

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

101. Although the individual enduring lessons identified during Operation TELIC have been learned to a greater or lesser degree, it is helpful to distil these lessons into key strategic issues or themes. This is not for the sake of neatness: it is both an aid to understanding the inter-relationship between many of the lessons while, at the same time, offering areas which might usefully be addressed in the forthcoming strategic defence review (SDR).

102. Eight key strategic issues have been identified which Defence needs to address, itself and in consultation with its partners in government and key allies, in order to ensure that it is better placed to meet the operational challenges of the future.

103. The Departmental action plan for addressing these issues has been agreed by COS and lifted into the Operation TELIC Lessons Compendium Executive Commentary, without prejudice to any recommendations of the Chilcot Inquiry; however, in some cases the outcome will depend on considerations which are outside the scope of this report (for example, the resources that are available to Defence or the role any future government foresees for the UK Armed Forces: matters which will be addressed in the forthcoming SDR).

104. The specific circumstances which apply at the time of any future operation will also be relevant to how individual lessons are implemented. But it is clear that these issues must be addressed and that Defence must give thought now to: how these issues impact on the doctrine which underpins how UK armed forces operate; what that means for how we plan and prepare for current and future operations; and how we ensure that appropriate arrangements are in place to guarantee that the lessons from operations continue to be recognised and quickly dealt with.

105. The 8 key areas form the following chapters of this report: an analysis of the key enduring lessons, drawing on all lessons work over the last 6 years, leading to specific recommendations detailed within the Executive Commentary.

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 2

- **Our ability to match policy ends with ways and means came under serious pressure during Op TELIC. In part this was because of the nature of the coalition, and the absence of a recognised forum in which to agree and coordinate coalition-level strategy.**
- **If, as is likely, it proves impossible for a coalition to provide a consistent strategy throughout an enduring campaign, it is vital that the UK maintains a balance of ends, ways and means at any given point in the campaign. We achieved this only intermittently during Op TELIC, not least because Defence had a tendency to adopt a short-term outlook. The theatre perspective was driven by 6-month roulement of HQ staff; this encouraged over-optimistic assumptions about progress.**
- **Despite recognising as early as 2003 that MoD needed to conduct more formal Strategic Estimates, we seem to have failed to learn this lesson.**
- **Op TELIC casts doubt upon our strategy for equipment procurement. Our previous assumption, underpinned by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, was that we should equip (and train) for high intensity conflict, and then adapt for peace support. This approach has been discredited.**

201. In any coalition of alliance campaign we should expect a degree of tension between the multinational strategy, whether overly stated or not, and national strategies adopted by coalition members. Iraq was no different. Indeed, it seems that the nature of the coalition and the politically sensitive character of the campaign exacerbated the difficulty in striking this balance. Nevertheless, there is potential for criticism at 3 levels of strategy⁸:

⁸ The MOD definition of strategy is: "The art of creating a desired pattern of events where the ends and the ways and the means of achieving them may be brought into balance, within the prevailing environment ... Military Strategy is the application of military resources to help achieve

a. Coalition. There was never any formal articulation of coalition strategy. Understandably, given the dominance of the US, the American US 'Victory in Iraq' publication⁹ and the testimonies of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus – powerful distillations of US strategic vision – became, by default, coalition strategy. Furthermore, unlike NATO, there was no obvious forum for the formation and coordination of coherent coalition strategy (both military and political). As the new and legitimate (but inexperienced) Iraqi Government gained in confidence and became more assertive on the basis of its own national policies and positions, the complexity of developing a coherent strategic approach was compounded. Frustrating though some have found it, the NATO process is designed to produce coherent strategy; perhaps we should not be surprised that a coalition is unable to do this in the same way. Nonetheless, there needs to be an accepted approach to providing the necessary strategic direction in a coalition. More specific coalition aspects are covered in Chapter 7.

b. National. The UK's involvement in Iraq was and remains controversial. Public opinion was at best ambivalent in its support, certainly after the early war fighting stages. Within the MOD and the Armed Forces, the traditionally close relationship with the United States was seen as critical to the UK's defence effort; and given UK involvement in the first Gulf War and the subsequent enforcement of the No-Fly Zones, it was readily assumed that UK Armed Forces would be involved if the US again engaged Iraq militarily. For other Departments, planning for military engagement and its outcome was not a priority, and it was not until late 2003 at the earliest that the key Departments began to work both collectively and in earnest towards agreed UK objectives. Even then, whereas there were numerous policy statements on individual aspects of the campaign, there appear to have been surprisingly meagre and infrequent attempts to draw them together¹⁰, or to relate them to resources. Previous MoD internal studies have made this point repeatedly; for example, a DOC report from 2006¹¹ concluded that "the absence of an HMG Strategy for Iraq hindered the UK's ability to provide support to the emerging Iraqi Government".

grand strategic objectives. It is the military component of grand strategy and is formulated from political direction. It is concerned with determining the military strategic objectives and desired end states required to achieve grand strategic aims, the military action needed to achieve those objectives, the resources to be allocated and the constraints to be applied." JDP 0-01.1 7th Edition

9 National Security Council paper dated November 2005 (http://www.gov.uk/whistleblowers/whistleblowers.gov.uk/focus/iraq-national_strategy_20051120.pdf).

10 11 Feb 05 Cabinet Office "Iraq Strategy for 2005, which led to a paper "Strategy for the UK's contribution to Iraq Security" presented to DOP(I) by MOD on 15 Nov 05; Iraq: Medium Term Prospects and Implications, taken by DOP(I) on 12 Oct 06; and the FCO-led "Iraq Strategy" of January 2009 which followed NSID instruction that it should be produced on 9 Dec 2008.

11 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 3 (COS Approved) 4 Apr 06, Page 3-2, Para 303.

c. MOD. Within MoD there was never a single military strategy document which linked strategic objectives, appropriate ways of achieving those ends, and the resources required to deliver them. In 2003 the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Strategic Estimate process should be completed more formally; it was essential to provide the strategic direction to staff at PJHQ, who were in turn required to conduct operational planning and produce a campaign plan. This does not appear to have happened. Moreover, the 2005 and 2008 editions of Defence Strategic Guidance contain virtually no reference to Iraq, reinforcing the impression that the Department's strategic focus on Iraq was less than wholehearted¹².

202. Against such a background, any campaign will inevitably be subject to incremental adjustment of strategic policy ends – this should not surprise us. The key in such circumstances is to remain strategically coherent in achieving those ends, even as they evolve, and most importantly to recognise strategic change when it occurs, react to it and signal clearly when significant strategic adjustments are made. It is difficult to conclude that this happened during Op TELIC. Although some at the heart of the process could discern clarity in our approach, the perceived failure to capture or articulate strategy must have added to the difficulty of disseminating strategic intent down the military command chain – increasing the scope for misunderstanding¹³. CDS' directives to the Joint Commander (CJO) and to SBMR-I were not re-issued after 2005¹⁴. We accept that comprehensive and coherent records have, in comparison with former campaigns, been increasingly supplanted by email, bi-lateral conversations and decisions on individual issues; this seems an inevitable if unwelcome consequence of modern ways of working. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the lack of a formally articulated strategy – both coalition and UK-specific – contributed to a widespread divergence of understanding: up and down the chain of command¹⁵, between government departments and between allies. We have clear doctrine in this area: we did not appear to implement it in Iraq. A much-debated example of this divergence is illustrated on the chart below¹⁶: the relative UK and US speeds of draw-down following the initial combat phase and again during the 2006-7 US surge:


12 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, Page TEL-3-1-4, Para 17.

13 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, Pages 4-2 & 4-5, Paras 403 & 411. 'Tellingly, however, almost all senior officers comment at some point about the lack of strategic guidance they were afforded, whether in their pursuit of a national representative role in embedded employment in coalition organisations, or as GOC MND-SE'. 'Lesson: A vital pre-requisite of a balanced, properly resourced and coherent campaign is clarity in the national strategic direction given to Defence.'

14 CDS Directives 13 and 14 dated 8 Apr 05.

15 Cf CDS Directive 18 Mar 03 and CJO's Executive order to the NCC dated 19 Mar 03, but other examples emerged from interviews with in-theatre commanders.

16 Source Data: US Figures taken from Brookings Institution Iraq Index (accessed 11 Jan 2010). UK Figures provided by PJHQ J1 Ops Sp.



203. The DOP paper which exposed this debate¹⁷ was produced against a need to strike the right balance between operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a need to determine how best we could deploy finite resources. Its focus, perhaps, was on what to do with available resources (means) rather than how best to achieve defined objectives (ends): to use the planner's shorthand, it considered 'task to troops' rather than 'troops to task'¹⁸.

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the key difference appears to be that the US purposely adopted a campaign footing with heavy prioritisation towards Iraq, whereas the UK only ever partially adopted a campaign approach, which increasingly focused on events in Afghanistan²⁰.

204. For enduring coalition campaigns, it may be that the best we can hope for is to ensure that policy goals (ends), political, diplomatic, economic and military levers (ways) and resources (means) are synchronised at any given point in a campaign. But that is not to say that rigorous strategic planning should be abandoned. On the contrary, if careful strategic analysis is

¹⁷ 'Iraq and Afghanistan – Balancing Military Effort in 2007' Paper for DOP by DG Op Pol 2 Feb 07.

¹⁸ HCDC.07.06 Strategy by numbers (2,500) not viable if UK forces are not able to deliver meaningful effect for securing the population and training the ISF

¹⁹ Notably:

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²⁰ See Chapter 8 (HMG Strategy/Cross-Government Co-ordination on Stabilisation) below on the effect of this lack of 'campaign footing' for Iraq on the priorities of OGD in the context of a comprehensive approach.

conducted from the outset, it should provide an invaluable baseline from which to judge subsequent deviation. But the MoD, despite its status as a military strategic headquarters, produced very little strategy for Op TELIC. Policy papers were written, but much of the Commitments Staff output amounts to little more than commenting on work done by PJHQ. This was exacerbated by an inconsistent approach to measuring progress (covered more in Chapter 10), while dilution of the MoD's corporate memory^{21,22} has made compilation of coherent strategy, even in retrospect, a more difficult task.

205. UK Armed Forces have, for many years worked on a assumption that they should be equipped and trained for high-intensity conflict, and that they could subsequently adapt for lower intensity tasks such as peace support. Our operational experiences during the 1990s, especially in the Balkans, appeared to vindicate this concept, and it was explicitly endorsed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR 98). There was some development of the approach following the publication of SDR (New Chapter) in 2001, but the impact of this on the core Defence Strategy was marginal. Initially, our contribution to major combat operations in Iraq was consistent with the approach set out in SDR 98. The later challenges of the Iraq campaign went beyond the key underpinning defence assumptions, particularly the duration of commitment at medium-scale. And, very significantly, we were not prepared for counter-insurgency.

206. Op TELIC as a whole, therefore, did not vindicate SDR 98. War-fighting probably remains the single most difficult task for military forces; and the performance of the UK Armed Forces in that phase of Op TELIC was of the highest order²³. Initially, the post-combat role taken on by the UK in Basra also followed expectations of a rapid transition to peace support operations, in accordance with SDR 98. But such an expectation proved illusory, and it should have been clear from 2004 onwards that the campaign in Iraq had become something other than peace support. COIN required specific training, and was not a natural sub-set of war-fighting. This transition faced 2 obstacles. First, there was a reluctance within Defence to face up to the implications of a fundamentally changed and more enduring campaign; there was a tendency to place the most positive construction on the evidence of progress on the ground, and this led to


21 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, Pages 6-9 & 6-10, Paras 616 & 619: 'In the process of compiling this Volume . . . many organisations have been unable to produce a full narrative or commentary of decisions made or direction issued with the appropriate supporting documentation. Lesson: 'Defence corporate memory must be properly maintained both to protect our people and our reputation.'

22 DOC has been tasked to undertake a study into corporate memory weaknesses MSU/4/1/2/5/is dated 16 Dec 09.

23 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, page IEF-1-1, Para 3: The decisive combat phase of Operation TELIC was a success.

unrealistic expectations of the campaign duration. Secondly, the involvement of UK OGDs was initially limited and was insufficient to cope with the problems in the early stages; this was subsequently compounded by the deteriorating security situation, which severely constrained their ability to operate effectively²⁴. The extent to which economic, political and social reconstruction can take place in a hostile environment will remain a matter for debate and subjective judgement, but earlier recognition of the changed nature of the campaign would have allowed the appropriate resources – military and civilian – to be deployed sooner and more effectively. It is a matter for speculation whether that would have produced a different outcome in the UK area of operations in the South.

207. Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA). Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA) have been in place since SDR 98; they assume that the UK should be capable of sustaining 2 medium scale operations: one short (~6 month) war-fighting operation, and one enduring peace support operation. These assumptions have provided the basis for equipment, manpower and training planning over the last 12 years, although they were never intended to drive operational decisions. The combination of Iraq and Afghanistan meant that the UK was committed to sustaining 2 medium scale COIN operations – much closer to warfighting than peace support – Iraq from late 2003-mid 2009, and Afghanistan since 2006. The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) system and access to the Treasury Reserve for the net additional cost of operations mitigates the immediate impact of this operational pressure, but cannot alleviate the impact on members of the armed forces or their families – or on the need for recuperation and training to recover capabilities temporarily denuded while resources were refocused towards Iraq and Afghanistan. We consistently exceeded our own guidelines on harmony between operations and training throughout Operation TELIC²⁵:



24 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, page TEL-3-4-20. Para 388
 25 MOD Annual Report and Accounts 2003 – 2009.

Perversely, the introduction of new equipment more relevant to an operational theatre adds to the training burden; so did the need to concentrate on the requirements of COIN. One effect of this has been that training for a wider range of potential war-fighting scenarios has been either curtailed or stopped, in order to concentrate on the specifics of current operations. All these considerations brought the utility and realism of DPAs into question; mechanisms exist to review planning assumptions but they were not triggered during this period²⁶. The 2010 Defence Review should consider whether the existing mechanisms, already amended by the undertaking of the Government to hold a Defence Review during every Parliament, are sufficient.

208. The Defence Equipment Programme. Experience of Iraq (and Afghanistan) also raises questions concerning the forward Defence Equipment Programme. Although the application of the terms 'priority' and 'main effort' were not intended to be exclusive, it is difficult to discern how profoundly they affected the Defence Equipment Programme²⁷. The Defence Secretary announced a review of acquisition in Dec 08 aimed at adapting 'to the rising cost of high-end defence equipment and to provide more support for current operations'. The ability of Defence to plan and equip for the most demanding inter-state warfare, while deftly managing actual conflicts and funding them from contingency, was stretched to the limit by Iraq. The military demands of COIN are closer to war-fighting and our training and equipment must reflect that, and the continuing need for an expeditionary capability. Moreover, while UK involvement in contingency operations remains an appropriate use of Treasury Reserve funding, greater cost-effectiveness could have been achieved during Op TELIC. An obvious conclusion is that equipment needs to be designed with flexibility built in, and must be suitable for rapid adaptation. The forthcoming Defence Review will presumably address the timescales in which conventional war-fighting may be required, consider the implications for DPAs, and reach conclusions on the appropriate balance in priority between the needs of current operations and the development of a broader set of capabilities. In framing our equipment programme, Op TELIC underscores the importance of taking into account the views of key allies, especially the US.

26 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, page 3-4, paras 308 & 309. 'This overstretch in UK forces, and the resultant imperative to reduce numbers on Op TELIC to relieve pressure, served to reinforce the divergent US and UK approaches to Iraq.' Lesson: 'If force structures and resources to generate outputs that deliver effects articulated in Defence Planning Assumptions are to be exceeded, then the impact of that excess needs very clear exposure.'

27 It appears that equipment for Iraq was the preserve of the UOR system. This comment reflects the input of numerous interviewees and is repeated in the Bernard Gray Report.

Operation ZENITH

By early 2007 the UK drawdown and the move to Provincial Iraqi Control was agreed coalition policy, and there was a strong desire on the part of the Iraqis to implement this policy quickly. DOP was aware²⁸ that departure from Basra Palace would reduce situational awareness in the city, but understood that this could be mitigated by improved partnerships with Iraqi Army (IA) formations, including embedding military transition teams (MITT). Ministers were briefed²⁹ and agreed that UK forces intended to partner the ISF in Basra (and this was done by UK forces for 10 IA Div in Baghdad), but UK practice³⁰ subsequently was not to embed MITTs in 14 IA Div once UK forces vacated Basra city in August 2007. It seems that this was based on an Iraqi conviction that the UK modus operandi increased the risk to IA soldiers (even though British forces were embedded elsewhere with IA in the same way as US MITTs) and a UK calculation of insufficient troops both to MITT and to maintain a capability to intervene in Basra post withdrawal from Basra Palace. Despite the conscious loss of situational awareness³¹ of a deteriorating situation in Basra we convinced ourselves that the ISF was sufficiently mature to underpin PIC in Basra by December 2007: a view shared by the US after initial reservations³². Although the ultimate effect of the Spring 2008 ISF (supported by US and latterly UK forces) Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS to regain control of Basra achieved the objective of Iraqi control which UK had long been seeking, the 'way' in which this 'end' was achieved does not appear to be underpinned by UK operational design. Rightly or wrongly, UK's focus on withdrawal gave rise to a US and Iraqi impression that UK had less appetite for risk, thereby increasing the divergence.

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³³ It further

soured the UK-Iraqi relationship and was played back to us in negotiating our long-term defence partnership.

28 'Iraq and Afghanistan – Balancing Military Effort in 2007' Paper for DOP by DG Op Pol 2 Feb 07. Paragraph 16: "A delay until the end of Aug 07 looks inevitable, which has the advantage of allowing us to maintain better situational awareness of Basra City and assuage US concerns to some extent"

29 Ibid, Annex A, Paragraph 4 et seq.

30 GOC MND-SE at the time believes the direction not to MITT came from COS

31 Acknowledged, inter alia, by CJO (CJO/DVR(21/07) dated 29 Nov 07. Paragraph 6a: "Our SA of down-town Basra is not good because there are limits to what ISTAR, HUMINT and KLE can give us. In such circumstances rumours and false-reporting abound. To an extent we are going to have to live with this."

32 "

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Echoed by Gen Petraeus' 7 Dec 09 press

conference in Washington DC (reported in Financial Times 8 Dec 09, Page 9). "We learnt in Iraq that if the security situation deteriorates beyond a certain point, not only can you no longer successfully hand off tasks to them [Iraqi Security Forces], they actually get hijacked or completely intimidated by insurgent elements"

33 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, Page 7-8, Para 713.

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 3

- **At the highest level, the possession and communication of the more convincing narrative can become a key instrument of 'victory'.**
- **The planning of strategic communications must address what it means to fight an unpopular war, and what additional effort is required to compensate for this. It is crucial that an unpopular war does not undermine support for other operations, or indeed for the UK military's wider reputation.**
- **To be fully effective, that strategic narrative needs to be developed across the entire coalition. Within the UK, it needs to be owned beyond Defence; the military component needs to be clearly subordinate to a wider message.**

301. Faced with omnipresent media on a global scale, a coherent narrative, both consistent and persistent, is essential for sustaining support and conditioning the purpose of military operations. This is especially true where the public support for military action is equivocal. However, and following on from the comments made in Chapter 4, effective strategic communication is unachievable without strategic coherence³⁴ – both across Government and within the coalition.

302. Coalition. From a coalition perspective, the breadth of the coalition and the lack of a forum in which to forge strategy made a coherent strategic narrative all the more difficult to achieve: media and political dynamics will always be different in Washington, London, and other capitals. Coherent strategic communication proved particularly elusive at moments of strategic adjustment. Even so, no serious attempt appears to have been made to forge a convincing coalition-wide strategic narrative. Most notably, as the US surged during 2007 while the UK drew down troop levels, the narrative debate, both within the MoD and across Whitehall, appears to have been dominated by discussion of how to maintain an apparently divergent strategy without offending the US. There is nothing inherently flawed about differing approaches in different regions of the same operational theatre – pragmatism is always crucial.

³⁴ DG Op Pol made this point forcefully (DG Op Pol/11/5 (172/03) dated 4 Aug 03, Paragraph 2): "An information strategy cannot exist outside a general strategy"

But our failure to offer a persuasive argument in this case reflected the lack of a coherent strategic narrative – which, in turn, reflected the lack of coherent strategy.

303. National. The absence of coalition-wide mechanisms and a reluctance to face up to the changed nature of the campaign also had an effect at the national level. It encouraged more short-term, reactive operational planning, narrowly focussed on the UK's area of operation. MoD appears to have clung to an unjustified optimism that a deteriorating situation would get better within months, particularly during 2004 and 2005. Any setbacks on the ground reinforced a defensive tendency, which in turn added to the difficulty of developing and delivering the strategic message. Admittedly, there was some recognition in 2005 of the need for improved co-ordination of strategic communications, when the Prime Minister directed that the Defence Secretary should take lead responsibility. But this was not wholly successful. Once a department was seen to be in the lead, there was an understandable trend for people – in politics, government and in the media – to perceive the issue as solely an issue for that department. This is the antithesis of the 'Comprehensive Approach', which requires many departments to deliver the message as well as to help shape it. There is no reason why Defence should be seen as the natural lead for communicating the strategic message, especially once a campaign has moved beyond the combat phase³⁵. In Iraq, unsurprisingly, the relatively high profile of the military on the ground meant that Defence was indeed seen as the lead department, even though the strategic message was as much a matter of international development or foreign policy.

304. Strategic Narrative. The strategic narrative challenge was occasionally exacerbated by patchy media handling, highlighted by the Jun 07 report by Tony Hall³⁶ in the wake of Op DEACON³⁷, the detention and subsequent recovery from Iran of RN and RM personnel. This was a sharp reminder, the recommendations from which have been fully implemented. From a national perspective, it is difficult to identify an agreed narrative for Op TELIC before late 2008^{38,39}. Probably the most important reason for this was the more benign security situation in

35 Wider UK government discussion, particularly within the Iraq Information Strategy Group, on narrative appears to be consistently side-tracked by the need to react to short-term media onslaught. Strategically and presentationally, the FCO lead for strategic communications in Afghanistan is a model which plays to the long-term departmental lead.

36 Report by Tony Hall on Review of Media Access to Personnel, Jun 07.

37 The detention of RN/RM personnel by Iran on 23 Mar 07.

38 [The Iraq narrative was first developed on a X-Govt basis Post COTK in a SO1-level meeting (The Iraq Working Group) – He sent us some examples. Interview with E. ٱٱٱٱٱ, Iraq Start Comms, on 26 Nov. Also: 'We continue to fail in our information campaign ... we need a strategic level information plan' GOC MND-SE hauldown report to CJO (COMD/GOC/DO) dated 1 Dec 04 Para 4]

39 It has remained frustratingly elusive for Afghanistan, albeit the latest version:

<http://defence.gov.uk/defence/central/defence/afghanistan/afghanistan/CivilianAndJointService/BrowseDocumentCategories/MainComm/PublicRelations/Final%20afghan%20campaigns/MediaAndCommsStrategy.Ppt> addresses many of the issues which were lacking in the TELIC narrative.

Basra following Operation Charge of the Knights (COTK). It allowed the other UK departments (principally FCO and DFID) contributing to the reconstruction of Basra to more easily carry out their work, and the delivery of a UK government-wide coherent strategic approach became easier to achieve.

305. The unique circumstances surrounding UK involvement in Iraq may have made the achievement of strategic coherence and communication especially difficult, but they also underscore the need for it. Whilst the particularly difficult background to operations in Iraq may not be repeated for future military operations, there are general lessons that can be drawn. The importance of a clear, agreed government-wide strategy applied consistently will be important even where there is no doubt about the public's support for military action. This lesson is reinforced by the need, in future, to put the case for military action to Parliament; indeed, it may be the vehicle that helps to deliver it. Coalition operations add further complication. We will need to give serious thought to how strategic communications are managed in such operations.

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 4

UTILITY OF FORCE

- **An understanding of the utility of force to the resolution of conflict, and its relationship with other 'ways' or levers of power, is fundamental to its appropriate application. This requires a very thorough understanding of the specific operational environment – considered from a number of perspectives.**
- **To gain understanding and align with partners and OGDs, we will need to achieve a greater degree of campaign continuity – training must be more systematic, military commanders tour lengths must be longer, and direction must be more consistent.**
- **UK doctrine for command on operations assumes that we will either be operating nationally or in a coalition where the UK exerts serious influence – the role of PJHQ when neither is the case requires review.**
- **UK formation commanders used the intelligence assets available to them in Iraq in a way which suggests a lack of uniformity in their awareness of the available intelligence and its integration. This must be addressed in the training of our formation commanders.**

401. As a means of achieving strategic goals, military force was clearly appropriate during the initial combat phase of Op TELIC. But this did not pertain in subsequent years. Ultimately, British military understanding reached conceptual maturity only with the recognition that the sources of violence in Southern Iraq were primarily the result of intra-Shia rivalry⁴⁰. Such rivalry – unlike the Sunni insurgency further north - was not about resistance to an elected Iraqi Government. The realisation that it would more quickly be mitigated without the central distorting presence of UK Forces in the main population areas was slow to gain widespread currency. And even now, this conceptual underpinning of UK strategy in Southern Iraq, vital to the final years of the campaign, is not well appreciated.

⁴⁰ 'I remain firmly of the view that the Campaign plan, with its focus on the neutralization of the Sunni Insurgency and its neglect of the Shia, is flawed' GOC MND-SE hauldown report to CJO (COMD/GOC/DO) dated 1 Dec 04, para 1.

402. Such an appreciation requires a degree of training and situational understanding which took years to develop in Northern Ireland and, even then, relied heavily on continuity in formation headquarters, intelligence staff and resident units. The 2 year 'resident' tour length balanced the more rapid turnover of 'roulement' units. In settling on 6 month tour lengths for Op TELIC, we learned the wrong lesson from Northern Ireland: we allowed formation commanders to revise concepts of operations⁴¹ and risked diverging from OGDs, the US and Iraqis. Campaign design requires a degree of continuity that can only be imparted in theatre by matching military commanders' tours with FCO and DfID counterparts.

403. The Role of PJHQ. Although the presence of PJHQ compensated for this lack of in-theatre continuity, its position straddling the strategic/operational levels and its geographical separation from OGDs raised a number of issues:

- It mitigated some of the inability of insufficient in-theatre continuity to manage the campaign plan, but this misses the point: the campaign, in accordance with our doctrine, should be managed in theatre⁴².
- In coalition or Alliance terms, PJHQ is the closest UK comes to a US 'combatant command'. It balanced multiple, simultaneous, expeditionary operations; but the relationships with key OGDs continued to be managed by Whitehall, making a comprehensive approach more difficult to achieve from Northwood. OGDs do not have an equivalent level of command to PJHQ.
- It duplicates some of the functions of the MoD Commitments Staff. During Op TELIC there was a tendency for MoD staff to 'mark PJHQ's homework' rather than focus on strategic direction.

404. Throughout Op TELIC there appears to have been continuing confusion over the relationship between MOD, PJHQ and theatre (and, to a lesser extent, front-line commands). In part this was because much of our doctrine assumes that we will be operating either nationally,

⁴¹ All UK divisional and brigade commanders had attended HCSC where campaign planning is taught, albeit for use at the operational level.

⁴² Interviews with/reports from most Commanders MND-SE reflect the view that there was, and should be, one campaign plan, owned by CG MNF-I.

or in a coalition where the UK exerts serious influence. The modern nature of command will form one element of a wider, ongoing, review of the organisation and management of Defence⁴³.

405. Roulement v Fixed Headquarters for Stability Ops. For most of the campaign, the US practice was to man MNF-I on an individual replacement basis, while founding MNC-I (its subordinate HQ) on a rotational formation plot. These policies will converge with the stand-up of USF-I in 2010; nevertheless subordinate headquarters will continue to rotate. Although there are exceptions, US rotation policy mitigates against campaign inconsistency by stipulating 12 month tours. Linked to the generic point on understanding of the utility of force at Paragraph 601 above, the UK policy of rotating brigade headquarters on a 6 month basis⁴⁴ bears re-examination as a campaign transitions to COIN or stability operations.

406. Training Iraqi Forces. The pivotal role of indigenous security forces in a counter insurgency is now widely recognised; they are the *sine qua non* of a successful campaign^{45, 46}. While the US-led Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) provided an effective model for the training of indigenous security forces, and UK embedded officers were particularly effective and valued, it focused on Baghdad and the surrounding areas, both because it was the seat of national government and because those areas were the source of over 90% of the violence in Iraq. In contrast, we must remember that MND(SE) saw only around 3% of violent attacks in Iraq; but in comparison with the US, the Iraqis perceived the UK-led approach to be under-resourced and lacking in commitment.

a. Iraqi Navy. The concept of training of a new Iraqi Navy started as the UK's only opportunity to be the major partner in the re-build of Iraqi forces. It offered us the potential to influence the outlook and doctrine of what is likely to be a major military player in the Middle East; *Redacted* It remains to be seen whether UK influence will persist with the Iraqi Navy, *Redacted*

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b. Iraqi Army (IA). There is, as previously discussed, a reasonable argument to be made that by 2007 the conceptual underpinning of our strategy became clear.

43 Review of the Organisation and Management of Defence, Hd DBI.

44 In some cases brigade commanders changed during their brigade's deployment, resulting in one instance in 5 brigade commanders in 18 months

45 JDP-340 'Security and Stabilization. The Military Contribution', Annex11A, Nov 09: 'A key military contribution to Security Sector Reform (SSR) is assisting in the development of indigenous security forces. This is about developing indigenous forces so that they are capable of delivering the nation's long-term security needs without over reliance on outside assistance.'

46 Victory in Iraq, National Security Council, Nov 05: 'Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their security threats over the long term'

Nevertheless, we made mistakes in its implementation, especially in ensuring that the Iraqi Army in Basra was as prepared as it could be⁴⁷ at that stage for the challenges of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). Acknowledging that our presence exacerbates the security problems (as CGS publicly commented as early as Oct 06) does not imply a hands-off approach, even if drawing down troop levels is the agreed strategy. A coherent coalition policy on partnering needs to be agreed and implemented.

c. Iraqi Police. Op TELIC exposed the UK's lack of capability to conduct 'hot-stabilization' policing⁴⁸. Individual nations based their advice on their national policing models; the UK advocated British policing lines rather than gendarmerie (and this divergence is repeated in Afghanistan, between for example the German and US approaches). The US Military Police forms a significantly greater slice of military strength than in UK forces, providing *inter alia* the capability to conduct post-conflict policing themselves, and also to train an indigenous police force⁴⁹. Neither role has to be carried out by military forces, although clearly the US doing so can be advantageous. The question for the UK is whether we wish to replicate the US capability, albeit on a smaller scale, and if so, how. Certainly UK land forces need to do more. Even if not directly involved in the training process themselves, UK forces should be capable of working alongside a nascent indigenous police force and, where police training or mentoring is provided by another force, we need to be able to satisfy ourselves that it is effective and coordinated.

407. Transition from an Occupation to Support of a Democratically Elected Government. The process of transition is inevitably complicated when large coalitions are involved; individual members will be simultaneously engaged in bilateral relationships with the indigenous government. The UK strategy in 2008 was to normalise our bilateral relationship, moving away from one dominated by the military relationship. Set against Iraqi political reality, including the withdrawal of US forces from cities and towns by 30 Jun 09 and the threat of a referendum on continuing US presence, the relative value of the enduring UK military contribution (less than 1000 UK personnel compared with more than 100,000 US) produced insufficient political

47 we drew back from the ISF too early after TDA' GOC MND-SE hauldown report to CJO (COMD/GOC/DO) dated 1 Dec 04, Para 8.
48 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 2 (COS Approved) 22 Feb 05, pages 5-1-3 & 5-1-4, para 512 & 513: 'Although MND(SE) was able to initiate the training of the Iraqi Police, the limitations of existing UK military forces to train civilian police were recognised early in the campaign'. Lesson: 'UK policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction must be cognisant of the need to rebuild foreign, civilian police forces. The policy needs to recognise the different skill-sets of the various UK police forces and tailor pre-deployment training accordingly.
49 As well as detainee operations, including the training of indigenous correction officers.

momentum – Iraqi, British or US - to cement our opening gambit. It was unclear to both HMG as a whole and to the Iraqis what priority to put on the continued bilateral defence relationship as the key UN Security Council Resolutions finally came to an end. There is a need for greater cross-Whitehall coordination to achieve UK goals when we reach a similar point in Afghanistan and future campaigns.

408. Iraq and Regional Dynamics. Iraq was unusual in its relative isolation from its neighbours for decades preceding the coalition intervention. Much coalition activity since 2003 has had the effect of perpetuating this isolation. Iraq's neighbours have had a range of concerns:

Redacted.

Only relatively recently has re-integration of Iraq into the region become a realistic prospect. We must be careful not to learn false lessons from Iraq; most troubled states are part of a wider regional dynamic which needs to be addressed if the specific issues of the failed state are to be resolved. But Op TELIC suggests that early harnessing of regional powers might have offered solutions to some campaign challenges.

409. Intelligence. Given that the utility of force can only be exploited effectively against the best possible situational awareness, the degree to which UK military commanders understood and used the intelligence assets at their disposal appears inconsistent. This may partly be due to the tendency to attempt to resolve issues on national lines. Some of the tensions are beyond the remit of this Report:

- The extent to which the system of setting priorities for the *Redacted* recognises the importance of supporting military operations, and the extent to which that priority is translated into practice.
- Whether there was an agreed cross-Whitehall view on what intelligence was telling us about conditions on the ground in Iraq at all stages, and whether that was being accurately presented to key decision makers.

However, there are intelligence issues that the MoD does need to address:

- The importance of ensuring that there is a good understanding on the part of tactical commanders of the nature and use of intelligence, and how best to task the *Redacted*. (see also section on "Training" at Paragraph 707 below.)
- The importance of maintaining an effective common picture, rooted heavily in intelligence and reinforced by day to day reporting from units. There must be effective arrangements in place to pass this on from unit to unit as tours change (a key NI lesson that was not transferred to Iraq)^{51,52}.
- The need to continue to develop the Operational Intelligence Support Group approach.

Redacted

Defence Intelligence has a key role to play in this fusion and the wider rationalisation of intelligence structures, manning and processes in order to serve in-theatre commanders.

Redacted

- The need to invest in systems that will allow coalition partners to share material rapidly and securely, including *Redacted* HUMINT material (see also "CIS" section at Paragraph 907.f.(2) below)^{54,55}.

Redacted

- The critical contribution of ISTAR and the need to ensure its exploitation in COIN. There is a justified expectation of operating under a recognised picture at sea, in the air and – increasingly – on the ground. This was recognised in greater UK investment in this capability as Op TELIC unfolded^{56,57}. However, commanders and staff in MND-SE

50 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, page 6-3, paras 605 & 607: 'due to a lack of in-depth understanding of the capability, the UK effort in MND(SE) was mistakenly focused on requesting ISTAR platforms rather than their product'. Lesson: 'When operating as part of a coalition, understanding the procedures to gain access to coalition ISTAR assets are vital; defaulting to the national route whilst potentially easier will probably not deliver as quickly.'

51 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, page 6-4 & 6-5, paras 608 & 610 'The appetite for all-source ISR is insatiable'. Lesson: 'The creation and maintenance of a lasting, fused intelligence picture is vital in an enduring campaign.'

52 Reiterated in the Fulton Report (D/CDS 3/6/1 dated 16 May 07), Paragraph 37 and the subsequent action plan (D/CDS/3/6/1(a) dated 19 Jun 07 Annex A), Ser 2.

53 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, page TEL-3-5-3, paras 415 & 416

Redacted

54 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, page TEL-3-5-3, paras 411 & 413. 'Better connectivity with US intelligence assets would have enabled more informed planning and intelligence briefing, thus overcoming delays and duplication of effort'. Lesson: 'In any future coalition operation, early action must be taken to establish adequate connectivity with coalition partners, to ensure effective distribution of intelligence.'

55 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, page TEL-3-5-1, paras 401: 'The MOD should review its intelligence structures and specialist and deployed manning, to ensure their suitability and resilience in meeting the challenges of modern operations and in cooperating with potential allies and partners. This implies greater connectivity between the various national and allied elements, and access to robust, reliable communications bearers.'

56 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, page 6-5, paras 609 & 610 'What is also needed is a fused picture with J2, J3, J5 and other

wrongly tended to look for national rather than coalition solutions⁵⁸. It would be difficult to expect commanders in future operations to operate under less ISTAR coverage. This raises some uneasy questions about how we would satisfy ISTAR demands in an operation where R assets were unavailable.

- The importance of being able to exploit all sources in association with key coalition partners, *Redacted*, including intelligence from detainees (see Paragraph 610 below).
- The exploitation of Iraqi intelligence capability. *Redacted*, failure to partner any element of the burgeoning Iraqi intelligence structure left UK forces yet more reliant on US intelligence linkages.

410. Intelligence Staff and Foreign Area Expertise. The more senior the defence intelligence post, the less likely it is to be occupied by a career specialist intelligence officer. The use of high quality generalists in this way does not appear to have resulted in any material degradation in intelligence product: indeed, it applies critical and operationally-experienced eyes to the intelligence system and its product. However, in theatre, particularly the wider region, UK's defence intelligence expertise comprises Defence Attachés. Unlike their US Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Counterparts, DAs are neither selected for their intelligence background nor steeped in an understanding of their country and region.

Redacted

The selection, training and career planning of DAs should be reviewed, to ensure that UK derives maximum *Redacted* benefit from those selected. The US FAO system should be used as a benchmark.

411. National Policy on Detention and Interrogation. Experience on *Redacted* operations on Op TELIC showed the importance of being able to detain

key intelligence agencies all contributing. Lesson: 'The creation and maintenance of a lasting, fused intelligence picture is vital in an enduring campaign.'

57 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 2 (COS Approved) 22 Feb 05, page 3-9 paras 324 & 325 'Within PJHQ and theatre, intelligence and operational staffs had difficulty in producing a fused operational and tactical picture'. Lesson: 'A review of the DIS, PJHQ and theatre J2 structures, manning and processes should be conducted to ensure that the growing intelligence capabilities are fused into a more robust product for the end user.'

58 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, page 6-3, paras 605 & 607: 'The result was increased requests from theatre directly to the UK for additional national ISTAR assets, which were eventually provided. Had the correct engagement of the in-theatre chain of command been followed this might have delivered the required increase in ISTAR capability far sooner. Lesson: 'When operating as part of a coalition, understanding the procedures to gain access to coalition ISTAR assets are vital: defaulting to the national route whilst potentially easier will probably not deliver as quickly.'

suspected insurgents, both in terms of force protection and the value of information arising from subsequent interrogation. For Op TELIC this was authorised under relatively permissive UNSCRs until the end of 2008. Although there will always be differences between UK and US policy and practice on detention and interrogation, these are well understood at the strategic level, and were managed effectively at the operational level. The short pause in early 2009 – following transition to the new legal basis for UK forces – in interrogation activities *Redacted* *Redacted* at the operational level in Baghdad. The debate on UK detention and interrogation policy should not be undertaken in isolation from its strategic and operational consequences: both force protection and *Redacted* ; must remain important factors. Our policy on such issues and the risks of disclosure need to be well understood by the US and other Allies in advance.

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 5

COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE CAMPAIGN

- **Comprehensive planning between UK government departments and between allies' military and civil planners must occur before commitment of forces. It must include post major combat operations and contingency planning for changes of campaign direction.**
- **Joint and combined training and exercising are essential elements of the preparation for operations such as TELIC; they also contribute to wider defence relationships.**

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501. Planning. Participation in the 1991 Gulf War 1, Northern and Southern Watch, the re-establishment of staff at US CENTCOM following 9/11, and participation in Exercise INTERNAL LOOK should have afforded ample planning time for UK participation in Op TELIC. However, the unique circumstances leading up to UK engagement in Iraq meant that, for a number of reasons, our involvement in preliminary military planning was not as influential as it might have been:

a. The delivery of the necessary UK political authority, inevitably connected to the debates within the UN, produced a tension between political and military timescales. This was exacerbated by the decision to abandon the northern (Turkish) axis and inject British land forces into an already congested southern axis. The political imperative to publicly delay any decision to go to war until other avenues had been exhausted is acknowledged and has been exhaustively discussed elsewhere; but it had particular implications for those preparations that are a prudent part of any contingency planning, particularly procurement and logistic support.

b. The success of the UK's engagement in the initial phase of Op TELIC owes much to informal agreements with industry – essentially British industry – which carried significant risk for both sides. A mechanism needs to exist for letting contracts without premature public visibility, while at the same time avoiding the potential for nugatory expenditure to be a bar to effective preparation. It seems likely that this lesson would apply equally to

other departments. We do not underestimate the practical difficulties of introducing such a mechanism. It would require a change of Treasury rules, which currently preclude contingency expenditure against operations which have not yet received formal approval. We believe such nugatory expenditure will have to be accepted as the price necessary to ensure that our forces deploy with the most appropriate equipment possible.

c. UK forces had to find a place in an existing US military plan, which had been fine-tuned over the previous decade.

d. Again, because of the need to delay formal UK political authority, US plans had to assume that there would be no UK participation in the initial attack, until days before military operations began.

e. There was an assumption among some NATO nations that post-combat phases in Iraq might be an appropriate vehicle for NATO C2 structures (see Paragraph 902). In part this stemmed from a perception that the ISAF structures in Afghanistan in 2002 had not worked properly – and that a more firmly established command regime would be needed. In the event, the absence of NATO procedures planning structures placed a premium on embedded UK staff in US headquarters, particularly CENTCOM; their ability to integrate into *ad hoc* but US-based coalition planning procedures became pivotal.

502. These reasons have led many commentators to conclude that UK participation in Op TELIC was less militarily efficient than it should have been. There is merit in this argument, and much evidence to support it. However, given the delicacy of both the international situation and domestic politics – both outside the remit of this Report – it would be naïve to have expected the early planning authority some craved. Even so, it is difficult not to conclude that, were a similar situation to arise, some of the most deleterious consequences could not be avoided.

503. Post-Combat Phases. Despite problematic planning, the war-fighting phase (TELIC 1) was an undoubted success. However, it is well-documented that insufficient consideration was given in the initial US-led military planning to the post-combat phases⁵⁹. This is not only hindsight: the point was being made elsewhere by the UK to the US, and this is one lesson that

59 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, page TFL-3-1-5 & 3-1-6, paras 28 & 30: 'A lower priority was apparently afforded to planning for Phase IV (Post-Conflict Operations). Lesson: 'National planning for the aftermath and phased transition to peace support after a military operation, including on a contingency basis, must be accorded appropriate weight and legitimacy across Government at an early stage. This involves the early engagement of all likely stakeholders and participants within a coordinated framework. In dealing with a dominant coalition partner, the UK should continue to insist that such planning be afforded the same importance and tempo as the military campaign itself.'

appears to have been quickly recognized on both sides of the Atlantic. The efforts of UK military planners were largely focussed on belated integration with an established US war plan. Moreover, we must be careful not to over-estimate the scope the UK military, or indeed OGDs, had to influence US thinking – especially given the overt Pentagon policy not to engage in nation-building. Whilst MOD must use its influence to broaden the planning beyond the purely military, the lesson is wider: guidance from UK and US doctrine is that a campaign plan should work backwards from its end-state (in this case the departure of coalition presence) and that the campaign should be 'owned' by a wider authority than MoD. It suggests a comprehensive cross-Government and intra-coalition approach to planning. In Iraq, we only appear to have reached this stage in 2009; even then, the focus of the campaign plan was more national than coalition, reflecting the dwindling size of the coalition. This leaves the UK with 2 choices: either we need to do better in this respect, or we need to suppress our expectations as a junior coalition partner and revise our doctrine accordingly.

504. Impact of the Military Campaign. The assumptions which underpinned MoD planning in 2002 and early 2003⁶⁰ suggest a poor understanding of the likely consequences of the military campaign. In particular, there was inadequate consideration of the impact on an Iraqi society that had been repressed during Saddam's regime, and the potential for a degree of internal breakdown following the initial euphoria. Predicting the impact of the military campaign on Iraq with any confidence was never going to be possible; academic and Iraqi diaspora opinion in the run-up to our engagement varied widely. Against such a background, it is important that Defence (in co-operation with partners in government and the coalition) is capable of adapting rapidly to changing circumstances; contingency planning appears absent in Op TELIC as the situation changed in late 2003 and 2004. This was compounded by the rolling 6 month horizon enshrined in our roulement policy.

505. Resourcing Stability Operations and Counter-Insurgency. Although conventional combat may be more intense, experience from Iraq (reinforced by Kosovo and Afghanistan) suggests that stability operations, particularly COIN, require larger numbers of forces and for a greater time to achieve campaign success. The following table⁶¹, dating from 2004 and addressing the international commitment to Afghanistan, makes this point:

⁶⁰ Reinforced by wider government departmental evidence to the Chilcot Enquiry.

⁶¹ Source: Bhatia, M, Langan, K, Wilkinson, P, "Minimal investments, minimal results: the failure of security policy in Afghanistan", Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004. Note that the figures for Afghanistan have since changed four-fold.

PEAK TROOP STRENGTH BY TERRITORY AND POPULATION			
Theatre	Peak number of international troops	Troops/ km²	Troops/head of population
Kosovo	40,000	1 per 0.3	1 per 50
Bosnia	60,000	1 per 0.85	1 per 66
East Timor	9,000	1 per 1.6	1 per 111
Iraq (pre-surge)	155,000	1 per 2.8	1 per 161
Somalia	40,000	1 per 16.0	1 per 200
Liberia	11,000 + 2200 (MEF)	1 per 8.0	1 per 265
Sierra Leone	18,000	1 per 4.0	1 per 300
Haiti	20,000	1 per 1.5	1 per 375
Afghanistan	20,000 (OEF) + 6,000 (ISAF)	1 per 25.0	1 per 1,115

As soon as the strategic analysis suggests that engagement in stability operations, particularly COIN, is likely, planning needs to be based on an appropriate ratio of forces⁶². The graph in Paragraph 402 shows the relative degree of drawdown between the US and UK in the immediate aftermath of combat operations in Iraq. In pursuit of a reduction in force numbers in theatre, it is clear that, by 2007, the UK had arrived at a situation where we had insufficient

⁶² In 2003 there was discussion within NATO of expanding the 'ISAF Effect' beyond Kabul, but the resource bill (estimated at 100,000 troops) was perceived as being too great. Seven years later it has been achieved.

troop strength to carry out the tasks associated with stability operations – even taking into consideration the increasing capability of the Iraqi Army⁶³.

506. Wider Regional Support. Launching and maintaining operations into Iraq required regional support. Once Saudi Arabia and Turkey had been discounted as options for land offensives, Kuwait became essential as a reception, staging, training and launch platform. Elsewhere, Oman, Qatar, Jordan and Bahrain were essential for air and maritime operations.

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507. Preparation and Training. The UK's ability to participate in Op TELIC, particularly the initial war-fighting, owes much to the experience of tri-Service and multinational exercises and training (some larger examples include Exercises PURPLE STAR 96 and SAIF SEREEA 01). Recognising the value of combined exercises, the US is planning a series of BRIGHT STAR exercises with the Iraqi Security Forces from 2011; these will serve the twin purpose of routine joint training and strengthening the bilateral defence relationship. There are numerous references in previous Op TELIC lessons studies to the requirement for continuing UK joint and combined training; but we do not currently appear to be achieving the endorsed frequency of such training, largely because of levels of commitment and resource constraints. Joint and combined training and exercising are essential elements of the preparation for operations such as TELIC; they also contribute to wider defence relationships which, in turn, offer basing, over-flight or other advantages. But there is a balance to be struck. Our focus on Iraq/Afghanistan-specific training risks weakening other capabilities. We may reach levels where it cannot be

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64 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03 page TEL-3-1-7 & 3 1-8, paras 37 & 41

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assumed that UK forces would be able to engage successfully in future operations without renewed commitment to a balanced training regime.

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 6

HMG STRATEGY/CROSS-GOVERNMENT COORDINATION ON STABILISATION

(A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH)

- **The post-conflict phase of Op TELIC demanded a cross-government approach: economic regeneration and the development of effective governance were tasks beyond the reach of MoD in isolation. These elements of the campaign were initially under-resourced, and suffered from relatively ineffective UK government machinery to achieve a truly comprehensive approach.**
- **When engaged in dangerous stabilisation tasks, the military will naturally assume the leading role. UK forces need to have training in stabilisation skills, and need the ability to use money as a weapon system. We have made patchy progress in learning these lessons.**

601. Civil Administration and Reconstruction. It is now well recognised that the coalition occupation of Iraq in 2003 left the Iraqi society degraded and dysfunctional in many vital aspects. It is also widely conceded that the UK, at that stage, had little understanding of what was necessary to ensure effective delivery of civil support. Moreover, it is difficult not to conclude that general cross-Whitehall commitment to the process was inadequate. This was not only a problem for the UK:

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. The planning and delivery of reconstruction in the aftermath of combat operations necessarily lagged behind security⁶⁶. This was compounded by dismissal of Baath Party officials, who were replaced *ad hoc* by personnel largely ignorant of the context in which they were operating⁶⁷. This squandered the vital opportunity of the initial weeks after military intervention; in that favourable early period the coalition might have demonstrated civil progress to an increasingly sceptical

⁶⁶ The inability to deal with the situation has also been well publicised. See, for example, Hilary Synnott, *Bad Times in Basra*, or Rory Stewart, *Occupational Hazards*.

⁶⁷ In NI this had not been such a problem: the instruments of State had not been dismantled and the Police had better continuity and feel for situation and context. Indeed, the relative size of the public sector in relation to the community it served was both a means of ensuring that public services thrived and that unemployment was minimised.

population, before the lack of progress could be blamed on the intervention. This is not said through the benefit of hindsight. Even at the time, some in Defence were frustrated at what they perceived to be a lack of cross-Government engagement. There were glaring variations between Departments' approaches⁶⁸.

602. Doctrine and Development. It is fair to acknowledge that this situation improved as the campaign progressed. By 2007, for example, the Stabilisation Unit was becoming increasingly influential. It produced, in concert with the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), a most valuable analysis of the Basra PRT which recognised the requirement for proper resourcing, particularly the need for high quality personnel in theatre. Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the observation that our Balkan success in nation-building should have allowed the UK to improve more rapidly. Our institutional thinking appears somewhat leaden: although DCDC produced an initial pamphlet in 2006⁶⁹, UK doctrine for Stabilisation and Counter-Insurgency reached maturity only with the publication of JDP 3-40 in late 2009. This was too late to influence Iraq, but hugely helpful for Afghanistan; it has also been welcomed by US commanders who see it as a catalyst for further development of US doctrine. Although other Government Departments were consulted in its production, at 400+ pages it is a heavy tome of military doctrine; and we have yet to agree a common lexicon, let alone a common set of campaign planning tools, across Whitehall. Defence needs **to be prepared to 'soften' the military approach to stabilisation and reconstruction in order to encourage the integration of OGD into the process.**

603. Commanders Emergency Relief Programme (CERP). One notorious difference between UK and US military approaches to this challenge encompassed the idea of 'money as a weapon system'. The US provided commanders at all levels – including those from the UK – with a Commanders Emergency Relief Programme (CERP) fund: in contrast, few would dispute that the UK was slow and parsimonious in this respect. It is not a panacea: there has been justified criticism of (both UK and US) misuse of CERP where its use has not been coordinated with wider development plans. But CERP is an invaluable element of COIN. It needs to be properly

68 Throughout Operation TELIC there does not appear to have been a clear priority (main effort) across UK Government: MoD declared "current operations" as its priority in 2006; the FCO maintained its traditional broad remit; DfID was at least initially focused on Millennium Goals - it did not see its role as 'bailing out the military's mistakes', and the Stabilisation Unit has seen Afghanistan as its focus from its inception. There were also practical differences on the ground – for example, FCO personnel were not allowed to travel a military vehicle, even when the level of close protection was equal or greater to the RMP-provided FCO arrangements.

69 The Comprehensive Approach. Joint Discussion Note 4/05 dated January 2006.

financed, from a source which is identified as a matter of UK policy. And its use must be coordinated with longer term projects as part of a comprehensive approach.

604. Campaign Coordination. The 2009 MNF-I/US Embassy Joint Campaign Plan was an exemplary template for future campaign plans, not least in its potential to save 5 years' drafting. No equivalent existed in 2003/4; instead, guidance came from a succession of CPA edicts interspersed with direction from national capitals. National command from London was itself piecemeal: unlike Northern Ireland where a single Cabinet-level minister (reinforced, as required, by the Prime Minister) set and implemented the policy, much of the direction on Iraq came from the individual ministries that employed personnel deployed into theatre. The creation of the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit⁷⁰ was a worthy attempt to improve matters, but its terms of reference and manning effectively ensured that power remained in the hands of its parent departments, at least initially. There are some key lessons to draw from this:

- Planning for the post-conflict phase needs to take place in parallel with planning for a military intervention. The military intervention in Iraq was merely a means to achieving the end-state. Strategic planning must therefore start with the end state and work backwards, rather than starting with a military intervention followed by an assumption that everything thereafter will neatly fall into place.
- There is a requirement for cross-departmental (and ideally coalition-wide) campaign planning tools and a common lexicon, so that all contributing departments share a common vision and purpose.
- Coordination of the campaign must be civilian-led in theatre and be 'owned' more widely than by just the military at the operational level. By 2009 the collocation of elements of the coalition military headquarters in the US Embassy cemented the relationship between lines of operation: in 2003 there was no collocation and precious little coordination. From a national perspective, the perception that the military were in charge was reasonable but unhelpful, both in the inevitable focus on military activity which it encouraged, and the resentment which it tended to engender in non-military circles. In MND-South East it took until 2008 for this to come good.

⁷⁰ Since re-named Stabilisation Unit.

- Those involved in the provision of people and money to a campaign need to recognise the criticality of cross-government coordination, particularly in COIN, and its legitimacy as a call on the personnel and financial resources of MOD, FCO, DfID and the Treasury Reserve.
- Training for a comprehensive approach to any intervention must become a planned activity for all of the relevant Departments – the establishment of a cadre of staff prepared for the role is a move in the right direction.

605. Terms and Conditions of Service. The drive to coordinate between Government Departments, and to give the campaign coherence and continuity, was further undermined by differing terms and conditions of service. Varying UK policies on leave, travel and particularly security were seen as divisive in theatre. Employment flexibility between Government Departments could also be improved: the Interchange programme is a move in the right direction, but we could do more. Without underestimating the practical difficulties, there is a strong case for advocating tours of duty in relevant OGD for potential senior commanders.

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 7

COALITION OPERATIONS

- **A more integrated coalition approach from the outset would have increased operational effectiveness. National command and control (C2) structures need to balance the UK's ultimate accountability for UK forces with military efficiency in an integrated campaign.**
- **Embedded staff in predominantly US-manned Coalition headquarters were highly influential and valued.**

Redacted.

- **The extent to which UK defence capabilities were used on Op TELIC should be acknowledged in the next SDR, particularly if the UK cannot afford to retain our hitherto broad range of capabilities.**

701. Strategic coherence has been considered in Chapter 4 above; our aspiration to be an influential member of a successful coalition covers much of the same ground. Strategy, by definition, should be coalition-wide. But for the majority of the campaign, the UK effort in Southern Iraq was not treated (R) by UK & US) as an integrated part of a unified effort. There are several explanations: the south was geographically isolated; it had different security, political and ethnic dynamics and was, at least initially, relatively benign; and there was a tendency to for UK commanders to defer to the national rather than coalition chain of command. These factors had the combined effect, at least partially, as detaching South-East Iraq from the rest of the coalition campaign – it became almost a separate British endeavour.

702. Coalition Strategic Decision Making. After 9/11 and with NATO's increasing involvement in Afghanistan, many nations wishing to contribute to the 'Global War on Terror' placed liaison staff in the headquarters of US Central Command

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At this stage, the lack of a strategic decision making forum – a NAC-equivalent – became a common complaint amongst the

international liaison community in Tampa; but more seriously, it was used as a pretext by some for non-participation in the coalition. For the UK this had 2 effects.

a.

Redacted.

b. Secondly, from a military perspective, the lack of a formal coalition decision-making forum underscored the importance of effective liaison to US headquarters⁷²; this had proved invaluable in Op GRANBY but had faltered in the interim, although in the air the US/UK working relationship had remained strong.

703. After 2001 there was a relatively modest commitment to embed staff in predominantly US-manned coalition headquarters. This paid dividends in ensuring both integration of UK national strategy and operations, and Redacted influence over US planning. Effective liaison to US headquarters works best on a full-time basis; it is not so effective if reconstituted in times of conflict. Given that the future nature of UK operations is likely to be in coalition with others, we should consider investing as much effort in embedding personnel in key US (and potentially European) headquarters in the way we have traditionally done in NATO⁷³.

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704. Command and Control (C2) in a Coalition. An essential feature of any strategic or operational directive should be clarity of C2 relationships between the various elements. UK C2 for Iraq was convoluted. Moreover, it did not reflect our doctrine: we used terms (e.g. COMBRITFOR, SBMR, Principal Coordinating Nation) without being entirely precise about their meaning and implications. Whether NATO's traditional C2 relationships remain relevant to coalition operations in recent years is a question first raised in both Bosnia and Kosovo, as yet

71 Especially. Redacted

72 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03. Page TEL-3-1-2. Paras 9 & 10

Redacted

73 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03. Page TEL-3-1-1 & 3-1-2, Paras 4 & 5

Redacted.

unanswered⁷⁴. Many senior UK commanders involved in Op TELIC sensed a half-hearted approach to coalition warfare and a lack of rigour in our approach to C2 – unsurprising given the rapidity of turn-over in theatre, but nonetheless unfavourable to campaign continuity. The US vests more responsibility in its theatre commanders, not least because they are in theatre for longer.

705. Role of PJHQ in a Coalition Campaign. Throughout Op BANNER, Northern Ireland was run on clear C2 lines without PJHQ. Op BANNER pre-dated PJHQ, but the decision to keep it outside PJHQ's remit was made on the basis that Northern Ireland was a land-oriented operation, with limited involvement of the other Services. The precise degree of 'jointery' which determines the tipping point between the type of C2 construct which proved effective in Northern Ireland and a PJHQ construct have never been clarified. Indeed, the role of PJHQ in a long-term campaign within a coalition has already been raised, with recommendations in a number of extant reviews; it invites further re-examination, which is already underway as part of a wider review of the organisation and management of Defence⁷⁵. There is an opportunity to simplify C2 now that we are effectively reducing to one theatre.

706. Maximising the Potential of the Chain of Command. Partly because of the presence of PJHQ⁷⁶, there was a tendency within MND-SE to seek assistance not from the chain of command (MNC-I) but from PJHQ⁷⁷. Theatre assets were therefore not exploited to the full⁷⁸. There is a strong body of opinion that we have repeated this mistake in Afghanistan. Placing UK forces under US command rather than continuing to inculcate a sense of a parallel national chain would alleviate this.

707. Capabilities. Op TELIC suggests that US and European Allies' views should be taken into account in any discussion of role specialisation and equipment prioritisation for the UK. There are a number of capability areas where coalition operations in Iraq offer lessons:

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75 Review of the Organisation and Management of Defence, Hd DBI.

76 PJHQ was originally intended to direct, deploy, sustain and recover forces on operations overseas, with a lack of continuity in theatre it has assumed more of the operational level of command and with MoD streamlining it has become the de facto military strategic headquarters, similar in many ways to the US combatant command level.

77 The recent decision to make the UK Deputy Allied Commander in Afghanistan (DCG ISAF) also the UK National Contingent Commander (NCC) is intended to alleviate too great a Helmand focus in Afghanistan. The rationale behind this decision would have been equally valid in Iraq, and from the outset of operations.

78 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, page 3-4 & 3-7 Paras 310.a & 311 'An unwillingness to actively seek an MNC-I focus on MND-SE may also have been part of the relationship, bringing with it a reluctance to ask for MNC-I assets in support of UK operations in MND-SE' Lesson: 'Operational honesty with coalition partners must be promoted and protected if the correct allocation of coalition resources and effort is to be made.'

- a. Reach. UK Land Forces' inability to reach further than SE Iraq constrained our flexibility as a coalition partner.
- b. Air/Land Integration. The subject of Air/Land integration has already been separately reviewed as an independent DOC audit⁷⁹. Nevertheless, despite improvements already made, continued shortcomings in the practice and training of close air support must be urgently addressed.⁸⁰ Speed and accuracy of BDA also needs to be improved⁸¹.
- c. Reservists. Op TELIC was the largest UK use of reserve forces since WW2. The value of reserve forces has been underscored both as reinforcement of regular strength, and as a source of specialist skills⁸². Initial challenges, particularly where reservists were mobilised as individuals rather than as units, were largely overcome as the campaign progressed.
- d. Command Flight. SBMR-I and DCG MNC-I were reliant on US aviation support – partly a reflection of limited status in the UK C2. UK aviation resources were insufficient to provide in theatre UK commanders with tactical and operational mobility⁸³ and the C2 was too convoluted to maximise the potential of the existing assets.

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⁷⁹ DOC, Air Land Integration Operational Audit Report 5/07. COS Endorsed 28 May 08.

⁸⁰ HCDC 03.04.08. Shortcomings in the practice and training of close air support must be urgently addressed.

⁸¹ HCDC 03.04.09. Speed and accuracy of BDA needs improving.

⁸² See, for example, civil governance skills highlighted at Paragraph 26 above.

⁸³ See Paragraphs 32 and 33 above. This issue has also been a lesson identified in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan [DOC Op HERRICK Vol 1, dated 18 Jul 06, Para 231].

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f. Coalition Interoperability.

(1) Defence Industrial Strategy. Since publication of the Defence Industrial Strategy in 2005, the UK has aimed to maintain adequate interoperability with US equipments⁸⁴. This is particularly relevant for command and control systems. This need not be interpreted as simply buying US-sourced equipment; other solutions can deliver a more effective and efficient capability while nevertheless retaining interoperability. However, there may have been cases where UK capability could have been achieved more economically and quickly, and performed better, if US equipment had been procured (for example, Bowman v SINGARS). Adopting 'current operations' as the MoD's priority, followed by Afghanistan as 'main effort',

implies that the IAB should take greater account of interoperability as a factor in its decisions⁸⁵.

(2) CIS. Op TELIC exposed the weaknesses in UK CIS, especially alongside US systems: for example, our VTC is unreliable and not sharp enough to add value; we go through the motions, rather than using it to enhance our command function. There is limited cross-Government connectivity at SECRET level and above⁸⁶, mostly confined to the intelligence community, and the classified connections to allies are *Redacted*.⁸⁷ DII(FD) is not expected to resolve this⁸⁸. Our CIS strategy needs to reflect our policy of a comprehensive approach, and the implications of working predominantly within US-led coalitions.

708. Enduring Coalition Relationships with the Host Nation. The presence of coalition forces in Iraq was underpinned by UNSCRs. Once these had expired, and the US opted for a bilateral Security Agreement⁸⁹, the coalition had no future.

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. There are 2 key lessons:

a. A bilateral approach between host nation and coalition members makes it more difficult for a junior coalition partner to negotiate its long-term relationship with the host nation. There will be a conscious decision to be made when we approach a similar point in Afghanistan or future operations – whether to accept fragmentation into bilateral agreements, or to press for a more robust multi-lateral arrangement.

⁸⁵ The Acquisition Operating Framework, Version 2.0.19 states that interoperability is an overarching theme for all DLODs: Operation TELIC suggests otherwise

⁸⁶ DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, Page TEL-3-1-3 & 3-1-4, Para 14 & 18: 'Coordination with OGDs was once again hampered by poor physical communications. Despite recent improvements, MOD CIS is not compatible with any other Whitehall department. Lesson: Further secure CIS connectivity across Whitehall should be developed.'

⁸⁷ DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, Page 3-5 & 3-8 Paras 310.b & 313

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⁸⁸ Op TELIC also continued the trend towards contractorised support for our CIS systems. While this is laudable, there were instances of contractorised support wagging the operational dog.

⁸⁹ The coalition had peaked at 49 nations, 33 of which provided forces. By July 2009 it had dwindled to one, now 2 with the reinstatement of the UK Naval Training Mission.

b. Any damage done by premature UK disengagement from Iraq was partially counterbalanced the strategic kudos gained from transfer of capability to Afghanistan, and the effective strategic messaging which accompanied this transfer.

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 8

CAMPAIGN APPROACH

- **The UK lacked the institutional agility to switch from an expeditionary to a campaign mindset. We only ever partially adopted a campaign approach, and rarely achieved proper force preparation, cross-Whitehall planning, co-ordination and direction, in-Theatre C2 continuity and dynamic adjustment of the Equipment Programme.**
- **Adoption of a campaign footing across Defence – and ideally across government – should be the default setting in a campaign which reaches medium scale of effort, especially where the strategic estimate suggests it will endure beyond one force rotation.**
- **The UK needs reliable metrics for measuring campaign success, based on campaign objectives and a consistent commander's intent.**

801. A widespread sense that Operation TELIC was a temporary distraction from normal Defence business was reinforced by a mistaken belief that the campaign would be short-lived, and compounded by the limited engagement of other departments. There is, we must accept, a valid contrast between the approach of a government to a homeland crises and to a foreign endeavour lacking undivided popular support. But yet the discrepancy between HMG's direction of operations in Northern Ireland or its response to the 2003 Firemen's strike, and the Whitehall approach to directing and controlling operations in Iraq, was instructive. The counter-terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland had benefited from continuous direction from the Northern Ireland Office throughout the 38 years of Operation BANNER, with the Prime Minister superimposed when required. The 2003 Firemen's strike saw departmental contributions coordinated by the Deputy Prime Minister. Op TELIC was less vigorously coordinated. Within MoD we were slow to adapt, tending to mould the Operation into existing structures⁹⁰: no-one above 1 star level was specifically responsible for Iraq, and even the 1-star policy post was

90 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, Executive Summary, Para 50. Given the absence of a War Cabinet, the infrequency of OD/DOP/NSID meetings effectively left the Iraq Strategy Group to manage the campaign, with (from 2004) the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (now better-named the Stabilisation Unit) supposedly operationalizing and coordinating policy from the key ministries.

quickly disestablished. Moreover, although MoD claimed to have allocated priority to "current operations" from 2006⁹¹, it had limited impact on the normal running of the Department. Op TELIC also highlighted the paucity of training in cross-Whitehall teamwork at ministerial level^{92,93}. The Department has recognised the issue in respect of Afghanistan, which is now designated as the Department's "main effort"; but this will need to be policed, to ensure that wider processes and behaviours pay more than lip service.

802. Force Preparation. Amongst Land Forces, greatest confidence was reported from units which came together before their training package and trained with in-theatre equipment. This applies equally to headquarters, particularly multinational ones. For headquarters, there was consistent emphasis throughout the various Iraq lessons studies on commanders and staff understanding the context of the operation⁹⁴. This includes language and cultural training, but is wider: it also underscores the requirement to invest in training, particularly for commanders; longer tour lengths would give a greater return on this investment⁹⁵. Pre-deployment training must be conducted as deploying units/formations⁹⁶. And individual augmentees should be posted early enough to enable participation in pre-deployment training of the receiving unit or formation, particularly where it will act as a coalition headquarters.

803. Language and Cultural Training. The paucity of military Arabic speakers forced commanders at all levels to rely on contracted interpreters.

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It also avoided attacks of the kind directed against the locally recruited interpreters employed by the UK. Even once a reliable system of contracting interpreters had been established, it remained helpful for commanders to understand the language and culture of Iraq, both for reasons of cultural sensitivity and to ensure, as much as

91 Defence Board, November 2006. The effect of the more recent allocation of main effort to Afghanistan has been more clearly articulated, although its full impact is not yet realised.

92 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, Page 3-1-4 Para 16 Lesson: 'The re-introduction of regular Tier 4 exercises involving Ministers across Government, similar to the former WINTEX2 series, would expose OGDs to military doctrine and planning and build wider Government confidence in, and understanding of, the military planning process at the strategic and grand strategic levels'.

93 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 1 (COS Approved) 17 Oct 03, Page 3-1-3 Para 15, Lesson: 'Early cross-Government engagement is essential in strategic planning, not just for combat, but also for the transition to post-conflict and peace support operations. Although informal processes enable the exchange of information, they lack executive authority and accountability. Consideration should be given to strengthening the formal mechanisms by which cross-Government-endorsed campaign end states and strategic objectives can be developed for planning and contingency purposes'.

94 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 3 (COS Approved) 4 Apr 06, Page 1-3, Para 106 'Coalition attempts to establish regional political processes in SE Iraq have been shaped by the tribal nature of Iraqi society and government with the 14 Shia tribes dominating the political landscape' Lesson: 'A significant factor in achieving progress in the Security Line of Operation within SE Iraq has been an understanding of the regional and provincial politics, including the dynamics of tribal interests. In turn, this rests on maintaining cultural awareness, which remains a fundamental part of training.'

95 See Paragraph 39 below.

96 PAC HC895, Conclusions and Recommendations, Paragraph 7 reinforces this.

possible, that an interpreter was not translating in a biased manner⁹⁷. The Defence School of Languages turns out an excellent product when given enough time and resources. But the priority afforded by Defence to language skills can mean that the motivation and quality of its students is mixed. This has been partially addressed by the Defence Operational Language Award Scheme (DOLAS) introduced in Nov 09, but there remains a perception that all training needs to be publicly resourced and time-tabled. It is not unreasonable to expect individuals to devote their own resources, at least in terms of time. DOLAS could usefully be extended and incentivised to encourage Service personnel to engage in language training, using learning credits where appropriate.

804. In-Theatre C2 Continuity. Tour lengths for UK military commanders is a vigorously debated topic and has already been raised in Chapter 6 considering utility of force. What is beyond doubt is that at brigade and divisional level, the combination of US 12 month rotation policy, the lower rank of US brigade commanders and a greater adherence to the coalition chain of command, is conducive to campaign consistency⁹⁸. As has so often been said, COIN is 'war among the people': if UK forces are to be effective, there is a requirement for UK commanders to engage with the local population. The degree of influence of a minor coalition partner is also personality-dependent. Both types of relationship need to be cultivated. The UK policy of 6 month tours for *combat* forces remained appropriate throughout Operation TELIC; however, anything less than 6 months is both divisive and potentially counter-productive. Single Service policy needs to reflect this⁹⁹. The UK policy of rotating brigade headquarters every 6 months, as a campaign transitions to COIN or stability operations, was re-examined in the context of Afghanistan and amended (although the change does not yet appear to have been implemented). Longer tours, of 9-12 months, should be standard for any posts where interaction with allies or the host nation is a key feature of the appointment¹⁰⁰. As an encouragement, anyone posted on a longer tour in acting rank should be guaranteed a subsequent substantive appointment in that rank. And personnel on extended tours should have a degree of priority in the selection for subsequent appointments.

97 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, Page 3-8 Paras 315.b & 316 'the contribution of a cultural advisor proved priceless to those who had access to such individuals'. Lesson: 'Where the host nation is part of, or becomes part of, a coalition in complex stabilisation operations UK Defence investment in intellectual and practical measures to understand, and get the most from, the host nation's culture is essential.'

98 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, page 3-7 & 3-8 Paras 310.d & 314 'Tour length mismatch between US and UK can be a cause of friction' Lesson: 'Where an appointment requires the building of a complex relationship the tour length should be tailored accordingly'.

99 We understand the RAF has agreed to extend standard tour length from 4 to 6 months, but aircrew rotations are still inconsistent with both policy for other UK forces and US Army Aviation/USAF.

100 Longer tours were achieved, sometimes on a married accompanied basis, in more benign environments; for example MCC appointments are 18-months. However, the long-term psychological effect of the US 12 month standard unaccompanied tour, let alone the extended 15-month tour, is, on a historical medical basis, yet to emerge fully - 15 month tours have at least ended.

805. Campaign Reviews. The short-term horizon and rapid turnover of UK in-theatre commanders made it more likely that the significance of key events would be missed. (Obvious examples were the illegal detention of UK forces by Iraqi police in Basra in September 2005, the bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra in 2006 or the US decision to surge in January 2007.) It seems that operational-level reassessments were carried out only when prompted by external triggers (such as Operation Charge of the Knights). Greater continuity of in-theatre commanders, and strengthening of their campaign role, would make it easier to identify triggers for formal campaign reviews.

806. Equipment. Inevitably, given the timescales of Defence procurement, the majority of the equipment used in the initial stages of Op TELIC stemmed from the Cold War. A positive exception was the RAF, whose involvement in continuous operations in the region since 1990 had at least ensured that the majority of their equipment was both climatically suitable and interoperable with the US. Furthermore, the provision of the right equipment and capabilities in sufficient time was sensitive to the tensions in political and military planning timescales detailed in the previous Chapter. While the subsequent re-establishment of the ACDS (Log Ops) post and COM(L)'s role in formulating a coherent, 2-year forward requirement has gone a long way to resolving these issues, it cannot be a panacea. It is, and will remain, impractical and uneconomic to procure equipment capable of operating in all climatic and geographical conditions, let alone against all threats. There is therefore a requirement for a system which can modify existing equipment for specific campaigns, or even phases of a campaign, and which can procure equipment at short notice where existing equipment is unsuitable and cannot be modified. The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) arrangement proved essential in Op TELIC, but experience from Iraq suggests it could be improved in 2 respects:

- a. At the outset, the need to delay the placing of orders for new kit or the modification of existing kit in order to avoid a public perception that war was inevitable put the procurement system under pressure – even though the requirements had all been identified and, in practical terms, could have been met in time. The situation was exacerbated by an inadequate supply tracking system. If a mechanism cannot be identified to allow early commitment to UORs without exposing it to premature public visibility, preliminary triggers are required for certain types of essential expenditure.

b. Once Op TELIC was underway and new requirements were identified, changing priorities inevitably created a reactive approach to capability. Creating a capability amounts to more than issuing equipment; it involves training, support and other lines of development. However, the UOR process, at least early on, did not produce equipment for UK forces as rapidly¹⁰¹ as its US equivalent, nor in sufficient quantity to meet training demands. As a result some troops first encountered new equipment in theatre. This situation improved markedly later in the campaign, but weaknesses in the system persist. We believe these to be partly due to the limitations of the UOR guidelines¹⁰², partly a consequence of the short-term view from theatre of their requirements, partly industrial reality, and partly an institutional reluctance to admit that the existing solution was not working in a fast-changing operational environment. While the MoD gains much from the UOR system, the rules can constrain the operational requirement, particularly in an enduring campaign. There is an obvious incentive to categorise equipment as UOR in order to qualify for Treasury Reserve funding rather than from the MoD core budget. This can skew the requirement, running the risk that the short-term fix undermines a longer-term solution. And in turn, this can undermine the adaptability which might allow the equipment to fill both the immediate requirement of an operation and a wider and more enduring defence need. The need for access to Reserve funding to meet the unforeseen requirements of specific operations remains, but the distinction between UOR and normal defence procurement needs to be re-examined in order to avoid artificiality¹⁰³. We understand this review is already underway.

807. Implications of Applicability of UOR Equipment to Wider Operations. The UORs for Operations TELIC and HERRICK have dramatically changed the way in which the individual Serviceman is equipped, particularly in terms of weapon systems and protection. Two lessons emerge.

a. First, the weight of personal equipment, particularly the protective element, has increased with the inevitable consequences for agility. As the Public Accounts Committee

101 In March 2009 MNF-I celebrated the delivery into theatre of the 10,000th MRAP (Mine-Resistant Armour Protected Vehicle).

102 2009DIN04-025.

103 DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, page 5-7 paras 516 d & 518 'Core equipment funded by the Defence budget, with funding for UORs augmented by the Treasury Reserve 103, might make perfect sense for the relatively short, non-enduring operations envisaged by SDR. However, trying to fund an enduring operation such as Op TELIC from additional Treasury funds has become much more difficult. Lesson: 'The manner in which the Defence and the Equipment Programme is funded needs to be examined to ensure it can react appropriately to enduring operations and changing operational priorities, whilst maintaining and protecting a core programme'.

has noted, we must now concentrate on “reducing the weight of more complex equipment, including electronic counter-measures”.

b. Secondly, on return from operations it is difficult to expect the Serviceman to revert to obsolete equipment in training. Once it has been agreed that equipment procured under a UOR has general applicability, enough should be procured and supported to enable use by units and formations in their training cycle. This is a vexed question, but clearly it is important to deduce what capabilities identified during Op TELIC remain appropriate for Op HERRICK and beyond. For example, the relationship between FRES and the vehicles procured for Op TELIC needs to be assessed in this light, but the lesson is much broader: complete capability areas were under-used, either because the capability was not required or because it was provided by the US.

808. Regeneration of Capability. Regenerating force elements was identified as a priority immediately after offensive operations into Iraq in 2003; but, the timescales which were agreed at that time have continuously slipped¹⁰⁴, not least because the assumption at that time was that UK would not commit more than at small-scale in Afghanistan until the commitment in Iraq reduced below medium scale. We need to be brutally honest about regeneration timescales, particularly when we are already exceeding Defence Planning Assumptions on operations. In this respect it might be helpful to enshrine regeneration timescales in Defence Planning Assumptions, to ensure that the process is properly resourced.

809. Logistic Aspects of Campaigning. During the initial deployment, problems with supply were inevitable given the timescale – especially challenging for procurement and deployment decisions – and the lack of asset tracking CIS. The re-establishment of ACDS(Logistic Operations), disestablished under SDR, rightly raised the profile of logistics within MoD Head Office. Apart from the strategic air bridge, which is discussed below, there appear to have been relatively few major lessons during the period 2004-9. There appear to be a number of reasons for this. The subordination of the Chiefs of Materiel to CDM with the creation of DE&S was a welcome move; the theatre, not least in comparison with Afghanistan, was benign in terms of ports, access and consumption rates; and the link between MoD and the front line in Iraq was championed by CoM(Land), ensuring that issues which had dogged the initial phase of Op TELIC 1 (before the creation of DE&S) were gripped early and effectively. The planning and

¹⁰⁴ COS agreed regeneration of SSF I capability is currently 2011 with no timelines for MS/LS.

execution of the withdrawal of UK forces from Iraq, using the JFLogC as the controlling headquarters, was an exemplary operation, if resource-heavy and unexpectedly benign, assisted by an improved asset tracking system. But even at that late stage, only 71% of demands from Iraq met supply chain targets, and logistic CIS in general remained inadequate. The lack of achievable targets and reliable information systems, compounded by turnover of personnel in theatre and the volatility of demand, created continual friction. Op TELIC showed that 'just-in-time' logistics, designed for a more benign environment, does not make for a credible, robust logistic supply system. Again, we endorse the PAC comment that MoD should, "within the next two years, address the deficiencies in its logistics information systems"¹⁰⁵.

Three specific areas of logistics on Operation TELIC are worthy of highlighting:

a. Strategic Air Bridge. The ageing air transport fleet was severely tested during the deployment phase of Op TELIC. While capable of maintaining operations during the stability phase, it has creaked continuously since the requirement to support Afghanistan was added in 2006. Despite welcome increases in the size of the C-17 fleet, the pressure has not eased, and has been exacerbated by the requirement for repatriation of fatalities and for Defensive Aid Suites to be fitted to aircraft in theatre.

b. Medical. One advantage of coalition membership was an ability to draw on US medical lessons and medical support¹⁰⁶. The key medical care issue highlighted by the outgoing Surgeon General¹⁰⁷ was pain management, which needs to be harmonised throughout the casualty chain. Mental illness, re-integration into civil society and associated societal problems¹⁰⁸ also remain to be addressed¹⁰⁹. The Department of Health expectation that the MoD will resource such an approach is countered by MoD's belief that the NHS should pick up the bill. We endorse the PAC's recommendation¹¹⁰ that MoD must build on work to achieve a common cross-government approach to the care of ex-Service personnel in society.

¹⁰⁵ House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 'Support to High Intensity Operations', 54th report of session 2008-09 dated 13 October 2009, Conclusions and Recommendations, Paragraph 3.

¹⁰⁶ "The provision of medical support, including life-saving treatment at the front line, has been a particular success." Ibid, Summary.

¹⁰⁷ Lieutenant General Lilleywhite, interviewed for the British Legion magazine, October 2009.

¹⁰⁸ Eg "20,000 ex-soldiers in prison, on parole or serving community sentences", The Week, 3 Oct 09

¹⁰⁹ Lieutenant General Lilleywhite (op cit): "We have not persuaded people that we have got the right treatment in place or that we can successfully manage it. We have more work to do."

¹¹⁰ PAC HC895, Conclusions and Recommendations, Paragraph 9.

c. Health & Safety at Work. A substantial proportion¹¹¹ of UK personnel killed or injured in Iraq were non-battle incidents. This prompted work commissioned by 2nd PUS¹¹², but does not yet appear to have produced an acceptable level of improvement in Afghanistan¹¹³.

810. Measurement of Campaign Effectiveness (Metrics). The inconsistent approach to metrics, both across the coalition and across UK departments, compounded campaign inconsistency and made the lessons process less objective. There was no apparent connection to the Balanced Scorecard designed to inform COS and Defence Ministers of operational success¹¹⁴. A more rigorous and co-ordinated approach to measuring campaign progress, especially if combined with greater continuity of in-theatre commanders, should have identified campaign tipping points. Conversely, campaign reassessments that were externally triggered (such as the actions taken following Op Charge of the Knights) could have been anticipated or avoided by a better understanding of campaign progress. Objective measures of campaign effectiveness, linked to strategic objectives and commanders' intent, are an essential component of a campaign plan¹¹⁵.

111 43 killed + 1603 wounded.

112 Operational Safety Paper, Defence Ministerial Committee, 22 Jul 09

113 "Non Battle Injuries (H&S or disease) were still too high in theatre, despite recent improvements, and there was a need to bring new focus to both behaviours and how Defence manages the risk." Minutes of OPCOS (COS (OPCOS) 04/10) dated 19 Jan 10.

114 Those charged with producing metrics believe their product was designed to give credence to existing strategy rather than to inform decisions on courses of action.

115 The NATO metrics for ISAF have been criticised for their 'input' as opposed to 'output' nature; nevertheless, they at least provide a picture of campaign progress over time in a way which is difficult to discern from Iraq.

IRAQ STUDY TEAM OBSERVATIONS

CHAPTER 9

CAPACITY FOR ADAPTATION/MENTAL AGILITY

- **In comparison with the US, the UK military was complacent and slow in recognising and adapting to changing circumstances. It took too long to update our thinking on how to counter the type of insurgency encountered in Iraq, following a relatively benign decade of peacekeeping in Northern Ireland and the Balkans.**
- **MoD is good at identifying lessons, but less good at learning them. There is no cross-Government or coalition lessons process. The UK has an inconsistent approach to learning lessons, both within the MoD and across Whitehall.**

901. Doctrine. Good doctrine is an essential constituent of a counter-insurgency operation. The US military may claim to have had further to come than UK, having less experience of COIN and having disavowed nation-building. However, the US recognised the changing circumstances in Iraq and overhauled its thinking and its doctrine more rapidly than the UK¹¹⁶. Although the US was able to allocate substantial resources to doctrinal development, US military leadership was instrumental in driving through change. There is also a difference in the relative attitudes to doctrine: the US military views doctrine as direction; our experience during Op TELIC suggests that UK views doctrine at best as guidance, at worst as optional background reading. The US are quite simply better at applying its doctrine than the UK.

902. Lessons. The Annexes to this report provide ample evidence that the MoD is diligent at *identifying* lessons, although the delay between Volumes 3 and 4 of TELIC lessons reports¹¹⁷ does not reflect well on the lessons process at the strategic level. And although the MOD lessons system may appear *prima facie* better than that of any other government department, the incomplete nature of the MoD lessons system has been compounded by the MoD's 3 changes of IT systems (CHOTS to JOCS to DII) and locations (re-cant into Main Building in

¹¹⁶ DOC Operation TELIC Lessons Study Volume 4, Page 7-5 & 7-7 Paras 709 & 712. US COIN doctrine develop(ed) rapidly, taking into account the specific challenges the US forces had been facing in Iraq for some time. Some commentators have argued that the UK should have reacted to the specific set of circumstances they faced in Basra in a similar manner. Lesson: 'To avoid doctrine falling behind the dynamic and complex contemporary operational environment requires flexible doctrine, with regular and agile review processes to match.'

¹¹⁷ A similar gap exists for HERRICK lessons.

2004) during Op TELIC. The lack of effective cross-departmental secure IT systems, in theatre and in Whitehall, also affects the ability of Government as a whole to work efficiently on the comprehensive planning, delivery and management of operations which require a whole government approach. Indeed, the ever increasing volume of information associated with progressing a lesson from "identified" to "learned" is problematic. We are institutionally unable to quickly and efficiently analyse identified lessons, and slow to draw out underlying threads and themes. This limits the pace of Defence adaptation, particularly at the strategic level¹¹⁸. Furthermore, the classification of the MoD lessons process, even when this is found to be justified, can reinforce an impression of a desire to limit embarrassment^{119,120}. Moreover, analysis of Annex D suggests that, at the tactical level, our service personnel and their commanders are comfortable with honesty. The higher up the chain of command, the less this laudable openness seems apparent during Op TELIC.

118 The inability of Defence to identify a suitable sponsor and adequately prioritise sufficient resources to carry out critical upgrades to the Defence-wide lessons database (DLIMS – Defence Lessons Identified Management System) is perhaps an illustration of where the importance of learning lessons and the link to success on operations, is not widely understood.

119 Chairman HCDC letter to SoS Defence 13 Dec 07 on the Fulton Report: "We are concerned that the very restricted distribution of the Fulton Report has limited its value as a vehicle for ensuring that lessons are learned. We feel that it will be difficult for personnel, at all levels, to appreciate the reasons for, and the importance of, the changes being proposed, without understanding the context"

120 HC181 dated 14 Dec 07, Paragraph 13: "The decision not to publish the Fulton Report has led some people to conclude that the whole thing was a whitewash. We can assure the House that this is not the case."

SUMMARY OF LESSONS MATERIAL ON IRAQ

Report	Terms of Reference	Author	Duration	Comments
Vol 1: The Major Combat Phase	Routine review into military operations	Directorate of Operational Capability	Up to 01 August 2003	Secret UK Eyes Only
Vol 2: The Emergence of Insurgency	Routine review into military operations	Directorate of Operational Capability	01 August 2003 – 30 November 2004	Secret UK Eyes Only
Vol 3: From Counter Insurgency to Iraqi Self reliance	Routine review into military operations	Directorate of Operational Capability	01 December 2004 – 28 February 2006	Secret UK Eyes Only
Operations in Iraq – An Analysis from the Land Perspective	Reviews the events of the campaign up to 1 May 2003. It concentrates on land and land-air issues.	Army	Op TELIC 1 (to August 2003) – published March 2005	Restricted
Stability Operations in Iraq (Op TELIC 2-5) – An Analysis from a Land Perspective	Analysis of the period following the major combat operations phase of Op TELIC, known variously as Phase IV, or Op TELIC 2-5, which ran from May 2003 to 31 January 2005	Army	Op TELIC 2-5 (May 2003 to 31 January 2005) – published July 2006	Restricted
Operations in Iraq – First Reflections	To set out an account of the operation to date, and provide some early indicators of lessons for the	TELIC Lessons Learned Team	Published July 2003	Public

	future			
Operations in Iraq – Lessons for the Future	Presents the conclusions of analysis of the Iraq operation to the end of the combat phase and the early post-conflict period, and identifies the key lessons we can draw for the future	TELIC Lessons Learned Team	Published December 2003	Public
Fulton Report	Operational circumstances, consequences and implications of the detention of the 15 RN personnel by Iran in March 2007	MOD	March 2007 – published July 2007	Secret UK Eyes Only LIMDIS
The Aitken Report	Investigation into UK Cases of Deliberate Abuse and Unlawful Killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004	Army	2003 and early 2004 – published 25 January 2008	Public
HCDC - Periodic reports on Op TELIC / HMG involvement in Iraq	Lessons of Iraq	HCDC	16 March 2004 (HMG response 8 June 2004)	Public
	Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post Conflict Operations	HCDC	24 March 2005 (HMG response 27 July 2005)	Public
	UK Operations in Iraq	HCDC	10 August 2006 (HMG response 18 October 2006)	Public
	UK Land Operations in Iraq	HCDC	3 December 2007 (HMG response 21	Public

			February 2008)	
	The Iran Hostages Incident: the lessons learned	HCDC	14 December 2007 (26 March 2008)	Public
	UK Operations in Iraq and the Gulf	HCDC	22 July 2008 (HMG response 29 October 2008)	Public
	The Comprehensive Approach	HCDC	Publication planned for Autumn 2009	Public
Foreign Affairs Committee – periodic reports on HMG involvement in Iraq	(For example) The Decision To Go To War in Iraq	FAC	7 July 2003	Public
NAO reports, including: 1) Op TELIC – United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq	NAO Audit into major combat operations in Iraq	NAO	Published December 2003	Public
2) Support to High Intensity Operations	NAO report into MOD's support to high intensity operations focusing on: equipment, logistics, pre-deployment training and support to personnel	NAO	Published May 2009	Public
Board of Inquiry – CH46E Sea Knight	A BOI is conducted by the MOD for the purpose of	BOI (Navy)	Crash 21 Mar 03	Restricted Staff

helicopter crash	establishing the circumstances surrounding serious accidents and incidents ¹²¹			
Board of inquiry – Sgt Roberts	As above	BOI (Army)	Killed 24 Mar 03	Restricted Staff
Board of Inquiry – LCoH Hull	As above	BOI (Army)	Killed 28 Mar 03	Secret UK Eyes Only
Board of Inquiry – LCpls Allbutt and Clark	As above	BOI (Army)	Killed 24 Mar 04	Restricted Staff
Board of Inquiry – Hercules XV179 crash	As above	BOI (RAF)	Crash 30 Jan 05	Secret UK Eyes Only
Board of Inquiry – Capt Norton	As above	BOI (Army)	Injured 24 Jul 05	Restricted Staff
Board of Inquiry – LBdr Parkinson	As above	BOI (Army)	Injured 12 Sep 06	Restricted Staff
Lessons captured on the Defence Lessons Identified Management System	For example, PJHQ J7 Lessons Team reports			
Review of the Basra Provincial Reconstruction Team	Review of performance and recommendations for improvements	Stabilisation Unit	3 September 2008	Restricted Staff (point of contact – Redacted Stabilisation Unit)

¹²¹ The process for conducting MOD BOIs has evolved over time. Joint Service Publication (JSP) 832, Guide to Service Inquiries, Chapter 1 outlines in broad terms how BOIs should be conducted as of Oct 2008.

Civilian-Military Relations in Basra: Lessons Identified	Lessons from current and past 2 years of civ-mil relations and recommendations for other operational environments	Stabilisation Unit/Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre	8 April 2009	Restricted (point of contact – <i>Redacted</i> Stabilisation Unit)
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LIST OF LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES ON IRAQ

<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lesson</u>	<u>Source</u>
TEL.0.1	<u>Personal Relationships</u>	Personal relationships <i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.2	<u>Each Coalition Operation will be Different</u>	Each coalition operation will be different. <i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.3	<u>UK and US Machinery of Government</u>	The misalignment between UK and US machinery of Government and differences in political/military chain of command structures encouraged incoherence and duplication of effort. <i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.4	<u>Consultation with the US</u>	In future, effective consultation with the US will require a coordinated multi-disciplined approach across the political, military, diplomatic and intelligence spectra. <i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.5	<u>Early Cross-Government Engagement</u>	Early cross-Government engagement is essential in strategic planning, not just for combat, but also for the transition to post-conflict and peace support operations. Although informal processes enable the exchange of information, they lack executive authority and accountability. Consideration should be given to strengthening the formal mechanisms by which cross-Government endorsed campaign end states and strategic objectives can be developed for planning and contingency purposes.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.6	<u>Tier 4 Exercises Involving Ministers across Government</u>	The re-introduction of regular Tier 4 exercises involving Ministers across Government, similar to the former WINTEX series, would expose OGDs to military doctrine and planning and build wider Government confidence in, and understanding of, the military planning process at the	Doc TELIC Vol 1

		strategic and grand strategic levels.	
TEL 0.7	<u>Strategic Estimate Process</u>	The Strategic Estimate process needs to be completed more formally by MOD, to form the basis for strategic direction to PJHQ to conduct operational planning and produce a campaign plan.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.8	<u>Secure CIS Connectivity across Whitehall</u>	Further secure CIS connectivity across Whitehall should be developed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.9	<u>Delegation of Funding for Quick Impact Projects</u>	Delegation of sufficient funding to the in-theatre commander for Quick Impact Projects proved valuable during Phase III of the operation and should be formalised for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.10	<u>Involvement of Industry Earlier in the Planning Process</u>	The wider involvement of industry earlier in the planning process should be authorised in order to facilitate timely planning for delivery of stocks and UORs.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.11	<u>FCO/DFID/MOD/HMT - A Joint Approach</u>	FCO/DFID/MOD/HMT should develop a joint approach to managing post-conflict operations. The regular embedding of DFID/FCO officials in large-scale military exercises geared to such operations should also be considered. This work could also be developed with the US in order to improve the Pentagon's approach to nation-building.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.12	<u>Responsibility for Policy and Expertise on Post-Conflict Matters</u>	Within MOD, responsibility for developing policy and retaining expertise on post-conflict matters and reconstruction should be formally assigned to a directorate within the Policy and Commitment Area.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.13	<u>Traditional Allies and Less Familiar</u>	The UK must be prepared to operate with both traditional allies and less familiar partners. Our forces must be so organised, trained and resourced that the requirement for interoperability with our partners will [not]	Doc TELIC Vol 1
	<u>Partners</u>	compromise our overall operational effectiveness.	
TEL 0.14	<u>Sea Basing</u>	The possibilities offered by sea-basing for sustained reach and agility need to be articulated further and developed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.15	<i>Redacted</i>	<i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.16	<u>Existing and Potential International Partners</u>	The UK should continue to cultivate both existing and potential international partners in emerging trouble spots in order to ensure access and should be prepared to include them in the planning process as early as possible.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.17	<u>Military Defence and Liaison Staffs</u>	In order to play an integral role in the strategic campaign planning process, the Military Defence and Liaison staffs require appropriate and timely access to relevant information and assumptions.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.18	<u>MOD Regional Directorates</u>	MOD Regional Directorates should be involved in the strategic planning for any operation, so that their expertise can be utilised to influence other countries to the UK's	Doc TELIC Vol 1

		benefit.	
TEL 0.19	<u>Involvement of MOD Regional Directorates in Strategic Planning</u>	The benefit of involving MOD Regional Directorates in strategic planning should be reflected in the restructuring of the Policy and Commitments areas, in order to establish a more structured liaison between the defence relations area and strategic planner.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.20	<u>Existing ICP Procedures</u>	Existing ICP procedures should not be neglected and Chairman UKCICC(H) should be directed to coordinate operations within the Home Base as appropriate.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.21	<u>Information Campaign C2</u>	A new paradigm is required for the command and control of the Information Campaign, in order to improve strategic direction, balance and longer-term vision.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.22	<u>Cross-Government Consultation and</u>	Effective cross-Government consultation and coordination are essential through every phase from pre-conflict, through conflict, to the long-term challenge of the post-conflict phase if an Information Campaign	Doc TELIC Vol 1
	<u>Coordination</u>	(IC) is to be successful. There is a continuing need for the permanent establishment of more formal cross-Government endorsement of the IC (including both the provision of a recognised and routine	
		lead from across Whitehall and the commitment of resources). Coordination mechanisms with potential coalition partners should be reviewed in order to ensure the delivery of a consistent and synchronised message.	
TEL 0.23	<u>New Paradigm for Force Generation</u>	A new, more dynamic paradigm is needed that can effectively generate appropriate, trained and equipped forces at the necessary readiness to meet the requirements of the defence of the UK and its interests worldwide.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.24	<u>Force Generation - Political Requirements</u>	Military planning and force generation processes need to be more responsive to late and changing political requirements.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.25	<u>Unpredictable Nature of Emerging Operations</u>	Given the unpredictable nature of emerging operations and political imperatives, planning and readiness assumptions should be revisited, to identify a methodology that is consistent with an expeditionary strategy.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.26	<u>Planning Assumptions and</u>	Planning assumptions and readiness profiles for RN assets, including the ability for a CVS to deploy in the fixed-wing aviation role, should be reviewed in order to meet the requirements of a balanced maritime	Doc TELIC Vol 1
	<u>Readiness Profiles for RN Assets</u>	requirements of a balanced maritime package in support of expeditionary operations.	
TEL 0.27	<u>JFLogC and Other Joint Assets</u>	Particular attention should be paid to the JFLogC and other Joint assets to determine where the planning responsibility for their force generation and manpower attribution lies.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.28	<u>LAND Pairing Mechanism</u>	The LAND pairing mechanism should be reviewed, to ensure that it remains fully consistent as a means of force generation with the requirements of expeditionary and enduring operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL.0.29	<u>Land-Based Air Refuelling and ISR Support to Maritime Operations</u>	The requirement for land-based Air Refuelling (AR) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) support to maritime operations should be considered in the development of CONOPS for the future UK carrier force.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.30	<u>Limited 'Pool' of Joint Enablers</u>	The operational risk inherent in reliance on a limited 'pool' of Joint enablers that cannot support more than one deployed formation should be considered in more detail.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.31	<u>Deployable Team to Conduct and Coordinate all In-Theatre Serious Incident Investigations</u>	The establishment of a deployable multi-disciplined team with the expertise to conduct and coordinate all in-theatre serious incident investigations and repatriation activities should be considered further.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.32	<u>Mobilisation of Reserves to Compensate for Over-Stretch and Under-Manning</u>	The mobilisation of Reserves to compensate for over-stretch and under-manning, and the associated adverse impact on the provision of formed unit support, should be examined further.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.33	<u>Existing Legislation for the Mobilisation of Reservists</u>	Existing legislation for the mobilisation of reservists (RFA 96) is not in keeping with current Service doctrine of expeditionary operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.34	<u>Timing of the Decision to Mobilise Reserves</u>	The timing of the decision to mobilise Reserves, should be informed by the notification and pre-deployment training requirements, particularly for 'pinch point' trades.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.35	<u>Balance between Regular and Reserve Forces</u>	The balance between Regular and Reserve forces for key enabling capabilities should be re-examined in order to reduce dependence on mobilisation during planning and preparation for operations. Where	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.36	<u>Value of Reserves in All Phases of an Operation</u>	Regular capability is unavailable, readiness and mobilisation criteria should be adjusted to reflect this.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.37	<u>Balance of Regular and Reservist Medical Personnel</u>	The value of Reserves in all phases of an operation, including post-conflict, needs greater recognition. Furthermore, early planning and guidance on an operation should enable more precise targeting of individuals, especially if there was a centrally held database of information relating to individual's specialist military and civilian skills and capabilities.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.38	<u>Disciplinary Action Against Reservists</u>	The balance of Regular and Reservist medical personnel requires review, taking into account the necessary balance between the NHS and Reservist commitments.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.39	<u>Application of RFA 96 in Channel Islands and Isle of Man</u>	Policy and procedures are required for disciplinary action against Reservists who 'fail to report'.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.40	<u>TA Structures</u>	The applicability of RFA 96 to residents of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man should be reviewed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
		The ability of TA units to prepare for operational deployment, as formed units, should be investigated. TA structures need to be carefully considered within the Future Army Structures work.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL 0.41	<u>Joint Reserves Passport Policy</u>	A Joint Reserves passport policy is required, in line with Regular forces.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.42	<u>Mobilisation Processes</u>	Although call-out notice aspirations were met for the second tranche of Reserves, mobilisation processes should be reviewed, including call-out notice and Readiness State definitions.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.43	<u>Examination of Reservist Issues</u>	Reservist issues will need careful and sensitive handling and should be further examined after de-mobilisation, when employers and employees have had time to reflect on the experience.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.44	<u>Policy for Regular Reserves</u>	In the light of the disappointing response for Operation TELIC, including the absence of any effective tracking mechanism, a review of the policy for Regular Reserves is required, to determine their utility for operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.45	<u>The Momentum of the Sa BRE</u>	The momentum of the SaBRE campaign should be maintained by Ministers and senior commanders, using corporate communications and possibly the relevant Service Presentation Teams, in order to	Doc TELIC Vol 1
		retain employer support as an essential element of future mobilisation, including for subsequent Operation TELIC deployments	
TEL 0.46	<u>Joint Approach to Mobilisation</u>	A more Joint approach to mobilisation, including consistent procedures wherever possible, should be developed and resourced with the necessary staff.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.47	<u>Provision of Advice to PJHQ on Reserve Issues</u>	The process of providing advice to PJHQ on Reserve issues needs review.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.48	<u>Consultation with the Principal Personnel Officers</u>	Consultation with the Principal Personnel Officers (PPOs) should be initiated with a view to establishing the RTMC as a tri-Service mobilisation centre for Reserves, OGDs, MOD civilians, civilian contractors and civilian media personnel.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.49	<u>FLC Support to PJHQ</u>	PJHQ and the FLCs, together with the DLO, should review their understanding by which the former is supported by the latter during the planning phase of an operation. The reason for the success of the	Doc TELIC Vol 1
		Away Team' concept should be analysed and recorded for future reference and action.	
TEL 0.50	<u>Defence Augmentation Policy</u>	Greater understanding and utilisation of Defence Augmentation policy and procedures are required, along with improved scrutiny to ensure that FLCs are not being asked to provide what cannot be resourced.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.51	<u>Key Civilian Augmentation Posts</u>	The resourcing of key civilian augmentation posts within HQs, including those from OGDs and NGOs should be improved.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.52	<u>Generation and Deployment of Manpower</u>	The generation and deployment of manpower needs to be controlled so that HQs and units are augmented in a way which ensures the appropriate distribution of expertise	Doc TELIC Vol 1

		according to operational priorities.	
TEL.0.53	<u>Coalition Integration</u>	In the absence of coalition operational experience similar to that of the RAF through Operation RESINATE, it is essential that suitable training opportunities be resourced to maintain the momentum of coalition integration.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.54	<u>Full Mission Rehearsal for Coalition Operations</u>	A high priority should be afforded to a full mission rehearsal for coalition operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.55	<u>Integrated, All-Arms and Joint Training Opportunities</u>	Additional emphasis needs to be placed on integrated, All-Arms and Joint training opportunities in order to develop a greater inter-component ethos and to provide additional training for Joint commanders.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.56	<u>Tier 2 and 3 Expeditionary Exercises</u>	Operation TELIC confirmed the essential benefit of Tier 2 and 3 expeditionary exercises in demanding environments, such as Exercise SAIF SAREEA II in Oman, where logistic support can be comprehensively tested.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.57	<u>Balance Between 'Virtual' and Reality Training</u>	The retention of a sensible balance between 'virtual' and reality training - 'simulation and stimulation' - is required in modern training, in order to maintain the ability to fight.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.58	<u>Training Regimes</u>	Training regimes should continue to prepare forces for the rigour of expeditionary operations in arduous environments.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.59	<u>Basic Language and Cultural Training</u>	The implementation of large-scale basic language and cultural training across the Services and across all ranks should be considered.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.60	<u>Interpreters for Operations</u>	A mechanism is required to produce large numbers of good quality interpreters for operations, at short notice.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.61	<u>Publications about the Languages and Cultures in the Theatre of Operations</u>	Early on in the Joint Estimate process a Statement of Requirement (SOR) for publications about the languages and cultures in the theatre of operations should be identified. These products need to be delivered in a timely manner to all Fes.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.62	<u>Capacity for Expeditionary Operations</u>	If the UK is to maintain a capacity for expeditionary operations and power projection, it will have to conduct collective training for high readiness, support and enabling forces, based on the likely scenarios in which it is intended to fight. This should include improved training opportunities for All-Arms urban warfare.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.63	<u>Continuation Training for FRC Units</u>	The provision of continuation training for FRC units, particularly those in their HR year, must be reassessed and enabled.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.64	<u>PSO/IS Training</u>	PSO/IS training needs to be included in the METL(L) and resourced.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.65	<u>Land Forces - In Theatre Training Readiness States and Collective</u>	UK Land forces assumptions on In-Theatre Training (ITT), readiness states and collective performance levels should be reviewed against the potential future requirement for	Doc TELIC

	<u>Performance Levels</u>	near simultaneous deployment and employment.	Vol 1
TEL.0.66	<u>Embedded Training Teams</u>	Embedded, experienced training teams provided useful support to units deployed to theatre and offer a role model for the future.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.67	<u>Responsibility for In Theatre Training</u>	Clarification is required on the responsibility for In-Theatre Training (ITT).	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.68	<u>Ammunition and UORs - Arrival in Time</u>	Ammunition and UORs should arrive in time for personnel to train with them and become familiar with their use.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.69	<u>Last Minute UOR Equipment</u>	The dependence on last minute UOR equipment should be minimised. Similarly, the requirement for training stocks of such equipment for follow-on forces needs to be recognised, and, where necessary.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
	-	RSOI plans should incorporate the requirement to deliver Theatre-specific training.	
TEL.0.70	<u>Commander Mobile Sea Training</u>	The Commander Mobile Sea Training concept offers a flexible approach to pre-deployment training, potentially more attuned to the needs of the UK's expeditionary posture, since it can be conducted en route	Doc TELIC Vol 1
	<u>Concept</u>	to theatre. However, it cannot be a substitute for other, more basic aspects of Operational Sea Training.	
TEL.0.71	<u>Work-Up and ITT for Commando Units</u>	The requirement for work-up and ITT for Cdr units should be reviewed, to ensure readiness assumptions remain valid for near simultaneous deployment and employment.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.72	<u>Priority for Training for ATG Units</u>	Priority for training for ATG units deploying to theatre should be reviewed, to ensure that where opportunities arise en route they can be utilised.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.73	<u>Full Mission Rehearsal for Future Air Campaigns</u>	A high priority should be afforded to a full mission rehearsal for future air campaigns.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.74	<u>Improved Training Opportunities at Tier 1, 2 and 3</u>	Improved training opportunities at Tier 1, 2 and 3 are required, in order to improve Air/Land integration.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.75	<u>Reduced Time for ITT</u>	The nature of expeditionary operations, allied to the probability of late political approval to deploy forces, reduces time available for ITT, putting a premium on high quality and realistic pre-deployment training	Doc TELIC Vol 1
	-	for forces assigned to specialised missions.	
TEL.0.76	<u>Individual Training Standards</u>	The Individual Training Standards and the currency of training for Reserves should be investigated.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.77	<u>Embedding Lessons Teams</u>	Past experience has shown that, in operation of this scale and complexity, Lessons teams should be embedded within the staffs fighting the campaign, in order to gain first hand evidence, promote previous	Doc TELIC Vol 1

		best practice and allow reach-back to relevant date.	
TEL.0.78	<u>Understanding of PSO/IS</u>	At the political/military level, current staff talks, protocols and existing links with the US and probable Coalition partners should be utilised to improve the understanding of PSO/IS.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.79	<u>Availability of Recuperation Requirement Earlier in the Planning Process</u>	Greater detail of recuperation requirements, including timelines and force elements at readiness (FE @ R), needs to be available earlier in the planning process.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.80	<u>JRRF Concept Paper</u>	The JRRF Concept Paper should be revised to reflect recuperation priorities, and should include JRRF FE structures and readiness states.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.81	<u>Asset Tracking Capability</u>	A total asset tracking capability would, inter alia, facilitate the recuperation process (Action:	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.82	<u>Longer-Term Impact of Operation TELIC</u>	The longer-term impact of Operation TELIC on morale, retention, and thus recuperation, must be kept under review.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.83	<u>Logistics Advice to the Strategic Planning Process</u>	Building on the recent establishment of ACDS(Log Ops), further work is required to ensure timely and accurate logistics advice to the strategic planning process.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.84	<u>Joint Logistic Planning</u>	Robust Joint Logistic Planning Assumptions (JLPAs) proved invaluable in enabling shortfalls between stock and likely activity levels to be calculated. Consideration should be given to their	Doc TELIC Vol 1
	<u>Assumptions</u>	development as a formal planning tool.	
TEL.0.85	<u>SUSTAT</u>	The SUSTAT should be produced as early as possible, to enable units to provision in time to the correct levels and to allow the DLO to configure stocks and assess the sustainability requirements.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.86	<u>SUSTAT - Methodology and Procedures</u>	The methodology and procedures in producing the SUSTAT should take account of the DPAs and Logistic Equipment Support Planning Assumptions (LESPAs) in terms of scale and readiness.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.87	<u>Utility of Pre-Defined Deployment Stocks</u>	The utility of pre-defined deployment stocks that could be delivered straight to theatre to meet up with deploying units should be examined.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.88	<u>Likely HNS Capability</u>	More accurate information and assessments on likely HNS capability are required, to inform logistics planning. HNS is not necessarily the simplest, cheapest or most effective solution and, in an expeditionary strategy, over-reliance should be avoided.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.89	<u>Definition of a 'Day's Worth of Stock'</u>	The definition of a 'day's worth of stock' (DOS) should be re-assessed, to take into account the requirements of expeditionary deployment and manoeuvre warfare.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.90	<u>Terminology for Logistic Stock Requirements</u>	Terminology for Logistic stock requirements that is easily understood across the Services needs to be implemented.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL.0.91	<u>Stockholdings Risk</u>	The risks taken in our stockholdings must be more robustly exposed to all those involved in operational and departmental planning.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.92	<u>Equipment Cannibalisation</u>	Continued front line concern over cannibalisation suggests a review of policy is required.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.93	<u>Aviation Spares Support</u>	The provision of aviation spares support in theatre was particularly inadequate and requires review.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.94	<u>Impact on Morale of Shortfalls in Personal Equipment</u>	The impact on morale of shortfalls in personal equipment, such as desert clothing and ECBA, should not be underestimated. Consideration should be given to including ECBA as standard personal issue.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.95	<u>Readiness and Sustainability</u>	Policy and procedures should be developed to identify the readiness and sustainability stocks required to meet the demands of an expeditionary strategy, approve the appropriate resources, and	Doc TELIC Vol 1
	<u>Stocks</u>	either procure them in advance or ensure robust and feasible surge arrangements are in place with industry. If resources are not made available, then readiness times will need to be adjusted and the risk to expeditionary capability articulated.	
TEL.0.96	<u>Stocks Held at 1st Line</u>	Stocks held at 1st Line should be subject to the same maintenance regime as those held centrally, including refreshment of out of date equipment as routine.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.97	<u>Maintenance of Perishable Equipments</u>	Work should be put in hand to ensure adequate maintenance of perishable equipments, especially relating to CBRN defence.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.98	<u>Procurement of Consumable Stocks</u>	The procedures for the procurement of consumable stocks should be clarified for the FLCs and include a means of issuing a Unit Identification Number early in the planning phase of an operation.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.99	<u>Resources Required to Enable Pre-Deployment Training</u>	A review should be conducted of all resources required to enable pre-deployment training.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.100	<u>Coordination of Operational Munitions Issues</u>	The need for a single authority to coordinate operational munitions issues, including training, should be considered.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.101	<u>Generic Unit Deployment Scales</u>	The generic unit deployment scales required to close the Rx - R0 gap should be identified.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.102	<u>Deployment Scales Held at Appropriate Readiness</u>	Deployment scales should be held at the appropriate readiness matched to the unit and be included on the Joint Force FET at the earliest opportunity. This is especially important for units held at high readiness to prevent constraints on operational capability.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.103	<u>Force Preparation Routines</u>	Force preparation routines, to ensure individual and unit readiness, should be improved across all three Services.	Doc TELIC

			Vol 1
TEL.0.104	<u>Mobilisation and Mounting Process</u>	The mobilisation and mounting process needs to be established early, with clear instructions relevant to all Services. A single focus for all aspects of mounting coordination should be considered.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.105	<u>Review of Mobilisation and Mounting Process</u>	In the light of repeated and forceful comment from LAND units and PJHQ, on this and other operations, the mounting process should be reviewed, including reconsidering the role and function of the Joint Air Movement Centre, with a view to achieving a less contentious and frustrating process for those deploying.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.106	<u>Operation of the Coupling Bridge</u>	Responsibility for, and authority over, the operation of the coupling bridge needs to be harmonised.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.107	<u>Tri-Service JFET System</u>	Consideration should be given to the development of a tri-Service JFET system, to improve the control of force generation, and deployment planning and execution.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.108	<u>Deployment System and Processes</u>	Agility and accuracy should be built into our deployment system and processes, allowing in theatre commanders more control over the JFET and desired order of arrival.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.109	<u>Excessive Stock Demands</u>	A system or warning mechanism is required to prevent units from demanding excessive stock.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.110	<u>Joint Resources Cell</u>	The establishment of a Joint Resources Cell, which could take responsibility for the allocation and prioritisation of critical items across the FLCs, should be considered.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.111	<u>Defence Logistics Operations Centre</u>	The utility of the new systems established by the DLO for Operation TELIC, in particular the Defence Logistics Operations Centra (DLOC), should be reviewed and considered for future use.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.112	<u>Availability of Sealift</u>	The balance of risk in ensuring that sufficient sealift remains available requires careful, continued consideration.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.113	<u>Availability Criteria of the Ro-Ro Vessels</u>	A review of the availability criteria of the Ro-Ro vessels procured under PFI against deployment requirements should be undertaken.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.114	<u>Airlift - Volatility of the Charter Market</u>	Notwithstanding the DLO's success in securing adequate strategic lift on this occasion, Defence Planning Assumptions should review the balance of risk evident between the in the face of political and commercial pressures and the scale and tempo of strategic lift required.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.115	<u>Ability to Secure Commercial Transport</u>	The ability to secure commercial transport in the quantities and timeframes required for expeditionary operations will need to be kept under frequent review, and by a means that does not make national intentions overt.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.116	<u>DIPCLEAR</u>	Diplomatic and military staff need to be actively engaged in security early DIPCLEAR, access and over-flight	Doc TELIC

		permission ahead of potential transits to operations.	Vol 1
TEL.0.117	<u>Joint Containerisation Policy</u>	A Joint Containerisation policy is required to inform future requirements for infrastructure, training, handling and procurement (including specialist requirements). This will also need to address asset tracking and security.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.118	<u>Flexible Ammunition Arrangements</u>	The UK needs more flexible ammunition arrangements if aspirations for rapid deployments for expeditionary operations are to be met.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.119	<u>AT CONOPS</u>	A robust AT CONOPS is required, to clarify the procedures for the C2, in-theatre tasking, appointment and control of scarce AT assets.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.120	<u>Requirement to Track Inventory from the Base to Final Point of Issue</u>	In order to produce the strategic agility necessary to maximise our capability to conduct expeditionary operations there is a requirement to track the total UK inventory from the Base to final point of issue. This process requires robust information systems (IS) that can cope with the volume and diversity of activity.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.121	<u>Defence Global Inventory IT Management System</u>	A Joint solution for a Defence global inventory IT management system is required at the earliest opportunity.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.122	<u>Joint Global Consignment Tracking System</u>	A robust, Joint global consignment tracking system is required in order to provide effective logistic support to UK expeditionary operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.123	<u>TAV(-) System</u>	The benefits afforded by the procurement of the TAV(-) system should be noted, and serious consideration should be given to retaining and/or developing the system within the wider remit of improving the visibility of assets in transit.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.124	<u>Logistic IS Architecture</u>	Arrangements for planning the logistic IS architecture in operations should be reviewed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.125	<u>Coordination between Logistic Stakeholders</u>	The requirements for joint logistic IT systems and bearers to provide effective coordination between all logistic stakeholders should be established.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.126	<u>Early Entry of JFLogC</u>	The JFLogC should be an early entry capability, capable of self-sustainment from the outset, and should support all components across the theatre of operations at all stages of an operation.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.127	<u>Logistics Concepts and Methodologies</u>	Logistics concepts and methodologies, including the role of the JFLogC, should be re-examined in the light of the experiences of Operation TELIC.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.128	<u>Sea-Based Logistics Concepts</u>	Sea-based logistics concepts of operation should be developed in order to capitalise on the benefits of sea-basing to Joint expeditionary capability.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.129	<u>Refinement of the CONDO Policy</u>	Further refinement of the CONDO policy is required. Its utility should be more widely promulgated, and where appropriate continue to be specified in CJO directives, in	Doc TELIC Vol 1

		order that it is fully exploited.	
TEL.0.130	<u>Policy on Sub-Contractors</u>	Further consideration should be given to the policy on sub-contractors.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.131	<u>Policy of Active Service</u>	Direction on invoking the policy of active service is required at an early stage of planning, with clear guidelines on any potential trigger.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.132	<u>C2 Issues for Commercial Chartered Shipping</u>	The policy, ownership and C2 issues for Commercial Chartered Shipping deployed in support of operations should be reviewed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.133	<u>Future RFA Design</u>	Future RFA design should take into account the requirements for multiple FAS operations over a sustained period and for better self-defence capabilities.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.134	<u>Redacted.</u>	<u>Redacted.</u>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.135	<u>Future RFA Designs Incorporating Improved CIS</u>	Consideration should be given to future RFA design incorporating improved CIS and, in the interim, existing vessels being provided with existing secure communications.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.136	<u>Implications of the Single Fuel Policy</u>	Procurement decisions need to take greater account of the implications of the Single Fuel Policy.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.137	<u>Procurement of Fuel Delivery Adapters</u>	Consideration should be given to the procurement of fuel delivery adapters that allow maximum interoperability with coalition partners.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.138	<u>Deployed Vehicle Operational Stock</u>	The requirement for a deployed vehicle Operational Stock (Op Stock) should be reviewed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.139	<u>Recycling of Critical Repairable Items</u>	The existing procedures for the recycling of critical repairable items during an operation should be reviewed. Where appropriate, unserviceable, repairable equipment should be given priority on transport returning from theatre, with comprehensive asset tracking.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.140	<u>Production of a Rehabilitation Directive</u>	The production of a Rehabilitation Directive should be included in standard operating procedures and considered for inclusion in Joint logistic doctrine.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.141	<u>Fleet Management Processes</u>	Fleet management processes should be reviewed to minimise unnecessary specialist theatre/role modifications.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.142	<u>MN Liaison Officers</u>	The early deployment of MN Liaison Officers who have a clear understanding of their own national plan and a direct and timely link to their relevant national chain of command, should be encouraged	Doc TELIC Vol 1
		in order to assist the UK's involvement in the RSOM of MN force elements.	

TEL.0.143	<u>C2 for MN Logistics</u>	C2 for MN logistics must be clearly defined and disseminated early, if possible prior to the employment of non-UK force elements in the JOA.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.144	<u>Potential MN Partners</u>	Potential MN partners must be engaged at an early stage, to ensure that doctrine and concepts concerning multinational logistic operations are fully understood prior to the commencement of operational planning	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.145	<u>Recovery and Roulement Processes - DLO Integration</u>	The DLO should become more fully integrated in the planning and execution of the recovery and roulement processes.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.146	<u>DLO Operations Cell - Early Deployment</u>	The requirement for the early deployment of a DLO Operations Cell should be investigated further	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.147	<u>PJHQ Deployment and Recovery Cell</u>	The composition, role and deployment of the PJHQ Deployment and Recovery Cell should be further refined for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.148	<u>Implementation of the Bio-Security Policy</u>	The procedures for the implementation of the Bio-Security policy across the Services should be reviewed, as should the methods for raising the awareness of the associated issues, including the integration of the policy into training exercises.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.149	<u>Complexities of Modern Warfare</u>	Operation TELIC underlined the need to address how the complexities of modern warfare can best be replicated in training and how to configure and use both traditional and innovative weapon systems and tactics in areas of civil settlement and infrastructure.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.150	<u>UK LCC</u>	The UK LCC may be better placed alongside the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC), to ensure the influence desired at the operational level, whilst leaving the formation (Divisional, in this case) Commander to concentrate on the tactical level.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.151	<u>Standing Land Component HQ Cadre</u>	HQ LAND should re-consider the stalled initiative to form a standing land component HQ cadre that can establish relationships with other component HQs	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.152	<u>Transition between Different Scales of Operation</u>	The transition from existing Small-Scale operations to Medium-Scale or Large-Scale war-fighting requires significant planning and staff effort and must be identified as a distinct phase in operational plans.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.153	<u>C2 Arrangements between PJHQ and Deployed HQs</u>	The UK should review C2 arrangements between PJHQ and the deployed HQs when operating as part of a coalition on a Medium or Large-Scale operation, particularly when in junior partnership with the US.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.154	<u>Transfer of Units on Ministerially Directed Operations</u>	Earlier transfer of units on Ministerially directed operations to the Operation TELIC TASKORG would have been ensured clearer C2 arrangements and greater unity of effort in the build-up to operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.155	<u>NCC HQ - OPCON of Maritime Forces</u>	The NCC HQ should have the appropriate staff to hold OPCON of Maritime forces.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL.0.156	<u>NATO Command Delegations</u>	A review of NATO Command delegations should be conducted, to make them more appropriate for expeditionary operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.157	<u>Amphibious Objective Area</u>	An Amphibious Objective Area is the traditional way of delineating areas of responsibility, but tauter implementation at the local level of evolving Joint Operating Area principles could also have simplified the task of co-ordinating forces from different components.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.158	<u>TACON</u>	TACON should be invested in the commander with the greatest ability to influence an objective area, to enable him to direct forces as required in response to a fluid situation. This is compatible with the well-established practice of supported/supporting commanders.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.159	<u>C2 Arrangements for TLAM</u>	The C2 arrangements for TLAM should be reviewed, to bring them into line with other Fires such as Storm Shadow.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.160	<u>Naval Fire Support Capabilities</u>	The RN could provide more effective support to amphibious forces if Naval Fire Support capabilities were enhanced by greater range, weight of fire and intelligent munitions.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.161	<u>Value of Armour</u>	The value of armour providing heavy direct and indirect firepower and high levels of ballistic protection when operating in support of lighter forces has been reinforced by Operation TELIC. Combined arms training for light brigades needs to be addressed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.162	<u>Armour and SP Artillery</u>	The ability to task-organise armour and SP artillery with light forces needs to be addressed, both for the current structure and for the Future Army Structure.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.163	<u>The Value of Brigade Level Reconnaissance</u>	The value of brigade level reconnaissance was borne out by the experience of all three combat brigades during Operation TELIC. Regular training between FR squadrons and supported formations needs to be formalised, to improve integration and develop doctrine.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.164	<u>UAVs and the Land Battle</u>	PHOENIX played a significant role in the Divisional Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance battle. UAVs, tactically controlled at low level and within the Land component, will continue to be essential to the land battle.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.165	<u>Joint Training</u>	More Joint training is required to foster understanding and experience in land-air integration.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.166	<u>ATO Process</u>	The ATO process was too inflexible and requires review if it is to remain relevant to high-tempo operations similar to those experienced on Operation TELIC.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.167	<u>Fire Support Coordination Line</u>	The position of the Fire Support Coordination Line needs to be calculated in the full knowledge of its effect on the delivery of Air Power.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.168	<u>Less Well Demarcated Battle-Spaces</u>	The implications of modern, less well demarcated battle-spaces, where settled civil and urban communities, vulnerable infrastructure and asymmetric fighters exist in the same areas as conventional forces, need to be factored	Doc TELIC Vol 1

		into land-air doctrine and CONOPS.	
TEL.0.169	<u>The USMC</u>	The USMC is good at integrating air power with land manoeuvre. The reasons for this should be investigated, and appropriate doctrine and SOPs developed in order to help improve UK land/air integration.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.170	<u>Value of Regular, Pre-Combat Joint Training</u>	The effective integration of land/air forces <i>Redacted</i> highlights the value of regular, pre-combat Joint training.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.171	<u>Concept for Urban Operations</u>	UK forces need to develop a concept for urban operations to determine the role for CAS and techniques require.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.172	<u>Precision Weapons with Lower Explosive Yield</u>	Precision weapons with lower explosive yield are required, to achieve the desired effect in urban environments without an unacceptable risk of collateral damage.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.173	<u>Accurate Determination of Target Locations</u>	Air and Ground forces need equipment to determine target locations with sufficient accuracy to exploit fully the capability offered by GPS-guided weapons	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.174	<u>Correct Coordinate Datums</u>	The correct coordinate datums need to be used by all Coalition forces, to improve delivery accuracy.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.175	<i>Redacted</i>	<i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.176	<i>Redacted</i>	<i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.177	<i>Redacted</i>	<i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.178	<u>Vulnerability of BH</u>	The vulnerability of BH will need to be complemented by an appropriate level of suppressive fire support, unless there is greater investment in integrated defensive capabilities.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.179	<u>Large Support Helicopters</u>	Large Support Helicopters (CH47 and MH53) were essential to the success of the Operation, but require large decks to conduct safe, high-tempo operations when embarked.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.180	<u>Support Amphibious Battlefield Rotorcraft</u>	The Support Amphibious Battlefield Rotorcraft (Large) and (Medium) need to be optimised for ship operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.181	<u>Enhanced Night/Poor Visibility Capability</u>	Consideration should be given to fitting UK helicopter assets with an enhanced night/poor visibility capability.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.182	<u>Passage of Air Related Information</u>	JHC need to provide augmentation in both personnel and CIS to ground units, to ensure the passage of air related	Doc TELIC

		information.	Vol 1
TEL.0.183	<u>Tactical Doctrine for UK Apache</u>	The tactical doctrine supporting employment of UK Apache needs review in the light of US experience during Operation TELIC.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.184	<u>Support Littoral Manoeuvre</u>	Either FW or RW CAS is required to support Littoral Manoeuvre.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.185	<u>Apache in the Littoral Battle-Space</u>	Operation TELIC demonstrated the potential utility of Apache in the littoral battle-space.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.186	<u>US Technological and Doctrinal Dominance</u>	The implications of maintaining contact and congruence with an accelerating US technological and doctrinal dominance need to continue to be assessed and judgements factored into future development of UK forces.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.187	<u>UK Implications of War-Fighting Alongside the US</u>	We must be aware of the wide-ranging implications for UK doctrine, training, sustainability and equipment of war-fighting alongside the US, and recognise that other countries and potential adversaries will adjust their response accordingly.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.188	<u>Regular Training and Cross-Fertilisation with US Forces</u>	Regular training and cross-fertilisation with US forces are required, in order to promote interoperability when deployed in a US-led or backed coalition.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.189	Redacted	Redacted	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.190	<u>Integration of Prisoner of War Operations</u>	UK should be wary of integrating Prisoner of War (PW) operations too closely with other nations, given the national responsibilities for PWs under the Geneva Convention. Where PW guarding is integrated, agreed procedures should be negotiated and set out clearly well in advance.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.191	<u>PW Handling</u>	PW handling is a significant and sensitive task that needs to be properly considered and resourced in the initial planning phase for war-fighting operations, with a bespoke unit appropriately identified, trained and equipped (especially with dedicated comms).	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.192	<u>MOD Liaison with OGDs</u>	A central MOD focal point is required to develop policy and coordinate with OGDs.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.193	<u>Consultation of ICRC in PW Handling</u>	The ICRC should be consulted in the planning phase of any operation in order to agree procedures/ mechanisms for PW handling and other areas of activity.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.194	<u>ICRC Regional Delegation</u>	Deployed forces should be more proactive in contacting the ICRC regional delegation once in theatre.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.195	<u>Provision of Interpreters for PWs</u>	The provision of interpreters for PWs facilitates the passage of information and reduces the risk of frustration and	Doc TELIC

		misunderstanding. The physical segregation of different categories of prisoners needs to be anticipated during the planning process. Instructions for handling personal possessions must be adhered to.	Vol 1
TEL.0.196	<u>Joint Field Interrogation Team Procedures</u>	Joint Field Interrogation Team procedures require review to comply with ICRC standards.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.197	<u>Media and PWs</u>	While there are constraints on what the military authorities can achieve, commanders must remind the media of the need to comply with the law, and ensure that cameras are not let into PW facilities.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.198	<u>Evidence of the Reasons for Capture of Civilians</u>	Evidence of the reasons for capture of civilians should be noted down at the time. The sometimes overly formal procedures of Article 5 should not be overplayed; pre-Article 5 screenings can help to sort out the easiest cases quickly.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.199	<u>PSO - Involvement of OGDs</u>	PSO cannot be successful without the wider involvement of OGDs: nation building should not be the preserve of the Armed Forces alone, even in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction. A logical, resourced, dynamic and empowered cross-Government mechanism should be created to conduct early planning and oversee post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, consideration should be given to establishing a cross-Governmental task force ready to go into theatre as soon as the security situation allows.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.200	<u>OGDs Participation in Training and Exercises</u>	OGDs must be encouraged to participate in training and exercises to develop cross-Government planning and execution of PSO and nation-building.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.201	<u>Deployment of DfID Los</u>	The deployment of DfID Los is an essential element for the support of HA and reconstruction operations. DfID should be requested to consider providing a permanent LO to PJHQ and DfID Los should be deployed more widely in theatre, including to the NCHQ.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.202	<u>Military Forces - Appropriate Resourcing</u>	Military forces should be appropriately resourced, particularly with a sufficient budget and financial delegation authority, together with appropriate expertise, to be able to make a rapid impact on the civilian population with the delivery of HA and reconstruction project.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.203	<u>Restoration of the Iraqi Infrastructure</u>	The restoration of the Iraqi infrastructure required skills that were beyond the Armed Forces. The feasibility of a central register should be examined to enable both specialists and those with secondary skills useful in CIMIC terms, regulars, reservists and civilian experts alike, to be identified more easily and used more effectively.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.204	<u>CIMIC - Key Component of Operational Capability</u>	CIMIC should be formally recognised and resourced as a key component of operational capability, with appropriate Joint doctrine, training, deployable structures and resources, including equipment, for expeditionary operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.205	<u>Expansion of the CA Gp Regular Cadre</u>	The current expansion of the CA Gp regular cadre from 10 to 20 should be accelerated and further expansion should be considered to meet the requirement for large scale CIMIC operations. In addition, a larger Joint pool of CIMIC	Doc TELIC Vol 1

		trained personnel should be developed in order to augment the CIMIC capability.	
TEL.0.206	<u>Review of Intelligence Structures</u>	The MOD should review its intelligence structures and specialist and deployed manning, to ensure their suitability and resilience in meeting the challenges of modern operations and in cooperating with potential allies and partners. This implies greater connectivity between the various national and allied elements, and access to robust, reliable communications bearers.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.207	<u>Individual and Collective Training - Intelligence</u>	Individual and collective training is required for specialists, staff and commanders that reflects the complexity of the current intelligence processes and systems.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.208	<u>Intelligence Manning</u>	Intelligence manning was inadequate for this scale and type of operation. Defence intelligence assumptions and resourcing need to be reconciled.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.209	<u>Augmentation Process for Intelligence Units</u>	The augmentation process for intelligence units needs to be initiated early enough to match the early burden on intelligence staffs during the planning phase of an operation.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.210	<u>Insufficient linguists in Support Intelligence Function</u>	Insufficient linguists were available to support the intelligence function. The defence requirement for linguists needs to be articulated and appropriate priority given to ensuring that this requirement is met for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.211	<u>HUMINT</u>	HUMINT is an invaluable and ^R tool that should be accorded appropriate priority and resourcing.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.212	<u>Analysis of CBRN Threats and WMD Issues</u>	<i>Redacted</i> Experts within Dstl could have informed analysis and planning.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.213	<u>Rationalisation of UK Intelligence Systems</u>	A rationalisation of UK intelligence systems and the provision of, <i>Redacted</i> , for current and envisaged intelligence exchange should be considered.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.214	<u>Intelligence - Connectivity With Coalition Partners</u>	In any future coalition operation, early action must be taken to establish adequate connectivity with coalition partners, to ensure effective distribution of intelligence.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.215	<u>Intelligence 'RINGMAIN'</u>	An intelligence 'RINGMAIN' should be established, with appropriate software tools (in addition to physical connectivity), to improve the accessibility of intelligence.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.216	<i>Redacted</i>	<i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.217	<u>ISR and BDA Processes</u>	The ISR and BDA processes used by the Coalition were inadequate. The UK needs to encourage US development in this area and ensure that the UK processes maintain	Doc TELIC

		congruence.	Vol 1
TEL 0.218	<u>Alignment of Political and Military Objectives</u>	The alignment of political and military objectives and, ideally, a common legal basis, are crucial to the development of a UK targeting policy that is coherent with that of coalition partners.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.219	<u>Interim Targeting and ROE Directives</u>	Interim Targeting and ROE Directives should be included in the CDS Planning Directive in order to provide for timely planning and preparation.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.220	<u>UK Collateral Damage Estimate Policy</u>	UK Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) policy should be developed in the light of Operation TELIC, to seek greater coherence with the policies employed by potential allies, particularly the US.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.221	<u>Improved Collateral Damage Assessment Tools</u>	Improved collateral damage assessment tools are required, with consideration given to compatibility with US systems, to enable rapid decision-making.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.222	<u>Procedures for Targeting</u>	Whilst the Time-Sensitive Targets process was generally successful, the procedures for targeting need further development to facilitate Network Enabled Capabilities and rapid effects against fleeting or Time-Sensitive Targets.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.223	<u>Description of Targeting Processes and Terminology</u>	Targeting processes and terminology need to be better described in UK doctrine.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.224	<u>UK Aircraft - Data Link</u>	UK aircraft would be more effective when tasked against Time-Sensitive Targets if they were fitted with a data link, as it would increase situational awareness and hasten the targeting process.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.225	<u>Review of the CIS Supporting the UK Ability to Prosecute TST</u>	A review of the CIS supporting the UK ability to prosecute TST should be conducted in the light of the successful use of the US Automated Deep Ops Coordination System (ADOCS) software application during Operation TELIC.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.226	<u>UK BDA Policy</u>	UK BDA policy should be reviewed, to ensure compatibility with the Effects-Based Targeting concept.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.227	<u>UK BDA Processes</u>	UK BDA processes should be reviewed and exercised, to ensure that they match the needs of a national operation.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.228	<u>Operational Requirement for Trained Targeteers</u>	The operational requirement for trained targeteers should be properly scoped, and measures taken to train and 'track' the numbers required.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.229	<u>Standardisation of Targeting Processes</u>	Written guidance is required to standardise targeting processes, including the conduct of Targeting Boards, and to inform inexperienced targeteers.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.230	<u>Information Campaigning</u>	Information campaigning should start as early as possible and should continue into the post-conflict phase, to enable early and continued synchronisation with the other lines of operation.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.231	<u>Scope of Information Campaign</u>	An Information Campaign involves more than just influencing the media. It includes exploitation of other, less	Doc TELIC

		conventional means of delivery, including human engagement.	Vol 1
TEL 0.232	<u>Counter-Information Strategy</u>	A Counter-Information strategy should be developed and resourced, to enhance the effectiveness of the Information Campaign.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.233	<u>Further Evolution Of existing IT-Based Tools</u>	Existing IT-based tools require further evolution to inform adequately the decision-making process.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.234	<u>Awareness of the Strategic Information Campaign</u>	Formations at the tactical and operational levels need to have an awareness of the strategic Information Campaign, including the underlying nuances, to enable a coherent, consistent plan to be developed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.235	<u>IO - Strategic and Operational Tool</u>	Greater efforts must be made to inform ministers and the broader public audience that IO are an acceptable strategic and operational tool, which can save lives and shorten combat.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.236	<u>Ministerial Authority to Commence IO</u>	In future operations, early efforts to secure ministerial authority to commence specifically tailored IO should be made.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.237	<u>Requirement for Interpreters</u>	The requirement for interpreters should be included in the planning process and a mechanism is required to provide large numbers of interpreters at short notice.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.238	<u>Review of IO Manning</u>	Current IO manning requires review if the UK is to maintain a sustainable IO capability.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.239	<u>Independent PSYOPS Capability</u>	Greater investment is required if the UK wants an independent PSYOPS capability robust enough to support a war-fighting operation in a well-populated country.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.240	<u>Leaflet Dissemination Capability</u>	Consideration should be given to developing a leaflet dissemination capability in a non-benign environment, which could be based on modified UK fast jet aircraft.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.241	<u>Manpower, Training and Equipment Shortfalls - Media Ops</u>	Manpower, training and equipment shortfalls need to be addressed if a robust UK Media Ops capability is to be realised. Implementation of Directorate General Corporate Communication's (DGCC) Media Ops Capability Study should address these shortfalls.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.242	<u>Augmentation Process</u>	The augmentation process to fill posts in MOD and PJHQ was slow and needs review.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.243	<u>Embedded War Correspondents</u>	Despite occasionally negative/critical reports and additional logistic burden, in the round, embedded War Correspondents provided coverage beneficial to the Coalition. The support requirements and needs of embedded War Correspondents need to be included in planning for war-fighting operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.244	<u>Addressing International and Regional Audiences</u>	Greater priority needs to be given in the Media Ops plan to addressing international and regional audiences.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL.0.245	<u>Recruitment of Local Interpreters</u>	When Service linguists are unavailable, local interpreters should be recruited to support Media Ops, where benefit to the UK outweighs the risk to security	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.246	<u>Amendment of JWP 3-45</u>	JWP 3-45 needs amendment, to provide clear guidance for the planning and execution of Media Ops.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.247	<u>Media Ops - Transition to the Post-Conflict Phase</u>	Media Ops planning for operation similar to TELIC should reflect demands during the transition to the post-conflict phase.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.248	<u>Single Service Mobile News Teams</u>	Joint oversight is required of single Service Mobile News Teams in order to man and task Joint Combat Camera Teams efficiently.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.249	<u>Mobile News Teams' News Videos</u>	The process used to produce and approve Mobile News Teams' news videos should be streamlined to allow for timely distribution.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.250	<u>Internal News Publications</u>	Internal news publications provide an effective means of communication during all phases of an operation and should be considered during the Information Campaign estimate.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.251	<u>Combat ID CONOPS</u>	Combat ID CONOPS need to be available early in the preparation phase of an operation, to allow sufficient time for adequate training and development of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.252	<u>Combat ID - Doctrine and Peacetime Training</u>	Doctrine and peacetime training need to reflect the Combat ID requirements of coalition operations and of land and air forces.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.253	<u>Common Operational Picture</u>	New UK equipment, such as Bowman, that generates a UK 'Blue Picture', needs to be interoperable with coalition equipment, to produce a Common Operational Picture.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.254	<u>Thermal ID and Combat Identification Panels</u>	Thermal ID and Combat Identification Panels on vehicles were not robust and proved to be inadequate aids to Combat ID by Coalition aircrew.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.255	<u>Shortage of Thermal ID and Combat Identification Panels</u>	There were not enough Thermal ID and Combat Identification Panels available at the front-line for all vehicles to be fitted, increasing the risk of fratricide.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.256	<u>Traditional Recognition Training</u>	Traditional recognition training is an important element of Combat ID.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.257	<u>Selection of Target ID Enabling Technology</u>	The UK needs to maintain the pressure on allies to force the selection of Target ID enabling technology to underpin the land domain.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.258	<u>Joint CIS Infrastructure</u>	A Joint CIS infrastructure is required for expeditionary operations, to provide secure, reliable and timely information access to all stakeholders through a common network.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.259	<u>Connectivity Between the Home Base and Deployed Forces</u>	Connectivity between the Home Base and deployed forces should be designed to compensate for or remove single	Doc TELIC

		points of failure.	Vol 1
TEL.0.260	<u>UK CIS Architecture - of Interoperability with Potential Coalition Systems</u>	Future development of the UK CIS architecture must include a means of interoperability with potential coalition systems, particularly those of the US.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.261	<u>UK CIS Interoperability</u>	Current work into UK CIS Interoperability should consider the requirement to access the Joint Operations Picture.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.262	<u>Defence Communications Support Agency</u>	PJHQ should set clear CIS requirements for the Defence Communications Support Agency to deliver, not design the CIS architecture. In tandem, the Defence Communications Support Agency support arrangements should be reviewed, in order that the organisation develops sufficient flexibility to respond to the variable and short time-scales associated with expeditionary operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.263	<u>CONOPS for Defence Communication Support Agency</u>	A CONOPS for Defence Communication Support Agency (DCSA) support to expeditionary operations should be developed, in order to inform future planning, including resourcing priorities and UOR development.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.264	<u>Establishment of a Joint Force CIS Commander</u>	Consideration should be given to the formal establishment of a Joint Force CIS Commander, with supporting CONOPS and a core of trained staff, to manage Joint CIS support for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.265	<u>Withdrawal of Joint Force CIS Commander</u>	If the Joint Force CIS Commander is withdrawn after the war-fighting phase, a CIS formation should be nominated by PJHQ to assist DCSA develop the CIS.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.266	<u>Integrated Support Policy for CIS Equipment</u>	An integrated support policy for CIS equipment, including trained technicians, should be developed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.267	<u>Level of Contractor Support</u>	The level of contractor support required to deliver operational CIS capability for deployed operations needs careful consideration. Sufficient, skilled Service personnel must be retained to prevent an over-reliance on contractors.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.268	<u>Inadequacies in Training</u>	Inadequacies in training in the support and use of CIS systems need to be addressed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.269	<u>Reversion to Voice Circuits</u>	Whilst UK digitisation under the BOWMAN programme will bring significant advantages, the development of operational procedures will need to take account of the tactical lessons from Operation TELIC and the reversion to voice circuits when the tempo increased.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.270	<u>Military and Civilian Deployable Satellite Communications</u>	The balance between military and civilian deployable satellite communications capability should be reviewed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.271	<u>Provision of UHF TACSAT Channels</u>	The provision of UHF TACSAT channels for expeditionary operations should be resourced formally.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.272	<u>CESG Approved Secure Satellite</u>	Consideration should be given to the wider deployment and appropriate use of CESG approved secure satellite mobile	Doc TELIC

	<u>Mobile Phone</u>	phones.	Vol 1
TEL.0.273	<u>Common Processes for the Management of Information</u>	Joint doctrine needs to be developed that establishes common processes for the management of information.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.274	<u>Information Exploitation / Management</u>	Information Exploitation/Management must form part of battle-staff training.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.275	<u>Commercialisation & Contractorisation of CIS</u>	Future commercialisation and contractorisation of CIS in operational theatres, be they benign or not, must be resourced to provide an agile and flexible solution.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.276	<u>CBRN - Operational Planning</u>	CBRN issues need to be factored into operational planning from the outset, to ensure the plan is correctly shaped and forces properly prepared. To facilitate this, a CBRN expert should be included in the SPG.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.277	<u>Engagement of Dstl and Other CBRN Expertise in Early Planning</u>	A process is required for engaging Dstl and other CBRN expertise in early planning. However, this should be funded from the operational rather than research budget, in order to preserve general CBRN research.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.278	<u>Single Customer 2 Focus for All NBC Equipment</u>	A single Customer 2 focus for all NBC equipment issues is urgently required, to ensure that the correct levels of operational NBC equipment are available and distributed to the appropriate deployed unit.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.279	<u>CBRN Decision Making - Effective Risk Analysis</u>	A standardised, more refined system is needed to ensure that strategic CBRN decision making is supported by effective risk analysis.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.280	<u>Tactical Application of Extant Doctrine and Risk Assessment Methodologies</u>	A review of the tactical application of extant doctrine and risk assessment methodologies is required, in order to ascertain the root causes of the reported over-reaction to the CBRN threat.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.281	<u>BW Reporting</u>	Clear policy for BW reporting is required.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.282	<u>CBRN Capabilities of the BH Force</u>	The UK has a limited ability to conduct effective air operations in a CBRN environment. There is a particularly urgent requirement to review the <i>Reduced</i> of the BH force.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.283	<u>Engagement of S&T Community in Operational Planning</u>	The S&T community needs to be engaged at the outset of operational planning. Inclusion of an S&T stakeholder in the SPG would ensure that appropriate and timely S&T support is made available.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.284	<u>Full Potential of the S&T Community</u>	If the full potential of the S&T community is to be realised, there needs to be a clear framework for cooperation at every level and a greater and wider awareness of the available expertise in the S&T arena.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.285	<u>Air-Conditioned Accommodation</u>	Ready air-conditioned accommodation is required for summer operations in a desert environment to mitigate the reduction in operational capability of deployed forces.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL.0.286	<u>Force Projection Policy</u>	Force Projection policy requires more detailed environmental information.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.287	<u>Roulement in Hottest Season</u>	When possible, major roulements should not occur in the middle of the hottest season of the year.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.288	<u>Acclimatisation Period for Operations in High Temperatures</u>	Planning for operations in high temperatures must factor in an acclimatisation period prior to the commencement of operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.289	<u>Accommodation for Helicopter Forces</u>	Helicopter forces need improved domestic and technical accommodation to operate more effectively in high temperatures.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.290	<u>Ammunition Storage in High Temperatures</u>	Review of procedures and practices for ammunition storage in high temperature operational theatres is required, to reduce the amount of ammunition written off.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.291	<u>Improved Environmental Protection</u>	Improved environmental protection is required for equipment such as radars, airfield navigation aids and CIS, to enable their satisfactory operation in a desert environment.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.292	<u>Future Defence Environmental Capability</u>	The Future Defence Environmental Capability (FDEC) programme should be progressed, to enable the provision of coherent environmental information to support Joint operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.293	<u>Met Office Presence in PJHQ</u>	PJHQ should consider the establishment of a permanent Met Office presence to provide expert environmental advice.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.294	<u>Awareness of Environmental Information</u>	Commanders need to be aware of the environmental information available and its value.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.295	<u>Deployment of UK Met Office Team</u>	For Medium - to Large-Scale Operations led by the US, a UK Met Office team should deploy to join the US team producing the Joint Operational Area Forecast, to provide an integrated forecast.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.296	<u>UK-US Ensemble Prediction System</u>	A UK-US ensemble prediction system should be developed which enables outputs from respective meteorological computer models to be properly fused.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.297	<u>Secure CIS for the UK Met Office</u>	The provision of secure CIS to the UK Met Office would enhance the quality of weather forecasts and of plume analysis.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.298	<u>Current Communications Fleet - Increase in Capacity</u>	The current communications fleet needs an increase in capacity, if it is to meet the demands of both operations and VIP tasking.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.299	<u>Shallow Water Influence Mine-Sweeping System</u>	The vital role of the Shallow Water Influence Mine-Sweeping System in the Mine Counter Measures effort demonstrated the requirement for an enduring capability.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.300	<u>UK Ship-To-Shore and STOM Equipment</u>	A review of UK ship-to-shore and STOM equipment is required, to determine the extent to which the UK needs to invest in platforms capable of operating in hostile and semi-	Doc TELIC

		hostile environments	Vol 1
TEL 0.301	<u>Heavy Armoured Vehicles were Battle-Winning Equipments</u>	Heavy armoured vehicles, appropriately upgraded, were battle-winning equipments in the context of Operation TELIC. This demonstration of capability, coupled with an assessment of the effectiveness of armour against more capable, modern anti-armour systems, should inform force development and planning for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.302	<u>Reconnaissance Vehicles</u>	Redacted	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.303	<u>Modified CVR(T) in the Operational Fleet</u>	The number of appropriately modified CVR(T) in the operational fleet should be sufficient to sustain enduring commitments.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.304	<u>Long Range ATGW Capability</u>	In the light of the proven utility of Swingfire on Operation TELIC, the requirement for a long range ATGW capability after Swingfire's OSD should be reassessed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.305	<u>Weapon Stock-Piling Planning Guidance</u>	Weapon Stock-Piling Planning Guidance (SPPG) should reflect the increasing requirement for PGMs on operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.306	<u>Launch Platform Options for Storm Shadow</u>	Consideration should be given to expanding the launch platform options for Storm Shadow further, to include large, loiter platforms, in order to broaden its utility and employability.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.307	<u>Enhancement of Offensive Aircraft</u>	All offensive support aircraft would be enhanced by the employment of smart weapons such as EPW and the ability to re-programme both targets and weapon profiles whilst airborne.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.308	<u>TV Maverick</u>	TV Maverick enhances the capability of aircrew to detect and identify small tactical targets and allows maximum exploitation of its stand-off capability. The balance between the stockpiles of IR and TV Maverick should be re-assessed, bearing in mind the weather and day/night limitations of both variants.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.309	<u>Cluster Munitions</u>	Notwithstanding the public controversy surrounding cluster munitions, they were the weapons of choice and effect when aircraft were tasked against fielded forces. Stockholdings should reflect their utility and the valid military case for their use.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.310	<u>Offensive Capability to Degrade Enemy EW Radar</u>	An offensive capability is required to degrade enemy EW radar and reduce the risk to friendly aircraft from enemy integrated air defence systems.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.311	<u>Targeting Pod Numbers</u>	Targeting pod numbers should reflect the opportunity to equip more offensive aircraft to attack targets precisely, particularly mobile targets, thus enhancing their sensor-to-shooter and multi-role credentials.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL.0.312	<u>Better Image Resolution</u>	Better image resolution is required from the RAF's current inventory of targeting pods, to enable aircrew to identify targets from higher altitudes, at lower consequent risk.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.313	<u>TIALD Pod in the Non-Traditional ISR</u>	The capability and opportunity implied by use of the TIALD pod in the Non-Traditional ISR (NTISR) role during Operation TELIC underpin the case for improvements to the resolution delivered by the RAF's targeting pods.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.314	<u>Capability of Larger Offensive Air Platforms</u>	The capability of larger offensive air platforms to carry large numbers of precision weapons for an extended loiter time during Operation TELIC should inform future offensive platform development and plans for Time-Sensitive Targeting development.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.315	<u>Effectiveness of Multi-Role Aircraft</u>	The effectiveness of multi-role aircraft during Operation TELIC underpins the need to expedite the development of the Typhoon air-to-ground capability.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.316	<u>Aircraft Equipment with DAS</u>	All aircraft should be equipped with DAS capable of countering modern threat systems, but priority must remain with those aircraft that have to operate in high threat areas.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.317	<u>Review of the DAS Capabilities</u>	A review of the DAS capabilities of the AT fleet should be conducted, in the light of the enduring threat from IR SAMS.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.318	<u>Review of the Size of the Nimrod R1 Fleet</u>	A review of the size of the Nimrod R1 fleet should be conducted in the light of its performance during Operation TELIC and its current operational commitments.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.319	<u>UAVs</u>	UAVs have unique capabilities to offer as both ISR and offensive platforms and are an essential elements of a coherent force structure.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.320	<u>Operational Envelope -UAVs</u>	UAVs need to have an operational envelope appropriate to the environmental conditions predicted.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.321	<u>The SK Mk 7's ISR Capability</u>	The SK Mk 7 demonstrated good ISR capability overland and fulfilled its conceptual promise as a Joint platform in the land environment, but procedures, interoperability and more extended time on task need to be addressed. Also, if it is to operate in this environment routinely, consideration will have to be given to enhancing its survivability and providing opportunities for Joint and Combined training.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.322	<u>Real Time Imagery via Data-Links for Tac-Recce Capable Aircraft</u>	Considerable advantages could be accrued from providing all Tac-Recce capable UK aircraft with the ability to transmit real time imagery via data-links.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.323	<u>Data-Transfer Capability</u>	More emphasis should be placed on providing ISR and offensive air platforms with data-transfer capability, to increase operational flexibility and maintain interoperability with the US.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.324	<u>Scaling of Night Vision Equipment</u>	The ability to operate confidently and effectively at night enhances force protection, not only within the direct battlefield engagement environment but also within the logistic tail. A review of the scaling of night vision equipment is required, to ensure that numbers are appropriate to meet the needs of ground manoeuvre	Doc TELIC Vol 1

		elements.	
TEL.0.325	<u>The Minimi LMG</u>	The Minimi LMG contributed significantly to successful dismounted operations and, therefore, funding for it should be protected.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.326	<u>Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure</u>	Expeditionary campaign infrastructure should be provided in sufficient quantities and in the right timeframe to ensure that accommodation and human support services are available for deployed UK personnel on sustained operations, particularly in arduous locations. However, care must be taken to manage expectations against the requirement for personnel to remain robust in the face of war fighting operations in such environments.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.327	<u>UOR Action - Time-Scale Limitations</u>	Time-scale limitations may restrict what is achievable under UOR action. Enduring capability gaps that cannot be resolved within the timescales experienced on Operation TELIC must be identified and the associated risks exposed. These risks should be evaluated to ensure that essential war-fighting capabilities can be procured and delivered within readiness profiles. EP prioritisation needs to reflect UOD procurement lead-times.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.328	<u>UORs - Development and Evaluation Processes</u>	Development and evaluation processes required for UOR equipment on more complex platforms should, where possible, be undertaken in advance, to facilitate the achieving of operational capability in compressed timescales. This suggests an increased requirement for technology demonstration and for a more widespread employment of a 'fitted for' strategy. This lesson has been frequently raised in DOC Operational Lessons and Audit Reports.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.329	<u>Early Involvement of Subject Matter Experts, DLO, DPA and Industry</u>	The early involvement of Subject Matter Experts, DLO, DPA and industry is required to address likely UORs.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.330	<u>Equipment Capability Shortfall Register</u>	The maintenance of a robust Equipment Capability Shortfall Register (ECSR) can aid the rapid generation of possible UORs, and the extent to which contingency-based risk reduction can be further exploited should be reviewed, drawing on existing best practice.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.331	<u>Defence Logistic Operations Centre</u>	The Defence Logistic Operations Centre (DLOC) made a significant contribution to the timely delivery of UOR capability and should be further developed for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.332	<u>Timely, Clear and Accurate Requirement Specification</u>	Timely, clear and accurate requirement specification is vital. A more robust mechanism is required to ensure that Joint equipment shortfalls are addressed in a coherent manner.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.333	<u>Asset Management and Tracking System</u>	A robust end-to-end asset management and tracking system needs to be developed and introduced, not least to support the delivery of UOR equipment capability.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.334	<u>UORs - Shared Data Environment</u>	A shared data environment encapsulating all aspects of the UOR process should be developed to reduce staff effort and minimise delays.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL.0.335	<u>Process for Integrating and Accepting UORs</u>	The process for embodying and accepting UORs into service on initial delivery needs to be reviewed and formalised, with the aim of ensuring that it mirrors the procedures for accepting EP equipment into service wherever possible. Sponsors should be identified for each major platform type to lead on the integration of UOR equipment onto their respective platforms.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.336	<u>Deployment of UOR Equipment Teams and Experts</u>	UOR equipment team and experts from Trials and Development Units should deploy on operations as integrated elements of the Joint force whenever significant UOR activity is likely. Terms of Reference and SOPs should be developed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.337	<u>Defence Industrial Policy Assumptions and other Nations' Export Regulations</u>	Defence industrial policy assumptions and the risk from dependence on other nations' export regulations. There is a need to review Foreign Military Sales with the US arrangements should be reviewed against the demands of expeditionary operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.338	<u>Contractual Processes for Procurement</u>	Contractual processes for procurement of equipment from other nations for operations should be reviewed in the light of experience in Operation TELIC.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.339	<u>UOR Performance Reporting Mechanism</u>	A UOR performance reporting mechanism should be put in place to enable follow-on force preparations and resource planning decisions to be optimised.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.340	<u>DMSD Staffs Engagement Medical Planning</u>	DMSD staff should be engaged in the operational aspects of medical planning from the outset. Secure communications should be provided to allow the DMSD Clinical Policy Directorate and the DCAs to engage fully in the classified aspects of the planning process.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.341	<u>Anthrax Vaccination Uptake</u>	Better risk communication is required if the uptake of the anthrax vaccination is to improve. The integration of anthrax immunisation with other public health vaccination programmes may well reduce the fears and suspicions of eligible individuals.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.342	<u>CBRN Medical Countermeasures Policies</u>	CBRN medical countermeasures policies should include legal advice from an early stage. Greater effort should be dedicated towards briefing operational Commanders on policies and guidance on the use of CBRN medical countermeasures. Practicalities in respect of 'mandating' CBRN medical countermeasures should be reviewed, along with the guidance on how to deal with individuals who refuse.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.343	<u>Procurement and Preparation of Medical Equipment</u>	Adequate time must be allowed for procurement and preparation of medical equipment and stocks prior to operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.344	<u>Medical Staff - Training and Familiarisation with Equipment</u>	Adequate medical equipment must be held to allow medical staff time for training and familiarisation before deployment.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.345	<u>Theatre Operational Medical Database</u>	Sufficient sets of Theatre Operational Medical Database (TOMD) are needed to meet the operational requirement, with adequate numbers of medical staff trained in its use, to enable accurate, comprehensive records of in-theatre medical care to be maintained.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL 0.346	<u>Portable Remote Illness Symptom Monitor</u>	The Portable Remote Illness Symptom Monitor (PRISM) requires a validated concept of use and operator training should be conducted prior to deployment.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.347	<u>Egton Medical Information System</u>	The Egton Medical Information System (EMIS) requires modification in order that it can identify an individual's full vaccination status.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.348	<u>Maintenance of Vaccination Programmes</u>	Steps should be taken to ensure that all units can maintain up-to-date vaccination programmes.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.349	<u>Maintenance of Regular Reserves Details</u>	A review of the single Services' data capture procedures and maintenance of Regular Reserves' details is required.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.350	<u>Modular Transportable Surgical Facility Concept</u>	Operation TELIC confirmed the validity of the Modular Transportable Surgical Facility concept, but teething problems remain which should be investigated and resolved.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.351	<u>Role 2/3 Medical Units - Infrastructure</u>	All Role 2/3 medical units should be scaled for the UOR standard infrastructure.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.352	<u>Review of Medical Supply System</u>	An end to end review of the medical supply system is required.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.353	<u>Specialist Training - Handling of Medical Supplies</u>	A review of the need for specialist training should be conducted, if medical supplies are to be routinely routed via the regular logistics chain.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.354	<u>Medical Employment Standard</u>	Personnel deploying to an operational theatre should be at the required Medical Employment Standard.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.355	<u>Impact of Medical Countermeasures - Policy</u>	The relative balance of risk inherent in the current policy covering the impact of medical countermeasures on Medical Employment Standards should be reviewed, to be more consistent with the general risks accepted in war-fighting situations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.356	<u>Medical Treatment of Local Civilian Population - Policy</u>	The policy covering the medical treatment of the local civilian population through military means requires review.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.357	<u>Role of OGDs and NGOs in Medical Treatment of Local Civilian Population</u>	Every effort should be made to clarify the role of OGDs and NGOs particularly in non-benign environments, as early as possible. If it appears likely that the local population will seek medical care from the Defence Medical Service, the aim must be to encourage the provision of the appropriate clinical speciality (including paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology) and equipment from organisations who have the expertise and the experience to provide them.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL 0.358	<u>NHS/MOD Standard Operating Instructions - PW Handling</u>	Coordinated NHS/MOD Standard Operating Instructions are required on how PWs, medically evacuated to the UK, are to be administered, guarded and treated, in conjunction with the NHS Emergency Planning process.	Doc TELIC Vol 1

TEL.0.359	<u>Tri-Service Policy Casualty Procedures</u>	There is a requirement for a Tri-Service policy on casualty procedures, as a matter of priority. The establishment of a Tri-Service Casualty Centre should be considered.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.360	<u>Handling of Contaminated Casualties</u>	A cross-Governmental policy for the handling of contaminated casualties is required.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.361	<u>Operational Welfare Package</u>	A fully-funded Operational Welfare Package remains a critical success factor for the maintenance of morale and operational capability. However, the expectations of Service personnel must continue to be managed to reflect that which can sensibly, safely and securely be made available in the early stages of an operation, particularly in war-fighting. The wider implication of operation-specific policy decisions need review before deciding whether to apply them universally. A review of the Operational Welfare Package is now underway within PJHQ, in co-operation with SP Pol staffs.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.362	<u>Support to Families</u>	Levels of support to families need to be kept under constant review and expectations must be managed. Further means of providing information to families should be considered. Mechanisms should be developed to make it easier for families (both Regular and Reserve) to connect with each other.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.363	<u>Support Available to Reservists' Families</u>	The support available to Reservists' families is not well understood. The expectations of many families exceeded the art of the possible. The wider issues of communication and expectation management are particularly relevant to Reservists' families. All Reserve units should have nominated and trained welfare officers.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.364	<u>KINFORMing</u>	KINFORMing and casualty reporting policy and procedures need revision, to take account of the increased speeds at which the media and private communications can operate, in order to address the needs and sensitivities of bereaved families and the inevitable demand for rapid information by the media and public. Similarly, guidelines issued to Casualty Visiting Officers should be reviewed.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.365	<u>Specific Repatriation Policies</u>	Specific repatriation policies and orders needs to be in place from the start of an operation. SP Pol are leading a review of repatriation policy with PJHQ and the casualty cells.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.366	<u>Measurement of Individual Harmony</u>	The impetus to achieve measurement of individual Harmony needs to be maintained.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.367	<u>Life Insurance Schemes</u>	Life Insurance schemes that do not discriminate against servicemen in the Armed Forces and do not include 'war exclusions' need to be made available for Service personnel.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.368	<u>Harmonised Tri-Service Stress Management Policy</u>	A harmonised tri-Service stress management policy should be finalised and implemented.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.369	<u>Joined-Up Tracking Process - OPLOC</u>	A tri-Service, more rigorous and joined-up tracking process is needed to locate personnel and casualties in and out of theatre. Training should be provided for those inputting	Doc TELIC

		data into the system. This is now under consideration through the interim OPLOC Working Group.	Vol 1
TEL.0.370	<u>Augmentation Issues</u>	Augmentation could be made more effective if it was less ad hoc, with better training, earlier preparation and an improved volunteer civilian skills database. There needs to be an increasing effort on publicity to create a sufficiently large pool of volunteers, including the engagement of senior civilians within the Department PJHQ are currently taking forward augmentation issues.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.0.371	<u>Deployment of Civilians</u>	Deployment of civilians to theatre should be managed and supported centrally in PJHQ and integrated into overall planning. (This has already been taken forward). Contractual and financial specialists should be deployed as early as possible.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.1	<u>Consulting HM Treasury</u>	Consulting HM Treasury early in a crisis helps to build mutual confidence at all levels.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.2	<u>Financial Instructions</u>	Financial Instructions should be issued early in a crisis, but may have to be preceded by interim instructions setting out the conditions under which preparatory activity can be resourced, if there are constraints on overt planning.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.3	<u>CDL Contribution to Planning</u>	CDL must be brought into planning for operations from the outset, and industry should be consulted at a sufficiently early stage to enable UORs to be delivered in time.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.4	<u>National Planning for the Aftermath</u>	National planning for the aftermath and phased transition to peace support after a military operation, including on a contingency basis, must be accorded appropriate weight and legitimacy across Government at an early stage. This involves the early engagement of all likely stakeholders and participants within a coordinated framework. In dealing with a dominant coalition partner, the UK should continue to insist that such planning be afforded the same importance and tempo as the military campaign itself.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.5	<u>Intelligence Assessments</u>	Intelligence assessments on likely developments before, during and after the campaign should be given equal priority.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.6	<u>Rapidly Available Theatre Entry Assets</u>	Experience with Host Nation Support/In Country Resources on this Operation TELIC confirms that flexible and rapidly available theatre entry assets and strategic access afforded by sea and air remain vital to expeditionary warfare.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.7	<u>Strain on Harmony Standards</u>	As Operation TELIC continues, there will be an increasing strain on Harmony standards and a reduction in force generation options for other operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.8	<u>The Distinction between Deploying from Barracks and Being Ready to Fight In-Theatre</u>	The distinction, in terms of readiness, between deploying from barracks and being ready to fight in-theatre having completed logistic preparation, any UOR modification and ITT, must be clearly understood at all levels of military command and by Ministers.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.9	<i>Redacted</i>	<i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC

			Vol 1
TEL.N.10	<u>Compulsory Mobilisation</u>	Compulsory mobilisation is a powerful message to a potential adversary, the timing of which should be carefully considered within the context of the Grand Strategic and the Information Campaign.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.11	<u>Mechanism and Procedures for External Augmentation</u>	The mechanism and procedures adopted for external augmentation should be improved, so that augmentee requirements can be prioritised and individuals prepared for their respective appointments.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.12	<u>Individual Leadership Training</u>	The style and content of individual leadership training for UK forces were validated during Operation TELIC.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.13	<u>JFET and DOAST</u>	A well planned, accurate JFET and DOAST are critical to mission success and time should be allowed to develop them fully, especially when deployment timescales are short.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.14	<u>Management of the Deployment Process</u>	Consideration should be given to switching command to theatre earlier, to allow more effective management of the deployment process.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.15	<u>The Requirement for Re-Flagging</u>	The requirement for re-flagging should be considered in the early stages of planning.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.16	<u>Force Protection for SLOC</u>	Force Protection for SLOC is likely to become a significant feature of expeditionary operations at all scales.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.17	<u>Availability and Capacity of In-Theatre Ports</u>	The availability and capacity of in-theatre ports and unloading facilities must be factored into movement planning at the earliest opportunity, in order to identify fully the requirement for additional facilities and the possible impact on campaign planning.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.18	<u>Consignment Tracking System</u>	The lack of an effective consignment tracking system to provide logistics support to expeditionary operations has been highlighted in every major operation and exercise report since Operation GRANBY in 1991. Although new systems have been introduced (VITAL and RIDEALS) since then, the capability still fails to meet the requirement.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.19	<u>Successful Establishment of the JFLogC HQ</u>	Experience gained from exercising the logistics chain during Exercise SAIF SAREEA II and on recent operations contributed to the successful establishment of the JFLogC HQ.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.20	<u>Siting of JFLogC Commander</u>	If the JFLogC Commander is to be a truly Joint asset, he should be sited where he can best serve the interests of all 3 environments and have the appropriate connectivity.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.21	<u>Benefits of Sea Basing</u>	The benefits of sea-basing will only be realised fully by the introduction of a Joint Logistics CIS capability, to provide effective visibility of Joint stockholdings.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.22	<u>Contractors in a Non-Benign Environment</u>	The support offered by contractors in a non-benign environment, especially in the early stages of a deployment, cannot be contracted out with confidence.	Doc TELIC

		This risk must be taken into account in planning and procurement, especially in areas where in-Service capability is unavailable.	Vol 1
TEL.N.23	<u>Forward Operational Maintenance and Repair</u>	The requirement for a forward Operational Maintenance and Repair (OMAR) capability for the Maritime component during Operation TELIC should be noted for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.24	<u>Standing National JFACHQ</u>	The decision to form a standing national JFACHQ was vindicated by the experience gained during Operational TELIC.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.25	<u>Size of Commitment</u>	It is important that size of commitment does not constrain agility or be confused with effect. There will be operations where size and effect are closely linked. <i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.26	<i>Redacted</i>	<i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.27	<i>Redacted</i>	<i>Redacted</i>	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.28	<u>Targeting Authority</u>	The targeting authority delegated to commanders in theatre was significant and enabled them to conduct operations responsively and flexibly. This degree of delegation should be used as a benchmark for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.29	<u>Targeting of Information-Related Infrastructure</u>	International law requires that there has to be justifiable military advantage from the destruction of media infrastructure targets. Targeting of information-related infrastructure needs to be considered in the light of the competing requirements of the Information Campaign and the kinetic targeting process.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.30	<u>Spokesmen and Media Advisors</u>	Spokesmen and Media Advisors should be selected from a pool of available, trained and prepared personnel in order to execute the Media Ops plan effectively.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.31	<u>IR Beacons</u>	IR beacons were an effective aid to Combat ID.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.32	<u>Vindication of Previous Lessons</u>	Equipment decisions following the lessons from the Kosovo Campaign and Exercise SAIF SAREEA II were vindicated during Operation TELIC.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.33	<u>TLAM</u>	TLAM demonstrated its utility as a long-range weapon capable of creating tactical, operational and strategic effect.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.34	<u>UK's Precision Attack Capability</u>	The UK's precision attack capability has developed significantly since 1991 and was, with the US, central to the	Doc TELIC

		successful conduct of a high-tempo operation.	Vol 1
TEL.N.35	<u>Enhanced Combat Body Armour</u>	Enhanced Combat Body Armour is an effective measure to reduce casualties.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.36	<u>UORs Must Deliver Operational Capability</u>	To be effective, UORs must deliver operational capability (including integration and training) rather than simply procurement. Time must be factored into readiness timescales to allow training to take place.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL.N.37	<u>Announcements on Changes of Entitlements</u>	Where entitlements for Service personnel and their partners are being changed in anticipation of conflict, announcements should be made in good time, so that individuals are aware before fighting starts.	Doc TELIC Vol 1
TEL2.A.01	<u>Joint Coin Doctrine Development in NEC Environment</u>	Joint doctrine should be developed, integrating UK Army COIN doctrine, into a joint publication to: reflect the capabilities of all Services in a NEC environment; highlight the advantages of an effects-based approach to COIN and counter-terrorism; and provide a practical foundation for joint training.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.02	<u>Cross-Government and Joint Doctrine</u>	Cross-Government and Joint doctrine on COIN should be developed to reflect the complexities of coalition operations, occupation scenarios and the role of emerging cross-Whitehall organisations including the Post conflict Reconstruction Unit.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.03	<u>British Defence Doctrine</u>	British Defence Doctrine should be amended to reflect the requirement for cross-government coordination, potentially incorporating elements of existing PSO doctrine.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.04	<u>Field HUMINT Teams</u>	A review should be conducted to confirm whether the planned product of the UK's Field HUMINT capability is sufficient to meet fully the operational requirement, and to establish the minimum training and currency requirements for Field HUMINT personnel prior to operational deployment.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.05	<u>Field HUMINT Doctrine</u>	There is a requirement for HUMINT doctrine in order to inform pre-deployment training, currency requirements and language skills for HUMINT personnel.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.06	<u>Intelligence Feedback</u>	A more effective feedback loop is required to ensure that critical information gleaned from prisoner interviews can be acted upon and communicated as quickly and effectively as possible.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.07	<u>Intelligence Fusion</u>	A review of the DIS, PJHQ and theatre J2 structures, manning and processes should be conducted to ensure that the growing intelligence capabilities are fused into a more robust product for the end user.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.08	<u>Common Intelligence Database</u>	Consideration should be given to the development of a deployable intelligence database for use at division and brigade level, that can support rapid population and development on new operations. A key requirement is common access to databases contained in UKINTELWEB(TS).	Doc TELIC Vol 2

TEL2.A.09	<u>Training for a US-Led Coalition</u>	The UK needs to educate its personnel to understand better how to maximise opportunities within a US-led coalition HQ; this includes an understanding Redacted US military doctrine and ethos.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.10	<u>Understanding Strategic Influence</u>	Cross-Departmental work is required to develop and refine the implications of our relationship with the US in order that freedoms and constraints are better understood. In particular, strategies for engagement with the US by MOD, and coordination of these between Departments need further development.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.11	Redacted	Redacted	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.12	<u>Coalition Lead Nation</u>	The UK should capitalise on the experiences of leading a coalition by identifying and collating lessons from theatre, MOD and PJHQ through to Joint Operations doctrine and TTPs where appropriate.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.13	<u>Investment in Iraqi Mol</u>	The UK needs to increase its investment in the Iraqi Mol to ensure that progress in the development of civil Iraqi security and police services keeps pace with the developments in the military sector.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.14	Redacted	Redacted	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.15	<u>MDP Role in Post Conflict Reconstruction</u>	MOD Police can provide a significant input to Post-Conflict Reconstruction. MOD should examine the future MDP requirement for this role and determine if current scaling, training and procedures are sufficient.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.16	<u>Equipping and Protecting the Iraqi Security Sector Forces</u>	Financial apportionment for SSR needs to be allocated early in the campaign planning stages to enable rapid growth of forces with the appropriate means for self protection.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.17	<u>Embedded Personnel in MNSTC-I</u>	A review of UK embedded personnel in MNSTC-I is required to ensure that sufficient influence is exerted regarding the direction of funding and other resources to equip and protect the Iraqi security sector in MND(SE).	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.18	<u>Private Security Companies</u>	UK policy on the MOD's relationship with private security companies requires review.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.19	<u>IO Planning and Strategy</u>	Lack of IO Strategic/Operational direction in IO should not be allowed to delay UK strategic or operational planning. In order to avoid a potential planning vacuum, the UK should press coalition lead nations as strongly as possible to commence timely IO planning and for early provision of and IO strategy.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.20	<u>Employment of Language-Trained News Teams</u>	MOD should examine the employment of language-trained news teams that can be deployed as part of the strategic communications plan in order to influence regional	Doc TELIC Vol 2

		audiences.	
TEL2.A.21	<u>Exploiting New Media</u>	In order to develop the UK's Information Operations capability for expeditionary operations, the exploitation of internet and satellite broadcasting should be examined.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.22	<u>Deployment of the Media</u>	A failure to provide journalists with rapid and open access to UK Forces on operations will affect the Information Campaign. The transportation of journalist into theatre should be considered when planning Hub and Spoke operations, with concomitant pressure from the FCO to establish the required MOU with host nations.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.23	<u>Advertising Campaign Analysis</u>	The Bell-Pottinger plan has been a successful and adequately-funded element of the Information Campaign. ¹ Cost/benefit analysis should be performed to determine the value of additional expenditure to cover 2005 in the run-up to the Dec 05 Election ¹ \$6M from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.24	<u>Cross-Departmental Training</u>	Staff from Other Government Departments (OGDs) should be invited to participate in military training and joint exercises to enhance their understanding of how MOD operates. There will be particular need to develop a cross-Government understanding of the Generic Strategic Campaign Plan.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.25	<u>OGD Training on Military Courses</u>	The MOD should host officials from the OGDs on courses, in order to communicate more widely military ethos and doctrine. Course loading on RCDS, HCSC and ACSC, should be reviewed to determine whether more personnel from OGDs could be included. Selected MOD officials should also be sent on courses run by OGDs.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.26	<u>Interfaces Between Intelligence, Planning and Operations</u>	The interfaces between intelligence, planning and operations in PJHQ and theatre and the resources in these areas should be reviewed to enhance medium term contingency planning that is informed by intelligence.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.27	<u>POLAD Pre-Deployment Training</u>	POLADs should be attached to the relevant military HQ prior to deployment to allow them to familiarise themselves with their role and working environment and POLADs should also participate in HQ pre-deployment exercises.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.28	<u>UK Funding Mechanisms</u>	An agile mechanism that can quickly access funding for large scale projects that support campaign plans should be established with appropriate financial delegation to forces in-theatre.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.29	<u>DFID and MOD/UK Forces Coordination</u>	DFID and MOD need to consolidate recent improvements in coordination during military-led operations; DFID should be invited to review the level and duration of post-conflict support it provides to deployed UK HQ.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.30	<u>Retention and Processing of Evidence</u>	The Mounting Order should clarify the requirement to keep adequate Operational Records and Unit Cos should be held accountable for the quality of Operational Records that must record the location and activities of sub-units even if there is limited interaction with civilians.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.31	<u>Employment of Military Lawyers</u>	The role and number of deployed military lawyers should be reviewed to ensure that they are not over committed to	Doc TELIC

		Investigation into civilian deaths caused by British soldiers by offering advice to both the SIB and the unit, particularly when they provided the unit with initial advice on ROE.	Vol 2
TEL2.A.32	<u>War-Crimes Policy</u>	Cross-Government coordination is required on policy regarding the capture and prosecution or transfer to other judicial authorities of war criminals and criminals.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.33	<u>Internment of Suspected Terrorists</u>	MOD must approach the DCA again to reach agreement on the IRB terms of reference to review the GOC's decision to intern individuals considered a serious threat to the mission.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.34	<u>Military Law Enforcement Operations</u>	In advance of operations where law enforcement is required, UK forces and legal advisers should establish a working knowledge of local law - especially the criminal code.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.35	<u>Cultural Training</u>	Notwithstanding the many other demands on a unit's time prior to operations, cultural training provides a significant return and needs a higher priority during training for an operating environment in which the cultural dimension is vital.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.36	<u>Reservist Moral, Retention and Future Recruiting</u>	The methods and rationale of Reservist employment on Operation TELIC and other operations should be assessed to determine if there is any long-term impact on Reservist morale, retention and future recruiting.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.37	<u>Reserves Database</u>	In order to make better use of Reservists' specialist civilian skills, the impact and practicality of creating and maintaining a database to track such skills should be examined.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.38	<u>Reservists Tour Length</u>	The Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA 96) is sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of most Reserves and their chain of command, and pertinent commanders should be reminded of its content.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.39	<u>Logistic Doctrine</u>	Logistic doctrine needs to be reviewed to take account of the transition of logistic delivery within the Continuum of Operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.40	<u>Consignment Tracking</u>	The need for consignment tracking equipment and the training in its use should be considered early in operational pre-deployment planning. Such equipment (VITAL, TAV) ² should be provided at all logistic nodes in the operational supply chain, including PODs and DOBs, to enable sufficient consignment visibility to and from operational theatres. ² VITAL and TAV equipment/processes continue to be improved through the CONVIS project.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.41	<u>ISTAR</u> Redacted	Future ISTAR procurement strategies should Redacted	Doc TELIC Vol 2

TEL2.A.42	<u>Citadel COLPRO Development</u>	The requirement for Citadel COLPRO designed to enable continuity of C2 needs to be assessed, and then developed and trialled as necessary.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.43	<u>Protected Mobility Investment</u>	Sustained investment is required to provide sufficient protected mobility vehicles for operations in hostile environments such as Iraq.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.44	<u>Electronic Counter Measures for IEDs</u>	The counter-IED capability should be safeguarded through adequate resourcing and continued analysis of IED development. Sufficient Equipment to protect patrol Vehicles against IEDs should be maintained and available for current and future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.45	Redacted	Redacted	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.A.46	<u>Contribution to EW Coordination Cell</u>	in future operations, the UK should press for, and contribute to, coalition EWCCs which should include a spectrum management element.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.01	<u>Tracking US COIN Doctrine</u>	UK military commanders and planners should be aware of variable US COIN practices and track implementation of US doctrine in this area, including that of the US Army and the USMC.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.02	<u>UK Embedded HQ Staff Posts</u>	The number of UK personnel contributing to the MNF-1 HQ structure was primarily a consequence of our military contribution and political risk shared between the Prime Minister and US President.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.03	<u>Embedded UK Staff Capacity to Influence US</u>	In the early stages of campaign planning within a US-led coalition, the UK needs to assess where the greatest opportunities to engage and influence the US exist, and match the number of UK staff accordingly.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.04	<u>Experience of UK Embedded Staff</u>	When UK personnel are selected for embedded posts within a US-led HQ, if practical, their previous experience of working alongside the US should be taken into consideration.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.05	<u>UK/US Exchange and Liaison Posts</u>	US familiarity with UK staff officers through exchange and liaison posts has been a significant factor in establishing trust and respect, and raising the profile of embedded UK personnel in MNF-1.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.06	<u>UK Decision-Making</u>	Decisions on additional commitments within a multi-national operation should be made in a manner that does not raise expectations before a firm decision is made.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.07	Redacted	Redacted	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.08	<u>Relationship with Other Troop Contributing Nations</u>	In a Coalition, the formation of a partners group to communicate strategic intentions of all countries concerned will increase coalition unity of purpose and effort, and improve contingency planning. Such a group should be formed at the earliest opportunity after coalition membership is formalised.	Doc TELIC Vol 2

TEL2.N.09	<u>OPTAG Training Packages</u>	LAND has an enduring task as the proponent for the provision of ad-hoc training, at varying levels of commitment, and can expect to provide increasingly varied and sophisticated training packages.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.10	<u>Rebuilding Foreign Police Forces</u>	UK policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction must be cognisant of the need to rebuild foreign, civilian police forces. The policy needs to recognise the different skill-sets of the various UK police forces and tailor pre-deployment training accordingly.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.11	<u>Political Pressure for Border Security</u>	Political pressure on neighbouring countries should be applied in order to increase border security and reduce insurgent freedom of movement in COIN operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.12	<u>Personnel for Border Security</u>	The international boundaries of recently defeated/liberated territories may require significant manpower to maintain security whilst indigenous forces are trained. The requirement should be assessed prior to hostilities and should be factored into the strategic estimate.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.13	<u>Customs and Immigration Development</u>	Border Security requires specialist input such as Customs and Immigration. Such input should be factored into the strategic estimate.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.14	<u>Establishing a Criminal Justice System</u>	Establishing a criminal justice system in a post-conflict situation requires a cross-government approach and a detailed understanding of the existing legislation and legal practice within the country.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.15	<u>Military Awareness of Charities and NGO Sensitivities</u>	Charities and NGOs are concerned about being seen as too closely related to the military effort. The military should be aware of such sensitivities and manage in-theatre relationships with charities/NGOs accordingly.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.16	<u>Information Campaign Focus</u>	At times it might be appropriate for UK commanders to focus on an audience different from the Coalition Line of Operation if it is in the national interest, or if the operational situation demands.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.17	<u>Information Campaign During Contingency Operations</u>	The information Campaign will invariably come under pressure when complex contingency operations are planned at short notice. However, it is precisely on these occasions that the Information Campaign must be taken into account to make sure that the planned initiative is well understood by a potentially hostile target audience.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.18	<u>Arab Specialists and Linguists</u>	The UK must continue to build up its base of Arab specialists and linguists as noted in the DOC Appraisal of Defence Languages.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.19	<u>Adverse Media Coverage of Operations</u>	The discovery of potentially damaging action by Coalition Forces needs to be acknowledged early, thereby allowing early dissemination of appropriate messages to manage the perceptions of target audiences.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.20	<u>Cross-Government Media Coordination</u>	Careful planning by the FCO-led Iraq Planning Unit and the cross-government Iraq Communications Group were central to the success of the agreed plan for the Transfer of Authority; this demonstrated the benefits of a well-coordinated approach to coalition planning.	Doc TELIC Vol 2

TEL2.N.21	<u>Media Personnel in Headquarters</u>	The deployment to MND(SE) of SO1 Info Ops from PJHQ to run the information Campaign over the transition period was effective and allowed close attention to be given to managing the perceptions of the local population.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.22	<u>Iraqi Perception Management</u>	The Coalition should have made greater effort to ensure that the perceptions of the Iraqi people were better managed by the IIG; offering more continuous support and guidance could have helped the IIG's credibility with the Iraqi public.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.23	<u>Polling in the Information Campaign</u>	Polling has become an important measure of effectiveness for an information Campaign and should continue to be sufficiently resourced.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.24	<u>Influencing Hostile Media</u>	Whilst political imperatives may influence decisions over the toleration of potentially hostile media facilities, decision-makers must be made aware that removing the facility also removes the ability to influence its output.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.25	<u>Embedded Reporting</u>	Embedded reporting remains a key element in maintaining the immediacy and positive impact of media coverage, and should be incorporated whenever the tactical situation permits.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.26	<u>Delivery of Financial Resource</u>	Operational planning assumptions should be realistic about the ability of OGDs, other governments and pan-government organisations to deliver financial resources in a timely manner that can be aligned to campaign objectives.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.27	<u>Post Conflict Reconstruction Investment Balance</u>	When allocating funds to international organisations such as the UN for the purpose of PCR, the long-term benefits should be balanced against the resultant consequences on short-term regional PCR where the UK has lead nation responsibilities.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.28	<u>Reconstruction Delivery by DFID</u>	DFID's ability to deliver reconstruction will inevitably be affected by the security situation. The consequences of this situation need to be better understood by military personnel.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.29	<u>Resourcing the PCRU</u>	Recognising that the PCRU is still developing its capabilities, military support to it should be maintained and kept under regular review.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.30	<u>Forensic Science Service</u>	MOD should be aware of likely delays within the Forensic Science Service and the impact this will have on case progress.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.31	<u>Establishing UK-Owned Detention Facilities</u>	Where practicable, the UK should aim to establish its own detention facilities. The requirement for units trained and equipped to establish Internment facilities should be included in the operational planning process.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.32	<u>Medical Eligibility Matrix</u>	An Eligibility Matrix of non-military personnel entitled to medical cover by military resources should be available early in a campaign. To assist medical planning, this matrix should provide information on the probable numbers of people involved.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.33	<u>Coalition Rules of Engagement</u>	In a multinational kill chain, to avoid the complications caused by different legal interpretations of the operational	Doc TELIC

		situation, UK and lead-nation legal bases should be as closely aligned as possible. This alignment will become increasingly necessary as UK assets become more integrated in the NEC environment.	Vol 2
TEL2.N.34	<u>Quality and Value of Training</u>	Operations in Iraq continue to underline the value and quality of our training at home and overseas and the requirement for sustained investment in it.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.35	<u>Training for a Non-Linear Threat</u>	The training base, across the Services, should provide appropriate training to reflect that there is no secure area in the non-linear battlespace. This requirement applies to combat, CS and CSS units alike.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.36	<u>UK/US Combined/Multi-national Exercises</u>	The Combined/Multinational Exercise programme with the US remains vital to preserve UK/US cooperative capabilities. The balance and content of exercises should reflect the developing nature of asymmetric warfare	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.37	<u>The Contribution of Individual Training</u>	The type and ethos of individual training for UK forces continue to be validated on Operation TELIC. FLCs and the training base should continue to place emphasis on the quality of individual training, including inculcating Mission Command at Junior levels.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.38	<u>Priority of Media Training</u>	Units are now giving Media Training suitable priority; FLCs should ensure that this trend continues.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.39	<u>Civil Servant Training for Operations</u>	The requirement to train civil servants attached to military formations on an operation should be addressed prior to its commencement. The training should reflect today's non-linear battlespace where civilians are often as much at risk as service personnel.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.40	<u>Reserve Forces Act Restrictions</u>	The legislation to limit the Reservist mobilisation period to 12 months in 3 years if the Reservist has passed the 12 month point is inconsistent with other Reservist legislation. Efforts to remove this restriction from the Reserve Forces Act should continue.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.41	<u>Joint Logistics</u>	Whilst logistic planners must be alive to the opportunities of combining logistic formations where appropriate, success depends on the articulation of clear C2 arrangements; this is particularly critical when National assets may be tasked to support multinational activity.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.42	<u>Joint Force Logistics</u>	The success of logistic support to Operation TELIC continues to validate the Joint Force Logistics Concept.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.43	<u>Force Protection for Contractors and Logistics Vehicles</u>	The requirement to provide force protection to contractors who lack indigenous protection and the requirement for the appropriate driver and vehicle protection to be fitted to 'B' vehicles prior to deployment should be considered as part of the estimate.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.44	<u>Availability of Cross-Component ISTAR Product</u>	ISTAR sensor product needs to be available cross-component to reduce reaction times for Time Sensitive Targeting and increase situational awareness.	Doc TELIC Vol 2

TEL2.N.45	<u>ISTAR Assets for Target Engagement</u>	The locally non-permissive ground environment during Phase IV of Operation TELIC highlights the advantages of being able to engage targets directly from the locating platform, provided ROE permit such engagements.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.46	<u>ISTAR Impact</u>	The impact of new ISTAR equipment on training, manning levels, and the burden on an already overloaded CIS should be considered early in the acquisition process.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL2.N.47	<u>Force Protection Policy</u>	Although a Force Protection Policy, titled 'FP Engineering Guidance Note for Operation TELIC Commanders' has recently been issued by PJHQ J3 to theatre and should improve the current situation, FP needs to be thought through better for future operations.	Doc TELIC Vol 2
TEL3.A.01		The Coalition's support to the Iraqi electoral process with physical security, training the Iraqi Security Forces and conducting Information Operations was successful and should be reflected in UK tactics, techniques and procedures.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.02		MOD should engage widely with the US in order to develop a better understanding of the US approach to COIN, including lessons learned, in order to assess its overall effectiveness	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.03		MOD's Iraq stock-take process should be widened into an integrated cross-Government assessment against HMG objectives.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.04		MOD in conjunction with the FCO should undertake a strategic assessment of what capabilities are required for expeditionary policing capacity building.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.05		There is a requirement to ensure that limitations on Combat ID are mitigated in the urban environment through the use of systems such as Blue Force tracker.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.06		In noting the use of the Paveway Guided Missile the urban environment there is a greater need for CAS training at shorter ranges, and all fire controllers should be able to control CAS.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.07		MOD planners should consider the impact their plans may have on Other Government Departments and seek their early engagement in order to ensure the consequences of potential courses of action are correctly identified.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.08		The current Force Elements and scope and nature of CIMIC training should be examined to ensure it adequately prepares the Armed Forces to fulfil their CIMIC role.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.09		The routine posting of formation commanders should be avoided mid-tour.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.10		The advantages and disadvantages for the extension of key commanders beyond 6 months (up to 9-12 months) requires further analysis, particularly for operations focused on Security Sector Reform.	Doc TELIC Vol 3

TEL3.A.11		We should determine whether our own intelligence doctrine and procedures are correctly optimized and consider whether changes should be applied as a result of the lessons learned by the US and the UK in conducting COIN.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.12		In the light of recent operational experience we should re-consider addressing the ISTAR capability requirements, particularly in addressing surveillance generally and UAVs specifically.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.13		A DIS liaison officer with TOUCHSTONE capability providing 'reach-back' would add to the OISG utility.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.14		There is a urgent requirement to assess and improve our BH capacity as an operational priority, in the short to medium term.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.15		Problems with the Bowman Support Solution must be resolved in order to ensure that the operational fielding of Bowman is not undermined and so that the capability can be exploited and developed to the full.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.16		Redacted.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.17		There is a requirement to identify a means of exploiting emerging intelligence in the UK in order to support current operations and inform pre-deployment training.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.18		The CIED capability needs to migrate from Northern Ireland as the Normalization process progresses in order to ensure that it evolves into a coherent expeditionary capability.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.19		Short term action is required to fill the funding gap for FPE development and in the longer term, policy must be developed to ensure that FPE is brought into core business post Northern Ireland 'Normalization'.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.20		MOD needs to be aware of the extent to which Human Rights legislation and the ECHR places additional requirements on troops detaining civilians and the standard of investigation required if it is alleged troops have violated civilian's rights.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.21		More pro-active media engagement is required to provide context for allegations and court cases relating to soldiers abusing civilians.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.A.22		The MOD must identify a methodology and system that is able to track individual casualties without breaching medical confidentiality and the data protection act in order to accurately report casualties for public interest and operational analysis purposes.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.01		The UK government should be aware of the requirement to assist foreign governments develop their institutions and ministry level capabilities as part of a balanced security	Doc TELIC Vol 3

		sector reform package.	
TEL3.N.02		The absence of an appropriate HMG Strategy for Iraq hindered the ability of the UK government to support capacity building in the Iraqi government.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.03		A significant factor in achieving progress in the Security Line of Operation within SE Iraq has been an understanding of the regional and provincial politics, including the dynamics of tribal interests. In turn, this rests on maintaining cultural awareness, which remains a fundamental part of training.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.04		MOD should continue to analyse religious sentiments and actions in Iraq in order to anticipate future developments and to provide advanced warning of techniques that may transfer to other theatres.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.05		MOD needs to understand DFID's financial constraints and the impact reduced spending will have on reconstruction and governance programmes in Iraq.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.06		The Humanitarian Operations Centre played a useful role in coordinating relief activity undertaken by the Coalition, UN, OGDs and NGOs.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.07		The 'virtual' operational intelligence support group in MND(SE) has improved ISTAR fusion. Continued investment and development is required in order to maximize the utility of the OISG concept demonstrator being deployed to Afghanistan in 2006. This is a vital Defence asset that warrants control at the highest level.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.08		There is a requirement to assess and improve out AT capacity as an operational priority. The UK should consider civilian air charter to off-load capacity on all benign coupling bridges.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.09		There is a requirement to identify a means of exploiting emerging intelligence in the UK in order to support and inform pre-deployment training.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.10		A divisional HQ does not have the staff to take battle groups under command for extended/indefinite periods.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
TEL3.N.11		United Nations Security Council authority for deployed forces to intern individuals for imperative reasons of security should be obtained where possible.	Doc TELIC Vol 3
HCDC.03.04.01	MOD Openness	MOD demonstrating less co-operation and openness than a Select Committee should expect	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.02	Force Structure	TELIC 1 took MOD to maximum capacity in terms of operational capability	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.03	Force Generation	Requirement to re-examine mechanisms by which units are brought up to war establishments	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.04	Force Structure	MOD should be more explicit in articulating what scale of forces can be offered for expeditionary	HCDC

		operations, whilst ensuring adequate resources, equipment and training time	- 03/04
HCDC.03.04.05	C2	MOD are expected to revisit the question of a deployable PJHQ	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.06	C2	MoD should consider whether the highest levels of British command structures might be made more adaptable so as to be able to operate more closely in parallel with their American counterparts, when UK and US forces are operating together.	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.07	MOD Openness	The extent to which the UK persuaded the US out of attacking certain targets on grounds of principle is less clear. HCDC asked MoD for specific examples of UK influence but they failed to provide any, even on a classified basis.	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.08	Air-Land Integration	Shortcomings in the practice and training of close air support must be urgently addressed	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.09	Air-Land Integration	Speed and accuracy of BDA needs improving	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.10	Reserves	Short notice call on reservists needs improving	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.11	Reserves	Reservists should be made fully aware of their liability for call out	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.12	Reserves	Remedial action required for substantial number of reservists who failed medicals	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.13	Reserves	Non-alignment of Regular and TA shooting standards needs addressing	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.14	Reserves	TA Reservists experiencing pay problems should be addressed	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.15	Reserves	Procedures for reservists claiming financial assistance are streamlined and less intrusive	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.16	Reserves	MoD needs a more proactive approach to identify cases where reservists have experienced employment problems following a period of mobilisation	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.17	Reserves	Unreasonable for deployed reservists to do additional service on top of TELIC tour to qualify for annual bounties	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.18	Medical	Undermanning remains a continuing concern, requiring MoD, Department of Health and NHS to find innovative solutions	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.19	Medical	Concern over resignation of a large number of	HCDC

		medical reserves	- 03/04
HCDC.03.04.20	Medical	More medical supplies required on the shelf (rather than relying on UORs)	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.21	Deployment	MoD should identify how the challenges of limited landing slots for aircraft and small sea ports could be addressed in the future	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.22	Deployment	MoD needs to avoid competing directly with the US for outsize lift and co-ordinate its efforts to secure such assets	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.23	Deployment	MoD should ensure that forecasts for A400M in service dates are met, and any interim capability gaps are filled	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.24	Equipment - UORs	Delays in authorising UORs resulted in personnel not having access to the full complement of equipment, including LMGs and Underslung Grenade Launchers	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.25	Equipment - UORs	Delivery of UORs must be in time to provide adequate familiarisation, training and integration	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.26	Equipment - UORs	Risks of relying on UORs rather than holding adequate stocks are not well understood	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.27	Equipment - UORs	Where appropriate, UORs should be taken into core	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.28	Operational Planning	MoD should review RN capability to undertake mine clearance operations in shallow and very shallow waters	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.29	Equipment - Maritime	HMS Ocean was let down by unreliable and poorly integrated landing craft	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.30	Equipment - CIS	Serious shortcomings in the reliability, capacity and redundancy of CIS systems identified	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.31	MOD Openness	VCDS review of combat identification, provided to the NAO, was not made available to HCDC inquiry	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.32	Combat Identification	MoD should push forward with work with allies to agree a single system for Combat Identification	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.33	Equipment - Air	Lessons identified to minimise Sea King's vulnerability, whilst ensuring that Astor meets its in-service date to provide dedicated stand-off sensor coverage	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.34	Equipment - Land	HCDC to continue to monitor FRES as part of its annual inquiry into Defence Procurement	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.35	Logistics	In-theatre distribution and tracking must be improved to ensure that service personnel receive the	HCDC - 03/04

		equipment they are entitled to	
HCDC.03.04.36	Equipment - Land	MOD should examine the case for providing night vision capability to all personnel who are reequipped to operate at night	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.37	NBC	NBC detection and protection equipment not available to all	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.38	Logistics	More robust logistic support and asset tracking system required	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.39	Infrastructure	Priority of any operation that appropriate accommodation is made available as quickly as possible	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.40	Welfare	Improvements to welfare packages for early entry forces required	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.41	Welfare	Support to reserve families should be scrutinised	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.42	Welfare	Post-operational health needs constant review	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.43	Accounting	Concern that a misapplication of RAB has resulted in stock holdings being reduced too far	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.44	Operational Transition	British Government was constrained in its planning for post conflict by US primacy	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.45	MOD Openness	Government misjudged that planning to meet the needs of the Iraqi people was sensitive (and therefore specialist external assistance was not sought)	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.46	Force Structure	Scale and shape of force was well suited to meeting desired effects of combat phase of TELIC 1, but not the desired outcome of the post combat phase	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.47	Protecting the People	Mistakes were made in not identifying and protecting key buildings and infrastructure from looters	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.48	Protecting the People	A failure to establish troops on the ground quickly enough resulted in lawlessness that undermined local support for the coalition	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.49	Operational Transition	Peace support capabilities need to be improved to support the transition from combat to governance	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.50	Cultural Awareness	Language training needs improving to effectively communicate with the population	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.51	SSR / Police	Police Advice should have been available in advance of the military campaign	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.52	Protecting the People	Coalition failed to identify and secure munition sites, and other assets that would be exploited by the	HCDC

		insurgency	- 03/04
HCDC.03.04.53	Cultural Awareness	Greater efforts required to understand the societies into which military forces project themselves	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.54	MOD Openness	Military capability gaps could be filled through wider use of civilian expertise (following US example)	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.55	IO	If military IO is to be successful, it should start at the outset of a crisis, not at the outset of military intervention.	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.56	IO	Coalition perceived to have come second in perception management, through late and retrospective IO management	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.57	Media	Importance of the media campaign remains under-appreciated by sections of the Armed Forces	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.58	Media	MoD needs to consider how better to support the context of battlefield reporting in the future	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.59	Media	MoD should consider how to cope with unfavourable coverage from the front line	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.03.04.60	Operational Planning	Concern that too great a focus was placed on effects based planning, and the part the military can play as one component in a spectrum of political and military activity	HCDC - 03/04
HCDC.04.05.01	Operational Planning	Planning failed to recognise that Coalition presence would be resented by some Iraqis, and portrayed as cultural and economic imperialism	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.02	Metrics	Measures of effectiveness and resilience of insurgents required	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.03	Border Security	Inadequate attention paid to border security	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.04	Border Security	Failure to appreciate potential for insurgency to attract foreign fighters	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.05	Comprehensive Approach	Iraq civil lead for counterinsurgency required, with a need to combine politico-economic and military strands to COIN	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.06	Rule of Law	Requirement to examine policies, preparations and pre-deployment trg for PSO in relation to abuse of Iraqi detainees	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.07	Rule of Law	MNF-I should assist GoI in developing capabilities to detain, prosecute and imprison those assessed to pose a serious threat	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.08	SSR	Security Sector Reform should have been given greater priority before and immediately after the	HCDC

		invasion of Iraq	- 04/05
HCDC.04.05.09	SSR	Institutional development of IMoD required to give political oversight to ISF	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.10	SSR	Coalition should provide assistance to Transitional National Assembly in establishing mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of ISF	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.11	SSR / Police	Short termism and indecision on police reform. Weakness of police reform came close to undermining the success of military operations	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.12	SSR / Police	Requirement to integrate police development required in post-conflict planning	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.13	SSR	Importance of rebuilding indigenous forces from the outset	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.14	Protecting the People	Planning and resources should have been devoted to securing Iraq's many arms depots and sources of insurgency materiel	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.15	Comprehensive Approach	Post conflict stabilisation will only be effective through detailed engagement by all government departments from the outset	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.16	Comprehensive Approach	Better co-operation and mutual understanding required between Armed Forces and NGOs	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.04.05.17	Comprehensive Approach	Nation Building requires serious commitment of time, energy, financial resources and political resolve	HCDC - 04/05
HCDC.05.06.01	Border Security	Requirement to develop Iraqi Border Police and Navy to help contain the smuggling of IED components from Iran	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.02	SSR / Police	Corruption, militai infiltration and politicization of the IPS should be addressed as a matter of urgency, including addressing institutional problems in IMoD / IMoI	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.03	Metrics	Metrics and criteria for transition required	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.04	SSR	Transition to Iraqi control will allow UK forces to assume a supporting role, not to withdraw from theatre	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.05	PRT	Value of PRT remains in question: it should enhance, rather than replicate or duplicate, Iraqi decision making	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.06	Rule of Law	Transparency required over detainees, including numbers and grounds for detention	HCDC - 05/06

HCDC.05.06.07	Equipment - Land	Unacceptable that vulnerabilities of Snatch were not addressed earlier	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.08	Equipment - Land	Environmental mitigation for troops requires further work	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.09	Equipment - Air	Shortage of helicopters a critical weakness	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.10	Equipment - Air	Unreliable airbridge impacting on leave and R&R	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.11	Equipment - Air	Aircraft safety, and fitting Explosion Suppressant Foam across the fleet, should be addressed as highest priority	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.12	Welfare	"Can do" attitude of Services may be leading to Service commanders underplaying the pressure on Service personnel and their families	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.05.06.13	Force Structure	Are UK Armed Forces structured, trained and equipped to fulfill the role envisaged for them in SDR and its successor policy documents?	HCDC - 05/06
HCDC.07.01	Reconciliation	National and local reconciliation as the only route to generate lasting stability, but this must be done through a position of strength	HCDC - 07
HCDC.07.02	Protecting the People	A reduction in attacks against UK forces since Aug 07 in no way mitigated our failure to protect the Iraqi population from militia and criminal gangs. MNF-I and ISF failed to tackle the root causes of violence.	HCDC - 07
HCDC.07.03	SSR / Police	Development of both Iraq Army and Police as credible, capable and effective is fundamental to setting the conditions for MOD to drawdown and ultimately withdraw. Requirement for MOD to explain how training will continue against the backdrop of a strategy to reduce to 2,500, including proposals for the training of the IPS.	HCDC - 07
HCDC.07.04	Equipment - Air	MOD needs to closely monitor Merlin and Chinook programmes to prevent slippage and to ensure that helicopters are available for operational use as soon as possible	HCDC - 07
HCDC.07.05	Accounting	MOD appears to have made no provision for repair, refurbishment and storage of equipment returning from theatre	HCDC - 07
HCDC.07.06	Operational Planning	Strategy by numbers (2,500) not viable if UK forces are not able to deliver meaningful effect for securing the population and training the ISF	HCDC - 07
HCDC.08.01	SSR	The larger the military training commitment we can maintain to ISF, the greater the UK influence in Iraq	HCDC - 08

		and the region will be in the long term	
HCDC.08.02	SSR	Training of Iraq Navy is a long term responsibility, and MOD should consider how it can continue this task after the drawdown from southern Iraq	HCDC - 08
HCDC.08.03	Protecting the People	Growing prosperity and the improvement of living standards will have a disproportional impact on countering the insurgencies	HCDC - 08