation processes (if not absence of mentioning it) in programme documentation. Examples where there is no or very little mentioning of consultation processes are key documents about the REJUSCO programme (e.g. Project Fiche and Mid-term Evaluation), and key documents about the UNDP CEPI Programme (e.g. Concept Note CEPI, 17 October 2010 and Annual Report 2009). Only few programme documents refer to the frequency, content and nature of consultations with local authorities and communities (e.g. Rapport trimestriel 04/2009 République démocratique du Congo Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix, January 2010, p8)
asymmetrical relationship between internationally funded organisations and their local counterparts.

The new decentralised government structures are too new, and the average age of a government official is young, their salaries and material resources often rudimentary compared to those in local NGOs and the UN bodies operating in the area.

**Duration of Influence on the Driver**

The team encountered few initiatives with a long-term perspective and realistic capacity building objectives. Only those agencies that plan and work well within a long-term vision can achieve strong results regarding capacity building.

Under the catchphrase “Act quick...but stay engaged long enough to ensure success”, the OECD Guidelines for Fragile States predicts a minimum of 10 years for a capacity building initiative to realistically bear significant results. The average length of project evaluated was 4.5 years, with some as few as 2 years and others up to 8 years. The SCP and Life and Peace are examples of ones over 4 years. Those that had a more extended life were presented in a phased project approach. The longer-term initiatives were in fact an accumulation of shorter-term interventions, requiring distinct project start-ups and design phases, and in many cases, a change in local partners. Long-term projects, conceived as such from the beginning, constitute a rarity in the evaluation.

However, the team’s field visits found several project still on-going despite project documents indicating otherwise. In some cases activities were financed through ‘rolling’ projects, or by leveraging resources from pooled donor resources. If one looks beyond the project duration in the project document, then it would appear as though many agencies are pursuing more long-term capacity building perspectives by leveraging various mechanisms of financing available only in the short-term.

Donor programs often require the creation of parallel structures that depend on donor finances. In eastern DRC this is the case for the Civilian Protection Committees within FARDC in the SFCG Programme and the Community

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142 REJUSCO raised unrealistic expectations in this sector, and as a conséquence, a level of resentment amongst personnel both in the field and in the program.


144 Resulting from the principals of engagement in fragile states, April 2007, Principal 9. See also Faubert C. (2006) Assistance evaluation of UNDP in countries affected by conflict, case study DRC, p11«It will take years, if not a whole generation, for public sector reform and the return of good governance practices that would foster respect on the part of citizens towards government authorities, ».

145 Life&Peace operates on an annual contract basis with its partners.

146 Examples include EED, with contracts since 2006 and Life& Peace, with annual contracts since 2002.

147 ibid.
Development Committees within the UNDP programme in Ituri. There is a high risk that such structures stop functioning as soon as the donor funding ends.

In the case of SFCG it could be observed that some of the structures created by the program continued to work beyond the completion of project activities. Equally so in the case of UNDP where the structures remained in place beyond the period of direct support. The lack of resources, however, constrains the activities of these structures. Only those activities that can be carried out without material needs were realized. In the case of the Life & Peace program it was decided to reduce the number of partners in the middle of the program. Those partners who were no longer supported then reverted to their old activities (usually development work); the capacity building investment in these partners was largely lost.

10.6 Conclusion

Capacity building initiatives, mainly focussing on material support and periodic training, only partly responded to the needs in eastern DRC. A renewed focus on institutions would have consequences for costs, duration and sequencing of capacity building initiatives.

Providing technical input and in particular material assistance has too often been chosen as the easiest solution, whereas other low-cost inputs might be more adequate (e.g. provision of methodologies and tools, general coaching while working ahead, support in networking, lobbying at macro level). Strategies have not tackled specific risks such as corruption. “Working around” these risks affects performance significantly and creates a climate of distrust that impedes effective networking and cooperation. The context of eastern DRC requires a formulation designed for sustainability that take into account the lack of resources or the unwillingness to invest in local actors. It also requires lengthening interventions over many years, and allowing them freedom to innovate outside the traditional focus on timeframe.
11. CONCLUSIONS

11.1 Main strengths and weaknesses

Conditions in the DRC provide enormous opportunities for donors and aid agencies to prevent future conflict and build peace. But they equally constitute considerable obstacles for those who wish to contribute to a greater quality of life in the region.

Interventions focusing on peace in eastern DRC were only partially successful and for a variety of reasons. Two remain outstanding to the rest:

1. Protracted insecurity: armed groups continually destabilises regions, and consequently increasing operational costs and diminishing direct contacts with agencies in the field.
2. The profound weakness of the state, and the inability of international agencies and organisations to imagine a new way of constructively working with it.

Donors and multilateral agencies that sought to focus on peacebuilding in DRC were not entrusted with sufficient funds to overcome the immense obstacles and for results beyond those achieved. What remains is therefore a range of project in which their design depends on confused and ever-changing donor strategies.

Yet the country’s potential is enormous. Whereas the following paragraphs concern more particularly eastern DRC, and the activities financed under the rubric of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, lessons are applicable across the country. They gather around three main success factors.

First, in order to be strong, interventions need to address and respond to conflict drivers. The policy documents, working modalities, committees, and procedures all currently governing aid makes it virtually impossible to properly analyse and respond to the conflict context. This manifests itself most visibly in the generally weak understanding of the context, and in financing of projects that do not reflect the country’s articulated priorities. The database provided to the evaluation team contains mainly projects treating the consequences not the causes of violence.

Second, performance is influenced by the degree to which agencies work together. Yet over the course of this evaluation, the profound ambivalence of donors and operational agencies towards the state was glaring, and laden with hesitations about how to cooperate with this key Congolese actor. This is reflected in the project approach mechanisms used as recourse by agencies. Whilst this approach provides a large degree of delegation to the field, its
implementation is ill rooted in local realities, affecting negatively intervention effectiveness, particularly those meant to support the reconstruction of state structures. Yet this is key conflict driver.

The absence of a clear donor policy on coordination equally prevented more useful collaboration. In particular, projects were short-term with little regard to the importance of addressing conflict drivers.

Third, project success if heavily influenced by its ability to be grounded in local realities. Humanitarian assistance receives a large amount of funding, which extends to remote areas of the country. But it relies heavily on multiple sub-contracting arrangements, detailed technical cluster planning, and it raises issues with regard to substitution of the state. Interventions in the form of projects are not well integrated into the broader strategies that take into consideration the needs and objectives of local actors.

A tendency to resort to isolated interventions, in an environment where communications are frequently difficult, has weakened accountability. This has been compounded by a widespread ambivalence in relations between international agencies and local actors. The evaluation found a number of instances where monitoring and evaluation were largely absent.

It is clear that the project approach will remain the modus operandi for DRC in the foreseeable future. The flexibility provided and the very experimental nature of aid delivery in a complex context such as DRC necessitates it. If such a fluid approach were supported by good analysis and a rootedness in the local context, it would avoid a number of the criticisms raised.

Further, a growing search for coordination has characterised interventions in the DRC over the evaluation period, reinforced by shifts in general international development cooperation policies towards engagement with national and local authorities in the context of chronic fragility. Donors and aid agencies are unanimous in their support for the principles of capacity building.

### 11.2 Opportunities for Future Interventions

The broadest donor orientations remain favourable towards conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Further, for joint-programs, the cooperation between donors and agencies in addition to that between themselves and the government, was evidenced in the lead-up to the 2006 elections. It continued to dominate SGBV initiatives. The regional dimensions of conflict, particularly its effect across borders, are being taken into further consideration.

There is a variety of ways in which a rootedness in local contexts can be promoted. As decentralisation takes effect, the importance of capacity building is evidenced, stabilisation becomes a recognised theme for strategic interventions in
the East, a region where its territorial integrity is no longer questioned. Some NGOs, such as Cordaid, have developed interventions based on some form of consultation forms that remain worth studying.

The imminent intensification of private sector investment in mining and energy also points to new types of relations with the state. Companies have an interest in creating a stable and transparent environment around their investments. The joint ventures and operations that will emerge in the near future for the mining sector will require intensive dialogue to which the international donors could support more effectively than at present.

By identifying drivers of peace and conflict, and developing strategies to address them, supported by effective communications and cooperation with national, regional and local actors, donors and aid agencies can significantly raise the impact of their interventions. This should be accompanied by a deliberate focus on the human and institutional resources in areas where they are most needed.
12. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Donors should position programming from an assessment of conflict drivers.

If conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes are to hold central attention for international strategies, it is important to undertake on-going analysis of the peace and conflict drivers, such as land conflicts, the social environment, the activities of armed groups and the socio-economic conditions around mines. This would necessitate more resources to undertake situational analyses in the East, but would allow for better resource use over time.

For donors:

- Earmark funds to ensure that projects have conflict-sensitive analysis, and, in the case of conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions specifically, that the root causes are part of the objectives and are clearly justified.
- Develop a cadre of consultants capable of doing conflict analysis that translates into programming priorities, and to analyse the positive and negative effects of an interventions on the conflicts.
- For donor and implementing agency sector coordination groups, ensure that pertinent conflict analysis exists that can serve as a point of reference for programming decisions. Insert the mention of conflict drivers upon which the sector may have an influence.
- Require that the monitoring and evaluation reports of implementing agencies mention analysis undertaken in terms of peacebuilding, whether as an indirect impact or as a direct outcome of the project.

For donors and implementing agencies:

- Ensure that each implementing organisation has, and revises regularly, a conflict analysis (or peace or stability transition analysis). This analysis must relate to overall programming undertaken by the implementing organisation in a direct and measurable fashion.
- Encourage on the one hand more regular field visits by donors, and on the other hand more regular public consultations by agencies. Such consultations must be documented. It is advisable to introduce a complaints or grievances mechanism for projects that is accessible to beneficiaries.
- Review programming guidelines in order to ensure that in contexts of conflict programming there is a distinction made between indirect effects on peace by specific activities, and direct effects for interventions that fit under the rubric of conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
- Avoid amalgamating the treatment of conflict consequences and the prevention or re-establishment of peace. The first type of programming,
can, by virtue of its objectives, have a negative effect on conflict. This effect must be part of a formal monitoring process.

Such targeting must produce a common strategy amongst the actors most intimately involved in conflict prevention to define program priorities and the choice of implementing mechanisms.

**Recommendation 2: Donors should change the balance of sectors and increase joint interventions.**

Donor programming must be founded on definitions of value-added of the different sector towards a broad and comprehensive peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategy adopted by all intervening actors.

For the donors:
- ISSSS should form the basis for all planning in relation to the peace objective, and in view of this, should be reviewed for a new engagement.
- The European Service for Foreign Intervention, given its political nature for crisis intervention\(^{148}\), should be able to support civil missions and other interventions that are of a particularly sensitive nature.

For donors, agencies and implementing organisations:
- Sectors such as SGBV prevention, and humanitarian aid, should be part of additional efforts regarding monitoring and evaluation of the effects of these interventions on the drivers of peace and conflict.
- The mining sector, and those aspects of customary land laws should benefit from greater assistance.
- Organisations working on natural resource governance should more accurately distinguish between the informal economy and criminal economy nature of resource extraction, and reinforce coordination around traceability and international standards regarding social responsibility of companies.
- Organisations working in the mining sector should improve consultation, even coordination, with stakeholders who have already invested significantly in this sector, such as the Republic of China and multinationals.

These strategies represent an opportunity for dialogue engagement and new forms of cooperation with the state. New actors innovating creative approaches have been on the periphery of the relationships that link the government to development and stabilisation programmes.

**Recommendation 3: Adopt a new relationship with the Government of DRC, and create true partnerships at the local level**

\(^{148}\) For the United States this would be the Office for Transition Initiatives and District Stability Framework.
A clearer definition on the part of international organisations on their relationship with the central and local government would permit the development of new forms of innovative cooperation. These must be part of a new approach.

For the donors:

- Increase the volume of financing to sectors that contribute towards the formalisation of a regulatory framework for the exploitation of natural resources.
- Increase the volume of financing for projects that seek to improve the working conditions of artisanal and small-scale miners, in addition to the living conditions of soldiers and ex-combatants’ families;
- Increase the volume of financing for anti-corruption measures, integrity systems, and of transparency, with messages formulated for the benefit of local populations.
- Identify and develop expertise in the natural resource governance sector, in addition to human rights in the mining sector.
- Prioritise projects that have limited sub-contracting mechanisms, and projects that emphasise decision-making at the local and territorial levels.
- Prioritise projects that demonstrate flexibility in their implementation, or that at least can be re-adjusted mid-way through implementation\(^{149}\).
- Prioritise projects that seek to finance local NGOs not only for implementation purposes but also equally for building technical capacity for local development.
- Increase feedback loops for projects and initiatives, in particular by simplifying monitoring and evaluation systems, and in augmenting the number of studies conducted, and their publicity.

For NGOS

- The Cordaid model for financing local authorities based on results achieved should be expanded.
- Decentralise decision-making towards the field (at least to level of provincial capitals) and minimize as much as possible the amount of expenses on equipment and salaries, in order to reduce the cleavages with local authorities.
- At the project closure phase, ensure that training of staff and job placement is observed.

\(^{149}\) The study noted in almost all the themes evaluated a consistent lack of context analysis and strategies emanating from the local authorities, in addition to a lack of consideration towards parallel efforts being undertaken by other organisations. In addition there was a general lack of public and local consultations prior to activity design and implementation. A major observation made was the need to have more flexible project framework sand agreements that allow for changing of activities and budget allocations in order to respond to shifting dynamics in the field.
- Move towards a systematic identification of possible risks during project implementation, and incorporate these risks into the objective framework for capacity building.
- Develop local monitoring and evaluation systems that are accessible to the population, in particular grievance mechanisms and conflict mapping.\textsuperscript{150}
- Prioritise programs that promote mentoring or secondment of personnel to local organisations (with a clear objective on the secondment and a minimisation of additional ‘gifts’).

\textsuperscript{150} Grievance mechanisms, as promoted by the World Bank for extractive industry projects, are gaining favour with certain NGOs, as reflected in Code of Conduct for the Humanitarian Accountability Project. These systems require minimal effort and investment, ranging from public consultations during the conflict analysis phase to simple feedback sessions following evaluations conducted at the end of a project cycle.
APPENDIX 1: STEERING COMMITTEE FOR THE EVALUATION

Mr. Dominique De Crombrugghe, The Belgian Federal Service for Foreign Affairs

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APPENDIX 2: TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Background and rationale

“Conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) activities are projects, programmes, policies, strategies or other interventions that adopt goals and objectives aimed at preventing conflict or building peace; they are usually (but not always) focused on a particular conflict zone – an area threatened by, in midst of, or recovering from serious intergroup violence.”

Growing shares of aid resources, time and energy are being devoted to conflict prevention and peace building projects, programmes and policy strategies. These growing shares are appropriate given the high human cost of armed conflicts and their profound impacts on political, social and economic development. When a violent conflict breaks out, development derails. The benefits of development assistance can be reversed by violent conflict, which is not only an accompaniment of poverty but also one of its main causes.

More evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of CPPB efforts is essential. There is an increased interest among donors and practitioners, as well as among people affected by violent conflict, to learn more about what does work, what doesn’t and why. This demand to improve understanding of what contributes positively to peace and stability is motivated by the desire to develop more coherent, coordinated and effective interventions at all levels.

To respond to this increased interest, the OECD DAC has developed a draft Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Activities. The guidance gives in particular advice on those aspects of evaluating CPPB activities that differ from evaluating other development interventions. The guidance serves as a reference for the commissioning donors for the evaluation process and for consultants in the execution of the evaluation. The draft guidance is available on the OECD website.

At the same time as this evaluation in the DRC the guidance will be used in three other CPPB evaluations: Sri Lanka, Haiti and South Soudan. All four evaluations, executed independent from each other, will contribute to the finishing of the guidance.

This evaluation will concentrate on donors’ CPPB policies and interventions in the long-lasting and complex conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and more specific in the eastern DRC. As several donors (bilateral and multilateral) are active in the DRC, the choice has been made to undertake this

151 Guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peace building activities. OECD DAC, 2007, p 16
152 http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_21571361_34047972_35263575_1_1_1_1,00.html
evaluation as a joint exercise. This should facilitate the drawing of conclusions at a more strategic level.

A first call for tender has been launched in 2008 but cancelled due to the escalating conflict in the DRC. This call for tender replaces the first one.

2. The DRC conflict

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the site of one of the world’s worst ongoing humanitarian crises. Although the country emerged from what has been called “Africa’s first world war” in 2003 when the former Congolese warring belligerents came together to form a transitional government, credible mortality studies estimate that over 1,000 people still die each day from conflict-related causes such as disease and malnutrition as well as ongoing violence.

Conflict history

Independence
Congo became independent in June 1960, with Patrice Lumumba as prime minister and Joseph Kasavubu president. They became engaged in a power struggle and Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba, who was later arrested and assassinated in 1961. Moise Tshombe, head of breakaway Katanga, became Congo’s prime minister in 1964.

Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu ousted both President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Tshombe in 1965 and began his thirty-two years of rule. Six years later he changed the name of the country to Zaire. Mobutu systematically used Congo’s mineral wealth to consolidate power, co-opt potential rivals and to enrich himself and his allies. Mobutu was ousted in May 1997 by a rebellion under the leadership of Laurent Kabila, backed by neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda.

Post Mobutu to presidential election of Joseph Kabila
War broke out again in August 1998 when Kabila moved to purge Rwandans from his government. Rwandan troops backing Congolese Tutsi rebels invaded Congo. Kabila called on Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for help. An estimated 5.4 million people, the largest death toll in a conflict since World War II, died in the ensuing conflict between 1998 and 2004, mostly from war-related diseases and starvation. State parties, later joined by non-state actors, signed a ceasefire in Lusaka in July 1999, allowing the UN Security Council to send a peacekeeping mission (MONUC) in 2000. However violence continued, fuelled by Congo’s

154 IRC, http://www.internationalrescuecommittee.org
mineral wealth. Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and was replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. Peace negotiations continued throughout 2002 to work out the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops in exchange for the demobilisation and disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels in DRC territory. By the end of 2002 Rwanda and Uganda claimed full withdrawal from the DRC, although proxies remained. In December 2002 all Congolese belligerents and political groups signed a peace deal in Sun City, South Africa. The deal ushered in a transitional government in June 2003 in which Kabila shared power with four vice-presidents.

The establishment of a transitional government failed to stop the conflict in eastern Congo, specifically in the Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga provinces. Rebel groups, including dissident members of former rebel movements, Rwandan-backed Tutsi rebels and Hutu militias (with Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) the largest), continued to fight the government and rival groups, often seeking control of mineral wealth.

Conflicts over land and mineral wealth in the north eastern Ituri region led to widespread violence and massacres in 2002 that UN troops were unable to stop. A French-led three-month emergency mission under EU authority managed to contain the situation in 2003, and a more robust UN mission returned.

The sustained level of violence throughout 2004 and internal displacements led the UN in March 2005 to describe Eastern Congo as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis”.

The Ugandan rebel group, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), settled near Garamba National Park in north eastern Congo in late 2005-early 2006. This move reignited tensions between Congo and Uganda as Kampala threatened to pursue the LRA into Congolese territory and Kinshasa suspected Uganda of wanting access to eastern Congo to exploit its natural resources. In 2005, the International Court of Justice found the Ugandan army guilty of grave human rights abuses and illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources.

A new constitution, introducing president/prime minister power-sharing and a two-term limit for the presidency, was adopted 13 May 2005 and approved in a referendum on 18 December 2005. The national assembly and first round presidential elections were held on 30 July 2006. Violent clashes erupted in Kinshasa between Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba supporters when no candidate received an absolute majority in the first-round of votes. Provincial elections and a second round of presidential elections took place 29 October 2006; confirming Kabila as president with 58% of the vote, while his alliance won a substantial majority in both national and provincial assemblies.

2006 to present
The current problems in North Kivu stem from failures of the Congo peace process on army integration, economic governance and transitional justice. During the second half of the political transition a policy of containment, appeasement, and international emphasis on the holding of elections cooled tensions but left their causes unaffected. The province remained in effect split into two pieces, with Masisi and Rutshuru territories caught in a cold war between dissidents from the former Rwandan-backed rebel group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), and the national army (FARDC). Little progress was made on disarmament and reintegration of Mai Mai militias or repatriation of the Rwandan Hutu (FDLR) rebels. The illegal exploitation of natural resources continued unabated as all communities armed, animated by deep mutual resentments over land security, mass human rights abuses during the war and control of natural resources.

The 2006 national and provincial elections liquidated the RCD politically. Strengthened by his election, Kabila held discreet talks with Nkunda, facilitated by Rwanda, and concluded an agreement for the progressive integration of Nkunda’s troops into the regular armed forces, a process locally known as mixage, with the understanding that they would not have to leave the province until the general security situation improved significantly. But neither Nkunda nor Kabila was able to contain their hardliners opposed to the settlement. Fighting resumed between the insurgents of Laurent Nkunda and the national army in December 2006 several hundred thousands displaced civilians as a result. Mixage collapsed in May 2007, leading to new escalation of violence. Due to the failure to integrate Nkunda’s troops into the army, the crisis worsened after May 2007. Fresh outbreaks of fighting resulted in renewed violence against civilians, including the widespread use of rape as an instrument of war. UN attempts to impose a ceasefire and appoint a special envoy to mediate were unsuccessful.

The “Goma agreement” for peace in North Kivu was signed on 23 January 2008. The agreement followed negotiations between the government, renegade general Laurent Nkunda and Mai Mai militias. The deal included a ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops from key areas and the creation of a UN “buffer zone”. However, the Rwandan Hutu FDLR did not participate in the talks.

Despite some initial signs of Nkunda’s readiness to disengage, the agreement was quickly violated. Serious clashes between CNDP and FARDC continued and CNDP launched a new offensive in North Kivu in August 2008. CNDP advanced significantly, took control of Rutshuru in October and marched on Goma but didn’t invade the city. The 29th of October a ceasefire was self-declared by CNDP, although not well respected which was sadly demonstrated with the massacre in Kiwanja on the 4th of November, with an estimated 150 casualties.
An estimated 300,000 people have been newly displaced and the Congolese army has been implicated in looting, rapes and killings in and around Goma as troops abandoned their positions.

Early November the diplomatic efforts of the international community accelerated, and former Nigerian president Obasanjo was appointed as UN envoy to lead the peace talks. The UN was called to enlarge the MONUC, which didn’t have the capacity to protect citizens against the violence of the conflict.

In December diplomatic pressure on Rwanda to stop its support to CNDP increased after the publication of a UN expert panel report that demonstrated the links between Rwanda and the CNDP. One month later, Rwanda and the DRC started a 5 weeks joined offensive in North Kivu to chase off the FDLR. The offensive had a limited success; the FDLR ran off but regained their positions after the joint offensive ended.

Meanwhile, in January, CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda and replaced by Bosco Ntaganda, who has a warrant out for his arrest by the ICC. CNDP started to integrate the FARDC, officialised a by peace deal with Kinshasa which stipulates the transformation of CNDP into a political party.

At the same time more to the North-East in the province “Orientale”, the LRA was unsuccessfully chased by the Ugandese and Congolese army. Citizens became victim of brutal raids from the LRA, with 189 killings in Faradje on Christmas night, more than 200 people kidnapped and 80 women raped. By mid January it is estimated that 620 people were killed by the LRA.

3. Purpose and objectives of the evaluation

The evaluation will assess the relevance, results and the effects of CPPB policies and programmes of the international community and participating donors and agencies more in particular in eastern DRC; this by applying the DAC evaluation criteria. What works in the support of CPPB, what doesn’t, and why?

The evaluation has a double purpose, providing accountability on the one hand and on the other, a learning tool for improvement. The emphasis however lays on the learning purpose. Which lessons can be learnt in order to develop more strategic, coherent and coordinated policies and programmes and how can results, ownership, harmonization and alignment be improved? The evaluation results should allow the donors to improve their CPPB strategies, the international community present in the DRC to improve their joint CPPB approach, the Congolese authorities to manage the CPPB support better and the executing agencies to increase the quality of their interventions.

155 Belgium, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, UNDP, Unicef, UNFPA, UNIFEM, OHCHR
A further purpose of this evaluation is the testing of the OECD DAC “guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peace building activities”. The experience gathered with the implementation of the evaluation should be of help in the finalisation process of the guidance, which is still a working document.

4. Scope

The evaluation examines the CPPB policies, strategies and programmes supported by the international community (bilateral and multilateral organizations) in the east of the DRC. The geographical scope is limited to South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri. However nation wide interventions without specific focus on this conflict area, but with an impact on the conflict in the area will be taken into account as well.

The evaluation covers the period from 2002, when Rwanda and Uganda claimed their full withdrawal from the DRC and when peace negotiations resulted in the Sun City peace deal, to 2009.

CPPB interventions in the DRC cover a large field among which gender based violence, child soldiers, the ethnic question, regional politics, SSR, DDR, (transitional) justice, natural resources, land problems, IDP’s, the media, elections, etc. Possible other themes can be found in Figure 1 of the OECD guidance on evaluating CPPB activities (p.18).

The evaluators can propose 3 to 5 themes, considered relevant after the portfolio analysis of the different donors and organisations and the reconstruction of the theories of change (cfr infra). Those 3 to 5 themes will be evaluated in the field.

The evaluation will examine a sample of 50 to 60 interventions of various sizes within these 3 to 5 themes. During the main mission 20 to 25 interventions will be visited, from which 5 to 6 interventions will undergo an in-dept evaluation.

The selection of the themes and interventions will be made in consultation with the steering committee during the preliminary phase.

5. Evaluation questions

The evaluation questions follow the five OECD DAC criteria for evaluating development assistance, namely relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. Furthermore, the evaluation will pay attention to the additional criteria coordination among donors and with implementing organisations and policy coherence, as outlined in the working document Guidance on evaluation CPPB activities. This Guidance details the evaluation criteria in CPPB related questions. The guidance forms integrally part of these ToR when formulating the final
evaluation questions and if departing from the guidance, it should be explained why.

The main evaluation questions are the following:

1. What CPPB policies and strategies existed? How were they defined? Did they change over time?

2. What was the role of the government and other parties at the regional level?

3. To what extent did the CPPB policies/strategies and interventions provide an accurate and relevant response to the conflict and to the harm the conflict has caused and still causes? Were/are the objectives appropriate and the priority ones to address?

4. To what extent did the interventions achieve their objectives? What are the outcomes of the CPPB interventions? And are they sustainable?

5. How do the interventions compare to other options, that donors did not choose but were aware of, aiming at achieving the same goals?

6. What is the impact of the CPPB policies and strategies on the selected themes?

7. To what extent do the donors coordinate their CPPB efforts amongst themselves or with local institutions and to what extent is their CPPB approach coherent?

6. Approach/ phasing

The “OECD DAC guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peace building activities” and the “DAC Evaluation Quality Standards” should be considered as references for the evaluation, and should be taken into account as much as possible.

1. Inception report

The inception report specifies the consultants’ understanding of the task and scope of this evaluation. The report also elaborates the methodology to be used during all phases of the evaluation; which methodology will be used to reconstruct and analyse the theories of change, to determine the themes and the interventions, for the desk study, for the field visits, for the in depth evaluations, etc.? The indicative time schedule proposed in the ToR can be reviewed in this phase after consultation with the steering committee.
Participating donors will provide a database with an overview of their CPPB projects.

At the end of this phase the consultants will have formulated evaluation questions with related indicators and obtained the agreement of the steering committee on the same.

The evaluation team proposes ToR for the missions of the policy phase in an annex to the inception report.

The evaluators deliver the inception report 4 weeks after the assignment of the evaluation and present the report to the steering committee one week later. This inception report is considered as an important step to assure a qualitative evaluation process and consequently the steering committee can terminate the cooperation with the consultants if the inception report is not satisfactory.

2. **CPPB Policy phase.**
A literature study of recent publications and existing evaluation reports about CPPB will be carried out to give input to this evaluation.

The consultants will carry out an analysis of the database provided. The evaluation makes use of existing conflict analyses of the participating donors and reconstructs the implicit or explicit theories of change used by the donors to base their CPPB policy on. The soundness of both the conflict analyses as the theories of changes will be tested throughout the evaluation.

It is suggested that the team organizes a mission to the DRC:
- to discuss the purpose of the evaluation with the local authorities and to encourage their participation throughout the evaluation process and in the local reference groups.
- to assure an optimal involvement of the donor agencies during the subsequent field mission.
- to gather useful information about the CPPB policies and the theories of change.

Complementary missions will be organized to the headquarters of the participating donors and agencies to hold interviews with key actors within the donors’ policies and line departments. The objective is to gather additional information on the theories of changes and the CPPB policies.

The work done in this and the previous phase will result in a full report that answers the questions 1, 2, 3 and 7.

As a result of the portfolio database analysis, the analysis of the theories of change and based on agreed criteria the evaluators propose the 3 to 5 themes to evaluate in depth and a sample of 50 to 60 interventions to study. From this sample 20 to 25 interventions will be visited in the field of which 5 to 6
interventions will be evaluated in depth. The interventions will be selected within
the portfolio of the organisations participating in the evaluation unless otherwise
specified.

This proposition will be discussed with the members of the steering committee
and the decision on the selection will be taken in consultation.

3. **Thematic phase**
The CPPB strategies/policies and the theories of change behind the 3 to 5
selected themes are studied more in depth.
A document study of the 50 to 60 is done.

The main field mission will take approximately 6 to 8 weeks (or 250 to 300
working days) and includes:
- field visits to 20-25 selected interventions;
- 5-6 in dept evaluations.
The mission will start with a presentation, to the local reference groups in North
Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri (see section 9) of the objectives of the field visits.
At the end of the mission, the consultants will hold a debriefing session with the
local reference groups.
The evaluators will draft a report on their field visit within two weeks of the
mission and will present the report in the steering committee two weeks later.

4. **Final report**
Using the information gathered during the previous phases, the final report
provides answers to the evaluation questions agreed during the preliminary
phase.

The report will be submitted in three stages: first draft, final draft and a final
report. After each stage the members of the steering committee will have the
opportunity to comment on the report which will be considered by the
consultants. The final report should imperatively be approved by the members of
the steering committee.

The report contains an executive summary of maximum 5 pages. The report will
not be longer than 75 pages, annexes not included. The report is structured in
accordance with the DAC evaluation quality standards (cfr point 10 of these
standards). Lay-out recommendations will be provided in advance

The report is available in 3 languages: French, English and Dutch. The evaluation
team assures the quality of the translations (rereading obliged).

5. **Dissemination and feedback**
One restitution seminar will be held in the headquarters of one of the
participating donors and another one in the DRC.
To wrap up the evaluation, the consultants will draft a feedback note on the use of the OECD DAC working draft guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peace building activities. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the guidance and how can it be improved?

7. Outputs and indicative time schedule

The main language of this evaluation is French. All intermediary reports will be written in French, except for the policy phase report and the final report which will be delivered in French, English and Dutch. The meetings will be held in French but the presenting consultants should master English as well.

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<th>Week</th>
<th>Item</th>
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<th>language</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>Assignment of the evaluation exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Kick-off meeting</td>
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<td>Submission of the inception report</td>
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<td>French</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Literature study</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reconstruction theories of change</td>
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<td>Mission DRC</td>
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<td>Mission headquarters</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Submission of the policy phase report</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>French + English + Dutch</td>
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<td>2nd steering committee: presentation of the policy phase report</td>
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<td>Thematic phase</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Submission of field mission report</td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Submission of the first draft report</td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>3rd steering committee: Presentation of the first draft report + discussion and comments.</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Submission of final draft report</td>
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<td>French</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Deadline for final comments</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Final report + translations</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>French + English + Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Wrap up note on the use of the CPPB evaluation guidance</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>French + English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Ethical Principles

Do no harm: The evaluation should be conflict sensitive. The evaluators are aware of possible impacts on the conflict and all efforts are made to avoid that the evaluation has negative effects on the conflict and its victims.

The evaluation process shows sensitivity to gender, beliefs, manners and customs of all stakeholders; it is undertaken with integrity and honesty and ensures inclusiveness of views. The rights and wellbeing of participants in the evaluation are protected. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants should be protected by all means.

During the field missions the evaluation teams will call at the donors’ representations in the DRC and obtain clearance from civil or military authorities if appropriate. The evaluators will not take unnecessary risks for the safety of all the participating staff, partners and beneficiaries, and be aware that they may inadvertently expose those to greater risks than they themselves face.

The evaluators will explain in the inception report how they intend to make the evaluation conflict sensitive.

9. Management and steering committee

A steering committee will monitor the evaluators’ work in accordance with the ToR. The steering committee is composed of both evaluators and thematic specialists of the participating donor agencies and the secretariat of the DAC evaluation network (OECD). The committee can include qualified experts as member or for special hearings. The steering committee will meet in Brussels or in other headquarters of participating organisations when considered to be more suitable for the members of the steering committee and the consultants.

The steering committee will judge the content and the quality of the findings, analyses, conclusions and recommendations. It will meet three times:

1st meeting on the inception report;
2nd meeting on the policy phase report;
3rd meeting on the first draft of the final report;

Comments on the draft final report will be gathered in a response grid and delivered to the consultants who will complete the grid with their position against these comments and what use they intend to make of them.

During the missions several local reference groups will be established in the DRC. The consultants will hold feedback sessions on their missions in Kinshasa, North
Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. These groups will consist of the principal stakeholders of CPPB in DRC, such as staff members of the donor representations, the executing organizations and delegates of the Congolese (local) authorities and civil society. These reference groups have an advisory role but have no power of decision on the evaluation.

The day to day management of the evaluation is under responsibility of the Belgian Special Evaluation Office.

10. Quality control

An external quality controller will be part of the steering committee. This person will give particular attention to the quality of the methodology used and the conformity of the evaluation (process) with the DAC evaluation quality standards and the Guidance on CPPB Activities. The evaluators will organise their own external quality control mechanism.

11. Team profile

Minimal 6 consultants with complementary profiles containing:
- knowledge and experience of evaluation processes
- knowledge and experience of conflict prevention and peace building
- knowledge and experience of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in particular regarding the conflict in the east
- knowledge and experience of different themes linked to CPPB in eastern DRC.
- language skills: French, English, Dutch, Swahili and Kinyarwanda are demanded.
- preferably an international team, gender equal and with presence of local consultant(s).
- the team leader should be clearly identified

12. Technical tender

The technical tender consists of:
- an explanatory memorandum about the background to the contract as proof that the terms of reference and the subject under evaluation have been fully understood.
- An initial proposition of approach and methodology.
- schedule/work programme
- team composition (organisation, tasks carried out by each team member and their CV); the team leader must be clearly identified
- indicate the number of working days for each consultant per phase and whether the consultant is senior, junior or local.
- references for previous evaluation assignments carried out by the consultancy the last 10 years. This should be limited to contracts relevant for this evaluation.
- detailed budget.
- a summary of one page of the technical proposal.
## APPENDIX 3: LIST OF PEOPLE MET

**Theme: Humanitarian Aid and Sexual Gender Based Violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization and Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Max HADORN</td>
<td>OCHA, Chef de Bureau</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Anselm SCHNEIDER</td>
<td>GTZ, Directeur de Programme Multisectoriel VIH/Sida et Système de Santé</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heller KARSTEN</td>
<td>GTZ, Conseiller Technique, Lutte contre la violence sexuelle</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvie MONETTE</td>
<td>Ambassade du Canada, Deuxième Secrétaire (Coopération)</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Claude MAILHOT</td>
<td>Ambassade du Canada, Conseillère Politique</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie CROTEAU</td>
<td>UNICEF, Coordinateur Département Urgences</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fréderic SIZARET</td>
<td>UNIFEM, Country Programme Manager</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisèle Irénée KOULA</td>
<td>Ambassade de Japon, Troisième Secrétaire</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuki HIROTANI</td>
<td>Ambassade de Japon, Premier Secrétaire</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeda KIYOHIKO</td>
<td>Deuxième Secrétaire, Ambassade de Pays-Bas</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennyfer A.E. Imperator</td>
<td>UNFPA, Représentant Résident</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard DACKAM-NGATCHOU</td>
<td>Coordinatrice de projet, UNFPA</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roselidah Ondeko</td>
<td>Protection de l’Enfant, Urgences et Post-Conflit, VVS</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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**Theme: Justice**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howlandt, Todd</td>
<td>BCNUDH(HCDH-DDH/MONUC), Directeur</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouaka, Louis Marie</td>
<td>BCNUDH(HCDH-DDH/MONUC), Directeur-adjoint</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mpiana, Godefroid</td>
<td>ICTJ, Chargé de programme,</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arena, Sophie</td>
<td>BCNUDH (HCDH-DDH/MONUC), Coordonatrice Unité Protection,</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salami, Adam</td>
<td>BCNUDH (HCDH-DDH/MONUC), Human Rights Officer, Transitional Justice &amp; Fight against Impunity Unit</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meersman, Katrien</td>
<td>Ambassade de Belgique, Attachée de la Cooperation au Développement</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robberecht, Peter</td>
<td>Ambassade de Belgique, Premier Secrétaire, Section Politique</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decarnières, Aurore</td>
<td>Avocats Sans Frontières, Chef de mission</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailhot, Jean Claude</td>
<td>Ambassade du Canada, Conseiller et Chef de la Coopération</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crôôteau, Julie</td>
<td>Ambassade du Canada, Conseiller (Politique)</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monette, Sylvie</td>
<td>Ambassade du Canada, 2e Secrétaire (Coopération)</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dulieu, Pierre</td>
<td>CTB, Représentant résident</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyttendaele, Bart</td>
<td>CTB, Conseiller géographique, RDC, Desk Afrique centrale, de l’Est, du Sud et de l’Asie</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggen, Manuel</td>
<td>RCN Justice &amp; démocratie, Coordonnateur</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surname, Name</td>
<td>Org. and function</td>
<td>Place</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marqué bleu: entrevue de groupe</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior de Fabbribekers</td>
<td>Expert DDR SSR, Service de la coopération belge</td>
<td>Bruxelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Tim Woodman</td>
<td>British Embassy, Attaché de la Défense RDC, Angola, Gabon, RoC</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jos de Beus</td>
<td>PNUD, Poverty Reduction Unit, Advisor Recovery &amp; Development</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Damien Mama</td>
<td>PNUD, ….</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Medieu Diop</td>
<td>PNUD, Equipe Judiciaire, Securitaire et Gouvernance</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Patrick Dave</td>
<td>EUSEC, Directeur Assistance (reforme administrative FARDC)</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jean-Marc Tafani</td>
<td>MONUC DDR/RR, Deputy Director</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Stephan Pearce</td>
<td>Ambassade d’Afrique du Sud, Ministre Conseiller</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Sipho Mnguni</td>
<td>Ambassade d’Afrique du Sud, Attaché de Défence</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Norbert Sengamali Lukukwa</td>
<td>Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Directeur de Cabinet Adjoint</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Chriss Yamba</td>
<td>Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Conseiller Chargé du Suivi des Accords de Paix</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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**Theme : Demobilisation and Security Sector**
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Grevisse Didend Yav</td>
<td>Unité d’Execution du Programme National de Desarmement, Demobilisation et Reinsertion (UEPN-DDR), Administrateur du Projet</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mme. Evelyne Mbata</td>
<td>Unité d’Execution du Programme National de Desarmement, Demobilisation et Reinsertion (UEPN-DDR), Chargée de Communication</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Peter Robberecht</td>
<td>Ambassade de Belgique, Premier Secrétaire Section Politique</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. Michel Elesse Yombentole</td>
<td>Comité de Suivi de la Reforme de la Police (CSRP), Secrétaire Exécutif</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Yuki Hirotani</td>
<td>Ambassade du Japon, troisième secrétaire</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Kiyohiki Ideka</td>
<td>Ambassade du Japon, premier secrétaire</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Matou</td>
<td>Ministère de la Défence, Directeur du Cabinet</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Matthew Reid</td>
<td>MAG, Programme Officer</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<td>Lt.Col.Peter Aerts</td>
<td>Ambassade des Pays Bas, Attaché de Défence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Jean Luc Mwilambwe</td>
<td>Ministère de la Défense/ Etat Major General FARDC, Directeur du Cabinet chargé de la Politique, Diplomatie et la Défence Internationale</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mj. Sam Kabila</td>
<td>Ministère de la Défense/ Etat Major General FARDC, Directeur Adjoint du Planification Stratégique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mme. Tasha Gill</td>
<td>UNICEF, chargé de la protection</td>
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<td>Michael Tschanz</td>
<td>Chef de bureau national OIM</td>
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<td>Abbé Malu Malu</td>
<td>MONUC, section politique</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<td>Dr. Jörg Maxin</td>
<td>Responsable Programme Amani</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. Hans-Georg Hagen</td>
<td>Coopération Technique Allemande (GTZ), Directeur Résident</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mme. Judith Suminwa</td>
<td>Coopération Germano-Congolaise, Coordinateur du Fonds</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Per Rönning</td>
<td>MONUC, ancien chargé de COMREC</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Innocent</td>
<td>Ex-Chef de Protocol au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Rene Michel Bauman</td>
<td>World Bank, Conflict Officer</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Moska</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Intérieure, Police Advisor</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<td>Gen. Moja</td>
<td>Ministère de la Défense/ Etat Major General FARDC, Section Education</td>
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<td>Gen. Mboyama</td>
<td>Etat Major General FARDC, Directeur Adjoint du Plan de Réforme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Francis Saudubray</td>
<td>MONUC SSR, Coordinator SSR</td>
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<td>Mr. Patrick Merienne</td>
<td>DFID (Londen), MDRP expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pr. Adolphe Lumanu Mulenda</td>
<td>Vice Premature Intérieur et Sécurité, Vice-Premier Ministre / Ministre de l’Intérieure et Sécurité</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mwana N’sefu</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Intérieur et Sécurité, Conseiller Politique du Vice-Premier Ministre</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Daniel Lubo</td>
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<td><strong>Programme EUSEC</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Sándor Nagy</td>
<td>EUSEC, Commandant de détachement (armée hongroise)</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj. Aumory Damase</td>
<td>EUSEC, Conseiller (armée française)</td>
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<td>Maj. Marc Romfort</td>
<td>EUSEC, Chargé de la logistique (armée française)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gen. Mazunzu</td>
<td>FARDC, Général de la 10ème région militaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj. Samir Abdessaid</td>
<td>MONUC, Liaison officer FARDC</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj. Shahid</td>
<td>MONUC, Operations officer FARDC Amani Leo</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col. Bakuwe Kamutititu</td>
<td>FARDC, Commandant 313ème secteur, Nyangezi</td>
<td>Nyangezi</td>
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<td><strong>Programme UE-PNDDR</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mme. Willy Kikunga Vasanga</td>
<td>UE-PNDDR, Chef d’antenne Bukavu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Jean Pierre Kavaketi</td>
<td>UE-PNDDR, Sensibilisateur</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Lievain Cirhuza</td>
<td>UE-PNDDR, Chef d’antenne Uvira</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Narcis Nziale</td>
<td>UE-PNDDR, Management Information Service</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Sylvanie Tahohabehka</td>
<td>UE-PNDDR, Président des démobilisés site Nyamarege</td>
<td>Nyamarege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Itabala Biryalugo</td>
<td>UE-PNDDR, Chef de localité site Nyamarege</td>
<td>Nyamarege</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Byamungu Kigangu</td>
<td>Caritas, chargé de l’agromonie</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Zindula Ziharlirwa Matthieu</td>
<td>Caritas, monteur agricole</td>
<td>Nyamarege</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Cibey Magadju</td>
<td>CAPA, chargé des formations</td>
<td>Bukavu</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Programme ISSSS
Mme. Ilaria Elena Carpen
MONUC, stabilisation advisor eastern coordination
♀ Bukavu

Programme UNICEF
Mr. Flory
UNICEF, chargé de programme
♂ Bukavu

Programme IOM
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Chargé de programme Police Frontière, IOM
♂ Bukavu
Noel Craven
Chef de bureau Bukavu
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Lt Col. Freddy Yoka E-Ikotama
Inspecteur Provincial Adjoint, chargé de l’Administration et Logistique
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Colonel Antoine Masirika
Coordonateur Centre Jules Moquet
♂ Bukavu

Insp. Dismas Kashoungwé
DGM, responsable poste Ruzizi II
♂ Bukavu
Lucas Mukarbay
OFIDA, receveur poste Ruzizi II
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Chargé de programme COMREC, PNUD
♂ Bukavu
Mr. Yasin Kouadio
Comptable programme COMREC, PNUD
♂ Bukavu

FARDC comptables (EUSEC)
Maj. Honoré Kabilwa
FARDC 10ème région, Directeur Financier
♂ Bukavu
Capt. Kongolo Mwamba
FARDC 10ème région, CBC 51 secteur
♂ Bukavu
Maj. Lwaba Zephyrin
FARDC 10ème région, CBC 41 secteur
♂ Bukavu
Capt. Asee Soku Axin
FARDC 10ème région, CBC 31 secteur
♂ Bukavu
Lt. Munene Christian
FARDC 10ème région, CBC
♂ Bukavu
Capt. Kasongo Tamwbe
FARDC 10ème région, CBC 33 secteur
♂ Bukavu
Capt. Muludi Mawndana Pierrot
FARDC 10ème région, CBC 42 secteur
♂ Bukavu
?? Kizuwe Fockas
FARDC 10ème région, CBC 32 secteur
♂ Bukavu
?? Bokolomba Apana Louis
FARDC 10ème région, CBC 24 secteur
♂ Bukavu

FARDC admin.financ. (EUSEC)
Lt. col. Musangilay Mesu
FARDC 10ème région, chef T1
♂ Bukavu
Capt. Kasongo Kapinga Gabriel
FARDC 10ème région, chef bureau de mutation
♂ Bukavu
Capt. Assumani Bukungu
FARDC 10ème région, chef bureau des effectifs
♂ Bukavu
Maj. Mwanza Ubutuka André
FARDC 10ème région, adjoint T3
♂ Bukavu
Capt. Dunia Itongwa Jean Paul
FARDC 10ème région, T1 bureau de pension
♂ Bukavu

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Mr. Papy Busangu
FAO, consultant PARSAC
♂ Bukavu
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BIT, assistant au programme
♂ Bukavu
Mr. Lola Buhanda Justin
GAV, sous traitant de la BIT
♂ Bukavu
Mr. Jean Claude Muharano
Caritas Bukavu, assistant programme et chargé de projets
♂ Bukavu
Mr. Patient Malungane
Caritas Bukavu, assistant chargé de suivi
♂ Bukavu

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UE-PNDDR, ex-combattant M40 bénéficiaire site de Nyamarega
♂ Nyamarege
Mr. Valentin Bazombo Kizubi
UE-PNDDR, ex-combattant M40 bénéficiaire site de Nyamarega
♂ Nyamarege
Mr. Bahzizire Jean
UE-PNDDR, ex-combattant M40 bénéficiaire site de Nyamarega
♂ Nyamarege
Mr. Badesire Namuzero
UE-PNDDR, ex-combattant M40 bénéficiaire site de Nyamarega
♂ Nyamarege

Partenaires exécutants (UNICEF)
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AFEDEM, coordinateur national
♂ Bukavu
Mr. Dieudonné Sango
PRODES, coordinateur
♂ Bukavu
Mr. Vendicien Ruboneka
GAM, coordinateur
♂ Bukavu
Mr. Lola Buhanda Justin
GAV, sous traitant de la BIT
♂ Bukavu

Partenaires / Bénéficiaires Police des Frontières (OIM)
Col Albert Mahinda Ramusemba
Coordinateur Police des Frontières du Sud Kivu
♂ Bukavu
Insp Anicet Lhimuzi Rutebuka
Coordinateur adjoint Police des Frontières du Sud Kivu
♂ Bukavu
Jimmy Ntuba
Commandant Police des Frontières, secteur Kalehe
♂ Bukavu
Comm Ppal Rémy Songolo Saidi
Commandant Police des Frontières, secteur Bukavu
♂ Bukavu
Comm Ppal Maurice Paluku Siviri  Commandant Police des Frontières, poste Ruzizi II

Partenaires / Beneficiaires Police des Frontières (OIM) - Poste de Ruzizi II

Rose Abo Makila  Police des Frontières, Ruzizi II
Elysée Kamuanya Kasongo  Police des Frontières, Ruzizi II
Fatuma Masimango Beatrice  Police des Frontières, Ruzizi II

Partenaires executeurs (COMREC)
M. Jules Kanjira  APED
Mr. Jean-Pierre Cirimwami  IADL
Mr. Jean-Paul Munganga  ADI-Kivu
Mr. Jean Marie Nyamulinda  APED
Mr. Joseph Barhinimanya Rukengwa  GISDG
Mr. Alain Assani Sakiki  ADF
Mr. Joseph Mihigo  PAV

Beneficiaires (COMREC)
Mme. Mapendo Dafrose  Directrice Adjoint, école primaire Odare, Essence
Mr. Nelson Murumbi  Président du marché de Panzi
Mr. Bahizire Kamola  Vice-président de vendeurs de planches, marché de Panzi
Mr. Namulisa Muderhwa  Président du boucherie, marché de Panzi
Mr. Kwigomba Magambo  Conseiller du boucherie, marché de Panzi
Mr. Zishelda Byamungu  Président de vendeurs de planches, marché de Panzi

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Maj. Eric van Ommeslaeghe  Conseiller, EUSEC (armée française)
Capt. Gerard van Rijswijck  Conseiller, EUSEC (armée néerlandaise)
Lt.col. Emmanuel Mudosa  Commandant adjoint, 132eme brigade camp de Rumbangabo

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Monica Ndovia-Kule  Chargé de formation, UE-PNDDR
Célestin Tuyisenge  Caritas, Coordonnateur Diocese de Goma
Abbé Aimé Matembéra  Prêtre de Saké
Jules Tabaro  HDW, coordonnateur national
Jospin Sianveray  Prés. Démobilisés de Saké
Gregory Gromo Alex  MONUC DDRRR

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Pontien Bashige  UNICEF, Officier protection de l’enfance
Fidel Rutabagisha  Directeur du CTO / CAJED
Gilbert Munda  Coordinateur CAJED

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Thomas Kubuya  Project Coordinator
Col. T. Job de St Guillaume  Coordonnateur Nord Kivu, Police des Frontières

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Jonas Mfouatié  Head of office in North Kivu, UNDP Spokeperson in Eastern DRC, ex-head of office in Bunia
Alberto Barrera  Programme manager Centre de Négoce OIM, ex chargé de programme réinsertion en Ituri
Jean Claude Simpeze  UNDP, Chargé de l’Administration
Cryspin Barhigenga Boleta  UNDP, Chef d’antenne Wali Kalé
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ernest Balolo</td>
<td>UNDP, expert suivi/évaluation</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Claude Kalala</td>
<td>UNDP, expert suivi/évaluation</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dia Oumar</td>
<td>UNDP, Chargé des opérations</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maisha Musubaho</td>
<td>UNDP, Assistant Administratif et Financier</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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**Autres contacts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Taylor Munihire Maroki</td>
<td>ex-chargé de communication programme Amani Sud Kivu</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Kalissa Vulambo</td>
<td>Chef de division provinciale du Plan</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Tillon</td>
<td>Operations manager for programme on dialogue enhancement</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Starvros</td>
<td>ISSS, Responsable Est RDC</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Rodriguez</td>
<td>ISSS</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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**FARDC comptables (EUSEC)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Poste</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Jean Mbelenge</td>
<td>CBC 13eme secteur, 8eme région militaire FARDC</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt. Patrick Mbomba</td>
<td>CBC 21eme secteur, 8eme région militaire FARDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Tapo Mboka</td>
<td>CBC 12eme secteur, 8eme région militaire FARDC</td>
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**FARDC staff financier (EUSEC)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Mawa Philippe</td>
<td>S1, 132me brigade camp de Rumangabo</td>
<td>Rumangabo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Makal Aimé</td>
<td>S4, 132me brigade camp de Rumangabo</td>
<td>Rumangabo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt. Ategeka Justin</td>
<td>S3, 132me brigade camp de Rumangabo</td>
<td>Rumangabo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt. Kazadi Modeste</td>
<td>S3 adjoint, 132me brigade camp de Rumangabo</td>
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**Military camp Rumangabo (EUSEC)**

<table>
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<th>Poste</th>
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<tr>
<td>20 militaires (soldats)</td>
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<td>19 hommes, 1 femme</td>
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**PNDDR**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bisimwa Rusaki</td>
<td>SANOKI</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<td>Jules Maombi Kesuba</td>
<td>ECCINK</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pierre Claver Sebutdri</td>
<td>HDW, coordonnateur national</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascal Basibawea</td>
<td>ETN / BIT</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Muhindo Salume</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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**SMI FARDC (PNDDR)**

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<tr>
<td>Col Raoul Pembe</td>
<td>SMI, Responsable Nord Kivu</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj Remy B. Ciza</td>
<td>SMI</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diabazola Ntima</td>
<td>SMI</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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**Camp de Kitoukou**

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<tr>
<td>Focus group, 3 femmes de gardien</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group, 4 femmes de démobilisés</td>
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**OIM Police des Frontières**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Poste</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitaine Marcel Omari</td>
<td>Commandant Police des Frontières, Poste de la Grande Barrière</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitaine Nakahosa</td>
<td>Commandant second Police des Frontières, Poste de la Grande Barrière</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt / Commissaire Jean-Marie Ebay</td>
<td>Malaisi, Police des Frontières, Secrétaire de l'unité Grande Barrière</td>
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</table>

**Partenaires UNICEF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Poste</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joachim Fikiri</td>
<td>PAMI, protection de l'enfance</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Kakule</td>
<td>Don Bosco Ngangi</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phidias M. Wetemwami</td>
<td>CADERCO, réunion familiale</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faustin Ninha</td>
<td>UPADERI, Union Paysanne Masisi</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicole Gahereri</td>
<td>PAMI</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Elena Latiní</td>
<td>Caritas Roma, Commission Justice et Paix</td>
<td>Goma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefano Latiní</td>
<td>Caritas Roma, réinsertion enfants soldats</td>
<td>Goma</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eugène Ndwayni</td>
<td>Caritas Roma, Commission Justice et Paix</td>
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**Programme EUSEC**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col Félix Mangwala</td>
<td>Base militaire de Bunia, T4 Op. Safisha</td>
<td>Bunia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Vandebroek</td>
<td>Expert budget &amp; finances, formation</td>
<td>Bunia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Sikabwe Fall</td>
<td>Chef état major zone d’opération de Bunia</td>
<td>Bunia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**PNDDR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel François Xavier Duku</td>
<td>Responsable UE PNDDR, et ex- responsable CONADER Ituri</td>
<td>Bunia</td>
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**Theme : Capacity building**
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**People met GOMA**

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**People met BUNIA**

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Consultative group, Goma : 14 May 2010

Anna Muinonen
FC A , Directrice du Programme de FCA en RDC

Brylle, Line
SFCG, Chefe du Bureau Goma
Consultative group, Bukavu : 10 May 2010

Buhalagarha Chimanuka, Vicky
Ministére du Plan, Directeur du Cabinet

Birgindwa Lukeba, Gilbert
Centre Universitaire de Paix CUP, Recteur

Mubandilwa, Flory
Unicef, Protection Officer

Ekanbo, Assim
Unicef, Protection SGBV Officer

Kambale, Lameck
Unicef, Adm. Planification, suivi et evaluation

Cigwerhe, Jean Claude
PNUD, Chargé de Programme

Mulamba, Pascale
FHS, Chargé de Programme

Musahasulusa, Pacifique
AAP, Coordinateur

Socrate, Cuna-Byamungu
Inspection Provincial de la santé, Assistant technique au Programme national santé de la reproduction

Musole, Francois
CDJP (Communication diocesaine Justice et Paix / Bukavu), Assistant social, chargé de médiation et gestion de conflits

Musafiri, Magambo
VODIMIR, Coordinateur

Murhandikire, Jean-Jaques Bagalwa
Action pour le Développement e la Paix endogène (ADEPAE)

Ngengele, Jacky
DIVIGEFAE, Chef de division

Caba, Parfait
UNFPA, Chargé de programme de Genre et SGBV

Safi Kagarabi, Adèle
Commision Provincial de luttre contre les Violences sexuelles & CPLVS, Précidente

Uyamatoowa, Patrick
AINET/DRC, Chargé de programme

Bahamati Masheka ga Namwira, Maurice
Heritiens de la Justice, Secrétaire Exécutif

Consultative group, Bunia: 6 May 2010

Mukarukundo, Providence
PNUD, chargé de Programme, Ituri

Luh Mfone, Serge Armand
PNUD, Coordonateur Provincial

Kassongo, Freddy
PNUD, Chef d’Antenne et Animateur de site d’intervention/Fataki

Djoza, Marcelin
RCN, Justice Démocratique, Chef de Mission

Bonyoma, Eddy
Justice Plus, Chargé des questions juridique

NZANI LOGRO, Michael
ALCMDC, Coordinateur

Kabatoro, Wivine
OIM, Assistante Admin

Lotisima, Jean Louis
COORDO/ ARECO

Karilenso, Bernard
Inf. BTP/PNUD

Mugheva, Corneille
Coordo Premiere Alberte

Tshiala, Clarisse
ALDI, Administratrice

Kiza, Jacob
ALDI, Chargé de suivi et evaluation
### Conflict Mapping workshop, Goma : 13 May 2010

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### Conflict Mapping workshop, Goma: 21 May 2010

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<td>Chef coutumier Wali Kali</td>
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<td>Mr. Bauma Bitsibu</td>
<td>Vice président provincial de l’ANATC Nord Kivu, Chef coutumier du groupement Kawronza</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Kubuya Muhangi</td>
<td>Secrétaire exécutif, CRONGD (réseau des ONGs)</td>
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<td>Mme. Justine Masika</td>
<td>Secrétaire exécutif, SFVS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mme. Monica Ndovia-Kule</td>
<td>Chargé de formation, UE-PNDDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Mbelenge Ya Nsenge Jean</td>
<td>Comptable, 8ème région militaire FARDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Eric van Ommeche</td>
<td>Conseiller EUSEC (l'armée Française)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Nshagali Gratien</td>
<td>Réprésentant 8ème région militaire (FARDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Martial Mbilizi</td>
<td>PNUD/PLCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jean-Marie Katikati Muhongya</td>
<td>ex-coordonneur Programme Amani Nord Kivu</td>
</tr>
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### Conflict Mapping workshop, Bukavu: 13 May 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surname, Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lwashiiga, Bolange</td>
<td>Caucus des femmes Congolaises du Sud-Kivu pour la paix Bureau d’Etudes Scientifiques et Techniques (BEST)</td>
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<tr>
<td>De Failly, Didier</td>
<td>Université d’Utrecht/ Academie Néerlandaise de la défense</td>
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<td>Venweijen, Judith</td>
<td>MONUC, Officier de liaison SKB/FARDC</td>
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<td>Samir, Maj Abdessald</td>
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<td>Damase, Maj Amaury</td>
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Conflict Mapping workshop, Bunia: 6 May 2010

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<tr>
<td>Mukarukundo, Providence</td>
<td>PNUD, chargé de Programme, Ituri</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luh Mfone, Serge Armand</td>
<td>PNUD, Coordonnateur Provincial</td>
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<td>Kassongo, Freddy</td>
<td>PNUD, Chef d’Antenne et Animateur de site d’intervention/Fataki</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djoza, Marcin</td>
<td>RCN, Justice Démocratie, Chef de Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonyoma, Eddy</td>
<td>Justice Plus, Chargé des questions juridique</td>
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<td>NZANI LOGRO, Michael</td>
<td>ALCMDC, Coordinateur</td>
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<td>Kabatoro, Wivine</td>
<td>OIM, Assistante Admin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lotsima, Jean Louis</td>
<td>COORDO/ARECO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karilenso, Bernard</td>
<td>Inf. BTP/PNUD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mugheva, Corneille</td>
<td>Coordo Premiere Alberte</td>
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<td>Tshiala, Clarisse</td>
<td>ALDI, Administratrice</td>
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<td>Kiza, Jacob</td>
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<td>Lobela, Oscar</td>
<td>PNUD, Expert de suivi et evaluation</td>
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<td>Tsrorove, Abbé E. Roger</td>
<td>Caritas-Development, Bunia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rustique, Avo Eka</td>
<td>Commissaire de District Assistant Chargée des questions économique, financières, et du développement de l’Ituri</td>
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Conflict Mapping workshop, Shabunda: 6 May 2010

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<tr>
<td>Malonga Sébastien</td>
<td>Coordinateur école catholique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukanaga P.</td>
<td>Infirmier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyananio Moligi</td>
<td>Vicaire général Docèse Kalongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byamugongole Museme</td>
<td>Journaliste, radio Mutanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katali J. Véronique</td>
<td>Responsable bureau CEI (*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukemenge Idanyi J.</td>
<td>Chef d’antenne asbl ADR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Ntabuyantwa Claude</td>
<td>Responsable AAP Shabunda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paluku Kambesa</td>
<td>Chargé du développement rural, territoire de Shabunda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zihalirwa Bingane Innocent</td>
<td>Vérificateur scolaire, AAP</td>
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Conflict Mapping workshop, Bunia: 31 May 2010

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<tr>
<td>Kabona Maki</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jean Marie Dhena</td>
<td>AEJI, Coordonnateur</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamzu Oyoko</td>
<td>UE PNDDR Sensibilisateur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Ngadjole Kza</td>
<td>UPC, secrétaire fédéral Ituri</td>
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<tr>
<td>Floribert Mitulou Yesse</td>
<td>Chef de district Affaires Sociales</td>
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<tr>
<td>Henri Mbuna Dhedonga</td>
<td>CUEB, Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louise Tajeki</td>
<td>REFED, Coordonatrice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christophe-Justin Evi Lago</td>
<td>DIVINTER</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginie Ucaya</td>
<td>IJP, Administratrice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacifique Msaghi</td>
<td>AIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Me Modeste Magene</td>
<td>Barreau de Bunia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charlotte Bonabana</td>
<td>Associturi, Coordinatrice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francis Munga</td>
<td>APEC / Chargé de programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaclet Kabengel</td>
<td>PNUD, responsable renforcement des capacités</td>
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**Conflict Mapping workshop, Bukavu: 22 May 2010**

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<tr>
<td>Namira, Deo Buuma Bitalya</td>
<td>Action pour la Paix et la Concorde, Secrétaire Exécutif</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maliyaseme, Sosthene</td>
<td>Action pour la Paix et la Concorde, Chargée de Programmes</td>
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<td>Mudinga, Emery</td>
<td>Action pour la Paix et la Concorde, Chargée de Programmes</td>
<td>♂</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kajembe, Eric</td>
<td>Observatoire pour la Gouvernance et la Paix, Directeur</td>
<td>♂</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuvelier, Jeroen</td>
<td>International Peace and Information Service, Researcher</td>
<td>♂</td>
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<tr>
<td>Femont, Laurence</td>
<td>War Child, Program Consultant</td>
<td>♂</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Aide humanitaire et assistance aux victimes des violences sexuelles

Hypothèse encadrant ce thème

La prévention des conflits et le renforcement de la paix exige une focalisation stratégique sur les dynamiques de conflit. Or l’évaluation révèle l’existence de cloisons au sein des institutions qui empêchent une telle approche globale. Ainsi on retrouve des clivages très significatifs entre les services diplomatiques et de coopération, les capitales et les ambassades, les services politiques et ceux d’exécution, et entre les bailleurs et les opérateurs.

Le problème d’un cloisonnement excessif qui affecte la coordination est examiné sous l’angle de l’aide humanitaire et de l’assistance donnée aux victimes des violences sexuelles et se retrouve aussi dans la phase de terrain, au niveau des projets.

Projets évalués en profondeur

1. Projet non inclus dans la base de données : Allemagne : Volet SGBV d’un programme multisectoriel contre le VIH/SIDA et de renforcement du système de santé
   a. Agence d’exécution: GTZ. 3 experts internationaux travaillent pour ce projet en collaboration avec une équipe nationale.
   b. Description : Programme d’appui aux femmes victimes de violences sexuelles
   d. Contribution : 10 700 000 €
   e. Période : de janvier 2010 à janvier 2012.

2. N° 159156 - Pays Bas : Secours matériels fournis par CORDAID (Sud Kivu) DMV/HH ZR CORDAID 07-09 (Programme de développement du système de santé – AAP-Cordaid)
   b. Description: Lien urgence, réhabilitation et développement.
   c. Lieu: Sud Kivu
   e. Période: Deux ans et 6 mois, du 1 septembre 2007 au 28 février 2010

3. N° 340, Unicef: Programme élargi d’assistance aux retournés (PEAR+)
   a. Agences d’exécution: Coopi, Oxfam, International Rescue Committee (IRC)
   b. Description: Le PEAR plus est une extension du programme PEAR qui avait pour but de fournir une assistance humanitaire aux retournés et de faciliter la réinsertion des élèves dans les écoles.
   c. Lieu: Nord et Sud Kivu, Province Orientale (Ituri) et au Nord Katanga.
   d. Contribution : 2 286 996 $US. Budget pour le Sud Kivu avec le partenaire IRC

156 The numbers listed here are the rows in which the projects are to be found in the database.

Projets évalués sur base d’entrevues et documents

   a. Agence d’exécution : ONG locale, consortium ABC
   b. Description : Paix et Education.

5. N° 18, Belgique : Réinstallation de personnes victimes de la guerre (déplacées et réfugiées) et contribution au processus de stabilisation par la relance des activités agricoles.
   a. Agence d’exécution : Oxfam Solidarité Belgique (OSB) en partenariat avec les organisations locales suivantes : UWAKI SK (Fizi), APIDE (Mwenga), FOPAC NK (Rutshuru)
   b. Description : More information requested
   c. Lieu: RDC, Province: Sud Kivu (Territoires de Mwenga et Fizi) et Nord Kivu (Territoire de Rutshuru)
   d. Contribution : EUR 450 000 (coût global)

   b. Description : Santé physique et psychique, violence sexuelle basée sur le genre (VSBG)
   d. Budget : 15 000 000 $ Canadiens

Justice

Hypothèse encadrant ce thème

Une tension se fait jour aussi dans la cohérence globale entre les objectifs de négociation et de fin de conflit, d’un coté, et la lutte pour la dénonciation des violations des droits de l’homme et contre l’impunité de l’autre. Les dynamiques de conflit et les efforts de résolution ont un impact important sur le système de justice en RDC, où se joue le sort d’approches innovantes comme la justice transitionnelle.
La cohérence entre les interventions en faveur de la paix et les interventions en faveur de la justice sera examinée sous l’angle du mandat droits de l’homme de la MONUC, et des actions de justice transitionnelle.

Comme peu de projets ont trait spécifiquement à la justice en RDC, et comme un petit nombre d’organisations ont bénéficié de financements successifs des bailleurs couverts par cette évaluation, l’équipe a décidé d’opérer un échantillonnage par organisme, plutôt que par projet. Ceci doit permettre une approche plus réaliste des effets des projets qu’en se concentrant uniquement sur des financements réduits. Les actions évaluées peuvent donc regrouper plusieurs projets.

**Projets évalués en profondeur**

1. **REJUSCO (N° 9/10, Belgique, N° 289 DfiD; N° 156 Pays Bas): Programme de la Restauration de la Justice à l’Est de la RDC:**
   a. Agence d’exécution: Coopération Technique Belge
   b. Description: justice militaire et pénale, lutte contre les violences sexuelles
   c. Lieu: Est de la RDC
   d. Contribution: EUR 15 672 333
   e. Period: 2006 – 2010

2. **No 114, 124, 133, 134 Belgique: “Legal and judicial development, transitional justice, 2004-2010”**
   a. Agence d’exécution: Avocats Sans Frontières (Belgique):
   b. Description: soutien aux système juridique, surtout à Bukavu
   c. Lieu: Kinshasa, Regional, Office in DRC (Bukavu), Eastern region in general
   d. Contribution: 6 553 627 € (combinant Royaume Uni, Pays Bas, Union européenne, Suisse, Suède)
   e. Période: 2004-2010

**Projets évalués sur base d’entrevues et documents**

3. **Support to the Legal System / Access to Justice – UNDP and OHCHR.**
   a. Agence d’exécution: UNDP
   b. Description: Access to Justice and Legal Protection for Women
   c. Location: North and South Kivu
   d. Budget: 4 096 470 €
   e. Implementation period: 2008-2010

4. **Office du Haut Commissariat aux Droits de l’Homme (HCDH)**
   a. Description: Prévention et à la réduction des violences sexuelles faites aux femmes
   b. Lieu : Kinshasa. Provinces à travers les 18 bureaux de terrain Monuc

5. **N° 50, 59, 60, 61, Arrêter l’impunité lors des violations des droit de l’homme**
   a. Agence d’exécution: 11.11.11. (ONG belge)
   b. Description: Justice transitionnelle en RDC
   c. Lieu: Kinshasa,Nord et Sud Kivu
   d. Contribution: EUR 500 000
6. N° 92, 121 Projet d’appui à la lutte contre l’impunité et au processus de réconciliation en RDC (Phase I & II)
   a. Agence d’exécution: Commission Justice et Paix (ONG congolaise)
   b. Description: Transitional Justice in DRC
   c. Lieu: Est de la RDC. Bureaux en RDC, Burundi et au Rwanda (approche et activités) à tous les niveaux : national, provincial, diocésain et paroissial.
   d. Contribution: Contribution belge : Phase 1 : 42 850 €, Phase 2 : 43 105 €

**Projets évalués sur base documentaire seulement**

   a. Agence d’exécution: RCN (Réseau Citoyen/Citizens’ Network)
   b. Description: justice transitionnelle, se concentre beaucoup en Ituri
   c. Location: East DRC (principalement Ituri province)
   d. Contribution: + EUR 9 000 000

8. N° 93, Soutien à la lutte contre l’impunité en soutien à la Cour Pénale Internationale
   a. Agence d’exécution: Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA)
   b. Description: Series of seminars on the Rome Statute
   c. Lieu: Kinshasa
   d. Contribution: EUR 268 000

**DDR et secteur de sécurité**

**Hypothèse encadrant ce thème**

Un décalage significatif semble exister entre, d’une part, des orientations de politique globale très pertinentes des bailleurs (par exemple le soutien à la démobilisation des groupes armés et à la réintégration) et une exécution au niveau des projets qui reflète parfois des orientations très différentes. Ainsi tandis que les bailleurs émettent l’hypothèse que l’assistance humanitaire va apaiser les dynamiques conflictuelles, il semble au contraire que les organismes qui livrent ce type d’assistance ont du mal à maîtriser les effets nocifs, ou à profiter des effets positifs.

La question d’un clivage préjudiciable à la cohérence entre les orientations politiques et l’exécution est examinée sous le thème de la **réforme du secteur de sécurité et de la démobilisation**. On y voit comment des logiques très différentes peuvent prendre le pas sur une approche préventive.

**Projets évalués en profondeur**

1. Programme National DDR (PNDDR)
   a. Agence d’exécution: Banque Mondiale-MDRP/PNDDR
   b. Description: soutien aux clauses de démobilisation dans les accords de paix
   c. Lieu: North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, Katanga, Ituri
   d. Contribution: N° 34 Belgique EUR 2 000 000 / N° 278 PNUD EUR 3 378 776

2. N° 315, 321 DfID – Rétablissement de la chaîne des paiements pour les FARDC
   a. Agence d’exécution: EUSEC
   b. Description: Appui technique et en matériel lancé en 2004, statut de projet à EUSEC.
c. Lieu: Niveau national
d. Contribution: EUR 485 812 (mais aussi appui en personnel de pays du Comité de pilotage)

**Projets évalués sur base d’entrevues et documents**

3. Développement d’une brigade de police des frontières de la police congolaise au Nord et Sud Kivu. (IOM)
   b. Description: Renforcement des capacités de la police de frontières (Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité, SSR)
   c. Lieu: Nord et Sud Kivu, et plus précisément dans 8 secteurs de la police frontalière (Goma, Beni, Kayna, Tutshuru, Kelele, Sange, Uvira et Baraka).
   d. Contribution: USD 3.000.000 (financé par la Coopération Japonaise), un supplément de USD 250.000 a été sollicité début 2010
   e. Période: 12 mois à partir de mars 2008.

4. N° 272 PNUD Relance communautaire, réintégration des ex-combattants et réduction des armes légères (ComRec)
   a. Agence d’exécution: PNUD
   b. Description: soutien économique et social après la phase de démobilisation
   c. Lieu: 5 provinces in Eastern DRC
   d. Contribution: EUR 15 656 000 (Pays Bas, Belgique, DfID et Japon) puis augmenté à EUR 30 000 000.
   e. Période: 2003-2008

5. N°341 UNICEF (source: Belgique) Prévention du recrutement, encadrement transitoire et réinsertion socio économique des enfants affectés par les conflits armés
   a. Implementing agency: UNICEF
   b. Description: Financé par la Banque Mondiale et la France ainsi que Unicef.
   c. Location: North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri
   d. Contribution: EUR 3 194 671
   e. Période: 2009-2010

**Projets évalués sur base documentaire seulement**

6. N°169/170, Pays Bas: MONUC Fond de Stabilisation/ UNSSSSS
   a. Agence d’exécution: MONUC
   b. Description: Soutien au STAREC. Est devenu INSSSS depuis 2009.
   c. Location: North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri
   e. Période: 2007-2010

7. Small Arms and Light Weapon destruction in DR Congo
   a. Agence d’exécution: Mines Action Group (British demining organisation)
   b. Description: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) destruction and storage/humanitarian demining (security sector reform, SSR)
   c. Lieu: National
   d. Contribution: EUR 1.164.917
   e. Période: 14 months (1st November 2007 until 31 December 2008).

8. N° 297 DFID. Soutien aux familles et populations dans les Brigades intégrées
   a. Agence d’exécution: PNUD
b. Description: Soutien à 3 Brigades: Beni, Bunia and Bukavu.
c. Lieu: Niveau national
d. Contribution: EUR 6 490 000
e. Période: 2006 à 2010

   a. Agence d’exécution: GRIP
   b. Description: lobby et soutien à la société civile.
   c. Lieu: Sous-régional (RDC, Rwanda, Burundi)
   d. Contribution: EUR 374 000
   e. Période: 2006-2008

11. South African Ministry of Defence (Netherlands)
    a. Agence d’exécution: South African Ministry of Defence, via the South African Defence Forces present in DRC
    b. Rehabilitation of military camp infrastructure in view of supporting the military reintegration process (SSR)
    c. Lieu: North Kivu (Nyalleke and Mushaki/Rumangabo)
    d. Contribution: EUR 5.000.000 + EUR 200.000
    e. Période: 2005-2006

    b. Description: Transcrit les decisions politiques en opérations.
    c. Lieu: Nord et Sud Kivu
    d. Contribution: EUR 393 369
    e. Période: 2009-2010

**Renforcement des capacités et gouvernance**

_Hypothèse encadrant ce thème_

La façon d’inclure les acteurs étatiques dans les projets est un sujet récurrent des entrevues réalisées au cours de l’évaluation, et la création de coalitions est un atout pour la prévention des conflits et le renforcement de la paix. Alors que le re-développement progressif des structures administratives dans le pays poussent beaucoup d’observateurs à la prudence, une première analyse montre que les structures de coopération sont répandues dans de nombreuses régions du pays, et pratiquent intensivement le renforcement des capacités.

Le thème de la création de coalitions et du renforcement des capacités des autorités au niveau local est examiné sous l’angle de la gouvernance. On y examine en particulier la question de l’appropriation des stratégies de paix.

_Projets évalués en profondeur_

1. Nouveau Projet : Japon, Autonomisation Communautaire et Consolidation de la Paix en Ituri
   b. Description : Transition de l’urgence au développement.
   c. Lieu: Ituri
   d. Contribution: 5.022.871,79 $
   e. Période: 2009-2010

_Projets évalués sur base d’entrevues et documents_
1. N° 9+10 Belgique - Rétablissement de la Justice à l'Est du Congo – REJUSCO.

   Projet couvert conjointement sous le thème “justice”, voir plus haut

2. No 195 & 208 Allemagne. Promotion des initiatives de la société civile. Source : ZFD
   a. Agence d’exécution: EED
   b. Description: soutien ponctuel et tactique à des ONG nationales
   c. Lieu: Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu, Lubumbashi (et autres régions)
   d. Contribution: EUR 3 Millions
   e. Période: 2006-2011

3. N° 166 Pays Bas, Conflits, Paix, Sécurité - Dispositifs civils de prévention des conflits et construction de la paix
   a. Agence d’exécution: Search for Common Ground
   b. Description: soutien aux médias et conscientisation
   c. Lieu: Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu
   d. Contribution: EUR 500 000
   e. Période : 2007-2010

4. No. 308 DFID – Consolidation de la paix en RDC
   a. Agence d’exécution: Life and Peace Institute
   b. Description: formation de la société civile (formation technique et institutionnelle) à la résolution de conflits
   c. Lieu : Sud et Nord Kivu
   d. Contribution: EUR 2 272 000
   e. Période : 2002-2010

Projets évalués sur base documentaire seulement

5. N° 181, Allemagne: Fond pour la paix (KfW)
   a. Agence d’exécution: GOPA (entreprise) et ONG
   b. Description: petites infrastructures pour créer un « dividende de la paix » ciblant les questions de genre
   c. Lieu : (North and South Kivu and Maniema) as well as Kinshasa and surroundings.
   d. Contribution: EUR 50 000 000
   e. Période : 2008-2011

6. N° 307. DFID, Canada, Training Leadership Initiative
   a. Agence d’exécution: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (WWCIS)
   b. Description: Renforcement de capacité et consolidation de la paix.
   c. Lieu : Eastern DRC and Kinshasa
   d. Contribution : EUR 800 000 (co-financement : Sida, Norad, UE, US, Canada)
   e. Période : March 1, 2006 – April 30, 2008

7. N° 205: Allemagne - Great Lakes Programme "Conflict transformation through reintegration of refugees, cross border reconciliation, etc."
   a. Agence d’exécution: AGEH (ONG allemande)
   b. Description: appui au rapatriement et réintégration
   c. Lieu : Uvira, Bukavu, Kinshasa (DRC), Muyinga (Burundi), Rulenge, Kigoma, Dar-es-Salam (Tanzania)
   d. Contribution : EUR 3 116 819
   e. Période : 2007 - 2012

8. Securitization of the Electoral Process – UNDP
   a. Agence d’exécution: PNUD
b. Description: Renforcement de capacité
c. Lieu: National
d. Contribution: 50,632,834US$; Contribution from the Netherlands: 5.000.000€

Coopération économique et secteur minier

Projets évalués en profondeur

1. New, British, DFID, Trading for Peace: Achieving security and poverty reduction through trade in natural resources in the Great Lakes area.
   b. Description: Natural resources, trade, peace building
   c. Lieu : Regional (DR Congo, Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda)
   d. Contribution: 3, 25M £
   e. Période: 2006 à ce jour (troisième phase à commencer en 2010)

Projets évalués sur base d’entrevues et documents

2. N°58, Belgique. DGDC
   a. Agence d’exécution: 11.11.11 (ONG belge)
   b. Description: soutien à la société civile pour faire pression sur les autorités afin que l’exploitation des richesses naturelles contribue au développement
   c. Lieu : Niveau national. Concentration de l’équipe : Innovation et Formation pour la Paix et le Développement, autour du site de Banro, Sud Kivu
   d. Contribution: EUR 300 480
   e. Période : 2008-2010

3. Review of Mining Contracts in the DRC
   a. Agence d’exécution: Carter Centre / Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
   b. Description: Resource et gouvernance
   c. Lieu: National (Kinshasa)
   d. Contribution: € 150 000
   e. Période: July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008

4. Regional Initiative Against Illegal Exploitation – GTZ
   a. Agence d’exécution : GTZ funded by BMZ
   b. Description: Resources, good governance and economic regionalisation (targeting ICGLR and its member states)
   c. Lieu: Burundi, Bujumbura with regional focus
   d. Contribution: 5.6 million Euros (Phase 2)
   e. Période: January 2008 to June 2011

Projets évalués sur base documentaire seulement

5. Support to Good Governance in the Mining Sector of DRC
   a. Agence d’exécution: GTZ funded by BMZ
   b. Description: Natural resources, good governance, and peace building, support to the EITI process.
   c. Lieu: Kinshasa, DRC
   d. Contribution: EUR 3 900 000
   e. Période: 2009-2012