

CONTACTPOINT PROJECT BOARD MEETING MINUTES**Members present:**

Tom Jeffery (Chair)	Director General, Children & Families & SRO
[NAME REDACTED]	Non-Executive Board Member
Tim Wright	CIO, DCSF
[NAME REDACTED]	CFD Finance
[NAME REDACTED]	SRIE, Capgemini
[NAME REDACTED]	GRO Data Delivery Manager
[NAME REDACTED]	ContactPoint Implementation Manager, (for [NAME REDACTED])
Sharon Jones	Head of DWP Data Sharing Strategy
Malcolm Britton	Data Services, DCSF
[NAME REDACTED]	DCSF Internal Audit
[NAME REDACTED]	Programme & Project Management Unit, DCSF

Apologies:

Anne Frost	Workforce Development, DCSF
Jason Skill	Central Procurement, DCSF
Martyn Smith	CfH Spine Programme Director
[NAME REDACTED]	Director Children's Services,

Also in attendance:

Christine Goodfellow	Programme Director
[NAME REDACTED]	Head of Policy, Procurement and Finance
[NAME REDACTED]	Partner, Deloitte (for item 1)
[NAME REDACTED]	Director, Security & Privacy, Deloitte (for item 1)
[NAME REDACTED]	Programme Delivery Manager
[NAME REDACTED]	ContactPoint Delivery Manager
[NAME REDACTED]	Design Authority
[NAME REDACTED]	Programme Delivery Director, Capgemini
[NAME REDACTED]	PMO

Agenda – 31 January 2008:

1. Welcome and Introductions
2. Follow up on Security Review

[OTHER AGENDA ITEMS REDACTED AS OUT OF SCOPE]

Item 1: Welcome and Introductions

1. Apologies were presented. Tom Jeffery (TJ) led the introductions.

Item 2: Security Review

2. **[NAME REDACTED]** and **[NAME REDACTED]** presented the final draft findings of the ContactPoint Security Review. They reiterated their initial findings presented at the last project board meeting that they had been generally impressed with the emphasis on data security, the awareness of risks and the need for controls. Deloitte's do however recommend some further enhancements summarised in the conclusions to the report. Particular points being;
 - the processes applied in end user organisations are not always following security requirements as recommended by the ContactPoint project team. **[NAME REDACTED]** observed that more verification and guidance needs to be given to partners.
 - Further controls on backend staff and processes should be considered including data destruction, to avoid accidental or malicious loss of data.
 3. **[NAME REDACTED]** stated that no substantive additions had been made to Deloitte's findings since the December interim report.
 4. Sharon Jones (SJ) sought confirmation that apart from their comments on data destruction that there were no further issues with the data life cycle. **[NAME REDACTED]** confirmed that this was correct.
 5. **[NAME REDACTED]** raised three questions; whether the report incorporated any lessons from other studies, whether the time impacts referred to on page 5 had been included, and had the report been completed last summer, (ie before recent concerns over protection of personal data), would the recommendations have been the same,? Effectively, are we paying a premium for the current situation ?
 6. **[NAME REDACTED]** stated that the review has been built on available lessons learnt from other government departments. Tim Wright (TW) noted that the timing of other reports meant that the opportunity to digest all other reports was happening at this point in time leading to common conclusions. Other commissioned reports were broader based and that in fact Deloitte's went deeper than these other reports which would be a help to others.
 7. **[NAME REDACTED]** noted that any timetable impact could be confirmed when the recommended updating of the Risk Assessment is completed. **MATERIAL WITHHELD**. However the recommendation was to **update the Risk Assessment**.
 8. Christine Goodfellow (CG) noted for clarity, that a Risk Assessment had been completed, based upon the Manual of Protective Security of the time. The recommendation is to review that Risk assessment, in the light of
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updated guidance from the Cabinet Office.

9. **MATERIAL WITHHELD**
10. **[NAME REDACTED]** wanted to know how long would be needed to revise the Risk Assessment. **[NAME REDACTED]** estimated 3-4 weeks.
11. **[NAME REDACTED]** SJ queried how the report might impact on data supply organisations and whether it would be shared with them. TW stated he is expecting similar requests from other government departments (OGDs). TW however considered that whilst backend systems do have associated risks but they are not necessarily the greatest. Governance is needed as well at the user end of systems. It was however acknowledged that any findings on ContactPoint made public, could have implications for OGDs and notably those providing national data to ContactPoint. This would have to be factored into communications. **MATERIAL WITHHELD.**
12. **[NAME REDACTED]** confirmed that, if his understanding was correct ie there was a likelihood after the Risk Assessment was revised that a number of risks will need to be mitigated and that these could range from procedural to technical, then he was content.
13. TW asked whether there were explicit standards for protective markings that need to be applied to the classification of data. **[NAME REDACTED]** explained that it would apply to the context of the data. Assuming that the percentage of shielded records was small **[NAME REDACTED]** confirmed that it was) then the Manual on Protective Standards recommends in *the absence of other controls* then encryption would need to be applied. It would be the Departmental CIO to advise the Permanent Secretary on the course of action to follow.
14. **MATERIAL WITHHELD**
15. **[NAME REDACTED]** presented the ContactPoint team's response to the report, Attachment 1. The team did not believe it was appropriate from a security perspective to make public announcements on the specific controls that would be applied to the system.
16. CG raised the handling of the Security Assessment. TW confirmed that the explicit commitments given were for the Review to be completed by 31/1/08, and a published statement would be available after 11/2/08. (NB no timing for Secretary of State's (SoS) statement has been committed to). CG observed that the published public domain report would need to be written in a style that was appropriate and easy for the layman to understand. **[NAME REDACTED]** pointed out that the Written Ministerial Statement had referred to the publishing of "Key Findings". **MATERIAL WITHHELD**
17. **[NAME REDACTED]** sought to split the Executive Summary from the body of the report. **[NAME REDACTED]** also asked whether the Risk Assessment would provide additional time prior to publication.

18. TJ agreed with **[NAME REDACTED]** that a SoS holding statement would always be an option until the Risk Assessment was completed at the end of Feb 08. CG reminded the Board that Local Authorities and Case Management System (CMS) vendors were all awaiting the publication of the report and that delaying it could delay availability of CMS for the main release. TJ stated that we cannot go public until we know the likely impact of Deloitte's recommendations.
19. TW agreed to fully explore the applicable FoI exemptions and seek legal advice in the process.
20. **[NAME REDACTED]** SJ sought confirmation on when the DWP Perm Sec and SoS would be briefed prior to the public statement. TJ and CG confirmed that stakeholders would be involved. **[NAME REDACTED]** observed that the contents of the report could have ramifications on DWP itself. SJ was hoping to learn from these lessons and wanted time to prepare prior to publication, consideration being given to opening CIO to CIO channel of communication.
21. TJ summarised the item. He was grateful to Deloitte's for the work that they had completed. TW would now finalise arrangements with Deloitte and CG with TW would prepare submissions for David Bell and Ministers.
22. TW stated that nothing should be done to compromise the independence of the report, but presentation was a very important factor.