Operational guidance
Incidents involving
hazardous materials
Fire and Rescue Service

Operational guidance
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Major incidents involving hazardous materials in the United Kingdom are rare. Such incidents place significant demands on local fire and rescue services and often require resources and support from other fire and rescue services and emergency responders. However, smaller scale incidents involving hazardous materials are more prevalent and these may require a response from any fire and rescue service in England.

The Fire and Rescue Service Operational Guidance – Incidents involving hazardous materials provides robust yet flexible guidance that can be adapted to the nature, scale and requirements of the incident.

The Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser is grateful for the assistance in the development in this guidance from a wide range of sources, including the fire and rescue service and a range of experts from a wide range of industries and other organisations.

It is anticipated that this guidance will promote common principles, practices and procedures that will support the fire and rescue service to resolve incidents involving hazardous materials safely and efficiently.
The objective of the *Fire and Rescue Service Operational Guidance – Incidents involving hazardous materials* is to provide a consistency of approach that forms the basis for common operational practices, supporting interoperability between fire and rescue services, other emergency responders, industry experts and other relevant groups. These common principles, practices and procedures are intended to support the development of safe systems of work on the incident ground and to enhance national resilience.

Operational Guidance issued by the Department of Communities and Local Government promotes and develops good practice within the Fire and Rescue Service and is offered as a current industry standard. It is envisaged that this will help establish high standards of efficiency and safety in the interests of employers, employees and the general public.

The Guidance, which is compiled using the best sources of information known at the date of issue, is intended for use by competent persons. The application of the guidance does not remove the need for appropriate technical and managerial judgement in practical situations with due regard to local circumstances, nor does it confer any immunity or exemption from relevant legal requirements, including by-laws. Those investigating compliance with the law may refer to this guidance as illustrating an industry standard.

It is a matter for each individual fire and rescue service whether to adopt and follow this Operational Guidance. The onus of responsibility for application of guidance lies with the user. Department of Communities and Local Government accept no legal liability or responsibility whatsoever, howsoever arising, for the consequences of the use or misuse of the guidance.
Section 3

Introduction
Purpose

3.1 This operational guidance is set out in the form of a procedural and technical framework. Fire and Rescue Services should consider it when developing or reviewing their policy and procedures to safely and efficiently resolve emergency incidents involving hazardous materials, including CBRN(E) materials.¹

3.2 In everyday language the term hazardous materials, also referred to as dangerous/hazardous substances or goods, means solids, liquids, or gases that can harm people, other living organisms, property, or the environment. They not only include materials that are toxic, radioactive, flammable, explosive, corrosive, oxidizers, asphyxiates, biohazards, pathogen or allergen substances and organisms, but also materials with physical conditions or other characteristics that render them hazardous in specific circumstances, such as compressed gases and liquids, or hot/cold materials.

3.3 Non-Fire and Rescue Service organisations and agencies may use more technical and specific definitions because of their own requirements but the above definition is the most appropriate one for Fire and Rescue Services to base their risk assessments and planning assumptions on.

3.4 A Fire and Rescue Service may respond to a wide range of incidents involving hazardous materials that have the potential to cause harm to firefighters, the community and the environment. They may be called to deal specifically with emergency spillages or releases, or they may encounter hazardous materials at fires and other emergency incidents. The purpose of this guidance is to assist emergency responders to make safe, risk assessed, efficient and proportionate responses whenever hazardous materials are encountered in the operational arena.

Scope

3.5 The scope of this guidance is wide ranging due to the extensive nature of hazardous materials incidents encountered by the Fire and Rescue Service. It is applicable to any event, regardless of scale, from small incidents, such as the careless use of domestic cleaning products, to large scale chemical spillages on the highway and industrial accidents.

3.6 It is focused on the tactical and technical aspects of hazardous materials incidents to assist Fire and Rescue Services with:

- the development and implementation of safe systems of work
- inter-operability at large or cross-border incidents where more than one Fire and Rescue Service is in attendance.

¹ CBRN(E) materials terrorism entails the assumption or knowledge, based on intelligence or actual evidence, of actual or threatened dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material (either on their own or in combination with each other or with explosives), with deliberate criminal, malicious or murderous intent, targeted at a given population or economic/symbolic points.
3.7 The guidance covers the time period from the receipt of the emergency call to the closure of the incident by the Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commander. ‘Closure’ in terms of Fire and Rescue Service involvement may mean the handing over of responsibility to another agency or ‘responsible person’.

3.8 In addition to detailed tactical and technical information, this guidance also outlines the key operational and strategic roles, responsibilities and considerations that need to be taken into account to enable the Fire and Rescue Service to plan, train, test and respond effectively to any hazardous materials incident or event.

3.9 This operational guidance has been developed to deal primarily with accidental hazardous materials incidents. However, the operational principles are essentially equally applicable to deliberate, malicious or terrorist events although it is acknowledged that incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRN(E)) materials events will require a more specific response due to:

- increased security measures
- increased risks to Fire and Rescue Service staff
- complexity of multi-agency working
- potential for secondary devices
- potential for perpetrators to pick virulent agents that are both persistent and difficult to identify
- potential to conceal the identity and/or remove and/or replace signage and material information
- potential to pick locations that exploit the characteristics of the agent
- need to exchange information with off-site intelligence and scientific advisers.

**Structure**

3.10 This operational guidance is based on nationally accepted good practice. It is written as an enabling guide based around risk-critical operational principles rather than a strict set of rules and procedures. This is done to recognise local differences across the United Kingdom in terms of risk profiles and levels of resources.

3.11 Section 7 contains the bulk of the guidance and it is divided into three parts:

- Part A – Pre-planning considerations
- Part B – Operational considerations – Generic standard operating procedure
- Part C – Technical considerations
Part A: Pre-planning considerations
Provides guidance and information to assist Fire and Rescue Services in the
preparation of emergency response plans for hazardous materials incidents
and risks.

Part B: Operational considerations – GSOP
Provides guidance to Fire and Rescue Service staff on responding to and
resolving typical hazardous materials incidents. It is structured around six
emergency response phases common to all operational incidents.

The procedure detailed in this part of the guidance uses the Incident
Command System decision making model as its foundation. It is a Generic –
Standard Operating Procedure for dealing with hazardous materials incidents
that Fire and Rescue Services can adopt or adapt depending on their
individual risk assessments and resources.

Each section of the Generic Standard Operating Procedure details extensive
lists divided into:
• Possible actions
• Further considerations.

It should be stressed that these are not mandatory procedures. They are a
‘tool box’ of suggestions or ‘enabling guide’ appropriate to emergency
hazardous materials operations.

The Generic – Standard Operating Procedure reflects the hazards and control
measures of the national generic risk assessments relevant to hazardous
materials incidents.

Part C – Technical considerations
Contains technical and scientific information appropriate to the Fire and
Rescue Service functions being performed at hazardous materials incidents. It
summarises risk-critical operational guidance and information required by
firefighters, commanders and hazardous materials advisers. It also references
more detailed guidance that may be of interest to Fire and Rescue Services.

This part only contains technical information with operational
implications and is not intended to be a source of scientific theory.
Section 4
Legal framework
Introduction

4.1 This section does not contain detailed legal advice about legislation. It is simply a summary of the most relevant legislation to Fire and Rescue Authorities when considering hazardous materials incidents.

4.2 When considering this legal framework it is essential to recognise that any definitive interpretation of the legal roles and responsibilities imposed by legislation can only be given by a court of law.

4.3 For a full understanding of the responsibilities imposed by the legislation, and by the Fire and Rescue Service National Framework, reference should be made to the relevant legislation or the current National Framework. The range of legislation and guidance that could impact on the operational responsibilities of the Fire and Rescue Authority is extensive and each Authority should seek guidance from their own legal advisors.

Primary Fire and Rescue Service legislation

Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004

4.4 **Section 7 Fires** – places a statutory duty for a Fire and Rescue Authority to plan and provide arrangements for fighting fires and protecting life and property from fires within its area. A Fire and Rescue Authority is required to secure the provision of sufficient personnel, services and equipment to deal with all normal circumstances, as well as adequate training. A Fire and Rescue Authority must also put in place effective arrangements for receiving and responding to calls for help and for obtaining information which it needs to carry out its functions (s7(2)(d)); the latter might include, for example, information about the nature and characteristics of buildings within the authority’s area or availability of and access to water supplies.

4.5 **Section 8 Road Traffic Accidents** – places a duty on Fire and Rescue Authorities to make provision for rescuing persons from road traffic accidents and for dealing with the aftermath of such accidents. Historically, the risk of fire was the trigger for attendance at such an incident. While advances in vehicle design have seen the incidence of fire following an accident decrease, calls to assist with the rescue of people from wreckage and protect them from harm from spillage of hazardous substances have increased dramatically. A Fire and Rescue Authority is required, therefore, to secure sufficient resources and training to deal with all normal circumstances. A Fire and Rescue Authority must also put in place effective arrangements for receiving and responding to calls for help and for obtaining information to exercise its functions (for example, knowledge of local road and trunk road network).

4.6 The Secretary of State can also, by order following consultation, direct Fire and Rescue Authorities as to how they should plan, equip for and respond to such emergencies. This may include, for example, directions as to the deployments of...
mass decontamination equipment for civil resilience purposes. The intention is to ensure consistency of approach towards emergencies, particularly in response to terrorist incidents.

4.7 Section 9 also allows the order to require an authority to respond to an emergency that has arisen outside its own area if, for example, it has more appropriate equipment and training than the authority in whose area the emergency has occurred.

4.8 The term “emergency” in this Act means an event or situation that causes or is likely to cause:

(a) one or more individuals to die, be seriously injured or become seriously ill, or

(b) serious harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals).

4.9 Sections 11 and 12: Power to respond to other eventualities and other services – replaced section 3(1)(e) of the Fire Services Act 1947, and provides Fire and Rescue Authorities with discretion to equip and respond to events beyond its core functions provided for elsewhere in the Act. A Fire and Rescue Authority is free to act where it believes there is a risk to life or the environment.

4.10 Section 44 Powers of fire-fighters etc in an emergency etc

– 44(1) An employee of a fire and rescue authority who is authorised in writing by the authority for the purposes of this section may do anything he reasonably believes to be necessary.

(a) if he reasonably believes a fire to have broken out or to be about to break out, for the purpose of extinguishing or preventing the fire or protecting life or property;

(b) if he reasonably believes a road traffic accident to have occurred, for the purpose of rescuing people or protecting them from serious harm;

(c) if he reasonably believes an emergency of another kind to have occurred, for the purpose of discharging any function conferred on the fire and rescue authority in relation to the emergency;

(d) for the purpose of preventing or limiting damage to property resulting from action taken as mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

– 44(2) In particular, an employee of a fire and rescue authority who is authorised as mentioned in subsection (1) may under that subsection:

(a) enter premises or a place, by force if necessary, without the consent of the owner or occupier of the premises or place;

(b) move or break into a vehicle without the consent of its owner;
(c) close a highway;
(d) stop and regulate traffic;
(e) restrict the access of persons to premises or a place.

44(3) A person commits an offence if without reasonable excuse he obstructs or interferes with an employee of a fire and rescue authority taking action authorised under this section.

44(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (3) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

4.11 Section 58 defines the meaning of “emergency”. It means an event or situation that causes or is likely to cause:

(a) one or more individuals to die, be seriously injured or become seriously ill, or
(b) serious harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals).

4.12 Further information can be found at:


The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (England) Order 2007

4.13 The Order gives Fire and Rescue Authorities mandatory functions in connection with key types of emergencies: chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear emergencies (‘CBRN emergencies’) and emergencies requiring the freeing of people from collapsed structures or non-road transport wreackages (urban search and rescue, or ‘USAR emergencies’).

4.14 It makes it mandatory for Fire and Rescue Authorities to:

(a) make provision for decontaminating people following the release of CBRN(E) substances;
(b) make provision for freeing people from collapsed structures and non-road transport wreackages;
(c) use, on request from an affected Fire and Rescue Authority, specialist CBRN(E) or USAR resources outside their own areas to an extent reasonable for dealing with the CBRN(E) or USAR emergency.

4.15 Giving Fire and Rescue Authorities mandatory functions by order sends a clear signal that making provision for dealing with CBRN(E) and USAR emergencies is a core activity in the same way as it already is for firefighting and road traffic accidents. This further improves national resilience to such disruptive incidents.

4.16 Further information can be found at:

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2007/uksi_20070735_en_1
Civil Contingencies Act 2004

4.17 Previous legislation relating to civil protection at the local level (the Civil Defence Act 1948 and its Northern Ireland counterpart, the Civil Defence Act (Northern Ireland) 1950) related solely to civil defence. “Civil defence” was defined as measures, other than actual combat, for affording defence against a hostile attack by a foreign power. The focus on civil defence reflected the concerns which were current when the legislation was enacted. The previous legislation also relates to local authorities, police authorities and certain fire authorities only.

4.18 This Act repeals in their entirety the Civil Defence Act 1948 and the Civil Defence Act (Northern Ireland) 1950. Part 1 of the Act creates a new concept of an ‘emergency’. This term is broadly defined. It includes events which would have engaged the existing civil defence legislation (war or attack by a foreign power). It also includes terrorism which poses a threat of serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom and events which threaten serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom or to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom.

4.19 The Act imposes a series of duties on local bodies in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (to be known as “Category 1 responders”). These duties include the duty to assess the risk of an emergency occurring and to maintain plans for the purposes of responding to an emergency. The Fire and Rescue Service is a Category 1 responder, the range of Category 1 responders is broader than the range of local bodies which were subject to the previous legislation. It includes certain bodies with functions which relate to health, the Environment Agency and the Secretary of State, in so far as his functions relate to responding to maritime and coastal emergencies.

4.20 More detailed information is contained in Section 7 Part A, Pre-planning considerations and at:


Water Resources Act 1991

4.21 In England and Wales, The Water Resources Act applies to surface, ground and coastal waters (up to three miles).

4.22 Sections 85-89 of the Act which used to cover offences relating to polluting controlled waters have been repealed and replaced by the Environmental Permitting Regulations.

4.23 The Environment Agency’s cost recovery powers are still primarily covered by the Water Resources Act.

The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010

4.24 Regulation 12 – Requirement for environmental permit:
(1) A person must not, except under and to the extent authorised by an environmental permit:
  (a) operate a regulated facility; or
  (b) cause or knowingly permit a water discharge activity or groundwater activity.

4.25 Regulation 38 – Offences:

(1) It is an offence for a person to:
  (a) contravene regulation 12(1); or
  (b) knowingly cause or knowingly permit the contravention of regulation 12(1)(a).

(2) It is an offence for a person to fail to comply with or to contravene an environmental permit condition.

(3) It is an offence for a person to fail to comply with the requirements of an enforcement notice or of a prohibition notice, suspension notice, landfill closure notice or mining waste facility closure notice.

4.26 Regulation 40 – Defences

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under regulation 38(1), (2) or (3) to prove that the acts alleged to constitute the contravention were done in an emergency in order to avoid danger to human health in a case where:
  (a) the person took all such steps as were reasonably practicable in the circumstances for minimising pollution; and
  (b) particulars of the acts were furnished to the regulator as soon as reasonably practicable after they were done.

4.27 NOTE: Regulations 38 and 40 are of particular interest to the Fire and Rescue Service as they are potentially issues that could arise, for example, at a fire where contaminated firefighting water run-off enters a water system. In theory the enforcing authority could prosecute the Fire and Rescue Service for causing or knowingly permitting a water discharge activity or groundwater activity without a permit. In such circumstances the Fire and Rescue Service defence would need to ensure that, during the emergency, it took all reasonable steps to minimise the pollution and that the Environment Agency was informed when the discharge occurred.

4.28 Further information can be found at:

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2010/draft/ukdsi_9780111491423_en_1

Environmental Protection Act 1990

4.29 The Act deals with a number of environmental issues that may affect Fire and Rescue Authority operations.
4.30 **Part 1** – Integrated Pollution Control. This part of the act provides a system whereby a license or authorisation is required if a prescribed process is being carried out.

4.31 **Part 2** – Waste on Land. This part of the act introduced a new system of covering the management and disposal of waste. Under Section 33 of the Act, it is an offence to dispose of, treat or store controlled waste without a waste management license. Part 2 also places a duty of care on anyone who produces, imports, keeps, carries, disposes of or acts as a broker of controlled waste.

4.32 **Part 3** – Statutory Nuisance. This part of the Act defines the following statutory nuisances:

- smoke emitting from premises
- fumes or gases emitted from domestic premises
- noise emitted from premises
- noise that is prejudicial to health and is emitted from or caused by a vehicle
- machinery or equipment in a street
- any dust, steam, smell or other effluvia arising on industrial, trade or business premises
- any other matter declared by any enactment to be a statutory nuisance.

4.33 Further information can be found at:


**The Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009**

4.34 The *Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009* came into force on 1st March 2009 in England and on 6 May 2009 in Wales and implement the Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35/EC. The regulations ensure that the polluter pays for the most serious types of environmental damage, supplementing any existing legislation, such as the *Water Resources Act 1991*.

4.35 The regulations apply only to ‘environmental damage’ which is defined as follows:

(i) protected species or natural habitats, or a site of special scientific interest (SSSI). This is also referred to as ‘biodiversity damage’. At a SSSI, the damage must be such that it has an adverse effect on the integrity of the site. Outside SSSIs, the damage must be such that it has a significant adverse effect on the conservation status of the protected species or natural habitat.

(ii) surface water or groundwater damage to a waterbody that is sufficient to lower its status under the Water Framework Directive (whether or not the waterbody is re-classified). This refers to serious
damage only, not short term effects, or effects that are limited in geographical extent land.

(iii) Contamination of land by substances, preparations, organisms or micro-organisms that results in a significant risk of adverse effects on human health.

4.36 **NOTE:** Releases to air that cause deterioration in air quality are not covered by the regulations unless damage to water, land or biodiversity occurs. For example a deposition of airborne pollutants that contaminate land, so that the land itself presents a significant risk of adverse effects on human health would be covered.

4.37 The regulations apply to operators of all economic activities, whether public or private and whether carried out for profit or not. This includes Fire and Rescue Services and other public bodies.

4.38 If environmental damage is caused by an activity listed in Schedule 2 of the regulations, the operator is liable under the regulations regardless of whether they have been at fault or negligent. This is known as “strict liability”, although some defences do apply (see below). Schedule 2 activities relevant to the Fire and Rescue Service include discharges of pollutants into surface or groundwater that require authorisation and the use/release into the environment of dangerous substances.

4.39 If biodiversity damage is caused by any activity, operators are also liable if they have caused the damage intentionally or negligently.

**EXEMPTIONS**

4.40 The regulations are not retrospective and do not apply to damage before the regulations came into force. There are other exemptions which include:

- acts of terrorism
- damage caused by an exceptional natural phenomenon if the operator took all reasonable precautions to prevent it
- activities which have the sole purpose of protecting against natural disasters and activities which have the main purpose of serving national defence or international security.

4.41 **NOTE:** The regulations contain no ‘emergency’ defence for the protection of life and health, as there is in under Regulation 40 of the *Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010*. However we would hope that Fire and Rescue Service training, equipment, policies and procedures already in place and recognised in our partnership will go a good way towards ensuring that the Fire and Rescue Service have taken all practicable steps to prevent damage (see below).

4.42 To comply with the regulations the Fire and Rescue Service must:

(i) Take all practicable steps to prevent environmental damage occurring as a result of their activities – The Fire and Rescue Service must take all practicable steps to prevent damage where
there is an imminent threat of damage occurring from their activities (Regulation 13) or where some damage has already occurred and there is a threat of further damage (Regulation 14)

(ii) Notify all relevant details to the enforcing authority – Regulations 10 and 11 specify different enforcing authorities, according to the type of activity and damage. Operators must report threats of damage or actual damage to the authority that appears to be the appropriate one.

4.43 Failure to comply with the above duties is an offence. The Environment Agency will expect Fire and Rescue Services to take action to mitigate the impact of any of their activities that may cause or contribute to environmental damage. This is little different to the current requirements placed upon Fire and Rescue Services by the Environmental Permitting Regulation 2010. Such action could include blocking drains and/or modifying firefighting activities, providing it does not compromise public safety. The Environment Agency will also expect Fire and Rescue Service to notify them of threats of damage or actual damage where the Environment is the enforcing authority. Current notification procedures set out in the Fire and Rescue Manual – Environmental Protection.

(iii) Remediate, where environmental damage has been caused.

4.44 If the activities of the Fire and Rescue Service cause environmental damage and the regulations apply (ie if the activity is listed in Schedule 2 or if there is biodiversity damage that has been caused intentionally or negligently) the enforcing authority has a duty to serve a notification of liability. If this happens, the Fire and Rescue Service would be invited to submit proposals for the remediation of the damage. The enforcing authority would consider any proposals, consult members of the public if relevant, and would then serve a remediation notice, detailing the measures that Fire and Rescue Service would have to take within a specified time scale. It is important to note that:

- For water and biodiversity damage, the regulations set high thresholds and therefore remediation under the regulations will only be required in the most serious cases. Thresholds for land damage are lower however so incidents of land contamination may be covered

- If environmental damage does occur, it is possible that Fire and Rescue Service may themselves be liable on the basis that their own activity caused the damage. However, depending on the circumstances, the cause may be viewed as the activity of the site/vehicle owner whose property caught fire. Enforcing authorities may serve the notification of liability on any person they consider to be legally liable

- Although the enforcing body has a duty to serve a liability notice, it also has the power to withdraw the notice if it is satisfied that the notice should not have been served, or an appeal is likely to succeed.
4.45 **NOTE:** There are no defences to the duty to prevent environmental damage. There are some defences to a notification of liability to remediate damage.

These include:

- compliance with one of the permits or consents listed in Schedule 3 of the regulations (for example, permits under the *Environmental Permitting Regulations*, water discharge consents, groundwater authorisations)
- damage caused by a third party where the operator took all appropriate safety measures
- damage resulting from compliance with an instruction from a public authority (except where it relates to an emission or incident caused by the operator’s own activities).

4.46 The Environment Agency is responsible for:

- all types of environmental damage (water, biodiversity and land) from activities we authorise under the *Environmental Permitting Regulations 2007* (EPR)
- all water damage
- biodiversity damage in inland waters
- biodiversity damage in the sea caused by activities we authorise.

4.47 Local authorities are mainly responsible for land damage.

4.48 Further information can be found at:


**Health and Safety**

4.49 *Health and Safety at Work Act 1974:* requires employers have to take reasonable steps to ensure the health, safety and welfare of their employees at work.

4.50 *Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999:* require employers to carry out risk assessments, make arrangements to implement necessary measures, appoint competent people and arrange for appropriate information and training.

4.51 *Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992:* require employers to provide appropriate protective clothing and equipment for their employees.

4.52 *Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998:* require that equipment provided for use at work, including machinery, is safe.

4.53 *Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 (COSHH):* require employers to assess the risks from hazardous substances and take appropriate precautions.

4.54 Further information can be found at:
Planning

4.55 Notification and marking of sites regulations 1990 (NAMOS) – More detailed information is contained in Section 7 Part A, Pre-planning considerations.

4.56 Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982 (NIHHS) – More detailed information is contained in Section 7 Part A, Pre-planning considerations.

4.57 The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended) (COMAH) – More detailed information is contained in Section 7 Part A, Pre-planning considerations.

Radiation

4.58 Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 (IRR99) – apply to a large range of workplaces where radioactive substances and electrical equipment emitting ionising radiation are used. They also apply to work with natural radiation, including work in which people are exposed to naturally occurring radon gas and its decay products. Any employer who undertakes work with ionising radiation must comply with IRR99. It requires employers to keep exposure to ionising radiations as low as reasonably practicable. Exposures must not exceed specified dose limits. Restriction of exposure should be achieved first by means of engineering control and design features. Where this is not reasonably practicable employers should introduce safe systems of work and only rely on the provision of personal protective equipment as a last resort. Further information can be found in Section 7 Part C-10, Radioactive materials and at:

http://www.hse.gov.uk/radiation/ionising/legalbase.htm

4.59 Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) – REPPIR establishes a framework of emergency preparedness measures to ensure that members of the public are properly informed and prepared, in advance, about what to do in the unlikely event of a radiation emergency occurring, and provided with information if a radiation emergency actually occurs. A ‘radiation emergency’ is an event that is likely to result in a member of the public receiving an effective dose of 5 mSv during the year immediately following the emergency.

4.60 REPPIR do not replace existing nuclear site licence conditions but operators of licensed sites who comply with those conditions will satisfy equivalent provisions in REPPIR. REPPIR place legal duties on:

(a) operators of premises where work with ionising radiation is carried out eg licensed nuclear sites, hospitals, universities, ports, airports, factories,
(b) people who transport radioactive substances through a public place (but not those using standard forms of transport such as road, rail, inland waterway, sea, air, or through a pipeline),
(c) all local authorities, not just those who have REPPiR operators within their boundaries, and
(d) the employers of people who intervene in a radiation emergency, such as the Fire and Rescue Services.

4.61 Further information can be found in Section 7 Part C-10, Radioactive materials, and at:

http://www.hse.gov.uk/radiation/ionising/reppir.htm

Control of Asbestos Regulations

4.62 The Regulations include requirements on:

• managing asbestos in non-domestic premises
• prevention or reduction of the spread of asbestos
• identification of the presence of asbestos
• assessment of work which exposes employees to asbestos
• prevention or reduction of exposure to asbestos
• plans for working with asbestos
• information, instruction and training
• use and maintenance of control measures etc
• provision and cleaning of protective clothing
• air monitoring
• health records and medical surveillance
• licensing and notification of work with asbestos.

4.63 Further information can be found in Section 7 Part C-13, Asbestos containing materials and at:

http://www.hse.gov.uk/asbestos/

Other legislation and regulation

4.64 Other legislation and regulatory guidance relevant to the Fire and Rescue Service for dealing with hazardous materials incidents is contained in:

• ADR (European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road)
• RID (Regulations Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail)
• ADN 2007 (European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways)
• Dangerous Goods Regulations 2008 - International Air Transport Association (IATA)
• International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code
• The Chemical (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations
• Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations (DSEAR)
• The Water Industry Act 1999 – Applies to sewerage systems in England and Wales
• The Groundwater Regulations 1998 – Applies to groundwater and the associated land or soil
• The Hazardous Waste Regulations 1996 (as amended)
• Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2008-11 (DCLG)
• The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009 SI 2009 No 1348 (known as CDG 2009)
• The Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2008
• The Air Navigation Order 2005
• The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) (Amended) Regulations 2006
• Radioactive Material (Road Transport) (Great Britain) Regulations (RAMRoad)
• Packaging Labelling and Carriage of Radioactive Materials by Rail Regulations
• Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regulations 2005 (MSER).
Section 5
Strategic role of operational guidance
Strategic perspective

5.1 Fire and Rescue Authorities and strategic managers within the Fire and Rescue Service are responsible for ensuring their organisation and staff operate safely when dealing with incidents involving hazardous materials. Their legal duties and responsibilities are contained in Section 4 of this guidance.

5.2 Fire and Rescue Services should continually assess the risk, in terms of the foreseeable likelihood and severity, of incidents involving Hazardous materials occurring within their areas. This assessment should form part of their integrated risk management plan. The findings will help them ensure they have appropriate organisation, policy and procedures in place for dealing with these types of incidents.

5.3 The following principles may assist Strategic Managers when determining the level of acceptable service and whether they are meeting their duty of care:

- operations must be legal and within the requirements of regulations
- actions and decisions should be consistent with voluntary consensus standards, and nationally recommended practices and procedures
- actions and decisions to control a problem should have a technical foundation and be based on an appropriate risk assessment
- actions and decisions must be ethical.

At the incident

5.4 ‘Response’ can be defined as the actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. It encompasses the resources and effort to deal not only with the direct effects of the emergency itself (e.g., fighting fires, rescuing individuals, mitigating the effects of hazardous materials) but also the indirect effects (e.g., disruption, media interest). The duration of the response phase will be proportionate to the scale and complexity of the incident.

5.5 The generic key roles of the Fire and Rescue Services at hazardous materials incidents are:

- save life and carry out rescues
- fight and prevent fires
- manage hazardous materials and protect the environment
- mitigate the effects of the incident
- ensure the health and safety of Fire Service staff, other category 1 & 2 responders and the public
- safety management within the inner cordon.
5.6 When responding to incidents involving hazardous materials the Fire and Rescue Service has strategic multi-agency responsibilities. These are additional, and in the main complimentary, to the specific fire and rescue functions that the Fire and Rescue Service performs at the scene. The strategic objective is to co-ordinate effective multi-agency activity in order to:

- preserve and protect lives
- mitigate and minimise the impact of an incident
- inform the public and maintain public confidence
- prevent, deter and detect crime
- assist an early return to normality (or as near to it as can be reasonably achieved).

5.7 Other important common strategic objectives flowing from these responsibilities are to:

- participate in judicial, public, technical or other inquiries
- evaluate the response and identify lessons to be learnt
- participate in the restoration and recovery phases of a major incident.

Values

5.8 The Fire and Rescue Service expresses its values and vision of leadership in the form of a simple model. The model has been named Aspire and is fully described in the Fire and Rescue Manual (volume 2 Operations) – Incident Command. It has at its heart, the core values of the service; which are:

- diversity
- our people
- improvement
- service to the community.

5.9 These values are intrinsic to everything Fire and Rescue Services strive to achieve at an operational incident, where they routinely serve all communities equally and professionally, with the safety and well being of their crews at the forefront of their procedures and reflecting on how well they performed in order to be better next time. It is important that core values are recognised and promoted by all strategic managers and fire and rescue authority members.

5.10 This guidance has been drafted to ensure that equality and diversity issues are considered and developed and has undergone full equality impact assessment in line with priority one of the Equality and Diversity Strategy.
Operational guidance review protocols

5.11 This operational guidance will be reviewed for its currency and accuracy three years from date of publication. The Operational Guidance Programme Board will be responsible for commissioning the review and any decision for revision or amendment.

5.12 The Operational Guidance Programme Board may decide that a full or partial review is required within this period.
Section 6

Generic Risk Assessment
Introduction

6.1 Owing to the size and nature of the Fire and Rescue Service and the wide range of activities in which it becomes involved, there is the potential for the risk assessment process to become a time consuming activity. To minimise this and avoid having inconsistencies of approach and outcome, DCLG have produced a series of generic risk assessments. These risk assessments have been produced as a tool to assist Fire and Rescue Services in drawing up their own assessments to meet the requirements of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations, 1999.

6.2 There are a number of generic risk assessments that Fire and Rescue Services should consider when developing their policy and procedures for dealing with emergency hazardous materials incidents. They have been used as the foundations of the information and guidance contained in this operational guidance.

6.3 Generic risk assessments relevant to hazardous materials incidents:

- 1.1 Emergency response and arrival at the scene (Section 3 – Arriving and getting to work)
- 5.2 Acetylene
- 5.3 Chemical
- 5.4 Biological
- 5.5 Radiation
- 5.7 Explosives
- 5.9 Asbestos.

6.4 Fire and Rescue Services should use these generic risk assessments as part of their own risk assessment strategy not as an alternative or substitute for it. They are designed to help Fire and Rescue Services assess their specific risks, and should be considered as part of the Services’ normal planning process. It is suggested that competent assessors:

- check the validity of the information contained in the generic risk assessment against their Fire and Rescue Service’s current practices and identify any additional or alternative hazards, risks and control measures
- evaluate the severity and likelihood of hazards causing harm, and the effectiveness of current controls, for example, operational procedures, training and personal protective equipment etc, by using the Service’s methodology
- consider other regulatory requirements
- identify additional measures which will be needed to reduce the risk, so far as is reasonably practicable

2 Generic risk assessments are available from TSO Bookshops: www.tsoshop.co.uk/GRA
• put those additional measures and arrangements in place.

6.5 Generic risk assessments provide a guide to the type of information, arrangements and training that should be given to the Incident Commander, firefighters and any other staff likely to be affected.

6.6 Full guidance on the generic risk assessments is contained in Occupational health, safety and welfare: Guidance for fire services: Generic Risk Assessments, Introduction.
Section 7
Fire and Rescue Service Operations
Part A
Pre-planning considerations
Introduction

7A.1 Major catastrophes occurring in the UK and overseas have helped shape the legislative framework for emergency preparedness. Events such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America, the bombing of the London transport system in July 2005 and lessons learned from other major hazardous materials accidents have brought about a change in our thinking in terms of the perceived threat and the associated planning regimes needed to support our resilience capability and preparedness for incidents of a new dimension or previously unseen scale.

7A.2 The change in our frame of reference for emergency preparedness has been underpinned by an amendment to the existing EC Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC) and by the introduction of the principles of long term resilience capability into the Fire and Rescue Service National Framework document and the introduction of emergency planning legislation to cover civil contingencies.

7A.3 Pre-planning for operational incidents is a safety-critical part of Fire and Rescue Service work. Services must ensure they have suitable and sufficient emergency response plans in place to cover the following hazardous materials risks within their authority’s area:

- buildings and/or establishments subject to the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations (COMAH)
- buildings and/or establishments known to manufacture, store or use significant quantities of hazardous materials but not subject to COMAH regulations
- buildings or establishments known to have asbestos containing materials
- leaking and/or heated cylinders
- road transportation accidents, spillages or releases of hazardous materials
- rail transportation accidents, spillages or releases of hazardous materials
- waterborne transportation accidents, spillages or releases of hazardous materials
- air transportation accidents, spillages or releases of hazardous materials
- military accidents, spillages or releases of hazardous materials
- deliberate, criminal, malicious or terrorist events resulting in the release of hazardous materials.
The extent of pre-planning that individual Fire and Rescue Services carry out is dependent on the likelihood and severity of foreseeable hazardous materials and/or CBRN/CBRN(E)3 emergencies within their areas. The starting point for pre-planning should be the generic risk assessment process and guidance.

Part A of this operational guidance sets out the United Kingdom's legislative framework covering the key principles of hazardous materials emergency preparedness:

- Gathering and use of risk information
- Notification and Marking of Sites Regulations 1990 (NAMOS)
- Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982 (NIHHS)
- The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended) (COMAH)
- The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA).

**Gathering and use of risk information**

The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, states that a Fire and Rescue Authority must make provision for the purpose of:

(a) extinguishing fires in its area, and
(b) protecting life and property in the event of fires in its area.

Section 7(2)d of the Act places a responsibility on the Fire and Rescue Authority to make arrangements for obtaining information needed for that purpose. Sections 8(2)d, and 9(3)d place a similar responsibility on the Authority in respect of road accidents and other emergencies.

In support of the above legislative responsibilities, The Fire and Rescue Service National Framework document places a requirement on all Fire and Rescue Authorities to have in place effective arrangements for gathering risk information and making it readily available to operational crews. These arrangements should include an effective audit and review system to ensure that the information is current and in the required format.

Identifying and managing risk is at the heart of the role and responsibility of the Fire and Rescue Service and must be considered within a holistic approach to integrated risk management, whether that be through the pre-planning and management of emergencies, fire safety, crime and disorder initiatives, training or undertaking other day-to-day activities.

3 CBRN/CBRN(E) (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear/chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive) terrorism entails the assumption or knowledge, based on intelligence or actual evidence, of actual or threatened dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material (either on their own or in combination with each other or with explosives), with deliberate criminal, malicious or murderous intent, targeted at a given population or economic or symbolic points.
7A.10 The importance of multi-agency pre-planning in respect of significant known or foreseeable hazardous materials risks cannot be stressed highly enough. Local resilience forums, set up under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, are comprised of the key stakeholders in the local community. They should hold details of all significant risks within their area in the form of a community risk register.

7A.11 The gathering and use of ‘risk information’ forms part of the Fire and Rescue Operational Assessment Toolkit. The toolkit uses briefing sheets to support each key line of enquiry and assists the assessment team in focusing on key areas for assessment.

7A.12 Each Fire and Rescue Service should assess the hazards and risks in its area relating to hazardous materials and site-specific plans should be considered for locations where these are significant. This assessment should include other Fire and Rescue Service areas where ‘cross border’ arrangements make this appropriate. Such contingency plans should include:

- levels of response
- relevant standard operating procedures
- tactical considerations including rendezvous points, appliance marshalling areas and access points.

7A.13 Information should also be gathered and used to review safe systems of work, from sources both within and outside the Fire and Rescue Service, including:

- fire safety audits
- incident de-briefs
- health and safety events
- local authorities
- local resilience forums.

7A.14 Involving others in pre-planning is also an effective way to build good working relations with partner agencies and other interested parties, such as site owners. Fire and Rescue Services should ensure systems are in place to record and regularly review risk information and to ensure that new risks are identified and recorded as soon as practicable.

7A.15 Fire and Rescue Services must ensure that the information gathered is treated as confidential, unless disclosure is required for legal reasons.

7A.16 Fire and Rescue Services should consider the benefits of using consistent systems and formats to record information from all sources. Consideration should also be given to when access will be provided to information to support operational decision-making. Information needs and the capacity of Fire and
Rescue Service staff to assimilate information will vary in proportion to the nature and size of the incident and what stage the operational response has reached. Arrangements need to be flexible and may be based on more than one system.

7A.17 It is essential that all plans and relevant supporting information are available to emergency responders. Information retrieval systems should be easy and quick to operate, and should have some back-up facility were the main system to fail or become unavailable.

7A.18 Specific pre-planning for hazardous materials incidents includes the requirement for a written policy which outlines:

- how the Fire and Rescue Service will deal with hazardous materials incidents by using good practice for reducing the risk of contamination based on the principals of hierarchical control
- how the Fire and Rescue Service is going to train their staff to raise awareness, reduce the risk of exposure and to protect themselves, the public and the environment
- effective Fire and Rescue Service decontamination procedures.

Notification and marking of sites regulations 1990 (NAMOS)

7A.19 NAMOS regulations came into force on 1 September 1990 and are designed to complement the Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982 (NIHHS) (as amended).

7A.20 Under the regulations, if there is present on site a total of 25 tonnes or more of dangerous substances at any time, the site controller must notify in writing the Fire and Rescue Authority and the enforcing authority. For the purpose of the regulations, ‘dangerous substances’ means any substance that falls within the definition of current edition of the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations.

7A.21 The enforcing authority for these regulations is the Fire and Rescue Authority except that:

- under Regulation 4 Notification, the enforcing authority will be either the Health and Safety Executive or the local authority
- under Regulation 5 Access Marking, 6 Location Marking and 7 Signs to be Kept Clean, etc, the enforcing authority will be the local Fire and Rescue Authority with the exception of:
  - local authority, fire, police premises
  - crown property (except Health and Safety Executive)
  - United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority property
In these cases the Health and Safety Executive will be the enforcing authority.

### Particulars to be notified

**7A.23** The following particulars should be notified:

- name and address of person making the notification
- full postal address of the site
- a general description of the nature of the business carried on or intended to be carried on at the site
- a list of the classifications of any dangerous substances which are, or are liable to be, present
- the date on which it is anticipated that a total quantity of 25 tonnes or more of dangerous substances will be present, or, if they are already present, a statement to that effect.

### Changes to be notified

**7A.24** The following changes should be notified:

- the cessation of the presence of dangerous substances at the site, other than a temporary cessation
- the reduction of the total quantity of dangerous substances present at the site to below 25 tonnes, other than a temporary reduction
- any change in the list of classifications notified to the authorities.

**7A.25** Although the person in control of a site does not have to notify the total quantities on site, they will be required to assess total quantities to know whether they are required to notify under the regulations. They should therefore take into account any quantities present in:

- vehicles or vessels used for storage purposes – tanks, containers, drums – after unloading
- vehicles used for on-site transportation
- materials used for cleaning, etc
- process, manufacture, storage.
Access marking

7A.26 If there are more than 25 tonnes of dangerous substances on site at any one time, the person in control of the site should ensure that safety signs are displayed sufficiently clearly to give adequate warning of them to firefighters in an emergency. The safety sign for access marking is shown below.

Safety sign for access

7A.27 Signs should be placed in conspicuous positions close to site entrances that could reasonably be expected to be used by firefighters. They may be free-standing or fixed to fences, railings, faces of buildings, etc.

Location marking

7A.28 At a site storing a total of 25 tonnes or more of dangerous substances, an inspector may give directions to the person in control of the site to display safety signs at specified locations. These directions will only be given where the inspector is satisfied on reasonable grounds that:

- twenty-five tonnes or more of dangerous substance are, or are liable to be, present
- the display of signs is necessary to warn firefighters in an emergency of the presence of dangerous substances at these locations
- the safety signs shall be warning signs as defined by paragraph 3.2 of part II of schedule 1 to the Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996 (see Figure 2)
- the sign shall bear the hazard warning symbol and hazard warning text
- where two or more substances with different classifications are stored at the same site then the access marking sign bearing the exclamation mark should be displayed with the text ‘Dangerous Substance’
- signs do not have to be displayed at the site when dangerous substances are not present
- reference to ‘The Site’ means at or in the vicinity of the site location.
7A.29 The person in control of the site shall, as far as is reasonably practicable, ensure that any safety signs displayed at the site (to provide access and location marking) are kept clean and free from obstruction.

7A.30 These regulations shall not apply to nor bear relation to:

- dangerous substances buried or deposited in the ground as waste
- radioactive substances (only hazard)
- substances, which, under the Classification and Labelling of Explosives Regulations 1983, are classified as Class 1 goods within the meaning of:
  - *The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment regulations*
  - *The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code; or*
- aerosol dispensers unless labelled in accordance with the *Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations.*

7A.31 Notification shall not apply to:

- sites that are notifiable to the executive under the *Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulation 1982* (NIHHS)
- Control of Major Accident Hazards sites
- licensed sites under the *Petroleum Consolidation Act 1928* (as amended)
• sites within the area of a harbour authority if Regulation 27 of the Dangerous Substances in Harbour Regulation 1987 (as amended) applies
• sites that have a disposal licence in force under the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (as amended)
• nuclear sites licensed under the Nuclear Installations Act 1969 (as amended).

7A.32 NOTE: Access and location marking regulations shall not apply to petroleum filling stations.

7A.33 The Health and Safety Executive has the power to grant general or special exemptions and to impose conditions and time limits on them. Before granting any exemption, the Executive would have to consider the circumstances of the case and consult any bodies likely to be affected.

Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982 (NIHHS)

7A.34 These regulations came into force on 1 January 1983 and were introduced to identify sites that handled certain quantities of hazardous materials not covered by the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations (COMAH).

7A.35 The definition of ‘site’ means:
• the whole area of land under control of a person and includes a jetty, pier or similar structure, whether floating or not; or
• any structure, floating or otherwise, which is within the inland waters of Great Britain and is controlled by a person.

7A.36 Before any activity commences at a site deemed to be covered by these regulations, the occupier must notify the Health and Safety Executive at least three months before operations begin. In the case of ammonium nitrate this has been set in the 2002 amendment regulations at four weeks.

7A.37 Information to be supplied:
• name and full postal address of the site
• name and address of person making the application
• the area of the site and any site within 500 metres
• the date the activity commences
• a general description of the activities carried out
• name and address of the planning authority covering the site address
• name and quantity of each hazardous substance to be stored on site.
7A.38 To determine the exact quantity of a hazardous material held on a site the following must be taken into account:

- quantity held in any pipeline which is within 500 metres of, and connected to, the site
- quantity held in any other site within 500 metres of the original site
- any vessel, vehicle or aircraft used for storage at, or within 500 metres of, the site.

7A.39 The only exceptions are waste sites licensed under Section 5 of the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (as amended). Should the quantity of any hazardous material stored be either increased to an amount three or more times of the original declaration, or reduced by any amount or cease to be used altogether, the Health and Safety Executive must be informed.

7A.40 The regulations contain schedules that list the hazardous substances and quantities that require notification to the Health and Safety Executive.

The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended) (COMAH)

7A.41 The Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations (COMAH) implemented the Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC) in Great Britain, except for land-use planning requirements which are to be implemented by changes to planning legislation. They replace the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1984 (CIMAH) which implemented the original Seveso Directive (82/501/EEC). They came into force on 1st April 1999 and are amended by the Control of Major Accident Hazards (Amendment) Regulations 2005.

7A.42 Their purpose is to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances and limit the consequences to people and the environment of any which do occur. COMAH applies mainly to the chemical industry, but also to some storage activities, explosives and nuclear sites, and other industries where threshold quantities of dangerous substances identified in the Regulations are kept or used.

7A.43 A key feature of the COMAH Regulations is that they will be enforced by a competent authority comprising the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency in England and Wales, and the Health and Safety Executive and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency in Scotland. Operators will generally receive a single response from the competent authority on all matters to do with COMAH.

7A.44 The mechanism for determining whether COMAH applies has been simplified. Basically, an establishment having any substance specified in Schedule 1 present above the qualifying quantity is subject to the Regulations. There are two
thresholds, known as lower-tier and top-tier. Further details can be found in the
guidance to Schedule 1 which lists 39 substances by name in Part 2 and 10
generic categories in Part 3.

7A.45 Even if there are no threshold quantities of substances present at an
establishment, it may still be subject to the Regulations if specified dangerous
substances could be produced in threshold quantities as a result of loss of control
of an industrial chemical process.

7A.46 The Major Accident Control Regulations for the Ministry of Defence are intended
to discharge the requirement from the Secretary of State for Defence to have in
place arrangements which are at least as good as those required by statute
where the Secretary of State holds an exemption, with respect to COMAH.

7A.47 More information on the Regulations and how to comply with them can be found
on the Health and Safety Executive’s website:

Lower-tier duties

7A.48 If the lower-tier threshold is equalled or exceeded, operators must notify the
competent authority. Notification should be to the local Health and Safety
Executive office which will pass the details to the relevant Environment Agency
office.

7A.49 Operators of all establishments subject to the Regulations must notify certain
basic details to the competent authority. The key points which have to be included
in the notification are given below but full details are given in Schedule 3 to the
Regulations:

• name and address of operator
• address of establishment
• name or position of person in charge
• details of dangerous substances on site (a breakdown is required for
  petroleum products)
• site activities
• environmental details.

SITE OPERATORS MUST MAKE ALL MEASURES NECESSARY TO
PREVENT MAJOR ACCIDENTS AND LIMIT THEIR CONSEQUENCES TO
PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

7A.50 This is the general duty on all operators and underpins all the regulations. It is a
high standard and applies to all establishments within scope. By requiring
measures both for prevention and mitigation there is a recognition that all risks
cannot be completely eliminated. This in turn implies that proportionality must
remain a key element in the enforcement policy of the Health and Safety
Executive and the Environment Agency. Thus, the phrase ‘all measures necessary’ will be interpreted to include this principle and a judgment will be made about the measures in place. Where hazards are high then high standards will be required to ensure risks are acceptably low, in line with the Health and Safety Executive’s and Environment Agency’s policy that enforcement should be proportionate. Prevention should be based on the principle of reducing risk to a level as low as is reasonably practicable for human risks and using the best available technology not entailing excessive cost for environmental risks. The ideal should always be, wherever possible, to avoid a hazard altogether.

**SITE OPERATORS MUST PREPARE A MAJOR ACCIDENT PREVENTION POLICY**

7A.51 Regulation 5 requires lower-tier operators to prepare a document setting out their policy for preventing major accidents, this is known as a major accident prevention policy or MAPP.

7A.52 The MAPP will usually be a short and simple document setting down what is to be achieved but it should also include a summary and further references to the safety management system that will be used to put the policy into action. The detail will be contained in other documentation relating to the establishment eg plant operating procedures, training records, job descriptions, audit reports, to which the MAPP can refer.

7A.53 The MAPP also has to address issues relating to the safety management system. The details are given in Schedule 2 of the Regulations but the key areas are:

- organisation and personnel
- identification and evaluation of major hazards
- operational control
- planning for emergencies
- monitoring, audit and review.

**Top-tier duties**

7A.54 If any top-tier threshold is equalled or exceeded, the operator must also comply with regulations 7 to 14.

**SITE OPERATORS MUST PREPARE A SAFETY REPORT**

7A.55 A safety report is a document that provides information to demonstrate to the competent authority that all measures necessary for the prevention and mitigation of major accidents have been taken.

7A.56 The safety report must include:

- a policy on how to prevent and mitigate major accidents
- a management system for implementing that policy
• an effective method for identifying any major accidents that might occur
• measures (such as safe plant and safe operating procedures) to prevent and mitigate major accidents
• information on the safety precautions built into the plant and equipment when it was designed and constructed
• details of measures (such as fire-fighting, relief systems and filters) to limit the consequences of any major accident that might occur; and
• information about the emergency plan for the site, which is also used by the local authority in drawing up an off-site emergency plan.

7A.57 Safety reports will be available to the public via the competent authority registers, subject to safeguards for national security, commercial and personal confidentiality.

SITE OPERATORS MUST UPDATE THE SAFETY REPORT AFTER SIGNIFICANT CHANGES OR NEW KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SAFETY MATTERS OR EVERY FIVE YEARS

7A.58 The safety report needs to be kept up to date. If there are any modifications to the plant or the way it is operated or if new facts or information become available, the safety report must be reviewed and, if necessary, revised at the time. It must be reviewed after five years even if there have not been any changes. The operator must notify the competent authority of any revision, and also if the five-year review does not lead to a revision.

SITE OPERATORS MUST PREPARE AND TEST AN ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

7A.59 Top-tier operators must prepare an emergency plan to deal with the on-site consequences of a major accident.

SITE OPERATORS MUST SUPPLY INFORMATION TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING PURPOSES

7A.60 Local authorities (this means the Fire and Rescue Service in London and other metropolitan areas) play a key role by preparing, reviewing, revising and testing off-site emergency plans for dealing with the off-site consequences of major accidents at top-tier sites. In order to fulfil this role they need information from operators. Operators will need to hold discussions with their local authorities to determine their exact needs.

SITE OPERATORS MUST PROVIDE CERTAIN INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC ABOUT THEIR ACTIVITIES

7A.61 People who could be affected by an accident at a COMAH establishment must be given information without having to request it. Also safety reports must be made available to the public via public registers.
7A.62 Operators planning to build new top-tier establishments must submit information in advance of construction and wait for the competent authority’s response before starting to build safety-critical parts of the establishment. This is to ensure that safety is considered fully at the design stage.

7A.63 The COMAH regulations specifically require operators to consult their employees or employees’ representatives about the preparation of the on-site emergency plan. Consultation with those doing the work is crucial in raising awareness of the importance of health and safety and environmental protection. It can make a significant contribution to creating and maintaining a safe and healthy working environment and an effective health and safety culture. In turn, this can benefit the business, making it more efficient by reducing the number of accidents and the number of work-related ill-health incidents.

7A.64 Upon receipt of the safety report the competent authority should inform employee representatives and provide the name of the assessment manager. If the competent authority finds serious deficiencies in the safety report, it will copy to employee representatives any correspondence it has with operators in respect of this. Similarly, the competent authority will copy the letter informing the operator of its conclusions of the assessment of the safety report, to employee representatives.

7A.65 The Environment Agency has been pro-active in working alongside the European Commission’s activities related to the implementation of the Seveso II Directive. This work reflects the following arrangements introduced by the 

- The Directive 2003/105/EC introduces more explicit requirements on the environment. One of the generic categories of substances is ‘dangerous for the environment’ – designed to bring establishments which pose an environmental threat within scope. Also, clean-up and restoration of the environment is a new objective of emergency plans
- The environment now has a higher public profile to be sure that high levels of protection are achieved for the environment as well as for people
- The Environment Agency was created in 1996 and it brings together, in single regulatory authority, a wide range of responsibilities for, and expertise on, all aspects of environmental protection. This, and the move towards integrated pollution control, makes it easier to co-ordinate environmental inputs to the regulation of major hazards
- There has been a trend within industry, and particularly the chemicals sector, to integrate health, safety and environment policies and practices and adopt a more holistic approach to hazard identification and risk control.
There is other environmental legislation which, to some extent, overlaps with Seveso II. In particular, the Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC, Directive 96/61/EC) establishes a permitting process by the competent authority which covers, amongst many other things, accidental pollution.

The Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency will work together as the competent authority for the COMAH regime. In considering how this should be done, the objective was to achieve high levels of protection from major accidents for both people and the environment. The arrangements will ensure that:

- appropriate expertise on health and safety and the environment is brought to bear on the regulation of major hazards
- the activities of Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency, in relation to duties under the Regulations, are co-ordinated, consistent, transparent, targeted and proportionate
- the possibility of conflicting requirements being placed on operators is eliminated; and
- the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency will collaborate on issues of joint interest, so avoiding duplicating activity for themselves and for operators.

The working arrangements are set out in a memorandum of understanding, copies of which are available on request from the competent authority.

There are many aspects of an operator’s activities which do not relate exclusively to protection of either people or the environment. Co-ordinating the operational implementation of COMAH by the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency is, therefore, crucial. For key regulatory activities which require action by the competent authority, such as:

- assessing safety reports
- applying derogation procedures; and
- designating domino effects establishments, the operator will make a submission or application and receive a single response agreed between the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency.

The Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency will discuss and exchange inspection programmes for establishments subject to COMAH. Inspections relating to COMAH will be coordinated to avoid duplication of effort.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA)

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 delivers a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century.
7A.72 The Act is separated into two parts:

- **Part 1**: local arrangements for civil protection, establishing a statutory framework of roles and responsibilities for local responders.

- **Part 2**: emergency powers, establishing a modern framework for the use of special legislative measures that might be necessary to deal with the effects of the most serious emergencies.

7A.73 The definition of emergency in the Act covers the consequences of emergencies. It defines an emergency as:

- an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare
- an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment
- war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to security.

7A.74 For Part 1 of the Act the definition sets out the range of possible incidents for which local responders must prepare when fulfilling their civil protection duties.

7A.75 For Part 2 it sets out the situations in which it may be possible to use emergency powers if the appropriate safeguards are met.

7A.76 This does not mean that the definition of ‘emergency’ is the same in both parts. In Part 1, the threat must pose a threat of serious damage to human welfare or the environment of a ‘place’ in the United Kingdom. This reflects the fact that Part 1 is designed to deal with preparations by local responders for localised emergencies.

7A.77 In Part 2, the threat must pose a threat of serious damage to human welfare or the environment of one of the English regions, or one of the other constituent parts of the UK (Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland). This higher threshold reflects the fact that Part 2 is designed for use in very serious emergencies which affect a larger geographical area.

**Part 1: Local arrangements for civil protection**

7A.78 The purpose of Part 1 of the Act is to establish a new statutory framework for civil protection at the local level. Local responders are the building block of resilience in the UK, and the Act will enhance existing arrangements by:

- establishing a clear set of roles and responsibilities for local responders
- giving greater structure and consistency to local civil protection activity; and
- establishing a sound basis for performance management at a local level.

7A.79 The Act divides local responders into two categories depending on the extent of their involvement in civil protection work, and places a proportionate set of duties on each.
Category 1 responders are those organisations at the core of emergency response (eg emergency services, local authorities). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. They are required to:

- assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning
- put in place emergency plans
- put in place business continuity management arrangements
- put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency
- share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination
- co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency; and
- provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (local authorities only).

The definition of emergency in the Act defines the sorts of events or situations that Category 1 responders should be preparing for.

Part 2 of the Act additionally establishes a threshold that events or situations would need to meet to constitute an emergency, and thus to trigger the duties in Part 1 of the Act. This provides that Category 1 responders’ duties under the Act only apply to events or situations which require the use of assets beyond the scope of normal operations and require a special deployment.

Category 2 organisations (eg the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies) are ‘co-operating bodies’ who, while less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work, will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. Category 2 responders have a lesser set of duties – co-operating and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. The detail of what this means in practical terms is contained in the Contingency Planning Regulations 2005 and statutory guidance on emergency preparedness that can be found at:

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience

Category 1 and 2 responders are also required to come together to form ‘local resilience forums’ (based on police force areas outside London) which will help co-ordination and co-operation between responders at the local level.

**Part 2: Emergency powers**

In the UK emergency powers allow the making of special temporary legislation to deal with the most serious of emergencies. They are not a means for instigating martial law, for undermining Parliament, banning political parties or anything else
of that nature. An essential point to note is that emergency powers legislation is a mechanism for dealing with only the most serious of emergencies that require an urgent response, an instrument of last resort. The previous emergency powers legislation (the *Emergency Powers Act 1920*) was used twelve times in its eighty-four year history, the last time being in 1974. In the years since, a considerable amount of sector specific emergency legislation has been introduced. This reduced the need to resort to emergency powers, in part because of recognition that emergency powers legislation was inadequate. Nevertheless, there is still a need for a latent capacity to rapidly make new temporary statutory provision where this is the most effective way of enabling the resolution of an emergency situation.
Part B
Operational considerations – Generic Standard Operating Procedure
Background

7B.1 **Part B Operational considerations** provides good practice advice to assist Fire and Rescue Services to carry out emergency operations at incidents involving hazardous materials. It is structured around the:

- response phases of an emergency incident, common to all Fire and Rescue Service operations
- operational key principles, the critical ‘must do’s’ or ‘should do’s’ for the Fire and Rescue Service to ensure firefighter safety and inter-operability.

7B.2 This operational guidance follows a chronological timeline through a typical hazardous materials incident and builds into a generic standard operating procedure (G-SOP) comprising:

- Actions
- Considerations.

7B.3 The G-SOP is intentionally generic in nature because it is intended as a series of check-lists of considerations, rather than a set of rules that must be strictly adhered to.

7B.4 This approach has been taken to recognise local differences across the Fire and Rescue Service in terms of risk profiles and levels of resources. Services with limited capability for research and development may choose to adopt the procedures with few amendments. Whilst larger organisations with greater resources and a more complex risk profile may simply use them as foundation stones to ensure inter-operability at cross border or large scale incidents. However, it must be stressed that both approaches should be supported by full local risk assessments.

7B.5 The G-SOP has been formulated by bringing together existing ‘good practice’ from Fire and Rescue Services throughout the United Kingdom. This ‘good practice’ has been heavily influenced over the years by the hazardous materials training courses provided by the Fire Service College in Moreton-in-Marsh, and the Scottish Fire Services College, Gullane. International operational guidance has also been considered, particularly that used in the United States of America, Canada and Mexico (eg National Fire Protection Association’s standard 472 for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response regulations etc).

7B.6 The G-SOP also reflects the hazards and control measures detailed within the relevant Fire and Rescue Service generic risk assessments.
7B.7 It is deliberately written concisely and in an easy to navigate, colour coded format so that it can be used as a quick reference guide for operational staff, an aide memoir containing the most critical information is contained in Section 8, Appendix A. Where further more detailed explanations or technical information is needed it will be found in Part C, Technical considerations.

7B.8 Each phase of operations is broken down into more detailed hazardous materials – specific guidance grouped together under ‘actions’. These are not meant to be compulsory steps at every incident, but rather a check-list that should be considered by staff, particularly those with command responsibilities. ‘Actions’ are subdivided into ‘Considerations’. Again, these form a toolbox of good practice options rather than mandatory procedures.

Command and control at hazardous materials incidents

7B.10 Guidance on command and control at incidents is contained within the *Fire and Rescue Manual, Volume 2 Fire Service Operations, Incident Command*. The incident command system described in the manual should be used at all hazardous material incidents.

7B.11 The processes associated with the command and control of serious operational incidents are complex and detailed. A great deal of work has been done to assist Incident Commanders, and others charged with operational responsibilities, to understand the cognitive and emotional processes that occur at such times. However, such processes are not a tool. In the search for a device to practically assist commanders in the discharge of their responsibilities, experienced officers have reported the value they have derived from the *Decision Making Model* developed by the London Fire Brigade. This is a cyclical process control model which may assist commanders in achieving their operational objectives at hazardous materials incidents. The full explanatory note can be found in Appendix 4, of the *Fire and Rescue Manual, Volume 2, Fire Service Operations, Incident Command*. 
7B.12 The Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commander has the responsibility for controlling the Service’s resources and operations at the scene. They must ensure that the operational risk philosophy is implemented at the scene.

Operational risk philosophy:
- The benefits of proceeding with a task must be weighed carefully against the risks
- It is important to think before you act, rather than, act before you think.

7B.13 All Fire and Rescue Service staff attending hazardous materials incidents must strictly adhere to the ‘line of command’ principle within the incident command system.
Operational key principle

Line of command principle:

- All commanders must know who they are responsible for
- All staff must know who they report to
- All staff must know what their operational brief is.

The incident command system relies upon a single unified command line. With the exception of urgent safety related issues staff should not take control of operations outside their assigned responsibility and should ensure all information and instruction is passed via the relevant command line officers.

This will enhance scene safety by ensuring that staff and crews do not, under any circumstances, ‘self-deploy’ to hazardous areas at hazardous materials incidents.

Fire and Rescue Service hazardous materials responders – Key levels

7B.14 The three key levels of Fire and Rescue Service hazardous materials responder are:

**Firefighter**
As defined in the Emergency Fire Service Rolemaps. The skills, knowledge and understanding referred to in the generic standard operating procedure (G-SOP) relate to a ‘competent’ firefighter.

**Commander**
Generic term for all ‘Operational’ (Bronze) and ‘Tactical’ (Silver) Fire and Rescue Service command roles designated within the incident command system. ‘Strategic’ (Gold) command issues are not detailed within the G-SOP as it is an on-site operational and tactical guide.

**Hazardous Materials Adviser**
Generic term for any person, with enhanced knowledge of hazardous materials operations, used by a Fire and Rescue Service to provide specialist advice to the Incident Commander at emergency incidents involving hazardous materials. This level of responder includes such roles as the Hazardous Materials Officer, Hazardous Material and Environmental Protection Officer, Scientific Adviser, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive Subject Matter Advisor etc. Their primary functions are to:

- gather, filter and interpret technical information on hazardous materials for the Incident Commander
• assess the risks posed by emergency hazardous materials incidents

• advise the Incident Commander on the development of a hazardous materials tactical response plan

**NOTE:** At an incident where National Resilience DIM (detection, identification and monitoring) teams are deployed the Hazardous Materials Adviser will act as the link from the DIM team to the Incident Commander. It should also be noted that at a CBRN(E) event, a CBRN(E) Subject Matter Advisor, when mobilised, will be responsible for advising the Incident Commander on the development of the tactical response plan.

### Generic standard operating procedure (G-SOP) – Overview

#### Operations risk management

On-site Fire and Rescue Service emergency operations should always be based on structured, standardised and risk assessed safe systems of work. These are commonly known as standard operating procedures. All good standard operating procedures allow flexibility, within defined boundaries, so that competent staff can use professional judgement to choose the most appropriate procedures and tactics when faced with unique, or rapidly developing, emergency situations. This controlled but dynamic management of risk must always have firefighter safety at its core, whilst acknowledging that a professional, highly trained emergency service will be exposed to some controlled risk to achieve the community’s expectations. Any residual risk at emergency incidents must be kept as low as reasonably practicable.

**7B.15** The critical success factors in the first hour of a hazardous materials incident will typically be the ability of responders to:

- identify hazards in order to effectively carry out a risk assessment, possibly under considerable pressure and with limited and/or incomplete information
- recognise that the incident involves hazardous materials, especially if they have not been mobilised specifically to a hazardous materials incident

**NOTE:**

Responders should also be aware that what may appear to be a hazardous materials incident initially, maybe a CBRN(E) event

- gain control of the incident ground, identify the problem and separate responders and the public from it
- establish command and control
- stabilise the situation.
The G-SOP described in the following paragraphs details the operational and tactical functions to be evaluated and possibly implemented at incidents involving hazardous materials to achieve these success factors and then go on to resolve the incident in the most safe, effective and efficient manner.

This G-SOP should be viewed as a flexible guide and not a set of rigid rules. Individual Fire and Rescue Services should decide what works best for them in terms of the level of detail their organisation requires. They should then design training and development programmes that incorporate their specific equipment, risks and resources.

Assumptions behind the G-SOP:

- All staff attending the incident are competent to do so, or are properly supervised
- Predetermined attendances are suitable and sufficient for the safe operation of the G-SOP
- The G-SOP consists of ‘actions’ and ‘considerations’, not all actions must be followed at every incident, but they should be considered
- Emergency response phases are generic and do not equate to strict timelines. In particular Phases 3 (Planning), 4 (Implementing) and 5 (Evaluating) should be cyclical at complex incidents. Evaluation should be a continual process when circumstances or risks are changing. This is shown in the Emergency Incident Phase Cycle diagram
- Actions and considerations are not necessarily sequential, or indeed mandatory
- Actions will often occur simultaneously or in a different order to the G-SOP depending on the incident dynamics
- G-SOP should be used as an ‘enabling guide’ or ‘toolbox’ of possible approaches rather than a prescriptive list of ‘should-do’s’
- The Incident Commander will decide which actions and considerations are appropriate for the incident and also their priority
- Local risk assessment by the Fire and Rescue Service as the ‘employer’ is still required
- G-SOP covers all of the control measures raised in the relevant national generic risk assessments.
7B.19 The G-SOP offers several benefits as it:

- recognises that the majority of hazardous materials incidents are minor in nature and generally involve limited quantities of harmful substances
- provides a flexible management system that expands as the scope and magnitude of the incident grows
- provides a consistent management structure, regardless of the classes of hazardous materials involved.

7B.20 It should be regarded as the minimum safe level of operational procedure to maintain the safety of staff and ensure inter-operability in critical areas of emergency operations. Where risk-critical issues exist, operational key principles have been developed and highlighted. These are distinguished in the text by red text boxes. Fire and Rescue Services are advised to consider such guidance as the ‘highest priority’ guidance.

7B.21 There are six basic response phases that should be considered at all emergency incidents:

1 Mobilising and en-route
2 Arriving and gathering information
3 Planning the response
4 Implementing the response
5 Evaluating the response
6 Closing the incident
Emergency incident phase cycle

Hazardous materials incident

Phase 1 Mobilising and en-route

Phase 2 Arriving and gathering information

Phase 3 Planning the response

Phase 4 Implementing the response

Phase 5 Evaluating the response

Phase 6 Closing the incident

Objectives Achieved
### Summary of phases and actions

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| 2.4     | Consider the immediate life risk  
  \(\text{\textit{NOTE:}}\) Immediate life risk = immediate human life saving rescues; immediate evacuation to prevent serious injury; prevention of catastrophic escalation likely to endanger life |
| 2.5     | Identify the problem and the likely impact |
| 2.6     | Estimate the resource requirements \(\text{\textit{NOTE:}}\) make-up if necessary |
| 2.7     | Implement the incident command system |

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**Phase 1**  
**Mobilising and en-route**

1.1 Assess the level, scale and type of incident  
1.2 Mobilise appropriate resources to the incident, marshalling areas or predetermined rendezvous points  
1.3 Access incident specific information en-route  
1.4 Notify relevant agencies

**Phase 2**  
**Arriving and gathering information**

- Incident information  
- Resource information  
- Hazard and safety information

2.1 Approach the incident safely and estimate the potential hazard zone  
2.2 Recognise hazards and risks from a safe location and implement an initial cordon  
2.3 Liaise with persons on and off-site  
2.4 Consider the immediate life risk  
  \(\text{\textit{NOTE:}}\) Immediate life risk = immediate human life saving rescues; immediate evacuation to prevent serious injury; prevention of catastrophic escalation likely to endanger life  
2.5 Identify the problem and the likely impact  
2.6 Estimate the resource requirements \(\text{\textit{NOTE:}}\) make-up if necessary  
2.7 Implement the incident command system

**Phase 3**  
**Planning the response**

- Think  
- Prioritise objectives  
- Plan

3.1 Identify the objectives  
3.2 Develop a response plan with specialist advisers and other agencies  
3.3 Identify the level and type of personal protective equipment required  
3.4 Identify effective decontamination procedures
Phase 4
Implementing the response

- Communicate
- Control

4.1 Review and monitor cordons to control access at the scene
4.2 Communicate and control the response plan
4.3 Establish and operate decontamination
4.4 Implement deliberate reconnaissance to gather further information
4.5 Implement effective firefighting, containment and pollution control techniques
4.6 Work with people and agencies that may provide additional advice and assistance

Phase 5
Evaluating the Response

- Evaluate the outcome

5.1 Evaluate the effectiveness of the response
5.2 Adjust the response plan if necessary

Phase 6
Closing the incident

6.1 Close down Fire and Rescue Service operations
6.2 Hand-over control of the incident site
6.3 Facilitate incident debriefs
6.4 Anticipate post incident considerations

7B.22 It is sometimes useful to see the emergency incident response phases in the context of the typical stages of an incident referred to in the incident command system and the Fire Service guide – ‘Dynamic management of risk at operational incidents’, this is shown below.
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7B.23 The operational and tactical guidance contained in this document has been developed to deal primarily with accidental hazardous materials incidents. However, the guidance is essentially equally applicable to deliberate, malicious or terrorist events. This said, it must be stressed that terrorist or CBRN(E) events do require a more specific response due to:

- increased security measures
- increased risks to Fire and Rescue Service staff
- complexity of multi-agency working
- potential for secondary devices
- potential for perpetrators to pick virulent agents that are both persistent and difficult to identify
- potential to conceal the identity and/or remove and/or replace signage and material information
- potential to pick locations that exploit the characteristics of the agent
- need to exchange information with off site intelligence and scientific advisers.

7B.24 Section 7 Part C-17 provides a brief overview of CBRN(E) considerations and signposts the guidance produced by the National Resilience Assurance Team.
## Phase 1: Mobilising and en-route

### Emergency incident response phases

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<td>Phase 6</td>
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### Summary of actions and considerations whilst mobilising and en-route to a hazardous materials incident

**DEFINITION:**

The activation and continuous process of deployment and management of staff and resources including emergency call handling, turning-out and travelling to the emergency.

### Phase 1: Mobilising and en-route summary

1. **Assess the level, scale and type of incident**
   - Gather information from caller
   - Match incident details to site-specific pre-determined attendances, operational plans, multi-agency plans etc
   - Implement ‘major incident’ plan, if necessary.

2. **Mobilise appropriate resources to the incident, marshalling areas or predetermined rendezvous points**
   - Consider use of pre-planned marshalling sites or rendezvous points for significant known hazardous materials risks/sites
   - Utilise Firemet and supply information to responders
   - Consider mobilising to up-wind rendezvous points for significant incidents
   - Mobilise resources according to incident type, scale and location
   - Mobilise enhanced resources for ‘major incidents’
   - Mobilise enhanced resources to known CBRN(E) events.
1.3 Access Incident specific information en-route
a) Responders should request information on, and begin to think about, the likely hazards and control measures when mobilised to known substances and hazardous materials sites
b) Access site specific risk inspection information
c) Request and use weather information (eg FireMet)
d) Assess and review marshalling/rendezvous point arrangements.

1.4 Notify relevant agencies
a) Request assistance or resources from other agencies and/or organisations
b) Notify other agencies and/or organisations for their information in line with Fire Service protocols.

Phase 1 Mobilising and en-route

1.1 Assess the level, scale and type of incident

Considerations

(1.1a) Gather information from caller
- Where is the incident? Is it at a known risk or target/sensitive site/occupancy?
- Is there a site-specific plan for the location?
- Are hazardous materials involved? If unsure, are hazardous materials found or used at the location?
- What quantity is involved?
- Are there reports of any unusual odours, explosions or other unusual reactions?
- Are there any injuries or casualties? Are the causes/reasons known?

NOTE: STEP 1-2-3
- Are other emergency services in attendance/involved?
‘STEP 1-2-3’ – Safety Triggers for Emergency Personnel:

- **STEP 1** – Single casualty, no logical explanation or cause – deploy as for normal collapsed casualty
- **STEP 2** – Two casualties, no logical explanation or cause – tell crews to approach with caution and send full informative and CHALETS information ASAP
- **STEP 3** – Three or more casualties, no logical explanation – should trigger crews not to go to scene

**NOTE:** Unless there is identified saveable life and a dynamic risk assessment has been undertaken, designate/ascertain a safe rendezvous point for further resources and Command and Control, CHALETS information must be provided.

**NOTE:** An additional flow chart explaining STEP 1-2-3 and CHALETS is explained in Arriving and gathering information 2.1d

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(1.1b) **Match incident details to site specific predetermined attendances, operational plans, multi-agency plans etc**

- Mobilising control staff and systems should be able to quickly and accurately match the information given by callers to site specific predetermined attendances, hazardous materials specific operational plans and hazardous materials related multi-agency plans

- The weight and scale of attendance should reflect the foreseeable risks posed by (a) the type of incident and (b) the site/location of the incident

- Develop a range of generic predetermined attendances for different types of hazardous materials incidents (e.g., small release in the open; large release in the open; small release within buildings; large release within buildings etc)

- Sites known to contain significant hazardous materials risks should have specific predetermined attendances based on, for example, the risk to human life; quantity and type of hazardous materials; processes carried out; risk of escalation; location in relation to inhabited areas and critical infrastructure etc.

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(1.1c) **Implement ‘major incident’ plan, if necessary**

Fire and Rescue Services should have plans in place to deal with ‘major incidents’. These should include guidance to all staff, including those responsible for mobilising, on the triggers for implementing the plans.
### Action

1.2 Mobilise appropriate resources to the incident, marshalling areas or predetermined rendezvous points

### Considerations

**(1.2a) Consider use of pre-planned marshalling sites or rendezvous points for significant known hazardous materials risks/sites**

Fire and Rescue Services should develop pre-planned marshalling sites or rendezvous points for their significant hazardous materials risks. This should form part of their overall integrated risk management planning process. Where rendezvous points are designated within the possible initial cordonning distances for the substances that could be involved in an accident or release, responders must be made aware of this and a number of alternative rendezvous points should be planned so that an up wind one can be used.

**NOTE:** At CBRN(E) events Services should be alert to the possibility of secondary terrorist devices being planted at known rendezvous points.

**(1.2b) Utilise weather information (eg Firemet) and supply information to responders**

Mobilising controls should have protocols in place so that they can quickly access Firemet information. Basic information such as wind speed and direction should be used when mobilising the Fire and Rescue Service response. Possible uses:

- Selection of up wind rendezvous points
- Selection of up wind access routes
- Adding weather information to turn-out instructions
- Responding quickly to requests for weather information from Fire and Rescue Service staff.

**(1.2c) Consider mobilising to up wind rendezvous points for significant incidents**

Pre-planned rendezvous points are usually in ‘safe’ areas a considerable distance away from any potential accident sites. However, this may not always be the case especially in highly built-up or industrialised areas. In such cases pre-planning may have identified a number of rendezvous points to take account of differing wind directions. If mobilising control staff believe, from the information given by the caller, that the incident may be of significant severity they should always mobilise resources to the up wind rendezvous points. Information on the wind direction can be gained through Firemet or by asking the caller.
(1.2d) Mobilise resources according to incident type, scale and location

Consider:

- ‘Foreseeable risks’ when mobilising, not ‘imaginable risks’ but react to a rapidly escalating incident (eg multiple calls, multiple casualties etc)
- Enhance predetermined attendances where known site-specific hazardous materials risks exist

**NOTE:** Decontamination equipment, environmental protection equipment, competence of responders etc

- Early notification of hazardous materials advisers and other specialists. These may be needed at the mobilising centre as well as on-site
- Media/press officer or department for significant incidents or high profile sites
- Equipment/incident support department (eg specialist decontamination equipment).

(1.2e) Mobilise enhanced resources for ‘major incidents’

Fire and Rescue Services should have triggers in place for implementing a ‘major incident’ procedure. This will involve additional mobilisations of Fire and Rescue Service’s resources and resources from other agencies.

(1.2f) Mobilise enhanced resources to known CBRN(E) events

CBRN(E) events are by their nature extremely complex incidents. The National Resilience resources that Fire and Rescue Services need to deal with them are strategically located across the UK. CBRN(E) mobilising procedures should be based upon the *Mass Decontamination Mobilising Model Guidance Document*, developed and issued by the National Resilience CBRN(E) Capability in National Resilience Information Note 14/2011 (6 May 2011).
## Action

### 1.3 Access incident specific information en-route

### Considerations

#### (1.3a) Responders should request information on, and begin to think about, the likely hazards and control measures when mobilised to known substances and hazardous materials sites

**Consider:**

- Potential life risk, need for evacuation or other protective measures
- Likelihood of explosion and fire-risk
- Substance and hazard information provided by the mobilising centre or mobile data terminal
- Communication with hazardous materials specialists
- Geographical location and topography

**NOTE:** Containment, water courses etc

- Potential quantities involved
- Physical properties (eg liquid, gas, vapour, dust/particulate, explosive limits etc)
- Initial cordon distance.

#### (1.3b) Access site-specific risk inspection information

Consider information from:

- 7(2)(d) inspections
- Fire Safety assessments

**NOTE:** Health and Safety Executive reports, DESEAR, MSER, enforcement notices, prohibition notices etc

- Notification and marking of sites (NAMOS) inspections and information
- Notification of installations handling hazardous substances (NIHHS) information
- British agrochemical standards inspection scheme (BASIS) inspections and pre-plans
- Asbestos register
- Significant control of substances hazardous to health (COSHH) assessments
- Control of major accident hazards (COMAH) plans and information
- CBRN(E) site-specific plans
- Local resilience forum plans

**NOTE:** Community Risk Register information

- Partner agencies (e.g. Environment Agency hold site-specific information through the issuing of their permits etc.)
**Operational key principle**

Request and use weather information (eg FireMet)

Consider:

- Approach from **UPWIND** direction

**Approaching hazardous materials incidents:**

- Hazardous materials incidents should always be approached from the upwind direction. This reduces the risk of unprotected crews being exposed to airborne hazardous materials (eg gases, vapours, particulates etc)
- If possible the incident should also be approached from a higher ground level or up-slope. This is particularly important if the hazardous are in a liquid state.

- Wind strength and its effect on the initial cordon
- Ambient temperature and its effect on the physical properties of substances
- Downwind, dilution, obstacle, oscillation and retention (DDOOR) guidance on vapour cloud behaviour in urban areas
- Limitations of FireMet data. Always check the wind direction when approaching the incident location.

**Acronym: DDOOR** – stands for downwind, dilution, obstacle, oscillation and retention. It serves to highlight key factors to remember when dealing with a hazardous release in an urban environment\(^1\). In particular the effect that the built environment and the wind can have on a dispersion plume. Operational commanders and hazardous materials advisers should consider these factors when developing their risk assessment and response plan for dealing with a hazardous material incident within an urban area.

- **Downwind** – the largest part of the plume moves downwind, and becomes wider and higher
- **Dilution** – the gas/vapour dilutes as it mixes with the air around it: the concentrations decrease downwind and at the sides and top of the plume
- **Obstacles** – the movement of the plume is strongly influenced by obstacles such as buildings and other structures. Some parts of the plume go up and over the buildings; some parts zigzag along the streets in the downwind direction. The plume may quickly fill street ‘canyons’

**NOTE:** Some parts of the plume spread upwind.

- **Oscillation** – the plume will oscillate; its position and course will not remain constant but will vary over time. It will follow different routes downwind often in response to minor changes in environmental factors
- **Retention** – some parts of the plume can be retained, and gradually released later, even after the source has been dealt with.

---

\(^1\) For further information see the DDOOR DVD (Rex Britter, Home Office, 2007).
(1.3d) Assess and review marshalling/rendezvous points arrangements

Consider:

- Pre-planned marshalling locations – Are they safe and appropriate for the incident in question?
- Pre-planned control of major accident hazards (COMAH) and other site-specific rendezvous points – Are they safe and appropriate for the incident in question?
- Pre-planned tactical and strategic holding areas for CBRN(E) or other ‘major incidents’
- Separate rendezvous points should be identified for specialist mass decontamination resources
- Designate marshalling area(s) en-route and inform oncoming responders

**NOTE:** Potential for escalation, weather changes, explosions etc.

**Action**

1.4 Notify relevant agencies

**Considerations**

(1.4a) Request assistance or resources from other agencies and/or organisations

Consider:

- Mutual aid schemes and specialist responders (eg Chemsafe, Radsafe, Chloraid, Bromaid etc)
- Environment Agency (eg environmental protection equipment)
- Local authorities
- Private hazardous material waste disposal and clean-up contractors
- Government Decontamination Service.

(1.4b) Notify other agencies and/or organisations for their information in line with Fire Service protocols

Consider informing:

- Police
- Ambulance
- Local authority (eg Environmental Health, Highways etc)
- Environment Agency
- Water companies
- Health Protection Agency
- Maritime Coastguard Agency
- Emergency Planning officer/department
- Local Resilience Forum coordinator
- Mutual aid schemes and specialist responders (eg Chemsafe, Radsafe, Chloraid, Bromaid etc).
Phase 2: Arriving and gathering information

Emergency incident response phases

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Summary of actions whilst arriving and gathering information at a hazardous materials incident

DEFINITION:

The structured and safe attendance of staff and resources at the incident or rendezvous point, and the systematic process of obtaining and interpreting information; carrying out risk assessments and prioritising emergency action.

Phase 2 Arriving and gathering information summary

- Incident information
- Resource information
- Hazard and safety information

2.1 Approach the incident safely and estimate the potential hazard zone

a) Use weather information (eg FireMet) and visual indicators of wind strength and direction (eg wind blown tree foliage etc) to plan your approach to the incident from the upwind direction so that crews are not exposed to hazardous vapours or gases

b) If possible and safe to do so without additional personal protective equipment, approach the incident from higher ground (ie up-slope) especially if hazardous liquids are known to be present

c) Ensure response vehicles approach the vicinity of the incident at slow speed

d) When approaching the vicinity of the incident use senses to assess ‘incident-indicators’ to assist in estimating the extent of the hazard zone

e) Estimate the potential hazard zone, and position staff and vehicles outside it

f) Establish command/contact point in a safe location.
### 2.2 Recognise hazards and risks from a safe location and implement an initial cordon

| a) | Identify the potential of the hazardous materials to cause harm to people by inhalation, ingestion, direct skin contact, absorption through the skin or eyes or entry through cuts and grazes |
| b) | Identify the potential of the hazardous materials to cause harm to property and the environment |
| c) | Recognise any additional hazards and risks |
| d) | Establish an initial cordon. |

### 2.3 Liaise with persons on and off-site

| a) | Gather information about the emergency or accident from witnesses |
| b) | Liaise with other persons/agencies to gain specific knowledge about the event, substance, site, process, treatment of casualties or containment system. |

### 2.4 Consider the immediate life risk

**NOTE:** Immediate life risk = immediate human life saving rescues; immediate evacuation to prevent serious injury; prevention of catastrophic escalation likely to endanger life.

| a) | Assess any immediate life-saving rescues  
**NOTE:** STEP 1-2-3 |
| b) | Consider effective control measures |
| c) | Carry out rescues |
| d) | Assess the need for any immediate evacuation and/or identify places of relative safety |
| e) | Assess the likelihood of a catastrophe occurring. |

### 2.5 Identify the problem and the likely impact

| a) | Carry out full survey of the site |
| b) | Retrieve and interpret hazard and incident information |
| c) | Assess the condition of damaged hazardous materials containment systems |
| d) | Predict the likely behaviour of the hazardous materials involved |
| e) | Estimate the size of the endangered area |
| f) | Estimate the potential harm/impact |
| g) | Review the position of the Initial cordon with regard to the information gathered and the predicted hazard zone. |
2.6 Estimate the resource requirements

**NOTE:** Make-up, if necessary

a) Consider requesting Fire and Rescue Service assistance based on the information gathered and the actions already known to be required. Further assistance can be requested after the response plan has been formulated.

b) Consider requesting assistance from non-Fire and Rescue Service organisations.

c) Consider declaring a ‘major incident’ which should mobilise significant Fire and Rescue Service and other agency resources.

2.7 Implement the incident command system

a) Implement the operational risk philosophy.

b) Strictly implement ‘line of command’ principle within incident command system at all hazardous materials incidents.

c) Implement command support and ensure it is properly resourced.

d) Limit the Incident Commander’s spans of control.

e) Carry out effective and appropriate sectorisation.

f) Ensure that appropriately trained commanders operate in Bronze (Operational), Silver (Tactical) and Gold (Strategic) command roles if required, and use a recognised decision making model and recording system.

g) Adopt a multi-agency approach to incident resolution.

h) Designate a clean area with washing facilities for hydration and welfare.
Phase 2
Arriving and gathering information

Action

2.1 Approach the incident safely and establish the potential hazard zone

Considerations

(2.1a) Use weather information (eg Firemet) and visual indicators of wind strength and direction (eg wind blown tree foliage etc) to plan your approach to the incident from the UPWIND direction so that crews are not exposed to hazardous vapours, gases or particulates

- Use local knowledge of topography and mapping systems to choose the safest approach road
- Be aware of the limitations of Firemet and cross-check the information using visual indicators at the site
- Always bear in mind that wind strength and direction can change. So ensure staff and vehicles have clear, immediately available means of egress
- Remember built up urban environments may have the following gas cloud/plume dispersion characteristics (Acronym: DDOOR)
- Deploy improvised wind monitoring devices (eg tie a number of 1-2m lengths of traffic/fire tape to vertical objects or suitable portable Fire and Rescue Service’ equipment such as lighting tripods)

- Remember, just because you cannot see it or smell it does not mean that it is not there.
### Acronym: DDOOR

- **Downwind** – the largest part of the plume moves downwind, and becomes wider and higher
- **Dilution** – the gas/vapour dilutes as it mixes with the air around it: the concentrations decrease downwind and at the sides and top of the plume
- **Obstacles** – the movement of the plume is strongly influenced by obstacles such as buildings and other structures. Some parts of the plume go up and over the buildings; some parts zigzag along the streets in the downwind direction. The plume may quickly fill street ‘canyons’
- **Oscillation** – the plume will oscillate; its position and course will not remain constant but will vary over time. It will follow different routes downwind often in response to minor changes in environmental factors
- **Retention** – some parts of the plume can be retained, and gradually released later, even after the source has been dealt with.

### (2.1b) If possible and safe to do so without additional personal protective equipment, approach the incident from higher ground (ie up-slope) especially if hazardous liquids are known to be present

- It will not always be possible to approach a hazardous materials incident from higher ground and the upwind direction. Where it is not possible the safest approach route should be chosen based on the physical properties of the hazardous substance (eg liquids not vaporising or gassing-off – slope may be the most important factor; toxic gas release in windy conditions – wind direction will be the most important factor).

### (2.1c) Ensure response vehicles approach the vicinity of the incident at slow speed

This will:
- Enable visual assessment of scene
  - **NOTE:** plumes, liquid spills etc
- Reduce the probability of driving into a hazardous area
- Avoid collisions with casualties, people escaping the release and other members of the public who may be attracted to the incident.

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2 For further information see the DDOOR DVD (Rex Britter, Home Office, 2007).
HAZARD ZONE

Hazard zone

- This is an area that contains hazards to which a risk assessment should be applied in order to determine a suitable inner cordon
- A hazard zone is not necessarily an ‘exclusion zone’ and would encompass both the ‘hot’ and ‘warm’ zones if they exist
- An exclusion zone is an area containing hazards that have been risk assessed as so dangerous to health that nobody, including Fire and Rescue Service staff, should be allowed to enter (e.g. blast area around explosives involved in fire)
- The hazard zone is sometimes referred to as the ‘evacuation zone’ by other agencies and generally means the area where they would seek to encourage all members of the public to leave or possibly shelter-in-place.

(2.1d) When approaching the vicinity of the incident use senses to assess the ‘incident-indicators’ to assist in estimating the extent of the hazard zone

Examples of ‘incident-indicators’:

- Gas and vapour clouds or plumes
- Visible smoke and other signs of fire
- Liquid spills, wet areas, patches, puddles, pools and streams/flowing liquids
- Unexplained noise (e.g. explosions, venting cylinders, site specific audible warnings etc) may indicate a more cautious approach and larger hazard zone
- Distinct odours (e.g. bleach, garlic, rotten cabbage, bad eggs etc.) If you can smell something out of place then you are probably too close
- Damaged containers and packages
- Biological indicators such as dead birds, animals, fish, insects, trees and vegetation
- Casualties and other ‘involved people’ may physically mark the hazard zone or they may be able to describe it based on their experience
- Remember the primary response protocol STEP 1-2-3 – Safety triggers for emergency personnel when the cause of harm to the casualties is unknown and there is no immediately apparent reason for their incapacity.
### STEPS 1 - 2 - 3

**STEP 1** – Single casualty, no logical explanation or cause – deploy as for normal collapsed casualty

**STEP 2** – Two casualties, no logical explanation or cause – tell crews to approach with caution and send full informative and CHALETS information ASAP

**STEP 3** – Three or more casualties, no logical explanation – should trigger crews not to proceed, designate a safe rendezvous point for further resources and Command and Control. Park at a safe distance, following a risk assessment by the Incident Commander. Assess the scene and gather more information. Do not approach the casualties unless their lives are at risk and effective personal protective equipment is worn. CHALETS information must be provided.

**NOTE:** See flow chart below.

- Complete CHALETS assessment as soon as possible.

### CHALETS

**‘CHALETS’ Assessment**

- **Casualties** – Approximate number of casualties dead, injured, uninjured, number trapped
- **Hazards** – Present and potential
- **Access** – Best access routes for emergency services and suitable provisional rendezvous point
- **Location** – The exact location of the incident using map references if possible
- **Emergency** – Emergency services present and required, consider attendance of hospital medical teams, specialist equipment and specialist services
- **Type** – The type of incident with brief details of types and numbers of vehicles, trains, buildings, aircraft involved
- **Safety** – What personal protective clothing is required and ensure you are in a safe area.
Step 1-2-3 flow chart

- Identify Hazards
  - Control scene
  - Safe arrival routes & rendezvous points
  - Additional resources
  - CHALETS

- Are there 3 or more casualties with no apparent cause?
  - Yes
    - Yes: Undertake Dynamic Risk Assessment
      - Benefits outweigh risks
        - Undertake rescues
          - Minimum staff
          - Highest appropriate level of PPE / RPE
        - Disrobe
        - Decontamination
        - Immediate medical advice
      - Risks outweigh benefits
        - Introduce Control Measures
    - No: Follow STEP 1 or 2
  - No
    - No: Direct ambulant casualties to place of relative safety

- Are there non-ambulant casualties requiring rescue from hazard area?
  - Yes
    - Yes: Undertake Dynamic Risk Assessment
      - Benefits outweigh risks
        - Undertake rescues
          - Minimum staff
          - Highest appropriate level of PPE / RPE
        - Disrobe
        - Decontamination
        - Immediate medical advice
      - Risks outweigh benefits
        - Introduce Control Measures
    - No
  - No: Follow STEP 1 or 2

- Report arrival and location to Control

- Apply STEP 123
(2.1e) Estimate the potential hazard zone, and position staff and vehicles outside it

- Incident Commanders should work to their standard operating procedures but when estimating the potential hazard zone, in relation to attending and parking at a ‘no-notice’ incident scene, they should consider the ‘worst case foreseeable’ not ‘worst case imaginable’

**NOTE:** This is not the initial cordonning assessment but more about establishing a safe parking/marshalling point.

- At known hazardous materials risk sites 72(d) risk inspections and other pre-planning should have identified initial rendezvous points and/or marshalling sites.

(2.1f) Establish command/contact point in safe location

- Position command point vehicle in a safe area well outside the potential hazard zone to avoid re-positioning it during the incident
- Maintain contact with mobilising control
- Establish and maintain incident ground communications
- Begin recording incident and hazard information (eg staff and appliance details, substance information, analytical risk assessment etc).
**Action**

2.2 Recognise hazards and risks from a safe location and implement an initial cordon

**Wind and gradient in opposite directions**
Considerations

Cordon control

- Cordons are employed as an effective method of controlling resources and maintaining safety on the incident ground. They must be continuously monitored and adapted to reflect changes in hazards, weather etc.
- Cordons may be defined by a series of markers (e.g., cones, traffic tape, police, members of staff, etc.) or a notional boundary (e.g., agreed line on a map, existing boundary lines or fences etc.), where the boundary is not obvious it must be communicated to all responders.
- The Incident Commander must consider the safety of Fire and Rescue Service staff, the public, members of other emergency services and voluntary agencies attending incidents. However, it must be noted that overall responsibility for the health and safety of personnel working within cordons remains with the individual agencies. Such agencies should ensure that staff arriving at the site have effective personal protective equipment and are adequately trained and briefed for the work they are to undertake within the cordon. Where this is not the case the matter must be referred to the command level.
- At hazardous materials incidents strict cordon control is essential to manage the release and associated contamination issues. After the initial cordon has been established to secure and stabilise the site, the incident should be divided into two types of cordon – the inner and outer cordon.

Initial cordon

- It provides an initial means of controlling, safeguarding and coordinating the immediate response and adds an element of control to the incident. It must be flexible and be able to be moved if necessary.

Inner cordon

- The inner cordon surrounds the area where potentially hazardous activity may be conducted and encompasses both the ‘hot’ and ‘warm’ zones. It is used to control access to the immediate scene of operations. Access to the area controlled by an inner cordon, which by definition is the hazard zone, should be restricted to the minimum numbers required for work to be undertaken safely and effectively.

Outer cordon

- The outer cordon designates the controlled area into which unauthorised access is not permitted. It encompasses the inner cordon and the ‘hot’, ‘warm’ and ‘cold’ zones. It should be established and maintained by the police.
(2.2a) Identify the potential of the hazardous materials to cause harm to people by inhalation, ingestion, direct skin contact, absorption through the skin or eyes or entry through cuts and grazes

- Line before identifying the hazards posed by the substance (e.g., toxic, corrosive, explosive etc).
- Identify how the substance could cause harm to people (e.g., inhalation, ingestion, direct skin contact, absorption through the skin or eyes or entry through cuts and grazes).
- Determine who is at risk.
- Predict the likelihood of harm occurring.
- Estimate the severity of the harm.
- Identify or classify the hazardous materials by its hazards.

**NOTE:** This will be easier to do and more accurate with known substances rather than unknown or mixtures of substances.

- Estimate the quantities involved and quantities present at the scene.
- Recognise the hazardous material’s physical properties.

**NOTE:** be aware of the limitations of using the senses to determine the presence of hazardous materials.

- Identify the potential for chemical reactions (e.g., release of energy, heat, light, explosion etc).
- Identify the location of substance (e.g., inside or outside buildings, degree of packaging/containment, proximity to populated buildings etc).
- Ascertain the likelihood of containers rupturing if heated or subjected to an internal reaction.
- Review the available pre-planning information, operational intelligence and ‘incident-indicator’ information to identify other significant hazards.
- Identify typical occupancies and locations at the incident where hazardous materials are manufactured, transported, stored, used or disposed of.
- Identify the primary hazards associated with the United Nations’ hazard class and division of the hazardous materials present.
- Identify and use transportation documents and material safety data sheets.
- Recognise typical containers, and their hazards, generally used to store/transport hazardous materials (see Part C for further information – Transportation and storage section if necessary).
- Recognise typical hazardous materials packages by type (see Part C for further information).
• Identify site and transportation markings that indicate hazardous materials, including the markings, labels and placards provided under:
  – United Nations systems (United Nations hazard warning diamonds and United Nations numbers)
  – United Kingdom Hazard Identification System (UKHIS)
  – Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH)
  – Globally harmonised system (GHS)
  – European Agreements concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, by Rail and by Inland Waterways (ADR, RID or ADN)
  – International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) code
  – Air transport container markings
  – Biohazard package markings
  – Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations (CHIP)
  – Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures (CLP) Regulations
  – Dangerous Substances (Notification and Marking of Sites) Regulations (NAMOS)
  – Military hazardous materials systems
  – Pipeline regulations

  **NOTE:** The Incident Commander and hazardous materials adviser should always consider the possibility of incorrect, inaccurate, missing or misleading information being gathered on the hazardous materials. Where ever possible ‘triangulation of information’ should be gained, this means trying to ensure that at least three sources are used to verify critical assumptions/decisions.

(2.2b) Identify the potential of the hazardous materials to cause harm to property and the environment

Consider:

• The proximity of drains and sewers and the presence/absence of any pollution control facilities
• Proximity and sensitivity of groundwater aquifers, rivers, reservoirs and other water sources used for drinking water and other uses
• Proximity to flora and fauna (eg environmental protected sites such as sites of special scientific interest)
• Fire and cooling run-off water, including fire fighting foam use. Are there firewater containment facilities available
• Soil contamination (eg Is there unmade ground?)
• Non-hazardous substances to humans which can damage specific environments (eg milk spillage running into fisheries etc).
Recognise any additional hazards

Consider:

- Fire, including actual and potential ignition sources
- Working at height
- Manual handling
- Heat exhaustion for staff wearing enhanced personal protective equipment
- Effects of fire, heating, cooling, water sprays etc on specialised hazardous materials containment systems
- Criminal or terrorist activity, including secondary devices.
**HOT, WARM AND COLD ZONES**

**Hot zone**
- This is the contaminated area(s) where the initial release occurs or disperses to. It will be the area likely to pose an immediate threat to the health and safety of all those located within it and is the area of greatest risk.
- It is located within the inner cordon and is part of the hazard zone.
- Effective personal protective equipment is required when working within the ‘hot’ zone. Each emergency service has differing specifications for personal protective equipment and will decide on the appropriateness of their own personal protective equipment. The effectiveness of each type of personal protective equipment for the ‘hot’ zone depends on the type and concentration of the contaminant. Any decisions made should be based on a hazard assessment.
- There may be more than one area of release and therefore more than one ‘hot’ zone. Where possible all ‘hot’ zones should be encompassed within a single inner cordon. Where this is not possible for reasons such as scale, location, topography etc the establishment of two or more inner cordons should be considered. This may necessitate treating the cordoned areas as separate incidents with distinct command structures. This is potentially more likely at CBRN(E) events rather than hazardous materials incidents.

**Warm zone**
- This is the area uncontaminated by the initial release of a substance, which may become contaminated by the movement of people or vehicles.
- It is surrounded by the inner cordon and is part of the hazard zone but usually contains lower risks than the ‘hot’ zone.
- In the initial stages of an incident, the movement of contamination from the ‘hot’ zone to the warm zone will be uncontrolled. As soon as practicable, the warm zone will be managed and controlled by emergency responders wearing appropriate personal protective equipment.
- The ‘warm’ zone will later be extended to include the managed area encompassing decontamination. This extended section of the ‘warm’ zone will be termed the decontamination area.
- At small scale, low risk, low complexity hazardous materials incidents ‘warm’ zones may not exist. Responders should not designate them if there is no benefit from doing so.

**Cold zone**
- This is the uncontaminated area between the inner cordon and the outer cordon. It is the area within which key operational command positions and other essential activities will be set up.
- The Police Service, in liaison with the Fire and Rescue Service and the Ambulance Service, should decide whether members of the public need to be evacuated from the ‘cold’ zone. (See diagram opposite)
Establish an initial cordon

- The initial cordon is temporarily established by the first wave of unprotected emergency responders, before any detailed scene assessment or any other scientific analysis has been conducted. It provides an initial means of facilitating (controlling, safeguarding and coordinating) the immediate response and adds an element of control to the incident
- The initial cordon must be flexible and be able to be moved if necessary
- The initial cordon is an immediate precautionary measure and must be formed in a position of safety. Unprotected responders must never be deliberately deployed to a position where 'contamination' is suspected. However, it should be considered as enclosing a 'potential hazard' zone rather than an 'exclusion' zone. Only responders who have been briefed and equipped to deal with the hazards should be allowed to operate within it. Certain extremely high-risk incidents will require the establishment of an 'exclusion' zone in addition to the initial cordon (e.g., explosives involved in fire etc)
- Given the limited number of resources available in the early stages, it may be impracticable to position cordon staff around the entire 360° of the event. Commanders should initially aim, as far as practicable, to create an arc of containment of 90° either side of the upwind meridian. This is essential to protect responders and to prevent decontamination areas from being compromised by either the release or contaminated casualties
- Where the hazardous materials involved are toxic by inhalation it may be necessary to extend the initial cordon in the downwind direction to protect people from vapours, gases, or dusts (NOTE: solids/liquids which produce toxic gases upon contact with water). The initial cordon should enclose the area in which persons may become incapacitated and unable to take protective action and/or incur serious or irreversible acute health effects. Areas where non-acute or possibly longer-term health risks may be present should be designated and dealt with by the Health Protection Agency.
- The initial cordon must be communicated to all first responders especially on-coming response vehicle drivers
- Use generic initial cordon distances as a basis for further risk assessment (e.g., Chemdata initial isolation distances, Emergency Response Guidebook, IAEA Manual for first responders to a Radiological Emergency, Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regs. etc)
- Public Safety Hazard – An ‘E’ following the first two characters of an emergency action code (EAC) indicates that there may be a public safety hazard outside the immediate area of the incident, and that the following actions should be considered:
  - People should be warned to stay indoors with all doors and windows closed, preferable in upstairs rooms facing away from the incident. They should eliminate all ignition sources and stop any ventilation
  - Effects may spread beyond the immediate vicinity. All non-essential staff should be instructed to move at least 250m away from the incident
  - Police and Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commanders should consult with each other and with a product expert or a source of product expertise
  - The possible need for subsequent public evacuation should be considered, but it should be remembered in most cases it will be safer to remain in a building than to evacuate.
**NOTE:** Continuous risk assessment should be carried out to ensure that the cordon remains appropriate and proportionate to the risks identified by the Incident Commander.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident type (if known)</th>
<th>Initial cordon distance (metres radius)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Explosives – manufacture, storage, transport | 100m for transport incident HD 1.4  
  200m for transport incident HD 1.3  
  600m transport HD 1.1, HD 1.2 and HD 1.5 (or when HD is not known)  
  100m for registered premises (fireworks only)  
  200m for incidents at other registered premises  
  600m for incidents involving licensed storage (under 2000kg)  
  1000m for incidents involving licensed storage (more than 2000kg) |
| (NOTE: Pre-planning for known sites should include rendezvous points at safe distances) | (see Part C-4)                                                                                       |
| Explosives – CBRN(E), terrorist (*Consider no Fire and Rescue Service attendance or treat as EXCLUSION distances for Fire and Rescue Service staff, take guidance from police and explosive ordnance specialists) | 100m for an activated device  
  Unexploded devices:*  
  100m for a suitcase size device  
  200m for a car size device  
  400m for a lorry (or when size of device is not known) |
| Cylinders involved in fire  
  (NOTE: shielding may reduce distances)  
  (see Part C-5) | Fireball up to 25m  
   Cylinder may be thrown up to 150m  
   Flying fragments up to 200m |
| Chemical or biological | Due to the diverse range of incidents likely to be encountered it is not possible to set a single initial cordon distance. |
| Radiation  
  (see Part C-10) | **Outside buildings**  
   45m – unshielded or damaged potentially dangerous source  
   100m – Major spill from a potentially dangerous source  
   300m – fire, explosion or fumes involving a potentially dangerous source  
   400m or more to protect against an explosion  
   – Suspected bomb (exploded or unexploded)  
  **Inside buildings**  
   Affected and adjacent areas (including the floor above and below) – Damage, loss of shielding or spill of a potentially dangerous source  
   Entire building and outside distances detailed above – fire or other event that can spread a potentially dangerous source materials throughout the building (eg through the ventilation system). |
Explosives known to be involved in fire

If explosives are known to be involved in fire then Initial Cordon distances should be treated as exclusion zones (ie nobody, including Fire and Rescue Service staff, allowed within the cordon).

### Action

**2.3 Liaise with persons on and off site**

### Considerations

**2.3a Gather information about the emergency or accident from witnesses**

Consider:

- Site staff
- Driver
- Eye witnesses (members of public)
- Document/record information gained from witnesses.

**2.3b Liaise with other persons/agencies to gain specific knowledge about the event, substance, site, process, treatment of casualties or containment system**

Consider:

- Fire and Rescue Service hazardous materials adviser
- Detection, identification and monitoring (DIM) advisers
- Fire and Rescue Service CBRN(E) subject matter advisors
- Independent scientific advisers
- Site experts or technical advisers
- National Chemical Emergency Centre
- Chemical industry emergency responders and mutual aid schemes (eg Chemsafe, Radsafe, Chloraid, Bromaid etc)
- Environment Agency staff
- Water undertakers representatives
- Health Protection Agency officers
- Port or harbour authorities
- Other emergency services and specialist military assets (eg EOD etc)
- Site and company experts/technical advisers
- Local authority emergency planning departments and local resilience forums

**NOTE:** Ascertain information on any relevant history of problems, failures, releases, similar events etc.
### Action

2.4 Consider the immediate life risk

**NOTE:** ‘Immediate life risk’ means – immediate human life saving rescues; immediate evacuation to prevent serious injury; prevention of catastrophic escalation likely to endanger life.

### Considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2.4a) Assess any immediate life-saving rescues (NOTE: STEP 1-2-3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consider:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number, location and degree of entrapment of casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Whether conscious, unconscious, obviously dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Likelihood/degree of contamination of casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ability to survive if not rescued immediately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Known or apparent hazards from the emergency/accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Known or apparent physical properties of the hazardous materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apparent fire/explosion risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Additional hazards (eg mechanical processes, manual handling, working at height etc)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** STEP 1-2-3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2.4b) Consider effective control measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Incident Commander should survey the area around the casualties and take regard of any emergency action codes and additional personal protection codes (see Part C-3, Transportation, packaging and supply of hazardous materials, for further information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Structural firefighting kit, gloves, fire-hood and self-contained breathing apparatus should be the minimum level of personal protective equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use higher levels of chemical personal protective equipment if substance is obviously hazardous, the likelihood of contamination is high; and/or the time taken to rig is proportionate to the casualty’s condition/survivability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Approach from up-wind and up-slope whenever possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Avoid or minimise contact with hazardous materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Minimise exposure time in the hazard zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Designate the safest access route to minimise the probability of contaminating the rescuers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Effective decontamination and safe undressing procedures for the rescuers (see Part C-15, Decontamination, for further information)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Improvised, interim or clinical decontamination for the casualties (see Part C-15, Decontamination, for further information)

• Use minimum number of rescuers, if possible limit the number of rescuers directly contacting any hazardous materials or casualties

• Incident Commander must give a specific safety brief to the rescuers detailing the:
  – likely hazards
  – actions to be taken
  – safe access and egress routes
  – time limit of deployment
  – team leader and lead rescuer
  – location of inner cordon and casualty hand-over area
  – decontamination/safe undressing procedure.

• If there are unacceptable risks, delay rescues until the hazards are controlled possibly by increased level of personal protective equipment.

(2.4c) Carry out rescues

Immediate life-saving rescues should be carried out if benefits outweigh the risk of harm to the rescuers.

(2.4d) Assess the need for any immediate evacuation

• Identify the inner cordon and the numbers of people (a) already exposed (b) potentially at risk

• Consider the realistic potential for the hazardous materials to spread whilst the response plan is being implemented

  NOTE: Dangers from the hazardous materials; weather conditions; physical properties; rates of dispersion; potential risk of escalation/explosion etc

• Assess ‘sheltering in place’ as an alternative to evacuation, factors:
  – health risks posed by the hazardous materials
  – size of the affected area
  – construction of buildings
  – time of day
  – number/condition/age of occupants
  – weather conditions
  – availability of safe and suitable accommodation
  – availability of responders
  – numbers of staff and other agencies required to carry out the evacuation
Operational considerations – Generic Standard Operating Procedure

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NOTE: Respiratory personal equipment and personal protective equipment

– risk to responders carrying out the evacuation

– communicating the evacuation (eg fixed alarm system, responders with megaphones, door knocking, avoiding panic, radio and TV announcements etc)

– safe holding area required for members of the public being evacuated or dispersal plan.

(2.4e) Assess the likelihood of a catastrophe occurring
Consider:

• Multiple casualties or fatalities on arrival

• Large scale fire or explosion(s) threatening populated areas, or, safety critical systems, storage or processing units

• Imminent large scale explosion, fire or hazardous materials release into a populated area

• Imminent large scale release into sensitive environments (eg drinking water sources, etc)

• Declare ‘major incident’ if necessary.

Action
2.5 Identify the problem and the likely impact

Considerations

(2.5a) Carry out full survey of the incident ground

• Joint survey with the ‘responsible person’

• Access, or carry out, a full hazardous materials inventory of the incident ground (ie find out what hazardous materials are there and what’s actually involved or likely to be involved)

• Locate where the release(s) is coming from

• Identify site containment information (eg drainage, sewerage, interceptors etc)

• Draw up/acquire a site layout plan and annotate with all relevant information

• Identify if deliberate reconnaissance within the inner cordon is necessary, if it is it will need to feature in the response plan.

(2.5b) Retrieve and interpret hazard and incident information

Possible sources include:

• Emergency Response Guidebook

• Placarding and signage eg:

  – United Nations hazard warning labels
- United Kingdom Hazard Information System
- European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR)
- European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (ADN)
- The European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road and by Rail (ADR/RID)
- Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 (CHIP)
- Classification Labelling Pancaking (CLP)
- Notification and Marking of Sites (NAMOS)
- International Maritime Dangerous Goods code, etc
- Dangerous Goods Emergency Action Code
- Technical reference databases, manuals, hazardous materials lists and other sources (eg Chemdata, Cirus etc)
- Scientific support and technical information specialists (eg Scientific advisers, DSTL, County Chemists, Bureau Veritas etc)
- Specific emergency response agencies (eg Chemsafe, Radsafe, Chloraid, Bromaid, NAIR, Health Protection Agency-poisons)
- Fire and Rescue Service Detection, Identification and Monitoring teams
- Material safety data sheets (MSDS)
- EH40 Workplace Exposure Limits
- Transportation documents
- Hazchem Emergency Response Service (HERS).

(2.5c) **Assess the condition of damaged hazardous materials containment systems**

Consider:

- Construction and operation of road, rail and other transport containers
- Construction and use of fixed storage tanks
- Construction and operation of intermediate bulk containers
- Pressurised containers are inherently higher risk than non-pressurised
- Type of stressors involved (eg direct flame impingement, heat, cold, chemical, mechanical, shock, friction etc)
- Ability of the container to tolerate the stresses upon it
- Identify if deliberate reconnaissance within the inner cordon is necessary, if it is it will need to feature in the response plan.
(2.5d) Predict the likely behaviour of the hazardous materials involved

- The more complex the incident, the higher the level of knowledge required to perform this task
- Consult product and process specialists

Consider:
- Physical and chemical properties
- Quantity, concentration, release rate and surface area
- Weather/ambient conditions
- Fire/explosion risk
- Topography and site layout (e.g., slopes, spacing of tanks)
- Method of containment
- Will containment system cope?
- Beware mixtures of hazardous materials
- Combinations of additional hazards.

(2.5e) Estimate the size of the endangered area

- The more complex the incident, the higher the level of knowledge required to perform this task
- Consult product and process specialists
- Predict dispersal pattern

**NOTE:** Downwind, dilution, obstacle, oscillation and retention (DDOOR) guidance in urban areas; Chemet plume predictions; high risk sites may have fixed or transportable monitoring equipment; Environment Agency provide a mobile air monitoring response service etc.

- Quantity, concentration, release rate and surface area
- Weather, likelihood of change
- Fire/explosion risk
- Emergency Response Guidebook and Chemdata guidance

**NOTE:** Isolation distances for significant releases

- Identify the hazard zone.

(2.5f) Estimate the potential harm/impact

- The more complex the incident, the higher the level of knowledge required to perform this task
- Consult product and process specialists
- Worst case foreseeable not worst case imaginable
• Determine:
  – Who will be affected and what will happen to them?
  – What property will be damaged or lost and how will this affect production, services and transportation?
  – How will the land and air be affected?
  – How will the water resources be affected?

  **NOTE:** Consider both drinking water/other abstractions and impact on fisheries/aquatic and fauna and flora
  – How long will the emergency last?
  – How long will it take to recover from the incident?
  – Can the financial cost be estimated?

• Explosion hazards
• Fire/flammable hazards
• Cryogenic hazards
• Water reactive hazards
• Other chemical reactive hazards (e.g. oxidisation, toxicity, corrosivity)
• Biological hazards
• Radiological hazards

  **NOTE:** Contamination and irradiation risks

• Asphyxiating hazards
• Carcinogenic hazards
• Mechanical hazards
• Electrical hazards
• Physical and ergonomical hazards
• Contamination – casualties, responders, property and the environment
• Secondary contamination
• Acute and chronic effects of substances
• Environmental toxicity/persistence.

(2.5g) Review the position of the initial cordon with regard to the information gathered and the predicted hazard zone

• Is the cordon too close due to changing weather conditions, escalation of the emergency/accident and/or greater knowledge of the hazards?
• Is the cordon too far away? This may be because; the initial cordon was ‘precautionary’ and further information has been gathered; the call was a false alarm; the ‘responsible persons’ or other agencies have dealt with the emergency/accident etc
• Only move the cordon at this stage if safety is compromised.
Action

2.6 Estimate the resource requirements

Considerations

(2.6a) Consider requesting Fire and Rescue Service assistance based on the information gathered and the actions already known to be required. Further assistance can be requested after the response plan has been formulated.

Consider:

- Numbers of casualties/rescues
  
  \textbf{NOTE:} Mass decontamination

- Scene safety and safety officers
- Cordonning and possible evacuation
- Need for specialist hazardous materials advice
- Future need for deliberate reconnaissance.

Estimate:

- Number of firefighters required
- Number and level of command roles required
- Number and level of hazardous materials specialists
- Additional personal protective equipment requirements
- Type and amount of decontamination equipment and competent staff

  \textbf{NOTE:} NRAT Mass Decontamination Mobilising Model Guidance document

- Amount of firefighting foam
- Type and amount of neutralising agent, absorbent, over-size containers, drain seals and other pollution control equipment held by Fire and Rescue Services
- Detection, identification and monitoring units required?

(2.6b) Consider requesting assistance from non Fire and Rescue Service organisations

Consider:

- Police for outer cordonning requirements

  \textbf{NOTE:} Inner cordon at CBRN(E) events

- Specialist hazardous materials, scientific or process advice
- Environment Agency and Water / Sewerage Undertakers
- Risk to public health (eg local authority environmental health department, Health Protection Agency etc)
• Industry led response/advice schemes (eg Chemsafe, Radsafe, Chloraid, NAIR etc)
• Specialist waste disposal assistance

**NOTE:** Ensure this is requested through the consignor/owner/occupier or responsible authority so that the Fire and Rescue Service does not become liable for the costs

• Type and amount of neutralising agent, absorbent, chemical containers, other pollution control equipment.

**(2.6c) Consider declaring a ‘major incident’ which should mobilise significant Fire and Rescue Service and other agency resources**

Individual Fire and Rescue Services should assess their local risks in conjunction with their local resilience forum partners to develop appropriate and proportionate ‘major incident’ triggers and procedures.

---

**Action**

**2.7 Implement the incident command system**

**Considerations**

**(2.7a) Implement the operational risk philosophy**

**Operational key principle**

**Operational risk philosophy**

• The benefits of proceeding with a task must be weighed carefully against the risks
• It is important to think before you act, rather than, act before you think.

**(2.7b) Strictly implement 'line of command' principle within incident command system at all hazardous materials incidents**

**Operational key principle**

**Line of command principle**

• All commanders must know who they are responsible for
• All staff must know who they report to
• All staff must know what their operational brief is.

The incident command system relies upon a single unified command line. With the exception of urgent safety related issues staff should not take control of operations outside their assigned responsibility and should ensure all information and instruction is passed via the relevant command line officers.
(2.7c) Implement command support and ensure it is properly resourced

- Accurate information exchange and communication is required between command support and the mobilising centre
- Good incident ground communications are essential
  
  **NOTE:** Multi-agency communications (eg Airwave interoperable channels etc)
- Maintain accurate records of all staff in the ‘cold’, ‘warm’ and ‘hot’ zones as well as any exposure to hazardous materials.

(2.7d) Limit the Incident Commander’s spans of control

- The span of control for tactical command roles should be as narrow as possible
- Limit to a maximum of five lines of direct communications
- Reduce lines of direct communication to three or four in high-risk, complex, significant or developing situations.

(2.7e) Carry out effective and appropriate sectorisation

- Ensure the degree of sectorisation is appropriate to the size and complexity of the incident
- Incidents are best managed if they are kept as simple as possible
- Beware of over complicating simple hazardous materials incidents or under sectorising complex incidents
- Limiting spans of control to ensure the close monitoring of staff and safety, is the key to effective sectorisation and delegation of responsibility
- Significant hazardous materials incidents are more likely to require the following functional or support sectors:
  
  **Marshalling**
  
  **NOTE:** Must be pre-planned for known risks – level 3

  **Hazardous materials information**
  
  **NOTE:** Designate responsibility for collating and interpreting information to a dedicated competent person possibly supported by a team, remember it may be necessary to have an off-scene hazardous materials specialist as well as on-scene

  **Decontamination**
  
  **NOTE:** Mass decontamination sector(s)

  **Logistics**
  
  **NOTE:** Chemical protective clothing requirements, high turn-over and fatigue of breathing apparatus wearers, decontamination resources

  **Welfare**
  
  **NOTE:** Operating in chemical protective clothing will increase fatigue and dehydration
Press liaison

**NOTE:** Evacuation/shelter-in-place warnings, increased need for public reassurance

### Safety

**NOTE:** Ensure each working sector has a nominated safety officer with the necessary level of hazardous materials competence, at a large incident these may be coordinated through a safety sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2.7f) Ensure that appropriately trained commanders operate in Bronze (Operational), Silver (Tactical) and Gold (Strategic) command roles if required, and use a recognised decision making model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2.7g) Adopt a multi-agency approach to incident resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fire and Rescue Services should work with their local resilience forum partners to develop, test and exercise multi-agency protocols.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(2.7h) Designate a clean area with washing facilities for hydration and welfare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure there is clear separation from operational areas/sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Designate a welfare officer supported by a team where necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Designate staff to monitor hand-washing and other basic hygiene requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Consider multi-agency collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• If no clean area can be established then no eating, drinking etc should be allowed on-site as a precaution against the risk of accidentally ingesting hazardous materials.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Phase 3: Planning the response

Emergency incident response phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Mobilising and en-route</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Arriving and gathering information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Planning the response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>Implementing the response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5</td>
<td>Evaluating the response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 6</td>
<td>Closing the incident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of actions and considerations whilst planning the response to a hazardous materials incident

DEFINITION:

The systematic process of agreeing response objectives, risk assessing options and developing a sequence of actions, based on a safe system of work, to favourably change the situation.

Phase 3 Planning the response summary

3.1 Identify the objectives

a) Identify any on-going risks to people from the hazardous materials following the initial assessment (i.e., those not controlled during the reactive period of the incident)
   Set any human rescues as a critical-priority objective

b) Identify any fires or fire risks. Set firefighting as a high-priority objective due to the Fire and Rescue Service’s responsibilities under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004

c) Identify property that can be saved and also property that is already lost

d) Identify the extent of environmental harm and the potential for intervention

e) Agree and prioritise the objectives in consultation with the relevant agencies/people.
### 3.2 Develop a response plan with specialist advisers and other agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Identify the options to achieve the objectives</td>
<td>(3.1a) Identify any on-going risks to people from the hazardous materials following the initial assessment (ie those not controlled during the reactive period of the incident). <strong>Set any human rescues as a critical priority objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Risk assess the options and select the best course of action</td>
<td>• Are all persons accounted for?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Develop the response plan</td>
<td>• Are Initial cordons in place and effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Identify the tactical mode</td>
<td>• Has everyone been evacuated within the hot and warm zones?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Ensure there is sign-up to the response plan from other emergency services, other statutory authorities, responsible persons, site operators, land owners, specialist commercial responders, waste contractors, local resilience forum, military etc where this practicable.</td>
<td>• Review any decision to ask people to shelter in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What can be achieved with current levels of Fire and Rescue Service resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What can be achieved with additional Fire and Rescue Service and specialist resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3 Identify the level and type of personal protective equipment required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Assess the tasks and associated hazards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Select the most effective personal protective equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c Select the most appropriate/capable staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.4 Identify effective decontamination procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Establish the responsibilities of the Fire and Rescue Service for decontamination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Assess the hazards posed by the hazardous materials, the site and the tasks being carried out, then select the most effective type of decontamination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Identify the resources and procedures required for decontamination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Identify procedures and precautions to deal with any decontamination run-off to prevent or minimise environmental pollution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3.1b) Identify any fires or fire risks. Set firefighting as a high-priority objective due to the Fire and Rescue Service’s responsibilities under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004

Consider:

- Extinguish fire if safe to do so
- Cool and protect exposure risks
- Protect un-ignited fire risks and control ignition sources
- Control water run-off
- Current levels of Fire and Rescue Service resources
- Additional Fire and Rescue Service and specialist resources.

(3.1c) Identify property that can be saved and also property that is already lost

Consider:

- Current levels of Fire and Rescue Service resources
- Additional Fire and Rescue Service and specialist resources
- Cost of interventions.

(3.1d) Identify the extent of environmental harm and the potential for intervention

Consider:

- Proximity of drains and sewers and the presence/absence of any pollution control facilities
- Proximity and sensitivity of groundwater aquifer, rivers, reservoirs and other water sources used for drinking water and other uses
- Proximity to flora and fauna
- Proximity of national parks, sites of special scientific interest, conservation areas and other protected sites
- Soil contamination and recovery periods
- Hierarchy of pollution control (Part C-16)
- Costs of interventions

**NOTE:** Liaise with Environment Agency, water company and site operator if cooperative over cost recovery from the polluter.
(3.1e) Agree and prioritise the objectives in consultation with the relevant agencies/people

Consider:

- Achieving the best result for the most people
- Fire and Rescue Service hazardous materials adviser’s assessment
- Responsible authorities’ priorities
- Owners/occupiers’ priorities
- Consigners priorities.

### Action

3.2 Develop a response plan with specialist advisers and other agencies

### Considerations

(3.2a) Identify the options to achieve the objectives

- Use multi-agency approach to identify all options to achieve the objectives and resolve the incident, unless there are time-critical priorities
- For known hazardous materials risk sites, always consider implementing the pre-planned response but check it is relevant to the specific objectives
- **NOTE:** There will usually be more than one way to resolve the incident, that is:
  - Do nothing – always consider this option with regard to Fire and Rescue Service involvement especially if the risks to responders are high. Ask the questions – Is it an emergency? Is it the Fire and Rescue Service’s responsibility? Should the ‘responsible person’, organisation or authority employ a specialist contractor?
  - Defensive containment – ie, Can the incident be resolved without committing staff to the hazard zone? eg valving-down, remote isolation, controlled burn etc
  - Offensive action – ie, proactive containment, leak sealing, decanting, dilution, etc.

(3.2b) Risk assess the options and select the best course of action

Consider:

- Identify the significant hazards
- Determine who is at risk
- Predict the likelihood of harm occurring
- Estimate the severity of the harm
- Choose the option that appears to deliver the most benefit for the least risk/cost.
(3.2c) Develop the response plan

Develop a sequence of actions with risk control measures appropriate to the complexity of the incident, consider:

- Scene assessment, control and management
- Rescues, evacuation/shelter in place
- Emergency control of any release, spill or leak
- Deliberate reconnaissance
- Mass decontamination
- Release, spill or leak containment
- Environmental protection
- Investigation and evidence gathering
- Responder decontamination
- Fire and Rescue Service equipment cleaning/removal
- Hand-over and Fire and Rescue Service closure
- Clean-up.

Ensure the response plan covers both on-site and off-site actions if the scale warrants it:

- Identify people and agencies that may provide additional advice and assistance
- Agree on-site accountability
- Agree off-site accountability

**NOTE:** Mutual aid, secondary notifications, press releases, recovery tasks, etc

- Establish protective actions for the public (ie shelter-in-place v evacuation)
- Inner cordon (‘hot’ and ‘warm’ zones)
- Outer cordon (‘cold’ zone)
- Casualty assessment and treatment
- Rest centres for evacuees
- Responder welfare
- Operational level hazard control measures
  (see ‘actions’ below for level of personal protective equipment and decontamination)
- Tactical level hazard control measures
- Environmental protection action and pollution control
- Environmental monitoring
- Agree a public information and notification strategy and who is responsible for leading and coordinating it
• Law enforcement, on-scene security and potential crime scene issues (eg evidence collection and handling etc)

• Minimise disruption to the community

• Record the plan and the rationale behind it

  **NOTE:** Complete the incident command system analytical risk assessment

• Traffic control.

### (3.2d) Identify the tactical mode

Consider:

• Offensive

• Defensive

• Transitional.

### (3.2e) Ensure there is sign-up to the response plan from other emergency services, other statutory authorities, responsible persons, site operators, land owners, specialist commercial responders, waste contractors, local resilience forum, military etc, where this is practicable

• If necessary, due to the scale of the emergency, seek acceptance of the plan from Strategic Coordinating Group (Gold) and/or Fire Gold Command

• Agree protocols for dealing with major or significant incidents through local resilience forums.

---

### Action

3.3 Identify the level and type of personal protective equipment required

### Considerations

#### (3.3a) Assess the tasks and associated hazards

• Physical properties (eg vapour, liquid, solid etc)

• Will the physical properties change and affect the contamination of the responders? (eg changes in ambient temperatures – if gas tight suit wearers move from a very cold environment into a warm one, condensation may occur leading to a liquid hazard rather than a vapour)

• Concentration, temperature or potency of the hazardous materials

• Degree of contact with the hazardous materials

• Duration of contact with the hazardous materials

• Complexity of the tasks

• Degree of strength, physical effort required

• Likelihood of heat stress
• Manual handling risks
• Working at height risks
• Working conditions
  (eg hot/cold, light/dark, in the open/in a building, firm/level ground versus slippery/
  uneven ground etc).

(3.3b) Select the most effective personal protective equipment

Consider:
• Dust/particle masks or respirators and eye protection
• Powered respirator protective suits
• Self contained breathing apparatus
• Structural firefighting kit
• Chemical resistant gauntlets
• Splash suits
• Liquid tight suits
• Gas tight suits.
(see Part C-14, for further information.)

(3.3c) Select the most appropriate/capable staff

Consider:
• Competence in hazardous materials operations
• Experience in hazardous materials operations
• Size (eg entry into confined spaces etc)
• Physical condition and suitability for required operations/personal protective
  equipment

  **NOTE:** All staff selected to operate in enhanced personal protective equipment
  should be trained in its use and limitations.
### Action

**3.4 Identify effective decontamination procedures**

### Considerations

#### Contamination

- Contamination occurs when a substance adheres or is deposited on people, equipment or the environment, thereby, creating a risk of exposure and possible injury or harm. **NOTE:** Contamination does not automatically lead to exposure but may do.

- Alpha, beta and gamma emissions in themselves cannot cause contamination, although the actual source materials may be able to depending on their physical properties and their containment.

#### Decontamination

- Decontamination is the physical and/or chemical process of reducing contamination to minimise the risk of further harm occurring and to minimise the risk of cross contamination to a level as low as reasonably practicable. **(NOTE: It can be started by the disrobing of clothing.)**

#### Exposure

Exposure occurs when a harmful substance:

- Enters the body through a route, for example, inhalation, ingestion, absorption or injection, or

- When the body is irradiated **(NOTE: Radioactive exposure does not automatically mean you are contaminated).**

#### Firefighter decontamination

- Is the use of decontamination equipment in a planned and structured manner to minimise the risk of further harm occurring and cross contamination to a level as low as reasonably practicable. Firefighter decontamination may be divided into two categories, ‘initial’ and ‘full’. These procedures usually involve two processes. Firstly, ‘contamination reduction’ and then ‘safe undressing’.

#### Mass decontamination

- Is the planned and structured procedure delivered by the Fire and Rescue Service using purpose designed decontamination equipment where there are large numbers of contaminated casualties.

#### Improvised decontamination

- Is the use of an immediately available method of decontamination prior to the use of specialist resources.
DECONTAMINATION

Interim decontamination

• Is the use of standard equipment to provide a planned and structured decontamination process prior to the availability of purpose designed decontamination equipment.

Clinical decontamination

• Is the process where contaminated casualties are treated individually by trained healthcare professionals using purpose designed decontamination equipment.

(3.4a) Establish the responsibilities of the Fire and Rescue Service for decontamination

• Firefighter decontamination is always a requirement for the Incident Commander where contamination is reasonably believed to have occurred

• Decontamination of the general public is a Health Service responsibility, usually carried out by the ambulance service at emergency incidents. When the ambulance services’ resources are unable to cope with the number of casualties, mass decontamination should be carried out by the Fire and Rescue Service

NOTE: Improvised or interim decontamination in the initial stages whilst mass decontamination is being established may produce a more positive patient outcome

• Clinical decontamination is the process where contaminated casualties are treated individually by trained healthcare professionals using purpose designed decontamination equipment

• Non-firefighter responder decontamination (ie ambulance service, police, military etc) should be the responsibility of the respective employer, however, in certain emergency situations the Fire and Rescue Service may carry out this function.

(3.4b) Assess the hazards posed by the hazardous materials, the scene and the tasks being carried out, then select the most effective type of decontamination

Consider:

• Physical properties

• Risk (likelihood and severity) of potential harm to affected staff

• Degree of contamination of staff (eg the team leader may need less decontamination if he/she supervised the work and did not come into contact with the substance)
• Initial firefighter decontamination as opposed to full firefighter decontamination

NOTE:
Review the advantages and the limitations

• Topography of scene
• Drainage or the natural containment of the scene (eg Where will run-off drain too, or can/should run-off be contained on scene?)
• Decontamination methods:
  – physical
  – chemical.
• Firefighter decontamination (primary decontamination) initial or full depending on risk and scale of incident
• For CBRN(E) events, the Ambulance Service must be consulted on the most effective form of decontamination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational key principle</th>
<th>Decontamination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The outcome of decontamination is, as a minimum, to lower risk of harm/cross-contamination to an acceptable level, that is, as low as reasonably practicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3.4c)</td>
<td>It is not always possible to totally remove the contaminant or clean the personal protective equipment on-site.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Identify the resources and procedures required for decontamination

• Cording and location of decontamination zone in relation to the ‘hot’ and ‘warm’ zones
• Control of staff waiting to be decontaminated and the location of the holding area
• Communication with staff in the decontamination zone
• Resource management:
  – staff
  – supervision/accountability (Decontamination Officer/Sector Commander; Assistant Decontamination Officer; Decontamination BAECO etc)
  – personal protective equipment
  – respiratory protective equipment
  – ancillary equipment
  – water and cleaning agents
  – maintenance of equipment
  – management of personal effects

NOTE: The police will be responsible for personal effects at a CBRN(E) event.
(3.4d) Identify procedures and precautions to deal with any decontamination run-off to prevent or minimise environmental pollution

Further information on environmental protection is contained in Part C-16 Environmental protection and the Fire and Rescue Manual – Environmental Protection.

Further detail can also be found in the Contaminated Water Protocol V2.0 developed by the Environment Agency, Water UK and CFOA.
Phase 4: Implementing the response

Emergency incident response phases

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Summary of actions and considerations whilst implementing the response to a hazardous materials incident

DEFINITION:
Taking action to improve the situation and achieve the objectives consistent with the response plan and standard operating procedures.
## Phase 4
### Implementing the response summary

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<td>c)</td>
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<td>Ensure all responders are briefed by their commanders on the response plan</td>
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<td>e)</td>
<td>Designate clean areas with washing facilities for staff hydration and welfare</td>
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<td>Communicate with the local community to ensure public safety and reduce anxiety/concern.</td>
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<td>b)</td>
<td>At protracted incidents consider implementing health surveillance of staff.</td>
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**Phase 4 Implementing the response**

**Action**

4.1 Review and monitor cordons to control access at the scene

**Considerations**

(4.1a) Establish and monitor the inner cordon

- Review the position and effectiveness of the initial cordon and define the inner cordon
- Designate the ‘hot’ zone and ensure staff required to work in, or adjacent to, it know its boundaries, hazards and decontamination procedures
- Designate the ‘warm’ zone and ensure staff required to work in, or adjacent to, it know its boundaries, hazards and decontamination procedures
- Carry out any remaining rescue or evacuation of people within the inner cordon
- Control the inner cordon for all agencies on-site, except where a crime is suspected (eg CBRN(E) events) when the police will assume this responsibility
- Establish ‘gateways’ through the inner cordon for Fire and Rescue Service staff

**NOTE:** Other emergency services should establish their own entry procedures

- Ensure that staff entering the ‘warm’ zone:
  - have the correct personal protective equipment
  - are given a safety brief on the hazards, boundaries, emergency procedures and control measures
  - understand their task(s)
  - know where the decontamination area is and what procedures are to be used.

(4.1b) Ensure that an outer cordon is established

- Liaise with the police or site controller/owner over the Fire and Rescue Service requirements within the ‘cold’ zone (eg appliance positioning, command support facilities, welfare/hydration area, mass decontamination resources, detection, identification and monitoring unit plus support, urban search and rescue etc)
- Ensure the police establish, monitor and enforce the outer cordon
- Communicate the location and entry point(s) to the ‘cold’ zone to all staff.
(4.1c) Establish a clear path to the decontamination area from the ‘hot’ zone ensuring that the ‘warm’ zone is extended as necessary to encompass it

- The decontamination area is the area containing the emergency services’ decontamination equipment/structures. It is a suitable area initially established outside the inner cordon, at first uncontaminated by the initial release, which becomes contaminated by the managed and controlled movement of staff/people who require decontamination

- Prior to decontamination commencing, the inner cordon will be adjusted to encompass the decontamination area

- The decontamination area will initially be positioned in an uncontaminated area that forms part of the ‘cold’ zone, but must be as close to the inner cordon as possible

- The area chosen must be of sufficient size to accommodate the ‘footprint’ of the Fire and Rescue Service, and possibly also Ambulance Service, decontamination structures, and be an area that the police are able to support in respect of their areas of responsibility.

### Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.2</th>
<th>Communicate and control the response plan</th>
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</table>

### Considerations

(4.2a) Use the incident command system to effectively manage Fire and Rescue Service resources on-site

- Review all commanders’ spans of control

  **NOTE**: Maximum of three to four direct lines of communication

- Review initial sectorisation

- Ensure Command Support is adequately resourced.
### (4.2b) Ensure the communications systems are in place and are effective

- Designate specific incident ground radio/communications channels
- Designate specific members of Command Support to set-up and monitor on-scene channels
- Identify any radio safety related issues (e.g., intrinsically safe apparatus, unexploded device triggers etc)
- Utilise on-site communications systems if available
- Set-up secure, reliable communications with the mobilising control and any providers of specialist hazardous materials advice
- Ensure there is a back-up system (e.g., mobile phones, Command Support ‘runners’, use of other responders’ systems/apparatus etc)

**NOTE:** Noise from high pressure leaks, equipment operation or site processes may make the acme thunderer whistle ineffective as an evacuation signal. All staff committed into the hazard zone must be aware if an alternative evacuation signal is to be used.

### (4.2c) Nominate Safety Officers

- Ensure Safety Officers are competent in hazardous materials operations
- Ensure they receive a focused briefing on their role, the hazards and the response plan
- Designate specific Safety Officer(s) to monitor the inner cordon
- Designate specific Safety Officer(s) to monitor decontamination.

### (4.2d) Ensure all responders are briefed by their commanders on the response plan

- Ensure briefings are relevant to the responder’s role
- Focused on hazards, control measures and actions
- Remember Fire and Rescue Service staff off-site, specialist advisers, other agencies, other emergency services etc.

### (4.2e) Designate clean areas with washing facilities for staff hydration and welfare

- Fundamental to safety

**NOTE:** Ingestion of hazardous materials

- May be situated outside the ‘cold’ zone for increased safety
- Monitor hygiene procedures (e.g., hand washing etc).
### Action

4.3 Establish and operate decontamination

**NOTE:** Consider improvised or interim decontamination whilst mass decontamination is being set up.

### Considerations

(4.3a) Establish and operate decontamination for Fire and Rescue Service staff

- Decontamination methods:
  - physical
  - chemical.
- Firefighter decontamination (primary decontamination) initial or full depending on risk and scale of incident
- Generic decontamination system, stages:
  - position and set-out decontamination zone
  - brief wearers
  - drop tools
  - remove/reduce contamination
  - undress safely
  - check for exposure
  - wash hands, face and any areas of exposure
  - re-robe and welfare
  - record any exposure (maintain records and document any exposure to hazardous materials through faulty/inadequate personal protective equipment or procedures)
- manage contaminated personal protective equipment and other equipment
- arrange secondary decontamination (ie further off-site cleaning/treating of personal protective equipment and other equipment to ensure it is safe to be brought back into operational use).

- Use of MD4 Firefighters’ decontamination unit
- Contain decontamination run-off where ever possible unless agreement has been reached with the land owner and the Environment Agency regarding safe dilution/disposal
- Maintain records and document any exposure to hazardous materials through faulty/inadequate personal protective equipment or procedures
- See Part C-15, Decontamination, for further information of the methods of decontamination.

 Operational key principle

Decontamination

- The outcome of decontamination is, as a minimum, to lower risk of harm/cross-contamination to an acceptable level, that is, as low as reasonably practicable
- It is not always possible to totally remove the contaminant or clean the personal protective equipment on-site
- The decontamination area is the area containing the Fire and Rescue Service (and possibly other emergency services’) decontamination staff, equipment and structures
- Decontamination is initially established outside the inner cordon, in an area uncontaminated by the initial release, which becomes contaminated by the managed and controlled movement of people who require decontamination
- Prior to decontamination commencing, the inner cordon will be adjusted to encompass the decontamination area
- The decontamination area should always be divided into ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ areas to minimise cross-contamination. Additionally disrobing and re-robing areas may be designated.

(4.3b) Establish and operate mass decontamination

- Mass decontamination is a National Health Service responsibility that the Fire and Rescue Service carries out when requested to do so by them or their representatives the Ambulance Service
- Further information on operational mass decontamination is contained in Part C-15, Decontamination.
(4.3c) Establish decontamination for other agencies

- Other emergency services and the military have their own decontamination procedures, although may require provision of water from the Fire and Rescue Service
- Fire and Rescue Service should only carry out decontamination of other services in emergency situations.

Action

4.4 Implement deliberate reconnaissance to gather further information

Considerations

(4.4a) Select, protect and brief the reconnaissance team

- Staff must be competent in hazardous materials operations
  NOTE: Complex tasks may require detection, identification and monitoring operatives or advisers
- Use personal protective equipment assessed as effective in Phase 3 – Planning the response
- Ensure the reconnaissance team is given a specific task and safety brief
- Select operating procedures to limit contamination of wearers.

(4.4b) Carry out deliberate reconnaissance

- Avoid or minimise contact with the hazardous materials to reduce contamination:
  - use the minimum number of wearers
  - limit the time of entry into the hazard zone
  - limit physical contact with the hazardous materials
  - if the task only requires one wearer to have contact with the hazardous materials then ensure this happens and avoid cross contamination between wearers.
- Decontamination must be established before crews are committed, and an agreed withdrawal strategy must be in place and understood by crews
- Ensure there is a swift procedure in place to accept and analyse the findings from the team.

(4.4c) Analyse reconnaissance information and amend the response plan if necessary

Fire and Rescue Service should have in place appropriate resources and procedures to analyse information gained by reconnaissance. Incident Commanders should liaise with hazardous materials advisers and other scientific advisers before amending the response plan.
### Action

| 4.5 | Implement effective firefighting, containment and pollution control techniques |

#### Considerations

**4.5a) Control or extinguish fires**

- Duties under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004
- Effects of heat on personal protective equipment
  
  **NOTE:** Inability to use most chemical protective clothing whilst carrying out aggressive firefighting tactics
- Additional physical or chemical reactions with the hazardous materials (eg production of steam, rate of vaporisation etc)
- Fire run-off water – quantity and degree of contamination
- Fire-water recirculation
- Flame bending techniques using hand held spray branches
- Isolation and/or protection of structural exposures using water curtain branches
- Cylinder cooling using water spray
- Manual valve closure under the protection of water spray branches
- Foam attack on a pool of flammable liquid
- Foam attack on a running flammable liquid fire
- Dry agents
- Bulk carbon dioxide
- Protect surrounding risks and allow to burn out
  
  **NOTE:** Environmental considerations.

**4.5b) Carry out ‘defensive’ hazardous materials containment actions (ie the risk outweighs the benefit of committing staff within the inner cordon to control the release)**

- Very close liaison with the site occupier/owner, Environment Agency and statutory water undertakers
- Remote isolation of the release
- Site drainage shut-down
- Interceptor systems
  
  **NOTE:** operational intelligence and pre-planning.
(4.5c) Carry out ‘offensive’ hazardous materials containment actions

- Spill control:
  - absorption
  - covering
  - damming
  - diking
  - dilution
  - diversion
  - dispersion
  - retention
  - vapour dispersion
  - vapour suppression.

- Leak control:
  - neutralising
  - over-packing
  - patching
  - plugging
  - pressure isolation
  - solidification
  - vacuuming
  - water bottoming.
(4.5d) Work with the responsible agencies to control pollution from the site

- Work with the Environment Agency (See Part B, Section 16 – Environmental protection, for further information)
- Contaminants entering the drainage system are the statutory water undertaker’s responsibility (or possibly the Highways Agency or private owner) not the Environment Agency
- Hierarchy of control:
  1. Stem or reduce the leak at source (eg close valves, clay sealing putty, over-pack drums, leak sealing devices etc)
  2. Contain the release close to the source (eg absorbents, pop-up pool etc.)
  3. Prevent the release entering the drains (eg clay drain mats, polyboom, peristaltic pumps etc)
  4. Control the pollutant in the drainage system (eg pipe blockers, sewerage control systems etc)
  5. Boom water courses (eg Environment Agency ‘Grab-Packs’, booms, dams etc)

(4.5e) Ensure that all emergency actions are within the realm of ‘reasonable’ response

- Incident Commander must have a rationale or justification for their actions
  
  NOTE: Legal duties under Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004, environmental legislation etc See Section 4, Legal framework
- Implement the operational risk philosophy (“The benefits of proceeding with a task must be weighed carefully against the risks, it is important to think before you act rather than act before you think.”)
- Act in the best interest of the community
- Assess and control the risks facing staff
- Use safe systems of work.

NOTE: The term ‘reasonable’ is a generic and relative one that applies to that which is appropriate, usual in the circumstances and justifiable for a particular situation. In the law of negligence, the reasonable person standard is the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would observe under a given set of circumstances. An individual who subscribes to such standards can avoid liability for negligence.
### Action

| 4.6 | Work with people and agencies that may provide additional advice and assistance |

#### Considerations

**(4.6a) Work with people and agencies identified in Phase 3 – ‘Planning the response’ that may provide additional advice and assistance**

- Use the expertise of the Fire and Rescue Service hazardous materials adviser to interpret and understand technical information and guidance
- Beware conflicting and uncertain information and advice, try to verify by gaining three sources of advice
- Ensure you understand any conflicting or competing interests of particular agencies (e.g., avoidance of prosecution possibly by a site operator; avoidance of litigation by a trade association adviser, etc.)
- If joint working is agreed in hazard zones ensure systems of work and emergency procedures are understood by all parties prior to entry
- Record joint and/or agreed actions.

**(4.6b) At protracted incidents consider implementing environmental monitoring and/or health surveillance of staff**

- At major risks such as top tier control of major accidents hazards sites, environmental monitoring and/or health surveillance systems may be made available to emergency responders by the operators
- The Health and Safety Laboratory, Buxton, may be able to offer advice on appropriate environmental monitoring and health surveillance and screening
- Health Surveillance should be conducted when a disease or health effect may be related to exposure or where there is a likelihood that the disease or health effect may occur. It also be carried as a precaution to reduce anxiety amongst responders
- Further information on radiation incident monitoring is contained in Part C-10, Radiation.
Phase 5: Evaluating the response

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Summary of actions and considerations whilst evaluating the response to a hazardous materials incident

**DEFINITION:**

Assess the progress of the response plan to ensure the response objectives are being met safely, effectively, and efficiently. Review the effectiveness of the control measures and adjust the plan accordingly. Evaluation is not a one-off action but should be carried out continually throughout the incident as circumstances change or new information becomes available.

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<td>a) Adjust the response plan, implement additional control measures and communicate the changes.</td>
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## Phase 5: Evaluating the response

### Action

| 5.1 | Evaluate the effectiveness of the response |

### Considerations

#### (5.1a) Select competent staff to carry out evaluation
- **NOTE:** For most small scale incidents this function will be carried out by the Incident Commander as part of the operational and tactical risk assessment and decision making processes.
- At large or complex incidents allocate dedicated staff with the incident command system, hazardous materials operations and evaluation skills.

#### (5.1b) Evaluate the effectiveness of ‘reactive’ stage actions
- Was initial hazard recognition and risk assessment carried out effectively?
- Was there a safe approach?
- Was initial cordonning safe and effective?
- Were immediate rescues and evacuation/shelter in place actions taken?
- Were critical incident stabilisation actions taken/considered?

#### (5.1c) Continually evaluate progress of the response plan
- Are tasks being carried out safely?
- Are safety briefing arrangements effective?
- Are tasks on schedule?
- Have the hazards and risks changed?
- Are sufficient resources available?
- Are the objectives being achieved?
- Is the plan on schedule?
- Is command and control operating effectively? (eg risk assessment, tactical mode, inner/outer cordons, spans of control, sectorisation, multi-agency working etc).

#### (5.1d) Evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination
- Are hazard control zones being effectively managed?
- Are staff being effectively decontaminated?
- Is any cross-contamination occurring?
- Are sufficient resources available?
- Are the objectives being achieved?
(5.1e) Evaluate the effectiveness of the specialist hazardous materials advice

- **NOTE:** For most small scale incidents this function will be carried out by the Fire and Rescue Service hazardous materials adviser
- Consider any new information (eg results of deliberate reconnaissance etc)
- Review existing information, evidence and any assumptions
- Are conditions changing? (eg weather, quantity being released etc).

(5.1f) Record significant findings

- Contemporaneous notes
- Debrief templates/forms
- Staff performance and/or competence assessments.

---

**Action**

5.2 Adjust the response plan if necessary

**Considerations**

(5.2a) Adjust the response plan, implement additional control measures and communicate the changes

- Incident command system decision making model
- Completion of analytical risk assessment
- Detection, Identification and Monitoring Deployment Plan and Risk Control form
- Effective lines of command and communication

**NOTE:** Multi-agency approach, on and off-site.
Phase 6: Closing the incidents

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Summary of actions and considerations when closing a hazardous materials incident

DEFINITION:

Safely and efficiently end Fire and Rescue Service involvement at an emergency hazardous materials incident, and communicate this to the appropriate responsible person, organisation or agency.

Phase 6: Closing the incident summary

6.1 Close down Fire and Rescue Service operations

a) Minimise the impact to the community by the Fire and Rescue Service leaving the incident
b) Return equipment and other resources to the correct place and ensure they are secure and ready for re-deployment
c) Extract and clean equipment from the ‘hot’ and ‘warm’ zones
d) Ensure that correct action has been taken if staff have been exposed to hazardous materials.

6.2 Hand-over control of the incident site

a) Identify the responsible person, organisation or agency
b) Document the hand-over.

6.3 Facilitate incident debriefs

a) Carry out on-site debriefs
b) Prepare for off-site debriefs.

6.4 Anticipate post incident considerations

a) Ensure that arrangements are put in place for any post incident issues.
## Phase 6: Closing the incident

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<td>6.1 Close down Fire and Rescue Service operations</td>
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### Considerations

#### (6.1a) Minimise the impact to the community by the Fire and Rescue Service leaving

- Action should be appropriate to the scale and risk of the incident
- Assess the residual hazards and risks to the community
- Fire and Rescue Service has no duty or responsibility for the ‘clean up’ of pollution/hazards/wastes caused by others, but is responsible for wastes produced by itself
- Any general ‘duty of care’ to the general public concerning an incident that the Fire and Rescue Service did not create, on a site that the Fire and Rescue Service does not control or own, is only based on ‘reasonableness’ not specific legislation
- Ensure there is effective multi-agency/community liaison and engagement
- Support the police in terms of scene and evidence preservation
- Proactive media and communications
  
  **NOTE:** Protect the reputation of the Fire and Rescue Service.

#### (6.1b) Return uncontaminated equipment and other resources to the correct place and ensure they are secure and ready for re-deployment

- Fire and Rescue Services should have procedures in place for the repatriation of equipment and other resources
- After-use inspections and, if required, functional tests
- Repatriation procedures should be integrated into operational training
- At Hazardous materials incidents it is essential that these procedures include assessment of contamination by a competent person
- Report any faults or low levels of supplies.

#### (6.1c) Extract and clean contaminated equipment from the ‘hot’ and ‘warm’ zones

- Liaise with hazardous materials adviser, specialist and/or contractors over procedures and processes
- Determine financial liability for clean-up costs
  
  **NOTE:** Generally, the polluter pays and the Environment Agency can recover certain costs.
(6.1d) Ensure that correct action has been taken if staff have been exposed to hazardous materials

- Record and investigate any hazardous materials exposure to staff
- Exposure should only occur through:
  - staff being unaware hazardous materials were present
  - incorrectly positioned initial/inner cordons
  - incorrect level or type of respiratory personal equipment/personal protective equipment
  - failure of personal protective equipment (eg ripped gas tight suits etc)
  - ineffective decontamination.
- Differentiate between exposure to hazardous materials; working in the ‘hot’ or ‘warm’ zones in effective personal protective equipment/respiratory protective equipment and general attendance at the incident
- Notify others as appropriate (eg next of kin, Health and Safety Executive, mobilising control, line manager, occupational health provider etc)
- Agree health monitoring if appropriate and communicate with and reassure the staff involved
- Assess any benefit from hazardous materials/air sampling to confirm exposure (eg suspected asbestos etc).

Action

6.2 Hand-over control of the incident site

Considerations

(6.2a) Identify the responsible person, organisation or agency

- Owner/occupier if the incident is at a private site
- Consigner, supplier, manufacturer etc if a transportation incident
- Land owner, local authority, Highways Agency, Police Service etc if a ‘dumping’ or fly-tipping incident
- Police and Health Protection Agency if considered to be a public health issue
- Environment Agency if involving land or water pollution
- Statutory water undertaker if involving contamination of sewers or drains.

---

Document the hand-over

- Develop a standard procedure and form
- Record name, job/position and contact details of person accepting the site
- Supply relevant information:
  - time of arrival and departure
  - known residual hazards
  - fire and rescue service hazardous materials adviser’s contact details
  - fire and rescue service action taken
  - other agency details if known.

Facilitate incident debriefs

Carry out on-site debriefs

- Hot debrief of first responders (ie what went well, what could be improved, what ‘lessons learned’ need to be shared with other parts of the organisation etc.)
- Provide command/competence assessment feedback for key individuals
- Multi-agency debrief if there are immediate important or safety issues that need to be addressed
- Identify and record ‘lessons learned’ or risk assessment findings from the incident
- De-briefs will range in complexity and formality, proportionate to the scale of the incident and in line with individual Fire and Rescue Service procedures
- Feed significant outcomes into reviews of policy and procedures.

Prepare for off-site debriefs

- May not be required dependent on the scale of the incident
- Off-site incident debriefs should include all relevant agencies. Fire and Rescue Services may wish to hold internal Fire and Rescue Service-only command debriefs prior to multi-agency incident debriefs
- Arrange for staff to make a contemporaneous written record of their actions. This information may be used to assist in any internal or external investigations or enquiries that follow any incident eg Coroner’s Court, public enquiry, etc
- Major incidents may be subject to criminal, coroners or other public investigations or enquiries. Where this is the case, the Fire and Rescue Service debrief or investigation manager should take advice from the Fire and Rescue Service’s principal management before progressing with the investigation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Anticipate post incident considerations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Considerations

(6.4a) Ensure that arrangements are put in place for any post incident issues

- Any safety events; personal injuries, exposure to hazardous substances or near-misses should be recorded, investigated and reported in line with legislative requirements such as *Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrence Regulations 1995*, etc.

- Staff health monitoring/surveillance where exposure has occurred

  **NOTE:** Liaison/notification of occupational health provider

- Implementation of procedures to detect and deal with delayed health effects where this is foreseeable

- Arrangements should be in place to either remove all contamination from personal protective equipment or to ensure it’s safe and appropriate disposal and to check that the equipment maintains the agreed levels of integrity and protection for the wearer throughout its lifecycle

- Repatriation of impounded and/or contaminated equipment

- Trauma incident management – Staff should be supported and monitored to identify whether they are experiencing any adverse affects and to check whether they would benefit from accessing counselling and support services (e.g., reassurance briefings for potentially contaminated crews etc.)

- Liaison with enforcing authorities where legislation/regulation may have been contravened

- Assess and report any post incident financial liability (e.g., negligent actions, asbestos contamination etc.)

- Are changes required to safe systems of work, appliances or equipment in the light of any ‘lessons learned’ from debriefs or from safety events?

- Review existing information held on a premises or location, or the need to add a new premises or location into future preplanning (e.g., by adding to visit or inspection programme).
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Technical considerations
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PART C-1

Information sources

Introduction

7C1.1 The initial response to an incident often dictates the success of the outcome. A risk assessment based on poor information is a poor risk assessment. So clearly access to clear and accurate information at the beginning of the incident is crucial. There can be many sources of information and it is therefore important to choose the ones most appropriate to the incident in hand. This section aims to make this process more efficient by outlining what information is available and where to obtain it.

7C1.2 This section outlines some of the key sources of information available to contribute to the successful management of a hazardous materials incident.

7C1.3 It is not an exhaustive list of such sources, neither will the available information be replicated here. The use and interpretation of this information is discussed in the following section.

7C1.4 The role of the hazardous materials adviser is to gather the relevant data to enable the appropriate decisions to be made by the Incident Commander. It is difficult to define exactly what ‘relevant’ information is, as this is the decision of the hazardous materials adviser. Nevertheless, there are some guiding points, namely:

- Different sources of information will be available during incidents on a site-based incident (eg chemical manufacturing, distribution or storage site) versus an off-site incident (eg on a highway or at a port)

- Common information can typically be obtained from written or electronic sources such as the material safety data sheet, databases or books. This type of information may require further interpretation

- Information obtained from either a product expert or scientific adviser will not usually require further interpretation

- Each has their advantages and disadvantages but the choice of information sources is the responsibility of the hazardous materials adviser based on the scale and nature of the incident

- Wherever possible advice from more than one source should be gained to corroborate the information, ideally the “rule of three”, or “triangulation” of information sources should be used

- Sufficient information has been obtained at the point that a clear strategy begins to emerge in planning the response
• Do not underestimate the importance of safe direct observations.

7C1.5 In the case of trade name preparations (or mixtures), the starting point may need to be the material safety data sheet or the product expert as most common databases and printed information sources do not contain information on this type of product. There are however some exceptions, with Chemdata® and CIRUS being the most common ones.

**Generic information resources**

7C1.6 There are times when information may have already been collected, for example on the known risks at a site, which can be utilised in the all important initial phase of the incident. Another variable to consider is the location of the incident. Clearly, it is much more difficult to plan for an incident during the transport and distribution of a chemical, rather than on the site at which it is manufactured.

7C1.7 When considering where firefighters can gain generic information, hazardous materials incidents have been broadly categorised into ‘on-site’ and ‘off-site’ (or transport) incidents. The exact definition of these categories is less important than the intended purpose of offering guidance as to the information sources available for each as the incident progresses. While certain information sources may be common to all incidents, other sources will depend on the type of incident.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Phase</th>
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<th>Off-site or transport based incidents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1 – Mobilising and en-route</td>
<td>Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) Plans*</td>
<td>Notification call or report (eg 999 log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7(2)(d) risk assessments*</td>
<td>Firemet**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2 – Arriving and gathering information</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Observation</td>
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<td>Phase 3 – Planning the Response</td>
<td>Material safety data sheet</td>
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<td>Product experts</td>
<td>Vehicle markings*</td>
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<td>Chemical databases</td>
<td>Emergency action code list*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Portable reference material, eg Emergency response guidebook</td>
<td>Dangerous goods documentation*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile Data Terminal based systems (eg Chemdata®, CIRUS etc)</td>
<td>Portable reference material, eg Emergency response guidebook</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Level 2 and level 3 Scientific Adviser (eg CHEMSAFE etc)</td>
<td>MDT based systems (eg Chemdata®, CIRUS etc)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHEMET**</td>
<td>DIM equipment</td>
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<td>Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) equipment</td>
<td>Level 2 and level 3 Scientific adviser/Team (eg CHEMSAFE, RADSAFE etc)</td>
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<td>Product specific aid schemes</td>
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<td>CHEMET**</td>
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<td>AT THE INCIDENT GROUND</td>
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<td>AWAY FROM THE INCIDENT GROUND</td>
<td>Manufacturer or supplier</td>
<td>Manufacturer or supplier</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level 1 Scientific Adviser (eg CHEMSAFE, RADSAFE etc)</td>
<td>Level 1 Scientific adviser (eg CHEMSAFE, RADSAFE etc)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Material safety data sheet</td>
<td>Material data safety sheet</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chemical/scientific reference books</td>
<td>Chemical/scientific reference books</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*where applicable to the incident

**Firemet and Chemical Meteorology (CHEMET) are accessed via the Met Office’s Hazard Manager
Site emergency plans

7C1.8 Larger hazardous installations will be subject to the Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) Regulations. They are applicable to any establishment producing, storing or otherwise handling large quantities of hazardous materials. Examples of these types of installations include chemical manufacturing, warehousing and distribution sites.

7C1.9 The regulations operate on two levels, ‘lower’ and ‘upper’ tier, with the site designated into the relevant category based on the inventory of materials.

7C1.10 Lower tier sites are required to document a ‘major accident prevention policy’. An upper tier control of major accident hazard site is required to produce a full safety report which demonstrates that all necessary measures have been taken to minimise risks posed by the site with regard to the environment and the local population. In addition, upper tier sites have an off-site plan which is prepared by the local authority, or in metropolitan authorities by the Fire and Rescue Service and tested every three years.

7C1.11 These plans can therefore be a useful reference source for:

- obtaining an inventory of the types and quantities of hazardous materials held on site
- a map showing the location of the materials
- an assessment of the known risks and remedial strategies
- the location of equipment used to fight fires or prevent the release of materials from the site.

7C1.12 Further information is contained in Section 7, A42.

Risk assessments

7C1.13 Another source of information on smaller installations may have been obtained during the assessment of risks carried out as required by law. 7(2)(d) risk inspections, so-called as they are referred to in this section of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, can also be a useful source of information on the nature and quantities of hazardous materials situated on the site as well as the known risks posed by the nature of the operation on the site.

Met Office Hazard Manager

7C1.14 The Met Office provides a range of services that help authorities prepare for and respond to emergencies that are caused or influenced by the weather. Linked to these services is advice, available from teams of Met Office forecasters, specialist scientists and advisors, on the interpretation and impact of the weather
during an emergency. This service is coordinated through the Met Office’s team of regionally-based Public Weather Service Advisors who can be called upon to provide advice at a strategic command and control centre.

7C1.15 Hazard Manager is intended to be a one-stop information source for the emergency response community, allowing access to all services in one location, using a single username and password.

7C1.16 The services currently available on Hazard Manager are:

- Flood Forecasting Centre with Extreme Rainfall Alert updates (England and Wales only)
- Interactive Map Viewer with weather information
- National Severe Weather Warning Service
- Emergency support
- FireMet and Chemical Meteorology (CHEMET) services.

7C1.17 Hazard Manager is designed to supplement the role of the Public Weather Service Advisors in providing consistent weather-related information and interpretation for the UK emergency response community.

Accessing Hazard Manager

7C1.18 Anyone who works for a Category 1 or Category 2 organisation (as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) can access Hazard Manager. However, some of the services available through this portal are restricted to approved users. For example, Flood Forecasting Centre products are only available for England and Wales, and FireMet and CHEMET are only available for subscribed users.

7C1.19 Users need to register to access the services required. This is confirmed by an email with an activation link. The Hazard Manager site can be found at:

www.metoffice.gov.uk/publicsector/hazardmanager

FireMet

7C1.20 FireMet is a weather system designed by the UK’s Met Office in collaboration with the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) to provide Fire and Rescue Service responders with the latest weather information to help them identify a safe approach when dealing with a major incident. FireMet is a password-protected, web-based system available to all Fire and Rescue Service Incident Command Units, mobilising controls and detection, identification and monitoring units, as well as the National Coordination Centre. It is not available to the general public or other users.
7C1.21 The aim is to provide immediate access to forecast conditions, while they are waiting for a more detailed Chemical Meteorology (CHEMET) report. It also provides three hours of hindcast data, as well as three hours of forecast data.

7C1.22 Users log in to the site using a previously obtained username and password. They are then required to enter location information based on postcode, GB or NI OS grid reference or numerical grid reference. The outcome indicates the direction of the wind and sectors most likely to contain any wind-borne hazard which are coloured red. This can be overlaid on a map to indicate the routes of approach offering the least risk to the Fire and Rescue Service responders (see figure below).

© Met Office

CHEMET

7C1.23 In the event of an incident involving hazardous chemicals, local Fire and Rescue and Police services can contact the Met Office Environment Monitoring and Response Centre. Typical scenarios could be a chemical spillage, a fire at a chemical plant or oil refinery, or a road traffic collision in which a hazardous
substance has been released. For small-scale events, the Environment Monitoring and Response Centre produces meteorological guidance and a plume prediction as a chemical meteorology (CHEMET) report. For larger release events, such as the Buncefield Oil Depot fire, more-sophisticated plume modelling techniques are utilised.

7C1.24 A chemical meteorology report is made of two parts.

7C1.25 CHEMET Form A contains the input data, which consists of the incident details including grid reference of the location, time of the event and any additional information on the chemicals involved. If available it can also include details of the current weather at the site. The Form As are completed by the emergency services and forwarded to the Met Office Environment Monitoring and Response Centre.

7C1.26 CHEMET Form B contains the weather forecast information along with an area at risk map. The figure below gives one example of a risk map.

© Met office

7C1.27 The advantages of using CHEMET:

- quick response – typically within 20 minutes of the provision of part A information
can be delivered by fax or email

easily identifiable area of risk

sufficient for most short lived incidents.

**7C1.28** The limitations of CHEMET:

- will not give information on chemical concentrations and therefore dilution down-wind
- does not take into account extreme heat
- does not take into account topography of the area (e.g., where the land down-wind is raised and thus has the potential to divert the plume from the predicted area
- no information is given on deposition
- provides short period information, the wind direction or weather can change suddenly.

‘**NAME**’ dispersion model

**7C1.29** Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME) is the title of an atmospheric pollution dispersal model which is a much more sophisticated tool than CHEMET for pollution forecasting. It has the capability to:

- simulate the effect of fires
- forecast air quality up to 36/48 hours ahead
- take into account the chemical involved
- show deposition, air concentration and height of the plume
- predict long-standing air pollution problems such as acid rain
- forecast international movement of pollutants.

**7C1.30** It would generally be used for the more prolonged incidents as it takes longer to produce than CHEMET. It is ideally suited for incidents involving extreme heat, explosive releases where the contaminant is forced above the boundary layer (e.g., Buncefield) and nuclear incidents.

**7C1.31** Further information on NAME can be found on the following web site:

   www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/modelling-systems/dispersion-model
PACRAM (Procedures and communications in the event of a release of radioactive material)

7C1.32 As part of the procedures and communications in the event of a release of radioactive material (PACRAM) a weather forecast is prepared by the Met Office and sent to the site in question or to an off-site emergency room. The response is similar to that for a chemical incident using CHEMET.

7C1.33 The PACRAM form is similar to that used for CHEMET and provides details of the incident and may be sent, upon completion, to the Met Office when an incident occurs. The Met Office will then complete Part 2, which provides forecast meteorology and an area at risk map like those used for CHEMET.

7C1.34 Further information on PACRAM can be found on the following web site:

www.metoffice.gov.uk/publicsector/radiation

Environment Agency Air Quality Cell

7C1.35 The Environment Agency co-ordinate air quality data during a major incident in England or Wales, to assist the Health Protection Agency in providing fast and effective public health advice.

7C1.36 The Health Protection Agency will provide public health advice directly to an incident’s tactical coordinating group (Silver) or via the Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) if there is a strategic coordinating group (Gold). The Air Quality Cell therefore requires a Silver or Gold multi-agency group to be operating in order to provide an appropriate communications route for their advice.

7C1.37 To do this the Air Quality Cell will:

- Form a virtual Air Quality Cell with key partners during the emergency phase of a major incident to provide specialist technical expertise (Emergency phase – From start of an incident until the Air Quality Cell hands control to the Recovery Co-Ordination Group. The Air Quality Cell is operational for a maximum period of five days or until the release has ceased or stabilised)
- Provide a new air quality data co-ordination service during the emergency phase of a major incident
- Develop and implement a dynamic air monitoring and air dispersion modelling plan
- Co-ordinate all available resources to deliver monitoring and modelling
- Provide a new air monitoring service to enhance existing arrangements
- Provide a coordinated air dispersion modelling service using new and existing arrangements
• Set response times for various elements of the new service to meet the needs of the emergency services and the Health Protection Agency

• Provide clear explanation of differences and assumptions for both modelling and monitoring outputs

• Provide timely and plain English briefings to support Silver Command or the Science and Technical Advice Cell

• Handover to the lead agency responsible for the recovery once the emergency phase is over.

7C1.38 The Air Quality Cell will not respond to:

• unidentified chemicals or chemical warfare agents, which we are unable to monitor

• hostile chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear events

• radioactive / nuclear incidents (except in a secondary capacity eg hydrogen fluoride release from enriched uranium source or fire involving manufactured products (smoke detectors etc)

• accidental biological release.

7C1.39 How to contact the Air Quality Cell

• Air Quality Cell operates 24/7 and can be contacted through the normal Environment Agency incident route

• Telephone the Environment Agency’s Incident Communication Service or the Regional Communication Service (Wales)

  Incident Communication Service : 0800 163 300
  Regional Communication Service Wales – 0292 0466 422

• Air Quality Cell can also be contacted through the Centre for Radiation, Chemicals and Environmental Hazards.

  The 24/7 national hotline number : 0844 892 0555

• The call will be passed to a competent officer who will assess the information against the triggering criteria:
  – Is it a major incident?
  – Does it involve a fire, explosion or chemical release?
  – Is there likely to be a significant risk to public health?

7C1.40 The key members of Air Quality Cell

• Environment Agency

• Met Office

• Health Protection Agency
- Food Standards Agency.

**7C1.41** Other organisations may be invited to join Air Quality Cell depending upon the nature of the incident (e.g., local authority, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory).

**7C1.42** The Air Quality Cell will develop and implement a monitoring and modelling strategy to support the Health Protection Agency in providing fast and effective public health advice. The strategies are dynamic and allow the Air Quality Cell to respond efficiently to questions from Silver Command or from the Science and Technical Advice Cell.

**7C1.43** Working arrangements

- The Air Quality Cell is a virtual group communicating by Atlas Incident Management System and British Telecom’s MeetMe

- Atlas Incident Management System is accredited to restricted level and allows the Air Quality Cell to share information security marked to this level. Everyone with a license can share/update information, log actions, decisions and communicate using this system. Operational instructions and protocols are provided

- The Air Quality Cell will provide air quality advice and information to the Food Standards Agency so that the implications for the safety of foods can be considered

- Gold/Silver are responsible for communicating Air Quality Cell air quality data to any regional or national strategic co-ordination centres

- No member of the Air Quality Cell will communicate directly with the media – communication will be through Silver or Gold Group.

**Response times**

**7C1.44** The Air Quality Cell is functional:

- within two hours of notification of an incident (Mon-Fri 9-5 except public holidays)
- within four hours of notification (at all other times).

**7C1.45** The Met Office will supply current and forecast meteorological data to suppliers of air modelling services within 30 minutes of notification of incident.

**7C1.46** The two nearest monitoring teams will reach the incident rendezvous point:

- within three hours (Mon-Fri 9-5 except public holidays)
- within four hours (at all other times).
**Enhanced air monitoring capability**

7C1.47 Eight monitoring teams are available on 24/7 stand-by, and based across England and Wales. Each team has a vehicle containing hand-held kit for downloading real-time data.

7C1.48 In addition, there are two mobile monitoring labs, which contain more sophisticated equipment.

**Close down**

7C1.49 The Air Quality Cell will stand-down when the release to air has ceased or been stabilised. The Air Quality Cell will operate for a maximum of five days or until the release has ceased or stabilised (whichever is the soonest).

7C1.50 Co-ordination of air quality data, including monitoring and modelling during the recovery phase is managed and delivered by the recovery co-ordination group, usually lead by the local authority.

7C1.51 The Air Quality Cell review and agree all data before releasing them to the recovery co-ordination group.

**Information available at the incident scene**

7C1.52 After arriving at the incident, it is important to quickly survey the site to establish the circumstances and nature of the incident, depending on whether the incident is occurring on the site of a chemical manufacturer, storage facility or distributor (on-site) or while goods are being distributed (off-site or transport incident). The methods of ascertaining all of the relevant information will depend on the context and nature of the incident, but will typically include:

- direct observation from a distance judged to be safe, perhaps using binoculars
- interviewing other parties such as the driver of the vehicle involved or the site operator
- other responders such as police
- obtaining information from vehicle and/or product markings (eg Hazchem placard (used to indicate that the vehicle is carrying hazardous substances))
- product experts
- material safety data sheets or other information in writing.

7C1.53 Ascertaining whether dangerous goods are involved in transport incidents should be straightforward providing the consignor and transporter have complied with the relevant legislation. Where dangerous goods are being carried by road vehicle, for example, plain orange plates are displayed at the front and rear of
the vehicle or a Hazchem placard is displayed on the side and rear of the vehicle (see Part B, Section 3, Transportation). There are other similar marking schemes in place for dangerous goods being transported by rail, air or sea.

7C1.54 However, some initial caution should always be shown where there is some doubt as to the nature of the good being transported or if it is unlikely that the relevant legislation has been complied with. Examples include illicit drug or bomb making facilities or the illegal transporting of diesel fuel in unmarked intermediate bulk containers in unmarked vehicles. Inter-modal containers or ISO containers used to transport goods by container ship can also pose dangers where dangerous goods are not declared on the manifest. Due to their very nature, it is impossible to state how common these practices are. However, the likelihood of illegal practices should always be considered in the context of the incident.

7C1.55 It is also not the case that an absence of UN markings indicates that the goods do not pose any risk to the responders or to the environment. It merely indicates that the goods do not satisfy the criteria for labeling under the UN regulations (more information is available in Part B, Section 3, Transportation, packaging and storage of hazardous materials).

7C1.56 For transport based incidents, the driver (if available and able to do so) may be a valuable source of information on the goods being carried. For example in detailing where the vehicle has come from and where it is going to as well as information on what is being carried and any known hazards. Drivers of vehicles carrying dangerous goods are required to undergo relevant training.

7C1.57 The Dangerous Goods Note should be present where the vehicle indicates that it is carrying hazardous goods. Since July 2009, the driver of the vehicle no longer has to carry product specific instructions in writing on what action to take in the event of an incident. These instructions in writing were commonly referred to as “Tremcards®” and were also used by emergency responders as a means of identifying the load. Instead, the driver now has to carry only a generic instructions in writing, which cannot be used to identify the load on the vehicle. Drivers can still carry product specific information but this must be in addition to and not attached to the generic information.

Product specialists

7C1.58 Product specialists can be a useful source of advice, particularly where the product is a proprietary preparation (trade name product) or where the expert has particular knowledge of the site processes and can make suggestions for dealing with the incident.

7C1.59 However, a degree of caution should be used when involving product specialists who have a vested interest in minimising the disruption caused by the incident, perhaps at the expense of the emergency responders. It can also be the case that over familiarity with the product may cause the expert to become blasé to the risks it poses. If there is any doubt as to the probity or suitability of the advice
being offered by a product expert, seek alternative advice such as from an independent scientific adviser. It is in any case prudent to seek alternative views to those of a product specialist, even if you are so inclined to follow their advice.

**Material safety data sheets**

7C1.60 A material safety data sheet or safety data sheet is a document intended to provide occupational workers and emergency personnel with information on the material and procedures for handling or working with that substance in a safe manner. However it is worth remembering that the safety data sheet is primarily aimed at the occupational worker who will have potentially repeated and long-term exposure to the material or substance.

7C1.61 Safety data sheets are particularly important in the case of proprietary preparations where more than one product has been mixed or reacted, as other than the manufacturers or product expert, this will be the only source of information on the product (though note that some chemical databases such as Chemdata® and CIRUS do contain emergency response information on proprietary preparations that has been included based on the information provided by the manufacturer). This is because the act of mixing or reacting the constituent ingredients can have a marked effect on the final properties of the material. For example, both an acid and a base are corrosive but if mixed, the resulting product may have been neutralised and is no longer corrosive. Therefore it can be unreliable to assess the hazards of the product based on the individual ingredients.

7C1.62 The format of safety data sheets in the European Union is of a set format laid down by EC directive. The information is listed in the 16 standard headings given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard heading No.</th>
<th>Standard heading</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Identification of the substance/preparation and company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Composition/information on ingredients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hazards identification</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>First-aid measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fire-fighting measures</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Accidental release measures</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Handling and storage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Exposure controls / Personal protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Physical and chemical properties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Stability and reactivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Toxicological information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is the responsibility of the person supplying the material (substance or preparation) to supply the information specified under these headings. The safety data sheet needs to be dated and any revisions marked.

Scientific advisers

General

Scientific advisers can be a useful resource particularly in instances where either the incident is complex or where other information cannot easily be sourced. Scientific advisers can also be used to obtain product information or to provide corroboration of other information sources. Other reasons for involving scientific advisers include providing reassurance or as a ‘check’ for the response plan that the hazardous materials adviser or Incident Commander has developed.

Scientific advisers can be situated remotely and accessed by telephone, fax or email or at the incident site. There are some common features that scientific advisers should offer:

- ability to understand the nature of the products and how this affects the actions taken
- assessment of the potential for reactions.

Scientific advisers may have expertise in the products involved in the incident, for example being representatives of the manufacturers, or they may have a more general chemical knowledge. There are several suppliers of general scientific advice on a commercial basis such as Bureau Veritas (who act as the primary scientific advisers to London Fire Brigade) as well as the 24-hour Chemsafe help-line operated by the National Chemical Emergency Centre (NCEC) and staffed by qualified chemists, which is free at the point of use to all UK Fire and Rescue Services.

When contacting scientific advisers it is advisable to obtain as much information on the chemicals and the incident as possible before calling. This may include names, part names, company names and product markings. Where this information is not available, supply the information that you have and call back with any subsequent information. The quality of the advice received is dependent on the information that you are able to provide to the scientific adviser.
Chemsafe

7C1.68 Chemsafe is a voluntary scheme run by the Chemical Industries Association and is an integral part of the chemical industry’s Responsible Care initiative. It is also consistent with the objectives of Cefic’s International Chemical Environment Programme.

7C1.69 Chemsafe has been developed to provide a rapid and co-ordinated response to minimise adverse affects to the public, property and the environment following a chemical distribution incident. Chemsafe sets down performance standards for responding to emergencies, based upon the following response levels:

- Level 1 – Provision of information
- Level 2 – Provision of advice at the incident scene
- Level 3 – Provision of practical assistance at the incident scene.

Chemsafe and the National Chemical Emergency Centre (NCEC)

7C1.70 As part of Level 1, participating companies are required to provide the National Chemical Emergency Centre with the details of all the chemicals they transport (all chemicals, not just those classified as hazardous). This means that if the emergency services cannot during an incident contact the company whose name appears on the label or placard for the chemical, they can call on the National Chemical Emergency Centre, via its Chemsafe Longstop service, to provide the necessary information – 24 hours a day.

7C1.71 The chemical information is normally provided as safety data sheets. The National Chemical Emergency Centre has over 400,000 safety data sheets and maintains a database of both current products and those that are no longer manufactured.

7C1.72 The National Chemical Emergency Centre is the Chemsafe Longstop centre. The Chemsafe Longstop centre provides expert advice and information in the event of chemical incidents. Although Chemsafe is primarily intended to cover distribution incidents, the National Chemical Emergency Centre’s Emergency Responders provide advice to the emergency services on any incident involving chemicals, from minor spillages in homes and workplaces to major disasters.

7C1.73 Further information for emergency responders and the Chemsafe User Guide (in portable document format (PDF) can accessed at:

http://the-ncec.com/emergencyresponders/

Additional resources available through Chemsafe

7C1.74 CHEMSAFE RESPONSE NETWORK

A number of Chemsafe member companies have undertaken to operate a “Chemsafe Response Network” which will provide Level 2 assistance to the
Emergency Services on behalf of another Chemsafe member company who is remote from the scene. This assistance is available normally only in the event of a road transport incident and where the owner/supplier of the goods is a Chemsafe member company. The scheme can be activated directly between companies or by the Chemsafe Longstop centre.

7C1.75 PRODUCT SPECIFIC MUTUAL AID SCHEMES
For certain chemicals which may pose particular problems or for which special equipment may be required in the event of an incident, there are a number of product specific mutual aid schemes. These schemes may be activated by the owner/supplier of the goods, or by the Chemsafe Longstop centre. For more information on products covered by these schemes, contact the Chemsafe Longstop centre.

7C1.76 INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT
Information and advice on products originating outside the UK can be obtained by the National Chemical Emergency Centre Chemsafe Longstop centre via the International Chemical Environment Scheme, which includes a network of chemical emergency response centres across Europe.

7C1.77 Chemsafe emergency number : 0870 1906800

Detection, identification and monitoring equipment

7C1.78 The National Resilience Assurance Team have provided strategically positioned Fire and Rescue Services with a range of detection, identification and monitoring equipment. The use of this equipment should be considered in circumstances where it is appropriate, such as:

- Where there is a need for example to quickly ascertain the possibility of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident
- Where there are few other clues to the identity of the material, eg an unknown substance such as a ‘white powder’ is found
- To eliminate unlikely but serious consequence substances (eg the carrier for anthrax) and enable the incident to be quickly down-scaled
- Where it is thought likely that a positive identification can be made
- Where for known substances, equipment is available to monitor the levels of a particular hazard. This can support the correct establishment of safety cordons or identify when safe levels have returned to a location.

7C1.79 Where the use of detection identification and monitoring equipment would merely add delay without affecting the outcome of the incident, ie where the identity of the substance is already known or strongly suspected and there is a plan to deal with it, then the use of the equipment should be avoided.
7C1.80 Where the results obtained from detection identification and monitoring equipment are inconclusive or contradictory, further advice on their interpretation can be sought from some scientific advisers.

Electronic information sources

7C1.81 There are many electronic and database systems available, each with its advantages and disadvantages. The merits of each source is not discussed in detail here but the following table is intended as a signposting guide as to the type of information available from each reference source.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Key (note that this is not a ranking order)</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Electronic source</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Chemdata®</td>
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<td>2 CIRUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Emergency Response Guide Electronic Version</td>
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<td>4 Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders (WISER)</td>
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<td>5 Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO)</td>
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<td>6 HAZMASTER G3</td>
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<td>7 Emergency Response Intervention Cards (ERICards)</td>
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<td>8 Chem-Exper</td>
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<td>9 ChemIDplus</td>
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<td>10 Pesticide Register of UK approved products</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 European Chemical Substances Information System (ESIS)</td>
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<td>12 Sigma Aldrich MSDS</td>
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<td>13 International Chemical Safety Cards</td>
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<th><strong>Electronic sources</strong></th>
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<tr>
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A short summary of each reference source is provided below:

1. **Chemdata®** is a chemical hazards and identification database developed by the National Chemical Emergency Centre specifically with Fire and Rescue Service users in mind. It is the most widely used chemical database within the UK Fire and Rescue Service. It is searchable by name, part name, UN number etc. It contains information on both hazardous (UN no) and non-hazardous products and trade name products (mixtures) as well as pure chemicals. Designed around the emergency action code approach, it gives clear advice as well as information on the associated chemical hazards and required personal protective clothing, adverse chemical reactions and hazardous combustion by-products, exposure guidelines and first aid advice. Protective action distance information from the *Emergency Response Guidebook* (see below) is also included. The software is available as a standalone personal computer application, as part of a networked system or as an application for most Fire and Rescue Service mobile data terminals. Chemdata® is also available on palm-top personal organisers (Pocket Chemdata®) and is licenced to users on an annual subscription.

For further information:

[www.the-ncec.com/chemdata](http://www.the-ncec.com/chemdata)

2. **CIRUS** (Chemical Information Retrieval Update System) is a risk and hazard information database that was designed and built by London Fire Brigade for use by its firefighters, although it is now more widely used. Because it was specifically developed for use by firefighters rather than for wider use throughout chemical industry, it focuses on the actions to be taken when dealing with a particular material rather than the properties of the material and requires no interpretation of instructions. It lists an emergency action code and decontamination code for almost every entry, the exceptions being the majority of the explosive and radioactive material entries. The Chemical Information Retrieval Update System also gives storage emergency action codes to support London by-laws. These are considered useful for downgrading incidents when smaller amounts than the transport threshold for emergency action codes (3000 litres) are encountered.

The Chemical Information Retrieval Update System is available on a licence subscription from London Fire Brigade.

3. **Emergency Response Guide** is a database based on the *Emergency Response Guidebook*, designed to provide emergency responders with an interactive version of the book. The information contained in the personal computer version is the same as in the book. The program enables users to search by UN hazard symbol (warning diamond), UN number, class or by named substance. Information is provided in the form of numbered guides which are designed to apply to substances with similar hazards.
and properties. One key feature is the additional tables showing suggested protective action distances (note not ‘evacuation’ distances as they are commonly referred to).

Download and installation instructions for the current version can be found at:

www.tc.gc.ca/eng/canutec/guide-ergo-221.htm

4. **Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders (WISER)** is a system designed to assist first responders in hazardous material incidents. WISER provides a wide range of information on hazardous substances, including substance identification support, physical characteristics, human health information, and containment and suppression advice. WISER displays the appropriate advice based on designated role (e.g., 1st Responder, hazardous materials adviser). WISER also includes some information from the *Emergency Response Guidebook*. It is available as a free download for personal computers or for some personal digital assistants. Where an internet connection is available, WebWISER allows the user to utilise their web browser to access the same functionality as the standalone applications. WebWISER includes support for personal digital assistant’s browsers including BlackBerry, pocket personal computers, Palm, and some telephones.

Further information and to download:

www.wiser.nlm.nih.gov/

5. **Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations (CAMEO)** is a suite of programs freely provided through the United State Environmental Protection Agency, which includes:

   a. CAMEO, which contains response recommendations for over 6,000 chemicals. The database also contains over 100,000 American chemical synonyms and identification numbers, which aid emergency responders to identify substances during an incident. The search engine gives access to datasheets on each chemical providing physical properties, health hazards, information about air and water hazards, and recommendations for firefighting, first aid, and spill response.

   b. The CAMEO Chemicals Database includes information about the intrinsic hazards of each chemical and about whether a chemical reacts with air, water, or other materials. It also includes case histories on specific chemical incidents, with references. This free resource can be downloaded and installed on a desktop or laptop computer. The CAMEO Chemicals Database uses the same chemical database as Computer-Aided Management of Emergency database.

   c. A reactivity worksheet database of reactivity information for more than 6,000 common hazardous chemicals, which details the dangers from accidental mixing.
d. **ALOHA** – Aerial Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres is an atmospheric dispersion model used for evaluating releases of hazardous chemical vapours. ALOHA allows the user to estimate the downwind dispersion of a chemical cloud based on the characteristics of the released chemical, atmospheric conditions, and specific circumstances of the release.

e. **MARPLOT** – is a mapping program and was developed jointly by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency, and it runs on both Windows and Macintosh computer operating systems.

f. **CAMEO – Companion**, developed by the Arizona Emergency Response Commission, is designed to provide a written help resource for all CAMEO suite users, particularly those who utilize the software on an occasional basis. The CAMEO-Companion provides explanations and step-by-step instructions to help CAMEO users perform emergency response and planning activities learned in CAMEO training classes.

For further information and download:

*www.epa.gov/OEM/content/cameo/index.htm*

*www.cameochemicals.noaa.gov/*

6. **HAZMASTER G3** is a commercial software that incorporates its own graphical user interface to provide a common search and ‘look’ to access a number of other, mainly free, databases packages available. Hazmaster includes not just information on chemical hazards but also information on specific radioactive nuclides. Users are able to select material attributes observed on-scene, which the system uses to instantly identify hazardous materials from its database of over 625,000 material attributes.

For further information, visit:

*www.hazmatlink.com/hazmasterG3.html*

7. **Emergency Response Intervention Cards** (ERICards) is a database of initial actions for the first responders when they arrive at the scene of a chemical transport accident. They were developed to be based on the UK emergency action codes and on the Accord européen relative au transport international des marchandises Dangereuses par Route (ADR) Hazard Identification Number. ERICards are therefore intended to deal with chemical accidents involving a substantial amount of product, occurring during land transport only and may therefore not be appropriate for other incidents. They are also not available for every UN number. Searches can be made by searches relating to substance name, UN Number, ADR label, the hazard identification number or the ERICard reference if known. ERICards is available as a free download for both personal computers and as a personal digital assistant version. For further information:

*www.ericards.net*
8. **Chem-Exper** – The aim of this website is to compile a freely accessible online database of chemicals. It is an open site that invites participation from chemical manufacturers and laboratories to register their products and supply material safety data sheets. The website provides links to the organisation that registered the product should further information wished to be sourced directly by the user. The website currently contains information on over 200,000 chemicals and formulations, with 10,000 MSDS and 10,000 infra-red spectra. The directory can be searched by chemical name or synonyms (in different languages), registry number (Chemical Abstracts Service or European Commission numbers) and by physical or chemical characteristics. For further information:

www.chemexper.com/

9. **ChemIDplus Advanced** is produced by the US National Library of Medicine. It is a search engine for databases of chemical physical and toxicological properties. Further information can be found at:

www.chem.sis.nlm.nih.gov/chemidplus/

10. **Pesticides Register of UK Approved Products** is produced by the Health and Safety Executive. This online application allows the user to search for information on plant protection products with on-label approvals. Searches of the application can be made by specific approval features, changes in the Pesticide Register and by searches relating to products subject to phased revocation. For further information visit:

www.pesticides.gov.uk/databases.asp

Banned pesticides:

www.pesticides.gov.uk/approvals.asp?id=55

11. **European Chemical Substances Information System (ESIS)** is produced by the European Union Joint Research Centre. This free online application is a database of chemical substances registered by the European Union. The information presented includes chemical names (in English, French, German and Spanish), and for “annexed” materials, the risk (R) and safety (S) phrases will be displayed. Searches can be made by substance name, CAS Registry Numbers and EINICs Registry Numbers. It should be noted that this database focuses on pure chemicals and not commercial formulations. Further information can be found by visiting:

http://ecb.jrc.ec.europa.eu/esis/

12. **Sigma Aldrich** provides an accessible material data safety sheet search engine through its website. It should be noted that a log-in user name may be required for repetitive searches. For more information visit:

www.sigmaaldrich.com/sigma-aldrich/home.html
13. **International Chemical Safety Cards (ICSC)** are short summaries of health and safety information about chemical substances designed to be used by workers handling these chemicals. They are produced by the International Programme on Chemical Safety in collaboration with the European Commission and various national bodies. An ICSC is designed to complement a material safety data sheet, and to be used by individual workers rather than safety specialists. The cards are produced in a standard format, which eases translation between languages. The cards are currently available in web enabled format or portable document format (PDF) in sixteen languages, and in paper format in other languages. As of April 2005, 1491 cards are available in English. For further information visit:


**More internet links**

Databases on toxicology, hazardous chemicals, environmental health, and toxic releases:


Profiles of some very common hazardous materials:

www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/chemicals/chem_profiles/

Health Protection Agency Compendium of Chemical Hazards:

www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&Page&HPAwebAutoListDate/Page/1153846673455?p=1153846673455

The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) and exposure limits:

www.hse.gov.uk/coshh/index.htm

Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2008 (CHIP Regulations) and a handy list of symbols, abbreviations, risk and safety phrases:

www.hse.gov.uk/chip/index.htm

Health and Safety Executive asbestos information:

www.hse.gov.uk/asbestos/

Health and Safety Executive radiation information:

www.hse.gov.uk/radiation/ionising/index.htm
National Chemical Emergency Centre (NCEC):

www.the-ncec.com/

NIOSH database:

www.cdc.gov/niosh/database.html

Documentation for Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health Concentrations (IDLH):

www.cdc.gov/niosh/IDLH/intridl4.html

Chemical Safety Information from Intergovernmental Organisations:

www.inchem.org/

Materials Safety Data Sheets Links:

www.ilpi.com/msds

### Printed information sources

7C1.83 The following table is intended as a signposting guide to the type of information available from each reference source.

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<th>Key (note that this is not a ranking order)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Printed sources</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. The Dangerous Goods Emergency Action Code (EAC) List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Emergency Response Guide (ERG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. EH40 Exposure Limits</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. The UN Modal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Wiley Guide to Chemical Incompatibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Hazardous Materials Incidents, guidance for fire services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The UK Pesticide Guide</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Hazardous Materials Chemistry for Emergency Responders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The Dangerous Goods Emergency Action Code (EAC) List

Provider: NCEC. Published by TSO

The book is revised every two years to be in line with any changes made to the Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations (RID and ADR Agreements). The purpose of the publication is to provide the first responder with rapid advice when confronted with a bulk transport incident involving hazardous materials. Duty holders are required to use the publication for the application of emergency action codes to ‘bulk’ loads containing dangerous goods. This is required under the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009 (CDG 2009).

2. Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG)

Provider: US Department of Transportation (DOT), Transport Canada and the Secretariat of Communications and Transportation of Mexico (SCT), (New edition every four years)
This publication is written for first responders, firefighters, police and ambulance crews when responding to a transport emergency involving hazardous materials. It is updated and re-issued every four years. The book is divided into five-colour-coded sections and has been written to be used during the first thirty minutes of an emergency situation by those agencies that may be the first to arrive at an incident. After identifying the substance, the relevant guide number to follow is selected. The book also contains details of initial isolation and protective action distances, commonly but erroneously referred to as ‘evacuation distances’.

3. **EH40 Workplace Exposure Limits and Amendments**

**Provider:** The Health and Safety Executive

This is the hard copy of the list of workplace exposure limits for use with the *Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002* (as amended). The exposure limits contained therein are therefore legally binding.

The 2005 edition of these regulations detailed a departure from the old system for the setting of occupational exposure limits. The old system utilised occupational exposure limits set as maximum exposure limits and occupational exposure standards. The new format now utilises a single occupational exposure limit which are workplace exposure limits.

It should be noted that until 2005 it had been standard practice for the Health and Safety Executive to publish a new edition of the EH 40 document, or an amendment, each year. However, with the increased use of the internet the Health and Safety Executive no longer publishes a revised hard copy. Hence, there was an amendment to the document in 2006 and again in 2007. These revisions should have been sent out to the recipients of the hard copy published in 2005. However, the emergency responder can source the updated tables from the following web link:

www.hse.gov.uk/coshh/table1.pdf

4. **The U.N. Modal Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods**

**Provider:** UN

The regulations can be utilised by the emergency responder to identify materials at an incident that have been classified as hazardous for transport. From the UN Number identification, further information can be determined regarding the product’s possible toxicity, reactivity, flammability and environmental impact from additional information such as the packing group.

Provider: HM Fire Service Inspectorate. Published by The Stationery Office (TSO).

The purpose of this publication is to provide an introduction to the basic science required for an understanding of the way in which fires behave and how they can be extinguished. The book is divided into three parts: In Part 1 some of the physical properties of materials are discussed as these greatly affect the way that materials behave when involved in fire. Any combustion process essentially involves a chemical change and in Part 2 the burning process is described in some detail for different materials together with an indication of the hazards involved. Finally in Part 3 (the shortest part) the various modes of fire extinction are described.

The language used in the book is straightforward to read and the terminology defined as it is encountered in the text. The text itself is never too long and broken down into readily digestible paragraphs. Together with clear, coloured photographs, diagrams and an occasional sprinkling of simple exemplar calculations, the result is a good quality ‘first reader’ in this subject area.

6. **Petrochemical Incidents – Fire Service Manual**

Provider: HM Fire Service Inspectorate. Published by The Stationery Office (TSO).

Although this manual is entitled *Petrochemical Incidents* it contains more than procedures for fighting petrochemical fires. There is a useful amount of fundamental information about the refining processes, layout and typical storage arrangements to be found on sites. References are made to potential incidents which might occur (eg boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions (BLEVEs), boil-overs, tank fires etc), although there are no specific references to actual incidents which have occurred in the past.


Provider: Phillip Carson and C.J. Mumford, Published by: Elsevier

This publication aims to raise awareness and to help users identify, assess and control the hazards of chemicals to permit optimum exploitation whilst minimizing the dangers. The publication provides look-up data, and concise, clear explanations of general chemical principles, physiochemical and reactive properties, toxicities and exposure limits, flammability characteristics, monitoring techniques, personal protection and other parameters and requirements relating to compliance with safe practice, control of risks to public health and limitation of environmental impact.
As a handbook it is particularly useful to emergency responders as a reference source either to supplement their existing knowledge or as a data source. Users must be aware that changes in the legislation impacting on hazardous materials frequently affect not only quantities (eg occupational exposure limits) but the listings as well.

8. Bretherick’s Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards – Volumes 1 & 2

Provider: Peter Urben, Published by Elsevier

This publication is designed to provide information which relates to chemical risks, either alone or in combination, that result from chemical reaction. The toxicological information cited is for hazardous chemical reaction by-products.

There is extensive referencing to the primary literature. It is designed to improve safety in laboratories that perform chemical synthesis and general research, as well as chemical manufacturing plants. Entries are ordered by empirical formula and indexed under both name(s) and Chemical Abstract Service registry numbers.

This publication references chemical incidents where an accident or adverse chemical reaction may have occurred.

9. Wiley Guide to Chemical Incompatibilities

Provider: Wiley Interscience.

This publication contains nearly 9,000 chemical incompatibility profiles with nearly 250 new entries. These entries cover flammability, violent and explosive binary reactions, chemical incompatibilities, and reactions that may result from physical changes.

10. Hazardous Materials Incidents, guidance for the fire service

Provider: HM Government. Published by The Stationery Office (TSO).

This is this publication. It provides a generic standard operating procedure for the Fire Service emergency response. It also gives more detailed technical operational guidance on the 9 UN classes of hazardous materials as well specific sections on; information sources; interpreting and using chemical information; and transportation, packaging and storage of hazardous materials.


Provider: Richard J. Lewis Sr. Published by Wiley Interscience
This publication provides information on the dangerous properties of industrial materials, with references to 26,000 substances and associated toxicological information. Also included in the publication is information relating to industrial hygiene, safety, emergency response, law, and policymaking.

12. The UK Pesticide Guide 2010

Provider: CABI & BCPC.

This publication provide a pesticide index and profiles, other registered products, adjuvant information, supplier listing and further information for pesticide users.


Provider: The North American Bureau of Explosives

This publication contains information on over 3,600 regulated chemicals and is designed for use by first responders. Sections include information on the basic properties of the chemicals, recommended methods for dealing with hazardous materials in the early stages of an emergency, a listing of emergency environmental mitigation procedures and first-aid information. Information regarding chemical personal protective equipment compatibilities is also included. It should be noted however, that the publication is written to be inline with the U.S. and Canadian regulations.


Provider: International Civil Aviation Organization. Published by The Stationery Office (TSO).

Designed to for use with the International Air Transport Association air transport regulations, this publication provides information on UN numbers, basic response procedures and drill codes.


Provider: Robert Burke. Published by CRC Press.

The second edition of this publication includes chapters that are organized by the nine U.S. Department of Transportation's hazard classes. Within each class, the publication discusses individual chemicals that are commonly involved in emergency situations along with their physical and chemical characteristics. Additionally, each chapter addresses the multiple perils of hazardous materials, including “hidden” hazards. The “top fifty”
hazardous industrial chemicals are considered throughout the book. The publication also provides incident reports and statistics to underscore the effects that specific chemicals can have on incident outcomes.

The publication also addresses potential chemical and biological terrorist agents. This resource is written to be appropriate for response personnel without a strong chemistry background by conveying the information in understandable terms.

**Product specific aid schemes**

7C1.84 There are a number of industry led schemes in operation for specific chemical products where, due to the nature of the hazards of the material or the specific expertise needed to effect a response, the manufacturers cooperate to provide emergency assistance to the emergency services. The schemes known to be operating in the UK are detailed below.

7C1.85 It is emphasised that in the case of the specialist aid schemes listed, generalist scientific advisors may have neither the expertise nor the experience to handle them in the quantities likely to be involved in an incident. Immediate contact with the specialist organisation is essential as a major incident could easily result from incorrect actions.

**NOTE:** In the event of needing to invoke a response from one of these schemes, use the contact details where provided or where these are not available contact the NCEC Chemsafe line (0870 1906800). Further information on Chemsafe is contained in Chapter 4, Scientific advisers.

**Acrylonitrile/medical**

7C1.86 For acrylonitrile/medical, an *Emergency Response Manual and a Mutual Aid Scheme of the European acrylonitrile/medical producers* exists. All Acrylonitrile/medical producers involved in transporting acrylonitrile/medical in Europe should have an established procedure for receiving transport incident reports and for being able to give expert advice on how to minimize any danger arising from an incident on road, rail or waterway/sea.

7C1.87 The underlying features of this scheme are that the firm delivering the acrylonitrile/medical (the supplying company) is under an obligation to take action when notified of any transport incident. Another firm (the assisting company) can be requested by the supplying company to take action, for example if the assisting company is closer to the scene of the incident.

7C1.88 The assisting company takes the place of the supplying company on its behalf until the representatives of the supplying company reaching the scene of the incident.
Bromine (Bromaid)

7C1.89 Bromaid is a pan-European organisation of the three main bromine suppliers to provide mutual emergency response support to the emergency services on a geographic basis, regardless of whose bromine equipment may be involved in an incident.

7C1.90 In the UK, the response is provided by Chemtura and its agents, who have received bromine specific training and have the appropriate equipment to provide support to the emergency services at the scene of an incident. The target is to attend the scene within four hours and for the equipment (based at Droitwich, West Midlands) to be at the scene within eight hours. For further details, visit:

www.bromaid.org

7C1.91 The 24-hour emergency number for Chemtura in the UK is: 0208 762 8322

Chlorine (ChlorAid)

7C1.92 ChlorAid is a product specific scheme for providing mutual assistance for incidents involving chlorine. The scheme provides three levels of emergency support:

- Level 1 – Telephone advice
- Level 2 – Incident attendance by a product specialist
- Level 3 – Incident attendance by an emergency response team. INEOS ChlorVinyls will provide the response to the incident.

7C1.93 INEOS ChlorVinyls provides an External Chemical Emergency Service (ECES), primarily for all products manufactured at its sites in the UK. This response capability consists of a specially equipped vehicle and safety equipment for attendance at the scene of an incident involving chemicals. INEOS ChlorVinyls personnel are specifically trained in assisting with such emergencies and can be made available at the request of customers, local authorities and the emergency services.

7C1.94 In case of a UK distribution or chemical emergency involving exposure, leaks or spills, the contact details are:

ChlorAid (INEOS ChlorVinyls External Chemical Emergency Service)
01928 572000

INEOS ChlorVinyls Runcorn Site Emergency Services Department:
01928 512222

Further information is available at:

www.chloraid.srst.co.uk

www.ineoschlor.com
**Ethylene oxide**

7C.95 Shell Chemicals Europe transports ethylene oxide from the supply point at Wilton, and occasionally from the Netherlands, to a number of customer sites across the United Kingdom. In the event of a distribution emergency involving ethylene oxide, Shell Chemicals Europe will initiate their emergency procedures and provide assistance.

7C.96 In the event of an incident involving ethylene oxide, the requirement is to ensure a competent responder can be at the scene as quickly as possible. With that objective, in the UK ethylene oxide customers participate in a mutual aid scheme for ethylene oxide distribution emergencies. This facilitates a more rapid response when the incident is remote from the location of the response team.

7C.97 Shell Chemicals Europe accepts the general obligation to respond to the Ethylene Oxide distribution emergency and remains in charge of the overall incident response and co-ordination. The mutual aid company acts on behalf of Shell Chemicals Europe until a nominated responder reaches the scene.

**Isocyanates (ISOPA)**

7C.98 ISOPA represents the manufacturers in Europe of aromatic diisocyanates and polyols, the main raw materials for polyurethanes. The European isocyanate and polyol producers who are members of ISOPA have established a system of mutual aid to deal with potential emergencies arising during the transportation of toluene diisocyanate, diphenylmethane diisocyanate or their derivatives in Europe.

7C.99 In the event of any difficulty occurring during transportation of a shipment of either toluene diisocyanate (UN- Number 2078) or diphenylmethane diisocyanate or their derivatives forwarded by one of the participating companies, then the said company may request another company closer to the scene of the incident to intervene on their behalf.

7C.100 In this context, “transportation” is taken to mean all of the activities associated with the transport unit, including unloading.

7C.101 Each of the companies may be requested to provide assistance from an appropriate emergency response centre.

www.isopa.org/isopa/

**Titanium tetrachloride**

7C.102 Assistance in the event of incidents involving titanium tetrachloride, TiCl4 or “tickle” is organised by the Titanium Dioxide Manufacturers Association (TDMA). The main UK member is Huntsman Pigments (Grimsby and Teesside). The scheme can be invoked by contacting the NCEC Chemsafe number.
PART C–2
Interpreting and using chemical information

General information

Introduction

7C2.1 For the purpose of this operational guidance the information included in this section is based on what a hazardous materials adviser needs to know to assist him/her to develop the incident response plan with the Incident Commander. It assumes that the reader is already familiar with the basic scientific information contained in the Fire Service Manual (Volume 1 – Fire Service Technology, Equipment and Media) Physics and Chemistry for Firefighters.

The importance of information in managing the incident

7C2.2 The successful management of an incident is dependent on sufficient information being collected to determine the risks involved to the emergency responders and to other persons in the vicinity, and the appropriate actions being taken to mitigate those risks.

7C2.3 The type of information needed, in addition to the circumstances of the incident, will be the identification of the materials involved and understanding their behaviour.

7C2.4 Answers to questions such as:

- What are the names of the materials and quantities involved?
- What are the hazards?
- What is the physical form and is it likely to change during the incident?
- Will there be a reaction?
- Is a vapour cloud likely or toxic products of combustion?
- Will the product float, sink, be dissolved in or react with water?

7C2.5 Will then translate into the initial actions relating to:

- selection of personal protective equipment to prevent casualties
- first-aid measures to treat any casualties
• firefighting measures (eg foam or water spray)
• spillage control and accidental release measures – how to protect the environment.

7C2.6 As the incident develops there may be a requirement to involve a scientific adviser or a product specialist to provide specific advice. The company whose products are involved may need to be notified to activate emergency plans and after the incident is stabilised to arrange clean-up.

7C2.7 Many of these specific actions may be determined by the information gathered about the incident and the substances involved and each person involved in the process will require a full and accurate briefing of the situation. Therefore understanding the nature of the hazardous materials involved is key information.

7C2.8 Where people have been exposed to hazardous materials the ‘risk assessment’ is not only important in terms of the ‘quality of the information’ but its timeliness is also crucial to its usefulness. This is because of the high toxicity of some hazardous substances, more precisely, the high speed in which intoxication in humans develops. Risk assessment must show results within the shortest possible time frame. Numerous toxic agents can cause irreversible effects in humans within minutes after inhalation or contamination of the skin. It is therefore essential that the crucial information that has to serve as the basis for proper and adequate countermeasures is available as soon as possible.

Chemical names (nomenclature) and numbers

7C2.9 The first step in obtaining information on the nature of the hazardous materials involved in the incident is their correct identification.

7C2.10 Identification can be more difficult in the case of chemical substances, not least because of the range of names, numbers and symbols used to identify them. There are various types of chemical name used to describe both pure chemical substances (ie not containing a mixture) and preparations (which are usually a mixture of other chemical substances).

7C2.11 This section provides a broad overview of the range of chemical names (chemical nomenclature) in common use.

Key operational principle
Emergency responders should always use the phonetic alphabet to spell any chemical or product name as the misspelling of a single letter can have significant safety implications.
Systematic or International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC)

7C2.12 These names are designed to give the fullest possible information about the molecular structure of a substance. Systematic naming of an organic compound generally requires the identification and naming of a parent structure. This name may then be modified by prefixes, infixes, and suffixes, which convey precisely the structural changes required to generate the actual compound from the parent structure.

7C2.13 Systematic names for complicated molecules can themselves be very complicated and many attempts have been made in the past to tackle the problem. The most important system of systematic names currently in use is that devised by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC).

7C2.14 For example, the name 1,1,1-trichloroethane tells us that the substance is a chloroalkane (chloro – means it contains chlorine and the – ane ending means it is an alkane) with two carbon atoms (-eth-, short for ethyl) and three chlorine atoms (trichloro-), all situated on the first of the two carbon atoms (1,1,1-) denoting their position.

7C2.15 The exact spelling of systematic names may be important when retrieving chemical information from electronic databases, although some databases are able to cope with, for example, missing numbers or similar spellings as well as trivial name alternatives.

Trivial

7C2.16 These are names given to a substance that may be in common use but do not usually describe the chemical structure of the substance. Trivial names are used because they are simpler to remember and/or are shorter.

7C2.17 Examples (with their systematic names) include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trivial name</th>
<th>Systematic name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formic acid</td>
<td>methanoic acid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common salt</td>
<td>sodium chloride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formaldehyde</td>
<td>methanal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toluene</td>
<td>methyl benzene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEK or methyl ethyl ketone</td>
<td>2-butanone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commercial and trade names

7C2.18 These are names that have been designated by a chemical manufacturer usually to describe a proprietary preparation, although sometimes they can be used to describe a pure chemical substance – some of which enter into common usage.
(nylon, aspirin and Teflon® being famous examples). These names have the advantage of being unique and usually more memorable than systematic or even trivial names.

7C2.19 Other examples of trade names include:

- Roundup
- Jeyes Fluid
- Castrol GTX.

7C2.20 Usually the only sources of information on trade name products is a material safety data sheet completed by the manufacturer or a product expert. However the two main chemical databases used in the UK – Chemdata and CIRUS – both contain information on a number of trade named products.

Synonyms

7C2.21 Stated simply, a synonym is an alternative name for a substance. Synonyms can be a combination of systematic, trivial or even trade names. A possible difficulty encountered when seeking information about a substance lies in the fact that the substance may have many synonyms and some reference sources may list the information under a different synonym with no cross-referencing given. Better reference sources list the various synonyms and offer cross-referencing.

Chemical formulae

7C2.22 Chemical formulae list the proportions of the constituent elements within a compound. There are several ways in which chemical formulae can be displayed. The usual way is to subscript the ratio numbers, eg CO₂. Another option is not to subscript the ratio number, eg CO2. This method is computer compatible and allows electronic searches by formula for databases that have this feature (eg Sigma Aldrich). However, several different substances may share the same computer compatible formula (eg C₂H₆O).

7C2.23 Other ways of presenting the chemical formula can convey some structural information and uniquely identify the material (eg CH=CH symbolising a carbon-carbon double bond). The Sigma Aldrich material safety data sheets Library provides this information.

7C2.24 The use of chemical formulae to identify the properties of a material is limited.

Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry numbers

7C2.25 Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers are unique numerical identifiers for chemical elements, compounds, polymers, biological sequences, mixtures and alloys. They are commonly referred to as CAS numbers. The Chemical Abstracts
Service, a division of the American Chemical Society, assigns these identifiers to every chemical that has been described in the literature. The intention is to make database searches more convenient, as chemicals often have many names. A Chemical Abstracts Service registry number is separated by hyphens into three parts, the first consisting of up to seven digits, the second consisting of two digits, and the third consisting of a single digit serving as a check digit. The numbers are assigned in increasing order and do not have any inherent meaning.

United Nations (UN) numbers

7C2.26 UN numbers are discussed in 7C3-23. However, these four digit numbers can be a means to identify either a specific substance or a group of substances sharing the same characteristics (eg flammable liquids that are not listed individually). These numbers can then be used to access emergency response advice from reference sources such as Chemdata, CIRUS or Emergency Response Guide.

EC numbers

7C2.27 The European Commission number, or EC number, also known as EC-No and EC#, is the seven-digit code that is assigned to chemical substances that are commercially available within the European Union.

7C2.28 The EC number is made up of seven digits according to the pattern xxx-xxx-x, with the single digit operating as a check digit as in the Chemical Abstract Service system (but using a different check algorithm).

Interpreting material safety data sheets

7C2.29 Material safety data sheets or safety data sheet can be a key document for providing emergency responders with information on the hazardous material. However, it is worth remembering that the safety data sheet is primarily aimed at the occupational worker.

7C2.30 Safety data sheets are important sources of information particularly in the case of proprietary preparations where more than one product has been mixed or reacted other than by the manufacturer or product expert. The safety data sheets will be the only source of information on the product (though note that some chemical databases such as Chemdata and CIRUS do contain emergency response information on proprietary preparations that has been included based on the information provided by the manufacturer). This is because the act of mixing or reacting the constituent ingredients can have a marked effect on the final properties of the material. For example, both an acid and a base are corrosive but if mixed, the resulting product may be neutralised and no longer be
corrosive. Or a flammable liquid that mixes with water may be diluted sufficiently to no longer possess flammable properties. It can, therefore, be unreliable to assess hazards based on the individual ingredients.

7C2.31 The format of safety data sheets can vary according to the region where the product is produced, but in the European Union a set format is laid down. The information in the safety data sheet has to be provided in the 16 standard headings given below. The type of information included in each section is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section number</th>
<th>Heading</th>
<th>Useful information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Identification of the substance/preparation and company</td>
<td>Name of the product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Name and contact details of the manufacturer or distributor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contact details and possibly an emergency telephone number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Composition/information on ingredients</td>
<td>May help to understand the nature of preparations. However, should be used cautiously as the final properties of the material may significantly differ from its constituent ingredients.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hazards identification</td>
<td>Summarises the main hazards of the product – or indicating it does not pose a significant hazard. A good starting point when referring to the safety data sheet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>First-aid measures</td>
<td>Should offer advice on exposure to eyes, by inhalation or ingestion. Pay particular attention to when medical intervention or assistance is recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fire-fighting measures</td>
<td>The writer is unlikely to be aware of the equipment and procedures adopted by the Fire Service, so treat this section with some caution. May give an indication of whether foam or water should be used to fight the fire. If unsure, also check physical properties such as density in Emergency Action Code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical considerations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Accidental release measures</td>
<td>This section should usually be considered in the context that is aimed at dealing with a smaller occupational spill or release, so the advice may not apply to the incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Handling and storage</td>
<td>Typically conditions to avoid and how best to store the material. May indicate conditions under which a reaction may occur, for example due to heat, impurities or degradation. Other phrases to look out for include “Fumes/vapour/powder can form explosive mixtures with air”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Exposure controls / personal protection</td>
<td>Exposure limits, if these apply to the substance, are shown. These are based on repeated occupational exposure usually on a timed average period. The levels of personal protective equipment recommended are unlikely to be considered in the Fire and Rescue Service context. Therefore treat the advice in this section with caution. May be more useful when downgrading levels of protection from chemical protective clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Physical and chemical properties</td>
<td>Potentially a useful source of information in planning the response, but does require interpretation of the information provided. Further information is given in this chapter on interpreting physical and chemical properties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Stability and reactivity</td>
<td>Will detail any known reactions, particularly if likely to be violent or producing toxic or flammable gases. Most safety data sheets contain phrases in this section such as “avoid contact with strong acids, bases or oxidisers”. However most materials will react with these substances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Information Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Toxicological information</td>
<td>Values are indicated by route of exposure and measured in either LC50 or LD50, ie the lethal dose per kg of bodyweight required to kill 50 per cent of the sample size (typically rats). Lower values therefore indicate more toxic substances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ecological information</td>
<td>Typically indicates the eco-toxicity of a material, for example in removing dissolved oxygen in the marine or freshwater environments, or gives an indication of persistence or bioaccumulation. Further information is available elsewhere in this section. As per Section 11, is best used to assess the degree of the hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Disposal considerations</td>
<td>Will detail how hazardous waste involving the substance should be disposed. Typically the advice will be to contact the local authority or a waste management company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Transport information</td>
<td>If the substance has a UN number, it will be given in this section. Emergency action codes should also be listed if applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Regulatory information</td>
<td>If the substance is classified as hazardous for supply (or use), ie it has risk and safety phrases, then these will be listed in this section. Risk and safety phrases will indicate potential longer term health effects, which are not reflected in UN number criteria (eg carcinogens, mutagens).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interpreting physical and chemical properties

7C2.32 There are many sources of explanation of the various physical and chemical properties of materials that are commonly to be found in Section 9 of a material safety data sheet. The purpose of this chapter will not be to replicate or elaborate on these explanations but to consider the salient points in the context of hazardous materials incident response.

Physical state (solid, liquid, gas)

7C2.33 The physical state of the material will have a bearing on the risks it poses and on how it should be dealt with effectively at the incident. This refers both to the physical state of the material at ambient temperature (i.e., the background temperature, which of course will vary depending on the climate and season) and the state in which the material is either stored or transported. For example, gases are stored under pressure and if stored under sufficient pressure, they will liquefy.

7C2.34 Gas is one of three classical states of matter. Near absolute zero, a substance exists as a solid. As heat is added to this substance it melts into a liquid at its melting point, boils into a gas at its boiling point, and if heated high enough would enter a plasma state in which the electrons are so energized that they leave their parent atoms from within the gas.

7C2.35 A pure gas may be made up of individual atoms (e.g., a noble gas or atomic gas like neon), elemental molecules made from one type of atom (e.g., oxygen), or compound molecules made from a variety of atoms (e.g., carbon dioxide). A gas mixture would contain a variety of pure gases much like the air. What distinguishes a gas from liquids and solids is the vast separation of the individual gas particles.

7C2.36 Vapour refers to a substance in the gas phase at a temperature where the same substance can also exist in the liquid or solid state, below the critical temperature of the substance.

7C2.37 Gases and vapours have no fixed size or volume; they will expand to fill their container or in the open spread out until they are equally distributed throughout the space available to them. The physical behaviour of gases is described by the gas laws. Properties, notable for those who have to manage incidents, include:

- gases and vapours exert an increasing pressure on their containers as they are heated
• when a gas or vapour expands (perhaps as it escapes its container) its temperature falls.

GASES

Gases other than oxygen present a health hazard to humans either by their toxic effects or by asphyxiation (breathing pure oxygen is also hazardous). **Gases also present the fastest route of exposure by respiratory intake.** Therefore particular care should be taken to reduce the risks from known releases of toxic gases or vapours.

MISTS AND AEROSOLS

Mists and aerosols are dispersions of liquids, and some cases solids, in the air and present similar hazards to gases and vapours. All such clouds are by their nature heavier than air and can sink into hollows and low-lying areas. They are also more likely to **present a significant contamination risk** than a true vapour or gas.

7C2.38 Liquefied and cryogenic substances present a particular hazard. Because of the relationship between pressure, volume and temperature, as liquefied gases are released (large increase in volume) there is a corresponding decrease in both its pressure and its temperature. Cold liquefied gases can cause severe frost and thermal shock on exposure. Cryogenic gas turns into liquid at -90°C or below and can instantly freeze material (ie human tissue). Any clothing saturated with a cryogen must be immediately removed.

7C2.39 Liquefied gases can also cause a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) if the container is heated. This is a container failure with a release of energy, often rapidly and violently, which is accompanied by a release of gas/vapour to atmosphere and propulsion of the container or container pieces due to an over pressure rupture. If the substance involved is flammable, it is likely that the resulting cloud of the substance will ignite after the boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion has occurred forming a fireball and possibly a fuel-air explosion termed a vapour cloud explosion. See Section 7, Part C5.120 for further information.

7C2.40 The expansion ratio of a liquefied or cryogenic substance is the volume of an amount of that substance in liquid form compared to the volume of the same amount in gaseous form at a given temperature. Substances with large expansion ratios (eg nitrogen 1:694; oxygen 1:860; liquefied petroleum gas 1:270 etc) can produce pressures that can rupture the pressure vessel. Hence the use of pressure relief valves and vent valves on liquefied petroleum gas containers.
Operational key principle

The physical state of the material can have a significant bearing on the strategy for dealing with the incident. Cryogenic and liquefied gases pose particular hazards to responders from the risk of freezing or boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.

7C2.41 Liquids will flow in response to gravity when released and must therefore be contained safely in order to stabilise the incident and prevent further risk to persons, property and the environment. Volatile liquids will readily give off vapours (see vapour pressure) and this could present problems in creating flammable or noxious atmospheres.

7C2.42 Solids need further assistance to move greater distances and in general are easier to contain. In cases of fire, the surface area of the solid is important to consider. In other words, powders will burn more easily than solid blocks of material.

7C2.43 The physical nature of the material also has consequences for its spread, for example, solids in the form of dusts, fumes and smoke can be quickly carried by the air and present a risk to anyone situated in the path of dispersion.

Operational key principle

Solids in the form of dusts, fumes and smoke can be quickly carried by the air and present a risk of contamination to anyone situated in the path of dispersion.

NOTE: Finely divided, flammable dusts can also present an explosion risk.

Density and specific gravity

7C2.44 The density of the material needs to be considered in relation to the surrounding environment. For example in the case of gases, the main consideration is whether it is lighter or heavier than air. Gases that are lighter than air will disperse more easily, although care should be taken where the gas is released in a confined space as it can collect in ceiling voids and spaces (for example the space between a false ceiling and the roof).

7C2.45 Most gases are heavier than air. The ones that are not can be remembered according to the following mnemonic HA HA MICE:

- Helium (He)
- Acetylene (C$_2$H$_2$)
- Hydrogen (H$_2$)
Ammonia (NH₃)
Methane (CH₄)
Illuminating gases (e.g., neon Ne)
Carbon monoxide (CO)
Ethane and ethylene (C₂H₆ and C₂H₄)

7C2.46 Gases that are heavier than air can collect in low-lying spaces (such as cellars or the holds of ships) and present an asphyxiation hazard. Therefore it is important to wear adequate respiratory protection (breathing apparatus) when entering confined spaces where it is suspected there has been a build-up of a gas.

7C2.47 For liquids, the relative density to water (as well as solubility) will determine the fate of the material in drains and watercourses.

7C2.48 The specific gravity of a liquid is determined by comparing the weight of an equal amount of water (Water = 1.0). If the specific gravity is less than 1.0 then it will float, if greater than 1.0 it will sink.

7C2.49 Liquids that float on water (such as oil) can be recovered using booms, whereas materials that sink or dissolve cannot.

Water solubility

7C2.50 The ability of a material (gas, liquid or solid) to dissolve in water. Solubility is expressed in a figure of g/100ml water. Materials can be insoluble, sparingly soluble or soluble. This has implications for the nature and management of the incident in terms of containing pollution, fighting fires and the subsequent clean-up.

7C2.51 Soluble materials (such as acids) may be more easily dispersed in the marine and aquatic environments, but this solubility can pose threats to aquatic life such as fish. The release of quantities of soluble contaminant materials into the water course is very likely to have an adverse effect (e.g., fish kill).

7C2.52 Sparingly soluble or insoluble materials (e.g., petrol) on the other hand may be spread by flowing water. This could result in vapours or fumes being transported some distance away from the incident. However, as explained above insoluble materials that float on water can be contained by using booms.

7C2.53 Decontaminating people and equipment of soluble materials can be carried out with water alone, otherwise detergents and/or physical removal will be required.
Solubility and density will determine if a material will float, sink or dissolve in water, which will in turn determine the risks of it spreading and deciding whether the material can easily be contained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chemical</th>
<th>Soluble in water</th>
<th>Specific gravity</th>
<th>Behaviour in water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petrol</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Floats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trichloroethane</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Sinks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulphuric acid</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Dissolves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Partition constant or partial coefficient (octanol/water)**

7C2.54 This gives an indication of relative solubility of a material (compound) in water and in octanol. These two liquids do not mix (are immiscible) and materials or compounds that are more likely to dissolve in octanol means the compound also will not mix with water and is said to be hydrophobic (literally, “fear of water”).

7C2.55 The value is expressed as a logarithmic value (eg log \( P_{ow} \)). Negative values indicate that the compound is hydrophilic (likes water). Higher positive values indicate the substance is hydrophobic.

7C2.56 The hydrophobicity of a compound can give scientists an indication of how easily a compound might be taken up in groundwater to pollute waterways and its toxicity to animals and aquatic life.

7C2.57 Materials that are hydrophobic are more difficult to clean-up and decontamination cannot be carried out with water alone, as water itself will not remove the material from chemical protective suits or equipment.

Decontamination is more difficult for hydrophobic compounds.
Corrosivity and pH

7C2.58 The pH of an acid or base is not an indication of its strength as, for example, weak acids can still show low value pH values. Therefore it is important to consider the strength of acids and bases as well as the pH value.

7C2.59 The terms “strength” and “concentration” are frequently confused when used in the context of acids / bases or alkalis that dissociate into ions to a limited extent when dissolved in water. The confusion is caused by the fact that in common usage “strength” and “concentration” are interchangeable terms.

7C2.60 However, when referring to acids or bases (also called alkalis), the terms “strong” or “weak” refer to the relative amount of substance present in ionic form compared to the amount of the same substance present in (non-ionic) molecular form. An acid or base is “strong” if it is entirely or almost entirely present in solution in ionic form cations (+) and anions (-). Hydrochloric acid (HCl) is a “strong” acid because in water, it dissociates almost entirely as H+ and Cl- ions. Acetic acid (vinegar) on the other hand, is only slightly dissociated into ions when dissolved in water. Most of the acetic acid dissolved in water is present in the non-ionic molecular form.

7C2.61 This distinction matters as stronger acids or bases are more reactive and corrosive and therefore pose more of a hazard to the responders, requiring measures to be taken to reduce the risks posed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of strong acids</th>
<th>Examples of weak acids</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hydrochloric acid (HCl)</td>
<td>Organic acids such as carboxylic acids (R-COOH) of which acetic acid or vinegar (CH₃COOH) is a very common example</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrobromic acid (HBr)</td>
<td>Hydrofluoric acid (HF) – note that although HF is a weak acid, it still poses very serious hazards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric acid (HNO₃)</td>
<td>Hydrocyanic acid (HCN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulphuric or sulfuric acid (H₂SO₄)</td>
<td>Carbonic acid (H₂CO₃)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perchloric acid (HClO₄)</td>
<td>Sulphurous or sulfurous acid (H₂SO₃)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nitrous acid (HNO₂)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Examples of strong bases

- Potassium hydroxide (KOH)
- Barium hydroxide (Ba(OH)₂)
- Sodium hydroxide (NaOH)
- Calcium hydroxide (Ca(OH)₂)
- Lithium hydroxide (LiOH)
- Magnesium hydroxide (Mg(OH)₂)

Examples of weak bases

- Aniline, C₅H₅NH₂
- Ammonia, NH₃
- Methylamine, CH₃NH₂
- Pyridine, C₅H₅N
- Sodium carbonate NaCO₃

Operational key principle

The strength of an acid or base is linked to its corrosivity, but strength is not the same thing as concentration for acids and bases.

The pH scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acidic</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Alkaline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrochloric acid</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>Orange juice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure water</td>
<td>Blood</td>
<td>Baking soda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk of magnesia</td>
<td>Caustic soda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chemical reactivity

7C2.62 Whether two (or more) chemicals will react when they come into contact will depend on the properties of the chemicals concerned as well as some other factors such as:

- Temperature – an increase in temperature increases the rate of reaction
- Concentration or pressure – the higher the concentration or pressure, the faster the rate of reaction
- Surface area – gases and liquids (having the greater area for reaction) react more readily than solids
- The energy or heat content (enthalpy) needed to initiate the reaction – with reference to the above
- Whether the net result of the reaction is to give out more heat than it consumes (exothermic) or to absorb more heat than is given out (endothermic) – exothermic reactions are more hazardous and more likely to occur.
Chemical reactivity is therefore usually predictable, based on the chemicals involved and the circumstances of them mixing.

Common reactions include:

\[ \text{Acid} + \text{Base} = \text{Salt (soluble)} + \text{Water} \]
\[ \text{eg} \quad \text{HCl} + \text{NaOH} = \text{NaCl} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \]

\[ \text{Acid} + \text{Insoluble Carbonate} = \text{Salt} + \text{Water} + \text{Carbon Dioxide} \]
\[ \text{eg} \quad 2\text{HNO}_3 + \text{CaCO}_3 = \text{Ca(NO}_3)_2 + \text{H}_2\text{O} + \text{CO}_2 \]

\[ \text{Oxidizer} + \text{Organic compound} = \text{Fire} + \text{Water} + \text{Carbon Dioxide} + \text{Other Products} \]

\[ \text{Concentrated Acid} + \text{Organic compound} = \text{Dehydrated Organic} + \text{Water} + \text{Concentrated Acid} \]

\[ \text{Base} + \text{Organic compound} = \text{Soapy Salt} + \text{Water} \]
\[ \text{eg} \quad \text{Caustic Soda (NaOH)} + \text{Stearic Acid} = \text{Sodium Stearate} + \text{water} \]

There are other specific types of reaction that pose particular hazards. These are discussed below.

**Polymerisation reactions**

Polymerisation reactions involve the linking of molecules (monomers) together chemically. In controlled conditions polymerisation is safe, in uncontrolled conditions it can lead to a runaway reaction resulting in an increase in volume and pressure with the risk that containers of these materials can suddenly burst releasing the material and/or toxic gases. Examples include vinyl chloride, toluene diisocyanate and epichlorohydrin.

The reaction can be triggered by heat, pressure or the presence of contamination or a catalyst (a substance that initiates a chemical reaction without being changed itself).

**Reactions with water**

Water reactive substances react with water to produce secondary products that are hazardous. Possible reactions include the production of flammable gas, toxic gas or a large amount of energy.

Examples include sodium which when reacting with water produces hydrogen gas and calcium carbide which when reacting with water gives acetylene gas:
\[ \text{CaC}_2 + 2\text{H}_2\text{O} = \text{C}_2\text{H}_2 + \text{Ca(OH)}_2 \]
### Water reactive materials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Hazard of reaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sulphuric acid</td>
<td>Heat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potassium, sodium</td>
<td>Flammable hydrogen gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcium carbide</td>
<td>Corrosive and flammable products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium chloride</td>
<td>Hydrochloric acid burns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sodium peroxide</td>
<td>Oxygen and heat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reactions with air (pyrophoric substances)

**7C2.70** Pyrophoric substances ignite spontaneously in air often liberating vast amounts of energy and causing combustion which can also lead to noxious products of combustion. They are sometimes also water reactive. Examples of pyrophoric substances include white or yellow phosphorus and iron sulphide.

### Operational key principle

The likelihood of reaction can usually be predicted based on the properties of the reactants and the environmental conditions. Beware materials that can undergo spontaneous reactions such as polymerisation or react with air or water.

### Neutralisation reactions

**7C2.71** The most common example of neutralisation is reacting an acid with a weak base (alkali) such as soda ash (sodium carbonate).

**7C2.72** The advantage of neutralisation is the reduction in corrosivity of the material that is being neutralised, making the material (and the waste products) easier to handle.

**7C2.73** However there are distinct disadvantages of neutralisation reactions that usually outweigh the advantages.

**7C2.74** For instance, to neutralise a strong acid requires either a strong base or a very large quantity of a weak base such as soda ash. Adding soda ash to acid creates carbon dioxide and is therefore a ‘frothy’ reaction. This increases the quantity of waste materials that must be disposed of as well as incurring the costs and trouble of sourcing the neutralising agents, for seemingly little advantage.
7C2.75 There should never be an attempt to neutralise concentrated acids or bases (>30%). These can react violently with any neutralising agent added, with the reaction getting increasingly more violent as the concentration increases. This can be very dangerous and should be avoided.

7C2.76 In dealing with small residues of acid once other measures (such as pumping into a separate container or absorbing in an inert material) have been taken to remove the bulk of the acid spill neutralisation can be considered.

Operational key principle
Neutralisation of an acid (or alkali) spill usually carries more disadvantages than advantages. It is better instead to look at the neutralisation of residues. You should never look to neutralise concentrated acids or bases and if in doubt don’t do it!

Concentration

7C2.77 The concentration of solutions is expressed as Molarity (M) or moles (measured in mols it is a unit used to express the amount of a substance) per litre of solution.

7C2.78 Concentrations are always percentage ratios of solute (the solid substance) to the solvent (usually water). The most commonly used chemistry concentration unit is Molarity.

- Molarity = mols of solute/litres of solvent (water).

7C2.79 The concentration of a solution greatly influences the rate of chemical reaction. Higher concentrations mean faster reactions. More concentrated solutions (e.g., acids or bases) are therefore more reactive and more hazardous.

7C2.80 There may be the temptation to ‘reduce the hazard’ by either diluting concentrated acids or bases with water or by neutralising an acid with a base or vice versa. Dilution of concentrated (>30%) acids or bases with water should be avoided if possible. This is because the concentrated acid or base will react with the water added producing heat which will in turn speed up further reactions. Dilution of concentrated acids or bases can be safely carried out by adding the acid or base to water and not the other way around. Clearly in the event of a spill of an acid or base, this is not practicable.
Concentrated (>30%) acids or alkalis (bases) should not be diluted or attempts made at neutralisation.

**Flash point**

7C2.81 Flash-point refers to the lowest temperature at which a liquid or solid gives off vapour to a degree that a flammable mixture is formed when the vapour combines with air near the surface of the liquid or solid. Hence, the lower the flash-point, the more flammable the material. Flash-points are determined by experiment with two main methods used – open cup and closed cup. Closed cup flash-points are typically a few degrees lower than open cup flash-points for the same material.

7C2.82 Flammable liquids are defined by possessing a flash point of 60°C or lower. Liquids that have a flash point above 60°C are termed combustible. Highly flammable or extremely flammable liquids have flash points lower than 23°C, which is close to normal ambient temperatures. This means that an ignition source (electrical spark, static electricity, naked flame etc) can trigger a fire where there are flammable liquids present. However this likelihood also depends on the flammable limit range of the flammable liquid.

**Flammable limit range**

7C2.83 The flammable limit range of a substance is the range of concentrations of the substance in air that are flammable. Flammable limits are also called flammability limits or explosive limits. The lower flammable limit or lower explosive limit describes the leanest mixture that is still flammable, while the upper flammable limit or upper explosive limit gives the richest flammable mixture. Increasing the fraction of inert gases in a mixture raises the lower flammable limit and decreases the upper flammable limit. Vapour monitoring at an incident scene can determine if the vapour cloud is within the flammable range. If the values found are above the upper flammable limit, then there will be a risk of ignition when the vapour has further dispersed so that the concentration falls below the upper flammable limit.

7C2.84 An analogy can be given with a petrol-engine powered car. A carburettor or fuel-injection system in the engine ensures the correct mixture of fuel to air. If the fuel mixture is too rich (too much petrol) or too lean (too little petrol) then the mixture will not burn and the car doesn’t work.
Substances with wider flammable ranges are more hazardous than those with narrow ranges. Isopropyl alcohol for example, has a flammable range of 2–12 per cent in air whereas acetylene has a flammable range of 2.5–80 per cent, making vapour clouds of acetylene much more likely to be flammable in air.

Operational key principle
Be wary of materials with a wide flammable limit range. Vapour concentrations above the upper flammable limit / upper explosive limit pose a risk of ignition as the vapour disperses.

Ignition (auto-ignition) temperature
The auto-ignition temperature (sometimes called the kindling point) refers to the temperature at which the substance will ignite in the absence of a source of ignition such as a spark or flame. Auto-ignition temperature decreases as the pressure increases or where oxygen concentration increases. An analogy can be given of a diesel-engine powered vehicle where the mixture of fuel and air is compressed sufficiently for the diesel to self-ignite and power the vehicle.

Pyrophoric substances such as silanes and phosphorus have low auto-ignition temperatures.

Vapour density
This refers to the relative weight of a gas or vapour compared to air (or sometimes it can be compared to hydrogen gas). Air is assigned an arbitrary value of 1 and if a gas has a vapour density of <1 it will generally rise in air. If the vapour density is >1 the gas will generally sink in air. All vapours tend to be heavier than air.

Vapour pressure
Vapour pressure is a measure of how easily a liquid evaporates or gives off vapours. It is displayed using the units of pressure such as Pascals (or kPa) or sometimes mm Hg or in reference to atmospheric pressure (bar). The higher the vapour pressure the more vapour will be produced. Vapour pressure is also temperature dependent with more vapours being produced as temperature rises. Where the vapours being given off by a liquid pose a hazard (eg flammable vapours), these can be suppressed by covering the surface. Sheets, beads and fire-fighting foam are examples of materials that can be used for this purpose.
The figure above illustrates that for any pool of liquid, there is always a small amount of vapour being given off at the surface. There is an equilibrium between the vapour coming off (arrows up) and the vapour being re-absorbed into the liquid (arrows down). Vapours can be suppressed by covering the surface with a suitable material.

Materials with high vapour pressure may require suppression of the vapours produced by applying foam or fixed materials (eg sheeting etc) to the surface of the liquid. Minimising surface area will minimise vapour production. Therefore, avoid the use adsorbents (eg sand etc) as this will increase the production of vapours through increased surface area.

Boiling point

Boiling point is the temperature at which a liquid’s vapour pressure equals atmospheric pressure and the liquid starts to turn to vapour. Low boiling point substances tend to be either gases or very volatile liquids at ambient temperature. Ethers, most alcohols and atmospheric gases such as nitrogen and oxygen are examples of this.
Toxic products of combustion

7C2.92 When a material burns (combusts) it undergoes a chemical reaction that usually involves atmospheric oxygen. This results in products of combustion, some of which may pose particular hazards to health. Hydrocarbons and many common materials such as paper, wood and plastic contain carbon. When burned they produce oxides of carbon – carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide. If smoke is produced in a fire, it will contain particulates – usually of carbon. As carbon monoxide is a toxic gas it can be assumed that all smoke is toxic and products of combustion will either be toxic or asphyxiating.

7C2.93 Particular concern needs to taken when the products of combustion are corrosive or acutely toxic. These tend to be produced when the chemical products undergoing combustion contain certain elements such as halogens (F, Cl, Br, I), metals and particularly alkali metals (Li, K, Na) or certain non-metallic elements (specifically N, S, P, As) in their compound structure. Compounds containing these elements are to be found commonly in products such as detergents, fertilisers and pesticides. If in any doubt as to whether fumes are likely to contain these species, consult the safety data sheet or seek further advice from the manufacturer or from a scientific adviser.

7C2.94 Chlorinated hydrocarbons, for example, produce hydrogen chloride fumes when they decompose at high temperatures (when exposed to a fire or hot surfaces). If the hydrogen chloride fumes are inhaled by responders, it will lead to the formation of acid in the lungs which will then affect the working of the lungs and could lead to more serious health effects such as pulmonary oedema which can
occur up to 48 hours after exposure and can result in death. Therefore anyone who is suspected of having breathed in toxic or corrosive fumes should seek immediate medical attention.

**Toxicity**

7C2.95 Toxicity is the intrinsic capacity of a chemical agent to affect an organism adversely.

7C2.96 Toxicity rating is an arbitrary grading of doses or exposure levels causing toxic effects. The grading can be "highly toxic," "toxic," "harmful" and so on, based on the lethal dose. The most common ratings concern acute toxicity (ie a short-term but potentially high exposure). Substances can also have chronically toxic effects (ie from repeat and cumulative exposure over time). The differences between acute and chronic toxicity are reflected in the criteria for classifying products for transport and supply. For example, cancer is much more likely to develop from repeated occupational exposure to a carcinogen than a one-off acute exposure.

7C2.97 The dose-effect relationship is the relationship between dose and effect on the individual level. An increase in dose may increase the intensity of an effect, or a more severe effect may result. A dose-effect curve may be obtained at the level of the whole organism, the cell or the target molecule. Some toxic effects, such as death or cancer, are not graded but are “all or none” effects.

7C2.98 A dose is often expressed as the amount of a substance entering an organism (such as a person) and is expressed in units such as mg/kg body weight. A dose threshold is a dose level below which no observable effect occurs. Thresholds are thought to exist for certain effects, like acute toxic effects; but not for others, like carcinogenic effects or exposure to radiation. The lethal dose (LD50 or LC50) is the dose causing 50 per cent death in an animal population. LD50 is given as a measure of the acute toxicity of the chemical substance. The lower the LD50 the higher is the acute toxicity. There is no necessary correlation between acute and chronic toxicity.

**Operational key principle**

Note the difference between acute and chronic toxicity. Toxicity is indicated by the lethal dose, which is measured in relation to body weight. The adverse effects are therefore minimised by eliminating or reducing the possible dose.
### Eco-toxicity

**7C2.99** Further information on eco-toxicity and how to interpret the various values such as chemical oxygen demand, biological oxygen demand, bioaccumulation and persistence can be found in *Fire and Rescue Manual (Volume 2: Fire Service Operations), Environmental Protection*.

## Dispersal of chemicals in water

### Predicting dispersal of chemicals in water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boiling point</th>
<th>Vapour pressure</th>
<th>Specific gravity</th>
<th>Solubility</th>
<th>Expected behaviour in water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below ambient</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Insoluble</td>
<td>All liquid will rapidly boil from surface of water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below ambient</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Below that of water</td>
<td>Low or partial</td>
<td>Most liquid will rapidly boil off but some will dissolve. Some of the dissolved liquid will evaporate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below ambient</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>At least 50 per cent will rapidly boil off; the rest will dissolve. Some of the dissolved liquid will evaporate later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Below that of water</td>
<td>Insoluble</td>
<td>Liquid will float, forming a slick. Those with significant vapour pressure will evaporate over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Below that of water</td>
<td>Low or partial</td>
<td>Liquid will float but will dissolve over time. Those with significant vapour pressure may simultaneously evaporate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Below that of water</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Liquids will rapidly dissolve in water up to the limit (if any) of their solubility. Some evaporation may take place over time if vapour pressure is significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Near that of water</td>
<td>Insoluble</td>
<td>Difficult to assess. May float on or beneath surface or disperse through the water column. Some evaporation may occur from surface over time if vapour pressure is significant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Near that of water</td>
<td>Low or partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Will behave as above at first and eventually dissolve. Some evaporation may take place over time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Will rapidly dissolve up to the limit (if any) of their solubility. Some evaporation may take place over time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Above that of water</td>
<td>Insoluble</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Will sink to the bottom and stay there. May collect in deep water pockets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Above that of water</td>
<td>Low or partial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Will sink to the bottom and then dissolve over time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above ambient</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td>Above that of water</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Will rapidly dissolve up to the limit (if any) of their solubility. Some evaporation may take place from the surface over time if vapour pressure is significant.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART C–3
Transportation, packaging and supply of hazardous materials

Introduction

7C3.1 This section provides a summary of the information that emergency responders will need to know regarding the storage, packaging, transportation and supply of hazardous substances (mostly commonly referred to as dangerous goods in the regulations that apply to their transportation). It is not intended to be a detailed guidance document on these regulations.

7C3.2 The section is intended to enable the reader to:

• recognise typical container shapes that would indicate the presence of hazardous materials whether in storage, packaging or being transported
• recognise containers for specific hazardous materials whether in storage, packaging or being transported
• identify the basic design and construction features, including closures for storage, packaging and transportation systems
• obtain an overview of the storage, packaging and transportation systems
• retrieve and interpret information retrieved from markings and information for storage, packaging, transportation and supply (or use).

7C3.3 Throughout the note, reference is made to other publications; these should be read in conjunction with this note to ensure a full understanding of the subject.

Operational considerations for transport incidents

7C3.4 The generic standard operating procedure detailed in Part A of this operational guidance should be considered when responding to any transport related emergency incident.

7C3.5 The types of stress that will affect packaging and the transport method are:

• accidental damage
• major stress of a road traffic collision, train crash or air crash
• direct involvement in fire
• heat transfer
• mechanical failure
• human error.

7C3.6 All of these stressors may well result in one or more of the following:

• damage to the structure of the packaging
• damage to the transport media
• a loss of product
• a fire/explosion
• casualties trapped in the immediate vicinity of the hazardous substance
• damage to the environment
• damage to the surrounding area
• damage to the local infrastructure.

7C3.7 As a transport-related incident implies, being away from a base site, there will be no operational plan to fall back on. Therefore the Incident Commander and the hazardous materials adviser will need to carry out a risk assessment and create a response plan suitable and sufficient in the circumstances.

Transportation of dangerous goods

Regulatory background

7C3.8 The regulatory framework for the global transport of dangerous goods is agreed by the UN Sub-Committee of Experts for the Transport of Dangerous Goods. Its provisions are set out in the UN Model Regulations (Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, commonly known as the ‘orange book’) which are revised and republished every two years and form the basis of the internationally agreed mode-specific requirements.

7C3.9 Detailed rules for the international transport of dangerous goods by road are set out in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) publication known, from its French title, as ADR (Accord dangereux routier). The text for each edition of ADR (re-issued every two years) is agreed by a UNECE committee which usually meets bi-annually in Geneva and the UK is represented at these meetings by the Department for Transport (DfT), which consults key dangerous goods interest groups before the UK position on the various agenda items is decided. Currently, including the UK, there are 46 ‘contracting parties’ to ADR. This Agreement between States has no overall enforcing authority; in practice checks are carried out by contracting parties and non-compliance is dealt with by national authorities against offenders in accordance with their domestic legislation.
7C3.10 Detailed provisions for the international transport of dangerous goods by rail are published under the OTIF (Organisation intergouvernementale pour les Transports Internationaux Ferroviaires) convention in a document known from its French title, as RID (Reglement International concernant le transport de marchandises Dangereuses par chemin de fer). OTIF is an intergovernmental organisation with a mainly European membership that includes the UK. The RID Committee usually meets annually, at different locations, and the UK is again represented by DfT. The text of RID is almost identical to that of ADR, varying only to reflect modal differences.

7C3.11 The EU has adopted the UNECE / OTIF rules in a series of Directives, which extend the scope of ADR and RID to apply to national as well as intra-Community transport. A combined Directive for the inland transport of dangerous goods (covering road, rail and inland waterways) – 2008/68/EC – is transcribed into GB domestic legislation via *The Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009*.

7C3.12 The modal regulations lay out the requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods for the specific mode of transport. In summary they are:

- *The European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road* (ADR)
- *The EU Regulation concerning the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail* (RID)
- *The European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways* (ADN)
- *The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, published by the International Maritime Organisation*
- *Restricted Articles Regulations published by the International Air Transport Association*
- *International Civil Aviation Organisation Regulations*.

**The UN system**

7C3.13 The UN ‘orange book’ establishes a basic system for the safe transport of dangerous goods. The system is designed to reduce the risk of serious incidents involving dangerous goods and the impact of such incidents when they do occur.

7C3.14 Dangerous goods are substances which meet the criteria for one or more classes.

7C3.15 The regulations stipulate that dangerous goods are:

- classified (identified) according to their hazard(s)
- packaged to the required standards
• marked
• labelled
• documented.

7C3.16 The regulations also state that relevant personnel should be properly trained.

Classification

7C3.17 To accommodate the large number of dangerous goods and the consistent, rapid development of new substances, the unusual chemical names used to describe them and the different emergency response for them, the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UNSCETDG) devised tests and criteria to be used to determine which substances could be identified as dangerous goods in transport. This sub-committee then devised a system of nine classes for substances, based on the hazard or the most predominant of the hazards they pose in transport, with the objective of dividing all current and future dangerous goods into these classes. The system of classes was established keeping in mind the type of containment to be used, the chemical and physical characteristics of the substances and response procedures that would be most appropriate in the event of an accidental release.

7C3.18 Classification is a fundamental part of the UN system incorporating:

• UN class
• UN packing group
• UN number
• Proper shipping name.

7C3.19 Dangerous goods are firstly assigned to one of nine hazard classes, known as UN classes, according to their primary hazard. Secondly, an assessment is made of the relative hazard of a substance within the same class and the substance is assigned to one of three packing groups. Each substance is then allocated a substance identification number which is designed to allow identification of the substance in transit. These code numbers are commonly known as ‘UN numbers’. The UN recommends that UN numbers appear on all transport documents and are displayed on packages, containers, vehicles, along with a description of the substance called the proper shipping name.

7C3.20 The nine UN hazard classes are numbered 1 to 9 and sub-divided into divisions. The Regulations also contain rules on identifying the hazards and danger of the substances. Each class (and sometimes division) is therefore assigned a hazard symbol.
The nine classes are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Flammable liquids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Flammable solids; substances liable to spontaneous combustion; substances which, on contact with water emit flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Oxidizing substances and organic peroxides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Toxic and infectious substances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Radioactive material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Corrosive substances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The classification of substances by type of hazard was developed to meet technical conditions while at the same time minimising interference with existing regulations. It should be noted that the numerical order of the classes does not indicate the degree of danger. The objective of the definitions is to establish which substances are dangerous and in which class, according to their specific characteristics, they should be included.

**United Nations class, division and hazard symbol**

**Class 1 Explosives**

(Divisions – 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 (1.6 not used in the UK))

**Class 2 Gases**

Division 2.1 Flammable gases
Division 2.2 Non-Flammable, compressed gases

Division 2.3 Toxic gas

**Class 3 Flammable Liquids**

**Class 4 Flammable Solids**

Division 4.1 Flammable solids, self reactive substances and solid desensitized explosives

Division 4.2 Substances liable to spontaneous combustion

Division 4.3 Substances which in contact with water emit flammable gases.
Class 5 Oxidising substances

Division 5.1 Oxidising substances other than organic peroxides

Division 5.2 Organic peroxides (used until 2009)

Class 6 Toxic and infectious substances

Division 6.1 Toxic substances

Division 6.2 Infectious substances

Class 7 Radioactive material

Category I, Category II, Category III and Fissile material (capable of nuclear explosion)
United Nations packing group

7C3.23 The UN developed a system to identify substances in a particular class or division according to the “degree of danger”. This is known as the ‘packing group’, of which there are three levels

- Packing Group I: Very dangerous
- Packing Group II: Medium danger
- Packing Group III: Minor danger.

7C3.24 Goods are assigned to one of these groups based on the criteria. Packing group does not apply to explosives (Class 1), gases (Class 2), organic peroxides (Class 5.2), infectious substances (Class 6.2), radioactive material (Class 7) or self-reacting substances found in Class 4.1. Instead there are special packaging and transport provisions for these materials.

7C3.25 The international agreements for the carriage of dangerous goods require packaging to be of a design type certified by a national competent authority. This involves testing the packaging to ensure its suitability for the carriage of certain dangerous goods. Such packaging is often referred to as a ‘type-approved’ or ‘UN Certified’. Such packaging is marked in particular ways, prefixed by the UN logo and followed by a set of codes which detail the standard of packaging.

UN number

7C3.26 Once a product has been assigned to an appropriate hazard class and packing group, a UN number can be selected. The UN number is a means of identifying a chemical substance or an article containing a chemical. A list of UN numbers can be found in the current version of the dangerous goods emergency action code list at:

http://the-ncec.com/resources/
In addition, several other organisations publish lists of additional numbers for use in their countries, or by a particular mode of transport:

- UK ‘7000 series’, which included numbers for wastes, hot liquids, and several chemicals are not included specifically in the UN list and have not been used for some time
- 8000 series, published by International Air Transport Association includes entries for some additional substances and articles which are to be transported by air
- North American 9000 series also contains many additional numbers for substances and articles not otherwise classified for transport.

UN numbers also divide into two types:

1. **Single substance numbers** for pure chemicals – for use when transporting a chemical substance in its pure form, or for solutions or mixtures including those substance where the principal hazards of, and emergency response actions to, such a mixture do not differ significantly from those of the pure substance.

2. **Generic or not otherwise specified numbers** – for use in the transport of pure substances not specifically mentioned in the UN list and for mixtures of substances which meet the criteria of that number.

**Proper shipping name**

The name immediately following the UN number is the ‘proper shipping name’ and is the one that should be quoted on packages, tanks and in documentation. Even when the substance is known by more than one name it is the proper shipping name that should always be used. Examples include UN 1035 Ethane and UN 1993 Flammable liquid, not otherwise specified.

**Segregation**

There are rules on segregation as a means keeping incompatible goods apart from one another, using a barrier or intervening space. Chemicals must be segregated when either stored or transported to reduce the likelihood of them mixing if an accident occurs. This is an essential element of the safe system of work designed to prevent fires, explosions and the release of harmful gases etc. The rules for sea transport (ie international maritime dangerous goods code) are stricter than for road or rail.

The regulations contain segregation tables that can be referenced to see if two materials can be transported together or if conditions apply if they are transported in the same shipment. These tables can be a useful guide for establishing some common incompatibilities or where additional hazards will result from chemicals mixing, eg a flammable material and an oxidising agent, which could result in a fire if mixed.
Documentation

7C3.32 There are slightly different rules for each mode of transport on the documentation that must accompany consignments of dangerous goods that describes the load. However, they are all based on the same principles. These documents are a very valuable means of identifying the load and hence obtaining hazard information that can be used to develop the incident response plan.

7C3.33 The documentation should contain the following information for each dangerous substance, material or article being carried:

• United Nations number preceded by the letters ‘UN’
• Proper shipping name supplemented, when applicable with the technical name in brackets
• Packing group for the substance preceded by the letters ‘PG’ (eg PG II), or the initials corresponding to the words ‘packing group’ for other languages
• Total quantity of dangerous goods for different UN number, proper shipping name or, packing group (shown as by volume or mass (weight) as appropriate)
• Number and a description of the packages when applicable
• For dangerous goods in machinery or equipment, the total quantity of dangerous goods contained therein
• Name and address of the consignor (ie where it was sent from)
• Name and address of the consignee(s) (ie where it is going to). If this is not possible (eg multi-drop) then the words ‘delivery sale’ may be shown instead.

7C3.34 There are special provisions for explosives (Class 1) and radioactive material (Class 7).

7C3.35 The most common form of transport document likely to be encountered is the dangerous goods note accompanying the movement of dangerous goods by road. Since the removal of product specific instructions in writing for the driver (commonly known and referred to as Tremcards ®) from July 2009, which were used as a means of identifying the load by emergency responders, the dangerous goods note is the main means of identifying the contents of a vehicle carrying packaged dangerous goods.

Road transportation

Packaged goods transport labelling

7C3.36 There are different regimes used to placard and label dangerous goods transported in ‘packages’.
Following classification, the manufacturer or importer will be able to produce an appropriate label for the substance. For transport purposes, this label will include:

- the designation of the product or proper shipping name
- the UN number
- and appropriate hazard warning symbols.

The designation of the goods is the proper shipping name for the goods. This is the official description listed in the regulations for a particular UN number.

If a product is not specifically listed in the Regulations, or the hazardous properties and emergency response procedures for a solution or mixture do differ significantly from those of the pure substance, then one of the generic not otherwise specified entries must be used. In such cases, the proper shipping name must be supplemented with the technical name of the goods. The technical name should be a recognised chemical name for the substance or substances which caused the product to be classified as hazardous. Normally not more than two ingredients are named, eg, UN 1992 Flammable liquid, toxic, not otherwise specified (gasoline and carbon tetrachloride mixture) or UN 2003 Metal alkyl, not otherwise specified (trimethyl gallium).

There are different requirements for the labelling of products for supply and use, which are covered later in this chapter. However, for some containers the labels for transport and supply can be combined.
Combination packages

7C3.41 Packaged goods are usually transported in a combination package, consisting of inner packages of a size intended for supply (usage), packed into an outer box convenient for transport.

7C3.42 Packages for transport of hazardous goods are required to be fit for purpose, and be tested and marked with a UN symbol to show this.

For example: 4G/Y25/S/03/GB/PRL271

7C3.43 The inner package will be labelled for supply purposes, while the outer package will be labelled for carriage. Because the regulations for transport and supply of hazardous goods cover different hazards, the labels that have to be provided on each layer of the package can be different for each purpose.

7C3.44 This can cause some confusion, particularly where the inner containers of a package may be labelled as toxic, because of their potential to cause adverse effects on long-term exposure, while the outer containers may not be labelled at all, because the product does not cause effects on short term exposure.

7C3.45 Further details of the labelling systems for supply (usage) of chemicals are given later in this part.
Combination package

Road transport regulations

7C3.46 The regulations concerning the carriage of dangerous goods by road apply from when the goods are being loaded on to a vehicle until they are removed, or in some cases, until any receptacle containing dangerous goods and/or the vehicle itself has been cleaned to a set standard so that there is no risk from the original product.

7C3.47 Duties are placed on different people; those consigning dangerous goods for carriage, vehicle operators, drivers and others such as those involved in the design and construction of vehicles. Many of the requirements in the regulations are placed on the operator of the vehicle, ie the person who has the management of the vehicle (has the vehicle operator’s licence).

7C3.48 The requirements of the legislation only apply above certain quantity thresholds. These depend on whether the dangerous goods are being carried in packages, tanks or in bulk. The consignor of a load has the duty of classifying the dangerous goods in accordance with strict guidance and correctly packaging and labelling them.

7C3.49 Before responsibility for the safe carriage of these goods passes to the operator of the vehicle, there are further important requirements the consignor needs to fulfil:

- provide the operator with information
- ensure that the rest of the ‘transport chain’ – from the operator to the vehicle carrying the goods to the driver and the person who finally receives the consignment (the consignee) – has the necessary information to enable them to:
  - identify what is being carried and the hazards the goods pose
– ensure appropriate precautions are taken to prevent, as far as possible, any risk to the health and safety of anyone who might be affected by the carriage of the goods
– respond quickly and effectively in the event of an accident involving the carriage of dangerous goods and, in particular, provide the information to the emergency services so that they can act appropriately.

Marking of packaged goods vehicles

7C3.50 Vehicles that are used to transport dangerous goods in packages and which are within the scope of the regulations are required to display plain orange placards at both the front and rear. While this is an indication that the vehicle is carrying dangerous goods, it gives no indication of the nature of those goods. Further information regarding the load would need to be found on the driver’s delivery schedule, dangerous goods note or on the packages themselves.

Voluntary marking of packaged goods vehicles

7C3.51 There are currently two examples of voluntary vehicle marking schemes in the UK set up by transport carriers of dangerous goods, with the agreement of the Health and Safety Executive, the Police Carriage of Dangerous Goods Practitioners Forum and the Department for Transport.

Hazchem Emergency Response Service (HERS)

7C3.52 The Hazchem Network is a group of member carriers that use a central hub depot and satellite depots to transport packaged dangerous goods on pallets. An initiative was started in 2007 called the Hazchem Emergency Response Service to put a decal on the rear of its member vehicles displaying the name of the scheme and a contact emergency telephone number. The telephone number can be used to access emergency advice, to potentially access details of what the vehicle is carrying (if the registration number is known) and to access clean-up arrangements already put in place.
DHL Hazchem Emergency Response Service

7C3.53 This HERS scheme was then adapted for use by DHL, another carrier of packaged dangerous goods, in May 2010. A similar decal was developed that would be displayed on the back and sides of the vehicles used to transport dangerous goods, initially for two vehicles but with the plan to extend it to further vehicles in the DHL fleet. The decal would be used on two ‘transit’ style vehicles. These vehicles are sometimes used to carry radioactive materials but the HERS decals are used when the vehicles are carrying packaged dangerous goods but not radioactive materials.

7C3.54 These decals will only be displayed if the vehicle is carrying dangerous goods of sufficient quantities that the vehicle is subjected to the requirements of the ADR Regulations. In other words, if the vehicle is carrying goods that fall under the Limited Quantity Exemptions to ADR, or the vehicle is not carrying dangerous goods at all, then the decals will not be displayed.
The placarding of road tankers and tank containers

7C3.55 Although the UK is a signatory to the international agreements on road transport movements (ADR) there are different requirements for the placarding of tankers and tank containers for purely domestic journeys (UK Hazchem). These do not apply to international movements of dangerous goods either starting or completing their journey in the UK.

7C3.56 While each system is described in more detail in this chapter, the table below summarises the differences between the two systems.

### Road tankers placards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK Hazchem placard</th>
<th>ADR placard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of vehicle used by DHL to transport packaged dangerous goods in the UK. The Class 7 and Radsafe labels would be replaced by the above Decal (the packaged goods will not be Class 7)</strong></td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="UK Hazchem placard" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="ADR placard" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Tankers and tank container placarding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>UK Hazchem</th>
<th>ADR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN number</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard symbol</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency action code</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency telephone number</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard identification number</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### UK Hazchem hazard warning panel

7C3.57 UK Hazchem hazard warning panel or placard used in the United Kingdom contains information on the hazardous substance being carried by the vehicle.

7C3.58 UK Hazchem is not the ADR hazard identification number, also known as the Kemler Code, this is a different warning placard. The main difference is the ADR hazard identification number details the nature of the hazard presented by the goods as opposed to the actions to be taken when dealing with them.

7C3.59 The top-left section of the Hazchem panel gives the emergency action code, which advises the Fire and Rescue Service, what actions to take if there is an accident. The middle-left section gives the UN substance identification number. The lower-left section gives the telephone number that should be called if special advice is needed. The warning symbol at top-right indicates what UN hazard class the load presents. The bottom-right of the plate carries a company logo.
On arrival at an incident, emergency responders have to make very quick decisions, the consequences of which will determine the success or otherwise of the operations carried out. However, information gathering is time consuming and it is therefore often necessary for responders to act only on the information immediately available.

The emergency action code (also known as the Hazchem code) is designed to cover the first vital step and gives an immediate indication of any actions that could be taken should it be necessary without the use of reference materials or expert advice.

Once any immediate action has been taken to save life, protect the environment and prevent the incident escalating, the next phase can be taken which will involve more detailed information from the operator or driver, the company, paperwork from the vehicle cab and various data sources.

There is more information on emergency action codes in the latest version of the Dangerous Goods Emergency Action Code List book. But the code can be explained as follows:

### Emergency action codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Liquid Tight Chemical Suits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Breathing Apparatus &amp; Fire Kit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>DILUTE SPILLAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>CONTAIN SPILLAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Liquid Tight Chemical Suits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Breathing Apparatus &amp; Fire Kit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>PUBLIC SAFETY HAZARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The firefighting extinguishing medium is determined by reference to the first character of the emergency action code as follows:

1. denotes coarse water spray
2. denotes fine water spray
3. denotes normal foam ie protein based foam that is not alcohol resistant
4. denotes dry agent – water MUST NOT be allowed to come into contact with substance.

**7C3.65** Where the second character of the emergency action code is **S, T, Y or Z** normal firefighting clothing is appropriate, ie self-contained open circuit positive pressure compressed air breathing apparatus conforming to BS EN 137 worn in combination with fire kit conforming to BS EN 469, firefighters’ gloves conforming to BS EN 659 and firefighters’ boots.

**7C3.66** Where the second character of the emergency action code is **P, R, W or X** liquid-tight chemical protective clothing conforming to BS 8428, in combination with breathing apparatus specified in paragraph shall be used.

**7C3.67** An ‘**E**’ following the first two characters of an emergency action code indicates that there may be a public safety hazard outside the immediate area of the incident and that the following actions should be considered:

- People should be warned to stay indoors with all doors and windows closed, preferably in rooms upstairs and facing away from the incident
- Ignition sources should be eliminated and any ventilation stopped
- Effects may spread beyond the immediate vicinity. All non-essential personnel should be instructed to move at least 250 metres away from the incident
- Police and Fire and Rescue Service incident commanders should consult each other and with a product expert, or with a source of product expertise
- The possible need for subsequent evacuation should be considered, but it should be remembered that in most cases it will be safer to remain in a building than to evacuate.

**7C3.68** Where the emergency action code contains a **P, S, W or Y** there is a danger that the substance can be violently or explosively reactive or: there could be

- a violent or explosive decomposition of the material involved, including ignition or friction
- the ignition of a flammable gas or vapour cloud (this danger exists for all flammable gases and liquids with a flash point below 60°C)
- the rapid acceleration of combustion due to the involvement of an oxidiser
- a reaction with water which is itself violent, and may also evolve flammable gases.

**7C3.69** In some cases, a higher level of personal protection is required than the one indicated on the emergency action code displayed on a vehicle or tank. In the list of emergency action codes, this is indicated by the presence of an additional personal protection code of **A or B** in Column 4 of the emergency action code list. This information also appears on the Chemdata and CIRRUS database entries for the material.
Code letter **A**: Indicates that fire kit (to the specified standards as indicated in the emergency action code list) should be worn in combination with gas-tight chemical protective clothing (again as specified). The fire kit is intended to protect against one or more of the following additional hazards which are indicated in the emergency action code list by the appropriate character(s) in brackets, following the ‘A’, as shown below:

- **(c)** Liquefied gas with a boiling point below -20°C
- **(fg)** Flammable gas
- **(fl)** Flammable liquid
- **(cf)** Liquefied flammable gas with a boiling point below -20°C
- **(h)** The substance may be carried above 100°C
- **(co)** Oxidising gas with a boiling point below -20°C
- **(!)** The substance may have a particularly deleterious effect on chemical protective clothing

**7C3.71** An additional personal protection code letter **B** indicates that the chemical protective clothing should be gas-tight conforming to BS EN 943 part 2 in combination with the breathing apparatus (as specified in the EAC list).

### ADR Hazard identification numbers (HIN) or Kemler Code

**7C3.72** The hazard identification number consists of two or three figures indicating the following hazards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Hazard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Emission of gas due to pressure or chemical reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Flammability of liquids (vapours) and gases or self-heating liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Flammability of solids or self-heating solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Oxidizing (fire-intensifying) effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Toxicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Radioactivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Corrosivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Risk of spontaneous violent reaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**7C3.73** Duplicating of a figure (eg 55) indicates an intensification of that particular hazard.
Where the hazard associated with a substance can be adequately indicated by a single figure, this is followed by a zero.

If a hazard identification number is prefixed by letter ‘X’, this indicates that the substance will react dangerously with water.

The hazard identification number combinations have following meanings:

(* Water not to be used except by approval of experts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Asphyxiant gas or gas with no subsidiary risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Refrigerated liquefied gas, asphyxiant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>Refrigerated liquefied gas, flammable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>Refrigerated liquefied gas, oxidising (fire intensifying)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Flammable gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>Gas, flammable corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>Flammable gas, which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Oxidising (fire-intensifying) gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Toxic gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>Toxic gas, flammable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265</td>
<td>Toxic gas, oxidising (fire-intensifying)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>Toxic gas, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Gas, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>285</td>
<td>Gas, corrosive, oxidizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Flammable liquid (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive) or flammable liquid or solid in the molten state with a flash point above 60°C, heated to a temperature equal to or above its flash point, or self-heating liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323</td>
<td>Flammable liquid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X323</td>
<td>Flammable liquid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Highly flammable liquid (flash-point below 23°C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>333</td>
<td>Pyrophoric liquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X333</td>
<td>Pyrophoric liquid, which reacts dangerously with water*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336</td>
<td>Highly flammable liquid, toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>338</td>
<td>Highly flammable liquid, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X338</td>
<td>Highly flammable liquid, corrosive, which reacts dangerously with water*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>339</td>
<td>Highly flammable liquid which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Flammable liquid (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive), slightly toxic or self-heating liquid toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>362</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, toxic, which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X362</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, toxic, which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>368</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, toxic, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Flammable liquid (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive), slightly corrosive or self-heating liquid, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>382</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, corrosive, which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X382</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, corrosive, which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Flammable solid, or self-reactive substance, or self-heating substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423</td>
<td>Solid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gas, or flammable solid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases or self-heating solid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X423</td>
<td>Solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases, or flammable solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases, or self-heating solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Spontaneously flammable (pyrophoric) solid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X432</td>
<td>Spontaneously flammable (pyrophoric) solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Flammable solid, in the molten state at an elevated temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>446</td>
<td>Flammable solid, toxic in the molten state, at an elevated temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Flammable or self-heating solid, toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>462</td>
<td>Toxic solid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X462</td>
<td>Solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting toxic gases*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Flammable or self-heating solid, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>482</td>
<td>Corrosive solid which reacts with water, emitting corrosive gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X482</td>
<td>Solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting corrosive gases*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Oxidising (fire-intensifying) substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>539</td>
<td>Flammable organic peroxide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Strongly oxidising (fire-intensifying) substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>556</td>
<td>Strongly oxidising (fire-intensifying) substance, toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>558</td>
<td>Strongly oxidising (fire-intensifying) substance, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>559</td>
<td>Strongly oxidising (fire-intensifying) substance, which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Oxidising substance (fire-intensifying), toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>568</td>
<td>Oxidising substance (fire-intensifying), toxic, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Oxidising substance (fire-intensifying), corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Oxidising substance (fire-intensifying) which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Toxic or slightly toxic substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>606</td>
<td>Infectious substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>623</td>
<td>Toxic liquid, which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Toxic substance, flammable (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>638</td>
<td>Toxic substance, flammable (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive), corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>639</td>
<td>Toxic substance, flammable (flash-point not above 60°C inclusive), which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Toxic solid, flammable or self-heating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>642</td>
<td>Toxic solid, which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Toxic substance, oxidising (fire-intensifying)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Highly toxic substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>663</td>
<td>Highly toxic substance, flammable (flash-point not above 60°C inclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>664</td>
<td>Highly Toxic substance, flammable or self-heating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>665</td>
<td>Highly toxic substance, oxidising (fire-intensifying)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hazard identification numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>668</td>
<td>Highly toxic substance, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>669</td>
<td>Highly toxic substance which can spontaneously lead to a violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Toxic substance, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Toxic or slightly toxic substance, which can spontaneously lead to a violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Radioactive material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Radioactive material, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X80</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, which reacts dangerously with water*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>823</td>
<td>Corrosive liquid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, flammable (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X83</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, flammable (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive), which reacts dangerously with water*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>839</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, flammable (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive), which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X839</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, flammable (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive), which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction and which reacts dangerously with water*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Corrosive solid, flammable or self-heating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>842</td>
<td>Corrosive solid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, oxidising (fire-intensifying)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>856</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, oxidising (fire-intensifying) and toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Highly corrosive substance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X88</td>
<td>Highly corrosive substance, which reacts dangerously with water*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>883</td>
<td>Highly corrosive substance, flammable (flash-point between 23°C and 60°C inclusive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>884</td>
<td>Highly corrosive solid, flammable or self-heating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>885</td>
<td>Highly corrosive substance, oxidising (fire-intensifying)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Hazard identification numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>886</td>
<td>Highly corrosive substance, toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X886</td>
<td>Highly corrosive substance, toxic which reacts dangerously with water*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Corrosive or slightly corrosive substance, which can spontaneously lead to a violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Environmentally hazardous substance; miscellaneous dangerous substances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Miscellaneous dangerous substance carried at an elevated temperature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UK ‘bulk’ vehicle placarding

#### Single bulk load

The above figure shows the signage for a bulk single load (in excess of three cubic metres). The detailed signage will be on the sides and rear of the vehicle.

#### Single load in packages

7C3.77
7C3.78 The above figure shows signage for a vehicle carrying single load dangerous goods in packages. The side of the vehicle will have the standard warning symbols, according to the hazards posed by the load. The primary hazard is always the first symbol sign on the left.

**UK tank and tank container placarding**

7C3.79 The above figure shows a single load tanker. Note the variations in showing the key information.

7C3.80 The above figure shows the signage for a multi load tanker. The main placard will state multi load but the hazard symbol(s) will show the hazard(s) of the load. Each individual compartment to the tanker will have its own sign giving the UN number for the substance and the hazard symbol denoting its specific hazard.
European ADR vehicle ‘bulk’ placarding

Single bulk load showing ADR markings for a bulk single load

European ADR tanker or tank placarding

Single load tanker

7C3.81 For tank vehicles carrying only one substance, as shown above the identification numbers can be shown on the orange plates at the front and rear of the vehicle. Hazard warning symbols are located on each side of the vehicle and at the rear (as indicated).
**7C3.82** Tank vehicles carrying a multi load will display signage as shown above.

**7C3.83** Vehicles carrying tank containers must display orange plates on each side of the tank, or tank compartments, giving hazard and substance identification numbers. A blank plate is displayed at the front and rear. Hazard warning symbols are located on each side of the compartment adjacent to each ADR placard.

**7C3.84** Tank containers must have the identification numbers on the tank itself, to remain in sight when the tank is offloaded from the vehicle.
Elevated temperature marking

7C3.85 Tank-vehicles, tank-containers, portable tanks, special vehicles or containers or especially equipped vehicles or containers carrying elevated temperature substances are required under ADR to display an elevated temperature mark (shown below) on both sides and at the rear for vehicles, and on both sides and at each end for containers, tank-containers and portable tanks.

![Mark for elevated temperature substances](image)

Environmentally hazardous substances marking

7C3.86 When required to be displayed in accordance with the provisions of ADR – containers, tank-containers, portable tanks and vehicles containing environmentally hazardous substances meeting the specific criteria shall be marked with the environmentally hazardous substance mark shown below.

![Mark for environmentally hazardous substances](image)

Switch loading of petrol and distillate fuels

7C3.87 Switch loading is the terminology used to describe the practice of loading a distillate fuel eg diesel or gas oil, into a tank compartment which has previously contained petrol. Switch loading can also be practiced between petrol and kerosene but this practice is normally discouraged because of the risk of residual petrol (liquid or vapour) lowering the flash point of the kerosene.

7C3.88 In the UK the practice of switch loading road tankers is very common with perhaps as many as 95 per cent of petrol/distillate fuel tankers undertaking it in order to minimise unnecessary journeys eg by discharging one load and returning without another. Compartments of tankers which have been switch loaded will not only contain the liquid distillate product but also an amount of petrol vapour remaining from the previous load/loads.
7C3.89 Road tankers that transport petrol are designed and constructed for bottom loading with vapour recovery and in addition to the compartment ullage spaces, petrol vapour will be retained in the associated vapour manifold and pipework, together with small amounts of petrol in other associated pieces of equipment.

7C3.90 Distillate fuels have a greater density than petrol and in many cases a nominal ‘full load’ of distillate will require a tanker to run with an empty or partially filled compartment, to ensure that the vehicle does not exceed its maximum authorised mass on the road.

7C3.91 Large volumes of petrol vapour will be retained in the empty and/or partially filled compartments of a tanker carrying distillates in which petrol has been previously loaded. Even in compartments not previously loaded with petrol there is a risk that vapour will be present, due to the inter-compartment connection afforded by the vapour manifold and the vapour transfer valves, all of which are open during the bottom loading process. It is possible that a tanker may arrive at a site with a full load of diesel and leave with a full load of petrol vapour.

7C3.92 Where a mixed load of liquid products comprises petrol, diesel, kerosene or aviation fuels the tanker will be marked with the UN number of the product with the greatest hazard ie the lowest flashpoint. In the case of empty uncleaned tanks, the tanker is marked as if it still contained the original product. However, there are no specific provisions for marking where the transport of a single substance with the residual vapour of a product with a greater hazard (lower flashpoint) is undertaken even though this may present a similar hazard to that of an empty uncleaned tanker.

7C3.93 Under the current regulations, a compartment that was previously filled with petrol and then refilled with diesel and subsequently emptied of the diesel would have to be marked UN 1202 (diesel) to reflect the last load in the uncleaned tank, but in fact could be filled with petrol vapour.

7C3.94 These hazards are recognised by the petroleum industry and as a result it has become widespread practice in the UK for road tanker operators to retain the petrol marking (UN 1203) on tankers for a number of full loads of diesel or gas oil (UN 1202) after carrying petrol in order to reflect the presence of the retained petrol vapour and the greater danger this may pose.

7C3.95 Fire and Rescue Services should be aware that, when dealing with incidents involving petrol/distillate tankers, any of the tank compartments may contain mixtures of distillate and petrol vapour. Therefore, all the tanks should be treated as if they contained petrol vapour until information to the contrary is obtained.

7C3.96 This also means that tanks may contain diesel/gas oil as the main load but still marked as petrol to better reflect the greater danger from any residual petrol vapours.
The emergency action code for all such tankers should therefore be taken to be 3YE (indicating a possible public safety hazard beyond the immediate area of the incident) even though the emergency action code for the distillates will be 3Y and some tankers may still be marked as such.

As there are no movements of petrol/distillate tankers to and from Europe this will not be an issue for non UK registered tankers ie those marked with ADR hazard identification numbers.

**Supply labelling of chemicals**

Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 is the law that applies to suppliers of dangerous chemicals. Its purpose is to protect people and the environment from the effects of those chemicals by requiring suppliers to provide information about the dangers and to package them safely.

The Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 requires the supplier of a dangerous chemical to:

- identify the hazards (dangers) of the chemical. This is known as ‘classification’;
- give information about the hazards to their customers. Suppliers usually provide this information on the package itself (eg a label); and
- package the chemical safely.

NOTE: Safety data sheets are no longer covered by the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009. The laws that require a Safety Data Sheet to be provided have been transferred to the European REACH Regulation.

‘Supply’ means making a chemical available to another person. Manufacturers, importers, distributors, wholesalers and retailers are all examples of suppliers.

The Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 applies to most chemicals but not all. The details of the scope are set out in the regulations. Some chemicals, such as cosmetics and medicines, are outside the scope and have their own specific laws.

The Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 2009 will gradually be replaced by the European Regulation on Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures.

Supply labelling differs from transport labelling in that different danger symbols are used and different criteria are used to assign the risks. Therefore, something classified as ‘toxic’ (Class 6.1) for transport may only be classified as ‘harmful’ for supply. Equally, something classed as ‘toxic’ (skull and cross-bones) for supply, such as a carcinogenic substance, may not be classified as hazardous for
transport at all. Equally, a particular substance may have different classifications for each system. Solvents may be classed as ‘flammable’ (Class 3) for transport, but ‘harmful’ or ‘toxic’ (equating to class 6.1) for supply.

7C3.106 The reasons for this are the different types of risk exhibited in different situations. The end user, dealing with small quantities on a frequent basis over long time-periods, is at greater risk from any harmful/toxic effects due to contact with the product than from its flammable characteristics. The emergency services, however, will be dealing with a “one-off” situation which is not supposed to happen, potentially involving large quantities of the product, where the flammability hazard far outweighs the longer-term effects of contact with the product.

Supply labels

7C3.107 Supply labels may also provide advice for the consumer for the safe use of the product. Such information might include (UK/EU Example):

- Name, address and telephone number of person responsible for supplying the substance or preparation
- Name of the substance or preparation
- Indication(s) of danger and warning symbol(s)
- Risk and safety phrases
- EC number (for substances)
- Chemical Abstract Service number (for pure chemicals).
REACH – registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals regulations

7C3.108 The registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals regulations (REACH); an EU regulatory framework for chemicals came into force on 1 June 2007. The aim of REACH is to improve the protection of human health and the environment. REACH puts greater responsibility onto industry to manage the risks from chemicals and to provide safety information that will be passed down the supply chain.

7C3.109 REACH will require a registration, over a period of 11 years, of some 30,000 chemical substances. The registration process requires anyone manufacturing in, or importing into the EU, more than one tonne per year of these substances to generate data for all chemicals produced or imported, whether on their own or in one or more preparations. This information must be registered with the European Chemicals Agency. The registrants must also identify appropriate risk management measures and communicate them to the users.

7C3.110 In addition, REACH will allow the further evaluation of substances where there are grounds for concern and foresees an authorisation system for the use of substances of very high concern. This applies to substances that cause cancer, infertility, genetic mutations or birth defects, and to those which are persistent and accumulate in the environment. The authorisation system will require companies to switch progressively to safer alternatives where a suitable alternative exists. All applications for an authorisation need to include an analysis of alternatives and a substitution plan where a suitable alternative exists. Current use restrictions will remain under the REACH system.

Globally Harmonised System

7C3.111 The REACH Regulation is currently written around the current classification and labelling system which is set out in 67/548/EEC and implemented in the UK through the Chemicals Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply Regulations 2009. However, the EU is committed to introducing the Globally Harmonised System of classification and labelling of chemicals.

7C3.112 The Globally Harmonised System is being progressively implemented worldwide. In the EU, a timetable for implementation has been issued and the deadline for substance reclassification was 1 December 2010 and for mixtures 1 June 2015.

7C3.113 The Classification Labelling and Packaging Regulation No 1272/2008 that implements the Globally Harmonised System for classification in Europe will result in a major overhaul of hazard communication for safety data sheets and labelling for supply. Therefore, over the next few years, we will be faced with a dual system as some labels and safety data sheets change and others do not and the key message for this confusing transition period is that those supplying chemicals attempt to make the communication of hazards and risk management as clear as possible to users and to emergency responders.
To ensure that hazard classifications (and consequent labelling) of all substances manufactured in or imported into the EU are transparent, industry are required to submit a notification of the hazard classification to the European Chemicals Agency at the latest by 1 December 2010 unless already submitted as part of a registration. The Agency will then include this information in a classification and labelling inventory in the form of a database accessible via the internet.

The Globally Harmonised System introduces a set of harmonised criteria for the classification of chemicals. Many of these criteria are familiar to those working under the current EU system, although in many cases the actual values used to define the hazard category will differ. There are also a number of additional hazard categories for some criteria that indicate a lower degree of hazard. These may be implemented on an optional basis and it is expected that some countries will include them in their new regulations while others will not.

The system for classifying mixtures (preparations) will also change, and this is expected to result in a significant increase in the number of mixtures that are classified as hazardous.

The content of labels will also change significantly. Under the Globally Harmonised System, the familiar rectangular orange symbols are replaced by a set of pictograms which are diamond shaped like the transport symbols, but with the symbols in black on a white background with a red border. The EU Indications of Danger is replaced with signal words, while R & S phrases are replaced with hazard statements and precautionary statements.

The tables below compare the Globally Harmonised System and the existing labelling systems. Examples of Globally Harmonised System compliant labels are also given.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Globally Harmonised System symbol</th>
<th>Existing symbol</th>
<th>Hazards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Flammable gases self-reactive" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Flammable liquids pyrophoric" /></td>
<td>Flammable gases self-reactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Flammable solids self-heating" /></td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Flammable aerosols" /></td>
<td>Flammable liquids pyrophoric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image5" alt="Contact with water, emits organic peroxides flammable gas" /></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flammable solids self-heating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image6" alt="Oxidizing gases" /></td>
<td><img src="image7" alt="Oxidizing liquids" /></td>
<td>Oxidizing gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image8" alt="Oxidizing solids" /></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oxidizing liquids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image9" alt="Gases under pressure" /></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oxidizing solids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image10" alt="Corrosive to metals" /></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gases under pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image11" alt="Acute toxicity" /></td>
<td><img src="image12" alt="Very toxic (fatal)" /></td>
<td>Corrosive to metals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image13" alt="Toxic" /></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acute toxicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image14" alt="Serious eye damage" /></td>
<td><img src="image15" alt="Corrosive (causes severe skin burns and eye damage)" /></td>
<td>Very toxic (fatal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image16" alt="Serious eye damage" /></td>
<td></td>
<td>Toxic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image17" alt="Serious eye damage" /></td>
<td></td>
<td>Corrosive (causes severe skin burns and eye damage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image18" alt="Serious eye damage" /></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serious eye damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physio-chemical hazard markings under the Globally Harmonised System and the existing Chemicals Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply Regulations 2009 (CHIP) system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Globally Harmonised System symbol</strong></td>
<td><strong>Existing symbol</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hazards</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Respiratory sensitiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mutagen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Carcinogen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reproductive toxicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Systemic target organ toxicity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aspiration hazard</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acute toxicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Harmful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skin irritation, serious eye irritation, respiratory irritant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skin sensitiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Narcotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acute / chronic environmental hazard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Comparison of Globally Harmonised System and Chemicals Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply Regulations 2009 (CHIP) labelling advice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Chemicals Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply Regulations 2009 (CHIP) labelling system</th>
<th>Globally Harmonised System labelling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk phrases</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hazard statements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly flammable</td>
<td>Highly flammable liquid and vapour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very toxic by inhalation</td>
<td>Fatal if inhaled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes burns</td>
<td>Causes severe skin burns and eye damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safety phrases</strong></td>
<td><strong>Precautionary statements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep container tightly closed</td>
<td>Keep container tightly closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoid contact with skin and eyes</td>
<td>Do not get in eyes, on skin or on clothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wear suitable protective clothing</td>
<td>Wear protective clothing [manufacturer/supplier to specify]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Example of Globally Harmonised System compliant supply labels on chemical products

![Example of Globally Harmonised System compliant supply labels on chemical products](image)
Rail transportation

7C3.119 All of the classes of hazardous substances are carried on the UK rail network. The carriage of dangerous goods regulations apply to rail transport, with detailed guidance coming from HS (G) 163 Guidance for Rail Operators and Others Involved in the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail.

7C3.120 The only exceptions to the application of the regulations are:

- all substances carried with the sole purpose of being used on or by the train, eg fuel
- radioactive materials; these have their own regulations, RAMRail.¹

7C3.121 The regulations require that sufficient information is supplied with the load to ensure that all involved with the transportation process can:

- identify what is being carried
- be aware of the potential hazards
- in the case of the Fire and Rescue Service, respond quickly and efficiently.

7C3.122 The information is supplied to the train operator and the rail infrastructure controller, therefore if there is an incident and the information cannot be obtained from the train driver, it can be obtained from the operator. The information given includes:

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¹ Packaging Labelling and Carriage of Radioactive Material by Rail Regulations HSE.gov.uk
- designation and classification of the dangerous goods
- UN number
- packaging group
- compatibility and division for explosives
- consignor and consignee details
- specialist advice
- mass and volume for:
  - the package
  - the tank, tank container, or tank wagon
  - bulk load in container or wagon
  - the total consignment.

7C3.123 The containers, tank container tank wagons and wagons must display relevant signage as to its contents using the UK Hazchem system for UK only journeys or the RID marking provisions for international journeys (which mirror those of ADR for road vehicles), as shown above.

**Total Operations Processing System**

7C3.124 The Total Operations Processing System (TOPS) is a computerised system which enables Network Rail to keep a constant check on the position and availability of every rail vehicle on the Network Rail system and provide specific information of the various loads that are being hauled.

7C3.125 It consists of a central computer system connected to regional control offices, marshalling yards and depots throughout the country. The system is based on a main computer at Blandford House, Marylebone in London, which is linked to input points at area freight offices throughout Network Rail.

7C3.126 From these control centres, details are fed into the computer with all the wagon and freight details, loaded or unloaded, freight train movements and type of traffic conveyed. On request from an Incident Commander via Fire Service Control a Network Rail control office can obtain any specific information from the system, on any wagon or freight train and its cargo.

7C3.127 Each wagon is clearly marked with an individual identification number on the side of each wagon. This number will be recorded on the TOPS computer to enable information on the load to be readily made available for operational staff in the event of an incident.
Additional tank wagon identification schemes

7C3.128 Tank wagons carrying certain classes of dangerous goods can be identified by specific colour schemes. For example, tank wagons carrying liquefied petroleum gas will have a white barrel with a horizontal orange stripe round the barrel at mid height. Tank wagons carrying flammable liquids are painted dove grey and the sole bars are painted signal red. (Sole bars are the two horizontal metal bars upon which the bottom of the tank rests.)

7C3.129 In addition to the labelling, all wagons containing dangerous goods will have a ‘Network Rail Dangerous Wagon Label’ displayed on each side of the wagon. This label indicates the class of substance being carried and the principal hazard encountered. Containers that are hauled by rail are exempt from being labelled in this manner.

7C3.130 The emergency code for the label consists of a six digit number. The first four numbers are the substance identification number for the substance carried or the class, division and compatibility group in the case of explosives. The remaining two letters are referred to as the ‘Alpha Code’. This code has been allocated to firms and enables Network Rail to ascertain the telephone number from which specialist assistance can be requested in the event of an emergency.
Information available from the rail vehicle crew

7C3.131 Information on the specific details of each wagon and the details of their individual loads is held by the rail vehicle crew. This information sheet is known as the ‘consist’. Information found on the ‘consist’ will contain the following information:

- position of every wagon from front to rear
- train identity number
- locomotive identity number
- wagon numbers
- dangerous goods emergency codes
- UN number plus specialist advice contact code.

7C3.132 It would be advisable for the Incident Commander, to obtain the consist as this will provide immediate information on the type of loads being carried and provide interim guidance on a course of action to follow until further information is secured either from TOPS or from a designated specialist advisor.

Guidance manual for accepted and regulated materials to be transported

7C3.133 Network Rail has established conditions under which they are prepared to accept dangerous goods detailed in their *List of Dangerous Goods and Conditions of Acceptance*. This is a working manual for all Network Rail staff commonly known as the ‘pink pages’ which sets out the specific instructions to staff on the handling of dangerous materials.
It contains guidance on the action necessary in emergencies, explains how to obtain specialist assistance, and requires staff to summon emergency assistance when an incident occurs. It also includes illustrations of the labels used on packages of dangerous substances and on the wagons containing them.

All train crews should be aware of all goods carried, especially those of a hazardous nature and should ensure that compliance with the regulations is made, in respect to the quantity, labelling and method of transportation and to initiate emergency measures if required.

**Conveyance of explosives by rail**

**Wagon labelling**

The wagon label for explosives (both commercially and military) replace the individual UN hazardous substance number with a set of four characters identifying the category of the explosive. Thus a wagon label whose emergency code begins with the characters 1.1D would indicate an explosive of Hazard Division 1.1, compatibility group D, (ie an explosive presenting a mass explosion hazard).

**Weight limitations**

Only commercial explosives are covered by GO/RT3422, (Railway Group Standard which identifies the requirements for the acceptance and carriage by rail of explosives on Network Rail) and the total amount to be conveyed on any one train is limited to 36.25 tonnes.

Military explosives are covered by the *Conveyance by Rail of Military Explosives Regulations 1977*. The weight limits for military explosives, and for mixed commercial and military loads are given in GO/RT3053.

To summarise no more than 20 tonnes of explosives per wagon or container can be carried with a net amount of the same explosives. It is permissible to convey several groups of explosives on the same train but subject to a separation distance of 80 metres and a limitation of 40 tonnes per group. This is applicable
to groups within Hazard Division 1.1 and combined with 1.3 and/or 1.5. For groups within 1.3 and 1.5 either separately or together the separation distance reduces to 40 metres and the limit per group increases to 120 tonnes.

**Tank wagons held in sidings**

7C3.140 Railway wagons laden with explosives in transit are occasionally parked overnight in railway sidings and to this effect the working manual for rail staff is quite specific in detailing the responsibilities to staff where explosives are concerned. The manual places personal responsibility upon the supervisor for ensuring that any wagon of explosives standing in the sidings, goods or marshalling yards are under surveillance by railway staff and for keeping a tally of each wagon with its location whilst in their responsibility.

7C3.141 If through exceptional circumstances it becomes necessary to hold explosives in an ‘unsupervised location’ the Chief Operating Officer of Network Rail has made arrangements to ensure that Network Rail staff responsible for the handling and conveyance of dangerous goods will inform the British Transport Police and the Fire and Rescue Service whenever it is known that wagons containing explosives are likely to be held in unsupervised goods yards or sidings.

7C3.142 On receipt of this information the Fire and Rescue Service concerned should instruct a Fire Safety Officer to visit the site and if conditions warrant it, arrange with their Service Control for an appropriate special attendance to be made to the sidings in the event of any fire or special service call being received.

**Irradiated fuel flasks**

7C3.143 If an incident occurs involving an irradiated fuel flask, National Arrangements for Incidents involving Radioactivity (NAIR) will be activated immediately. However, there will be some operational priorities to be considered whilst the NAIR scheme is instigated.
If there is evidence of damage to an irradiated transport flask, all staff should keep at least 50m away upwind of the incident. If this area has to be entered for rescues, firefighters should wear breathing apparatus; protective clothing and dosimeters, and radiation procedures should be carried out.

Under severe damage to a flask there could be an immediate danger of a release of radioactivity and the approach to the incident and the immediate area around the incident should be treated with great caution and cordoned off to create safe areas.

If water leaks from the flask always treat as if radioactive and avoid if possible, especially any contact with the eyes or skin. In the event of the flask being involved in fire, it should be cooled by water spray. The nuclear physicist will monitor the run off and inform the local water authority of the slight chance of radioactive contamination in water courses.

The risk of contamination is not limited to water sources as there is a high possibility contamination can occur through airborne radioactive particles. Monitoring of the wind speed and direction is vital to continue to stay upwind and avoid further contamination risks.

Air transportation

Introduction

Unlike road and rail transportation of hazardous materials, air transport is international, and therefore is governed by international regulations and agreements.

The world-wide system used to control the transportation of dangerous goods by air is based on the same United Nation’s ‘Orange Book’ requirements placed on all other modes of transport. International requirements for the safe air transportation of radioactive material also relate to UN standards. Because of the particular nature of air transportation, restrictions on the type and quantities of dangerous goods transported are strictly enforced.

Worldwide harmonization

Worldwide harmonization of the transportation of dangerous goods by air is overseen by an agency of the UN. The principles of the international requirements are detailed in the International Civil Aviation Organisation Technical Instructions and include:

- classification
- identification (marking, labelling and documentation)
- acceptability for air transport
• packaging and packing
• loading and stowage
• information
• training
• reporting of incidents and accidents
• inspection and investigation.

International agreement

7C3.151 The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago convention) and its annexes set out the international standards and principles for air transportation throughout the world. Annex 18 to the convention contains the principles applied to dangerous goods. These principles include requirements that:

• states must ensure compliance with the technical instructions
• there must be inspection surveillance and enforcement procedures
• dangerous goods accidents and incidents must be reported
• dangerous goods accidents and incidents must be investigated.

International Civil Aviation Organisation Technical Instructions and International Aviation Transport Association dangerous goods regulations

7C3.152 The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Technical Instructions are produced in English and are the source of the legal rules.

7C3.153 The International Aviation Transportation Association (IATA), the aviation trade organization, publishes a set of Dangerous Goods Regulations that incorporate the ICAO Technical Instructions. The only real difference between the two documents is the order of the information, although the IATA document is more restrictive than the Technical Instructions. The IATA document is a field document and is more commonly referred to in aviation circles.

UK law

7C3.154 The UK’s legal obligations under the Chicago Convention are fulfilled by the following:

• The Air Navigation Order 2005 – which permits the making of regulations to control the carriage of dangerous goods by air
• The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) (Amended) Regulations 2006 – which contain detailed requirements and refer to the need for airlines to comply with the latest edition of the ICAO Technical Instructions.

7C3.155 The Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) Regulations apply to the following:

• Shippers
• Freight agents
• Handling agents
• Couriers
• The Post Office
• Passengers
• Operators.

7C3.156 The regulations require compliance with the technical instructions and require that the operators listed above have permission to carry dangerous goods from the Civil Aviation Authority.

Cargo aircraft

7C3.157 These aircraft are designed or modified for the carriage of cargo only, both in the under-floor hold and on the main deck. Aircraft specifically designed to carry cargo may have nose-opening or tail-opening cargo doors to facilitate the loading of large or specialist cargoes. Other cargo aircraft have large main-cabin freight doors, usually positioned aft of the nose area on the port side.

7C3.158 Dangerous goods are carried on cargo aircraft either in the under-floor holds or on the main deck. Those in the under-floor holds will be in passenger aircraft quantities, whereas those on the main deck will usually be cargo aircraft only items.

Passenger aircraft with under-floor holds (only)

7C3.159 These aircraft are designed primarily for carrying passengers. Cargo (and baggage) will be carried in holds that are below the main deck (under-floor). Examples of this type of aircraft are Boeing 737, 747 and Airbus 3 series. The introduction of wide-bodied passenger-carrying aircraft has meant that there is a great deal of capacity in the under-floor holds for carrying cargo. Dangerous goods may be carried in the under-floor holds in passenger aircraft in limited quantities.
Passenger aircraft with holds on the same deck as passengers (combi-aircraft)

7C3.160 These aircraft have also been designed primarily for carrying passengers. There are two types:

1. The holds are on the same deck as the passengers.
2. The holds are on the same deck as the passengers and there are also under-floor holds.

7C3.161 In aircraft with holds on the same deck as the passengers, the holds may be little more than areas of the cabin separated from the passengers by curtaining. In others they may be surrounded by sealed bulkheads with access from outside the aircraft only or through doors in the cabin that are kept locked in flight. Aircraft with holds on the same deck as passengers have come to be known as combi-aircraft.

7C3.162 Dangerous goods in passenger aircraft quantities may be carried on combi-aircraft in under-floor holds and on the main deck holds. When dangerous goods are carried, the hold must be totally separated from passengers by a bulkhead. Some low hazard dangerous goods (ie those which would not lead to the occurrence of a serious safety or health problem in the event of a leakage) may be carried in the main deck cargo hold on other types of combi-aircraft with approval from the Civil Aviation Authority.

Convertible aircraft (quick-change)

7C3.163 A number of aircraft are designed to be converted quickly so that during the day they can carry passengers and at night carry cargo. Dangerous goods are carried on quick-change aircraft as permitted for passenger or cargo aircraft, depending on the configuration at the time.

Principles of safe transportation of dangerous goods by air

7C3.164 The principles applied for the safe transportation of dangerous goods by air are that according to the hazard posed by the substance, they can be:

• carried on passenger and or cargo aircraft
• restricted to cargo aircraft only
• forbidden on both passenger and cargo aircraft (but exemption to carry may be possible)
• totally forbidden in all circumstances
• packaged – no bulk transportation
• limited quantities per package for passengers and cargo.
Dangerous goods integral to the aircraft

7C3.165 There are many systems and items of equipment on board an aircraft that are deemed to be hazardous materials, these include:

- aircraft equipment:
  - life rafts, aerosols
  - fire extinguishers, dry ice
  - batteries, alcohol
  - oxygen generators, perfumes and colognes
  - fuel, matches and lighters.
- passenger’s baggage.

Packaging for transport by air

7C3.166 The requirements for packaging are similar to those required by ADR and the Chemicals Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply Regulations (CHIP), except that packages must also take into account:

- temperature variations
- pressure differences
- vibration.

7C3.167 Packages are therefore required to undergo the following tests:

- drop test
- stacking test
- leak-proof test (drums only)
- hydraulic (pressure) test (drums only).

Marking and labelling

7C3.168 Packaged goods are marked and labelled in accordance with UN recommendations. Both primary and secondary hazard symbols are displayed if appropriate.

7C3.169 Where goods are designated as being excluded from passenger aircraft, an aircraft-specific ‘cargo aircraft only’ orange label must be displayed.
Shipper’s declaration

7C3.170 All dangerous goods must be accompanied by a shipper’s declaration. The shipper’s declaration for dangerous goods can be distinguished from other flight documents by the red and white hatching on each side of the document. The declaration should contain the following information:

- Proper shipping name
- UN number
- UN class, division and subsidiary risk(s)
- Packing group (if applicable)
- Packing instructions and type of packaging
- Net quantity and number of packages.

7C3.171 For radioactive materials, additionally:

- name or symbol of radionuclide
- activity
- package category and transport index.

7C3.172 The 'shipper’s declaration’ is produced by the shipper. There should be one copy at the originating point with one other travelling with the dangerous goods.
Notification to the commander

7C3.173 A ‘special load form’ must be given to the commander of the aircraft, identifying what dangerous goods have been placed on board in the cargo and where they have been loaded. This form is known as a ‘notification to the commander’ and must be on the aircraft in the possession of the commander. There should also be a copy of the notification to the commander at the airport of loading although, unlike the commander’s copy, this is not a legal requirement.

Loading of dangerous goods

7C3.174 Packaged dangerous goods might be loaded into aircraft:

- as individual packages
- on pallets
- within transport loading units (known as ‘unit load devices’).
7C3.175 The above figure illustrates a typical unit load device. This refers to any type of container with an integral pallet, or aircraft pallet whether or not owned by an IATA member, and whether or not considered to be aircraft equipped. These units interface directly with an aircraft loading and restraint system. Such units become an integral part of the aircraft structure when loaded.

7C3.176 If the labels on packages are not visible when they are on pallets or in unit load devices, a red hatched tag showing which hazard classes are present must be displayed on the outside of the pallet or unit load device. The cargo aircraft only label must also be displayed or be visible where appropriate.

### Loading restrictions

7C3.177 Packaged dangerous goods:

- **must not** be stowed in the passenger cabin or on the flight deck
- **must not** be on passenger aircraft if ‘cargo aircraft only’
- ‘cargo aircraft only’ packages **must** be accessible in flight
- packages of liquids with orientation arrows **must** be upright
- packages **must** be secured to prevent movement
- damaged packages **must not** be loaded
- incompatible dangerous goods **must not** be stowed to allow interaction
- most explosives **must** be segregated from other dangerous goods
- some types of radioactive materials **must** be separated from persons
- magnetized material **must** be loaded so that the compass cannot be affected.
Incidents

7C3.178 Incidents can be categorized into those:

- on the ground
- occurring during flight.

7C3.179 During the flight, if an incident occurs involving dangerous goods, the commander of the aircraft will refer to an ICAO document known as the ‘Red Book’. This publication provides emergency response details including an in-flight checklist for each dangerous substance category hazard. For incidents on the ground, the airport fire service will usually deal with the incident supported by the Fire and Rescue Service local to the airport.

7C3.180 All incidents must be investigated as this is a requirement of Annex 18 to the Chicago Convention.

Operational considerations

7C3.181 When dealing with an aircraft incident, the Incident Commander should take into consideration all of the hazards discussed previously (eg man made mineral fibres etc) as well as the biohazards from body fluids from casualties. The Incident Commander should also take into account the fact that until declared otherwise, the scene of an air crash is a crime scene.

Sea transportation

Introduction

7C3.182 Much of the cargo transported by sea may be classed as dangerous. Incidents involving dangerous substances at sea can be divided into two main areas:

- incidents offshore
- incidents in harbour.

7C3.183 The main difference between these two types of incident is that for an incident located in a harbour, the hazardous materials adviser must liaise with the Harbour Master when advising on the operational plan.

International Maritime Dangerous Goods code

7C3.184 By its very nature, transport of goods by sea is an international industry and as such is governed by an international standard, ie: The International Maritime Dangerous Goods code.
7C3.185 The International Maritime Dangerous Goods code is used by all areas of the shipping industry that carries dangerous goods, and covers all aspects of their transportation from the construction of the vessels to limiting quantities of substances carried.

7C3.186 The International Maritime Dangerous Goods code is in three volumes:

**Volume 1**: General provisions eg definitions, training requirements, etc

**Volume 2**: The dangerous goods list and limited quantities exceptions.

**Supplement**: The emergency schedules and medical first aid guidance.

7C3.187 The supplement also contains two sections that are of specific interest to the hazardous materials adviser.

### Marine pollutants

7C3.188 A number of dangerous substances in the various classes have also been identified as substances harmful to the marine environment these are known as marine pollutants. Substances classified as such are carried in packages or transport containers identified with a ‘marine pollutant’ symbol. Amendment 23 of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods code introduced a new marine pollutant symbol of a dead fish and a tree that replaced the previous triangle containing a dead fish and crossed lines.

![New (left) and previously used (right) marine pollutant symbols](image)

### Emergency schedule

7C3.189 This is the emergency schedule for dealing with incidents involving dangerous goods on fire or spilt.

**Fire**

A series of generic tables with the prefix ‘F’ providing guidance on specific hazards of a substance when involved in fire and the firefighting tactics to be employed in various locations on the ship.
Spillage
A series of generic tables with the prefix ‘S’ providing guidance on the hazards associated with various spills, personal protection, and tactics for different size packages and spills in various locations on the ship.

Medical First Aid Guidance

7C3.190 This section provides a flow chart to assist in the initial assessment of a casualty which refers the reader to generic numbered tables for specific conditions. In each case casualty signs and symptoms are described and detailed treatments given. In many cases the treatments are significantly more involved than for normal first aid and are designed to preserve life whilst at sea using the vessel’s on board medical facilities. This information can prove to be of considerable value when attempting to assess the likelihood of the exposure of a casualty to a particular substance.

7C3.191 However, it must always be borne in mind that the guidance given under Emergency Schedule and Medical First Aid Guidance is designed for use when the vessel is at sea and to assist the survival of the ship and casualties whilst awaiting help. As a result some of the tactics and procedures outlined, such as ditching the material overboard, may not be appropriate for when the ship is in port.

7C3.192 The emergency schedule is reproduced as a section in Chemdata. When accessing Chemdata for incidents involving ships the user should ensure that the sections on emergency schedules are referred to. This information is not only essential when formulating a plan but will give an understanding of the actions that may well have been taken by the ship’s crew prior to the arrival of the Fire and Rescue Service.

7C3.193 The bulk storage of hazardous substances presents specific problems to Fire and Rescue Service personnel, which are:

- quantities of substances stored
- variety of substances being stored
- variety of storage media
- proximity of other bulk storage of hazardous substances (eg at Buncefield there were approximately 29 bulk storage tanks and three pipelines.)
- size of the consequence area in terms of the plume, firefighting media run off, the potential proximity of residential areas, etc.

7C3.194 The Health and Safety Executive have issued regulations and approved codes of practice for aspects of the storage of hazardous substances. The regulations and approved codes of practice require that the owner/occupier carry out a detailed risk assessment on the premises storing hazardous materials and
subsequent safety systems be implemented. It is recommended that the hazardous materials adviser refers to these documents for details on safety systems.

7C3.195 The basis of the safety systems is the assessment of the risks from:

- release of dangerous substances
- ignition sources
- separation of product
- elimination or reduction of risks from dangerous substances through:
  - ventilation
  - control of ignition
  - separation of product
  - fire resistance of the storage media
  - fire reaction.

Packaging

Pressure receptacles

7C3.196 Pressure receptacles and their closures shall be designed, calculated, manufactured, tested and equipped in such a way as to withstand all conditions, including fatigue, to which they will be subjected during their normal use and during normal conditions of carriage.

Intermediate bulk containers

7C3.197 An intermediate bulk container is a container constructed of moulded plastic, fibreglass, steel or plywood with steel reinforcing and is used for storage and transportation of goods. Intermediate bulk containers may range in size but are generally between 700 mm and 2000 mm in height. The length and width of an intermediate bulk container is usually dependent on the country’s pallet dimension standard. They may have pallet-like bases so that they can be easily lifted using forklift trucks. Intermediate bulk containers can contain powdered or liquid chemicals.
Examples of intermediate bulk containers

Portable tanks, multi-element gas containers (ISO tanks)

7C3.198 Portable tank means a multimodal tank used for the carriage of explosives (UN Class 1) and other dangerous goods in UN Classes 3 to 9. The portable tank includes a shell fitted with service equipment and structural equipment necessary for the carriage of dangerous substances. The portable tank shall be capable of being filled and discharged without the removal of its structural equipment. It possesses stabilising members external to the shell, and is capable of being lifted when full. It is designed primarily to be loaded onto a transport vehicle or ship and is equipped with skids, mountings or accessories to facilitate mechanical handling. Tank-vehicles, tank-wagons, non-metallic tanks and intermediate bulk containers are not considered to fall within the definition for portable tanks.

Examples of portable tanks (ISO tanks)

Non-pressure transit tankers

7C3.199 Non-pressure tankers are used for the transportation of liquids and gases that do not need to be stored under pressure. There are various models ranging from the single load tanker to the multi load tanker. Tankers will not show any warning signage when empty.
**Non-pressure tank – nitric acid**

The photo above shows a non-pressure tank containing Nitric Acid >70 per cent. Note the added protection to prevent accidental damage to the structure of the tank, which is a good indication that the tanker carries a high consequence load.

**Multi-compartment tanker**

The photo above shows a 30,000 litre non-pressure, stainless steel, multi-compartment tanker that can carry a variety of substances at different times but only compatible loads during any single journey.
Vacuum-operated waste tanks

7C3.202 The photo above shows a vacuum-operated tank; notice should be taken of the external strengthening ribs which are to prevent the tank collapsing when the vacuum is applied. Details of the specifications regarding vacuum operated waste tanks can be found in Chapter 6.10 of ADR Volume II.

Pressure tanks

7C3.203 The above photo shows a typical pressure tank designed for carrying liquid petroleum gas.
Cryogenic liquid tanks

7C3.204 Cryogenic receptacle relates to transportable thermally insulated pressure receptacles for refrigerated liquefied gases of a water capacity of not more than 1000 litres.

Bags

7C3.205 These are a flexible packaging made of paper, plastics film, textiles, woven materials or other suitable materials.

7C3.206 The type of hazardous substances typically to be found in these bags include agrochemicals of a quantity of up to 1 tonne.

Carboys

7C3.207 These are large glass or plastic containers usually encased in a protective basket or crate and often used to hold corrosive liquids.
Bulk containers

7C3.208 Typically the term applies to containers designed for use on road vehicles and in shipping, such as ISO-containers. The term container does not cover conventional packaging, intermediate bulk containers, tank-containers or vehicles.

Drums

7C3.210 A drum is a flat-ended or convex-ended cylindrical packaging made out of metal, fibreboard, plastics, plywood or other suitable materials. This definition also includes packaging of other shapes, eg, round, taper-necked packaging or pail-shaped packaging. Wooden barrels and jerry-cans are not covered by this definition.
One example of where non-UN approved packaging is used to transport dangerous goods is the use of oak barrels to transport alcoholic beverages such as Scotch whisky.

**Bulk tanks**

The various tanks in use are designed to store different types of substances. The list below shows the design criteria for hydrocarbon oils.

- Floating roof tanks; containing:
  - Class ‘A’ (flash point below 228°C) hydrocarbon fuels,
  - Class ‘B’ (flash point between 228 and 656°C)
- Non-pressure; containing:
  - Class ‘A’ (flash point below 228°C)
  - Class ‘B’ (flash point between 228 and 656°C)
  - Class ‘C’ (flash point above 656°C)
- Fixed roof tanks containing:
  - Class ‘A’ (flash point below 228°C)
  - Class ‘B’ (flash point between 228 and 656°C)
  - Class ‘C’ (flash point above 656°C)
- Pressure fixed roof tank
  - Class ‘A’ (flash point below 228°C) hydrocarbon fuels
- Spherical pressurised tank
  - Liquefied petroleum gas, liquefied natural gas
- Horizontal pressure tank
  - Liquefied petroleum gas, liquefied natural gas
- Refrigerated storage tank
  - Liquefied petroleum gas, ethylene, liquefied natural gas, similar hydrocarbons, and also ammonia.

Detailed information on the various methods of bulk storage in the petrochemical industry including bulk storage systems for liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas can be found in *Fire Service Manual (volume 2 Fire Service Operations) Petrochemical Incidents.*
Overview of tank farm

Labelling and signage

7C3.214 Storage facilities for hazardous materials will be required to apply signage to the premises in accordance with the Notification and Marking of Sites Regulations 1990 (NAMOS) (7A.19).

Pipelines

Introduction

7C3.215 Onshore and offshore pipelines are an economic way of transporting large volumes of hazardous and non-hazardous substances across, into and out of the UK. Pipelines have long been used for transporting crude oil to refineries and to shipping terminals, and petroleum and its derivatives are still the main fluids moved by pipeline. Pipelines are being increasingly used for transporting various industrial materials and products, in particular those of the chemical industry. Progress has also been made with the transportation of solid materials as slurries in water or other fluids.

7C3.216 The advantages of pipeline transport include the reduction of costs, the easing of congestion on roads, the maintenance of delivery ‘round the clock’ irrespective of season or weather conditions, the elimination of contamination during transport, the removal of dangerous fuels cargoes from the roads and the reduction of stocks being held in crowded areas. Pipelines are classified as ‘cross-country’ or ‘local’, and in law a cross-country pipeline is one whose length exceeds 16 km.
Safety considerations

7C3.217 The Gas and Pipelines Unit, part of the Health and Safety Executive, oversee the safety of pipelines. The unit is the enforcing authority for:

- upstream natural gas transmission and distribution networks
- gas storage facilities
- onshore major hazard pipelines
- offshore pipelines; and
- other associated high hazard sites.

7C3.218 The Health and Safety Executive have issued guidance on the safety of pipelines in the form of L82 A Guide to the Pipelines Regulations. These regulations cover all pipelines but in particular and of more interest to the firefighter, major accident hazard pipeline.

7C3.219 This is defined as a pipeline which conveys a dangerous fluid which has the potential to cause a major accident.

7C3.220 The regulations and guidance note give best practice advice on:

- the requirement for emergency shut-down valves
- the major accident prevention document
- arrangements for emergency plans.

7C3.221 It is advised that the fire officer contacts their local emergency planning officer for details of any emergency plan in operation within their area.

Marking of pipelines

7C3.222 Details of the types of markers used to indicate the location of pipelines can be found at:

www.linewatch.co.uk/pdf/A4_PplnMrkrs.pdf

Operational considerations for pipeline incidents

7C3.223 The Health and Safety Executive has issued a document that includes information on:

- hazards and effects of pipeline failures
- fire and explosion
- toxic effects
- blast effects and projectiles
• cryogenic effects
• asphyxiation
• noise.

7C3.224 The Incident Commander and hazardous materials adviser as a contributory part of the risk assessment process will consider all of the above.
PART C–4
UN Class 1 Explosives

General information

Introduction

7C4.1 Of all the commonly encountered hazardous materials which may be involved in fire, it is likely that explosives pose the greatest and most immediate danger to life and property.

7C4.2 The highest degree of care and precaution is exercised by those responsible for manufacturing, handling and transporting explosives and a very substantial and complex system of legal safeguards is in place to control them. For this reason, it is very rare for large fires to occur in explosives installations. It is important that Fire and Rescue Service staff seek guidance from those responsible at an explosives installation whenever they are engaged in firefighting at such premises in order to avoid being exposed to any unforeseen risk from the hazardous materials present. However, it is also essential to have a general understanding of explosives and the key operational principles for firefighting in the vicinity of explosives. This is because the ‘responsible person’ or ‘duty-holder’ may not always be available (eg transportation accidents etc) or may not share all of the safety-critical information with the Fire and Rescue Service (eg unlicensed storage site, criminal activity etc).

7C4.3 Duty-holders who are engaged in specific activities such as selling fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles, storing explosives, firework display operators and explosives manufacturers, are required to have in place robust systems to counter foreseeable eventualities in worse case scenarios.

7C4.4 It is important that ‘fireworks’ are not considered to be anything other than explosives. Important factors to be considered are the type and quantity of firework, this may not be initially determinable or known by the Fire and Rescue Service on-arrival at an emergency.
Characteristics and classification

**7C4.5** Explosives are generally divided between those which:

**Deflagrate**
A technical term describing subsonic combustion that usually propagates through thermal conductivity (hot burning material heats the next layer of cold material and ignites it).

Deflagrations are usually less destructive than detonations; however, these events still present a serious risk as they will generate an overpressure which has the potential to harm individuals.

**Detonate**
A process of supersonic reaction in which a shock wave is propagated forward due to energy release in a reaction zone behind it. In a detonation, the shock compresses the material thus increasing the temperature to the point of ignition. The ignited material reacts behind the shock and releases energy that supports the shock propagation.

Because detonations generate high pressures, they are very destructive.

**7C4.6** Explosives, irrespective of whether they deflagrate or detonate produce large quantities of hot gases and proceed without consuming oxygen from the surroundings. Ignited explosives can therefore function, for example, under water. Once initiated the application of water will not extinguish a fire involving explosives.

**7C4.7** The types of energetic stimuli that can, in principle, bring about initiations of explosives are:

- impact / friction
- fire / heat
- fragment attack / overpressure
- electrostatic discharge
- electromagnetic radiation (in the case of electro-explosive devices)
- chemical attack.

**7C4.8** The United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UNCOE) classifies dangerous goods in the form in which they are to be transported according to the hazard they present during transport, and defines explosives as follows:
Explosives substances

An explosives substance is a solid or liquid substance (or a mixture of substances) which is in itself capable by chemical reaction of producing gas at such a temperature and pressure and at such a speed as could cause damage to surroundings. Trinitrotoluene and dynamite are well-known examples of explosives substances.

Pyrotechnic substances

A pyrotechnic substance is a substance or a mixture of substances designed to produce an effect by heat, light, sound, gas or smoke or a combination of these as a result of non-detonative self-sustaining exothermic chemical reactions. Pyrotechnic substances are commonly found in fireworks.

Explosives articles

An explosives article is an article containing one or more explosive substances. Thus, for example, all items of ammunition are classified as explosive articles.

7C4.9 In accordance with the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (Orange Book) for transport purposes, explosives (in their packaging) are classified into ‘hazard divisions’ (HD).

7C4.10 Licences issued under the regulations on the manufacture and storage of explosives refers to ‘hazard type’ (HT).¹

7C4.11 With explosives that are packaged for transport, the hazard division and hazard type will be the same, however, in some cases (eg detonators) unpackaged explosives may present a higher hazard.

7C4.12 Both the UN scheme of classification and the Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regulations 2005 (MSER) recognise that many substances and articles classified as explosives do not present the same degree of hazard and subdivide them according to their potential for harm.

¹ Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regulations 2005 (MSER)
United Nations Committee of Experts on Transport of Dangerous Goods and Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regulation 2005

HD 1.1 or Hazard Type 1
Substances and articles which have a mass explosion hazard. A mass explosion hazard is an explosion which affects almost the entire load virtually instantaneously. If involved in fire, major structural damage can be expected (e.g., high explosive shells, bombs etc).

HD 1.2 or Hazard Type 2
Substances and articles which have a projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard. E.g., mortar bombs, rocket-propelled grenades etc.

HD 1.3 or Hazard Type 3
Substances and articles which have a fire hazard and blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard combustion of which gives rise to considerable radiant heat or which burn one after another, producing minor blast or projection effects or both (e.g., flares etc).

HD 1.4 or Hazard Type 4
Substances, and articles which present only a slight risk of explosion in the event of ignition, or initiation during carriage, storage or manufacture. The effects are local, largely confined to the package and no projection of fragments of appreciable size or range is to be expected. An external fire shall not cause virtually instantaneous explosion of almost the entire contents of the package (e.g., small arms ammunition etc).

HD 1.5 (HD 1.5)
Very insensitive substances that have a mass explosion hazard. This division comprises substances which have a mass explosion hazard but are so insensitive that there is very little probability of initiation or of a transition from burning to detonation under conditions of normal transport (e.g., ammonium nitrate fuel oil – a preparation for blasting).

7C4.13 The UN has defined a further division based on risk rather than hazard, Division 1.6. However, it has not been possible to find evidence of articles of HD1.6 having been imported or exported through UK ports so they are included for information only:

Division 1.6 (HD 1.6)
Extremely insensitive articles which do not have a mass explosion hazard. This division comprises articles which contain only extremely insensitive detonating substances and that demonstrate a negligible probability of accidental initiation or propagation.
7C4.14 Throughout the rest of this document the term *Hazard Division* (HD) is used, to mean all aspects of explosives, whether in manufacture, storage or transportation.

**Hazards**

**Blast exposure**

7C4.15 Multi-level injury from blast exposure, referred to as ‘blast injury’, may result in impairments to groups of body organs and systems. A phenomenon called “blast overpressure” forms from the compression of air in front of a blast wave which heats and accelerates the movement of air molecules. This overpressure phenomenon is considered to be the positive phase of the blast wave. The negative phase of the blast wave occurs later, as a result of sub-atmospheric pressure/under-pressurisation. The amount of damage from the pressure wave depends on the peak pressure, duration, medium in which the explosion occurs (open air, confined space, or water), and distance from the explosion.

7C4.16 The type of explosive will have an impact on the nature and severity of the resulting blast injury. Explosives are categorised as either “high-order” or “low-order.”

- **High-order** explosives are chemicals which have a high rate of reaction—including nitroglycerine, dynamite, C-4, and a mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil. When a high-order explosive detonates, the chemicals are converted into gas at a very high temperature and pressure. High-order explosives have the potential to generate a large volume of initial pressure, and a blast wave that may expand outwards in all directions.

- **Low-order** explosives are designed to burn and gradually release energy at a relatively slow rate. This type of explosive are referred to as ‘propellants’ because they propel an object such as a bullet through a barrel. Low-order explosives do not create the shock waves generated by high-order explosives. The ‘blast wind’ of low-order explosives is a ‘pushing’ rather than the ‘shattering’ effect found in the ‘blast wave’ of high-order explosives.

7C4.17 Effects of exposure to explosive blast – The effects of exposure to any explosive blast are broken down into three distinguishable areas, these are:

- **Primary blast injuries** – are caused by the direct action of a blast wave on the body. The two most common injuries are eardrum rupture and lung haemorrhage. Lung haemorrhage is in fact the most likely cause of death in cases where primary blast effects prove fatal.

- **Secondary blast injuries** – are defined as those, which occur as a direct consequence of blast damage to buildings and structures. These injuries include lacerations caused by flying glass, blunt trauma caused by crushing and impact of falling masonry, and suffocation caused by asphyxiating dust. Secondary blast injuries can occur at significantly greater distances from an
explosion than either primary or tertiary blast injuries, and indeed experience shows that structural collapse is the dominant mode of death and injury from explosions in built-up areas. Thus secondary blast injuries are normally related to degree of building damage.

- **Tertiary blast injuries** – are defined as those resulting from body movement induced by the blast wave. Two modes may be distinguished, injuries caused by differential displacement of internal body organs following high acceleration, and injuries caused by impact when the body is either blown over or picked up by the blast wave and thrown against an object.

7C4.18 The **constituents of explosives**, especially fireworks, varies significantly. Compounds such as metals, metal salts, chlorine donors, hydrocarbon fuels, and binders are incorporated into compositions, for colour or sound effects etc. Some of the constituents of fireworks are toxic. Unfortunately, literature relating to fireworks manufacture does not tend to cover this aspect in much detail. For example, most fireworks contain potassium perchlorate which in itself is an irritant to the mucous membrane, and can have adverse effects to blood and/or the thyroid gland.

### Fireball

7C4.19 Severe burns may result even if no explosion takes place as the ignition of some types of Hazard Division 3 and Hazard Division 4 explosives can result in a significant fireball eg the burst diameter of an aerial firework shell can be in excess of 100m.

7C4.20 Respiratory injury may result if inhalation takes place.

### Noise

7C4.21 Hearing damage, usually temporary loss or ringing in the ears.

7C4.22 Explosives generate considerable noise when they explode which can make communication difficult especially if this happens over a protracted time, for example with Hazard Division 4 fireworks.

### Structural collapse

7C4.23 Entrapment following collapse of a structure.
Usage, transportation, packaging and storage

Usage

Quarries

7C4.24  The majority of locations holding civilian blasting explosives are quarries. These are typically held in a steel store. For quarrying operations most explosives are mixed on-site from non-explosive ingredients.

COMAH sites

7C4.25  The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH) apply mainly to the chemical manufacture and storage industry, but also to other industries such as explosives where threshold quantities of dangerous substances identified in the Regulations are kept or used. These Regulations relate to the identification, prevention and mitigation of major accidents to people and the environment and are detailed in 7A.41.

Explosives manufacturing

7C4.26  There are only a few locations in the UK where the manufacturing of high explosives or munitions using high explosives, is undertaken. The principal companies are:

1.  Exchem
2.  Orica
3.  Chemring
4.  Ulster Industrial Explosives, and
5.  BAe Systems

7C4.27  Other sites and companies are engaged in manufacturing small arms ammunition, munitions, pyrotechnics, detonators, and oil well explosives, amongst others products. Explosives manufacturing of this nature is not a seasonal activity.

Retail premises

7C4.28  Shops, supermarkets etc usually only store small quantities of fireworks and then only during the peak firework season; either within the shop or in an IS0 container in the goods yard. Typically this will be up to 250 kg of Hazard Division 1.4, or smaller quantities of Hazard Division 1.3, but may be more if separation distances permit. Fire and Rescue Services should also be mindful of transient
Fire and Rescue Service Operational Guidance – Incidents involving hazardous materials

Fireworks

7C4.29 The major proportion of fireworks are sold and used during the October/November firework season. However, professional fireworks displays take place at public and private events at other times of the year and there are a limited number of retailers selling fireworks all year round. Fire and Rescue Services could therefore encounter large stocks of fireworks at any time of the year. Fireworks importation varies according to the time of the year and the special event for which they have been imported. For example, in 2006 approx 1180 containers were brought through the port of Felixstowe. Equating to 15,559 Tonnes of fireworks (gross weight). Fifty-seven per cent of these were received in August and September.

Fireworks display operators

7C4.30 Fireworks display operators are likely to be using Hazard Division 1.1 and Hazard Division 1.3 fireworks in addition to Hazard Division 1.4. The main implications from this are:

1. Hazard Division 1.1 presents a mass explosion hazard
2. When fireworks of Hazard Division 1.1 are present in a store together with Hazard Division 1.3 or Hazard Division 1.4 the whole quantity will behave as if it is Hazard Division 1.1
3. Hazard Division 1.3 articles do not present a mass explosion hazard. There is nevertheless a potential for them to explode and produce large fireballs.

NOTE: Whilst the UN Hazard Division definition states that they have no mass detonation, this is based upon a test of the articles in the open within their correct transport or stowage packaging. Evidence from the Health and Safety Laboratory demonstrates that UN Hazard Division 1.3 fireworks will mass deflagrate (almost no perceptible difference to a detonation) when confined. In addition to this, containment also presents a different reaction to that of confinement (eg ISO containers).

Improvised or home-made explosive devices

7C4.31 Since the New York terrorist attacks of 9/11 awareness of terrorist activity has been heightened throughout the western world. A concerning development is the increased manufacture and use of improvised or home-made explosives and explosive devices. These have many forms but the most common group are peroxide explosives (eg triacetone triperoxide, hexamethylene triperoxide diamine etc).
Common explosives and their uses

Nitroglycerine

7C4.32 A very powerful and extremely sensitive liquid explosive which is usually mixed with other inert materials to form propellant, dynamites and blasting gelatines. The liquid is particularly sensitive to heat, flame, shock, oxygen or ultra violet light radiation and is not transported or used in its pure form as it is too dangerous to handle. Some types of explosives containing nitroglycerine, such as dynamite, release nitroglycerine liquid when in contact with water. This can present particular dangers during firefighting or where the explosives are involved in flooding. Nitroglycerine is also transported and used either as a dilute solution in alcohol or as a mixture with a solid dilutent for pharmaceutical purposes. Nitroglycerine—both the vapour and liquid (which is readily absorbed through the skin) are highly toxic.

T.N.T. (Trinitrotoluene)

7C4.33 A comparatively insensitive explosive mostly used for military purposes. It is a stable solid substance which is generally safe to handle. Small unconfined quantities may burn quietly but larger quantities, particularly under confinement, are likely to burn to detonation. On decomposition, toxic fumes are given off. It is moderately toxic by ingestion and can be absorbed through the skin.

Nitrocellulose (guncotton, pyrocotton, nitrocotton)

7C4.34 Nitrocellulose is a white or cream coloured fibrous material produced in a range of forms. Its properties depend on the amount of nitrogen in it. Types with a nitrogen level above 12.6 per cent nitrogen are generally used in explosives manufacture. Those below that are used for other purposes. Nitrocellulose is sensitive to impact and friction and easy to ignite by flame when dry and is therefore normally transported either wetted with water or alcohol or plasticised. Explosives grade nitrocellulose can present a fire or explosion hazard depending on its level of dryness and whether it is confined. Non-explosives grade nitrocellulose will normally burn and is often classified as a Class 4.1 flammable solid. Its principal uses are as an ingredient in propellant mixtures for ammunition and rocket motors, and in nitroglycerine explosives. Non-explosive grades of cellulose nitrate are used with other substances in the manufacture of paints and lacquers. Small arms propellant powders. These materials are usually made from nitrocellulose (single base) or nitro-cellulose with nitroglycerine (double base) and are usually in the form of a free flowing granular material. For the most part they burn fiercely but many types can, under confinement, burn to detonation. As a consequence the hazard can be either a fireball or a mass explosion.
Primary explosives such as fulminates, azides, and styphnates

7C4.35 These are initiating explosives which are highly sensitive and dangerous particularly when they contain heavy metals such as lead, silver or mercury. They explode violently and are commonly used in initiators such as detonators and cap compositions. These types of explosive are infrequently transported and are only carried when wetted with water or other suitable liquid to minimise their sensitivity to impact and friction. Transport packages are carefully designed to minimise the risk of leakage of wetting agents and the consequent drying of the explosive. Some forms of these substances, such as styphnic acid or potassium azide, have low explosive properties. These substances can, however, react with other substances such as copper or lead salts to form the highly dangerous forms. This can be a serious problem where these substances have been spilled and allowed to get in contact with copper, lead or other reactive species. Because the sensitive forms tend not to dissolve in water, a hazard could rapidly develop.

Gunpowder/black powder/black blasting powder

7C4.36 These are generally made from a mixture of charcoal, sulphur and potassium nitrate and are frequently described as ‘low explosives’. They are very sensitive to ignition from sparks, heat and friction. They burn violently even when loose and uncompressed and when confined may explode. They also release volumes of smoke on burning or exploding. Black powder is used as a blasting explosive as well as an ingredient in some types of sporting cartridges, fireworks and pyrotechnics.

Oxidisers

7C4.37 These substances are not explosives in their own right but can, under certain conditions in a fire, explode. Two types commonly used in explosives are worthy of comment.

Nitrates

Nitrates are used in explosives such as gunpowder, emulsion and slurry blasting explosives and pyrotechnic substances. The most common are potassium, sodium, barium and ammonium nitrates. If mixed with a fuel these compounds can burn fiercely or explode.

Wood, if impregnated with oxidisers, can burn fiercely and this can be a potential problem on vehicles with wooden floors or in wooden storage buildings where oxidisers have been transported or stored. Care must be taken in warehouses to ensure that oxidisers are segregated from other dangerous goods.
Ammonium nitrate is used as a fertiliser and is commonly found in farming areas. It is usually supplied as a porous prill\(^2\) which can readily absorb liquids. It forms the basis of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil explosives much used by terrorist organisations.

It is possible that other fuels such as saw dust and metal powders could also form explosive mixtures with ammonium nitrate. There have been a small number of reports throughout the world of nitrates exploding without other chemicals being present when confined or subject to severe heat. In recognition of this danger, the size of stacks of ammonium nitrate in storage is normally carefully controlled.

**Chlorates**

These substances, typically in the form of potassium chlorate, are mostly used in pyrotechnic compositions. As with nitrates, chlorates can decompose violently in a fire, particularly if mixed with fuels. As a general rule, chlorates are more aggressive and less stable in a fire than nitrates.

**Emulsion and slurry explosives**

7C4.38 Emulsion and slurry explosives are relatively new types of explosives which are mixtures of nitrates and other substances often in a water-based system. They are now replacing nitroglycerine based explosives for many uses, particularly in quarrying. A small proportion of emulsion and slurry explosives are produced as pre-packed, ready to use, products. The majority of this type of explosives, however, is manufactured at the shot hole, immediately prior to use. This mixing is carried out on a specially designed mixer truck that carries the necessary ingredients for producing a fully active explosive.

**Peroxide explosives (improvised or home-made explosives)**

7C4.39 Peroxide explosives are extremely dangerous because:

- only small quantities are needed to cause serious injury or explosions
- the constituents are readily available from almost any high street
- they are easy to make, instructions for their manufacture are easily available on the internet
- the emergency services may encounter them at many routine incidents (eg domestic property fires).

7C4.40 The main constituents are:

- hydrogen peroxide (eg hair dye etc)
- acid (eg battery acid, brick cleaner, citric acid used in brewing etc)

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2 A prill is a small aggregate of a material, most often a dry sphere, formed from a melted liquid.
• acetone (eg nail varnish remover etc)
• hexamine (eg camping stove fuel tablets etc).

7C4.41 It is important for Fire and Rescue Service responders to know and remember these constituents because early recognition of the possibility that home-made explosives are present at an apparently routine incident (eg fire and explosion at a domestic property etc) can save lives.

7C4.42 Peroxide explosives can vary greatly in appearance. Pure substances form a white powder, but they may also be granular in texture like sugar, or even form a sticky ‘goo’. Due to this, responders should not rely on physical appearance alone to identify this hazardous material. It is more important to recognise the raw constituents along with other indicators such as mixing jars and containers, a fridge or freezer to keep the substance cool.

7C4.43 Common types of peroxide explosives are:

• Triacetone triperoxide
  A terrorist explosive which has appeared as a weapon in the Middle East. Triacetone triperoxide has been used by suicide bombers in Israel, and was chosen as a detonator in 2001 by the thwarted ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid. It is one of the most sensitive explosives known, being extremely sensitive to impact, temperature change and friction.

• Hexamethylene triperoxide diamine
  Another peroxide-type explosive which is less sensitive than triacetone triperoxide but still dangerous.

Transportation and packaging

7C4.44 UK regulations implement the EU directive on transportation by road (ADR), rail (RID) and in respect of training, examination for safety advisers only for inland waterways (ADN). Further guidance is contained in Section 7C-12 Transportation, packaging and storage of hazardous materials and in Part C-4.4.66 Legal framework.

7C4.45 Certain explosives have to be segregated during storage and transport for safety. To facilitate this, each explosive is assigned to one of 13 ‘compatibility groups’. Explosives can be segregated by compatibility into a group according to well established mixing rules to avoid increasing the probability or magnitude of an accidental initiation.

7C4.46 Descriptions of the explosives which make up the various compatibility groups, and their subsequent classification codes are given below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of substance or article to be classified</th>
<th>Compatibility group</th>
<th>Classification code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary explosive substance.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>1.1A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article containing a primary explosive substance and not containing two or more protective features.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>1.1B 1.2B 1.4B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propellant explosive substance or other deflagrating explosive substance or article containing such explosive substance.</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1.1C 1.2C 1.3C 1.4C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary detonating explosive substance or black powder or article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance, in each case without means of initiation and without a propelling charge, or article containing a primary explosive substance and containing two or more effective protective features.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>1.1D 1.2D 1.4D 1.5D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance without means of initiation, with propelling charge (other than one containing a flammable liquid or gel or hypergolic liquids).</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.1E 1.2E 1.4E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article containing a secondary detonating explosive substance with means of initiation, with a propelling charge (other than one containing a flammable liquid or gel or hypergolic liquids) or without a propelling charge.</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1.1F 1.2F 1.3F 1.4F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyrotechnic substance or article containing a pyrotechnic substance, or article containing both an explosive substance and an illuminating, incendiary, tear or smoke producing substance (other than a water activated article or one containing white phosphorous phosphides, a pyrophoric substance, a flammable liquid or gel, or hypergolic liquids).</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>1.1G 1.2G 1.3G 1.4G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article containing both an explosive substance and white phosphorous.</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>1.2H 1.3H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article containing both an explosive substance and a flammable liquid or gel.</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>1.1J 1.2J 1.3J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article containing both an explosive substance and a toxic chemical agent.</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>1.2K 1.3K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explosive substance or article containing an explosive substance and presenting a special risk (eg due to water activation or presence of hypergolic liquids, phosphides or a pyrophoric substance) and needing isolation of each type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L</th>
<th>1.1L</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Articles containing only extremely insensitive detonating substances.

|       | N   | 1.6N |

Substance or article so packed or designed that any hazardous effects arising from accidental functioning are confined within the package unless the package has been degraded by fire, in which case all blast or projection effects are limited to the extent that they do not significantly hinder or prohibit firefighting or other emergency response efforts in the immediate vicinity of the package.

|       | S   | 1.4S |

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**Explosive decomposition**

It is important to remember that the UN classifications are based on the behaviour of the explosive when burnt in their packaging in the open air on a fire. However, the same explosive may behave very differently when under the sort of pressure that might be encountered in International Standards Organisation (ISO) transport containers, thick walled steel stores or some process plant.

In such circumstances, the very rapid build-up of pressure can cause the explosives to react more violently than the classification would suggest and therefore present a much greater hazard.

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**7C4.47** Where explosives of different hazard divisions are stored together, they are treated as if they are all of the highest hazard division (eg 100 kg Hazard Division 1.3 and 1000 kg Hazard Division 1.4 are treated as 1,100 kg of Hazard Division 1.3). For transportation purposes the same principle applies for different Hazard Divisions carried together and the vehicle should be placarded accordingly.

**Road**

**7C4.48** ADR requires that, subject to some exceptions, vehicles carrying explosives should be marked with placards in accordance with the Regulations.
• Vehicles carrying larger quantities of fireworks and other hazards should carry the appropriate UN hazard division orange diamonds. However, Fire and Rescue Services should be aware of the possibility of smaller loads of explosives being carried in un-placarded vehicles. Potential exists for the illegal carriage of explosives. Incident Commanders should always consider the possibility of this arising, if for example the driver of the vehicle involved cannot be easily identified at the incident.

• Vehicles carrying more than 5 tonnes of Hazard Division 1.1 explosives must have a driver and attendant (less than 5 tonnes and other Hazard Divisions no attendant is required) both of who will have received specific training to the ADR standard that enables them to take measures for their own safety, that of the public and the environment. The vehicle crew should therefore always be consulted.
• If the crew are injured and unable to be consulted, instructions in writing, to a standard format and in a language that the driver understands, outlining the load and any special actions required can found, if it is safe to retrieve, in the driver’s cab.

• All packages and the vehicle must be correctly identified as per The Carriage Regulations. The package labels and vehicle placards provide safety information for those involved in transportation and the emergency services and must be displayed at all times.

• On those occasions when Her Majesty’s Forces in the interest of national security do not comply with the carriage regulations, liaison with the crew of the vehicle is paramount.

• Although small quantities of explosives may be carried in private vehicles without having to comply with The Carriage Regulations, the carrier still has a responsibility to move them safely and securely.

• Even though up to 2kg of one or more specific item may be carried on public transport, they must however remain with the person carrying them, be properly packaged and reasonable precautions taken to prevent accidents.

**Rail**

• Transport of explosives is strictly controlled under railway transport legislation.

• Explosives are clearly marked and packed in specific wagons or containers. Placards similar to those required for road transport are displayed on both sides of the wagon and on all four sides of containers.

• Information in writing is carried by the crew detailing the explosive carried and any special action required. The crew will also have received specific training similar to that of road vehicle crews but to the European Agreement on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail (RID) standard and if uninjured, crews should always be consulted.

• The incident should be managed in a similar manner to that involving road transport but modified as necessary to ensure the safety of personnel working on the rail infrastructure.

**Sea and inland waterways**

• Legislation prohibits, with certain exceptions, unless a licence has been granted:
  – explosives being brought into or handled in a harbour
  – the loading/unloading of explosives on a vessel.

When this occurs on any part of the coast or in the tidal waters or within the territorial waters of Great Britain.
• The licence specifies any conditions or restrictions, including limits on the type and quantities of explosive handled and where in the harbour area the handling may take place.

• Once the loading/unloading of a vessel or a vehicle is completed, the master of the vessel or the operator of the vehicle shall ensure that the vessel or vehicle is taken out of the harbour or harbour area as soon as is reasonably practicable unless the harbour master and if berthed, the berth operator agree.

• Vessels carrying dangerous goods will, between sunrise and sunset, display a red warning flag and when moored or anchored between sunset and sunrise and during the day in restricted visibility, display an all-round, uniform and unbroken red light visible in good night time conditions for at least 2 nautical miles.

• The operator of any berth where explosives are being loaded/unloaded or stored before being loaded/unloaded, shall ensure that their emergency plan is made available to the Fire and Rescue Service.

• ROYAL NAVY VESSELS
  All Royal Navy vessels have a liaison officer who will inform the Fire and Rescue Service whenever the vessel is in port. Courtesy visits should be arranged on a regular basis especially if different types of vessels visit. If a vessel is in port for any length of time consideration should be given to holding a firefighting or rescue exercise. In the event of a fire onboard a navy vessel the Incident Commander must ensure that they clearly establish and understand the Royal Navy’s priorities. On a warship, protection of the ship’s magazine will often be the top priority and the action taken to achieve this may appear to be contrary to the priorities that are the norm to Fire and Rescue Services.

• INLAND WATERWAYS
  Fire and Rescue Services should contact the appropriate controlling authority for their area, which is usually but not always, the British Waterways Board for information in respect of:
  – types of vessel eg barges, small craft
  – mooring
  – storage areas
  – emergency access points to canals and rivers.

**Visits should be made to the wharves and vessels to liaise with the owners, masters, wharfing and berthing agents etc. and a response plan drawn up. Although the UK has only adopted part of and, craft on inland waterways may well display warning signs in line with British Waterways Board guidance and these will be similar to those for road and rail. In addition, packages, unless carried for their entire journey on inland waterways must comply with the carriage regulations for that part of their journey by road or rail.**
many rivers it will often be possible to deal with the incident from on land and similar methods as those for dealing with road and rail transport can often be used.

**Air**

- **CIVIL AVIATION**
  
  *International Air Transport Association Dangerous Goods Regulations and International Civil Aviation Organisation Technical Instructions* detail classifications which follow the UN system. Hazard Division 1.1, Hazard Division 1.2, Hazard Division 1.3 and Hazard Division 1.5 are normally forbidden.

  In the event of an incident occurring, e.g., aircraft overshooting the runway, the operator must inform the emergency services of any dangerous goods being carried. The airport fire service will usually be the first to be informed. In addition, the aircraft operator is required to ensure that a copy of the dangerous goods documentation, or the information contained in it that had been provided to the aircraft captain is readily available at the points of departure and intended arrival.

- **MILITARY**
  
  If military aircraft are involved in any incident guidance should always be sought from the Ministry of Defence or armed services personnel as the munitions carried will present a wide variety of hazards, e.g., high explosives, sub-munitions that arm on ejection, incendiaries and possible radiation hazards from depleted uranium ammunition.

**International Standards Organisation Transport Containers (ISO)**

- International Standards Organisation (ISO) containers are used for the transportation of fireworks from the port of origin to the port of disembarkation; they are also used for storage of fireworks. They can be found in a number of locations, varying from designated container yards, private properties to derelict sites. A fire involving, or in near proximity to an ISO container should be treated with extreme caution if information about its contents cannot be determined.

- In certain conditions selected fireworks stored in ISO containers may be liable to simultaneous detonation. This could result in the fragmentation of the container. Therefore, if there is a window of opportunity to prevent direct burning or thermal radiation affecting the container, then every effort should be made to provide complete cooling to the container, if the container is at any risk of heating then firefighting actions should not be undertaken.

- If this is not possible a 600m minimum hazard zone should be put in place. *(NOTE: This distance should be extended depending on the quantity of storage on-site.) This situation may arise when fireworks that contain flash powder are stored. If only one of the large fireworks detonates, due to*
localised heating through the container, a shock wave could be produced that provides sufficient energy to detonate all/the majority of this grade of firework at the same time. This will generate high pressure that will likely destroy the container.

- Where only Hazard Division 1.4 fireworks are stored, the containers should be suitably marked, but only when the container is in use. An example of such storage arrangements would be a supermarket prior to bonfire night.

- Any fire involving an ISO container at any location, not just explosives sites, should be treated with caution until information on its contents is known.

- At manufacturing and storage sites a large number of ISO containers may be found in close proximity (within 1m) of each other. In these circumstances it is possible for a fire involving one container to affect another.

- Under no circumstances should the doors of an ISO container doors be opened, even if the fire appears to be out. The doors should not be opened for at least 24 hours and the container treated as a potential source of explosion until that time.

Unsafe explosives

7C4.50 The following list has been compiled from available accident records and safety reports. It is not necessarily exhaustive. Safety flaws in the design, manufacture, processing, keeping, packaging and conveyance of explosives sometimes only come to light after accidents have occurred.

UNSAFE PACKAGING OF IMPACT-SENSITIVE ITEMS
Badly packaged impact-sensitive explosives items could be initiated by the knocks and jolts cargoes typically receive in transit. Such an accident occurred on a road vehicle in the UK as recently as 1989. The explosion caused one fatality and widespread damage.

EXUDATION OF EXPLOSIVES MATERIAL
This is a problem mainly associated with nitroglycerine-based blasting explosives, which may, under certain conditions, exude free nitroglycerine, a substance sensitive to impact and friction. Possible causes of exudation include poor quality control during manufacture, exposure to water, prolonged storage, storage at incorrect temperature and pressure on explosives cartridges. Nitroglycerine-stained packages have been found on a number of occasions within magazines in the UK, and there has been one incident in the last 25 years in which exuding explosives were found on board a ship – the ship was scuttled to avoid the risk of unloading the material. Nitroglycerine-based blasting explosives are currently being phased out and replaced with inherently safer types of explosives.
POOR INTEGRITY OF PACKAGING
Poor integrity of packaging may result in spillage of explosives substances. This in turn may result in the ignition of fire in the event that the spillage is subjected to impact or friction, or the spillage falls through cracks in the floorboards of a vehicle and lands on a hot surface, such as an exhaust manifold. One or two minor explosives events have occurred within UK manufacturing sites in recent times, caused by vehicles running over split explosives material, but no such events have occurred during transport of packaged explosives goods.

PROPELLANT WITH DEPLETED STABILISER CONTENT
Nitrate-ester based propellants with depleted stabiliser content may ignite spontaneously through the process of autocatalytic decomposition. Within the last 25 years there have been several fires in UK storehouses caused by this process. Within the last 10 years there has been one incident of fire on a rail wagon caused by spontaneous ignition of nitrocellulose, a raw material used in the manufacture of propellants.

LEAKS FROM MUNITIONS CONTAINING WHITE PHOSPHORUS
Certain types of munitions contain white phosphorus, a substance that can spontaneously ignite on exposure to air. There have been at least two instances in the UK during the last 45 years when leaks from these munitions have resulted in ignition of fire during rail transport.

MUNITIONS WITH CONTAMINATED COMPONENTS
Physical or chemical reactions between contaminants and explosive fillings may lead to the formation of heat-and impact-sensitive explosives crystals or compounds within munitions. These munitions may then become more susceptible to accidental initiation. Migration of sensitive compounds into screw threads and non-continuous welds may further increase the susceptibility of the munitions to accidental initiation by impact. There was a major explosion in a UK military port in 1950 caused by impact-induced ignition of a depth charge that had been sensitised by the presence of impurities in the main explosives filling. A similar accident occurred in Gibraltar a year later.

MUNITIONS WITH CRACKED WARHEADS
The explosives fillings of certain types of munitions are prone to cracking. Cracking may result in migration of explosives dust into screw threads and non-continuous welds within munitions, and this may increase the susceptibility of the munitions to accidental initiation in two ways:

- impact accidents may result in nipping of dust between metal surfaces and the presence of bare explosives crystals in the cracked surface may increase the chance of an initiation proceeding to full detonation
- the dangers posed by munitions with cracked warhead fillings are well recognised; such munitions are normally subject to Ordnance Board constraints, which would include restrictions on the height to which such munitions can be lifted.
MUNITIONS WITH DEFECTIVE ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
Certain types of munitions, such as torpedoes, are equipped with power supplies. There is a possibility that electrical short circuits within these types of munitions may ignite fires which may in turn initiate explosives material. So far as is known, no such accidents have occurred in the UK in post-war times.

SPONTANEOUS MOVEMENT OF SENSITIVE ITEMS WITHIN MUNITIONS
Stresses are created when components are installed into certain types of munitions. An explosives event may occur if these stresses relieve spontaneously on some subsequent occasion. There have been a number of such accidents within UK storehouses, though, so far as is known, no such accidents have occurred in ports or during transport.

DEFECTIVE ELECTRO EXPLOSIVES DEVICES
Electro explosives devices that have been badly designed, manufactured or packaged, may be susceptible to initiation by radio frequency radiation. There have been a number of such accidents involving unpackaged items on firing ranges, though so far as is known, no such accidents have occurred in ports or during transport.

FUSE DEFECTS
Munitions fitted with defective fuses may be vulnerable to the sorts of knocks and jolts that cargoes typically receive while in transit. There are three ways in which the safety of a fuse may be compromised:

- mis-assembly in which the fuse is assembled in a manner which “short circuits” the intended safety features
- severe metal corrosion affecting components such as springs, shutters etc, making inoperative the safety features that rely on the correct functioning of these components
- chemical reaction in which the chemical composition of some of the explosives compounds are changed, making them more sensitive to external stimuli.

ENERGETIC ACCIDENTS
Explosives cargoes, which contain unsafe items, may initiate spontaneously, ie without involvement of the cargoes in external accidents, such as lorry crashes and falls of loads from cranes. Explosives cargoes that do not contain unsafe items may initiate in the event that they become involved in accidents, such that sufficient energy is imparted to explosives material in the cargo to bring about an explosion or fire.
Storage

General storage

7C4.51 Where explosives are stored, it is the ‘net explosive content’ or ‘net explosive quantity’ that is the licensable amount. The net explosive content is the amount of explosive in the article, not including the packaging. In the case of fireworks the net explosive content is assumed to be 25 per cent of the weight of the firework but can be as high as 70 per cent, so a store licensed for 2 tonnes net explosive content, may actually contain 8 tonnes gross weight including packaging. Licences for storage of less than 2 tonnes net explosive content are issued by the appropriate licensing authority that, depending on the quantity stored and the location in the UK can be the police, the Metropolitan Fire and Rescue Authority, local authority or, in harbour areas and mines, the Health and Safety Executive. Where lower quantities are stored then the appropriate licensing authority may issue a registration rather than a licence. For stores involving more than 2 tonnes the Health and Safety Executive will issue a licence.

Licensing and registration

7C4.52 A licence is required for most manufacturing or storage activities. ‘Manufacturing’ includes processes where explosive articles or substances are made or assembled/disassembled, repaired or modified. The Health and Safety Executive is the licensing authority for all manufacturing. Depending on the quantity and type of explosives, the licensing authority for storage could be the local authority, Metropolitan Fire and Rescue Service, police or the Health and Safety Executive. There are a number of licensing exemptions for the storage of small quantities and for temporary storage. For example there are allowances for storing limited quantities of shooters’ powders, certain lower-risk pyrotechnics and articles such as flares, fog signals, car airbags and seatbelt pre-tensioners.

Unlicensed storage

7C4.53 During the fireworks season Fire and Rescue Services should be aware of the possibility that they may encounter illegally-stored fireworks. Situations where this might occur would include:

- transport haulier’s depots
- shops on short lets
- warehouse or lockup storage.
Operational considerations

Pre-planning

7C4.54 It is estimated that there are between 20 and 30 thousand premises licensed or registered to store explosives. The vast majority of these are shops and supermarkets registered for storing fireworks during the firework season. These premises are licensed or registered either by the Fire and Rescue Service (in the metropolitan counties) or by the local authority trading standards department.

7C4.55 The sites storing the largest quantities of explosives are licensed by the Health and Safety Executive, who licence about 230 sites in the UK. These sites range from manufacturers of blasting explosives and munitions, through to firework importers and firework display operators.

7C4.56 Sites holding smaller quantities of high explosives are licensed by the police. These sites are mainly at quarries. The police also grant explosives certificates to private individuals holding black powder (‘gunpowder’). This can be up to 5kg of black powder.

7C4.57 Fire and Rescue Services should contact the Health and Safety Executive and other licensing authorities with a view to identifying the Health and Safety Executive – licensed sites in their areas, so that they can undertake 7(2)(d) information-gathering visits. This will give them the information on the most hazardous sites in their area. A close and effective working relationship with the police, Health and Safety Executive, Customs and Excise, the Local Authority Planning and Trading Standards should be adopted to ensure that information about the movement, storage and use of explosives is made available to all partner organisations.

7C4.58 Sites owned and/or used by firework display operators should be treated as falling into the priority group for Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 section 7(2)(d) inspections. Fire and Rescue Services should also ensure that operational crews are reminded that explosives will be encountered at domestic homes and many retail businesses (eg flares stored at retail chandlers or Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLJ) property; shot gun cartridges in homes etc.).

7C4.59 Effective formalised systems for liaison must be in place to identify what information Fire and Rescue Services require and arrangements for updating that information at regular intervals.

7C4.60 Information which should be gathered would include:

Manufacturers and storage

- location of the explosives
- explosives hazard divisions that may be present
• maximum quantities of each held on site and in each location. This information is readily available from the site licence

• construction type of manufacturing and storage buildings; features or structural hazards which may have a profound effect on fire fighting or rescue operations, including:
  – potential for rapid fire spread or production of large columns of smoke and toxic products
  – lack of compartmentation
  – unprotected shafts or openings
  – substantial basement areas; and
  – high potential for structural collapse.

**Fire fighting/search and rescue**

• Access/egress safe routes within the establishment and boundary, in particular for aerial appliances and other specialised vehicles, giving consideration to available headroom, width, ground clearance, hard standing turning circles and load restrictions

• Travel distances from access points to various points in the building or around the grounds

• Details of fixed fire protection installations eg ventilators, sprinklers, drenchers, fire shutters, any back-up installations etc

• Safe areas where firefighting operations can be undertaken

• Identify the best locations in which to site command and control units, Breathing Apparatus control and special appliances, in order to maximise the overall control of the incident

• Communication dead spots

• Water supplies, hydrants, open and tanked

• Distances from water source and pressure calculations

• Establish designated rendezvous points for initial attendance; are these for emergency services as a whole or for Fire and Rescue Service use only? Consideration should be given to dependency on wind speed and direction, and giving alternatives.

**Hazard zones and evacuation distances**

• identify safe distances to establish notional hazard zones associated with the permitted quantity, hazard division etc

• anything that has projectile hazard in the event of an explosion eg walls

• evacuation distances for when explosives are involved in fire.
Other hazards

- large above or below ground oil or gas pipelines serving the establishment, or supplying products for storage or process
- compressed gases
- electrical transformers, sub-stations etc
- environmental consequences – identify watercourses, interceptors and plant drainage systems etc
- equipment required to mitigate environmental impact.

Duty holder information

- Who is the responsible person for the site and contact details for normal and out of hours?
- Access to a current copy of the ‘on site plan’
- Are explosives transported around the site and if so, how is this achieved?
- Security regimes employed by duty holder eg electrified fences, guard dogs etc which might impact upon operational tactics
- Would the use of mobile communication equipment create a hazard?
- Gather any technical data that gives general information on the properties and physical nature of substances.

7C4.61 Pre-planning arrangements should also include the development of contingency plans for a range of reasonably foreseeable events. The plans should also make provision for a pre-determined attendance that reflects the access and facilities provided for the Fire and Rescue Service and the type of incident likely to be encountered. Taking into account the size of the building, the time required to gain access, should this be necessary, to assemble sufficient resources to undertake firefighting and search and rescue operations from the pre-determined attendance and the effect that this will have on the anticipated mode of operations. The pre-determined attendance should ensure that adequate resources of staff and equipment are provided to undertake initial assessment and effect an early response to the incident safely.

FIRE SAFETY INSPECTIONS

7C4.62 The Fire and Rescue Service is responsible for the general fire precautions on all (except military) sites. Process fire safety is the responsibility of the licensing authority. Therefore, due to this dual enforcement position fire safety inspections should wherever possible be joint inspections (ie Fire and Rescue Service and the licensing authority). Under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order, before a licence can be granted, the licensing authority have a duty to consult with the Fire and Rescue Service.
7C4.63 Information contained in the Fire and Rescue Service’s fire safety file should therefore also be considered when producing operational site specific plans. If as a result of any 7(2)(d) visit it is identified that a premises does not have a fire safety file, then the Fire and Rescue Service’s normal process for information exchange should be followed.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (MOD) ESTABLISHMENTS

7C4.64 The safety of explosives at any Ministry of Defence site or whilst being transported, together with fire fighting recommendations is determined by the Explosives, Storage and Transport Committee of the Ministry. Fire and Rescue Services should ensure that:

- effective and regular liaison is maintained with Ministry of Defence establishments
- they are fully aware of the emergency procedures for the establishment
- they make themselves aware of these procedures via good liaison with the sites to ensure that co-ordination with Ministry of Defence personnel is arranged during pre-planning and before firefighting.

Familiarisation and exercising

7C4.65 It is imperative that personnel required to attend specific explosives manufacturing and/or storage location’s, are fully conversant with the layout of the site and all facets of fire prevention contained therein. Moreover, personnel should, on a regular basis, undertake exercises with other emergency services responders and site personnel to ensure that ‘response plans’ are fully understood. Training and exercising should not be constrained by time; the safe and effective outcomes are the crucial factors. To that end, training and exercising should be as realistic as possible, giving due cognisance to the tasks to be undertaken and the levels of command that may be implemented. Consideration should be given to the requirements of specialised equipment that may assist in an incident eg high volume pumps could prove to be a valuable asset in the drawing and delivery of large quantities of open water.

7C4.66 The above principles would apply to sites that have been identified as being of high risk, but the level of detail needed will depend on the complexity of each site. Where a Fire and Rescue Service has a Fire and Rescue Service’s Act Section 13 arrangement in place with a neighbouring Fire and Rescue Service, it is essential that that Fire and Rescue Service is also involved in any training and exercises that may arise and pertinent to the overall planning and response.

7C4.67 All personnel who may be expected to attend incidents at identified risk sites should also undertake technical training. This is particularly important for any operational/tactical managers who may have to take command at an incident. This should include an understanding of the hazards and risks associated with explosives and operational procedures.
Generic standard operating procedure

Phase 1: Mobilising and en-route

Considerations:

- Pre-planning information should be readily available en-route in an easy to read and understandable format (eg explosives key actions aide memoir, contingency plans, response plans, risk cards, site specific risk plans etc)
- Collate information available from the Fire and Rescue Service Control
- Consider on-arrival and approach tactics (eg slow approach, look for visual/audible incident indicators etc)
- Identify type and quantity of explosives
- Consider if fire fighting media may have adverse reaction
- Assess proximity to neighbouring habitable properties
- Assess if there is likely to be an immediate life risk
- Identify water supplies (open and hydrants)
- Identify boundary protection
- Take account of any local features that could exacerbate the incident (eg industrial premises or an increase in the number of persons that could be affected ie time of day, public attractions etc)
- Obtain contact details of competent person for the site
- Assess if resources are sufficient or if there is a need for more
- Commence risk assessment on information available (eg caller information, visual/audible indicators etc).

Phase 2: Arriving and gathering information

Considerations:

- Assess any immediate crew and public life risks from a safe location
- Consult with the on-site competent/responsible person and other responders to ascertain:
  - actual type/class and quantity of explosives involved
  - location of explosives
  - life risk
  - other hazards.
- Consider whether action already taken is adequate/appropriate
• **SHIPPING CONTAINERS**

As a general rule, shipping containers should be treated with suspicion as they have become a convenient storage facility for all kinds of materials and are often unmarked. Incident Commanders must be cognisant that the external heating of a container could have adverse effects on the contents. **Under no circumstances should the container doors be opened during firefighting, even if the fire appears to be out.** The container doors should not be opened for at least 24 hours and the container treated as a potential source of explosion until that time. When dealing with an incident at a firework display operator’s site all structures, including ISO containers, should be treated as if they contain Hazard Division 1.1 explosives, unless there is reliable confirmation that they contain no explosives.

• Notify mobilising control of the best approach route for other responding vehicles to follow to the marshalling area. Any designated rendezvous point should be a safe distance from the incident.

• Implement an initial cordon around the suspected hazard zone and strictly control access into it. The table below gives recommended initial cordon distances for explosives related incidents based on the quantities of explosives that might be stored within certain premises.

• As it may not always be possible to determine quantity at the early stage of the incident, decision-making should always default to these distances. As with any hazard zone, it can be increased or decreased once information has been gathered and a risk assessment carried out. All non-essential staff should be excluded from the hazard zone.

• **NOTE:** If it is confirmed that explosives are involved in fire then a risk assessed exclusion zone must be set-up and everyone, including Fire and Rescue Service, staff must withdraw from it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended minimum hazard zones for explosive related incidents</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Premises</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered for retail fireworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other registered premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensed storage of fireworks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Licensed for storage by the police</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Licensed site by the Health and Safety Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation incident</td>
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<td>Transportation incident</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN(E)*</td>
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<td>CBRN(E)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN(E)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* To be used in the absence of any reliable information/intelligence regarding the nature of the substance involved. Consideration should always be given to being out of line of sight of the device and behind substantial cover, if available.

- Estimate and request any additional resources
- Determine operational mode and ensure all staff are aware of it
- Implement any immediate life-saving rescues required following a risk assessment
- Consider evacuation at any early stage (this may be time consuming)
- Ensure robust incident command procedures are implemented in accordance with the incident command system
- Request police for cordon control
- Implement or initiate contingency plans (eg major incident plan etc) as appropriate
- Consider if there are other significant hazards present (eg pressurized gases, electrical sub-stations etc)
- Decide whether there is a risk of several simultaneous incidents
• Be aware that an unpredictable, dynamic sequence of damage can be expected.

**NOTE:** Improvised or home-made peroxide explosives can be encountered at the most routine incidents (eg house fires, car fires etc). They are detonated easily by shock, impact, flame impingement, sparks and even static electricity. As soon as responders believe that home-made explosives may be involved they should consider the following:

- Don’t touch anything suspicious especially white powders in unmarked jars
- Don’t tread on anything, peroxide explosives can explode when stepped on especially granulated forms
- Consider defensive tactics if no life is at risk
- Carefully retrace your route away from the scene
- Preserve the scene and any potential evidence
- Establish cordons and secure the site
- Inform the police and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service.

**Phase 3: Planning the response**

**Considerations:**

• The Incident Commander must ensure that a risk assessment is carried out in order to develop the response plan including appropriate and relevant control measures

• Identify the objectives - the prime objectives when dealing with any incident that could result in the involvement of explosives are to:
  - save life; and
  - prevent the fire spreading to the explosives.

• The Incident Commander’s priority must be the evacuation of everybody in the hazard zone at which point all emergency service personnel can withdraw

• Once explosives are involved in the fire, the application of water will not extinguish them

• If explosives are involved in fire then a risk assessed exclusion zone must be set-up and everyone, including Fire and Rescue Service, staff must withdraw from it

• If explosives are not involved in fire, firefighting should be limited to preventing the fire spreading to structures or other areas containing explosives

• Ensure adequate protection is available, from which to undertake firefighting operations

• Identify exposure hazards and provide protective spray
• Consider environmental impacts as smoke plumes and water run off may contain high concentrations of chemicals
• Develop the response plan with the site operators, other emergency services and hazardous materials advisers
• Consider whether action already taken is adequate / appropriate.

**Phase 4: Implementing the response**

Considerations as the incident develops and the response plan is implemented:

• Ensure all personnel including other emergency services are aware of and understand the evacuation signal
• Be aware of any vehicles in the area of Fire and Rescue Service operations and determine contents if safe to do so
• If an explosion has occurred, secondary explosions can take place for some considerable time afterwards
• Fighting of secondary fires after an initial explosion should not take place until there is confirmation that no more explosives remain on site
• Where it is considered safe to do so, firefighting jets should be positioned to prevent fire spread utilising branch holders and ground monitors
• Use appropriate number of personnel, in proportion to the tasks to be undertaken
• Liaise with site management or competent person
• Small buildings or vehicles offer little protection and sheltering behind walls can be dangerous because they will only stop small projectiles and any blast wave may overturn vehicles, demolish walls and in doing so create more projectiles
• **NOTE:** Fireworks are routinely stored in ISO containers (See Phase 2 guidance above for shipping containers)
• Be aware of any explosives that may have been subjected to the blast wave but have remained intact
• If dealing with an incident at a firework display operator’s site all buildings should be treated as if they potentially contain Hazard Division 1.1 explosives unless there is reliable confirmation that they either contain no explosives or they only contain Hazard Division 1.4 explosives.
• Fires that have spread to buildings or areas holding Hazard Division 1, 2 or 3 explosives must not be fought:
  − Hazard Division 1.1 explosives stored or transported in ISO containers may mass explode if the container is heated or involved in a fire
– Hazard Division 1.2 fragments are mainly munitions. If a container of Hazard Division 1.2 explosives were involved in a fire they would be likely to produce potentially lethal flying fragments (either from the munitions themselves or from the container).

– Hazard Division 1.3 explosives may produce a significant explosion, or the doors may burst open under pressure from the build-up of gases and a large fireball produced. It is possible that in extreme circumstances the container may mass explode.

– Hazard Division 1.4 – The effects of a fire involving Hazard Division 1.4 explosives should normally be contained within the container. However, it may not always be possible to determine type and quantity; therefore, it would be prudent to treat the load as a higher class of explosives ie Hazard Division 1.3.

• If there is any doubt whatsoever about the nature or location of the explosives involved, the fire should not be fought and personnel should withdraw to a safe distance.

• As stated above, the priority is to save life. This is best achieved by evacuating all those in the immediate vicinity. In exceptional circumstances, this could involve placing firefighters at a higher risk than would normally be considered acceptable.

• Incident ground communications – No radio frequency transmission is to be allowed within a radius of 10 metres from the electro explosive device. Emergency services using vehicle borne sets with an effective radiated power greater than 5 watts should not transmit within 50 metres of the damaged equipment. All non-essential transmitters should be either switched off or removed to a distance greater than 50 metres.

• Consider the impact of noise on any evacuation signal.

• Key considerations for all Fire and Rescue Service staff:
  – ensure effective communications are established and maintained throughout the incident
  – ensure that crews operate at a minimum of two persons in the hazard zone
  – do not enter the hazard zone unless instructed to undertake operational tasks
  – remember that vehicles, brick or block structures may afford little protection; use earth embankments or similar substantial cover for protection
  – be aware of smoke plumes and avoid where possible.

• Hazardous materials advisers, after liaison with the Incident Commander and site specialist, should, in line with the generic standard operating procedure, complete a hazardous materials risk assessment including the:
Technical considerations

- explosive type and quantity
- life safety
- provisions for cover or protection
- business continuity for the wider community.

This approach should be used to establish suitable and sufficient hazard zones. This will enable hazardous materials advisers to advise Incident Commanders that cordon can be downsized. For example, fire in a town centre shop registered to store 250kg of Hazard Division 1.4, the initial cordon table says 100m cordon. The hazardous materials adviser may advise a reduction of the hazard zone to 15 metres and out of direct line of sight. This would enable perimeter cooling until such time that the explosives have all detonated or remote monitors have controlled the fire.

Phase 5: Evaluating the response

Incident Commanders should constantly evaluate the risk posed by explosives at the incident and the effectiveness of specific operational procedures and advice. Evaluation is not a one-off process but should be continual throughout the incident as circumstances change or new information is gathered. After evaluation, if necessary, the Incident Commander should adjust the response plan, amend/implement control measures and communicate the changes to all staff.

Phase 6: Closing the incident

At the end of any incident involving explosives, further control measures should include:

- **RESIDUAL HAZARDS**
  It is possible for explosives to remain live after the fire has been extinguished when buried under ash, even if they have been involved in a very intense fire. Unexploded parts may also have been projected some considerable distance. Simply stepping on these explosives, particularly detonators, can generate sufficient friction to set them off potentially causing severe injury. **Entry into an explosives storage structure should not be undertaken until it can be confirmed by the duty holder that sufficient steps have been taken to identify and remove any live explosives.**

- **LIAISON BETWEEN THE INCIDENT COMMANDER AND THE FIRE INVESTIGATION OFFICER**
  The Fire Investigation Officer must be briefed regarding the location, condition, type and actual involvement of any explosives at the incident. Any fire investigation may be subject to the higher requirements of the Health and Safety Executive, police, coroner’s or public enquiry investigations. In such circumstances the Fire and Rescue Service’s strategic management should be consulted for further guidance.
• **HAND-OVER OF THE INCIDENT TO THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY**
  This will be the duty holder, owner or occupier in most instances. The outcomes of the analytical risk assessment should form part of the incident hand-over.

• **HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE**
  The Health and Safety Executive should be informed whenever explosives are involved fire.
Technical considerations

PART C–5
UN Class 2 Gases (including acetylene)

General information

Introduction

7C5.1 This section offers Fire and Rescue Service staff technical operational guidance to assist them in carrying out operational risk assessments to safely resolve emergency incidents involving gases. It does not cover the basic scientific principles applicable to gases, such as the gas laws, as these are contained in Fire Service Manual (volume 1 Fire Service Technology, Equipment and Media) Physics and Chemistry for Firefighters.

Characteristics and classification

What are gases?

7C5.2 Gas is one of three states of matter. Dependant on pressure, most substances can be cooled to form a solid. As heat is added to the solid it turns into a liquid at its melting point, and then changes into a gas at its boiling point.

7C5.3 A pure gas may be made up of individual atoms (eg a noble gas or atomic gas like neon), elemental molecules made from one type of atom (eg oxygen), or compound molecules made from a variety of atoms (eg carbon dioxide). A gas mixture would contain a variety of pure gases much like air.

7C5.4 Vapour refers to a gas phase at a temperature where the same substance can also exist in the liquid or solid state, below the critical temperature of the substance.

7C5.5 Gases and vapours have no size or volume; they expand to fill their container or in the open spread out until they are equally distributed throughout the space available to them. The physical behaviour of gases is described by the gas laws. Properties, notable for those who have to manage incidents, include:

- gases and vapours exert an increasing pressure on their containers as they are heated
- when a gas or vapour expands, perhaps as it escapes its container, its temperature falls.
UN Class 2 – classification

7C5.6 Gases are recognised by their containers, warning symbols and their behaviour.

7C5.7 In the system of hazard classification devised by the United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (UNSCETDG) the following classes are directly associated with gases:

- Class 2.1 – Flammable gases
- Class 2.2 – Non-flammable, non-toxic gases
- Class 2.3 – Toxic gases
- Class 4.3 – Substances which in contact with water emit flammable gases
With regard to compressed gases, primary identification is by means of the shoulder label with the name and chemical formula, an example of which is shown below.
Secondary identification is by cylinder shoulder colour. Unless otherwise specified, gas and gas mixtures can be identified by a colour classification indicating gas properties in accordance with the risk diamond on the cylinder label, for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gas Type</th>
<th>New Colours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inert</td>
<td>Bright Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxidising</td>
<td>Light Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flammable</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxic and/or corrosive</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of the most common gases have been assigned a specific colour. The specific colours assigned to the common gases are shown below. The full scheme is contained in BS EN 1089-3: 1997, which although not mandatory by law is being adopted by British Compressed Gas Association member companies. Fire and Rescue Service responders should be aware that body colours below the shoulder of a cylinder are not specified and may vary according to the gas company. The adoption of BS EN 1089-3: 1997 has been agreed by the British Compressed Gas Association and the Health and Safety Executive and is expected to be adopted in 2015.
Cylinder identification marks

7C5.11 There are stamp markings on the cylinder shoulder, which may also help to identify the contents of a cylinder and the owner. Typical markings on cylinder necks are shown below. The name of the industrial gas company will be stamped on the cylinder. This will allow identification of the cylinder owner is. For acetylene cylinders, the word acetylene is stamped onto the neck.
Hazards

Compressed gases

7C5.12 Compressed gases pose different hazards to chemical liquids or solids and can often be more dangerous due to the following hazards:

- potential source of high energy, particularly in high pressure cylinders
- cylinders containing compressed gases may fail if over-pressurised or weakened by the application of heat
- low boiling point of some liquid contents resulting in the potential for ‘vapour flashing’
- ease of diffusion of escaping gas
- leakage of flammable and/or toxic gases can cause dangerous conditions especially if they are confined
- low flashpoint of some highly flammable liquids
- absence of visual and/or odour detection of some leaking materials
- heavy and bulky containers, unless cylinders are secured they may topple over, cause injuries, become damaged themselves and cause contents to leak
- if the regulator and valve assembly shears off, the cylinder may ‘rocket’, like a projectile or ‘torpedo’, dangerously around the workplace
- liquefied gases (eg butane, propane etc) respond more rapidly to heat than the permanent gases such as nitrogen or oxygen
- low boiling point materials can cause frostbite on contact with human tissue
- some cylinders are protected by pressure relief valves, fusible plugs or bursting discs, however, these may not work correctly in a fire situation, or if damaged
- other physical hazards stem from the high pressure of a cylinder’s contents (eg accidental application of a compressed gas or jet into eyes or onto an open wound, whereby the gas can enter the tissue or bloodstream, is particularly dangerous).

7C5.13 To prevent the interchange of fittings between gases, cylinder valve outlets are left hand threaded on flammable gas cylinders and right hand on other gases.

Cylinders in fires

7C5.14 All cylinders represent a potential hazard if directly involved in a fire. Cylinders are pressure vessels, designed to withstand high internal pressure but if that pressure increases with heat they may fail. This is particularly important if
cylinders are directly impinged with flame as, in addition to the increase in internal pressure, the cylinder shell itself starts to lose its strength as a result of excessive heat.

7C5.15 The nature of the failure and its consequences depends on the combination of cylinder design and gas type. Flammable gases clearly represent a greater risk but all failures will have significant consequences.

**Flammable gases**

7C5.16 Failure of flammable gas cylinders result in the release of combustion energy if they burst in a fire. Hazards from this include:

- a blast pressure wave
- fireball
- cylinder fragments may be thrown considerable distances
- flying fragments may travel up to 200 metres and have high looping trajectories
- flying glass and other structural material
- structural damage to buildings in the vicinity.

7C5.17 Flammable gases ignite or burn producing heat and light, and in certain conditions explosions. The following terms should be understood in order to assess the risk posed by this hazard:

- **Lower explosive, or flammable, limit** – lowest concentration of vapour/gas in air at a given pressure and temperature that will propagate a flame when exposed to an ignition source
- **Upper explosive, or flammable, limit** – maximum concentration of vapour/gas in air at a given pressure and temperature in which a flame can be propagated
- **Flammable range** – concentrations of flammable gas/vapour between the lower and upper explosive, or flammable, limit at a given temperature
- **Flash point** – lowest temperature required to raise the vapour pressure of a liquid such that vapour concentration in air near the surface of the liquid is within the flammable range, and as such the air/vapour mixture will ignite in the presence of a suitable ignition source, usually a flame
- **Fire point** – minimum temperature at which a mixture of gas/vapour and air continues to burn in an open container when ignited
- **Auto-Ignition temperature** – minimum temperature required to initiate or cause self-sustained combustion of material in the absence of any external source of ignition
• **Critical temperature** – that temperature above which no amount of pressure can liquefy a gas. It does not relate to flammability or likelihood of explosion.

7C5.18 Most gases are denser than air, although common exceptions include acetylene, ammonia, helium, hydrogen and methane. Even these may, on escape, be cooler than ambient air and therefore slump initially, but eventually the gas will rise. Gases that are lighter than air may accumulate under structures at high levels unless ventilated. Hydrogen and acetylene, which have very wide flammable limits, can form explosive atmospheres in this way. More dense gases will on discharge accumulate at low levels and may, if flammable, travel a considerable distance to a remote ignition source.

**Toxic gases**

7C5.19 Toxic or poisonous gases cause harm when we are exposed to them. Generally exposure occurs through inhalation but gases may also be absorbed through the skin. Further information on toxicity is contained in Section 7 Part C-9 – Toxic and infectious substances.

**Cryogenics (extreme cold)**

7C5.20 Cryogenic liquids present a cold burn hazard when they are released quickly, 7C5.124 – Cryogenics for further information.

**Usage, transportation, packaging and storage**

**Usage**

7C5.21 Most industrial gases are naturally occurring and are extracted from the atmosphere. It is not possible or necessary to describe the usage of gases further in this chapter, however, the following chapters contain information on the hazardous materials gases most frequently encountered by firefighters at emergency incidents.

**Transportation and packaging**

**General**

7C5.22 The transportation of gases as gases at ordinary temperatures and pressures is not a practical or economically viable option for the chemical industry due to the size of containers that would be required. Viable storage and transport options
rely on cooling, the application of pressure and dissolving gases. The favoured option is to use pressure to liquefy a gas but for every gas there is a critical temperature above which it cannot be liquefied by the application of pressure.

7C5.23 Gases below their critical temperatures are often called vapours and can be liquefied by the application of pressure so as to be transported or stored as liquids at ambient temperature. Above this critical temperature gases cannot be liquefied by the application of pressure alone. When a pressurised liquid is warmed it will exert the critical pressure on its container at the critical temperature.

### Critical temperatures of common gases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Critical temperature (°C)</th>
<th>Critical pressure (bar)</th>
<th>Boiling point (°C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ammonia</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>112.8</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butane</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chlorine</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propane</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulphur dioxide</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argon</td>
<td>-122</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxygen</td>
<td>-119</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>-183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrogen</td>
<td>-147</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrogen</td>
<td>-240</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helium</td>
<td>-268</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7C5.24 Gases which have a critical temperature below ambient temperature can be stored or transported in small quantities as compressed gases at ambient temperatures but when bulk quantities are required they are usually cooled to just above their boiling point and transported as a refrigerated or cryogenic liquid.

**NOTE:**

- **Carbon dioxide** – can be encountered as solid, liquid or gas. The critical temperature of CO₂ is a little over 31°C so for most of the year when encountered in small quantities (as in the case of fire extinguishers) it will be a pressurised liquid but on a hot day it will be a gas. Small quantities of carbon dioxide can also be encountered as a solid used as a refrigerant called ‘dry ice’, which does not melt but turns into a gas as it warms up. This process by which a solid does not melt but turns directly into a gas as it warms is known as ‘sublimation’. Bulk carbon dioxide is transported as a refrigerated pressurised liquid.
• **Acetylene** – is different from other gases in that it can decompose in the absence of air into its constituent elements, carbon and hydrogen. This is an exothermic reaction, that is, it gives off heat and is more generally known as decomposition. Exothermic decomposition does not produce as much heat as acetylene burning in air. Decomposition requires a significant input of energy from direct flame contact on a cylinder to initiate it. Mechanical shock alone to a cold cylinder cannot initiate decomposition.

**Road**

7C5.25 Appropriate options for storing and transporting gases are detailed in the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR), which is enacted into UK law by the carriage of dangerous goods regulations.

7C5.26 In this system a hazard identification number consists of two or three figures, where ‘2’, for example, indicates a hazard of emissions of gas due to pressure or to chemical reaction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard warning number</th>
<th>Hazard description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Asphyxiant gas or gas with no subsidiary risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Refrigerated liquefied gas, asphyxiant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>Refrigerated liquefied gas, flammable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225</td>
<td>Refrigerated liquefied gas, oxidising (fire intensifying)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>Gas, flammable corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>Flammable gas, which can spontaneously lead to violent reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Oxidising (fire-intensifying) gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>Toxic gas, corrosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X323</td>
<td>Flammable liquid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>323</td>
<td>Flammable liquid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>362</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, toxic, which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X362</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, toxic, which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>382</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, corrosive, which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Examples of hazard warning numbers associated with a gas hazard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hazard warning number</th>
<th>Hazard description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X382</td>
<td>Flammable liquid, corrosive, which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423</td>
<td>Solid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X423</td>
<td>Flammable solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>462</td>
<td>Toxic solid which reacts with water, emitting flammable gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X462</td>
<td>Solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting toxic gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>482</td>
<td>Corrosive solid which reacts with water, emitting corrosive gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X482</td>
<td>Solid which reacts dangerously with water, emitting corrosive gases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7C5.27 Further information on the transportation of gases is contained in Section 7 Part C-3, Transportation, packaging and storage of hazardous materials.

### Storage

7C5.28 Gases are stored in cylinders, cryogenic vessels or tanks. On-site generation of gas is also an option.

### Cylinders

7C5.29 Gases are stored in cylinders either as a compressed or liquefied gas, or dissolved in a solvent (e.g., acetylene dissolved in acetone). Cylinders are subject to rigorous type testing to ensure that they are fit for purpose, and are tested to 1½ times their working pressure. Some cylinders are equipped with safety devices, which are designed to relieve pressure by venting gas as the cylinder heats up.

7C5.30 Serious accidents can result from ignorance of the properties of the gases, or from misuse or abuse. Great care is needed during the transportation, handling, storage and disposal of such cylinders.

7C5.31 Cylinders exist in the following types of construction:

- Welded cylinders – two steel halves welded together around the centre
- Drawn steel – a single steel skin containing no weld
• Aluminium cylinders – lighter in weight than steel cylinders and are used to contain specialist gases

• Composite cylinders – a woven jacket impregnated with resin and protected by a hardened plastic outer cage. This type of cylinder is mainly used for liquefied petroleum gas but can be found with various contents. Occasionally these cylinders can have an aluminium lining.

7C5.32 The cylinder construction provides little to no indication as to the contents of the cylinder, but may alter the actions required to deal with them when involved in fire, in particular composite cylinders.

7C5.33 All cylinders may fail in a fire situation and the effect of the consequent explosion will depend upon the nature of the gas contained. Acetylene is a special case because it can undergo a self-sustaining internal decomposition reaction, producing heat, which may continue after the fire has been extinguished.

7C5.34 Liquefied gases are generally of two types:

• high pressure (eg carbon dioxide, ethane)
• low pressure (eg liquefied petroleum gas).

7C5.35 As the cylinder heats up in the fire, the liquefied gas absorbs some of the heat and boils, increasing the pressure in the cylinder. This will normally result in the operation of a safety relief device, fitted to the cylinder valve, which relieves the excess gas pressure. If the cylinder wall becomes excessively heated, the effective maximum working pressure of it is reduced and the cylinder may fail catastrophically.

7C5.36 Liquefied petroleum gas cylinders failing under heat may result in a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion. This is where the boiling liquid in the cylinder rapidly vaporises and expands explosively bursting the cylinder. If the gas released contacts a source of ignition this could result in a fireball. Further information is contained later in this Part at 7C5.116, Liquefied petroleum gas.
Cylinder Failure – All pressurised cylinders, regardless of their contents are at the greatest risk of failure whilst being subjected to direct flame contact.

As a metal cylinder is heated the shell will begin to lose its tensile strength, in composite cylinders heating will also break down the resin. *(NOTE: Although steel loses approximately 50 per cent of its strength at about 550°C, rising gas pressure may overcome reducing steel tensile strength at about 300°C)*

All cylinders ultimately fail because the shell reaches a point where its tensile strength weakens to such a degree (or in the case of composite cylinders the resin breaks down) that it can no longer contain the internal pressure being exerted by the gas.

Operational considerations
(compressed gas cylinder incidents)

Pre-planning

7C5.37 Fire and Rescue Services should ensure that they:

- proactively collect information on the location and type of hazardous gases in their turn-out area
- make significant information available to mobilising controls and operational staff
- have liaison and contact arrangements in place to deal with emergencies involving gas cylinders via the British Compressed Gas Association Competent Person Scheme
- have operational plans, which include safe rendezvous points, for significant site-specific risks
- review and update any information held.

Phase 1: Mobilising and en-route

7C5.38 Consideration:

- Pre-planning information should be readily available en-route in an easy to read and understandable format (eg gas cylinders involved in fire – key actions aide memoir, contingency plans, response plans, risk cards, site specific risk plans etc).
Phase 2: Arriving and gathering information

7C5.39 Considerations:

- Response vehicles must be parked outside any potential blast zone whenever cylinders are suspected of being involved in fire.

- The Incident Commander should assess any immediate crew and public life risks, then gather information to establish an initial cordon around the potential hazard zone. Consideration should be given to evacuation of the public and non-essential responders. Liaison with the police will be necessary if evacuation is required. Where evacuation is not possible, or is considered inappropriate, all those remaining in the hazard zone should be warned of the risks and, if necessary, advised to stay away from openings especially windows and occupy rooms furthest away from the risk.

- Staff required to carry out tasks within the initial cordon should make use of all available substantial shielding. Personal protective equipment (personal protective equipment) appropriate to the immediate hazard should be worn, such structural firefighting kit including gloves, flash/fire hoods and eye protection. Staff who are tasked to work behind shielding within the area of the hazard zone likely to be affected by a fireball (ie approximately 25m for a single cylinder) should wear breathing apparatus in addition to the above personal protective equipment.

- The key information required is:
  - Are there cylinders at the incident? and if there are
  - Are the cylinders involved in fire? (ie direct flame contact, fire damage or radiated heat damage from the fire)
  - Are any cylinders leaking, venting, bulging or steaming?
  - What gases are involved?

**NOTE:** If acetylene cylinders are involved and are suspected of having been affected by heat they can pose significant additional risks, these are detailed in 7C5.48.

- Other considerations when designating the initial cordon include:
  - size of cylinder(s)
  - number of cylinders
  - shielding provided by any buildings or structures
  - type and extent of adjacent structures
  - local topography (eg protection provided by slopes and gradients of ground levels etc)
  - affect of the potential blast pressure wave.
- affect of the potential fireball
- cylinder may be thrown some distance when not contained within the structure or building which would provide substantial shielding
- cylinder fragments and other projectiles (e.g., valve assembly) may be thrown a considerable distance and have high looping trajectories
- flying glass and other structural material
- structural damage to buildings in the vicinity
- possible need for an exclusion zone within the hazard zone
- other hazards inside or close to the initial cordon
- proximity and importance of adjacent occupancies and key infrastructure, such as major roads and railways.

- If cylinders, including acetylene, have not been heated then they do not represent a hazard and should be handed over to the site operator. In a developing fire situation consider carefully moving them if there is a risk that the fire will spread and involve them

- Acetylene cylinder identification:
  - It should be easy to distinguish between liquefied petroleum gas and other cylinders (including acetylene) on the basis of their shape (see photo of liquefied petroleum gas cylinders below right, acetylene below left).
  - To distinguish positively between acetylene and other non-liquefied petroleum gas cylinders is more difficult when they have been subjected to a fire.

**NOTE:** If in doubt, treat the cylinder as though it is an acetylene cylinder, until a positive identification can be made.
When cylinders are not affected by fire they can be identified by their label, colour (acetylene cylinders are maroon) or by their markings. In addition the cylinder industry now marks Acetylene cylinders with tape or a plastic collar. Absence of these does not indicate that it is not acetylene.

**NOTE:** Due to the possibility of foreign acetylene cylinders being imported into the UK, it is essential that operational staff called to deal with an incident involving cylinders carry out a risk assessment and consider the possibility of incorrect colour markings. The Incident Commander should use as many sources of information as possible to verify that the contents of the cylinder match the colour coding. These may include confirmation with the owner, occupier or operative; any documentation available; 7(2) (d) information; visual information for example a cylinder connected to an oxygen cylinder or strapped to a welding trolley etc. If there is any doubt as to the identification of the cylinder and the risk assessment indicates that there is a possibility that acetylene may be involved, the cylinders should be treated as acetylene until otherwise confirmed.

- Contact the cylinder owner by telephone for specialist advice. Consider asking for the attendance of a specialist at the scene, although there has to be good visibility for this to be productive (gas cylinder supplier contact details are contained below in Phase 3: Planning the response).

- If non-acetylene cylinders have been heated but not damaged, they should be cooled, or allowed to cool then handed-over to the site operator who should be fully advised of the circumstances. In a developing fire situation consider cooling and carefully moving them if there is an imminent risk that the fire will spread and involve them.

- Does the cylinder show signs of heat damage or direct flame contact?
  - Check to see whether there is any obvious fire damage to any structure or material near to the cylinders.
  - Do the cylinders appear to be scorched?
  - Are the labels burnt?
  - Are the plastic guard or test rings melted?
  - Is the cylinder paintwork burnt or blistered?
  - Does the cylinder surface steam or dry out quickly when water is applied?
  - Have eye witnesses seen flame impingement etc?
  - Is there any visible bulge in the cylinder?
  - Are pressure relief devices operating?

**NOTE:** The operation of a pressure relief disc or fusible plug through a fire situation indicates an increased likelihood of catastrophic failure and should not be regarded as a sign of safety.
• As cylinders heat up in a fire the pressure inside them increases. Direct flame contact may also weaken the cylinder wall. If heat continues to be applied then the maximum safe working pressure of the cylinder may be exceeded. This may eventually cause the cylinder to burst or fail in a violent manner resulting in the release of a considerable amount of energy. Subsequent events will depend upon the gas type. For inert gases no further action is required. Cylinders containing oxidant, toxic or flammable gases may produce other hazards and specialist advice should be sought from a hazardous materials adviser and/or the gas supplier. For example, flammable gases such as hydrogen or methane will rapidly expand explosively following the cylinder rupture because of the very high internal pressure. This could actually extinguish the fire by blasting it out but also could result in a delayed ignition of the unconfined gas cloud.

**Operational key principle**

**Cylinder cooling** – As soon as a cylinder is discovered at a fire, regardless of the contents, the Incident Commander should make every effort to extinguish any fire affecting the cylinder and apply cooling sprays directly on to any affected cylinders.

• It is important to quickly cool cylinders with water if they have been heated in a fire. This applies to cylinders suffering direct flame contact and also to those affected by radiant heat.

• Firefighters carrying out this task should continually risk assess the situation and take advantage of all available substantial shielding/cover. They should consider using ground monitors and lashed jets where severe or prolonged heating has taken place and should always wear appropriate personal protective equipment.

**NOTE:** If firefighters encounter cylinders that have been fully involved in a severe fire for an unknown period of time they should treat them with extreme caution and adopt defensive tactics.

• Initial crews discovering cylinders should make every effort, without exposing themselves to unnecessary risk, to identify the type, contents, location and number of any cylinders involved as this will determine the appropriate course of action. In particular, crews should attempt to identify if cylinders are acetylene.

• Where a cylinder is alight at the valve group, it should be ascertained whether or not it is alight around the cylinder neck (from the base of the valve group where it enters the cylinder) or from where the hoses attach to the valve group itself. A risk assessment needs to be carried out to identify whether
the cylinder can be safely turned off. Where the cylinder is alight at the neck (ie the base of the valve group) this indicates that the valve group or cylinder neck is damaged and potentially will not be able to be shut off

- In most cases, non-acetylene cylinders which have not failed can be made safe by the application of cooling water. Internal pressure will be reduced as heat is removed from the cylinder and a heat or pressure weakened cylinder shell will recover most or all of its original strength as it is cooled. Once water has been applied and the cylinder wall temperature reduced, the cylinder is very unlikely to fail. Consideration should then be given to reducing the hazard zone.

Phase 3: Planning the response

7C5.40 The Incident Commander should ensure that a risk assessment is carried out in order to develop the response plan including appropriate and relevant control measures.

7C5.41 The response plan may be developed with the:

- On-site responsible person
- Hazardous materials adviser
- British Compressed Gas Association Competent Person.

Support from a gas industry competent person

7C5.42 A support network has been established between the Fire and Rescue Service and the British Compressed Gas Association (the trade association for all the major cylinder companies). During an incident involving cylinders it is important to identify the gas company that owns the cylinder. This will enable the gas company to provide assistance in identifying the contents of the cylinder and to provide any assistance required in order to manage the incident effectively. The owner of the cylinder can be identified in a number of ways:

- via the owner of the premises, by asking for the name of the gas supplier
- from the cylinder label if it is possible to get close enough safely
- by inspecting the label on any other cylinders in safe locations elsewhere on the premises.

7C5.43 The following are the 24-hour telephone numbers of the main gas cylinder companies:
Four main gas cylinder companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Products</td>
<td>0500 02 02 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOC</td>
<td>0800 111 333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energas</td>
<td>01482 329 333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Liquide</td>
<td>01675 462 695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The British Compressed Gas Association competent persons are designated staff from the various cylinder companies who have passed a training course specialising in the subject of acetylene cylinders in fires. The competent person would only normally be requested to attend difficult or protracted incidents. The competent person is able to offer telephone advice to the Incident Commander on the numbers and types of cylinders delivered to the premises and support the decision making process.

It is not the role of the competent person to instruct Incident Commander on actions to be carried out. The Incident Commander, in liaison with the hazardous materials adviser should advise the competent person of the situation, the actions that have been taken and proposed further actions.

The competent person can also make arrangements to have cylinders collected at the end of an incident. However, there is usually no need for the cylinders to be collected at the end of the Fire and Rescue Service incident. The owner or manager of the premises should be advised that the competent person will arrange collection of the cylinder during office hours.

**7C5.44** In a situation where a composite cylinder is involved in a direct flame contact but is not leaking, the fire can be extinguished and the cylinder cooled. However, caution should be exercised when considering moving the cylinder as the resin may have become weakened to an extent where it may begin to leak when handled. In these situations it is best to leave the cylinder in place and consult a hazardous materials adviser or product specialist.

**Phase 4: Implementing the response**

**7C5.45** The Fire and Rescue Service response to incidents involving gas cylinders should be based on the following procedural flow chart.

**NOTE:** If there is doubt over the contents of a cylinder affected by heat or fire, it should be treated as an acetylene cylinder, until a positive identification can be made.
GAS CYLINDER LOCATED

Has the cylinder been exposed to heat?

No

Yes

Yes or don’t know

Is it an acetylene cylinder?

No

Yes

Start water spray cooling as soon as possible and designate a hazard zone - Considerations:
- Cool from a protected position using any available cover; consider ground monitors or lashed jets;
- Plan for water supplies and water run-off; if the gas released from the cylinder is burning, allow it to burn, consider protecting surrounding risks with water sprays; when cooling is effective, re-assess and reduce the hazard zone.

Hazard zone considerations:
- Size, number and contents of cylinder(s); shielding; fireball up to 25m; cylinder and fragments may be thrown some distance; flying fragments up to 200m if it is in the open (ie no shielding); shelter in place or evacuation of public?

Is the cylinder leaking?

No

Yes

Does the cylinder show signs of heat damage or flame contact?

No

Yes

Is the cylinder damaged and / or leaking?

No

Yes

Does the cylinder contain a hazardous material?

No

Yes

Implement hazardous materials standard operating procedure and resolve incident

Continue cooling

Continue cooling, until all heat sources are removed and the cylinder shell is at ambient temperature

No further action by Fire and Rescue Service, hand-over to owner or responsible person

Continue cooling

No or don’t know

Yes

Do not move the cylinder (See Chapter 4 for further actions)
Phase 5: Evaluating the response

7C5.46 Incident Commanders should constantly evaluate the risk posed by the gas cylinder(s); the effectiveness of specific operational procedures being adopted; and the advice upon which the risk assessment and tactics are based. Evaluation is not a one-off process but should be continual throughout the incident as circumstances change or new information is gathered. After evaluation, if necessary, the Incident Commander should adjust the response plan, amend or implement control measures and communicate the changes to all staff.

Phase 6: Closing the incident

7C5.47 At the end of any incident involving hazardous gases further control measures may include:

- **Liaison between the Incident Commander and the Fire Investigation Officer**
  The Fire Investigation Officer must be briefed regarding the location, condition, type and actual involvement of any cylinders or other gases at the incident.

- **Hand-over of the incident to the appropriate authority**
  This will be the site owner or occupier in most instances. The outcomes of the analytical risk assessment should form part of the incident hand-over.

- **Notification of the Health and Safety Executive**
  The Health and Safety Executive should be informed whenever cylinders or pressure vessels have exploded.
Acetylene

Characteristics

General

7C5.48 Acetylene has the following properties.

### Decomposition – Acetylene is distinguished from other flammable gases by its ability to continue to “self-heat” after the fire has been extinguished.

When involved in a fire, acetylene can begin to decompose, that is, break down into its constituent elements of hydrogen and carbon. The decomposition reaction is exothermic, that is, it produces heat.

Acetylene cylinders are designed to contain and inhibit decomposition, however, if left unchecked decomposition could lead to the failure of the cylinder.

This means that unlike other fuel gases, **acetylene may continue to be a hazard after the fire has been extinguished and requires specific operational procedures.**

However, only a high heat source such as direct flame contact can initiate decomposition.

### Cold Shock – Mechanical shock alone to a cold cylinder cannot initiate decomposition.

- Flash point -17ºC
- Vapour density 0.91
- Acetylene is slightly lighter than air
- Boiling point-85ºC
- Flammable limits 2.5 to 80 per cent

**NOTE:** However, for practical purposes, if it has leaked it will mix with air and should be presumed to be present in an explosive mixture.

- Critical temperature 36ºC
- Storage pressure 15.5 bar at 15ºC
- Naturally odourless, but industrial acetylene smells of garlic due to impurities
• Industrial grade acetylene is colourless
• Unstable gas at ambient temperature and pressure, and is significantly more so at elevated temperatures and pressures
• Soluble in many organic liquids, especially acetone which is the most common solvent used in acetylene storage.

Acetylene cylinder identification

7C5.49 It should be easy to distinguish between liquefied petroleum gas and other cylinders (including acetylene) on the basis of their shape (see photo of liquefied petroleum gas cylinders below right and an acetylene cylinder below left).

Acetylene and liquefied petroleum gas cylinders

7C5.50 To distinguish positively between acetylene and other non-liquefied petroleum gas cylinders is more difficult when they have been subjected to a fire.

**NOTE:** If in doubt, treat the cylinder as though it is an acetylene cylinder, until a positive identification can be made.

7C5.51 When cylinders are not affected by fire they can be identified by their label, colour (acetylene cylinders are maroon) or by their markings. In addition the cylinder industry now marks acetylene cylinders with tape or a plastic collar (see photos below). Absence of these does not indicate that it is not acetylene.
7C5.52 **NOTE:** Due to the possibility of foreign acetylene cylinders being imported into the UK, it is essential that operational staff called to deal with an incident involving cylinders carry out a risk assessment and consider the possibility of incorrect colour markings. The Incident Commander should use as many sources of information as possible to verify that the contents of the cylinder match the colour coding. These may include:

- confirmation with the owner, occupier or operative
- any documentation available
- 7(2)(d) information
- visual information for example a cylinder connected to an oxygen cylinder or strapped to a welding trolley etc.

**Acetylene cylinders**
Acetylene cylinders (sometimes referred to as dissolved acetylene cylinders) differ from other compressed gas cylinders in that they contain a filler material, known as a porous mass, usually monolithic in form. They also contain a solvent, typically acetone, that is absorbed by the mass. The acetylene dissolves into the acetone and is held by it in a stable condition. The function of the porous mass is to evenly distribute the acetone throughout the cylinder and prevent the presence of large internal voids.

The porous mass or filler used for new cylinders is a monolithic mass poured in as slurry and baked in an oven to form a porous solid. Older cylinders may be filled with a granular filler. The materials used for the mass or filler include:

- lime/silica/asbestos
- fibreglass/lime/silica
- charcoal/kieselghur.

Cylinders containing granular type fillers are still in use but are less common. These can suffer from settlement problems that can allow free acetylene gas to collect at the head of the cylinder, with consequential implications should a decomposition reaction occur, however, gas suppliers carry out regular inspections and maintenance to minimise this risk.

Monolithic mass type fillers are not prone to settlement problems and investigative research on cylinders which have been subject to mechanical damage shows that the monolithic mass is extremely resilient and does not readily split or separate from cylinder walls.

Gas companies are aware of ways in which either mass type can be adversely affected and routinely check for such problems at each re-fill.

At the top of an acetylene cylinder, just below the valve assembly, there is a small cylindrical “gas space” hollowed out of the porous mass which is subsequently pugged with gauze or felt. The gas space is around 2cm diameter and 5cm deep typically. Its purpose is to allow free dissolution of acetylene from its carrier solvent to feed free gas out through the valve assembly for use (see diagram below).
It should be noted that, due to atmospheric pressure, the acetone will still contain a quantity of dissolved acetylene even though the gauge reads zero and the cylinder is normally considered to be empty (e.g., a large cylinder could contain up to 500 litres of acetylene). Therefore an “empty” cylinder still represents a potential hazard in a fire.

Historically, some acetylene cylinders were fitted with pressure relief devices such as fusible plugs or bursting discs. These were designed to release the gas if the temperature or pressure rises excessively. In general, steel welded type cylinders were fitted with two fusible plugs in the shoulder of the cylinder, whilst those drawn from solid ingots were fitted with bursting discs, usually in the valve group. Some older cylinders may still be in circulation with fusible plugs in the base. The efficacy of these devices was tested by Health and Safety Laboratory and found to offer no significant contribution to safety. The operation of the pressure relief device allows gas (ignited or un-ignited) to leak from the heated cylinder increasing the risk of an explosion of a cylinder or further feeding the fire. The main reason for the ineffectiveness of the pressure relief devices is that they cannot vent gas generated by decomposition fast enough. They can also cause fresh acetylene to be drawn into a hot spot and feed the reaction, and any leaking gas can form a cloud around the cylinder. Such pressure relief devices are, therefore, no longer fitted to new cylinders, and are being removed from older cylinders.

Cylinders are designed to suppress decomposition and to self-extinguish it if it does occur. The porous mass contains thousands of small pores, which act as a stabiliser by dividing acetylene into small units. If decomposition were to
occur, the acetylene would absorb heat to the stage where decomposition can no longer continue. This enables the cylinders to withstand most flashbacks and non-severe heating.

7C5.62 Acetylene at realistic fill pressures has to reach a temperature of approximately 300°C to initiate decomposition. This can be caused by a flashback from welding or cutting equipment (if the flashback arrester is missing or faulty), or by exposure to intense heat. The latter is only usually achieved by direct contact of flames on a cylinder.

7C5.63 Type approval testing of acetylene cylinders has shown that the porous mass does contain and effectively ‘snuff’ out decomposition. However, mechanical impact/shock to a heated acetylene cylinder could cause it to burst and must be avoided. Therefore acetylene cylinders exposed to severe heat in a fire should not be approached or moved until after they have been cooled and checked to ensure that decomposition is not occurring.

7C5.64 Re-development of heat at the cylinder surface is a good indicator of the decomposition reaction occurring and this is why it is recommended that the “Wetting Test” or Thermal Imaging equipment is used to check the temperature of the cylinder shell.

7C5.65 **NOTE:** An acetylene cylinder that has been heated and is also leaking presents an extra hazard. This is because fresh acetylene may be drawn through the internal mass of the cylinder and if a decomposition reaction is taking place may provide additional fuel for the reaction and promote the potential for catastrophic failure.

### Hazards

**7C5.66** The general hazards:

- highly flammable
- high concentrations may cause asphyxiation
- low concentrations may cause narcotic effects
- decomposition producing heat
- acetylene cylinders are normally used in conjunction with oxygen cylinders thereby increasing the potential hazard.

**7C5.67** Acetylene can decompose to its constituent elements if exposed to extreme heat or, heat and shock.

**NOTE:** Decomposition cannot be initiated by cold shock alone.

**7C5.68** Decomposition, if left unchecked, could result in a the failure of a fire exposed cylinder. Hazards from this could include:
• A blast pressure wave

• Fireball of up to 25 metres

• Cylinder may be thrown up to 150 metres*

• Flying fragments and other projectiles (eg valve assembly) may be thrown up to 200 metres*

**NOTE:** The steel used to make acetylene cylinders is heat treated to ensure that when they do fail, they do so in ductile mode rather than brittle failure. Many merely split open, releasing the gas contents but if they explode the typical result is three or four large pieces which may have high looping trajectories

• Flying glass and other structural material

• Structural damage to buildings in the vicinity.

* Possible **maximum** travel distances for acetylene cylinders in the open (ie not within a structure or building which would provide shielding and therefore reduce the distances projectiles could travel).

### Operational considerations

7C5.69 The following information is specific to incidents involving acetylene cylinders and augments the general guidance on gas cylinders given earlier in this Section.

**Pre-planning**

7C5.70 Fire and Rescue Services should liaise with local police, the Health and Safety Executive, Environment Agency, acetylene cylinder suppliers, users, Highways Agency, Network Rail, and other local authority agencies that will be affected by this type of incident. Liaison will ensure:

• a possible reduction in the number of acetylene cylinder incidents

• all parties involved understand the implications of such an incident

• the safe and effective management of the incident

• the safe and effective handover of affected cylinders.

7C5.71 Types of premises likely to contain acetylene cylinders should be identified as part of an on-going integrated risk management plan.

7C5.72 Fire and Rescue Services need to have in place systems that support operational staff in dealing with incidents involving acetylene cylinders. It is vital that crews rehearse the safe systems of work described below in order to develop relevant task management skills in conjunction with the knowledge and understanding provided by this guidance document.
Operational staff should be made aware of the specific dangers posed by acetylene cylinders involved in fire. Staff should be able to implement the key operational procedures for dealing with this type of incident at all role levels.

**Acetylene cylinder procedure**

Due to the risk of decomposition occurring within acetylene cylinders after any fire involving them has been extinguished, specific operational procedures are required for acetylene incidents.

The flow chart below includes guidelines to assist in deciding if a cylinder has been involved in a fire sufficiently to cause decomposition. An often encountered situation where a cylinder operator damages a hose should not always be considered sufficient to initiate decomposition, provided any flames from the damaged hose are extinguished in a timely fashion.
Single acetylene cylinders involved in fire

- Acetylene cylinders that have been significantly heated or damaged by fire must not be moved.

- They should be cooled as soon as possible with water spray and a hazard zone designated around them (Up to 200m for cylinders in the open with no shielding). Where cylinders are heavily involved in fire an exclusion zone should also be considered.

- **COOLING PHASE** – Water cooling should be continued for at least one hour. Ground monitors and lashed jets should be used, any firefighters carrying out essential tasks within the hazard zone must have appropriate personal protective equipment and make full use of all available substantial cover/shielding. After a minimum of one hour of water cooling the cylinder’s temperature should be checked to see if it has been effectively cooled.

  **NOTE:** “effective cooling” means bringing the cylinder shell temperature down to ambient temperature. The “Wetting test” and/or thermal imaging equipment should be used to do this.

- **MONITORING PHASE** – When effective cooling of the cylinder shell has been achieved, water cooling should be stopped. The cylinder should still not be moved for a further one hour and an appropriate, risk assessed hazard zone should be maintained. This monitoring phase is required due to the possibility of internal decomposition occurring.

  **NOTE:** Leaking acetylene cylinders have a higher risk of decomposition occurring.

- During the monitoring phase, temperature checks of the cylinder shell should be made every 15 minutes. If any increase in temperature is observed a further one hour continuous water cooling should be applied to the cylinder before its temperature is re-checked.

- When the cylinder remains effectively cooled for the whole of the monitoring phase (ie the shell temperature remains at ambient temperature for one hour without being water cooled, and is not leaking, there is no risk of cylinder failure and it should be handed over to the responsible person or agency on-site.

  **NOTE:** A cylinder which is leaking significantly should not be moved and should be allowed to vent safely. The Fire and Rescue Service should assess any fire or explosion risks caused by the escaping gas and continue cylinder shell temperature monitoring.

Multiple cylinders (or substantially concealed single cylinders)

Where cylinders are very closely packed, and/or concealed/buried by debris, there may be a risk that the cooling water may not come into contact with a substantial proportion of the cylinder shell, therefore limiting the effect of cooling. If the Incident Commander considers that significant areas of the cylinder are ‘dry’ then the cooling phase should be extended (eg if 50 per cent of a cylinder is not being touched by cooling water, that is dry metal, then consider increasing the cooling phase to three hours).
**Technical considerations**

- Are the cylinder labels burnt?
- Has the plastic test ring melted?
- Is the paint on the cylinder body scorched?
- Is there any visible bulge in the cylinder?
- Are pressure relief devices operating?
- Does the cylinder surface steam or dry out quickly when water is applied?
- Is there any other sign of heat?
- Eye witness testimony?

**SUSPECTED ACETYLENE CYLINDER EXPOSED TO HEAT**

**Cooling phase** - Apply cooling water from a shielded location as soon as possible. Continue cooling for one hour after the fire has been extinguished. (*Note:* If a significant area of the cylinder is buried/concealed (ie dry) consider increasing the cooling time)

**Interrupt cooling**

- Apply the *“Wetting Test”* and/or use thermal imaging equipment to check that cooling has been effective

**“Monitoring Phase”** - Stop water cooling, do not move the cylinder, maintain an appropriate hazard zone, re-apply the Wetting Test and/or thermal image equipment tests at 15 minute intervals for 1 hour. If re-heating is observed water cool continuously for 1 hour then start the Monitoring Phase again.

- Is the cylinder leaking?
  - No
  - Yes

- Do not move cylinder, allow it to vent safely, assess any fire or explosion risks caused by the escaping gas
  - Risks controlled
  - Significant leak only

- Get a clear view from a shielded location
- Spray as much of the cylinder surface as possible
- Stop spraying
- Is the cylinder surface steaming?
  - Yes
  - No

- Does the cylinder surface dry out rapidly?
  - Yes
  - Re-apply cooling water for 1 hr
  - No

- Allow to cool, hand-over to responsible person/owner

- Contact the gas supplier for advice

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No further action by Fire and Rescue Service, hand-over to owner or responsible person
Explanatory notes for the procedural flow chart

**Does the cylinder show signs of heat damage, “flash-back” or direct flame contact?**

7C5.76 It is important to assess whether the cylinder has been sufficiently heat affected for decomposition to be initiated. It requires a significant temperature increase (ie above 300°C), this is normally only achieved by direct contact of flames on a cylinder.

7C5.77 There are signs which can be used to detect possible heating:
- If there is any visible bulge in the shell treat the cylinder with extreme caution as this indicates a greatly increased likelihood of catastrophic failure!
- Do any of the cylinder labels appear to be burnt?
- Are any of the plastic rings around the cylinder valve melted in any way?
- Is the cylinder paintwork burnt or blistered?
- Does the cylinder surface steam or dry out quickly when water is applied?
- Are pressure relief devices operating, if fitted?

**NOTE:** The operation of a pressure relief disc or fusible plug with gas burning off or leaking, indicates an increased likelihood of catastrophic failure and should not be regarded as a sign of safety.

7C5.78 Eye witnesses may be able to provide information to enable the Incident Commander to confirm:
- whether a cylinder has suffered direct flame contact and if so for how long
- the severity and duration of any heating of a cylinder
- whether a flash-back, and not a backfire (ie a single cracking or ‘popping’ sound), has occurred.

7C5.79 Flashback might be accompanied by a shrill hissing sound. A flashback occurs when the flame travels back through the hoses into the body of the cylinder. This may be caused by user error or poorly maintained or faulty equipment. Flashback arrestors fitted to the hoses will detect and stop reverse gas flow preventing a flammable oxygen and acetylene mixture from forming in the hose.

7C5.80 Flashback arrestors are mandated under DSEAR in the UK and are designed to prevent a flashback. It is an automatic flame trap device designed not only to quench the flame but also to prevent the flame from reaching the regulator.

**NOTE:** Extra care should be taken with unofficially imported cylinders which may not have flashback arrestors.
7C5.81 Flash backs into acetylene cylinders which may initiate decomposition are generally due to the failure to fit a flame arrestor.

7C5.82 An acetylene cylinder is designed to suppress decomposition and to self-extinguish if decomposition does occur. The porous mass contains thousands of small pores, which act as a stabiliser by dividing the acetylene into small units. If decomposition were to occur, the acetylene in some of the units would decompose slowly but the walls of the cells would absorb heat to the stage where decomposition can no longer continue. If a flame were to develop, the small pores would act as arrestors. This enables the cylinders to withstand most flashbacks and non-severe heating.

7C5.83 Where cylinders are in the proximity of a fire but show no signs of direct heating (see list above), they are likely to be safe to move. However, before doing so the temperature of the cylinder walls should be checked by spraying with water and seeing whether they remain wet or through the use of thermal imaging equipment. Staff must be made aware of the manual handling problems associated with moving an unheated cylinder to a safe location. Acetylene cylinders are comparatively heavy in relation to other cylinders and are awkward to carry, especially when wet.

“Cooling phase” – Do not move the cylinder. Designate a hazard zone. Apply cooling water from a shielded location as soon as possible. Continue cooling for one hour after the fire has been extinguished.

7C5.84 If a decomposing cylinder is leaking or is moved, the rate of decomposition and heat generated may be increased to such an extent that the cylinder walls are weakened abnormally and rupture. Greater safety can be achieved if the decomposition process is slowed or arrested by water spray cooling.

7C5.85 Water cooling is currently the most effective method of preventing failure of an acetylene cylinder and should be used whenever it can be implemented without compromising the safety of firefighters (eg where protection is offered by suitable shielding).

7C5.86 The period of greatest risk is when the cylinder shell is hot, so every effort should be made to cool it comprehensively taking full advantage of any available substantial shielding/cover and the use of ground monitors and/or lashed jets.

7C5.87 The application of water will result in the cylinder shell cooling quickly. This in turn will slow down any internal decomposition process occurring inside the cylinder. As a consequence of this and after carrying out a risk assessment the Incident Commander, in liaison with the hazardous materials adviser, could reduce the initial cordon distance in favour of a risk assessed hazard zone.

7C5.88 Considerations when determining the hazard zone include:

- size of cylinder(s)
• number of cylinders
• shielding provided by any buildings or structures
• type and extent of adjacent structures
• local topography (eg protection provided by slopes and gradients of ground levels etc)
• affect of the potential blast pressure wave
• affect of the potential Fireball of up to 25 metres*
• cylinder may be thrown up to 150 metres*
• flying fragments and other projectiles (eg valve assembly) may be thrown up to 200 metres*

**NOTE:** The steel used to make acetylene cylinders is heat treated to ensure that when they do fail, they do so in ductile mode rather than brittle failure. Many merely split open, releasing the gas contents but if they explode the typical result is three or four large pieces which may have high looping trajectories.

• flying glass and other structural material
• structural damage to buildings in the vicinity
• possible need for an exclusion zone within the hazard zone
• proximity and importance of adjacent occupancies and key infrastructure, such as major roads and railways.

**NOTE:** * Possible maximum travel distances for a cylinder in the open (ie not within a structure or building which would provide shielding and therefore reduce the distances projectiles could travel).

7C5.89 Consideration should always be given to the use of any substantial, portable materials, that might offer shielding between the cylinder(s) and risks (eg a public highway, railway or other thoroughfare), to reduce the hazard zone. This might be particularly possible where such materials are paletted and can easily be moved into place without subjecting the operative to any undue risk. This may be necessary when cylinders cannot be water cooled due to their location within, for example, a dangerous structure.

7C5.90 There may be circumstances where attempts to apply cooling water would expose firefighters to unacceptable levels of risk that outweigh the benefit likely to be gained. At such incidents the alternative would be to leave the cylinder in place without applying water until it bursts or all sources of heating are removed. Remotely operated vehicles (have been used at cylinder incidents to assist the Incident Commander in monitoring the condition, degree of heat damage and temperature of cylinders.
Remote operated vehicles may be available from a number of sources, for example the military, police, multi-agency initiatives (eg Highways Agency, Network Rail and Transport for London, used by London Fire Brigade) and private commercial companies. Fire and Rescue Services should consider the need to pre-plan for the availability of remotely operated vehicles based on their integrated risk management plan.

During an incident involving acetylene cylinders it is important to identify the gas company that owns the cylinder. This will enable the gas company to provide assistance in identifying the contents of the cylinder and to provide any assistance required in order to manage the incident effectively. Contact details are contained in 7C5.43.

When contacting the relevant cylinder supplier the following information is required:

- State which Fire and Rescue Service is attending and the name of the caller
- State the address of the incident and the premise name if applicable
- State what advice is required. ie telephone support or on-site support
- If on-site attendance is required be prepared to provide a map reference and directions
- Confirm that the police at the outer cordon are aware that the cylinder supplier’s representative is attending
- Number of cylinders involved and if collection will be required?

The supplier company will then pass the call onto the ‘competent person’. As all the companies are different in size and therefore have different levels of resource the way in which the first call is dealt with may vary but the technical advice offered will be standard across all companies.

If the Incident Commander would like on-site assistance this will be arranged by the ‘competent person’. However, before requesting a site visit certain questions need to be considered such as:

- **Is it definitely acetylene involved?** If unsure try to gather as much information as possible from the site occupier and over the telephone from the ‘competent person’. If still unable to determine a site visit may be required

- **Is the cylinder visible?** If it is covered in debris or behind other shielding and it can’t be seen it must be questioned if the attendance of the ‘competent person’ will add value to the decision making process?

- **Is there adequate lighting for the ‘competent person’ to be able to clearly see the cylinder/s involved?** If not it would be best to advise the ‘competent person’ not to arrive on site until after first light.
Attendance on site by competent persons should be managed in daylight hours where at all possible unless the incident involves severe disruption such as closing major arterial routes.

The ‘competent person’ will be able to help in identification and if necessary assist with providing guidance for the “Wetting Test”. They can also arrange for the removal of the cylinder(s) at the conclusion of the incident. The Incident Commander can discuss all relevant issues with the ‘competent person’, Police, Local Authority and any other relevant organisations in attendance in order to make an informed decision with regard to maintenance of the initial hazard zone or its reduction.

Apply the “Wetting Test” and/or use thermal imaging equipment to check that cooling has been effective?

Decomposition of the acetylene contained within a cylinder may take place after the external heat source has been removed if there has been sufficient transfer of energy to start the reaction. Once started it will continue until all of the acetylene is consumed or until the cylinder is effectively cooled and made safe. Acetylene cylinders are designed and tested to withstand such decomposition and can cool naturally without any problem. The porous mass is designed to assist in this. Cooling will slow the reaction and allow it to self extinguish.

It is therefore important to be able to identify if an acetylene cylinder is hot or becoming hotter by itself. This can be achieved by carrying out a “Wetting Test” and/or the use of thermal imaging equipment.

Testing may be performed immediately upon discovering cylinders that may have been exposed to heat, or during the cooling process for cylinders known to have undergone heating.

The purpose of testing is twofold, firstly to establish if the cylinder shell is cool and secondly to confirm that acetylene is not undergoing internal decomposition. To achieve the second purpose a number of successful tests spread over at least one hour must be observed. This procedure will ensure that any heat build up will be noticed externally before it can reach temperatures likely to weaken the cylinder shell or cause dangerous internal pressures. Due to high conductivity of steel, any decomposition occurring in a part of the cylinder that cannot be seen will still be observable using the ‘wetting test’ on any visible part of the cylinder shell.

When externally cool, the cylinder should be safe to approach as long as no gas is leaking but it must not be moved in case there is a large internal cavity due to damage to the porous mass. Movement of the cylinder may accelerate decomposition and result in catastrophic failure hence the importance of continuing to apply ‘wetting tests’ for at least one hour after a perceived ‘test pass’ has been observed.
The ‘wetting test’ involves:

- Getting a clear view of the cylinders from a shielded location
- Briefly spraying water on to the cylinder surface
- Stopping spraying and looking for signs of steam rising from the surface of the cylinder
- If steam is not seen rising, checking to see whether the wetted cylinder surface dries out quickly (ie one – two minutes).

**NOTE:** During the process of combustion tars and oils may be released and deposited on the cylinder surfaces. The oil and tar deposits may make the ‘drying out’ part of the test difficult to interpret due to the reaction between oil and water

- If either check is failed then water cooling must be re-applied for one hour before testing again. If both tests are passed then the "monitoring phase" should start.

**NOTE:** Use of thermal imaging equipment and remote temperature measuring equipment gives additional confidence and should be used whenever possible.

'**Monitoring phase**' – Stop water cooling, do not move the cylinder, maintain hazard zone, re-apply the wetting test and/or thermal image equipment tests at 15 minute intervals for one hour.

*If any re-heating is observed water cool continuously for one hour then start the monitoring phase again.*

Water cooling must be completely stopped during the monitoring phase to allow any internal heating to show itself by raising the temperature of the exterior of the cylinder shell. Testing should be carried out at 15 minute intervals so that any heat build up through decomposition will be noticed before it can reach a dangerous temperature. A written record of the results of the tests should be maintained throughout the monitoring phase.

It should be noted that effective water cooling may reduce the cylinder temperature down to the temperature of the cooling water which may be lower than the ambient temperature. This means that during the monitoring phase when no water is being used to cool the cylinder its temperature may rise slowly and naturally to its ambient temperature. The Incident Commander should take care not to misinterpret this rise in temperature as the result of internal decomposition.
The natural heating effect of direct sunlight on dark coloured or blackened cylinders will also result in a rise in the cylinder shell temperature which is not attributable to decomposition. If in doubt the Incident Commander should extend the monitoring phase or, if the temperature rises above ambient/expected levels, recommence water cooling for at least one hour.

An appropriate, risk assessed hazard zone should be maintained throughout the monitoring phase because should re-heating of the cylinder take place, it may be difficult to quickly reintroduce cooling phase cordons due to staffing levels and adverse public reaction.

If any re-heating above ambient cylinder temperature (either steaming or rapid drying out) is observed at any of the wetting tests then the cylinder must be continuously water cooled for a further one hour. After this period the wetting test and/or testing with thermal image equipment should be carried out again. If no re-heating has occurred the full monitoring phase procedure should be also started again (ie stop water cooling and carry out “wetting Tests” at 15 minute intervals for one hour).

It should be remembered that failure of the cylinder occurs because the cylinder has reached temperatures of over 300°C and the cylinder walls are losing their tensile strength. Cylinders at temperatures close to 300°C will cause the water to violently boil off, as seen when red hot metal is plunged into cold water. The “failure” of the Wetting Test due to a “hotspot” does not imply that the cylinder is at immediate risk of failure unless there is an extremely violent reaction.

Is the cylinder leaking?

The monitoring phase will have established that the cylinder shell has been effectively cooled from its original temperature, but more importantly that any decomposition reaction has stopped. However, if there is still any low-level decomposition within the cylinder then this will be fuelled, and potentially accelerated, if fresh acetylene passes through this area (ie if a leak pulls gas across the decomposition zone). The leak would need to be serious to stimulate rapid decomposition. A leak such as this would be seen from a melted fusible plug, should that be present or a massive release from the valve. The porous mass should be adequate to self extinguish in the event of small leaks. If decomposition is fuelled, then the cylinder will heat up. This heating will then be detectable as the shell of the cylinder shows signs, once again, of heat. If there is a significant leak the Incident Commander should consider re-establishing the monitoring phase (ie cylinder shell temperature checks at 15 minute intervals for a further hour).

Leaking acetylene gas may also cause an additional fire and/or explosion hazard if it is confined around the leaking cylinder. This risk needs to be assessed and managed by the Fire and Rescue Service.
No further action by Fire and Rescue Service, hand-over to owner or responsible person

7C5.112 Heat damaged cylinders are not the responsibility of the Fire and Rescue Service. Once the fire and explosion risk has been dealt with the site and cylinder(s) should be handed over to the responsible person, owner or operator. A full brief should be given by the Incident Commander to the responsible person detailing what action has been taken and why. If the cylinders are not at a premises but on public land, contact the local authority or the Highways Agency as appropriate.

Multiple cylinders (or substantially concealed single cylinders)

7C5.113 Where multiple cylinders are encountered and they are very closely packed, and/or concealed/buried by debris, there may be a risk that the cooling water may not come into contact with a substantial proportion of the cylinder shell, therefore limiting the effect of cooling.

7C5.114 If the Incident Commander considers that a significant area of any cylinder is ‘dry’ then the cooling phase should extended (eg if 50 per cent of a cylinder is not being touched by cooling water (ie dry metal) then consider increasing the cooling phase to three hours).

7C5.115 In extreme circumstances where the vast majority of the cylinder(s) is concealed or buried and is believed to be ‘dry’, the Incident Commander should consider increasing both the cooling phase and the monitoring phase.

Liquefied petroleum gas

Characteristics

7C5.116 This section provides a brief over-view of liquefied petroleum gas. Further detailed information can be found in Fire Service Manual (Volume 2 Fire Service Operations) Petrochemical incidents – Chapter 8 Liquefied petroleum gas.

7C5.117 Many hydrocarbons exist as gases at normal atmospheric temperatures but they can be liquefied under moderate pressure. As the liquids occupy only about 1/250th of the space they would occupy if they were stored as gases, from a commercial point of view, it is more practicable to store and convey the hydrocarbons as liquids.
Liquefied petroleum gas may be stored as a liquid either at ambient temperature under its own vapour pressure or in a refrigerated condition at a lower pressure. If the temperature of the storage is sufficiently low, the liquefied petroleum gas may be stored at atmospheric pressure.

### Propane and butane main properties of the gases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Propane</th>
<th>Butane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific gravity of liquid (water = 1)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of gas (air = 1)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vapour pressure at 15°C</td>
<td>7 bars</td>
<td>2 bars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boiling point of liquid</td>
<td>-42°C</td>
<td>-0.5°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flammability range in air</td>
<td>2% to 10%</td>
<td>1.5% to 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical temperature</td>
<td>97°C</td>
<td>152°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion ratio liquid to vapour</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that liquefied petroleum gas vapour is heavier than air, it will flow along the ground and into drains, etc, sinking to low levels. In still air conditions any accumulation of vapour will take some time to disperse. This means that a flammable mixture might become ignited some distance from the point of leakage with the flame travelling back to that point.

Liquefied petroleum gas is colourless, odourless, and has anaesthetic properties. For this reason liquefied petroleum gas is usually odorised enabling detection by smell down to one fifth of the lower limit of flammability (ie, approximately 0.4 per cent gas in air). In some circumstances, however, the odorant would not be used.

Escaping liquefied petroleum gas can also be recognized by its cooling effect on the surrounding air, causing condensation and freezing of water vapour in the air, showing as frost at the point of leakage. Owing to its consequent lowering of temperatures, liquefied petroleum gas can cause severe frost burns to the skin.

### Hazards

Liquefied petroleum gas is highly flammable

**Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)** – When liquefied petroleum gas pressurised containers (road/rail tanker storage vessels) are heated, without adequate cooling, a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion could occur. This is usually a result of the heating of a vessel containing a flammable liquid by an external fire. The contents of the vessel are heated above their boiling point and the pressure in the vessel increases. The failure occurs when the flames impinge on an area which does not have liquid on the other side. As the liquid is heated and boils it absorbs heat, it is generally when the...
liquid has boiled away from the area of impingement that weakening of the vessel wall will occur. The vessel ruptures and pieces can be propelled considerable distances. The spillage of the overheated liquids and then ignition create a large fireball with explosion pressure effects. This can mean that it is extremely difficult to predict when, and if, a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion will occur. A vessel that is venting in a fire does not mean that everything is safe, more than likely the opposite is the case. A boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion can occur at any time and some have occurred many hours into an incident.

**7C5.124** For further details on a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion, its causes and effects refer to *The Fire Service Manual (Volume 2, Fire Service Operations)* Petrochemical Incidents.

**7C5.125** An unconfined vapour cloud explosion is an event where a flammable cloud of fuel/air burns in free space, generating shock waves, the flame front accelerating from a low initial velocity to sonic velocity. One of the main differences with this type of explosion is that the explosion centre may be a substantial distance from the incident (up to 5Km) due to cloud drift, possibly creating significant additional problems for firefighters.

### Calculations of fireball diameters for containers of differing size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel volume (m³)</th>
<th>Diameter fireball (m)</th>
<th>Duration fireball (sec)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational considerations**

**Liquefied petroleum gas cylinders firefighting considerations**

- There is no ‘safe period’ when a pressurized liquefied petroleum gas container is subjected to heat, especially when heating is due to direct flame contact. Expect a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion at any time if adequate cooling is not available

- Ideally do not try to put out a fire involving liquefied petroleum gas, isolate the supply of gas to extinguish the flames or allow it to burn out

- If extinguishment is the only course of action use dry powder type media but beware the build up of flammable/explosive atmosphere
• Assess any immediate crew and public life risks, then gather information to establish an initial cordon around the potential hazard zone. Consideration should be given to evacuation of the public and non-essential responders

• Protect surrounding risks and cool the cylinder with water spray. Generally as soon as effective water cooling takes place hot cylinders are unlikely to fail. However, firefighters should take advantage of any available substantial shielding/cover and keep as low as possible to the ground. Lashed jets and monitors should always be considered

• Any flame contact on liquefied petroleum gas cylinders is dangerous and can lead to cylinder failure and explosion, but contact on the cylinder surface area above the level of the liquid (i.e. ‘dry walled’ areas at the top of the cylinder) is most dangerous as the internal gas will not conduct heat away as quickly as internal liquid.

**Bulk liquefied petroleum gas firefighting considerations**

• In the case of small leaks only that have ignited and posed an contact hazard, the flames may be extinguished with dry agent and freeze-sealing techniques applied if staff have received appropriate training

• Where there is no risk to life, serious consideration should be given to employing a ‘defensive’ or ‘non-attack strategy’

• Evacuation of the surrounding area should be considered a priority – debris may be projected over 1 km from the fire site

• If it is decided to attack the fire, immediate, massive cooling should be applied, paying particular attention to ‘dry wall’ areas. This cooling is also important in securing adequate time to evacuate the danger zone

• Responders should be fully briefed as to the potential danger of the situation

• The Incident Commander should exercise strict control and supervision over crews involved

• Ground monitors or lashed jets/branches should be employed as early into the incident as possible

• Consider employment of water bottoming techniques if specialist advice is available

• Consider flame bending to prevent flame contact on pressurized containers

• Reduction of tank inventory may hasten the onset of a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion due to the increase in dry wall area as the tank is emptied

• Remember that in the event of a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion the fireball can engulf exposed crews. The use of heavy coarse sprays to provide a measure of protection for crews and equipment against fire effects should be considered
If a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion occurs, the ground flash can exceed the size of the arising fireball with the attendant risk to crews.

**Unignited leaks**

- The primary considerations are the size of the leak, wind strength and direction, and the potential for vapour cloud ignition
- Consider the need for evacuation of members of the public.
- Wind direction and gradient are same

**Wind and gradient in opposite directions**

- Elimination of ignition sources
- Consider the need for evacuation of members of the public
- Elimination of ignition sources
- Consider vapour containment and dispersal by the use of fog branches or monitors, flat fan or other ground sprays to form a barrier to movement of vapour clouds and to reduce the gas concentration to below the lower explosive limit by the entrainment of air
• Vapour clouds can be controlled by water sprays/walls but the application of water to liquid spills will increase the rate of vaporisation
• Use explosimeters to determine the effectiveness of procedures
• Responders should only enter vapour cloud in exceptional circumstances in order to effect rescues or to attempt to stem the leak. Even then, they should wear structural firefighting kit (including flash/fire-hoods), breathing apparatus and be provided with the protection of heavy water spray or fog coverage. If necessary, the crew providing this cover should be similarly protected
• Pools of liquefied petroleum gas should be covered by medium/high foam in order to reduce gassing off
• Strict control of hazard area should be implemented to prevent inadvertent entry to area of danger
• Consider possible accumulations of gas at low levels, eg, in basements, drain and water courses.

**Water injection into liquefied petroleum gas vessels (water bottoming)**

• If the escape of burning liquefied petroleum gas is from an outlet near the base of the vessel and the installation includes a fire brigade inlet, water may be gently introduced into the vessel to lift the liquefied petroleum gas above the outlet, which will extinguish the fire at this point and allow staff to approach the vessel to carry out the necessary actions to stem the flow of liquid
• However, extreme caution should be exercised when using this method, particularly to ensure that only sufficient water pressure is used to lift the vessel’s contents above the outlet. If such precautions are not observed, liquefied petroleum gas could be forced out of the safety relief valves in the top of the vessel, which could lead to a far worse situation than the original incident
• This technique must not be used under any circumstances for refrigerated containers because the water will freeze and the refrigerated liquid will boil with potentially catastrophic consequences

**NOTE:** Specialist advice is imperative prior to pumping water into an liquefied petroleum gas vessel, to ensure that other dangers are not introduced – such as over-pressure in the vessel due to admission of water in excessive quantities or at excessive rates, and freezing of leaking valves, etc, where evaporation of liquefied petroleum gas will cause cooling below the freezing point of water. Such ice formation could melt later, resulting in possible undetected leakage of liquefied petroleum gas.
Liquefied natural gas

Characteristics

7C5.126 Comprehensive information on all forms of natural gas can be found in Fire Service Manual (Volume 2 Fire Service Operations) Natural Gas Incidents and Fire Service Manual (Volume 2 Fire Service Operations) Petrochemical Incidents, Chapter 7 Liquefied Natural Gas.

7C5.127 When natural gas is cooled to a temperature of approximately –160 0C and it is at atmospheric pressure it condenses to a liquid called liquefied natural gas.

7C5.128 Liquefied natural gas is odourless, colourless, non-corrosive and non-toxic, it vaporises rapidly to form a highly flammable gas when mixed with air. It is not explosive in its liquid state; its vapour can explode when mixed with air in the right proportions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liquefied natural gas main physical properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boiling point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific gravity of liquid (water=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vapour density (air=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flammability range in air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion ratio liquid to vapour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hazards

- Accidental leakage of liquefied natural gas will boil (vaporise) instantly gaining heat from its surrounding area: gas is initially heavier than air with the vapour cloud above the spillage
- Liquefied natural gas will ignite easily at very low concentrations in air 5 to 15 per cent, edges of gas cloud most likely to find ignition source causing rapid burn back towards the evaporating liquid
- Liquefied natural gas is 83-99 per cent methane, when ignited generates vast quantities of heat radiation quickly (twice the heat from the equivalent quantity of petrol)
- Bulk storage of liquefied natural gas poses a severe cryogenic hazard
- High concentrations of liquefied natural gas may cause oxygen deficiency and asphyxiation. Whilst not toxic liquefied natural gas vapours are capable of causing asphyxiation by displacing the air necessary to support life
- Liquefied natural gas will react explosively at room temperature with chlorine and bromine
• May explode on contact with chlorine trifluoride.

Operational considerations

Firefighting

• If possible extinguish flame by isolating source of supply, only if considered essential should flame be extinguished using fine water spray (fog) without isolating source, due to danger of unignited vapour explosion.

Spillages

• Small spills – establish cordon in all directions, stay upwind, vapour will initially collect in low lying areas, eliminate all ignition sources, use water sprays to control vapours
• Do not direct water at the spill or source of the leak as this will lead to an increase in vaporisation
• Large spills – Consider evacuation and/or shelter-in-place (ie keep people indoors closing all windows and doors)
• Environmental – prevent spillage from entering drains or water course.

Cryogenics

Characteristics

7C5.129 Cryogenic liquids are liquefied gases that are kept in their liquid state at very low temperatures. All cryogenic liquids are gases at normal temperatures and pressures. These gases must be cooled to below room temperature before an increase in pressure can liquefy them.

7C5.130 The vapours and gases released from cryogenic liquids also remain very cold. They often condense the moisture in air, creating a highly visible fog.

7C5.131 Each cryogenic liquid has its own specific properties but most cryogenic liquids can be placed into one of three groups:

INERT GASES
Inert gases do not react chemically to any great extent. They do not burn or support combustion. Examples of this group are nitrogen, helium, neon, argon and krypton.

FLAMMABLE GASES
Some cryogenic liquids produce a gas that can burn in air. The most common examples are hydrogen, methane and liquefied natural gas.
OXYGEN

Many materials considered as non-combustible can burn in the presence of liquid oxygen. Organic materials can react explosively with liquid oxygen. The hazards and handling precautions of liquid oxygen must therefore be considered separately from other cryogenic liquids.

7C5.132 Cryogenic liquids are shipped and used in thermally insulated containers. These cryogenic liquid containers are specifically designed to withstand rapid temperature changes and extreme differences in temperature.

Liquid dewar flasks

7C5.133 Liquid dewar flasks are non-pressurized, vacuum-jacketed vessels, somewhat like a “Thermos bottle”. They should have a loose fitting cap or plug that prevents air and moisture from entering, yet allows excess pressure to vent. Flasks containing helium, hydrogen and other low boiling point liquids have an outer vessel of liquid nitrogen for insulation.

Laboratory liquid dewar flasks

7C5.134 Laboratory liquid dewars have wide-mouthed openings and may not have lids or covers. These small containers are primarily used in laboratories for temporary storage.

Liquid cylinders

7C5.135 Liquid cylinders are pressurized containers specifically designed for cryogenic liquids. This type of container has valves for filling and dispensing the cryogenic liquid, and a pressure-control valve and a pressure relief valve with a frangible (bursting) disk as backup protection. There are three major types of liquid cylinders designed for dispensing:

- liquid or gas
- only gas
- only liquid.
Hazards

Extreme cold

- Cryogenic liquids and their associated cold vapours and gases can produce a thermal burn. There is no initial pain, but there is intense pain when frozen tissue thaws.

- Unprotected skin can stick to metal that is cooled by cryogenic liquids. The skin can then tear when pulled away. Prolonged breathing of extremely cold air may damage the lungs.

Asphyxiation

- When cryogenic liquids form a gas, the gas is very cold and usually heavier than air. This cold, heavy gas does not disperse very well and can accumulate near the floor. Even if the gas is non-toxic, it displaces air. Oxygen deficiency is a serious hazard in enclosed or confined spaces.

- Small amounts of liquid can evaporate into very large volumes of gas. For example, one litre of liquid nitrogen vaporises to 695 litres of nitrogen gas when warmed to room temperature (21°C).

Toxicity

- The chances of the Fire and Rescue Service encountering toxic cryogenic substances is extremely remote as they are only likely to be found in tiny quantities in one or two research establishments in the world. If they are encountered reference should be made to the material safety data sheet for information about the toxic hazards of a particular cryogen.

Fire hazard

- Flammable gases such as hydrogen, methane, liquefied natural gas and carbon monoxide can burn or explode. Hydrogen is particularly hazardous. It forms flammable mixtures with air over a wide range of concentration; it is also very easily ignited.

Oxygen-enriched air

- Liquid hydrogen and liquid helium are both so cold that they can liquefy the air they contact. For example, liquid air can condense on a surface cooled by liquid hydrogen or helium. Nitrogen evaporates more rapidly than oxygen from the liquid air. This action leaves behind a liquid air mixture which, when evaporated, gives a high concentration of oxygen.
Liquid oxygen hazard

- Liquid oxygen contains 4,000 times more oxygen by volume than normal air. Materials that are usually considered non-combustible, (such as carbon and stainless steels, cast iron, aluminium, zinc and teflon (PTFE),) may burn in the presence of liquid oxygen. Many organic materials can react explosively, especially if a flammable mixture is produced. Clothing splashed or soaked with liquid oxygen can remain highly flammable for hours.

Explosion due to rapid expansion

- Without adequate venting or pressure-relief devices on the containers, enormous pressures can build up. The pressure can cause an explosion called a ‘boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion’ (BLEVE)
- Unusual or accidental conditions such as an external fire, or a break in the vacuum which provides thermal insulation, may cause a very rapid pressure rise. The pressure relief valve may not be able to handle this increased pressure. Therefore, the containers must also have another backup device such as a frangible (bursting) disc.

Operational considerations

- Once cryogenic products have escaped from their containment vessel there is no mechanism for recovering the product
- Large volumes will eventually absorb enough heat from the atmosphere to boil and form a gas, which can then be dispersed
- This process can take along time and the resultant freezing of land or structures can cause other problems
- Cryogenic products will form dense vapour clouds.

Spillages

- Stop the flow of liquid. Consider the use of water to freeze seal a small slow leak, water can not always be used safely, some materials will react violently with water or could make a corrosive solution that would enlarge the hole
- Where possible contain the leak, disperse the vapours using water sprays or reduce vaporisation by covering the liquid with a tarpaulin or appropriate foam layer
- Dry agents only near the liquid
- Do not allow anyone to enter the vapour cloud unless they are wearing appropriate personal protective equipment
- Consider evacuation of the public.
Ammonia gas

Characteristics

7C5.136 Ammonia is a colourless, corrosive and toxic gas that is about one half as dense as air at ordinary temperatures and pressures. It is regarded as flammable however because of the high ignition temperatures and the narrow flammable range of 15-28 per cent. The possibility of ignition is remote. Ammonia has a characteristic pungent, penetrating odour and forms a minute proportion of the atmosphere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammonia gas main physical properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boiling point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative vapour density gas (air=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative density liquid (water=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flammability range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-ignition temperature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hazards

- Although generally lighter than air, ammonia gas can mix with water vapour and become heavier than air, collecting in pockets at floor level. It is not normally flammable, but at extremely high concentrations it can create an explosive mixture with air.

- Ammonia is a severe irritant of the eyes, nose and throat.

- Exposure in excess of the allowable workplace limits can cause headaches, coughing and difficulty breathing. Prolonged exposure to high concentrations of ammonia can lead to pulmonary oedema, which can be fatal.

- Skin contact with liquid ammonia can cause burns. Eye contact can cause severe damage to the eye.

- Ammonia, even at dilute concentrations, is highly toxic to aquatic animals, and for this reason it is classified as dangerous to the environment.

- Ammonia has a high reactivity and may react enthusiastically or violently with some materials, including acids and aldehydes.
Operational considerations

Unignited leaks

• In a spillage situation water sprays or fog may be used to dissolve, reduce or divert any vapours but the run off should be contained to avoid severe and long-term impact to the environment.

• If possible the leak should be stopped, but any spilled liquid will rapidly vaporise and disperse over a large area. Initial isolation of 100m should be maintained until the gas has dispersed.

Ignited leaks

• The main concerns will be to prevent the gas interacting with other materials and to cool containers. Only if essential (ie to save life) should the flame be extinguished without isolating source, due to the danger of unignited gas leak explosion.

• Any heating of the contained gas will cause pressure rise and the potential of the risk of containers rupturing or exploding.

• Firefighting should be undertaken from the maximum distance possible utilising ground monitors or unmanned hose holders.

• Toxic and corrosive fumes may be produced in a fire.

• Warn the public to stay indoors, close all windows and doors, alternatively, consider evacuation.

NOTE: Ammonia is transported and used as either aqueous or anhydrous ammonia. The former is ammonia dissolved in water which is substantially less hazardous than the latter, which contains no water and to which the above precautions apply.

Chlorine gas

Characteristics

7C5.137 Chlorine is very reactive and widely used for water purification, sanitation, as a bleaching agent, as a versatile raw material in synthetic chemistry etc.
7C5.138 It exists as a pale green gas about 2.5 times as dense as air. It is poisonous with a detectable odour in concentrations ranging between 0.2 and 0.4ppm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chlorine main physical properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boiling point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative density (water = 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vapour pressure, kPa at 20°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative vapour density (air=1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7C5.139 Chlorine is normally found as a gas, but can be pressurized and cooled to change to a liquid for shipping and storage. If released chlorine liquid will quickly revert to a gas that stays close to the ground and spreads rapidly.

**Hazards**

- very toxic by inhalation and can be recognized by its pungent, irritating odour similar to that of bleach
- may cause severe damage to eyes
- corrosive to skin and most materials
- oxidising substance
- can ignite combustible substances
- it is not itself flammable, but can react explosively or form explosive compounds with other chemicals such as turpentine and ammonia
- spilled liquid has a very low temperature and evaporates quickly
- persons exposed to chlorine become restless, sneeze, develop sore throat and salivate copiously
- liquefied pressure gas
- heating may cause pressure rise leading to a risk of bursting
- marine pollutant and acutely toxic to the aquatic environment

**NOTE:** Effects are likely to be severe and long term.
Operational considerations

Spillage

- Do not spray water on to a spillage or leaking cylinder
- In emergencies limited water sprays may be used with extreme caution to ‘knock down’, control or divert vapours but the run off should be contained to avoid severe and long-term impact on the environment
- If possible the leak should be stopped, but any spilled liquid will rapidly vaporise and the resultant gas is heavier than air and so will settle in any low-lying areas
- Isolation of the area should be maintained until the gas has dispersed
- Consider evacuation but it is generally safer to keep people indoors with all doors and windows closed, in an upstairs room if possible
- If chlorine gas comes into contact with moist tissue, such as is found in the eyes, throat and lungs, an acid is produced that can cause damage to these tissues
- Prevent from entering watercourse and sewers
- The UK chlorine industry has established a free mutual-aid scheme known as ‘Chloraid’ available 24/7 to provide expert help and guidance on all matters involving chlorine. Further information may be found by reference to the following web link:
  
  www.chloraid.srst.co.uk/

Fire

- Emergency Action Code – 2XE therefore use fine water spray or fog
  
  **NOTE:** Prevent run-off from entering drains and watercourses
- The gas itself will support combustion therefore avoid the gas interacting with other materials
  
  **NOTE:** Steel will burn in a chlorine atmosphere
- Cool intact and undamaged containers as they may explode when exposed to heat
- Any heating of the contained gas will cause a pressure rise and therefore the potential for risk of bursting and explosion
- Firefighting should be undertaken from the maximum distance possible or by using unmanned hose holders or ground monitors
  
  **NOTE:** Consideration of boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) situations should be anticipated and actions taken accordingly. Further information is contained in 7C5.123 and 7C2.39.
PART C–6
UN Class 3 Flammable liquids

General information

Introduction

7C6.1 There is no simple ‘response for all occasions’ when it comes to incidents involving flammable liquids. In addition to posing the threat of fire, most of these materials also present a health hazard for the worker or emergency responder. When dealing with flammable liquids it is safe to assume that they possess more than one hazard, this section deals only with those that directly influence its fire hazards.

Characteristics and classification

7C6.2 UN Class 3 Flammable Liquids covers substances and articles, which:

- are liquids at 20°C and at a pressure of 101.3 kPa, with a melting point or initial melting point of 20°C or less at a pressure of 101.3 kPa
- at 50°C have a vapour pressure of not more than 300kPa
- have a flash point of not more than 60°C.

7C6.3 This group also contains:

- liquid substances and molten solid substances with a flash-point of more than 60°C that are carried or handed over for carriage whilst heated at temperatures equal to or higher than their flash-point
- liquid desensitised explosives, which are explosive substances that are dissolved or suspended in water or other liquid substances to form a homogeneous liquid mixture to suppress their explosive properties.

7C6.4 Flammable and potentially flammable liquids can be identified in a number of ways:

- hazard warning diamonds
- hazard warning symbols
- United Nations Class 3 or hazard sub risk 3
- ADR hazard identification number containing 3
- description as a Class I, II or III flammable liquid
• description of a liquid as ‘flammable’, highly flammable’ or extremely flammable’
• chemical name showing the material is carbon based, for example, ethanol or butanone.

UN Class 3 hazard symbol for flammable liquids

Hazards and risk assessment

7C6.5 Once it has been established that a flammable liquid is present and will impact upon the risk assessment for the incident, the physical properties of the material should be determined as a matter of urgency to assess the significance the fire risk is.

7C6.6 Having investigated the documented inherent physical properties of the substance the relevant environmental properties also need to be considered (eg the ambient temperature, wind strength and direction etc).

Factors that increase fire risks from flammable liquids

QUANTITY AND SURFACE AREA

7C6.7 As the quantity of a flammable liquid increases so does the risk because a large quantity can generate a spill with a greater surface area than a small quantity. Increased surface area facilitates the evolution of vapour and the potential size of the ignitable plume or fire. Additionally, any fire that results from a large quantity of liquid can be deeper and thus last longer than one from a small quantity.

HEATING

7C6.8 Hot materials are more reactive and ‘volatile’ (produce more vapours) so a heated flammable liquid will generally be more ignitable than a cold one and more likely to exhibit rapid fire growth.

CONTAINMENT

7C6.9 If materials are released in a poorly ventilated or confined situation then the hazards they bring will be increased above those anticipated at an open area where dispersion is possible. Toxic, flammable/explosion hazards are increased by confinement.
PRESSURE

7C6.10 Apart from the very obvious danger of bursting its container the fact that a material is under pressure means that it will be likely to give off far more vapour if it is allowed to escape. Increased vapour can exaggerate toxicity and flammability hazards. Additionally reactions of gaseous materials are often increased by the application of pressure.

INCOMPATIBLE MATERIALS

7C6.11 Some materials, especially oxidizing agents, are likely to react chemically with flammable liquids. The heat of the reaction and/or presence of oxidizing agent will make the mixture liable to ignition and rapid fire growth.

ABSORBERS, ADSORBERS AND WICKS

7C6.12 The common belief that ‘absorbing’ hazardous materials makes them safer is not entirely true. Many adsorbers can act as a wick and enable materials to be ignitable below their documented flashpoints.

LOCATION

7C6.13 Proximity to human or animals, property, sensitive or protected habitat will increase the risk that any loss will be significant.

TOPOGRAPHY AND METROLOGY

7C6.14 Slopes will spread a spill, depressions in the surface and trenches, etc can collect/concentrate vapours that are heavier than air. Strong sunshine can heat materials and surfaces they may contact. Rain can cause the boiling of liquefied gases and react with water-reactive materials.

INERTING AGENTS

7C6.15 By replacing the air with a gas that does not support combustion the risk of fire can be greatly reduced or eliminated.

ABSORBERS AND ADSORBERS

7C6.16 These can be used to immobilise or contain a spill to restrict its surface area and prevent movement towards sensitive areas or other hazardous features such as ignition sources or incompatible materials.

LOCATION

7C6.17 Locations remote from risk to life, property or vulnerable habitat decrease the likelihood of significant damage occurring should ignition occur.

TOPOGRAPHY AND METROLOGY

7C6.18 Strong winds can disperse vapours and gases, rain can dissolve soluble gases, ‘wash them out’ of the atmosphere and promote mixing/dilution of any vapour plume. Spills can collect in depressions in the ground to limit spread and surface area.
Operational considerations

7C6.19 Incidents involving flammable liquids will fall into one of two categories:

- unignited leak of substance
- substance involved in fire.

Unignited leak of substance

7C6.20 Incidents involving an unignited leak of substance, unless dealt with effectively and efficiently, will evolve quickly into an incident involving fire. It is imperative, therefore, that the Incident Commander and hazardous materials adviser fully understand the hazards and risks involved.

7C6.21 Having identified and interpreted the physical properties of the material and relevant environmental influences on risk, the following actions should be considered:

- eliminate all ignition sources
- stop leak, if practicable
- prevent the substance entering water courses, drainage systems, basements, etc
- absorb the substance with sand, earth or other non-combustible material
- consider foam suppression of vapours
- consider water sprays to control vapours
- use spark-proof equipment.

Additional operational considerations when involved in fire

7C6.22 Dealing with a flammable liquid directly involved in fire is relatively simple albeit hazardous. Consider:

- For small fires, CO₂ or dry powder may be effective media
- Do not apply water to burning flammable liquid fires unless a full assessment of its physical properties has been made as a dangerous, violent reaction, boil-over or slop-over may occur
- For larger fires normal foam, alcohol resistant foam or fine spray is usually appropriate. These should be applied from a safe distance, preferably using fixed monitors. Foam should be applied gently where possible using spray techniques. Care must be exercised to avoid surface disturbance and spreading the burning liquid
• Generally large scale foam attacks should not be started until all resources, including foam concentrate, are available on-site

• Whilst efforts will be made to extinguish the fire, the surrounding risks may well be a priority

• Spill fires can be most difficult to deal with especially when being fed by a storage tank or pressurised pipeline. The source of the leak should be identified and isolated as soon as possible

• With a flowing spill fire it is generally best to commence at the furthest point of the fire and work towards the source of spillage. It is good practice to form a deep blanket of foam beyond the farthest point at the lowest level so that flowing burning liquid will flow beneath it and be extinguished

• Beware fires involving tanks and containers of flammable liquids as over-pressurisation and explosion may occur. Cool any affected containers with water spray

• Beware flammable liquids entering drains, sewerage systems and other confined spaces where it may vaporise and create explosive atmospheres

• Further detailed information on fighting petroleum fires is contained in chapter 6 of the Fire Service Manual (Volume 2 Fire Service Operations), Petrochemical incidents

• Further detailed guidance on using foam for firefighting is contained in Fire Service Manual (Volume 2 Fire Service Operations) Firefighting Foam

• Further technical guidance on firefighting foam is contained in Fire Service Manual (Volume 1 Fire Service Technology, Equipment and Media) Firefighting Foam – Technical.

Factors that decrease fire risks from flammable liquids

QUANTITY

7C6.23 Decreased quantities mean smaller potential surface area of any spill, and fires of shorter duration.

COOLING

7C6.24 As flammable liquids are cooled they become less reactive and less volatile to produce less vapour.

SURFACE AREA

7C6.25 The smaller the surface area the less vapour will be evolved; so a small, deep spill will last longer than a large, shallow one of the same volume (quantity of material) but will have a smaller vapour hazard surrounding it and thus is less likely to come into contact with an ignition source.
FOAM BLANKETS
7C6.26 An appropriate foam can put a barrier between the flammable liquid and supporter of combustion to inhibit the formation of an ignitable fuel/air mixture. Foam blankets can limit the size of any ignitable plume and slow the fire growth if an ignition does take place.

VENTILATION
7C6.27 Good ventilation can assist in dispersing flammable vapours to minimize the size of any ignitable plumes. By providing an easy path for the escape of any gases heated by an ignition, the risk of explosion is reduced.

PRESSURE
7C6.28 Adjusting pressure to match the ambient pressure decreases hazard by reducing the strain on mechanical features thus reducing the potential to explode, implode or eject the contents.
PART C–7
UN Class 4 Flammable solids; substances liable to spontaneously combust; substances which on contact with water emit flammable gases

General information

Introduction

7C7.1 Flammable solids are amongst the most common of all flammable materials, but relatively few are included in the UN hazardous substances classifications.

7C7.2 Those included can exhibit special risks and this section highlights some of the more important problems associated with these hazardous materials.

Characteristics, classification and hazards

Division 4.1 Flammable solids, self-reactive substances and desensitized explosives

Division 4.1: Flammable solids, self-reactive substances and desensitized explosives

7C7.3 This division includes:

- Desensitized explosives such as those wetted with sufficient water, alcohol, or plasticizer to suppress explosive properties (e.g., UN 1356 Trinitrotoluene, wetted with not less than 30 per cent water by mass; UN 3319 Nitroglycerine mixture desensitised, solid)
• Readily combustible solids. Examples include:
  – solids that may cause a fire through friction, such as matches, eg, UN 1331 Matches ‘Strike Anywhere’
  – UN 1327 Hay, Straw or Bhusa
  – UN 2000 Celluloid.

• Self-reactive materials that are thermally unstable and can undergo a strongly exothermic (heat-evolving) decomposition even without the presence of oxygen (air). Certain exclusions apply, eg, the material meets the definition of an explosive, oxidizer or organic peroxide as prescribed in the UN transport regulations.

Division 4.2: Substance liable to spontaneous combustion

Division 4.2: Substances liable to spontaneous combustion

7C7.4 Substances (solids and liquids) which are liable to spontaneous heating under normal conditions encountered in transport, or to heating up in contact with air, and being then liable to catch fire.

7C7.5 Spontaneously combustible materials include:

• Pyrophoric (literally, ‘fire-loving’) materials. These are materials (solids and liquids) that can ignite with no external ignition source within five minutes after coming in contact with air (eg UN 1854 Barium alloys, pyrophoric)

• Self-heating materials, those that exhibit spontaneous ignition or heat themselves to a temperature of 200°C during a 24-hour test period in the presence of air but in the absence of an energy supply (This behaviour is called spontaneous combustion, eg UN 2002 Celluloid)

• Generic advice on dealing with these materials is contained in Emergency Response Guidebook GUIDE NUMBER: 136.

Other considerations

7C7.6 There is a range of factors which influence whether solids are included in Division 4.1 or 4.2. Some of these are discussed below.
7C7.7 Normally it is the vapours produced from liquids or solids which burn, not the actual materials themselves. In practical terms, solids rarely produce enough vapours at ordinary temperatures to be ignitable; naphthalene and camphor being notable exceptions. However as solids are heated then vapour production will increase as they melt and possibly boil (e.g. sulphur). Some solids, normally organic in nature, will decompose as they are heated to produce small combustible molecules which, eventually, when mixed with air, may ignite (e.g. wood, plastics, paper).

7C7.8 For naturally occurring flammable solids the water content of the material can determine its ignition temperature. For example, it is relatively easy to ignite dry grass but rather more difficult to ignite damp grass.

7C7.9 Similarly the shape and surface area of solids also affects the ignition temperature. It is considerably more difficult to ignite a bar of metal where the access of oxygen in the air to the metal surface is limited and heat is rapidly spread throughout the bulk of the solid, than to ignite a similar weight of finely divided metal dust where the access of oxygen is much increased and the ability of the metal particles to lose heat quickly is reduced (i.e. the particles heat up more quickly than the bar of metal). Should the dust be confined in any way then the ignition process may give way to a deflagration reaction.

7C7.10 To further complicate matters, some elements can exist in different structural forms called allotropes, for example, graphite and diamond are allotropes of the element carbon. All the allotropes contain exactly the same atoms of the element, but as the atoms are bonded together in different ways they have different properties. Graphite and diamond are chemically inert except at very high temperatures; pure graphite and oxygen will not react until about 700°C. Amorphous forms of carbon (i.e. forms of carbon that can have varying structures) are much more reactive than their allotropic forms. Coal, coke, charcoal and animal charcoal are examples of amorphous forms of carbon that will burn readily provided they are suitably activated.

7C7.11 Phosphorus is another example of an allotropic element and exists as:

- white phosphorus (or yellow phosphorus)
- red phosphorus
- black phosphorus (extremely rare).

7C7.12 White phosphorus is toxic and in air fumes readily, ignites at relatively low temperatures (~30°C) and is normally stored under water. Due to its reactivity with air (oxygen), it is normally classified as a UN 4.2 material. Red phosphorus, on the other hand, is of low toxicity, only ignites at about 260°C and does not need to be stored under water because of its low reactivity with air (oxygen). In industry, red phosphorus is used in the manufacture of matches, phosphate fertilisers and insecticides. It is also used in the illegal production of Methamphetamine.
Division 4.3: Substances which in contact with water emit flammable gases

7C7.13 Substances (solids and liquids) which, by interaction with water, are liable to become spontaneously flammable or to give off flammable gases in dangerous quantities.

7C7.14 Examples include:
- aluminium phosphide (liberates phosphine gas)
- calcium carbide (liberates acetylene on contact with water)
- sodium.

Health hazards
7C7.15 It is relatively easy to reduce exposure to flammable solids as a group unless they are reacting. The primary hazard is inhalation of dusts and finely divided powders as they are easily inhaled. Some dusts such as sodium metal react with the moisture in lungs to form a caustic solution that causes burning of sensitive tissues.

7C7.16 The mixture of some metallic dusts with moisture on the body may result in chemical burns. It is imperative to avoid all clouds of smoke as they may include toxic by-products of the burning metal.

Operational considerations
7C7.17 Considerations:
- Most flammable solids can be handled easily unless they are on fire or otherwise reacting in some fashion
- Do not allow flammable solids to mix with other materials unless you are certain of the resulting reaction
Some flammable solids are very active chemically, so great care must be taken to ensure compatibility with other stored materials and their containers.

Some solid spills can be covered with a heavy plastic sheet to minimise dust blowing around or water contact from rain.

Regardless of the material involved, avoid adding any water until you are sure the situation will not worsen.

One exception to the use of water on flammable solids is in the case of contamination through skin contact. In such cases it is usually best to brush off as much powder as possible followed by the application of large amounts of water to reduce the tissue damage and prohibit the creation of a toxic paste being formed on the victim’s body.

Most emergency actions are based on letting the incident stabilise through fire or just sweeping up the material on the ground.

**NOTE:** Consider use of respiratory protection and other personal protective equipment.

Beware dust explosions. Increasing the surface area of a combustible solid enhances the ease of ignition. This means that dust burns more rapidly than the corresponding bulk solid. Particles behave in some ways similar to gas and a flammable dust-air mixture can form within certain limits. A dust explosion occurs when the suspended dust particles are ignited. Dust explosions are relatively rare but can involve an enormous energy release. Precautions to avoid or mitigate dust explosions:

- eliminate ignition sources
- control dust concentrations
- avoid or limit disturbing dust.
PART C-8

UN Class 5 Oxidising substance and organic peroxide

General information

Introduction

7C8.1 Oxidizing agents are the natural enemy of fuels as when they mix and react there is always the possibility that the fuel will ignite. Normally oxygen (from the air) is the main ‘oxidizing agent’ in combustion reactions but other materials can cause similar behaviour. This section describes how and why these materials act in the way they do and outlines general hazards that a firefighter may face when encountering them.

Characteristics, classification and hazards

Oxidation

7C8.2 In chemistry, the term oxidation has several levels of meaning:

**COMBINATION WITH OXYGEN**

At the simplest level, oxidation may be defined as combination with oxygen. Most oxidation processes of practical importance are exothermic; many take place slowly, eg, the rusting of iron, but if the heat is produced so quickly that at least red-heat is achieved, the process is a typical combustion process.

**COMBINATION WITH ANY SUPPORTER OF COMBUSTION**

In a wider sense, oxidation may be defined as combination with any supporter of combustion. When heated magnesium is placed into a jar of oxygen gas, it burns with a brilliant white light and produces dense clouds of white smoke; exactly the same things are observed when heated magnesium is placed into a jar of chlorine gas. Therefore, it seems to make no sense to include one of these reactions in a set of reactions called oxidation processes and to exclude the other; in fact, both reactions are considered oxidation processes, as is combination with any supporter of combustion.

Oxidizing agents

7C8.3 Oxidizing agents may be defined in two ways, in parallel with the two definitions of oxidation given above:

- oxidizing agents are substances that supply oxygen to another substance
oxidizing agents are substances that supply any supporter of combustion to another substance.

7C8.4 It can be argued that the first definition above is the one most relevant to a fireground situation, since most combustion processes involve rapid combination with oxygen, and most of the rest of this note is concerned with oxidation in this sense. However, large quantities of other supporters of combustion (particularly chlorine, but also fluorine and bromine) may be encountered in the chemical industry, so that an awareness of oxidation in the sense of the second definition is also very important for a firefighter.

Classification of oxidizing agents

7C8.5 If the discussion of oxidation is now limited to combination with oxygen, it is obvious that two criteria must apply to any oxidizing agent:

- it must itself contain some oxygen
- it must be able to supply this oxygen to another substance.

7C8.6 Many substances fulfil the first criterion, eg, oxygen itself, oxides, and any compound with a name ending in -ite or -ate; of these, only a limited number fulfil the second.

7C8.7 Thus, although sodium chlorate, NaClO₃, is a powerful oxidizing agent, calcium carbonate, CaCO₃, and calcium sulphate, CaSO₄, are not, because although they apparently contain at least as much oxygen as sodium chlorate, they do not easily give up this oxygen to another substance.

Identification

7C8.8 These materials can be identified from:

- UN hazard warning diamond
- Chemicals Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply (CHIP) Regulations 2009 label
- A hazard class containing 5, 5.1 or 5.2
- The chemical name.

Fire hazards of oxidizing agents

7C8.9 The fire hazards presented by oxidizing agents depend on whether they come into the category of inorganic, or organic, oxidizing agent. Each of these types of material is dealt with separately.
Inorganic oxidizing agents

Division 5.1: Oxidising substances other than organic peroxides

- These are the most commonly encountered oxidizing agents
- In terms of the fire triangle, these materials belong not to the fuel side of the triangle but to the supporter of combustion side
- These substances are non-flammable, even though some of them (such as sodium chlorate and, particularly, ammonium nitrate) may decompose explosively when heated, especially if present in large quantities in a confined space
- The main problems arise when inorganic oxidizing agents come into contact with combustible materials, thus putting two sides of the fire triangle together:
  - The oxidizing agent oxidizes the ‘fuel’, perhaps only slowly at first, but the process is exothermic, generating a little heat so that the temperature rises gradually. This accelerates the process, producing more heat, raising the temperature a little more, and the process accelerates further. Eventually sufficient heat is generated to raise the ‘fuel’ to its ignition temperature, and it begins to burn. Spontaneous combustion often happens when fuels are allowed to come into contact with oxidizing agents. Sometimes the combustion occurs almost immediately, as with highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide in contact with wood, sometimes after a short delay, as with glycerol in contact with potassium permanganate, and sometimes after a prolonged period, as with rags soaked in linseed oil in contact with atmospheric oxygen
  - Many fuel and oxidizing-agent combinations appear to be free from the spontaneous combustion hazard outlined above. However, problems still arise when the fuel becomes ignited, perhaps by contact with an ignition source; the combustion is no longer dependent on the limited availability of oxygen from the surrounding air because the oxidizing agent ensures the presence of available oxygen in a concentrated form. The fuel will burn much more fiercely than would otherwise be the case. This situation could arise if cellulosic material, such as a wooden floor or shelves, becomes impregnated with an oxidizing agent such as sodium nitrate or even concentrated nitric acid.
NOTE: Fuels and oxidizing agents must be stored in such a way that accidental contact between them is impossible.

Organic oxidizing agents

Division 5.2 Organic peroxides

7C8.10 The main class of materials under this heading consists of organic peroxides, widely used as catalysts in the manufacture of plastics. Typical examples are dibenzoyl peroxide and methyl ethyl ketone peroxide.

7C8.11 These substances are particularly hazardous because as well as being oxidizing agents, their organic nature ensures that they can also burn, unlike the inorganic oxidizing agents. Two sides of the fire triangle, therefore, are already present in a sample of organic peroxide; the input of only a little energy may complete the triangle, and the peroxide will burn very fiercely, and possibly, particularly in a confined space, explosively.

7C8.12 The extra energy may be supplied as heat; organic peroxides possess a self-accelerating decomposition temperature, above which the decomposition proceeds spontaneously. The self-accelerating decomposition temperature for both dibenzoyl peroxide and methyl ethyl ketone peroxide is over 50°C, but for some organic peroxides it is so low that they must be stored under refrigeration.

7C8.13 If warmed, organic peroxides are also likely to become sensitive to heat, shock and friction.

7C8.14 These substances are so hazardous in the pure state that the safest way to store and handle them is to dilute them with a chemically inert material, and they are normally met in this form. For example, dibenzoyl peroxide can be obtained as a 50 per cent paste with phthalate plasticizer or with water, or as a 50 per cent powder, mixed with an inert powder. Even in this form, the material may burn very fiercely when ignited.

Other hazards of oxidizing agents

TOXICITY

7C8.15 Many concentrated oxidizing agents are corrosive towards living tissue, such as the skin and, especially, the eyes. They may also be toxic for additional reasons.
**WATER REACTIVITY**

7C8.16 Many oxidizing agents do not react with water and may safely be diluted (eg hydrogen peroxide); others are violently water-reactive. For example, sodium peroxide reacts rapidly with water, producing hydrogen peroxide and considerable heat. If sodium peroxide in contact with cotton wool is wetted, the cotton wool immediately ignites and burns fiercely. Other peroxides formed from reactive metals behave similarly.

**Operational considerations**

7C8.17 It is essential to understand fully the potential hazards that oxidizing agents present at an incident, in particular consider the following:

- They can be extremely unpredictable
- Be alert to the possibility of sudden container failure. For example, peracetic acid will detonate if its concentration rises above 56 per cent and this can happen when a container has been incorrectly stored, allowing acetic acid to evaporate
- Beware of potential impact or frictional ignition hazards
- Separate oxidizing agents from ‘fuels’ if this is practicable
- Use ventilation and sprays to cool containers or oxidizing agent / fuel mixtures
- If a fire has developed, consider the choice of extinguishing agent. Water may be the best option but consider the problems of water “reactives” and environmental damage
- Also consider the danger of impregnating combustible material in the area with water containing dissolved oxidizing agents which might become spontaneously flammable much later on when the water evaporates
- If water is used to extinguish a fire ensure appropriate application of water to achieve a maximum cooling effect (fog or fire spray)
- If organic peroxides are involved in, or exposed to, fire, evacuate the area and attack the fire from a safe location. Consider structural cover for firefighters, lashed branches and ground monitors.
PART C–9
UN Class 6 Toxic and infectious substances

General information

Introduction

7C9.1 Toxic (poisonous) and infectious substances, are those liable to cause death or injury if swallowed, inhaled or absorbed through skin contact. Within UN Class 6 there are two divisions:

- **Division 6.1 toxic substances** – a poisonous material, other than a gas, known to be so toxic to humans that it presents a health hazard during transportation.

- **Division 6.2 infectious substances** – means a material known to contain or suspected of containing a pathogen. A pathogen is a virus, micro-organism or proteinaceous infectious particle (prion) that has the potential to cause disease in humans or animals.
Toxic substances – characteristics, classification and hazards

7C9.2 Toxicity is the capability of a poison, or toxin, to produce injury in an animal, a human being or the environment. Many poisons cause harm to living tissues at very small doses because they interfere with one or more of the large number of complex chemical processes that take place continuously in all living creatures. These processes are catalysed by enzymes and often a poison works by blocking the action of an enzyme, or by changing the direction of a particular process.

7C9.3 To appreciate the hazards presented by poisonous substances it is helpful to know some general principles that apply to all living creatures.

7C9.4 All living things are composed of cells. One of the simplest creatures is the amoeba, which is in fact a single cell about the size of a full stop. It may be found in pond water and can carry out in itself all the processes necessary to live, that is, breathing, eating, elimination of waste products and reproduction (where it divides into two identical cells). A human body is composed of about 250 different types of cell and human cells are much smaller than an amoeba. All living cells have certain common features and a typical living animal cell is shown below. It is important to note that red blood cells do not have a nucleus as they are designed to transport oxygen, and lose their nuclei after they are fully grown, before being released from the bone marrow into the blood stream.

7C9.5 The two parts of a cell that are especially sensitive to poisons are:

- the mitochondrion (the power-house of the cell)
- the nucleus (the control centre of the cell).
A typical animal cell (often called a Eucaryotic cell)

![Cell Diagram]

The mitochondrion

7C9.6 In the mitochondrion a chemical called adenosine triphosphate (ATP) is generated by a complex series of reactions in what is referred to as the 'respiratory chain'.

7C9.7 The overall reaction may be represented as: \(4H^+ + O_2 + 4e^- = 2H_2O\)

7C9.8 As a result of the energy liberated by this reaction, 34 molecules of adenosine triphosphate are generated. The oxygen comes from the air inhaled and every living cell must be adequately supplied with oxygen if it is to function properly. All cells require a continuous supply of adenosine triphosphate, which supplies the energy necessary to sustain life. All muscle cells are powered by adenosine triphosphate, so breathing and the beating of the heart are dependent on a continuous supply of adenosine triphosphate to the relevant cells. All nervous impulses depend on adenosine triphosphate, so to think or to use any of our senses requires a continuous supply of adenosine triphosphate. Each adult uses and synthesises many millions of adenosine triphosphate molecules every minute of the day. Almost all acute poisons act by reducing supplies of adenosine triphosphate to the cells or vital organs of the body, so that muscles or nerve cells cease to function normally.

The nucleus

7C9.9 This contains the chromosomes, which in turn are made up of genes. The basic material of all chromosomes and genes is deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and through the DNA all the functions of the cell are controlled. If a cell is to divide into two healthy cells to replace cells that become worn out, the DNA must be copied perfectly. Anything that affects the DNA may injure the cell.

7C9.10 Three possible effects of a poison are:

- to slow down the cell
- to kill the cell
- to cause the cell to go out of control and develop into a tumour, or a cancer (here the time-scale is 10–30 years, because even a small tumour will contain about 1,000,000,000 cells).
Some important characteristics of different types of cell

7C9.11 Some cells are replaced on a regular basis, such as those that line the intestine, or red blood cells (made in the bone marrow). Skin cells are also continuously renewed. The outer layers of skins are dead cells that are shed continuously. On the other hand, nerve cells and brain cells do not change very much and are not replaced if they get damaged.

Sperm cells and egg cells (gametes)

7C9.12 These are produced by special organs (gonads) in the male, and in the female by a process called meiosis. Normal cell division (referred to as mitosis) involves the production of two new cells that are perfect copies of the original cell. Each normal cell in a human body contains 46 chromosomes. During the formation of sperm cells two types of cell division occur, a special type of mitosis followed by a second division where each of the new cells contains only 23 chromosomes, one of which is an X or Y chromosome. The egg cells also contain only 23 chromosomes, one of which is an X chromosome. Thus when the sperm fuses with the egg cell, a new cell (zygote) is formed that contains 46 chromosomes. This cell has in its DNA all the instructions necessary to make a human body and will develop normally into a body, if it is given normal nurture and is not exposed to any toxic substance.

7C9.13 Sperm cells are generated continuously; a woman carries all her egg cells in her ovaries from birth. This has important implications about the effects of exposure to toxic substances in the longer term, as both the cells that generate sperm and the immature egg cells could be affected.

Absorption of poisons

7C9.14 Chemicals can cause poisoning if they reach sensitive parts of a person or living organism in sufficiently high concentrations and for a sufficient length of time. For a chemical to cause harm it must enter the body and poisons may be absorbed into the body in four main ways:

INHALATION – THROUGH THE LUNGS
Not only may gases and vapours be absorbed in this way, but also mists, smokes and dusts and fibres (depending on their size and shape). The peak retention depends on aerodynamic shape with particles of 1-2 μm in size being retained most effectively. Larger diameter dust particles do not penetrate the lungs but tend to be trapped further up the respiratory tract where cilia eventually return them to the oesophagus. From the oesophagus dusts tend to be excreted through the gut and it is possible that the dusts may cause toxic effects as though they were ingested like food. Most inhaled dust will enter the gut directly and may chemically react with the gut or interfere with micro-organisms living in the gut. Systemic action is also possible.
Irritation by dust particles is also possible but tends to be dependent on the solids being dissolved. Asbestos fibres cause fibrosis and cancer even though they are insoluble; a similar effect can occur with manmade mineral fibres. Insoluble particles such as coal and silica dusts readily cause fibrosis of the lung.

The volume of air inspired and expired with each normal breath increases with physical exertion. Thus the rate of physical work will directly affect the amount of toxic material inhaled by a person from a contaminated atmosphere.

**INGESTION – THROUGH THE GASTRO-INTESTINAL TRACT**

Such a process could occur through bad housekeeping, such as the practice of eating food in laboratories, but generally results from accidental exposure.

The physical state of a toxic substance can have an important bearing on the ease with which it may be absorbed by the body. Fine sub-division, and in some cases, the fact of solubility or insolubility in water, may aid absorption. Barium chloride, which is soluble in water and is a component of ternary eutectic chloride (a well known fire-extinguishing medium), is very poisonous, whereas the insoluble barium sulphate is not poisonous, and is used in the barium meal administered to patients for X-ray photographs of their gastro-intestinal tract.

**DERMAL ABSORPTION – THROUGH THE SKIN**

There is far less awareness of this mode of absorption than there is of the other two modes. Certain liquids, including methanol (methyl alcohol), organic mercury compounds, organophosphate pesticides and benzene, can be absorbed in this way.

Toxic materials may also enter the body through cuts and grazes, although this is not a common entry route.

**INJECTION – THROUGH AN OPENING IN THE SKIN**

Normal skin provides an excellent barrier to most chemicals. When the skin is punctured in some way (eg from a syringe needle, from handling animals or broken glassware, from cuts and grazes etc) this protection is bypassed. Any poison or toxic contamination on the skin or on the device causing the puncture wound is capable of directly passing into the bloodstream and eventually finding its way to internal organs where it may exert its toxic effect.

When decontaminating skin, care should be exercised to not rub so hard that it becomes damaged. Reddening of the skin is a sign that it is being damaged and further decontamination effort may be counter-productive as it may facilitate injection.
In general, for exposure to a given concentration of a substance, for a given time, inhalation is likely to cause more harm than ingestion, which in turn will be more harmful than dermal exposure.

**Operational key principle**

### Descriptive terms used in poisoning

**7C9.15 Terms used to describe cases of poisoning:**

- **Acute** – This means that adverse health effects occur within a short time (up to a few days) after exposure to a single dose (or given concentration) of poison. The time component of the dose is not important, as the concentration of poison is responsible for the effect.

- **Chronic** – This term refers to delayed health effects that occur many years after exposure to a poison and which persist over a long period of time. In industry the effects generally occur by repeated exposures over a period of days, months or years. However, certain materials, notably asbestos and respiratory sensitisers, can exert chronic effects after a single exposure to the substance. Chronic effects are dependent on the dose (or concentration) and time of exposure to toxins and do not refer to the severity of symptoms, or the amount of pain experienced.

- **Local** – Refers to the site of action of an agent and means that action takes place only at the particular area of contact between the organism and a toxic material. Absorption does not necessarily occur. Local effects occur usually to the skin, eyes and respiratory tract.

- **Systemic** – The site (target organ) or region of toxic action is other than at the point of contact between the organism and the poison and presupposes that absorption and distribution of the toxin has already taken place in the body. With systemic effects the whole body or many organs can be affected. Methylene chloride is an example of a substance causing systemic toxicity. Once inhaled into the body this material can be metabolised to carbon monoxide that initially may cause feelings of euphoria (similar to alcohol). At higher concentrations unconsciousness can result and repeated exposures to the material can lead to permanent brain damage.

- **Teratogen** – These substances cause mental or physical harm to an unborn foetus. The ‘harm’ cannot be passed on to future generations. The drugs lysergic acid diethylamide, methyl mercury, rubella virus (German measles) and herpes virus are teratogens (X-rays and gamma rays also can act as teratogens).

- **Mutagen** – Mutagenic substances can cause physical or mental harm to an unborn foetus which is heritable by future generations.
• **Carcinogen** – These are materials that can cause cancer.

**Mutagens and carcinogens:**

In practice it is not possible to draw a clear line of division between these classes because a given chemical may cause either a mutation, or a cancer, or both, depending on the circumstances.

Some common examples are: benzene, vinyl chloride, acrylonitrile, chloroform, benzopyrene (present in many fire-gases), asbestos, and the elements: beryllium, cadmium, cobalt, nickel, silver, lead and arsenic. Moulds that grow on foods produce some of the most deadly chemicals such as aflatoxin. X-rays, gamma rays and ultra-violet light are also capable of producing similar effects.

• **Irritant** – An irritant is a chemical that is not corrosive but which causes a reversible inflammatory effect on living tissue by chemical action on the local site of contact. This effect is often referred to as irritation and typical sites of contact on the body are skin, eyes and the respiratory system.

Allergies are different from irritants as they require interaction with the body’s immune system to generate their effect (see below). The allergic effect is dependent on the individual’s sensitivity to the allergen whereas an irritant acts on an individual in a non-specific manner, i.e., the effect of an irritant on an individual is largely not dependent on that individual’s sensitivity to the irritant.

• **Allergens and hypersensitivity** – An allergy is the tendency of the body to react adversely to certain substances. Hay fever, hives and some types of asthma are typical examples of allergies.

An allergic reaction is really composed of two contacts with a foreign substance. In the first contact the defence mechanisms of the body detect the foreign substance, an ‘antigen’, and manufacture antibodies to it. This change in the body is sometimes referred to as ‘sensitisation’ and any subsequent exposure to the same antigen provokes a massive response from the body and is the condition known as an allergy. In some allergic reactions, cells affected by the antigen–antibody reaction may liberate toxic chemicals such as histamine, which is responsible for some of the symptoms that accompany certain allergies such as a runny nose, itching eyes and hives. Thus anti-histamine drugs are sometimes prescribed.

The chemical most widely known as an individual cause of allergy is toluene di-isocyanate. One exposure can sensitisate a person, so that subsequent exposures can cause severe asthmatic attacks.

Some people maintain that certain food additives, such as the yellow dye tartrazine (E102), can cause allergies in certain cases.
• **Convulsant** – A convulsant is a material that results in violent, abnormal, uncontrollable contraction or series of contractions of muscles in the body. The convulsions produced are often referred to as ‘seizures’. Convulsions may have an ‘organic’ origin or may be induced using drugs. Some typical causes of seizures are:
  - high fever, eg heatstroke, infections
  - brain infections, eg meningitis, malaria, tetanus
  - metabolic disorders, eg high/low levels of sugars or sodium
  - inadequate oxygen supply to the brain
  - structural damage to the brain, eg through accident, stroke
  - exposure to toxic drugs/substances, eg amphetamines, lead, strychnine
  - withdrawal after heavy use of alcohol, sedatives including sleeping pills
  - prescription drugs.

It is believed that seizures are caused by disorganised and sudden electrical activity in the brain.

**Dosage**

7C9.16 A major factor in cases of poisoning is the dosage received. Indeed, substances not normally regarded as poisonous may become so if dosage is sufficiently massive (usually resulting in acute effects). It is therefore not always easy to make a clear-cut distinction between poisonous and non-poisonous substances. The concentration of poisonous material is not the only factor to be considered when assessing the degree of poisoning experienced, and other factors can also have an important influence:

- duration of exposure
- sizes of particles or physical state
- affinity for human tissue materials
- solubility in human tissue fluid
- sensitivity of human tissues and organs
- age of a person
- health of an individual.

**Occupational exposure limits**

7C9.17 In an attempt to limit long term damage to industrial workers by chronic exposures to poisons, the Health and Safety Executive has, via the *Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations*, established limits to the **airborne concentrations** of poisons to which workers can be exposed.
The ideal underlying the original occupational exposure limits was that it was possible to define average levels of substances in air that could be inhaled continuously by an industrial worker during a working shift (normally taken as eight hours/day), every week (normally taken as five working days) for their working life (normally taken as 40 years), without any ill effects occurring. That is still the ideal, but it is not always possible to achieve it and that was recognised in the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations.

Occupational exposure limits are intended to be used to control the exposure of workers to airborne hazardous substances in the workplace and are not designed to deal with serious accidents or emergencies such as a major gas release arising from plant failure.

Airborne control levels for hazardous substances that are recommended in the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations are reproduced in the current Health and Safety Executive document, which is reviewed periodically. The document contains information on a single type of occupational exposure limit known as the workplace exposure limit.

The control levels for gases and vapours in air, workplace exposure limits, are usually expressed in parts per million (ppm) by volume or parts of gas per million parts of air. Concentrations of dusts, smokes and fumes are often quoted as milligrams per cubic metre (mg/m³) of air at a standard temperature and pressure.

### Workplace exposure limits

‘Workplace exposure limits’ are occupational exposure limits set under the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations in order to protect the health of workers. Workplace exposure limits are defined as the maximum concentrations of hazardous substances in air averaged over a reference period (i.e., a time-weighted average) to which employees may be exposed by inhalation.

- An 8-hour reference period is used to control exposures to a hazardous substance during a typical workshift. Workplace exposure limits quoted for this period of time are known as ‘long term exposure limits’

- A 15-minute reference period is used to prevent acute effects such as eye irritation, coughing, etc., which may arise following exposure for a few minutes. Workplace exposure limits for this period of time are known as ‘short term exposure limits’. For substances where a long term limit is quoted but no short term limit is specified, it is recommended that a figure of three times the long term limit is used as a guideline for controlling short-term peaks.

When making an assessment on the chronic risk of a substance, it would be prudent to identify any risk phrases associated with the material to ascertain the long-term health effects on affected humans. Under the Chemicals Hazard
Information and Packaging for Supply Regulations 2009 (CHIP) these phrases must appear on packaging labels when these materials are transported unless they are exempted.

7C9.24 Every employer, including the Fire and Rescue Service, has a responsibility to identify the materials in the workplace that may put employees’ health at risk, to assess the risk and introduce the necessary controls to ensure exposures are below workplace exposure limits and as low as reasonably practical. Employers have a legal responsibility to inform their staff about those materials in the workplace that may damage their health and to identify the effects of those materials. When managing an incident at which hazardous materials will be encountered this responsibility falls to the incident commander.

Threshold odour concentration

7C9.25 Many poisonous substances have a characteristic smell (carbon monoxide is a well-known exception). In some cases the threshold of smell, or odour, is above the occupational exposure limit value. That means a person can suffer from toxic effects without realising that a poisonous gas or vapour is present.

7C9.26 Two common examples of that effect are benzene (Workplace Exposure Limit = 1 ppm, threshold odour concentration about 100 ppm) and methyl alcohol (Workplace exposure limit = 200 ppm, threshold odour concentration about 2000 ppm).

Other systems

7C9.27 If information on the occupational exposure limit is not available then it may be possible to use the threshold limit value (TLV) which is a roughly equivalent limit imposed on employers in the USA. Other limits associated with these basic threshold limit values are:

- short-term exposure limits (STELs) for a 15-minute reference period
- ceiling exposure limits (TLV-Cs) are for concentrations of materials that must never be exceeded even instantaneously.

Lethal dose 50 per cent (LD50)

7C9.28 This is the concept used to assess the acute toxicity of a material.

7C9.29 It has long been recognised that if similar quantities of poison are given to different people (or animals) in a population, it will produce differing health effects in the population. In order to have a quantifiable response to a poison, death is chosen as the discriminator as it is easily measurable. For this reason, lethality studies are normally carried out on animals. To obtain a representative value for lethality for an animal species, it is necessary to carry out tests on a group (or population) of animals so a statistical determination can be made on the amount of poison necessary to kill a certain percentage of the group in a certain time.
7C9.30 The lethal dose 50 per cent is thus defined as:

- the quantity of poison that will kill one half of a batch of ten or more animals within 14 days.

7C9.31 The LD50 is expressed as milligrams per unit body weight (mg/kg).

7C9.32 When quoting values for the LD50 it is necessary to quote the animal species being tested and the route the poison was given to the animal. For example the LD50 may be quoted as:

- LD50(oral, rat) = 414 mg/kg indicating that poison introduced to a group of 10 or more animals by ingestion (oral) at the level of 414mg/kg caused the death of half (50%) of the group within 14 days.

7C9.33 Owing to the above-mentioned dosage values being obtained mainly from studies of rats, mice and guinea-pigs, they should be regarded with caution, and if evidence concerning human beings is available it is used in preference to that obtained from animal experiments. Individuals vary greatly in their susceptibility to poisons for reasons that are not well understood, and conditions that may be safe for some are not safe for all.

Other terms

- Lethal Concentration 50 Per Cent (LC50) is used to denote the concentration of a gas present in the atmosphere for a given period of time that eventually kills half of a batch of ten or more animals within 14 days.

- LDLO and LCLO denote the lowest published lethal dose and concentration respectively. These figures, unlike LD50 and LC50, are not statistically derived and are often obtained from post-mortem examinations on accidental death victims. If these figures are available they should be used as the guide to toxicity of the material.

Biohazards/infectious substances – characteristics, classification and hazards

7C9.34 A biological hazard, or biohazard, is any microorganism, cell culture or human endoparasite, including any that have been genetically modified, that can cause infection, allergy, toxicity or otherwise create a hazard to human health.

7C9.35 Biohazards arise from exposure to a range of pathogenic or disease causing organisms. Acute or chronic infectious diseases may be caused by bacteria, viruses, protozoa or fungi. The pathogen can enter the body via skin contact, puncture wounds, cuts, and inhalation of aerosols or dusts and also by ingestion of contaminated food or drink.

7C9.36 These pathogens are found almost everywhere in varying forms and exist as a biohazard when the numbers exceed what is regarded as an ‘infective dose’.
**Pathogenic organisms**

### 7C9.37
Most biohazards arise from single-celled organisms of various types, which are collectively referred to as ‘pathogenic organisms’, ie disease-causing organisms. These can be grouped into four different classes:

- **Bacteria** (eg. *Escherichia coli* or *E.coli*; *tuberculosis* or TB, *salmonella*, *legionella* etc)
- **Viruses** (eg. *hepatitis B, C, HIV* etc)
- **Protozoa** (eg. *toxoplasmosis, ringworm, malaria* etc)
- **Fungi and spores** (eg. *aspergillosis* etc).

**NOTE:** Included within the above list, there is a serious health risk to firefighters by the transmission of infectious diseases through direct or indirect contact with animals (zoonoses), which are alive or dead and animal waste. Examples of zoonoses are rabies and ringworm. Contact between pregnant firefighters and sheep and goats carrying chlamydia psittaci can also result in miscarriage.

#### BACTERIA
- About 0.01mm in length
- Primarily found in moist medium with small hairs used for locomotion
- Rapidly increase in numbers in ideal conditions
- Not able to withstand high temperatures (above 60°C for half an hour will destroy), and large doses of gamma radiation will kill
- Many bacteria are harmless
- Necessary in soil, human and animal bodies
- Some can produce toxins and cause symptoms of disease such as TB, anthrax, tetanus or bubonic plague.

#### VIRUSES
- Much smaller than bacteria, consisting of nuclear material (DNA or RNA) surrounded by complex outer coat of protein
- Attach to host cell to reproduce and then infect other cells
- Typical viruses include Lassa fever, herpes, influenza, HIV, rabies and smallpox.

#### PROTOZOA
- Larger, single-celled organisms similar to bacteria
- Often water-borne, including malaria and amoebic dysentery.

#### FUNGI AND SPORES
- Live as parasites on a host
- Examples include thrush, ‘athletes foot’ and ringworm.
Categorisation of micro-organisms

7C9.38 The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens advises the Health and Safety Commission, the Health and Safety Executive and appropriate government ministers, as required, on all aspects of hazards and risks to workers and others from exposure to pathogens. In 1995 the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens issued guidance on the categorisation of biological agents, which classified biological agents into four categories:

Hazard Group 1 – unlikely to cause disease.

Hazard Group 2 – can cause disease and may be a hazard to employees, is unlikely to spread to the community and there is usually an effective prophylaxis or treatment available. Examples include measles and mumps.

Hazard Group 3 – can cause severe human disease and may be a hazard to employees, it may spread to the community but there is usually an effective prophylaxis or treatment available. Examples include hepatitis B and rabies.

Hazard Group 4 – causes severe human disease and is a serious hazard to employees, is likely to spread to the community and there is usually no effective prophylaxis or treatment available. Examples include smallpox and Lassa fever.

7C9.39 The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens issue an Approved List of Biological Agents which is updated regularly and available at:

http://www.hse.gov.uk

Notification

7C9.40 The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens have placed a duty on employers where a level 4 containment exists (based on control of substances hazardous to health principles) to identify hazards in the workplace and to understand and control the infection risk.

7C9.41 The Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999 (MHSR99) recommends the appointment of a competent person such as a Safety Officer/ Adviser, whose duties include:

- as part of the emergency plan, to notify local authority fire services, in advance, of substances to be handled that may be a hazard to fire officers in the course of their duties
- responsibility for decontamination procedures
- disposal of infectious waste.
7C9.42 *The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations* require the Health and Safety Executive to be notified of the intention to use, store or transport certain hazard groups.

**Hazards**

7C9.43 There are additional hazards associated with biological agent research and development premises, these may include:

- high security levels, including electronic locking mechanisms, preventing unauthorised access
- premises containing Hazard Group 3 and 4 are required to maintain negative pressure (up to –50Pa) in order to prevent the release of biological agents outside the building. Due to security reasons, these types of premises are required to be located above ground floor
- an uninterruptible power supplying lab equipment and building facilities
- regular disinfection of labs generally takes the form of gaseous formaldehyde fumigation over a 12 hour period
- various types of animals used for research purposes
- gases, including nitrogen, hydrogen, helium and oxygen
- chemicals, including acids, bases, alcohols, volatile agents and toxic or carcinogenic organic compounds, eg benzene
- various radiation sources for sterilisation.

**Usage, transportation, packaging and storage**

**Biohazard usage**

7C9.44 Biological hazards may be encountered in a wide range of situations:

- hospitals eg isolation wards, post mortem areas, medical schools, laboratories etc
- biotechnology laboratories using genetically modified organisms
- universities, colleges
- veterinary laboratories, quarantine kennels, abattoirs
- government research establishments
- biological, medical, animal research establishments
- farms, zoos, wildlife parks
• sewers, sewage treatment plants and flood water
• casualty handling/cadavers at fires, transport incidents or other special service calls
• residential premises where persons maybe infected
• post offices and mail delivery couriers
• funeral parlours/embalmers
• biological warfare or terrorist
• pharmaceutical laboratories
• government establishments.

Biohazard transportation, packaging and storage

Transportation

7C9.45 The transport categories are defined as:

• **Category A** – An infectious substance which is transported in a form that, when exposure to it occurs, is capable of causing permanent disability, life-threatening or fatal disease to humans or animals.

• **Category B** – An infectious substance which does not meet the criteria for inclusion in Category A.

7C9.46 For all substances a triple packaging system is used. This includes:

• a primary, watertight and leakproof receptacle surrounded by sufficient absorbent material to absorb any spills caused by breakage

• a secondary, watertight and leak proof packaging, again containing sufficient absorbent material to absorb any spills

• an outer packaging that protects the secondary packaging from physical damage.

7C9.47 The outer wrapping of any package should bear the international warning signs and a warning that the package should be neither opened nor touched. On the outer packaging there should be an indication of the nature of the contents, together with the name and address of both the consignor and consignee. The latter details should also be provided with the package.

7C9.48 For transportation, infectious substances will be assigned to UN 2814, UN 2900 or UN 3373. Vehicles used for the transportation of biological agents will come under UN hazard classification 6.2 and may display the warning triangle for “substances containing disease-producing micro-organisms”.

Technical considerations
Postal

7C9.49 Group 4 materials must not be sent through the postal system. Special arrangements apply to their transportation, nationally and internationally.

7C9.50 Group 2 and 3 materials may be transported either by post or an authorized courier provided they comply with the packaging requirements and bear the international warning signs together with the names and addresses of the sender and recipient.

7C9.51 Organisations that regularly send such materials through the post should have procedures in place for contacting competent personnel in the event of an accident.

Location and meaning of signs

7C9.52 Many establishments will display the international biohazard sign. However, the use of this sign varies considerably. Other black and white signs may relate to animals (eg ‘Do Not Remove’, ‘May be Removed in Cages’ etc).

7C9.53 Where biological agents are present within a building there should always be a warning symbol present at the entrances to laboratories and refrigeration units for agents of Hazard Groups 2, 3 and 4, but they may not be found externally.

Operational considerations

Biohazard pre-planning

Contact

7C9.54 The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations require that any premises that contain biohazards of Hazard Group 3 or 4 have written contingency plans for dealing with an emergency. In premises where Hazard Group 4 agents are in use, expert advice will be available at all times.

7C9.55 Establishments Handling Group 4 organisms are required to appoint a Safety Officer/Adviser with whom contact should be made. This should include out-of-hours contact facilities.

7C9.56 Most laboratories and research establishments generally have a rota of knowledgeable persons, some work on an ‘alert’ basis during times that the substances are present. Staff must stay on the premises in case of an emergency.
Nature of hazards

7C9.57 The type, quantity and level of hazards will determine the extent of Fire and Rescue Service pre-planning. There could be hazards involving toxins that present an immediate threat to human life (e.g., typhoid, tetanus, etc.). Other hazards cause a threat to fish and marine life or plants, but pose no direct hazard to humans.

7C9.58 The physical state of the organism presents different levels of risk. Some may be frozen and stored in plastic bags. Some are kept in water, which may boil in the event of a fire, sterilising them. Some are kept in the dry state in glass phials or bottles and here the risk is through aerosolisation and subsequent inhalation of the powder. Some may be found in bulk, usually in glass or stainless steel vessels.

Extent of hazards

7C9.59 The extent of the possible hazard to firefighters from such materials in the event of a fire or other incident may vary. Most micro-organisms are killed in temperatures in excess of 60°C but some are thermophilic and live and multiply in higher temperatures than this.

7C9.60 Guidance should be sought on how the micro-organisms react in fire and perhaps how long the fire would have to burn before destruction.

7C9.61 In addition to the biohazard, consider other laboratory risks such as:

- chemicals (acids, alkalis, toxics and flammables)
- gases (hydrogen cylinders, cryogens for storing bacteria and viruses)
- radiation (used for sterilisation and biological tracers).

The exact location

7C9.62 In some laboratories the main concentration of pathogens would be found in the main laboratory, but other smaller concentrations may be found elsewhere (i.e., freezers, cold stores or incubation rooms where temperatures may be controlled). Culture collections of freeze-dried materials may also be present.

7C9.63 All establishments handling infectious substances are required to have a safety manager and emergency plans.

7C9.64 These plans can vary between returning all substances to cabinets, to the sealing of rooms and evacuation in hospitals.

Expert assistance

7C9.65 In premises where Group 4 agents are in use, expert advice will be available at all times. Other premises may be hazard-free most of the time and then go on ‘Alert’ during which time staff must live on the premises.
Fire and Rescue Services will need to consider the levels of multi-agency liaison and advice that are required to resolve all foreseeable incidents involving biological agents within their areas. Stakeholders that are likely to provide positive benefits in this regard will include:

- Health Protection Agency
- Local Resilience Forum
- Emergency planning departments
- Environment Agency
- Environmental Health Department
- Police Service
- Ambulance Service
- Health and Safety Executive
- Highways Agency (for incidents on major roads)
- Specialist advice through industry experts
- Hospitals.

**Incidents involving biohazards**

The following considerations must be read in conjunction with the generic standard operating procedure described in Part B of this operational guidance.

- Approach upwind and uphill as appropriate (**NOTE**: Firemet information)
- Any decision to use ‘controlled burn’ tactics at a fire should be made on the basis of prior discussion with the site Safety Officer/Advisor or other subject matter advisers and a thorough written risk assessment
- The use of water should be minimised and any run off should be prevented from entering water courses
- All staff and other responders should be strictly controlled to restrict the potential for exposure
- Restrict the number of staff entering the hazard zone
- A thorough safety brief prior to deployment of staff within the hazard zone must be carried out
- The Incident Commander or hazardous materials adviser should maintain constant liaison with the on-site specialist or safety officer/adviser
- Appoint and brief Safety Officers to strictly supervise the inner cordon which should be based on pre-planning or specialist advice
- Staff should be made aware of the potential risks of disease and infection at off-site incidents such as animal incidents and road traffic collisions
• All responders should be prohibited from eating, drinking and smoking whilst at the incident

• Animal testing establishments – the likelihood of biologically infected animals escaping during an incident is remote, however, the capture of such animals could be dangerous and no attempt should be made without specialist advice

• Where an intense fire is involved and there is the possibility that microorganisms could be carried into the atmosphere by convection currents, downwind evacuation should be considered

• In cases of suspected exposure to HIV or hepatitis virus consider the need for post exposure prophylaxis within one hour

• Incident Commanders should be aware of the risks of infection to female firefighters who could be in the early stages of pregnancy when dealing with incidents involving sheep. Female firefighters can become seriously ill and possibly miscarry if infected with chlamydia psittaci (enzootic abortion)

• Specialist advice about on-site decontamination may be required especially if the incident involves group 3 or 4 pathogens

• Generally, personal protective equipment should be washed down with disinfectant (hypochlorite solution of 10,000 ppm recommended) but advice from subject matter advisers must be sought

• Contaminated chemical protective clothing and other equipment should not be removed from the incident until thoroughly disinfected and then only with authorisation from subject matter advisers

• The level of personal protective equipment required will depend on:
  – the nature of any biohazard present
  – the potential for exposure to known biohazards and due to the nature of the incident, those biohazards that it could reasonably expected may be present (eg animal rescues, road traffic collisions etc)
  – the advice of biohazard subject matter advisers
  – operational circumstances (eg immediate life saving rescues, fires etc).

• Consider other hazards:
  – high security levels, including electronic locking mechanisms, preventing unauthorised access
  – premises containing Hazard Group 3 and 4 are required to maintain negative pressure (up to -50Pa) in order to prevent the release of biological agents outside the building
  – an uninterruptable power supplying lab equipment and building facilities
  – regular disinfection of labs generally takes the form of gaseous formaldehyde fumigation over a 12 hour period
– the presence of various types of animals used for research purposes
– the presence of other pressurised gases, including nitrogen, hydrogen, helium and oxygen
– the presence of chemicals, including acids, bases, alcohols, volatile agents and toxic or carcinogenic organic compounds
– the presence of radiation sources for sterilisation.

• Records should be kept of anyone exposed to biohazards during operations together with details of the organism. Medical advice should be sought

• Arrangements should be in place for effective health surveillance of all staff that are suspected of being exposed to any bio-hazards during an incident. This may be by means of an on-site specialist, occupational health provider or Health Protection Agency whilst the incident is still in progress, although certain circumstances may require antibiotic prophylaxis to be given for potential exposures

• Plans should be in place to provide monitoring and recording of bio-hazard exposure. *Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations* require that employers keep a list of all personnel exposed to Hazard Group 3 and 4 agents be kept for at least 10 years (for those agents with delayed effects this list should be kept for 40 years)

• Staff should also be provided with follow-up monitoring by the occupational health provider as necessary. This will enable more sensitive whole body monitoring or analysis of biological samples, such as urine etc to be carried out.
PART C–10
UN Class 7 Radioactive materials

General information

Introduction

7C10.1 Radiation is the general term given to the process by which energy is transmitted away from an energy source. The term can equally be applied to heat, light, sound, microwave, radio or atomic sources of energy. This guidance is only concerned with the radiation arising from atomic sources as these uniquely have the property of causing ionisation when they interact with other substances and are often referred to as ‘ionising radiations’.

7C10.2 Ionising radiation generally arises by one of two processes:

- radioactivity
- X-ray emission.

Radioactivity

7C10.3 This is the phenomenon by which unstable isotopes of some atoms break down to form a more stable isotope of a different atom by expelling a small amount of matter from the nucleus (centre) of the unstable atom. Although there are several ways in which this can occur, by far the most dominant are by alpha emissions or by beta emissions. Shortly after an alpha or beta emission has occurred it is usually, but not always, followed by a gamma emission. Radioactive materials continue to undergo this process, often many millions of times per second until all the original unstable atoms have changed into the new stable atoms whereupon the radioactive material ceases to exist. Radioactivity cannot be destroyed other than by allowing it to decay away. The time taken for a radioactive source to reduce to half its original quantity is known as the half-life. If a radioactive material is burned in a fire, the equivalent amount of radioactivity will still exist in the smoke and the ash.

X-ray emission

7C10.4 This occurs when electrons are accelerated by high voltages inside an evacuated tube and are allowed to collide with a target made from a heavy metal, usually tungsten. The energy associated with the colliding electron is transmitted to the

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1 Isotopes are different forms of the same atom which are distinguished by having different numbers of neutrons in the nucleus but the same number of protons.
tungsten target and stimulates the emission of an x-ray from the target metal. Since x-rays can only be created through the application of a very high voltage, as soon as the electrical power is switched off, all x-ray emission ceases.

7C10.5 Radiological emergency incidents differ to other hazardous materials incidents in the following ways:

- firefighters generally have no experience with radiation emergencies as they are very rare
- even very low levels of radiation, that pose no significant risk, can be detected rapidly with simple, commonly available instruments
- radioactive materials can cause radiation exposure even when firefighters are not in contact with them
- the health effects resulting from radiation exposure may not appear for days, weeks or even years
- the public, media and firefighters often have an exaggerated fear of radiation.

Characteristics and classification

7C10.6 When describing radioactive processes extremely large numbers and very small numbers are frequently discussed therefore it is necessary to be able to use multiples and sub multiples of the units used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commonly used multiple and sub multiples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fraction or multiple</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>$10^{15}$</td>
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7C10.7 As described above, there are in effect three types of radiation arising from radioactivity.
Types of radiation arising from radioactivity

**Alpha radiation**
Has the greatest ionising potential of the three types. However, partly because of this, it has very poor penetrating power. Typically, alpha radiation can only travel about 3 cm in air and is completely absorbed by very thin layers of other materials eg paper, layers of dead skin, or water droplets.

**Beta radiation**
Has moderate ionising power. The penetrating range of beta radiation in air is approximately 1 m. It is fully absorbed by relatively small thicknesses of metals and plastics (eg 1 cm thick Perspex).

**Gamma radiation**
Has the lowest ionising potential of the three types but by far the greatest penetrating power. Gamma radiation will travel many hundreds or even thousands of metres in air. It is capable of passing through solid materials such as brick, concrete and metals although it will be attenuated as it does so. The more matter it passes through, the more its intensity is reduced. For this reason, dense metals such as lead or steel are the most efficient at absorbing gamma radiation.

(There are other nuclear processes which give rise to radioactive emissions but these are much less common and are therefore beyond the scope of this guidance)

7C10.8 When measuring radiation (alpha beta, gamma or x-ray) there are two properties which need to be classified, the activity (or strength) of the source and the dose (or amount) of ionising energy which is being absorbed by the body.

7C10.9 The modern unit of activity which has been adopted throughout Europe is the becquerel (abbreviated as Bq). All radioactive sources found in the UK legally have to be measured in becquerels. The becquerel is however, an extremely small quantity (it is defined as one nuclear disintegration per second) and most sources will have activities of thousands, millions, billions or even trillions of becquerels. This means that the usual SI multiples kilo, mega, giga, tera etc are often encountered when recording the activity of a source. It should however be noted that an older unit, the curie, is sometimes encountered particularly if the source originally came from the USA. Becquerels and curies measure the same dimension in much the same way as centimetres and miles measure the same dimension but on a different scale and magnitude of measurement.

7C10.10 The modern unit for measuring the radiation dose received by a person that has been adopted throughout Europe is the sievert (Sv). All personal dose (and dose rate) measurements legally have to be expressed as sieverts. In contrast to the becquerel, the sievert is a very large unit, and the common SI sub multiples of milli and micro are commonly encountered.
7C10.11 It should also be noted that another unit of dose, the gray is also widely used throughout Europe. Under most circumstances the sievert and the gray are numerically identical. The differences between the two units are beyond the scope of this guidance and for its purposes can be ignored.

7C10.12 Different units for dose measurement are used in the USA. These are the Rad (dimensionally equivalent to the gray) and the Rem (dimensionally equivalent to the sievert). One Rem is equal to 10 millisieverts (mSv).

7C10.13 Most hand held monitoring equipment measures the dose rate, which is the speed at which dose is being accumulated, although it is only the total dose received which is relevant as the cause of health problems.

7C10.14 A simple analogy which may assist firefighters in understanding the difference between ‘dose’ and ‘dose rate’ is a journey in a car:

- **The dose**, usually measured in millisieverts (mSv), a firefighter has received can be compared to how far you have travelled as shown the car’s odometer (miles)

- **The dose rate**, usually measured in millisieverts per hour (mSv/hr), can be compared to how fast you are travelling at any given moment as shown on the car’s speedometer (miles per hour).

**Hazards**

7C10.15 There are two principal hazards which arise from radioactivity, regardless of the type of radiation. These are:

- irradiation – which presents an external risk (ie from outside the body)
- contamination – which presents both an internal (ie inside the body) and possibly an external risk.

**Irradiation**

7C10.16 Irradiation is mainly a problem with materials which emit gamma radiation or from x-ray machines. Ionising energy is radiated out from the source and passes through a person’s body. As it does so, some of the energy is absorbed by the body tissues and the ionising properties can cause chemical changes in human cells. This can lead to damage and possibly disease. The source material however, never enters the body but a ‘hazardous materials exposure’ has occurred and a radiation dose will be received.

**Radioactive contamination**

7C10.17 Contamination is a potential problem with any radioactive material except electrically generated x-radiation. If a material which contains radioactive isotopes are in a form which is easily dispersed (ie dusts, powders, liquids, gases) the radioactive substance can become attached to the exterior of the body by direct
contact or airborne dispersion (e.g., dust, spray, mist, etc.). It may also enter the body through inhalation, ingestion or through an open cut or wound. In this sense, internal radioactive contamination poses much the same threat as any other chemical toxin or ‘hazardous materials exposure’. Once inside the body, alpha and beta emissions, which were not considered high risk in terms of external contamination, may produce damaging ionising radiation directly into the cells of the lymph system, blood and internal organs.

Sealed and unsealed sources

7C10.18 It is important for emergency responders to make a distinction between sealed (closed) sources of radioactivity and unsealed (open) sources of radioactivity.

- **Sealed sources** – A sealed source is a radioactive source that is encapsulated into a solid material, usually metal. The encapsulation is intended to prevent the escape of radioactive material while allowing the radioactive energy to pass through. Sealed sources are designed to withstand rough handling and elevated temperatures without releasing the radioactive material. Because the radioactive source substance is encapsulated or plated onto a surface, sealed sources do not present a contamination hazard under normal conditions, however, they can present an irradiation hazard.

- **Unsealed sources** – Unsealed sources consist of powders, liquids or sometimes gases which contain radioactive elements and which could easily be released from their containers through leaks and spillages and dispersed into the environment. The main hazard with unsealed sources is contamination although there may also be a significant irradiation hazard from the bulk material.

- **Shielding** – Both sealed and unsealed sources are generally stored or transported in such a way that they are ‘shielded’ by solid materials, usually their containers. These prevent or limit irradiation hazards. If a source’s shielding is removed or damaged the radioactive hazards are increased.

Damage caused by radiation

7C10.19 The damage caused by radiation may be divided into two different categories

- deterministic
- stochastic (or probabilistic).

7C10.20 Deterministic effects are those which occur at a relatively high dose and the severity of the effect is proportional to the dose. In all cases it is necessary to exceed a threshold dose before the effect is experienced at all. The most common effects in this category are skin reddening, hair loss, impaired fertility, lowered blood count, nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea. The threshold for detectable deterministic effects is about 100mSv. At this level no symptoms would be exhibited but tests on blood may start to show signs of damage.
As dose levels increase the severity of effects and the rapidity of their onset increases. Doses above 5000 millisieverts in a short period of time are life threatening.

7C10.21 Stochastic effects are those where the probability of experiencing the effect is proportional to the dose but the severity of the effect is independent of the dose. The most common effect in this category is cancer. The likelihood of contracting cancer increases with the dose but the severity of the disease is the same irrespective of the dose that caused it. Genetic effects are also believed to be stochastic although these have never been demonstrated in humans. As such it is assumed that any level of dose of radiation carries some risk and therefore all doses need to be kept as low as possible.

7C10.22 In summary, if the total dose is kept below 100 millisieverts, there will be no risk of any immediate effects such as skin reddening, hair loss, reduced fertility, nausea etc. However, the maximum annual dose to all radiation workers (male and female) is 20 mSv. There is an additional limit on females of reproductive capacity of 13 mSv in any three month period. The reason for this additional restriction is to protect a recently conceived foetus within a female who may be unaware of her pregnancy. In this sense it is not so much a restriction designed for the protection of females but is a restriction to protect a foetus.

7C10.23 Under the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 (IRR99), further restrictions apply to females who have announced they are pregnant or breast feeding but it is assumed that female firefighters would not be used in an emergency operational capacity once the pregnancy was declared (See Chapter 3 for further information).

7C10.24 **NOTE:** All doses referred to in this document are whole body doses unless otherwise stated. The IRR99 allow for higher annual doses if the radiation is delivered only to localised parts of the body. However, this is a very specialised area of workplace safety and is beyond the scope of this guidance document.
### Summary of whole body dose and effect

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dose</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 sieverts</td>
<td>Probable lethal dose</td>
<td>Very dependent on rate of delivery and health of individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5,000 mSv, or 5,000,000 μSv)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 sieverts</td>
<td>Erythema (skin reddening)</td>
<td>May not appear for several days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3,000 mSv or 3,000,000 μSv)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 sieverts</td>
<td>Depilation (hair loss)</td>
<td>Temporary between 3 and 7 Sv; permanent above 7 Sv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3,000 mSv or 3,000,000 μSv)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 sievert</td>
<td>Threshold for radiation sickness</td>
<td>Dependent upon other factors eg health, rate of delivery, skin type etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,000 mSv, or 1,000,000 μSv)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700 mSv</td>
<td>Threshold for temporary sterility</td>
<td>Can be permanent at higher doses in excess of 3 Sv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(700,000 μSv)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 mSv</td>
<td>Chromosomal changes in blood cells detectable Small increase in existing cancer risk</td>
<td>Minimum dose at which any physical changes can be detected. No noticeable effects by the person receiving the dose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100,000 μSv)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 mSv</td>
<td>Very small increase in overall cancer risk</td>
<td>No immediate observable effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5000 μSv)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** This table is designed to give a general awareness of the order of magnitude required for various effects to be observed and should only be regarded as a very approximate guide. In practice there are likely to be many other factors which would influence the response to various levels of dose.

### Usage, transportation, packaging and storage

#### Usage

**7C10.25** Radioactivity has a number of uses in society, these may be summarised as follows in an approximate order of severity of hazard:
Weapons

Vanguard class submarine carrying trident nuclear missiles

7C10.26 Nuclear weapons, their use, manufacture and transportation are subject to the highest levels of security and it is unlikely that the Fire and Rescue Service would ever be called upon to attend an incident involving a nuclear weapon without there also being an emergency response with expert advice from the military. The Ministry of Defence maintains a Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO) to respond to an incident including one arising through terrorist acts, involving defence nuclear assets. For fixed Ministry of Defence sites local arrangements should be in place to integrate the Fire and Rescue Service response with that of the base site.

7C10.27 For road convoys, hazardous materials and other safety information is available from the Convoy Command Team.

7C10.28 For air accidents involving nuclear materials a response team will deploy by helicopter to assist the response to the incident.

7C10.29 Further information is available in the Local Authority and Emergency Services Information; Defence Nuclear Materials Transport Contingency Arrangements on the Ministry of Defence website.

Power production

7C10.30 The UK currently has ten sites where electricity is generated by nuclear means although this number may change in time. These are all based in coastal locations. In addition to these, as part of the nuclear fuel cycle, there is a nuclear fuel production facility near Preston in Lancashire and the nuclear reprocessing works at Sellafield in Cumbria. The power stations themselves are secure locations with their own emergency teams. The hazards associated with the reactor and with stored nuclear fuel on site are high although the risk of an accident is generally accepted to be low.

7C10.31 Spent nuclear fuel (ie fuel which has been removed from the core of the reactor, is highly radioactive and probably represents the greatest potential radiation hazard anywhere within the UK. When fuel is removed from the reactor it is stored on site for several months in ponds before being transported to Sellafield by rail in specially constructed steel containers known as fuel flasks. These are
extremely robust but they are filled with water for cooling and shielding purposes and loss of cooling water could be a potentially serious problem. The total inventory of a fuel flask is likely to be hundreds of TBq or more.

7C10.32 New fuel is not highly radioactive and is transported to power stations by road. Uranium ore, ore concentrate and uranium hexafluoride are the raw materials used by the fuel production facility. The chemical properties of these materials are usually more problematic for the emergency services than their radiological properties.

Sterilisation plants

7C10.33 Very large sources of gamma radioactivity, usually cobalt 60 with activity of up to 10 PBq are used to sterilise instruments and utensils. These are always sealed sources and therefore the main hazard arises from irradiation.

Medical diagnostics

7C10.34 The main type of radiation used in diagnostics is x-rays. These do not pose a risk to firefighters if the power has been switched off.

7C10.35 Specialist departments within hospitals may however use radioactive materials which are either ingested or injected into the patient prior to the radiation emissions being detected in a scanner. These tend to be materials with a short half-life because the doctors do not want the radioactivity to remain in the body longer than necessary. The most commonly used material is technetium 99m (Tc-99m). It is usually supplied by a pharmaceutical company and is delivered by road. Other radioactive pharmaceuticals (eg Iodine 131) may also be produced by a company and sent to hospitals or clinics. Sometimes these are shipped to or from the UK by air. It is not unusual for the Fire Service to be requested to attend radiation incidents in the cargo handling areas of airports where packages have been compromised. These are usually encountered in MBq quantities.

7C10.36 Some hospitals may have their own facilities for producing short lived radioactive isotopes. These are produced in a particle accelerator known as a synchrotron.
Medical treatment

7C10.37 The main types of medical treatment are chemotherapy which involves the injection of radioactive drugs into the body and radiotherapy which involves the external exposure of body to highly collimated (directional) beams of gamma radiation. Radiotherapy sources are usually highly active but are well shielded in steel and lead housings. Radiotherapy frequently uses cobalt 60 as the source with activity up to about 10 GBq.

7C10.38 Brachytherapy sources are also used which are inserted into the body to deliver a localised radiation dose (eg Cs-137).

Industrial radiography

7C10.39 Powerful gamma emitting radionuclides are housed inside a shielded metal box with a shutter at one end. The box is placed in front of an engineering structure (usually during the construction phase, in order to take an x-ray (in fact it is a gamma ray) image of an engineering component in order to determine if it is free from defects and therefore able to withstand the load being applied to it. The shutter is normally opened and closed remotely by using a bicycle cable.
operating system. Note that although confusingly often referred to as x-rays, these instruments do contain radioactive sources and cannot be made safe by simply cutting the power supply.

**7C10.40** These are often found on construction sites and are used during the construction of load bearing structures to check for defects. They typically contain iridium 192 with activity in the range of 10 to 3000 GBq.

**Industrial process measurement (level gauges, density/moisture gauges)**

**7C10.41** Level or thickness gauges may often be encountered on production lines. They generally use a beta source such as strontium 90 in order to determine whether or not the objects passing between the source and a detector are of the correct thickness or filled to the correct level. Size of source is typically 1 MBq.

**7C10.42** Combined density and moisture gauges are often used on site in civil engineering projects for testing road surfaces. These use a caesium 137 source of approximately 300 MBq and an americium 241 source (combined with beryllium to produce neutrons) of approximately 1.5 GBq.

**Agricultural sources**

**7C10.43** Combine harvesters sometimes have a yield gauge which may contain an americium-241 source of approximately 35 MBq.

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**Massey Ferguson combine harvester with grain level gauge**

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**Teaching and research**

**7C10.44** The size and type of radiation are subject to wide variation dependent upon the particular research interests of the establishment concerned. The largest sources are likely to be found in the physics department of a university or the medical research department of a hospital.
**Anti static devices**

**7C10.45** These are used to prevent the build up of static electricity in some industrial processes by ionising the air around them. The most widespread application is in a car body repair workshop where paint spraying is conducted. Spray shops typically use sources of polonium 210 with activities up to 5 GBq.

**Scientific instruments**

**7C10.46** Small radioactive sources are sometimes used in particular measuring instruments in order to ionise the material under test in order to facilitate its analysis. Typical the sources are fairly small in the region of 1 kBq to 1 MBq.

**Luminising**

**7C10.47** Radioactive materials are sometimes mixed with light emitting material known as phosphors in order to convert radiation energy into light energy (eg the luminous hands on a watch). Any modern luminous article will be fully encapsulated such that little or no radiation can be measured on the outside of the article. However older articles (typically manufactured during the period from the 1940s to the 1960s might contain significant quantities of radium 226 eg the original instruments on a World War II Spitfire. It should also be noted that there are a number of sites around the country where luminising operations have taken place in the past which may have resulted in significant contamination of the ground and/or buildings.

**Gaseous tritium light devices**

**7C10.48** Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen. It is sometimes used as an energy supply inside a glass tube in order to energise phosphor coatings which then emit light. These are known as gaseous tritium light devices. They are self-contained light emitting devices, that is, they have no external power source. They may be encountered in various locations where self-luminous signs or objects are in use. It is worth noting that the amount of tritium in individual devices will not give rise to a significant risk even if broken and the tritium is
released. However, if the Fire and Rescue Service is mobilised to a premises where these devices are manufactured or stored in bulk, there may be terabecquerel amounts on site and special precautions may be appropriate.

7C10.49 In any incident involving tritium the principal concern will always be contamination rather than irradiation. It emits weak beta radiation only and has one of the weakest energy emissions of any radioactive material. Because of this it presents a unique problem in that no hand held instrumentation available to the Fire and Rescue Service is sufficiently sensitive to detect it.

7C10.50 It is therefore recommended that if a Fire and Rescue Service is mobilised to an incident involving a potential release of tritium appropriate chemical protective clothing and breathing apparatus is donned if entering a building. It is recommended that all responders contaminated by a significant release of tritium should undergo biological monitoring as it can breach chemical protective clothing in certain circumstances. This will require the staff affected to provide urine samples which will be analysed subsequently to determine the quantity of any tritium absorbed and to calculate any resultant internal dose.

7C10.51 It is worth noting that tritium may be found in gaseous form stored in a glass flask or it may be found as either tritiated water or organically bound tritium where the radioactive form of hydrogen is substituted for normal hydrogen. If gaseous tritium is involved it should be borne in mind that it readily exchanges with normal hydrogen atoms in molecules and therefore firefighting water run off may quickly become a source of tritium which could spread contamination widely.

Luminous key rings incorporating tritium

Smoke detectors

7C10.52 A small source of americium 241 typically 50 kBq is used in some domestic smoke alarms.
Lightning conductors

7C10.53 In the past radium 226 up to 500 kBq has been used as part of the construction on lightning conductors to improve their efficiency. Although they are no longer used in modern lightening protection systems, there is still a legacy of these sources in older building particularly in church steeples.

Transportation

7C10.54 The transport of radioactive materials within the UK is governed by strict regulations (see Section 7 Part C-3 Transportation, packaging and supply of hazardous materials for further information).

7C10.55 The general requirements for all packaging and packages used for the transportation of radioactive substances and articles are that:

- The package shall be so easily and safely transported and shall be designed that it can be properly secured in or on the conveyance during transport.

- Any lifting attachments on the package will not fail when used in the intended manner and shall take account of appropriate safety factors to cover snatch lifting.

- As far as practicable, the packaging shall be designed and finished so that the external surfaces are free from protruding features and can be easily decontaminated.

- As far as practicable, the outer layer of the package shall prevent the collection and the retention of water. Any features added to the package at the time of transport which are not part of the package shall not reduce its safety.

- The package shall be capable of withstanding the effects of any acceleration, vibration or vibration resonance. In particular, nuts, bolts and other securing devices shall be designed as to prevent them from becoming loose or being released unintentionally, even after repeated use.

- The materials of the packaging and any components or structures shall be physically and chemically compatible with each other and with the radioactive contents. Account shall be taken of their behaviour under irradiation.
• All valves through which the radioactive contents could otherwise escape shall be protected against unauthorised operation

• The design of the package shall take into account ambient temperatures and pressures that are likely to be encountered in routine conditions of transport

• For radioactive material having other dangerous properties the package design shall take into account those properties.

7C10.56 There are five basic container types for the transportation of radioactive materials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Five basic container types for transportation of radioactive materials with their performance statements</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Excepted Packages – “may survive a minor accident”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Industrial Packages – “may survive a minor accident”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Type A Packages – “survives a minor accident”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Type B Packages – “survives a major accident”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Type C Packages – “survives an air accident”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXCEPTED PACKAGES**
For certain very small quantities of radioactive materials. The marking with the UN number is a requirement under the latest transport regulations. Common examples of contents are radiopharmaceuticals, calibration sources and some experimental apparatus. Surface dose rates must be below 0.005 mSv per hour. Excepted packages can be conveyed by all modes of transport in the UK (including the postal service).

**INDUSTRIAL PACKAGES**
For materials of which the concentration of radioactive material is very low and possibly also where it is in a form which is not easily dispersed. These are basic containers used for materials of low specific activity or surface contaminated objects, such as natural uranium ores or depleted uranium and worn protective clothing such as gloves and overalls. These containers are not necessarily expected to survive accident conditions. These packages are usually transported by road, rail or sea, although some air transport does occur.

**TYPE A PACKAGES**
For relatively large quantities of radioactive materials (compared with Industrial packages) such as radiopharmaceuticals, or radiochemicals. These packages are designed to withstand minor accidents, and only release a small fraction of their contents in a more serious accident. Surface dose rates are normally limited to no more than 2 mSv per hour. These packages are normally conveyed by all modes of transport, especially air as this reduces travel time for short-lived isotopes.
**TYPE B PACKAGES**

For larger amounts of radioactive materials, such as irradiated nuclear fuel, nuclear wastes or large radiation sources for radiotherapy. These are very strong packages and typically contain large quantities of radioactive material. They are specially designed containers able to withstand accident conditions. Surface dose rates are generally much less than 1 mSv per hour, and are limited to 2 mSv per hour under standard conditions. Type B packages are the predominant package type conveyed by rail, they are also transported by road, air and sea.

**TYPE C PACKAGES**

For large amounts of radioactive materials carried by air. A robustly designed package for high activity dispersible sources, including fissile material exclusively for air transport. Testing of these packages ensure that the package remains intact should it be involved in an air accident. Type C packages are relatively rare internationally.

**OTHER PACKAGES**

7C10.57 In nuclear engineering, a fissile material is one that is capable of sustaining a chain reaction of nuclear fission. Fissile materials can be used to fuel:

- a nuclear reactor (eg at a nuclear power station)
- a nuclear explosive.

7C10.58 Fissile material can be carried in industrial packages, Type A packages, Type B packages or Type C packages, but in this case the package will be designed to withstand accidents similar to the Type B or Type C package.

7C10.59 An additional type of package is that used for uranium hexafluoride. These packages may be any of the above types (except not normally Type C). However, they require special treatment in emergencies, particularly in fires. These packages are normally cylindrical and range in size. They may be contained in a protective outer box, which gives the package protection against severe accidents. The material they carry is corrosive in nature, reacting with water to form hydrofluoric acid and this may be the major concern in an emergency. The radioactive material they carry is often of such a low concentration that it carries little risk from radiation.

**Marking and labelling**

7C10.60 Radioactive materials are classified under UN category 7.

7C10.61 Unless the package is an excepted package (in which case it is unlabelled), all packages are labelled according to the external radiation hazard associated with the individual package as represented by the maximum radiation dose rate at the surface of the package. This rate of surface radiation is defined by the term ‘Transport Index’ (TI). TI is used to express the external radiation hazard arising from a package in practical terms. The TI is determined by measuring the radiation dose rate at 1 metre from the package in µSv/hour and dividing...
the measured value by 10. If the material is fissile the TI is accompanied with the Criticality Safety Index and this is defined and measured differently. For further information regarding the transport index see the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, published by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

7C10.62 For the purpose of labelling, type A and type B packages are divided into three categories, which are:

- Category I – White
- Category II – Yellow
- Category III – Yellow

7C10.63 The label must include the radiation trefoil symbol, the name or symbol of the radionuclide, the activity (in Bq multiples) and the TI in the case of category II and III packages. Labels must be fixed to two opposite sides of the outside of the package. Examples of these labels are shown below.

### Fissile material

![Fissile material label](image)

### Radioactive substance

![Radioactive substance label](image)
7C10.64 Where the consignment in the freight container or tank is unpackaged LSA-I (low specific activity) or SCO-1 (surface contaminated objects) or where an exclusive use consignment in a freight container is packaged radioactive material with a single United Nations number, the appropriate United Nations number for the consignment shall also be displayed, in black digits not less than 65 mm high, either in the lower half of the placard and against the white background, or on the placard.
Documentation

7C10.65 ADR\(^2\) does not require that a transport document (consignment note) must be prepared by the consignor and accompany the package when it is transported but in practice it usually is. If the package is to be transported by more than one mode of transport, it is accepted practice for a single transport document to be provided – for example, in the case of a package travelling by road to the airport, thence by air, the document provided would be the airline’s ‘shippers’ declaration for dangerous goods’.

7C10.66 The transport document must include a signed declaration by the consignor and specified information relating to the package, including the UN number and proper shipping name assigned to the material. In addition, the consignor must provide the carrier with a written statement of any additional actions required of the carrier, for example any supplementary operational requirements relating to the loading, stowage, transport or handling, and any emergency actions appropriate to the consignment. Where no such supplementary operational requirements are necessary, a written statement to this effect must be provided to the carrier.

7C10.67 ADR requires that all transport documents are provided for excepted packages, and specifies that the information be provided in respect of each package.

7C10.68 The information contained in the documentation will give details such as the following:

- Name and address of the consignor
- Contact telephone number
- Name of material(s) being carried
- Description of materials

\(^2\) The European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, commonly known as ADR (from the French abbreviation Accord européen relatif au transport international des marchandises Dangereuses par Route), governs transnational transport of hazardous materials.
Other warning signs to be displayed

7C10.69 In the UK, unless the vehicle is carrying only excepted packages, it must also display either:

- a fireproof notice (a stamped metal plate) in the vehicle cab such that it is plainly visible to the driver; or
- rectangular, reflective, orange-coloured plates at the front and rear of the vehicle.

7C10.70 The fireproof notice or orange-coloured plates must be removed or covered when the vehicle is not carrying radioactive consignments.
Storage

- The storage of radioactive materials is regulated via the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010 (EPR2010), and the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 (RSA93). Since 6 April 2010 EPR2010 has come into force in England and Wales whereas RSA93 is still in force in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Section 23 of EPR2010 contains most of what was previously contained in RSA93.

- Any operator handling or storing radioactive materials must be registered under RSA93 or EPR2010.

- Section 7 of the Act deals with the storage conditions of sealed and unsealed sources.

- Section 10 deals with the storage of mobile sources.

- Sections 13 and 14 deal with the conditions under which sources may be accumulated and disposed of.

- If an operator stores sealed sources with activity in excess of a certain limit (limit varies according to the type of source) the High Activity Sealed Sources and Orphan Sources 2005 Regulations must also be complied with. These regulations are now incorporated into the Environmental Permitting Regulations in England and Wales (Section 23).

- High Activity Sealed Sources and Orphan Sources 2005 Regulations are designed to ensure the security of high activity sealed sources in order to prevent them falling into the hands of terrorist groups. Among other things, the organisation seeking to store the sources must contact the counter terrorism security adviser of the local police service who will give recommendations on the physical security of the storage. An authorisation under Radioactive Substances Act 1993/Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010 will now only be issued if these recommendations have been followed.

- In addition High Activity Sealed Sources and Orphan Sources 2005 Regulations require the organisation to have in place suitable management processes in order to control and account for the use of the radioactive materials. Provision must also be made in the financial accounts to cover the cost of final disposal.

Operational considerations

Pre-planning

7C10.71 Fire and Rescue Services should adopt a pro-active approach to identifying potential radiation sources wherever possible within their response area. The use of radioactive materials is tightly controlled in the UK through the Radioactive...
Substances Act 1993 and the Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010. All users of radioactive materials must be in receipt of an authorisation under Section 8 of the Act in order to hold radioactive materials. The authorisation states the maximum activity of each radionuclide the user may hold and whether the source is sealed or unsealed.

7C10.72 Copies of all such authorisations are sent to the relevant Fire and Rescue Service. It is recommended that an easily accessible central register of all these notifications is maintained. Once the Fire and Rescue Service has compiled a register of the location of the registered source users, it is good practice for the local fire station to arrange for familiarisation visits. The Fire and Rescue Service may need to prioritise the visits according to the nature of the sources or possible complexity of on-site processes.

Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999

7C10.73 The Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 are made under the Health and Safety at Work Act. They place a duty upon the employer (ie the Fire and Rescue Authority) to put in place systems to ensure that its employees are protected from excessive exposure to radiation. As part of the pre-planning procedure Fire and Rescue Services must have a written procedure stating how they will manage a radiation incident and stating how they intend to discharge their duties under the ionising radiations regulations. In particular the document must address the following points:

DOSE LIMITS

7C10.74 The maximum annual dose to all radiation workers (male and female) is 20 mSv. Firefighters attending a radiation incident fall under the definition of a radiation worker. There is an additional limit on females of reproductive capacity of 13 mSv in any three month period. The reason for this additional restriction is to protect a recently conceived foetus within a woman who may be unaware of her pregnancy. In this sense it is not so much a restriction designed for the protection of females but is a restriction designed to protect a foetus.

7C10.75 Further restrictions apply to females who have announced they are pregnant or breast feeding but it is assumed that female firefighters would not be used in an emergency operational capacity once the pregnancy was declared.

DOSE CONSTRAINTS

7C10.76 The regulations stipulate that, where appropriate to do so at the planning stage, dose constraints are used to restrict exposure to radiation as far as is reasonably practicable. This dose constraint will usually be significantly lower than the legal dose limits. Fire and Rescue Services should consider any possible operations not involving situations immediately threatening to life where they may wish to impose a dose constraint below the legal annual limit. This could possibly be the case at a protracted incident or if it was considered possible that crews may have to attend more than one radiation incident within a 12 month period.
7C10.77 It is recommended that a dose constraint of 5 mSv per incident is introduced at operational incidents. The reasons for this level of constraint are:

- It corresponds to the alarm setting on the electronic personal dosimeters, supplied through the Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience Project, which would naturally prompt staff to leave the hazard zone
- It is in line with dose reference levels used by the Ambulance Service
- It does not legally preclude female firefighters from entering the hazard zone as it is less than 13 mSv
- If a firefighter were to receive a dose in excess of one third of any formal dose limit (ie 1/3 of 20 mSv), the employer must conduct an investigation into the circumstances. This would equate to approximately 6 mSv for a whole body dose as measured by an electronic personal dosimeter and by using 5 mSv as the dose constraint level this should avoid crossing this reporting threshold.

AS LOW AS REASONABLY PRACTICABLE

7C10.78 At all times, it is not simply sufficient to avoid exceeding dose constraints or dose limits, the Fire and Rescue Service must take active measures to ensure that all doses received are ‘as low as reasonably practicable’. Dose limits are not aspirational, they are the last line of defence. In practical terms this means that if a task can be carried out in more than one way and one method is likely to result in lower radiation doses, this method must be used if reasonably practicable.

EMERGENCY EXPOSURE

7C10.79 Although the preceding paragraphs are based upon the legal requirements under Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999, there is an exception to these dose limits. Under the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPiR) it is permissible to disapply the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 dose limits at a licensed nuclear site or at an incident involving transport by rail if in doing so it might be possible to save life or maintain critical infrastructure.

7C10.80 In these instances it may be permissible for an informed volunteer to be exposed to a dose of up to 100 mSv. The authorisation for the disapplication of dose limits (ie allowing emergency exposure to take place) must be given by an officer or manager within the Fire and Rescue Service who has received appropriate training.

3 The figure of 100 mSv is not stipulated in the REPPiR, it has been arrived at through multi-agency collaboration. Where Fire and Rescue Services have licensed sites within their turn-out areas they should develop risk assessed emergency exposure procedures with site operators.
7C10.81 The REPPIR state that employees of the emergency services who may receive emergency exposures should be pre-identified as part of the planning process. Fire and Rescue Services should liaise with radiation risk operators or carriers, as appropriate, to obtain the expert advice needed to plan for emergency exposures.

7C10.82 Fire and Rescue Services that develop emergency exposure operational procedures which disapply the dose limits in the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 should record specific risk assessments on this aspect of their plans. Even when operating under emergency exposure conditions the principles of ‘as low as reasonably possible’ should still be taken into consideration.

7C10.83 Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents – Fire and Rescue Services should note that REPPIR applies to premises and transportation where a known source of certain strength exists. This is clearly not the case in a terrorist attack involving a radiation source at other premises. In this case therefore, the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 cannot legally be disapplied and the limitations in the regulations indicated above will apply.

7C10.84 However, this anomaly in law has been recognised and after consultation with the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive the following has been determined.

- "Terrorist incidents are not considered by the Health and Safety Executive to be applicable to either the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 or The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR). However REPPIR does provide a good framework which can be used for planning and management of risk with regard to intervention at this type of incident".

INFORMED VOLUNTEER

7C10.85 An informed volunteer in terms of the application of REPPIR is a radiation worker who has agreed to receive an emergency exposure above the limits imposed by Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999.

7C10.86 To be considered as an informed volunteer a firefighter should have received:

- appropriate training in the field of radiation protection
- suitable and sufficient information and instruction for them to know the risks to health created by exposure to ionising radiation and the precautions which should be taken
- a briefing on the risks and control measures associated with the specific emergency tasks in question.

NOTE: Informed volunteers should be asked to confirm their agreement to potentially receive an emergency exposure at this briefing.
The REPPIR also require that employers of informed volunteers:

- Provide equipment that is necessary to restrict the exposure of informed volunteers to radiation
- Identify, and appropriately train, managers/officers who are authorised, in the event of a radiation emergency, to permit informed volunteers to be subject to an emergency exposure
- Make arrangements for medical surveillance by an appointed doctor or employment medical adviser to be carried out without delay in the event of a radiation emergency
- Make arrangements with an approved dosimetry service for the assessment of doses during emergency exposures, and for the separate recording of such doses in dose records. Further information and the names of approved dosimetry services approved under REPPIR can be found on the Health and Safety Executive website:
  www.hse.gov.uk/radiation/ionising/dosimetry/ads.htm
- Ensure that no employee under 18 years of age, no trainee under 18 years of age and no female employee who is pregnant or breast-feeding is subject to an emergency exposure.

**CLASSIFIED PERSONS**

Classified persons are those who work regularly with radiation in regulated areas. It is unlikely that any firefighters would ever need to become ‘classified workers’. However, a situation could arise with part-time or retained duty system firefighters where their primary employment might be in an organisation where they are exposed to ionising radiations and by virtue of this would be classified workers.

This situation could arise where retained firefighters are recruited from an area where a licensed nuclear site is a major employer. Under these circumstances, the Fire and Rescue Service would have a duty under the *Ionising Radiation Regulations* to have a system in place whereby the annual doses received by individual retained staff from their other employment is captured so that they do not exceed any applicable dose limit.

The most convenient way of addressing this might be to issue each of the relevant member of staff with a radiation passbook. This is a recognised scheme within the nuclear industry whereby staff that may have to visit many sites during a year have their dose monitored by the health physics department of each site in question. This dose is then entered into the book which is issued on a personal basis. The classified person then takes it with them from site to site and the ‘running total’ is noted in order to ensure that dose limits and constraints are not exceeded.

It is recommended that if this is identified as an issue for any Fire and Rescue Service contact is made with the radiation protection adviser at the main licensed nuclear site in order to arrange for such a scheme to be implemented.
**DESIGNATED AREAS**

**7C10.92** Restricted and controlled areas are specially marked areas where radiation dose rates in excess of prescribed limits (6 mSv per year or 3 tenths of any other relevant dose limit) are likely to be encountered. If entering a ‘radiation controlled area’ at a licensed site, Fire and Rescue Service staff shall do so under the supervision of the site radiation protection supervisor and shall wear any additional dosimetry equipment required by the site. If the incident occurs at an unregulated location the establishment of the inner cordon and entry controls would satisfy this requirement.

**LOCAL RULES**

**7C10.93** The radiation employer (ie the Fire and Rescue Service) must produce a set of written local rules which set out the procedure to be followed when working with radioactive materials. In most cases this Fire and Rescue Service Operational Guidance would form the basis for fulfilling this requirement as amended by local risk assessments and standard operating procedures.

**RADIATION PROTECTION ADVISER AND RADIATION PROTECTION SUPERVISOR**

**7C10.94** The Fire and Rescue Service should consult a radiation protection adviser if it considers it needs advice on compliance with the Ionising Radiation Regulations.

**7C10.95** The appointment of a radiation protection supervisor within the Fire and Rescue Service is a useful role in helping to ensure adherence to the operational procedures for radiation incidents. The radiation protection supervisor needs to:

- understand the requirements of the local procedures within the Fire and Rescue Service
- command sufficient authority to be able to supervise the radiation protection aspects of incident
- understand the necessary precautions to be taken to restrict exposures
- understand the procedures to follow in the event of an emergency.

**7C10.96** The hazardous materials adviser position within Fire and Rescue Services should be considered suitable for the radiation protection supervisor role.

**PRIOR RISK ASSESSMENT**

**7C10.97** There must be a prior risk assessment carried out for all work involving radioactivity. The national Fire and Rescue Service generic risk assessment on radiation incidents (GRA 5.5 Incidents involving radiation) should be considered when Fire and Rescue Services carry out or review their own risk assessments.

**DOSIMETRY AND RECORD KEEPING**

**7C10.98** All staff who enter an area designated by the Fire and Rescue Service as potentially containing a radiation hazard should be issued with a dosimeter to record the external dose received. The Fire and Rescue Service should have a system in place to be able to capture this information and to store the dose record for up to 50 years.
The requirement to keep records only applies once a firefighter has received a radiation dose other than from normal background radiation. If after being worn the dosimeter is only displaying the normal background level of accumulated dose then there is no requirement to keep this record.

MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE

In the event of firefighters receiving a significant exposure to radiation they must be referred to a suitably qualified employment medical adviser to conduct medical surveillance. Fire and Rescue Services should consider making provision in their occupational health arrangements for this service to be commenced should the need arise. This may also include the provision of bioassay services in the event of suspected internal exposure.

It is possible that the health physics departments of a local Licensed Nuclear Site may be willing to provide this service locally, and liaison with the site radiation protection adviser is therefore recommended.

EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE AND CALIBRATION

Reliance is placed in this guidance on the ability to accurately measure the dose and dose rates to which firefighters are exposed. It is therefore essential that the equipment is properly maintained and subject to annual calibration tests.

TRAINING

All staff expected to encounter radiation should be properly trained to undertake the tasks expected of them. The Fire and Rescue Service should arrange for role appropriate training (including acquisition, application and maintenance of competence) of staff. This should be reinforced by exercising both at specific locations of radiation risks and of general radiation procedures.

EMERGENCY INCIDENT PLANS

For planning purposes only, the following table may be useful in estimating the likely realistic working times for various dose rates and separation distances before the recommended dose constraint level of 5 mSv (Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience electronic personal dosimeter standard alarm) and the emergency exposure limit of 100 mSv (electronic personal dosimeter emergency alarm) are reached.
### Radiation Incidents: Approximate Firefighter Duration Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical Activity</th>
<th>Gamma Dose Rate at 1m</th>
<th>Time to reach dose at 1m</th>
<th>Time to reach dose at 10m</th>
<th>Time to reach dose at 50m</th>
<th>Time to reach dose at 100m</th>
<th>Time to reach dose at 500m</th>
<th>Time to reach dose at 1000m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-60 Cs-137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 TBq</td>
<td>12 TBq</td>
<td>1000 mSv/hr</td>
<td>18 s</td>
<td>6 min</td>
<td>30 min</td>
<td>10 hr</td>
<td>13 hr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 TBq</td>
<td>6 TBq</td>
<td>500 mSv/hr</td>
<td>36 s</td>
<td>12 min</td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>20 hr</td>
<td>1 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330 GBq</td>
<td>1.2 TBq</td>
<td>100 mSv/hr</td>
<td>3 min</td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>5 hr</td>
<td>4 day</td>
<td>5 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150 GBq</td>
<td>600 GBq</td>
<td>50 mSv/hr</td>
<td>6 min</td>
<td>2 hr</td>
<td>10 hr</td>
<td>8 day</td>
<td>10 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 GBq</td>
<td>120 GBq</td>
<td>10 mSv/hr</td>
<td>30 min</td>
<td>10 hr</td>
<td>2 day</td>
<td>42 day</td>
<td>52 day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 GBq</td>
<td>12 GBq</td>
<td>1 mSv/hr</td>
<td>5 hour</td>
<td>4 day</td>
<td>21 day</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 GBq</td>
<td>6 GBq</td>
<td>500 μSv/hr</td>
<td>10 hour</td>
<td>8 day</td>
<td>42 day</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>330 MBq</td>
<td>1.2 MBq</td>
<td>100 μSv/hr</td>
<td>2 day</td>
<td>40 day</td>
<td>208 day</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 MBq</td>
<td>12 MBq</td>
<td>10 μSv/hr</td>
<td>20 day</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** This table assumes that there is no shielding between the source and the firefighter and that the source is a point source (i.e., very small in relation to the size of the firefighter). It has been calculated for two very common sources and it is important to be aware that the same activity from different sources can give rise to very different dose rates. Whilst this is useful for initial planning, real dose rate information needs to be gathered at an actual incident using radiation detection and monitoring equipment. The figures shown should be treated with caution and be regarded as approximations only.

7C10.106 If Fire and Rescue Services have significant radiation risks in their area they should arrange joint exercises with the facility concerned. This is especially important if there is a licensed nuclear site within their turn-out area. Early contact with the Radiation Protection Adviser or the Head of Radiation Protection Advisory Services would enable both the facility and the Fire and Rescue Service to understand each other’s role in an emergency and what would be expected of the Fire and Rescue Service. Licensed sites often operate their own fire brigade and are usually very helpful to the local authority Fire and Rescue Service.

7C10.107 The safety of nuclear installations in the UK is the responsibility of holders of Nuclear Site Licences granted by the Health and Safety Executive under the **Nuclear Installations Act 1965**. The Nuclear Site Licence, which permits the use of the site for certain specified activities, contains a number of standard licence conditions. Licence Condition 11 (Emergency Arrangements) requires the licensee to ensure that adequate arrangements are in place to respond effectively to any incident ranging from a minor on-site event to a significant release of radioactive material. In the event of a real fire at a nuclear installation, the Fire and Rescue Service would be required to support. For this reason, it is recommended that Fire and Rescue Services that have a nuclear installation within their area should establish formal links with these installations and exercise the emergency response arrangements.
Licensed nuclear sites are typically nuclear power stations, facilities for the manufacture or reprocessing of nuclear fuel, production and maintenance of nuclear weapons and sites operating a nuclear reactor.

The Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group is a forum which brings together a wide range of organisations, including CFOA, with interests in off-site civil nuclear emergency planning. The Group issues consolidated guidance on planning which can be found at:


**Phase 1: Mobilising and en-route**

Informative messages to mobilising control should state ‘RADIATION SUSPECTED’ when involvement is suspected but not yet confirmed, and “RADIATION CONFIRMED” when radiation is known to be involved. On receipt of either of these messages, mobilising control should inform all responders of the situation, it may also trigger other Fire and Rescue Service specific pre-determined attendances.

Radiation monitoring instruments should be switched on before reaching the incident.

Radioactive materials may be involved in incidents at premises or during transport. Their involvement may be suspected in the following cases:

- knowledge or intelligence that radioactive materials are in a building from operational information sources (eg 7(2)d visits, agency notifications, fire safety inspections/assessments etc)
- a radioactivity warning placard on a vehicle or package
- the caller may state that radioactive materials are present
- an electronic personal dosimeter alarm actuates
- a survey meter shows a dose rate above background
- terrorist or other malicious acts.
Phase 2: Arriving and gathering information

Radiation dose control measures – Where it is known that the only radiation at an incident is from a sealed source (ie there is no contamination risk) protection will depend upon a combination of TIME, DISTANCE and SHIELDING

TIME – the shorter the duration of exposure the smaller the accumulated dose

DISTANCE – the greater the distance from the source of radiation the lower the dose rate

NOTE: Inverse square relationship (eg doubling the distance from a radiation source quarters the dose received)

SHIELDING – in general the higher the density and greater the thickness of the shielding, the better the protection.

- Response vehicles should approach the incident from the upwind direction wherever possible as a precaution. This is essential if it is believed that there has been a significant release of contamination from an unsealed source of radiation

- Initially response vehicles should be parked a safe distance from the incident

- The table below gives generic initial cordon distances based on the guidance given by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency. This manual provides practical guidance for those responding within the first few hours of a radiological emergency. It does not address the response to emergencies involving facilities or operations for which specific emergency arrangements should have been developed. Further information can be found at:

www.iaea.org
### Radiation incidents – generic initial cordon

#### Outside buildings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unshielded or damaged potentially dangerous source</td>
<td>45 metres around</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major spill from a potentially dangerous source</td>
<td>100 metres around</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire, explosion or fumes involving a potentially dangerous source</td>
<td>300 metres radius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected bomb (exploded or unexploded)</td>
<td>400 metres radius or more to protect against an explosion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Inside buildings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Area Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Damage, loss of shielding or spill of a potentially dangerous source</td>
<td>Affected and adjacent areas (including the floor above and below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire or other event that can spread a potentially dangerous source</td>
<td>Entire building and outside distances detailed above.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- If immediately available, a survey meter (eg RADOS 200) should be deployed to check that the vehicles are not parked in an area affected by any gamma radiation. As a general guide the reading should be in the range 0.04 to 0.2 microsieverts per hour which is the normal background range. At a large site, there may be a formal rendezvous point and at some sites there may be several to take account of differing wind directions. If survey meters are not available to the first responders the electronic personal dosimeters issued to Fire and Rescue Services through the National Resilience Assurance Team provide a basic dose rate measuring capability.

- If the survey meter indicates normal background readings the appliances may be moved closer if this is desirable. If the survey meter indicates elevated gamma dose rates the appliances should be withdrawn to a point where normal background readings are obtained.

- The Incident Commander should liaise with a responsible person on site, if available. This may be a radiation protection supervisor or radiation protection adviser at a fixed installation or possibly the driver of the vehicle if in transit. At a licensed site there may be a written emergency plan. At a transport incident there should be documentation which will describe the type and size of sources being carried. The class of sign on packaging should also give information about the likely dose rates.
• The Incident Commander should attempt to determine the following information then carry out a risk assessment:
  – Is radioactivity the reason for the incident or is it a secondary issue which happens to be present?
  – What type of source is involved? What nuclide is involved?
  – Is it sealed or unsealed (ie irradiation or contamination risk)?
  – What is the size of the source (activity) in Bq? Which types of radiation are emitted? Remember most sources will emit more than one type of radiation
  – What is the exact location of the source within a building? Is this the same as the location of the incident or is it likely to become involved in the incident?

Radiation dose management

**DOSE LIMIT** – Under the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1999 the maximum annual dose to firefighters is 20 mSv. There is an additional limit on females of reproductive capacity of 13 mSv in any three month period.

**DOSE CONSTRAINT** – It is recommended that a dose constraint of 5 mSv per incident is introduced at operational incidents involving radiation.

**EMERGENCY EXPOSURE** – At a licensed nuclear site or at an incident involving transport by rail the legal dose limit can be exceeded if in doing so it might be possible to save life or maintain critical infrastructure. In these instances an informed volunteer may be exposed to a dose of up to 100 mSv. The authorisation of “emergency exposure” to must only be given by an officer or manager within the Fire and Rescue Service who has received appropriate training

**NOTE:** As low as reasonably possibly

At all times, it is not sufficient to avoid exceeding dose constraints or dose limits, the Fire and Rescue Service must take active measures to ensure that all doses received are ‘as low as reasonably possible’.

• Consider contacting RADSAFE in the event of a transport incident to gain expert advice and support.
**Assistance and liaison:**

**RADSAFE**
RADSAFE is a consortium of organisations that have come together to provide mutual assistance in the event of a transport accident involving radioactive materials belonging to a RADSAFE member. RADSAFE is designed to ensure the early provision of advice and support to the emergency services. It is activated by calling **0800 834153**. Further information is available at:

www.radsafe.org.uk

RADSAFE has three levels of response:

- **Level 1** – Notification/communication service, provision of generic radiological protection advice provided by Command and Control Centre
- **Level 2** – Provision of radiological advice/support at the incident scene
- **Level 3** – Consignment owner response and ‘clean-up’

**NAIR**
The NAIR (National Arrangements for Incidents involving Radioactivity) scheme exists to provide protection to the public in the event of incidents involving radioactivity in cases where no specific plans are available or existing plans fail to operate effectively.

NAIR provides the emergency services with expert advice where the public might be at risk and acts as a ‘long stop’ to other emergency plans.

The Fire and Rescue Service may call upon NAIR assistance through the police who should call **0800 834153** (same number as RADSAFE).

NAIR response is provided in two stages:

- **Stage 1** – provided by a radiation expert equipped with simple monitoring and protective equipment. They can quickly advise whether a radiological hazard exists. They are not equipped to deal with larger incidents. In such events the they will advise the police to initiate the Stage 2 response.
- **Stage 2** – provided by a well equipped team from a nuclear establishment with facilities to deal with larger incidents

**NOTE:** NAIR will not organise substantial recovery operations or carry out large scale decontamination.
• If there is no responsible person available and the premises/vehicle/source is not secure, the assistance of the police should be sought in order secure it

• The Environment Agency should be informed whenever a registered radioactive source is involved in an incident. This is particularly important if any contamination is released into the environment from for example water run off

• The local water undertakers should be informed if it is believed that radioactive contamination has entered a sewer or watercourse.

Phase 3: Planning the response

The Incident Commander must ensure that a full risk assessment is carried out prior to the deployment of staff in order to develop an appropriate and proportionate response plan.

The Incident Commander, in conjunction with the hazardous materials adviser, should determine the tasks to be undertaken. Consideration should be given to the following:

• The need to deploy crews

• If it is deemed necessary, determine if the risk involves a sealed source in which case the only hazard is likely to be irradiation or an unsealed source since in which case the main hazard is likely to be contamination

• If the hazard is irradiation only (ie a sealed source), structural firefighting kit with breathing apparatus is an appropriate level of personal protective equipment (personal protective equipment)

• If the hazard is contamination chemical protection clothing plus breathing apparatus is often an appropriate level of personal protective equipment

  NOTE: If it is not known whether sealed or unsealed sources are involved, chemical protective clothing should be worn.

• The type of source and the type of radiation emitted

  NOTE: Determining the type of radiation is secondary to the need to determine whether the risk is from irradiation or contamination or both. Be aware that the majority of radioactive sources will emit more than one type of radiation

• Be clear about the objective in committing crews eg fire fighting, search and rescue, maintaining critical infrastructure

• Brief the crews thoroughly about their task and emphasise the need to enter, carry out specific task then leave
Technical considerations

- Remind crews that personal protective equipment will protect them fully from the effects of contamination and the principles of **Time, Distance and Shielding** will protect them from the effects of irradiation. Spend as little time as possible in the proximity of the source; keep as far away from the source as possible (survey meter readings will assist in this); make use of any available shielding eg concrete, metallic structures, water tanks etc

- The use of a survey meter will help them to manage any possible dose to an acceptable level

- Dosimeters will record the personal dose received by each firefighter and the reading for each firefighter will need to be robustly recorded for future reference

- Electronic personal dosimeters issued to Fire and Rescue Services through the National Resilience Assurance Team provide an audible alarm which should prompt the wearer’s withdrawal from the hazard zone before any significant doses are received.

  **NOTE:** Three stage alarm.

  - The **first alarm** is a dose rate alarm which gives a warning that the wearer is entering an area affected by radiation. This can, and should be cancelled by the wearer. Temporary shielding could cause this alarm to sound more than once during a deployment.

  - The **second alarm** will operate when the total accumulated dose reaches 5 mSv. Crews would normally withdraw at this point. This alarm can be cancelled by the wearer.

  - The **third alarm** which would only ever operate if an emergency intervention was being made will operate at 100 mSv. This must not be ignored, wearers must aim to leave the inner cordon before it sounds. This alarm cannot be cancelled by the wearer.

**Phase 4: Implementing the response**

- Establish and mark an inner cordon. Set up a breathing apparatus entry control point as its “gateway”. The cordon boundary should be at a point where the background dose rate is about normal for the area (Note: normal background in most parts of the UK will vary from approximately 0.04 to 0.2 microsieverts per hour (μSv/hr))

  **NOTE:** In certain circumstances, where a qualified radiological assessor has assessed the entire radiological hazard, the inner cordon may be set at a level slightly higher than background

- The Incident Commander should assign staff with survey meters to monitor the boundary in order to ensure that the situation does not change during the incident
NOTE: Gamma radiation will radiate outwards 360° so consider monitoring all around the perimeter of the cordon but be aware that differences in shielding of the source may mean that the hazard zone is not circular in shape.

- If an outer cordon is required, establish this at an appropriate position. The space between the inner and outer cordons should be unaffected by radiation from the incident
- Set up a decontamination area across the boundary of the inner cordon but slightly away from the breathing apparatus entry control point. Maintain a clean path in and out of this area throughout the incident
- Every person passing through the breathing apparatus entry control point and entering the hazard zone must be wearing a dosimeter. A system should be set up to record the displayed dose on entry and to record it again on exit. At the entry point, note the serial number of the dosimeter issued to each firefighter.
- If chemical protective clothing is being worn and it becomes necessary to read the electronic personal dosimeter display or to operate the unit, the wearer should withdraw his arm from the suit unclip the electronic personal dosimeter and pass it through the collar, if fitted within the suit, into the head compartment. The wearer may experience difficulty in reading his own electronic personal dosimeter due to the proximity to his eyes but it is easily read by a companion outside the suit. It is therefore suggested that a buddy system is used to read each other’s electronic personal dosimeters when deployed in chemical protective clothing
- Each crew entering the hazard zone should have a dedicated operator of a survey meter accompanying them. The purpose of the survey meter operator, who should be assigned no other task, is to monitor the dose rate of the whole crew and direct their pathway to ensure that all doses are kept as low as reasonably practicable. The use of the survey meter is the primary means of ensuring external radiation safety
- The survey meter operator needs to be aware that the gamma radiation source may be located at any height even on the floor above or the floor below and should periodically move the meter vertically and horizontally in order to ascertain the direction from which the gamma radiation is coming. He should use this information in order to direct the crew away from the source as far as is practical and to take advantage of any available shielding
- When using a survey meter it is important to understand that in some circumstances, gamma radiation beams may be highly collimated, that is to say, may be emitted in a narrow beam which may not impinge upon the survey meter at hand height
- It is essential that crews are aware of the three stages of the electronic personal dosimeter alarm and the associated warning tones. The first alarm (which measures the dose rate) is intended to alert the wearer to the fact that a radiation affected area has been entered. This can be cancelled by
the wearer. The next alarm will operate when the wearer has received an accumulated dose of 5 mSv. The crew should withdraw on hearing this alarm (NOTE: if only one person’s alarm sounds, the whole crew should withdraw). A new crew should then be committed if there are further objectives to be completed

- On exiting the incident the crews should be directed to the decontamination area. If there was originally no known risk of contamination (ie a sealed source) and the crews can confirm that they encountered no other contamination risks decontamination is not required and they should present their electronic personal dosimeters to the breathing apparatus entry control officer for formal recording of their personal dose record

- If there is a contamination hazard present crews should initially be checked with a contamination meter prior to disrobing. If the Fire and Rescue Service does not have dedicated contamination meters it may be acceptable under some circumstances to use a Rados 200 connected to the contamination probe (Beta probe) but advice should be sought prior to undertaking this task. Monitoring effort should be concentrated in the first instance on the parts of the suit with the highest risk of becoming contaminated, usually the boots and the gloves followed by knees and elbows

  **NOTE:** Contamination meter readings of more that 5 counts per second (cps) above background level is usually taken as evidence of contamination. Licensed installations may have on-site emergency teams who could assist with contamination monitoring

- If no contamination is found (usually taken as 5 or less cps) the suits should be subject to appropriate cleaning procedures. If found to be contaminated, it is recommended that the suit is removed from the wearer using a safe undressing procedure and is double bagged prior to disposal or decontamination by a specialist contractor. It will assist the latter process if a record is kept of where on the suit the contamination was detected

- It is not generally regarded as good practice to use water/showers for decontamination of radioactive materials. The reason for avoiding the use of water is to prevent spread of contamination and prevent self absorption by water of alpha radiation. Having said this, where large numbers of contaminated people require urgent mass decontamination wet-containment may be the most appropriate method.

**Phase 5: Evaluating the response**

- Incident Commanders should constantly evaluate the risk posed by radioactive materials and the effectiveness of radiation procedures and of specialist advice obtained. Evaluation is not a one off process but should be continual throughout the incident as circumstances change or new
information is gathered. After evaluation the Incident Commander should review and adjust the response plan, amend or implement additional control measures and communicate the changes to all staff

- Aside from the general considerations which would form part of the evaluation process for any incident, the Incident Commander should particularly check the dose readings as measured by the electronic personal dosimeters of crews who have been committed and ensure that no limits or constraints have been exceeded and that all doses have been as low as reasonably practicable. The Incident Commander should also ensure that any issues relating to contaminated staff or equipment leaving the hazard zone are being adequately managed

- Consider the dose rates reported inside the hazard zone and the consequent need to deploy more crews. Gather clear information regarding potential radioactive contamination within the building.

Phase 6: Closing the incident

7C10.115 At the end of the incident the following measures will need to be considered:

- If the source has been made safe or the affected area contained, it should be handed over to the appropriate authority. In many cases this will be the owner of the source. If the incident has occurred at site registered under the Radioactive Substances Act there should be a representatives of the organisation on hand to deal with

- There is a growing awareness of ‘orphan sources’. These are radioactive sources which have no traceable owner (eg lost, stolen etc). If the incident has involved an orphan source the NAIR scheme should be implemented

- Collation and recording of radiation exposure dose records for all committed staff. These need to be transferred to a robust recording system and need to be kept for 50 years

- Introduce medical surveillance for significantly exposed firefighters

- Debrief crews. Provide advice and reassurance to firefighters on nature of risks from radiation. If available enlist the help of a specialist adviser to assist with this

- Consider engaging with the media and public relations issues. Radiation incidents will attract a great deal of interest and it is usually advisable to keep the media well informed

- Conduct a formal investigation if the level of 6mSv whole body dose has been exceeded by any staff.
Additional operational considerations when involved in fire

- Consider defensive firefighting tactics. Try to minimise the use of water and take active measures to prevent contaminated run off from entering watercourses. If the sources are in a complex building eg a hospital or university and the fire does not initially affect the radiation sources consider deploying resources specifically to protect radiation stores or sources.

- Consider the effect on dose rate if lead shielding were to melt (the melting point of lead is 327 degrees Celsius) and be lost as a result of heat from a fire. It may be necessary to adjust firefighting tactics to protect stores of radioactive substance.
Radiation suspected or confirmed

- Inform the Fire and Rescue Service’s RPA or other suitable responsible person.
- Gather as much information as possible about the radioactive material involved.
- Establish an initial cordon of 45 metres. Review this throughout the incident.
- Establish a command point & marshalling area in a convenient, safe area, upwind of the incident.
- Risk of irradiation only, BA and Gloves will be appropriate personal protective equipment.
- Consider defensive tactics, eg fire fighting from outside.
- NB: water run off may be contaminated.
- Leave resources in a safe place (marshalling area) until required.
- Decontamination will not normally be required. Avoid wet decontamination where possible.

- Determine the type of radiation being emitted from the source & select appropriate DIM equipment.
- How is the public at risk protected staff been contaminated?
- Consider setting up mass decontamination (NB: clinical decontamination - Ambulance Service).
- More than 10/mSv per hour
- Over 10/mSv per hour
- Decontamination will be required. Avoid wet decontamination when possible.
- What is the current dose rate of gamma radiation?
- Monitor all staff for contamination using a contamination meter before leaving the Hazard Zone.
- Decontamination will not normally be required.
- Does the Fire and Rescue Service need to intervene?
- No
- Yes (Unsealed source)
- Yes
- CPC+BA will be required by crews due to the risk of contamination by radioactive substance.
- Over 10/mSv per hour
- More than 5cps above background
- Decontamination will be required. Avoid wet decontamination when possible.
- Safe Undressing Procedure should be implemented.
- Decontamination will not normally be required.
- What is the current dose rate of gamma radiation?
- Monitor all staff for contamination using a contamination meter before leaving the Hazard Zone.
- Decontamination will not normally be required.
- More than 5cps above background
- Decontamination will be required. Avoid wet decontamination when possible.
- Safe Undressing Procedure should be implemented.
- Decontamination will not normally be required.
- What is the current dose rate of gamma radiation?
- More than 5cps above background
- Decontamination will be required. Avoid wet decontamination when possible.
- Safe Undressing Procedure should be implemented.
- Decontamination will not normally be required.
- What is the current dose rate of gamma radiation?
PART C–11
UN Class 8 Corrosive substances

General information

Introduction

7C11.1 Materials whose primary hazard is ‘corrosive’ will be assigned to UN Hazard Class 8. It covers substances and articles which by chemical action attack epithelial tissue of skin or mucous membranes with which they are in contact, or which in the event of leakage are capable of damaging or destroying other goods, or means of transport, and may also cause other hazards. The heading of this class also covers other substances which form a corrosive liquid only in the presence of water, or which produce corrosive vapour or mist in the presence of natural moisture in the air.

7C11.2 Corrosive materials can be identified in a number of ways:

- UN hazard warning diamond
- Chemical Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply (CHIP) Regulations label
- Material safety data sheet as a UN Class 8 material
- Name eg sulphuric acid, caustic potash.

CHIP label for UN Class 8 material

7C11.3 The corrosive nature of a material may be established practically by testing the solution with either litmus paper or pH paper. This is most easily done if the unknown material is in a liquid state but damp paper can be used on gases and solids although the results should be used with caution.
7C11.4 Most corrosives encountered are either acids, bases, alkalis or salts but a number of other materials in UN classes other than 8 may have a corrosive hazard eg chlorine, an oxidising, toxic, corrosive gas. Chlorine is a UN Class 2 material because its primary hazard is that it is a gas but anyone unwise enough to spray a leaking chlorine vessel will find that their spray will dissolve some of the chlorine so as to form a corrosive liquid that may attack the container or other unprotected metal surfaces. The ADR Hazard Identification Number\(^1\) will indicate if a material is corrosive, chlorine’s hazard identification number is 268.

### Acids – characteristics, classification and hazards

**Acidic materials**

7C11.5 An acid is a material that will liberate H+ ions into solution in excess of any OH- ions.

Characteristics:

- Many acids react and corrode many metals to produce hydrogen gas but whether a particular reaction will occur or not depends on the particular acid and metal concerned and also on the conditions; whether the acid is concentrated or dilute and whether it is hot or cold. The hydrogen produced is both lighter than air and likely, in confined spaces, to produce flammable/explosive atmospheres.

- Acids will produce carbon dioxide from a carbonate, eg sodium carbonate (soda ash). This reaction may be used as a test for an acid and in certain circumstances can be used to deal with acid spillages.

- Acids are neutralized (potentially violently) by bases (or alkalis) to give only salts and water. For this reason it is not recommended that alkalis be used as neutralizing agents for acid spills unless specialist advice is sought.

- All acids have a sour taste in dilute solution. This can be observed in the organic acids contained in: lemon juice (citric acid), vinegar (acetic acid) and sour milk (lactic acid).

**NOTE:** Under no circumstances should responders taste unknown substances to help identify them.

- Acids change the colour of some dyestuffs and are consequently referred to as indicators. The best known of these substances is litmus. Aqueous acids turn blue litmus paper to red.

- Acids are often corrosive to metal or flesh and hence toxic to some extent.

- Acids, in solution, have a pH below 7.

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\(^1\) The European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, commonly known as ADR (from the French abbreviation Accord européen relatif au transport international des marchandises dangereuses par Route), governs transnational transport of hazardous materials.
7C11.6 Somewhere in the chemical formula of an acid (at the front for mineral acids) there will be at least one H, eg HCl, HF, HNO₃, H₂SO₄. In the case of an organic acid the important H may not be so visible as in the case of CH₃COOH. This is important because unlike the other H’s that can be found in chemical formulae these H’s can be released as H⁺ ions into solution to carry out the typical reactions of an acid. Other H’s found in the chemical formula are not freely available as H⁺ and hence do not behave in the manner of an acid, eg CH₄, methane or C₂H₅OH, ethanol. Some experience of chemistry is required to recognise an acid from its chemical formula.

7C11.7 In order to determine how much acidic behaviour a material can exhibit the chemical industry will determine how many H⁺ are potentially released into each litre of acid and how many actually have been released.

7C11.8 The first parameter – how many H⁺ can potentially be released is expressed in terms of the concentration of the acid. A concentrated acid contains a lot of acid and a little water; a dilute acid contains a lot of water and a little acid. Unfortunately the assessment of how corrosive a material is cannot be limited to its concentration as not all acids are equally good at releasing all their H⁺ all at once. The ability to release H⁺ is described in terms of the strength of the acid. A strong acid will be good at releasing its H⁺ and a weak acid not so good.

7C11.9 It follows that two litres of equally concentrated acids, one weak and one strong – both capable of releasing the same quantity of H⁺ will be able to dissolve equal amounts of metal but the strong one will do it faster.

7C11.10 Operationally, the Incident Commander should be interested in how much acid is involved and how corrosive it is likely to be. The quantity can be used to consider the options to deal with it and its corrosiveness can be used to assess the corrosion hazard.

7C11.11 Corrosiveness will probably be described in terms of a pH value, where 1 indicates very corrosive and 6.99 indicates it is very nearly water as pure water has a pH of 7. The lower the pH values the stronger and generally more concentrated the acid is, but even a very concentrated weak acid is incapable of establishing a pH of less than 3. A pH of less than 3 will mean the acid in question will certainly be a strong acid. Almost all organic acids are weak acids.

7C11.12 The lower the pH the greater the likelihood that the acid has corroded metals to form an atmosphere containing a flammable proportion of hydrogen, especially in a confined space where appropriate precautions will be demanded.

7C11.13 In the same way concentrated and dilute apply to acids; they may be applied to solutions of alkalis. These materials are essentially the opposite of acids as they take H⁺ out of solution or release OH⁻ ions. A solution containing a lot of material potentially capable of doing this would be concentrated and a material particularly effective at doing this rapidly would be strong. Any solution with a
pH of more than 7 is an alkali and the more concentrated and stronger alkali solutions would have a pH close to the maximum value of 14. Weak alcalis would not be capable of establishing a pH of more than 12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pH</th>
<th>Acidic</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Alkaline</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Hydrochloric acid</td>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>urine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Orange juice</td>
<td>Blood</td>
<td>Pure water</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td>Baking soda</td>
<td>Milk of magnesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Caustic soda</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The pH scale is a ‘logarithmic’ scale and when we dilute an acid to increase its pH we must increase the volume by a factor of 10 to increase the pH by one unit, eg to dilute 10 litres of acid pH 2 to increase the pH to 4 will require making the 10 litres into 10 x 10 x 10 = 1000 litres. Doubling the volume will not halve the pH.

Some important inorganic (or mineral) acids

- **Nitric acid HNO₃** (aquafortis) – Nitric acid is sold as a 70 per cent solution and is referred to as concentrated nitric acid. It is possible to obtain 100 per cent nitric acid, which is referred to as fuming nitric acid. The chemical behaviour of nitric acid is dependent on concentration.
  - very dilute solutions show typical acid properties
  - concentrated solutions show oxidizing properties.

With some metals (eg copper), concentrated nitric acid reacts to produce the brown toxic gas nitrogen dioxide (nitrous fumes). However, not all metals react in this way and, for example, iron, aluminium and chromium react rapidly with nitric acid to form a layer of oxide. This oxide is insoluble even in concentrated acid and consequently prevents further corrosion (attack). Nitric acid is said to render these metals ‘passive’.

On heating, as in a fire, nitric acid readily decomposes yielding nitrogen dioxide and oxygen. It thus falls into the ‘assists fire’ category (oxidizing).

- **Hydrochloric acid HCl** (spirits of salt, muriatic acid) – Hydrochloric acid is marketed in the UK as ‘concentrated hydrochloric acid’, a solution that contains about 35 per cent dissolved hydrogen chloride.

Hydrochloric acid is obtained by dissolving hydrogen chloride gas in water. On heating hydrochloric acid it releases fumes of hydrogen chloride, which are very pungent and irritating. As hydrogen chloride dissolves very readily in water, inhaling these toxic corrosive fumes results in the formation of hydrochloric acid in the lungs causing irritation and possible oedema.

Hydrochloric acid is not oxidizing but does exhibit all the characteristics of a typical acid.
• **Sulphuric acid** $\text{H}_2\text{SO}_4$ (oil of vitriol) – Concentrated sulphuric acid can be marketed in two forms:
  - approximately 98 per cent sulphuric acid
  - fuming sulphuric acid, oleum or pyrosulphuric acid, all names given to sulphuric acid containing dissolved sulphur trioxide (SO$_3$).

7C11.15 The properties of sulphuric acid may be considered under three headings:

**Behaviour towards water** – Sulphuric acid in concentrated solution is a very powerful dehydrating agent, that is, it has the ability to remove and/or absorb large quantities of water. It does this with the evolution of a large quantity of heat, sufficient to boil the added water. Hence diluting such acid with water is a dangerous process and should be done with extreme care. For spillages requiring dilution, large volumes of water should be added from a safe distance (assuming neutralization is not practical). Some organic compounds containing carbon, hydrogen and oxygen may be dehydrated (have water removed from them) by concentrated sulphuric acid. For example sugar is dehydrated by concentrated sulphuric acid to produce sugar charcoal (ie carbon). Similarly any cellulosic material, cloth, paper, etc, undergoes a ‘burning’ reaction with the acid.

• **Behaviour as an acid** – Concentrated sulphuric acid (98%) contains little water and consequently shows little reaction towards metals at room temperature (at higher temperature the oxidizing properties of the acid are significant – see below). When, however, the concentration is reduced to a lower level, say 60 per cent, the reactivity of the acid increases considerably. These facts suggest that if a spillage of concentrated sulphuric acid occurs, dilution with water will produce a more corrosive acid unless sufficient water can be added to make the acid very dilute; at this point the reactivity would again decrease.

• **Behaviour as an oxidizing agent** – Concentrated sulphuric acid is a vigorous oxidizing agent, especially when hot, and is accompanied by production of the gas sulphur dioxide (SO$_2$). For example, copper can be oxidized to copper sulphate. The sulphur dioxide produced can dissolve in water to give the weak acid sulphurous acid (H$_2$SO$_3$). Sulphuric acid can ignite some organic compounds, especially if also in contact with another oxidant such as nitric acid, potassium dichromate, potassium chlorate, etc

**Other halogen acids**

• The other hydrogen halides, hydrogen fluoride, hydrogen bromide and hydrogen iodide, are all gases that dissolve in water to give acid solutions

• **Hydrofluoric acid** has the unusual property of dissolving glass and for this reason it is employed in industries where the etching or frosting of glass is performed. It is generally transported and handled in polyethylene containers.
When the toxicity of the common acids is compared, hydrofluoric acid is by far the most hazardous acid. Inhalation of hydrogen fluoride vapour causes oedema of the lungs, an abnormal accumulation of fluid in the lung cavities.

Due to its solubility in water, the acidic vapour dissolves easily in the eye and can permanently damages someone’s sight.

Externally, hydrofluoric acid causes more painful and usually more severe burns than the other mineral acids. Burns occur almost instantaneously from solution stronger than 60 per cent. Extremely severe burns can result from even a very mild exposure to the acid; tissues beneath the skin are destroyed, the destruction spreading even to the bones.

Chemdata and material safety data sheets refer to the use of Calcium Gluconate ‘antidote’ to treat hydrofluoric acid burns and some urban myths suggest that cutting away flesh contaminated with hydrofluoric acid may be appropriate. Where a hydrofluoric acid threat is known to exist, preplanning should include the provision of the antidote cream.

**Organic acids**

Organic (carbon-based) acids are weak acids. Unlike their inorganic counterparts, organic acids will burn.

**Unusual acids**

- **Picric acid** is explosive when dry
- **Peroxyacetic acid** is a fairly typical organic peroxide
- **Oxalic acid** is toxic.

**Bases/alkalis – characteristics, classification and hazards**

**Basic (or alkaline) materials**

**7C11.16** Bases can be defined as any metal oxide, or as something that will react with acids to produce only a salt and water (sometimes violently).

Characteristics:

- water soluble bases are referred to as alkalis
- alkalis can corrode some metals to release hydrogen
- bases can be very effective at removing flesh from bones; the strong concentrated alkalis are perhaps more corrosive to flesh than many strong concentrated acids
- spills of bases can make surfaces very slippery, notably ladders and walkways
alkalis turn red litmus paper to blue, and have a pH above 7.

Some important bases/alkalis

- **Sodium hydroxide** and **potassium hydroxide** are important members of the alkalis:
  - sodium hydroxide NaOH (caustic soda)
  - potassium hydroxide KOH (caustic potash).

Both are white solids at room temperature, and are marketed as pellets, as well as in flake and stick form, and all are very soluble in water. They are corrosive towards aluminium, zinc and lead but do not attack most other common metals. Concentrated solutions dissolve silk, wool and animal tissues.

- **Calcium hydroxide**: Ca(OH)\(_2\) (slaked lime) – Calcium hydroxide is a white solid which dissolves only slowly in water to give a weakly alkaline solution, often called limewater.

- **Calcium oxide** CaO (lime, quicklime) – which reacts exothermically with water to give calcium hydroxide. As with other alkalis, lime is corrosive towards eyes, skin, etc.

- **Ammonia**: NH\(_3\) – Ammonia gas dissolves readily in water to give ammonium hydroxide, an alkaline solution of about pH 10. It is thus frequently referred to as a weak base. Ammonia is encountered as a pressurized liquid (anhydrous ammonia) and in aqueous solution. The concentrated aqueous solution is known as ‘880’ ammonia, where 880 indicates the specific gravity, or relative density is 0.88. Although it is capable of burning, in practice, it is not considered a fire hazard because of its high auto-ignition temperature and narrow flammable range. The possibility of ignition is very remote, but should not be overlooked. In 1999 two American firefighters tried to start a forklift truck in a refrigeration plant where ammonia had leaked. One escaped with only severe injuries whilst the other died, engulfed in the fire.

- **Organic bases** – Ammonia NH\(_3\) is a base and if one or more of the H’s are replaced by organic groups then an organic base results, ie, using CH\(_3\), a methyl group, to replace H we get CH\(_3\)NH\(_2\) methylamine. If we replace two H with two CH\(_3\) we get (CH\(_3\))\(_2\)NH dimethylamine. As bases are corrosive and to some extent toxic, and organic materials are flammable, we would be wise to expect these materials to be flammable, toxic and corrosive.

Other corrosives

Many materials are corrosive to flesh and metal although they are neither acids nor bases. Although the primary hazard of chlorine is ‘gas’, it is a notable corrosive as are other halogens and many of their compounds encountered as...
solids, liquids or gases. Virtually all non-metal chlorides, fluorides and bromides are corrosive along with some metal chlorides, notably aluminium and ferric [iron III].

**Salts (not common salt, sodium chloride)**

7C11.19 Firefighters should not assume that as a salt is the product of neutralization then it is safe. Sodium cyanide is a salt but is highly toxic. Sodium peracetate is also a salt and is explosively unstable. Nitrates are generally good oxidizing substances. Many chlorides made by the neutralization of hydrochloric acid are corrosive in their own right. Sometimes the hazards of the parent acid are not exhibited by the salt, for example, sulphates made by neutralizing sulphuric acid or otherwise are not water reactive.

7C11.20 **NOTE:** Firefighters should understand that whilst neutralisation may remove the corrosive hazard of the acid or alkali, it might accentuate other hazards and generate a salt that is itself corrosive or hazardous in some other way. A list of common salts and the acid from which they were formed is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acid Derived salt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sulphuric Sulphate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulphurous Sulphite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitric Nitrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrous Nitrite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrochloric Chloride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrofluoric Fluoride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acetic a.k.a. Ethanoic Acetate, ethanoate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxalic Oxalate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbonic Carbonate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7C11.21 The other half of the name of the salt comes from the base with which it has reacted, eg, sodium hydroxide will produce sodium salts and ammonium hydroxide will produce ammonium salts.
Operational considerations

Practical treatment of acid and base spillages

7C11.22 There are four principal ways of dealing with spills of corrosives:

- **Contain and recover** by a specialist waste disposal company or the owner of the material
- **Contain and absorb** in some inert material, earth or vermiculite, etc, prior to appropriate disposal
- **Contain and ‘neutralise’** with soda ash (anhydrous sodium carbonate). Strictly speaking this is not a neutralization reaction between an acid and a base but is often called one. **This method does not work with alkali spills, only acids**
- **Dilute and disperse** to drain using copious quantities of water. This method should be regarded as a last resort if no other method can be employed. Specialist advice should be taken to ensure the acid is able to be safely and effectively diluted. Before washing any corrosive ‘away’ please consider that the upper tier ‘control of major accident hazard’ threshold for some acids is 1kg, so to dilute and disperse a few kilograms of these materials would be a serious mistake. Consultation with the Environment Agency and the site operators must take place.

7C11.23 In practice, any treatment of a spill of corrosive will contain elements of all these tactics, the spill will be contained and recovered, residues will be absorbed and if possible neutralised before the last traces are diluted and dispersed.

7C11.24 Other considerations:

- Acids and alkalis are normally transported at very high concentrations, eg 90-95 per cent sulphuric acid, 65 per cent nitric acid, 30 per cent hydrochloric acid, 50 per cent sodium hydroxide and 50 per cent phosphoric acid. At these concentrations the pH value is not important, the substances are simply very corrosive
- Corrosive substances can attack and corrode many materials, for example, cloth, paper and several metals. Decomposition often produces heat and gases, and in some cases extremely flammable hydrogen gas
- It can take some time before the consequences of corrosive effects are visible
- Accidental mixing of different corrosive materials can in some cases lead to violent reactions, which may give off large amounts of gases
- In the case of strong alkalis there is a latent period before a feeling of burning on the skin is experienced. By then the damage is already done. Skin contact with strong acids produces an immediate feeling. Both types of corrosive substances can cause serious skin and eye damages.
General information

Introduction

7C12.1 These are substances and articles which during transport present a danger not covered by other classes.

7C12.2 Magnetic materials are classified in this category (magnetism may affect the navigation systems of airplanes). Polychlorinated biphenyls are placed in Class 9 because they may damage the environment. Dry ice (solid carbon dioxide) can evaporate, producing asphyxiating fumes, and displace oxygen in the air in confined places such as cargo holds in ships and storage cellars. Asbestos can damage the lungs and the effect on health is not immediate, the damage appears after many years, therefore, asbestos is not placed in Class 6.1 but in Class 9.

Characteristic, classification and hazards

7C12.3 Unlike many other UN classes, UN Class 9 Miscellaneous Dangerous Substances can be substantially different in its meaning to ADR Hazard Identification Number 9, which relates to risk of spontaneous, violent reaction, usually relating to the risk of explosion, disintegration and polymerization reaction with the release of considerable heat or flammable and/or toxic gases.

7C12.4 Acetylene 239 is a flammable gas, which can lead to spontaneous violent reaction, is an example.

7C12.5 When used as ADR Hazard Identification Number 90 it has specific meanings: environmentally hazardous substance; miscellaneous dangerous substances.

7C12.6 Not all environmentally hazardous materials will be marked as UN Class 9 or ADR Hazard Identification Number 90; many foodstuffs are amongst the most hazardous to the aquatic environment but they are not carried as hazardous materials. Milk is even more damaging to a watercourse than raw sewage, but despite this it is not a ‘hazardous material’.

7C12.7 Dibromodifluoromethane is an example of a hazardous material whose principal hazard is damage to the environment.
In addition to environmentally dangerous materials, other packages assigned to UN Class 9 include:

- lithium batteries
- ammonium nitrate based fertilizer
- polychlorinated biphenyls liquid
- polyhalogenated terphenyls liquid
- battery-powered vehicles
- blue asbestos (crocidolite)
- brown asbestos (amosite, mysorite)
- white asbestos (chrysotile, actinolite, anthophyllite, tremolite)
- polymeric beads, expandable, evolving flammable vapour
- benzaldehyde
- engines, internal combustion
- genetically modified micro-organisms
- elevated temperature liquid, N.O.S., at or above 100°C and below its flash point (including molten metals, molten salts, etc)
- elevated temperature solid, N.O.S., at or above 240°C
- fish meal (fish scrap), stabilized
- air bag inflators or air bag modules or seat-belt pretensioners
- plastics moulding compound in dough, sheet or extruded rope form evolving flammable vapour
- chemical kit or first aid kit
- aviation regulated liquid, N.O.S.
- aviation regulated solid, N.O.S.
- fumigated unit
- dangerous goods in machinery, dangerous goods in apparatus.

**NOTE:** N.O.S is the term used for a substance ‘Not specified in Part I of the approved list of UN Substance Identification’

Each of the above hazardous materials has its own UN number but each will be displaying the same hazard warning diamond.
Operational considerations

Introduction

7C12.10 It must be appreciated that no single plan or set of procedures can cope with the range of hazards presented by materials encountered in UN Class 9, but some materials are regularly encountered and therefore worth considering in detail.

Ammonium nitrate based fertilizer

Background

7C12.11 The chemical compound ammonium nitrate (AN), the nitrate of ammonia with the chemical formula NH₄NO₃, is a white crystalline solid at room temperature and standard pressure. It is commonly used in agriculture as a high-nitrogen fertilizer, and it has also been used as an oxidising agent in explosives, including improvised explosive devices. It is the main component of ANFO, a very popular explosive.

7C12.12 All fertilizers fall into one of three categories:

- oxidisers belonging to Class 5.1, UN Number 2067
- NPK / NP / NK fertilizers capable of self-sustaining decomposition belonging to Class 9, UN Number 2071
- non-hazardous.

7C12.13 Ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers are of two main types:
• **Straight nitrogen fertilizers** – these products contain only nitrogen (N) as the principal plant nutrient. Typical products are ammonium nitrate (AN) and calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN), which are mixtures of AN and dolomite / limestone / calcium carbonate, and ammonium sulphate / ammonium nitrate (ASN) mixtures.

• **Compound fertilizers**: NPK / NP / NK – These products contain, in addition to nitrogen, at least one other nutrient such as phosphate (a source of P$_2$O$_5$) and/or potash (a source of K$_2$O).

### N:P:K fertilizers

Nitrates and ammonium compounds are often present in mixed fertilizers, or balanced mixtures as they are sometimes called. On the bag a code will be found, eg, 6-12-12.

The numbers, in order, refer to:

- N % of nitrogen
- P % of phosphorus as if it were phosphorus pentoxide (P2O5)
- K % potassium as if it were potassium oxide (K2O).

**NOTE:**

The first number is the only one of interest to the Fire and Rescue Services. The higher it is, the greater the amount of nitrates or ammonium compounds, and thus the greater the danger from the mixed fertilizer if it is near or becomes involved in fire.

**Historically, any %N figure of 20 or more (maximum 35%) should be regarded as a potential explosive risk when the fertilizer is close to, or directly involved in, any fire. The production of brown fumes from the fertilizer is also a sign of potential danger.**

7C12.14 The main methods of handling are:

- packaged in intermediate bulk containers of 500-1500 kg capacity
- 25 or 50 kg bags
- on pallets with up to 1.5 tonne load
- loose bulk.

### Hazards

7C12.15 The three main potential hazards of relevance to ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers are:
Ammonium nitrate itself does not burn, but is an oxidising substance and as such can support combustion. Therefore, combustible material must be present to have a fire involving ammonium nitrate. When an ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer is involved in a fire, or if it is heated to a certain extent, the ammonium nitrate will decompose and provide oxygen, thus increasing the fire hazard. The decomposition hazard can increase if the product, particularly spillage, is contaminated with combustible materials such as coal, grain, sawdust or oil spills.

In a fire the fertilizer will decompose with the release of toxic gases such as NOx, ammonia, hydrogen chloride and nitric acid vapours.

Ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers can chemically break down under the influence of heat and this is known as decomposition. The presence of a combustible substance is not necessary for decomposition to take place. The decomposition hazard is dependent on the type of product, the temperature of the heat source, the duration of exposure to the heat source, and the containment of the fertilizer.

Ammonium nitrate decomposes into gases including oxygen when heated (non-explosive reaction), however, ammonium nitrate can be induced to decompose explosively by detonation.

Large stockpiles of the material can be a major fire risk due to their supporting oxidation, and may also detonate.

Ammonium nitrate decomposes in temperatures normally well above 200°C. However the presence of impurities (organic and/or inorganic) will often reduce the temperature point when heat is being generated.

Once the ammonium nitrate has started to decompose then a runaway reaction will normally occur as the heat of decomposition is very large. Ammonium nitrate evolves so much heat that this runaway reaction is not normally possible to stop. This is a well-known hazard with some types of N-P-K fertilizers.

There are certain compositions of compound fertilizers (NPK/NP/NK) which are capable of undergoing self-sustaining decomposition, ie once a hot source (eg a hot electric light bulb or hot welding material) has initiated the decomposition, the reaction in the fertilizer is sufficiently thermally energetic to continue on its own without further heat input from any outside source. Such fertilizers are described as ‘self-sustaining decomposition’ type.

The decomposition hazard in straight “N” fertilizers such as AN, CAN, ASN and in non-self-sustaining decomposition type compound fertilizers (NPK, NP, NK) is dependent on contamination with sensitising materials such as chromates, chlorinated chemicals and various metals such as zinc and copper and their salts.

Decomposition is generally accompanied by the evolution of toxic gases such as NOx, ammonia, hydrogen chloride and nitric acid vapours.
EXPLOSION
There are two major types of incidents resulting in explosions:

- Explosion happens by the mechanism of shock to detonation transition. The initiation happens by an explosive charge going off in the mass, by the detonation of a shell thrown into the mass, or by detonation of an explosive mixture in contact with the mass.

- Explosion results from a fire that spreads into the ammonium nitrate itself, or from a mixture of ammonium nitrate with a combustible material during the fire. The fire must be confined at least to a degree for successful transition from a fire to an explosion (a phenomenon known as ‘deflagration to detonation transition’). Pure, compact ammonium nitrate is stable and very difficult to ignite.

Ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers are capable of detonating under certain conditions, requiring a strong source of initiation. Standard good quality fertilizer products have high resistance to detonation. This resistance, however, can be adversely affected by a number of factors, such as:

- substantially smaller particle size
- higher porosity (hence a lower bulk density)
- high levels (above safe limits) of combustible, organic and other sensitising materials.

Operational considerations:

7C12.16 Action in case of decomposition and fire:

- If possible, remove the heat source and extinguish the fire or decomposition
- Decomposition is indicated by the release of white/brownish fumes from the fertilizer mass
- If an area of slow decomposition or smouldering of the ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer should occur, the following steps should be taken immediately:
  - look for the source of heat and, if found, turn it off or remove it
  - if the area of decomposing material is still small and easily accessible, make an attempt to remove it from the main heap of the fertilizer by the use of picks, shovels or ship’s grab, and to cool it down by localised quenching with water.
- If it is impossible to remove the decomposing mass, soak the fertilizer involved as rapidly as possible with a large quantity of water preferably directed through high pressure jets against the centre of the decomposition. This may cause the additional problem of large quantities of contaminated water run-off.
- Fighting the decomposition by other means such as foam, carbon dioxide, steam, covering with sand is useless and may even promote the decomposition
- If fumes are present, use self-contained breathing apparatus
- If suppression of the slow decomposition should prove impractical or unsuccessful use defensive tactics and consider evacuation
- In ships or containerised stores open doors, hatches etc immediately to maximise ventilation, if safe to do so
- Use defensive firefighting and evacuation if explosive decomposition is suspected.

**Asbestos**

7C12.17 As asbestos containing materials are one of the most common hazardous materials encountered by Fire and Rescue Services at operational incidents. Section 7 Part C-13 is devoted to the substance.

**Polychlorinated biphenyls**

**Background**

7C12.18 Polychlorinated biphenyls were once used as dielectric fluids in electrical equipment such as transformers and capacitors. The use of this chemical was banned internationally in the mid-1980s, however, so called ‘closed systems’ that contain the substance are allowed to be kept until the end of their useful life. As such, polychlorinated biphenyls may be present at electrical installations in transformers and capacitors that were manufactured before 1987.

7C12.19 Polychlorinated biphenyls are UN class 9, they present a danger to the environment and should not be allowed to enter drains or surface waters. Exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls from transformers and capacitors may also have serious acute and chronic effects on human health.

**Hazards**

7C12.20 The three basic health hazards from polychlorinated biphenyl-containing transformers and capacitors are:

- electrocution from live equipment
- explosion hazards of oil-filled equipment
- exposure to toxic liquids or vapours.

7C12.21 There are two major routes of exposure from incidents involving polychlorinated biphenyl oil-filled equipment:
Dermal. Skin exposure to polychlorinated biphenyl liquids or vapours may lead to a condition called chloracne, or a number of other symptoms as detailed below. Symptoms may not be immediately apparent.

Inhalation. Toxic vapour inhalation from volatised oils may lead to the same symptoms as for dermal exposure. Symptoms may not be immediately apparent.

7C12.22 The symptoms of exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls are the same regardless of the route of exposure. Severe acute exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls may result in chloracne, the onset of which may be delayed by several months. Chloracne is an acne-like condition, which may also take the appearance of cysts or pustules typically involving hair follicles on the face and neck. Chloracne may also affect upper arms, back, chest, abdomen, outer-thighs and genitalia. Mild cases may clear several months after exposure; in severe cases the lesions may still be present several decades after onset.

7C12.23 Acute exposure may also cause irritation of the skin, eyes and lungs, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, liver damage and neurological effects – including headaches, weakness, muscular pains, damage to the peripheral nervous system, loss of appetite, sexual dysfunction and short-term weight loss.

7C12.24 Acute exposure to polychlorinated biphenyl is not anticipated to result in increased risk of serious long-term health issues. However, polychlorinated biphenyls have a half life of 7–12 years and so there is a high potential for repeated or chronic exposure to lead to accumulation in human body tissues, particularly in the liver and fat tissues.

7C12.25 The International Agency for Research on Cancer has classified polychlorinated biphenyls as probable human carcinogens. Prolonged or repeated exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls has been linked to an increased incidence of cancer, particularly cancer of the liver.

Operational considerations

PRE-PLANNING

7C12.26 The Environment Agency holds a register of polychlorinated biphenyl contaminated equipment in England and Wales, however, they continue to receive new registrations for old equipment and so there can be no assumption that polychlorinated biphenyls are not present in any unregistered equipment that was manufactured prior to 1987.

ARRIVING AND GATHERING INFORMATION

7C12.27 The Incident Commander will need to risk assess the likelihood of transformers and/or capacitors being present on-site. Sites that were built after 1987 are significantly less likely to contain polychlorinated biphenyl-contaminated equipment.
When attending any incident that involves transformers or capacitors, a precautionary approach should be taken. The oil-filled equipment should be treated as though polychlorinated biphenyls are present unless there is labelling clearly visible on the equipment that states it does not contain polychlorinated biphenyls.

When polychlorinated biphenyls are suspected to be involved the incident should be designated as a hazardous materials incident and generic standard operational procedures followed.

PLANNING THE RESPONSE

Specific polychlorinated biphenyl considerations include the following:

- For incidents, including fires, where inhalation exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls is possible, self-contained, positive pressure breathing apparatus must be worn.
- If there is risk of explosion of the oil filled equipment or fluid leaks are suspected, chemical protective clothing should be worn in order to prevent dermal exposure to polychlorinated biphenyl-containing oils.
- Decontamination of persons exposed to polychlorinated biphenyls and subsequent medical attention should be undertaken without delay.
- Fire water that is suspected to be contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls must be contained and disposed of as an environmentally hazardous substance. Advice must be sought from the Environment Agency.
- Polychlorinated biphenyl contaminated personal protective equipment for disposal should be stored in appropriate sealed and labelled containers. Polychlorinated biphenyl contaminated waste must be disposed of as hazardous material, preferably by high temperature incineration.

Specific risks from substances not classified under UN Class 9

Introduction

There are a number of specific risks or substances which although are not classified as “dangerous” under UN Class 9 may pose hazards to firefighters at operational incidents. This chapter outlines some of the more important hazardous materials risks that firefighters may encounter.
Fibre reinforced polymer composites

Background

7C12.32 Fibre reinforced polymer composites, are increasingly being used for primary and secondary structural components in aircraft. Incineration of composites in post crash aircraft fires generates a complex mixture of combustion products comprised of gases, organic vapours, and particulate matter including fibres. There are concerns regarding the health hazards posed to firefighting, investigation, and cleanup personnel exposed to these combustion products.

7C12.33 Polymer structural composites are engineered materials comprised of continuous, high-strength fibres impregnated with a polymer matrix to form a reinforced layer (ply), which is subsequently bonded together with other layers under heat and pressure to form an orthotropic laminate. The strength and stiffness of the laminate are determined by the orientation of the fibres with respect to the loading direction and their volume fraction in the composite.

7C12.34 Fibres used for composite reinforcements, in order of increasing cost (decreasing quantity), are high-strength glass, aramid, carbon/graphite, and boron. E-glass is the predominant reinforcement for polymer matrix composites used in aircraft interior applications due to its low moisture affinity and superior electrical insulating and mechanical properties.

7C12.35 However, it is now true to say that polymer composites are found increasingly in everyday objects and structures in the modern world so the guidance and precautions found in this section will be of use to a wide range of fires and other incidents that Fire and Rescue Services are called to.

7C12.36 Data from fire tests and crash-site investigations suggest that only a small fraction of the fibres released in fires are of respirable size. However, detailed chemical analysis of organic vapours revealed a high number of toxic organic compounds that are associated with the fibres.

Hazards

7C12.37 The three basic health hazards from polymer composites in an aircraft crash-fire situation are:

- the sharp splinters of exposed material
- the fibrous dust dispersed by the fire or blast
- the toxic gases generated during burning of the polymer matrix resin in the fire.

7C12.38 As the organic resin burns off, the continuous, reinforcing fibres are exposed to a turbulent, oxidizing environment that causes them to break up and erode into small microfibre fragments. The concentration of respirable airborne microfibres increases when the accident involves fire and impact or explosion. In addition,
the toxic chemicals produced from the combustion of the organic resin may be adsorbed on respirable fibres and enter the respiratory system with acute or chronic effects.

7C12.39 Extensive studies have been accomplished regarding health hazards associated with natural and man-made mineral fibres such as asbestos and glass. The existing framework of information on asbestos and glass fibres delineates the contributing factors in fibre toxicity, which may be applied for consideration of carbon fibre toxicology. Inhalation toxicity of asbestos is primarily attributed to the fibre’s dimensions.

7C12.40 There are two major routes to exposure from fibres

- **Dermal** – Irritation of the skin and eyes is a typical response to dermal exposure resulting from a reaction to sharp, fragmented fibres of diameter greater than 4-5 μm. The severity of the exposure depends on the fibre size and stiffness and the irritation is not permanent

- **Inhalation.**

7C12.41 The inhalation hazard from fibres poses the greatest potential for adverse health effects on humans and depends on the total dosage and the physical dimensions of the fibres. Smaller particles are deposited in the lower regions of the lungs and chronic toxicity is associated with this type of exposure. For purposes of hazard assessment, fibres are defined as high aspect ratio particles having a length-to-diameter ratio (L/D) greater than three.

7C12.42 The fibre dimensions and total deposition deep into the lung determine the inhalation hazard from fibres. Fibres with diameters smaller than 3 μm and lengths shorter than 80 μm are respirable and can penetrate deep into the lungs. The fibre retention time inside the lung is primarily dependent on the fibre dimensions. Fibres smaller than 15 μm long are cleared from the lungs by cellular activity. However, longer fibres saturate the self-clearance mechanism of the lungs and can lead to pathological effects.

7C12.43 Animal studies on exposure to respirable size raw polyacrylonitrile/medical and pitch-based carbon fibres do not indicate that there are significant adverse health effects. Studies involving animals exposed to aerosols of composite dust and carbon fibres from machining and grinding of fibre composites are inconclusive with respect to pathological effects.

**Operational considerations**

7C12.44 The Incident Command will need to risk assess the likelihood of fibre liberation by the incident, Fire and Rescue Service operations or by other causes such as wind and weather, other aircraft movements or other agency activities. If airborne particulates are suspected then enhanced levels of respiratory protective equipment should be used within the hazard zone.
7C12.45 For fire situations self-contained breathing apparatus should be the minimum level of respiratory protective equipment.

7C12.46 Airborne dusts and particulates can be controlled by dampening down residues using water sprays.

7C12.47 It is generally considered that normal washing protocols for personal protective equipment will suffice following normal Fire and Rescue Service operations at aircraft fire/crash scenario. Incident commanders may wish to liaise with the Air Accident Investigation Branch or Ministry of Defence on the scene advisers with regards to cleaning protocols.

7C12.48 Fire and Rescue Service personal protective equipment cleaning contractors should be informed of the potential irritant hazard with regards fibres and this should be risk assessed accordingly.

7C12.49 Where there is likelihood of body fluids / biohazards/chemicals contamination being adsorbed by fibres, then personal protective equipment should be managed in accordance with Fire and Rescue Service contaminated personal protective equipment protocols.

7C12.50 Further more detailed information is contained in Operational guidance-Aircraft Incidents:

http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/aircraftincidents

Chemical suicide

Background information

7C12.51 Chemical suicide (sometimes also referred to as detergent suicide) is a relatively new method of suicide that has its origins in Japan. The process involves combining common household chemicals to create a lethal gas.

7C12.52 Suicides typically take place in a confined space (eg a vehicle, a cupboard, a small room, a toilet, or bathroom). The method used is often the same, that is, duct tape or a similar material is placed around vents/windows in order to contain the gas; household chemicals are then mixed in a suitable container liberating a toxic gas (eg hydrogen sulphide) that is lethal in low concentrations. In some cases the subject places homemade signs around the vehicle, to warn responders of the hazard.

7C12.53 One of the most common forms of chemical suicide involves the use of portable, disposable barbecues. In a confined space the smouldering charcoal produces carbon monoxide as well removing the oxygen thereby causing death.
Hazards and risks

7C12.54 Properties of hydrogen sulphide:

- very low boiling point –60°C which means it will be gassing off at room temperature
- toxic
- corrosive
- highly flammable
- wide explosive range 4% – 46% Volume in air
- heavier than air
- at 700 parts-per-million just 2-3 breaths can cause immediate death, these concentrations can easily be attained in an enclosed environment.

Incident indicators

7C12.55 Some indications that the person has carried out a chemical suicide might include:

- a person appears unconscious and unresponsive
- tape over vents, doors and windows
- suicide note or posted notes warning emergency services of present dangers
- buckets, containers or cool boxes containing chemicals
- burnt disposable barbeques or charcoal etc
- empty containers of chemicals in or around the vehicle/room
- smell of rotten eggs.

**NOTE:** Warning signs may not always be present.
Acid sources

- Hydrochloric acid (sometimes referred to as muriatic acid) (Spirits of salt/hydrochloric acid)
- Sulphuric acid
- Toilet disinfectant
- Toilet bowl cleaner
- Some shower and tile cleaners
- Some stone and brick cleaners

Sulphur sources

- Artists oil paints
- Dandruff shampoos
- Pesticides
- Some timber filler pastes
- Latex paints
- Garden fungicides
- Lime sulphur

Operational considerations

7C12.56 Where it is identified that an individual may have attempted/committed chemical suicide the following actions should be considered:

- The primary responsibility of first responders is to preserve and protect life without compromising their own safety, or the safety of their colleagues or the public
- Consider STEP 1-2-3 procedure
- Resources should approach from and be located upwind from the incident
- Establish an initial cordon and restrict access to the area
- Request additional advice (e.g., hazardous materials adviser etc)
- Evaluate the downwind hazard zone and consider evacuation from immediate area and/or shelter-in-place advice
- Air monitoring equipment may be used (available on detection identification monitoring units)
• Liaise with other agencies to formulate a response plan

• Where the risk assessment indicates that there is the potential for contamination from the substance or the casualty, chemical protection clothing and breathing apparatus should be worn

• Suicides involving portable barbeques/charcoal can be dealt with using breathing apparatus only. Once the affected area has been well ventilated breathing apparatus can be discontinued

• Chemical resistant body bags are available and can generally be accessed through the police or Ambulance Service’s hazardous area response team

• Clean up of the site is not the responsibility of the Fire and Rescue Service; it is generally carried out by specialist contractors secured by the local authority.

Methamphetamine and other illicit drug laboratories

Introduction

7C12.57 The risk posed by illicit drug laboratories, particularly ‘methamphetamine’, is increasing within the UK. There are many examples from Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand of emergency service first responders being killed by hazards associated with illicit drug laboratories.

7C12.58 Operational responders need to be aware of these particular illicit drugs, the serious risks from their manufacture and some of the signs that may indicate their presence.

Methamphetamine and amphetamines

7C12.59 Amphetamine, dextroamphetamine, methamphetamine, and their various salts are collectively referred to as amphetamines. Street terms for methamphetamines are ‘meth’, ‘poor man’s cocaine’, ‘crystal meth’, ‘ice’, ‘glass’, ‘speed’, ‘yaba’.

7C12.60 Typically methamphetamine can be found in the following forms:

• white odourless powder that easily dissolves in water
• clear chunky crystals (crystal meth, ice)
• small brightly coloured tablets (yaba)

Manufacture

7C12.61 A clandestine or illicit drug laboratory will by the very nature of its purpose present many hazards to Fire and Rescue Service personnel. The risks from the materials used in the manufacturing process should not be underestimated.
There are three main types of laboratories:

- **Extraction**: Finished drug or precursor is removed from raw material by use of chemical solvents.
- **Conversion**: One form of drug is changed into a more desirable form, eg methamphetamine hydrochloride (powder) to crystal meth (chunky crystals).
- **Synthesis**: Raw materials are combined through chemical processes to produce the desired drug. The originals may already be controlled substances. Examples include methamphetamine from pseudoephedrine and heroin from morphine.

It is possible that each of these types of laboratory could be present at a single site. Alternatively, illicit operators may split the various processes across a number of different sites.

Each laboratory may vary in terms of the: chemicals used in manufacture, location, method of process, scale of production, equipment used, expertise/knowledge of the operator, hazardous nature of the process and the security measures taken by the operator eg booby traps. The drugs are easily manufactured using every-day materials and simple apparatus, with illicit drug laboratories likely to be encountered in almost any type of premises, including domestic dwellings.

**Common indicators of illicit drug laboratories**

There is no hard and fast description of a manufacturing facility but emergency responders should be alert to situations and circumstances that seem out of place. For example, one kilo of methamphetamine produces five kilos of toxic waste. Often that waste is disposed of in areas like farmland or dumped on the side of roads or on wasteland.

The list below gives brief details of the most common indicators or the location of an illicit drug laboratory.
Outside the premises

- chemical odours coming from the premises such as ammonia/bleach, cat urine, strong solvent and burnt rubber
- windows blacked out or curtains drawn
- occupants unfriendly, appear secretive about their activities
- access denied
- rubbish containing a large amount of common cold cure medication packaging or containers.

**Indicator of illicit drugs laboratory in household waste**

Inside the premises:

- laboratory glassware and equipment
- containers with clear liquids, chalky coloured solid on bottom or similar
- containers with two layered liquids in them, one dark and one pale yellow
- used coffee filters containing either a white paste or reddish brown substance
- baking dishes or similar containing a white crystalline substance
- presence of hot plates or similar heating elements near chemicals.
**Hazards**

7C12.67 The hazards found at these sites may either be chemical or physical in nature. They may be present at both active and inactive sites. When combined with a lack of quality control and unsafe working practices by illicit operators they will present a serious potential for injury to first responders and members of the public.

7C12.68 Chemical hazards posed by the chemicals used within the manufacturing process range from mild skin irritation to the ability to severely burn and poison. Part of the process involves heating a mixture of chemicals (known as cooking) and this can give off poisonous and flammable gases that may be inhaled, adsorbed or ingested. Contamination of the premises is usually present, however this may be difficult to ascertain at a site that is no longer active. Chemicals used in illicit drug laboratories include acids, bases, solvents, poison gas, organic peroxides, radioactive substances and corrosives.

7C12.69 Fire and explosion hazards exist, particularly during the cooking process. The gases produced can be ignited by the occupants or by emergency responders turning on lights or using non-intrinsically safe electrical equipment.

7C12.70 Physical hazards can include: drug affected occupants and adapted premises that include unsafe use of electricity, gas and heating equipment. In order to protect sites occupants may set booby traps; these can be in any form from electrical wiring to doors and windows to hazardous liquids placed above doors. Extreme examples in mainland Europe include grenades being placed amongst barrels of chemicals.

7C12.71 Dumpsites and contamination also pose a significant hazard. If methamphetamine production has been conducted within a building, chemicals from the process will have spread not only in the specific area but also throughout the whole building. The contaminated waste produced by the process will need to be disposed of which usually is undertaken without care.
For example waste is often poured down domestic drains and toilets, left in parks, refuse sites and left in vehicles and set on fire. This behaviour may also have serious consequences for the environment.

**Management of incidents**

**OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY WHERE THE LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT IS NOT DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE AREA OF MANUFACTURE**

7C12.72 Emergency responders should withdraw from an incident site if they discover the potential manufacture of drugs in areas not directly affected by operational activities.

7C12.73 The whole site should be considered to be contaminated and the remainder of the incident should be treated as a hazardous materials incident with appropriate actions taken to protect Fire and Rescue Service staff and the public. The situation should be made as safe as possible and any actions undertaken should be done so as not to raise unnecessary alarm.

7C12.74 A situation report should be passed to the Police Service via mobilising control and any further action should be carried out under supervision and in consultation with the senior police officer.

**OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY THAT DIRECTLY INVOLVES AN ILLICIT DRUG LABORATORY**

7C12.75 If the presence of an illicit drug laboratory is identified during operations, the incident should be treated as a hazardous materials incident with appropriate attendance and procedures being adopted.

7C12.76 A situation report should be passed to the police via Fire and Rescue Service control and firefighting and any rescues should be dealt with taking account of the potential risks associated with illicit drug laboratories. Once this phase is complete close liaison with the senior police officer should determine the next steps.

**General operational considerations**

7C12.77 The first priority at incidents where no fire/explosion has occurred is to preserve the scene and let the Police Service establish and contain the situation. Fire and Rescue Service presence may simply be for safety reasons in case of a subsequent fire/explosion.

7C12.78 If the police establish that an illicit drug laboratory is involved then they will probably call the national Illicit Lab Unit team in to assist. This may take several hours to fully deploy.

7C12.79 The aim will usually be to establish a suitable cordon and stand off rather than intervene and put responders at risk. There may however be occasions when lives may be at risk and immediate intervention is appropriate. This may be due to the occupants of the premises being overcome or where the
lack of intervention may lead to a critical escalation of the incident (fire and/or explosion). Joint risk assessments with the police should be undertaken and proposed actions agreed.

7C12.80 In the event of accidental discovery, action should be taken to ensure that all Fire and Rescue Service staff and occupants leave the site immediately and remain at a safe distance. Fire and Rescue Service staff should:

- react in the event of a fire, explosion or life at risk utilising standard operating procedures
- treat as a hazardous materials incident
- enter the site fully equipped with suitable respiratory protective equipment and personal protective equipment
- not use phones/radios until clear of the site
- not turn on/off any lights or electrical appliances
- not shut down any on-going chemical process or remove power source to the premises
- not touch, open or remove any bottles or containers as some chemicals involved can be fatal if inhaled
- not allow persons to re-enter the site
- provide information regarding the illicit laboratory to mobilising control
- where possible, make notes of what they have seen and done
- keep the premises under observation from a safe location
- evacuate the immediate area and establish a hazard zone in consultation with the police
- note reaction if water is applied to a fire
- contain water run-off.

7C12.81 Methamphetamine users:

- users may show signs of increased agitation, hyperactivity, Irritability, confusion, anxiety, paranoia and aggression.

Training and awareness

7C12.82 A key aspect of dealing successfully with these incidents is the training and awareness of relevant staff. It is important for Fire and Rescue Services to establish arrangements/protocols with their local police force to ensure information is shared and procedures are compatible.

7C12.83 All staff likely to come across illicit drug laboratories in their work should be made aware of the hazards and gain an understanding of what actions they should be undertaking.
7C12.84 Specific training is recommended for Fire and Rescue Service decision makers. This will include hazardous materials advisers who need a greater degree of knowledge regarding specific risk assessments and the various options available, ie decontamination issues, size of hazard zones and advice to the Incident Commander.

7C12.85 Joint training with the police is recommended. This will assist with the effectiveness of joint arrangements and agreed procedures.
PART C–13
Asbestos containing materials

General information

Introduction

7C13.1 Asbestos is the generic name given to the fibrous forms of naturally occurring silicate minerals. Asbestos containing materials were used in commercial products because of their high tensile strength, flexibility, low electrical conductivity, and resistance to fire, heat and chemicals. Asbestos became most prevalent in building construction from the 1950s onwards and was used extensively until it was prohibited in construction. Blue and brown asbestos were banned in 1985, white asbestos in 1999.

7C13.2 When work with asbestos, or work which may disturb asbestos, is being carried out, the Control of Asbestos Regulations require Fire and Rescue Authorities to prevent exposure to asbestos fibres. Where this is not reasonably practicable, they must make sure that exposure is kept as low as reasonably practicable by measures other than the use of respiratory protective equipment, then controlled by respiratory protective equipment.

7C13.3 The spread of asbestos must also be prevented. The Regulations (Approved code of Practise and Guidance L143) specify the work methods and controls that should be used to prevent exposure and spread.

7C13.4 Staff exposure must be kept as low as reasonably practicable below the airborne exposure limit. The Regulations specify control limits for all types of asbestos these can be found on the Health and Safety Executive’s web site:

www.hse.gov.uk

7C13.5 All work with asbestos requires a licence issued by the Health and Safety Executive unless it is exempted from current Regulations.

7C13.6 The Health and Safety Executive can issue certificates of exemptions from certain requirements of the Regulations, for example, the requirements to hold licenses to work with asbestos or to notify work with asbestos in advance. The exemptions are normally subject to specific conditions, such as compliance with a specific method statement.
7C13.7 The presence of asbestos containing materials does not necessarily mean that they are, or will be, adversely affecting the safety of those at the incident. Therefore to safeguard human health, the emphasis during all incidents must be on continuous risk management and the implementation of appropriate and proportionate control measures.

**Characteristics and classification**

7C13.8 There are three main types of asbestos which have been used in asbestos products. These are crocidolite (blue) asbestos, amosite (brown) asbestos and chrysotile (white) asbestos. Blue and brown asbestos are amphibole minerals while white asbestos is a serpentine mineral. The two mineral types have different physical properties and characteristics which leads to differences in their hazardous nature and disease potential.

**Amphiboles (blue and brown asbestos)**

7C13.9 Amphibole fibres are needle shaped which can split to form many new fibres from an initial single unit. The fibres are also more durable than white asbestos fibres and consequently have a greater potential to cause disease.

Serpentine (white asbestos)

7C13.10 Serpentine fibres are curly in nature and will usually split longitudinally when disturbed or subject to impact. Therefore their potential to generate fibres is less than the amphiboles and their disease potential is also lower.
While the three main types of asbestos are often described in terms of their common names which are based on colour, in practice this is not a reliable guide to identifying the type of asbestos. Colour is often distorted by deterioration, age, painting and heating. It is also common to have different types of asbestos mixed together.

### Types of asbestos as classified by the United Nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blue (crocidolite)</th>
<th>Brown (amosite)</th>
<th>White (chrysotile)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN 2212</td>
<td>UN 2212</td>
<td>UN 2590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC 2X (Amphibole)</td>
<td>EAC 2X (Amphibole)</td>
<td>EAC 2X (Serpentine)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Hazards

Inhalation of asbestos fibres is the major hazard to human health. If inhaled, the smallest of the fibres may remain deposited in the lungs. Symptoms resulting from this may not occur for 15-60 years following exposure. The principle diseases known to be caused by exposure to asbestos fibres are asbestosis, lung cancer, malignant mesothelioma and asbestos pleural disease.

### Asbestosis

Asbestosis involves fibrous scarring of the lung in which the tissue becomes less elastic making breathing progressively more difficult. It is irreversible and may progress even after cessation of exposure to asbestos. Asbestosis is an industrial disease arising from repeated high levels of exposure to airborne dust. There is no risk of contracting this disease from normal levels of environmental exposure to asbestos.

### Lung cancer

An increased incidence of lung cancer has been found amongst people who have worked with asbestos. The increased risk depends on the degree of exposure and is very much greater for smokers than non-smokers.

### Mesothelioma

Mesothelioma is a cancer of the inner lining of the chest or of the abdominal wall. The incidence in the general population is very low; the majority of cases are attributable to occupational or, more rarely, para-occupational exposure to asbestos (ie those living in the same house as an asbestos worker).

### Asbestos pleural disease

This is a non-malignant disease that causes scarring of the thin membranes lining the lung and chest.
Other diseases and conditions

7C13.17 Asbestos may cause cancer of the digestive tract, colon, larynx, oesophagus, kidney and some types of lymphoma. These asbestos related diseases may be due to swallowing some of the longer asbestos fibres that are caught in the upper airways and that are carried to the throat in mucus. However, the risk here is much smaller than those diseases caused by inhalation.

7C13.18 Skin and eye irritation may arise from acute exposure to fibres.

Hazards from chrysotile (white asbestos)

7C13.19 Crocidolite (blue), amosite (brown) and chrysotile (white asbestos) all cause cancer and have been classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer as category 1 human carcinogens. It is recognised that chrysotile (white asbestos) is less potent (ie has a lower cancer risk) than the other types but it is still a carcinogen. In addition many asbestos products contain a mixture of asbestos types such that exposure to chrysotile will not be in isolation. Consequently all three forms should be treated the same.

Hazards posed to the general public at serious fires

7C13.20 In all cases of incidents involving asbestos containing materials it is important to put the health risks to the general public into perspective. Asbestos is a naturally occurring substance and also a widely distributed industrial pollutant and consequently is found in low to moderate levels everywhere in the UK. These levels can be as high as 1000 fibres per cubic metre of air in urban or industrial areas. Exposure to these background levels is therefore unavoidable.

7C13.21 Asbestos containing materials in good condition and left undisturbed, in place cannot cause ill health as fibres will not be released. Handling or touching asbestos containing materials in good condition will also generally not present a risk. However, handling would require precautionary controls (such as wetting and personal protective equipment) in case the material had been damaged or crumbles/breaks up during movement. In such situations fibres are likely to be released.

7C13.22 The key factor however in the risk of developing an asbestos-related disease is the total number of fibres inhaled. Inhaled fibres can become lodged in the chest tissue and the body’s natural defences may not be able to easily break them down.

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1 Source data from the World Health Organisation provided by the Health Protection Agency
Usage, transportation, packaging and storage

Construction materials

7C13.23 Prior to asbestos being banned, it was predominantly used in the building industry as heat resistant insulation and lagging, and roof sheeting. Asbestos is likely to be present in the vicinity of heating and ventilation systems, pipe work, boilers, structural insulating panels or as a roofing material.

7C13.24 It is estimated that approximately six million tonnes of asbestos has been used in the UK in the last one hundred years. It may be found in the form of cement sheeting, impregnated cloth and rope or sprayed onto structures as slurry. Composites containing asbestos have also been used in decorative coatings and cladding for both internal and external use.

### Potentially high hazard (NOTE: If disturbed or involved in fire)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asbestos coatings</th>
<th>Widely used mixtures containing asbestos that were used to provide fire protection, acoustic properties, heat and condensation control by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• spraying onto structural beams, girders etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• loosely packing between floors and in partition walls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• lagging eg on pipework, boilers, calorifiers, heat exchangers, insulating jackets for cold water tanks, around ducts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Typical buildings include: office blocks, cinemas, theatres, swimming pools, multi-storey car parks, cold stores, hospitals, shops, derelict industrial buildings where old lagging has not been maintained etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Asbestos Insulating Boards (AIB) | Used for fire protection, thermal insulation, eg ceiling tiles, partition walls, soffits, service duct covers, fire breaks, heater cupboards, door panels, lift shaft linings, fire surrounds, backing panels for radiators, heater and boilers. |

| Asbestos insulation | Asbestos containing materials which were not in practice applied as coatings. They include preformed sections for pipe insulation, laggings, void infills and packing around cables which pass through floors, millboards used for electrical as well as thermal insulation. |
Lower hazard (if disturbed or involved in fire)

In some asbestos containing materials the asbestos is firmly embedded and the fibres are more difficult to release examples include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asbestos cement products</th>
<th>The potential for fibre release is usually low. However contamination can arise when asbestos cement is damaged or removed without suitable controls. Cement products include flat or corrugated roof sheets, wall cladding, guttering and downpipes, water tanks, bath panels, boiler and incinerator flues, fire surrounds etc. They generally contain between 10 and 15 per cent asbestos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certain textured coatings</td>
<td>eg artex (prior to the mid-1980s).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moulded and sprayed asbestos pipe lagging. This is an example of a potential ‘high hazard’ asbestos containing material.

Asbestos in buildings

7C13.25 Any building that was constructed or underwent major refurbishment between the 1950’s and mid 1980’s is likely to contain asbestos containing materials as they were used in hundreds of different products and buildings during this period. Asbestos products continued to be used until 1985 when blue and brown asbestos were banned and 1999 when the use of all asbestos containing materials was banned.
The use of asbestos containing materials peaked in the 1960’s and early 1970’s therefore premises built or refurbished during this time are the most likely to contain asbestos containing materials.

Railway rolling stock

Asbestos containing materials that remain in refurbished rail vehicles used on network rail’s infrastructure have been securely encapsulated. Therefore fibre release and possible exposure to the fibres will only occur in the event of a catastrophic failure of the vehicle eg as a result of a serious collision.

Ships

All types of asbestos have been widely used in shipping, in a processed form, because of the properties of heat resistance, insulation and the strengthening of other materials when used as reinforcement. Asbestos is likely to be found on board a ship in:

- cladding of fire-retardant bulkheads
- glands of high temperature valves
- friction materials in machinery
- lagging on boilers and steam pipes.

The environment

Asbestos is non-degradable, and if released into the environment could constitute a public health hazard. The Health Protection Agency, local authority and Environment Agency should assess and manage this risk.
Fibres once released into the air will be dispersed in natural air currents and by wind movement.

Land contaminated by asbestos containing materials and/or fibres may present a clean-up issue for the landowner or ‘responsible person’ where significant amounts of fibres have been released during an incident. The Health Protection Agency and local authority may consider asbestos sampling to assess if the risk is above that normally encountered in the environment or for ‘public reassurance’ purposes (ie to show nothing has been detected above normal background levels).

Consideration should always be given to the potential hazards posed by water run off. Water may run into drains but may also collect on hard surfaces which, after drying off, may contain an asbestos residue.

**Operational considerations**

**Pre-planning**

The Control of Asbestos Regulations require ‘duty holders’ to actively manage asbestos in non-domestic premises. To achieve this, they must prepare a written plan (commonly known as an Asbestos Register or Asbestos Survey Report) identifying where asbestos is or is likely to be present, and the measures taken to manage the risk. The plan should be readily available on site for anyone to examine. The ‘duty holder’ is also required to ensure that information about the location and condition of any asbestos is made available to the emergency services.

Guidance in The Management of Asbestos in Non-domestic Premises Approved Code of Practice states:

“....... the Fire and Rescue Service are the emergency service most likely to disturb or come into contact with disturbed asbestos and they should be contacted to see what information they want, in what form they would like it and if they would like the information sent to them”.

**NOTE:** Although the Approved Code of Practice puts the emphasis on the duty holder to contact the Fire and Rescue Service, in practice this is unlikely to happen to an extent whereby the Fire and Rescue Service is made aware of all the asbestos in its area. Also where information does come from surveys or registers this information may not be completely accurate or maintained up to date.

Fire and Rescue Services should therefore consider augmenting information provided by duty holders by gathering data themselves. Examples of how data could be gathered would include:

- risk information visits (eg 7(2)(d))
• fire safety inspections
• operational intelligence
• site exercises.

7C13.37 Fire and Rescue Services may want to consider a hierarchy of risk approach when responding to asbestos containing materials incidents with eg the highest risk being where owner/occupiers of buildings built prior to 1999 do not provide the Fire and Rescue Service with sufficient information when requested.

Known licensed asbestos removal

7C13.38 The Health and Safety Executive or the local authority environmental health department receive notifications of work involving the removal of asbestos by licensed contractors. Fire and Rescue Services should ensure that local protocols are in place for relevant information to be shared with them where significant risks to firefighters are foreseeable.

Phase 1: Mobilising and en-route

7C13.39 Where it is known that asbestos is involved at the address of the incident mobilising control should provide wind direction information to responders.

7C13.40 Crews should select a route to known, or suspected, asbestos incidents from the up-wind direction where they believe there is a risk of inhaling asbestos dust, fibres or composite particles (ie asbestos fibres attached to a bonding material).

Phase 2: Arriving and gathering information

7C13.41 Crews should approach known, or suspected, asbestos incidents from the up-wind direction where they believe there is a risk of inhaling asbestos dust, fibres or composite particles (ie asbestos fibres attached to a bonding material). Where appropriate, crews should notify mobilising control of the best approach route for other response vehicles to follow.

7C13.42 The Incident Commander should ensure all response vehicles and staff, if not yet deployed at the incident, are kept in an up-wind marshalling area or rendezvous point and establish an initial cordon around the suspected hazard zone and strictly control access into it.

7C13.43 Any immediate action to save life should be carried out using breathing apparatus2 and structural firefighting kit3 as a minimum level of personal protective equipment (personal protective equipment).

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2 Breathing apparatus means self-contained, positive pressure breathing apparatus conforming to the current Fire and Rescue Service European standards.

3 Structural firefighting kit should comprise boots, over trousers, tunic, gloves, fire hood and helmet conforming to the current Fire and Rescue Service European standards.
7C13.44 The Incident Commander should ascertain whether asbestos containing materials are involved at the incident and present a hazard to those attending as part of their risk assessment. If a hazard exists it should be managed through appropriate control measures contained in standard operating procedures. Further guidance on hazard identification is contained below.

7C13.45 Where there is doubt as to whether or not materials contain asbestos, Fire and Rescue Services should mobilise a hazardous materials adviser or subject matter adviser to the incident to assist the Incident Commander. Their training, knowledge and experience will improve the risk assessment process and they may be able to arrange analysis of suspected asbestos containing materials.

7C13.46 There are strict occupational exposure control limits which must not be exceeded. It is difficult to measure the amount of asbestos fibres that may have been released during operational incidents. Any release is likely to be unpredictable, variable, intermittent and short term (‘peaks’). It is therefore prudent for Fire and Rescue Services to assume, when carrying out their risk assessment that all activities will require control measures eg respiratory protective equipment (respiratory protective equipment), even when any possible exposure to released fibres maybe below the exposure limits (eg asbestos containing materials in which the fibres are firmly embedded).

Asbestos hazard identification guidance

7C13.47 Due to the nature of Fire and Rescue Service operational activities, it will not always be practical to identify asbestos at incidents or events. Therefore, the Fire and Rescue Service has adopted a precautionary policy for asbestos. Fire and Rescue Services should implement asbestos standard operating procedures whenever it is foreseeable that asbestos containing materials are present at the incident and involved in such a way that fibres may be released and inhaled by those present.

7C13.48 The following three step hazard identification process will assist the Incident Commander’s initial risk assessment:

- Step 1 – Are asbestos containing materials present?
- Step 2 – Can asbestos fibres be released or disturbed?
- Step 3 – Do responders have to enter the hazard zone?

**STEP 1 – ARE ASBESTOS CONTAINING MATERIALS PRESENT?**

7C13.49 Sources of information, which may be available to establish the presence of asbestos containing materials are:

- asbestos hazard signage
- visual appearance of construction/materials (eg asbestos cement roofs, insulation on plant/pipes etc)
- age of building/materials
NOTE: Those constructed between 1950-1980 but note that white asbestos (particularly asbestos cement products) may be present up until 1999

- hazardous materials adviser or subject matter adviser
- operational intelligence (eg 7(2)(d) inspections, asbestos register etc)
- multi-agency information sharing agreements (eg asbestos removal licences shared by the local authority etc)
- premises asbestos management plan and/or asbestos register, available from the ‘duty-holder’ of building
- knowledge of building stock

NOTE: Local authority building control department may be able to assist.

7C13.50 Clues such as the age of the building/alterations and visual appearance of materials may support the risk assessment process but they should not be relied upon as the only evidence for discounting the presence of asbestos containing materials.

7C13.51 Once the presence, or suspected presence, of asbestos containing materials is established, the next part of the assessment process is to determine the risk of responders inhaling asbestos fibres.

STEP 2 – CAN ASBESTOS FIBRES BE RELEASED OR DISTURBED?

7C13.52 Asbestos is not hazardous to health if it remains intact and undamaged. The asbestos containing material should be assessed and ideally visually examined to determine its condition (eg smashed/broken boards or sheets; damage with debris; degradation of bonding such as weathering etc) and therefore, the likelihood that fibres or composite particles can be released into the air.

7C13.53 The risk is lower in asbestos containing materials with a strong bonding material (eg asbestos cement sheeting etc). This contrasts with other asbestos containing materials, such as sprayed coatings and lagging which generally have a greater, more hazardous fibre content and are loosely bound, therefore, they release fibres relatively easily when damaged or disturbed.

7C13.54 It should also be ascertained whether the asbestos containing material has been mechanically altered (eg cut, sanded, smashed, machined etc) as this will release asbestos dust, fibres or composite particles. The risk of releasing fibres is lower for work with hand tools than powered tools.

7C13.55 There may also be occasions where asbestos dust, fibres and composite particles have been released prior to the arrival of crews. Where this is suspected the quantity and likelihood of disturbing the fibres should be assessed.

7C13.56 Asbestos fibres are extremely small and light, they are not visible to the naked eye. Therefore it can be difficult to detect them without air sampling equipment. However, in any disturbance there will always be asbestos dust and fibres released. The extent of fibre release may not be visible but it will generally
reflect the amount of dust/composite particles created. The greater the extent of destruction and the greater quantity of asbestos material, then the greater the extent of dust and fibre release. Dust and fibres will generally disperse fairly quickly where there is good unrestricted air movement. It is highly unlikely that this will increase the normal background level of fibres appreciably.

7C13.57 **NOTE:** Positive pressure ventilation may be used to improve firefighting conditions, however, crews should be aware that its use could disturb asbestos containing materials.

7C13.58 The risk of fibres being present, above background levels, will be lower where asbestos containing materials are in the open air as opposed to those releasing fibres inside buildings.

**STEP 3 – DO RESPONDERS HAVE TO ENTER THE HAZARD ZONE?**

7C13.59 The hazard zone is the area where asbestos fibres or composite particles could be airborne, or made airborne by the activities being carried out. If responders do not need to go into the hazard zone then the risk of inhaling fibres is eliminated.

7C13.60 If responders do need to enter the hazard zone then asbestos standard operating procedures must be followed and the asbestos containing materials should be categorised by the level of hazard posed. For simplicity and safety at fire related incidents it is recommended that they be designated as either:

- ‘lower hazard’ or
- ‘high hazard’

**NOTE:** ‘lower hazard’ – means asbestos cement products and textured coatings only. Other asbestos containing materials are also classified as ‘minor’ or ‘less significant’ hazard under the Regulations (eg asbestos paper, rope seals etc). But they have not been included in the ‘lower hazard’ category within this hazard identification process for fires because of their increased potential to release asbestos fibres in a fire.

‘high hazard’ refers to all other asbestos containing materials.

**Phase 3: Planning the response**

7C13.61 The Incident Commander must ensure that a risk assessment is carried out prior to the deployment of staff to the hazard zone in order to develop a response plan with appropriate asbestos control measures. The risk assessment should consider the:

- asbestos hazard assessment
- level of asbestos hazard involved (ie ‘lower hazard’ or ‘high hazard’)
- extent of asbestos containing material involvement
• necessity to expose staff
• tasks that are required in the hazard zone
• effect of non-asbestos hazards on asbestos procedures
• control measures.

7C13.62 The Incident Commander should assess the risks and select the most suitable personal protective equipment and respiratory protective equipment based on pre-planning and on-site monitoring of the hazards and the tasks that need to be achieved.

7C13.63 The options available to the Incident Commander are:

• **Breathing apparatus and chemical protective clothing**
  Worn at ‘high hazard’ asbestos incidents to increase the effectiveness of decontamination procedures (eg removing asbestos lagging from a boiler or ancillary pipe work etc).

  **NOTE:** Chemical protective clothing should not be worn in a fire situation if the heat or flames could have a detrimental affect on the protective clothing’s material.

• **Breathing apparatus and structural firefighting kit**
  Worn where chemical protective clothing is not appropriate, for example during firefighting tasks or other operations where the disadvantages (ie heat stress, impaired visibility and mobility etc) outweigh the advantages (ie ease of decontamination).

• **Other respiratory protective equipment** and **structural firefighting kit**
  May be worn for ‘lower hazard’ asbestos incidents (ie asbestos cement and textured coatings) and where staff will not be involved in ‘hot’ zone working which would disturb composite particles (eg assisting with decontamination where there is a very low risk of airborne fibres, dusts and composite particles; fire investigation activities which do not involve the disturbance of asbestos containing materials; re-inspections of incidents which do not involve the disturbance of asbestos containing materials; operating in areas where there are asbestos cement sheeting fragments etc).

  **NOTE:** All respiratory protective equipment used at asbestos incidents must be CE marked and subject to face-fit testing procedures. Where responders are working hard and there is a risk that the face seal may be compromised, breathing apparatus should always be worn.

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4 Such respiratory protective equipment can only be used by an Fire and Rescue Service following a pre-planned systematic respiratory protective equipment assessment. Further information is contained in Section 7 Part C-14 and specific guidance on the process to be followed is available from the Health Safety Executive’s website. Respiratory protective equipment, other than breathing apparatus, should not be used in fire situations where the harmful products of combustion could be inhaled.

5 The CE marking is a declaration by the manufacturer that his product meets the requirements of the applicable European Directive(s).
The Incident Commander should liaise with a hazardous materials adviser to identify appropriate and proportionate decontamination procedures.

The responsibility for the environmental impact and site cleaning rests with the owner/occupier of the premises. However, every effort should be made, within the response plan, to mitigate the impact of the incident on the environment.

Phase 4: Implementing the response

Work area considerations:

- establish a hazard zone and ensure it is controlled and monitored
- if different asbestos containing materials are present within a large incident site it may be necessary to have a number of hazard zones each with their own control measures
- keep the number of responders at the incident to the minimum required to safely deal with it
- allow only essential staff to enter the hazard zone and ensure they use appropriate respiratory protective equipment and personal protective equipment
- use and monitor personal protective equipment and respiratory protective equipment in line with the asbestos hazard assessment and the response plan
- ensure appropriate and proportionate decontamination is carried out when leaving the hazard zone
- ensure equipment is washed down prior to leaving the incident
- brief all staff on the asbestos hazards
- smoking, drinking or eating should not be allowed on-site unless designated rest areas with appropriate hygiene facilities are set up
- early notification and liaison with other responders (eg Police Service, Ambulance Service, utility workers etc) is essential
- liaise with the police and Health Protection Agency over the risk of exposure to members of the public
- inform the Environment Agency, Health Protection Agency and the local authority environmental health officer of the asbestos hazard
- ensure good personal hygiene both during and post incident.

Work method considerations:

- avoid disturbing asbestos containing materials (eg cutting away an area to gain access) unless it is absolutely essential. If essential, the area should be wetted and disturbance kept to a minimum
• leave intact individual pieces of asbestos cement sheeting if the fire has disturbed and distributed it over a wide area

• if disturbed asbestos containing materials have to be moved, ensure they are wetted, using a fine spray and moved as short a distance as possible to a safe place within the hazard zone

• water use should be kept to a minimum and the run-off controlled where possible

• avoid use of positive pressure ventilation fans unless to do so is imperative as they are more likely to release airborne asbestos fibres and composite particles from any disturbed/damaged structure

• do not intentionally break any asbestos containing materials into smaller pieces unless absolutely necessary

• use hand tools in preference to abrasive or power tools when cutting away as their use reduces the amount of potential fibre release

• avoid the use of cleaning methods, such as dry sweeping, which will increase airborne dust/particles

• keep to a minimum the movement of ash and debris (eg turning over) and ensure it is carefully carried out to prevent/reduce the amount of fibres and composite particles that maybe released.

7C13.68 The presence of asbestos containing materials may not be confirmed or apparent until the closing stages or even until the end of an incident and personnel may already have been exposed, if fibres have been released. In such circumstances the unintentional spread of fibres may have already occurred via:

• clothing – fibres trapped in fabrics

• breathing apparatus sets – fibres trapped on webbing etc.

• equipment – fibres trapped in crevices etc.

7C13.69 Considerations where asbestos is discovered during the course of an incident:

• stop non-critical operations in the hazard zone and immediately assess the asbestos hazards

• identify staff who have been exposed, carry out retrospective decontamination measures

• inform mobilising control, who may mobilise additional resources

• reassess the response plan, tactics and working practices – implement asbestos procedures.

Asbestos decontamination guidance

7C13.70 Decontamination should be in place, and communicated to staff, prior to work being carried out in the hazard zone, except where there is an immediate life risk.
7C13.71 All decontamination should take place on-site to avoid spreading asbestos, but if, in exceptional circumstances, staff need to continue decontamination off-site then, following cleaning, a thorough visual inspection of any rooms used or accessed should be conducted to ensure the absence of any dust. Air sampling may also be considered for reassurance purposes.

**NOTE:** The visual inspection is the most important control.

7C13.72 When considering the site of the decontamination area the Incident Commander should consider the following:

- Access to and egress from the building
- Establish sufficient distance from the 'hot' zone to the decontamination area to ensure that no airborne contamination can reach the decontamination area. However, attempt to keep them as close as possible to contain any decontamination run off to the initial site and limit the spread of asbestos
- Numbers requiring decontamination
- Location of the breathing apparatus entry control point
- Wind direction
- Location of the pump and availability of hose reel for washing off and damping down
- Slope of ground and drainage
- Hard standing with good vehicular access
- Weather conditions and welfare of staff.

**DECONTAMINATING WEARERS IN CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING**

7C13.73 Chemical protective clothing wearers should be decontaminated using standard wet or dry methods as appropriate.

**DECONTAMINATING BREATHING APPARATUS WEARERS IN STRUCTURAL FIREFIGHTING KIT**

7C13.74 Use a standard procedure as follows:

- Breathing apparatus wearers should carry out visual inspection of each other for any exposed skin or hair, note any areas/locations if they are found
• Vacuum⁶ each other if appropriate or

• Damp down all areas of personal protective clothing to ensure that any particles cannot become airborne. Start at the highest point (i.e., helmet) and work down, pay particular attention to folds and creases in the personal protective equipment

• Debris and dust can be gently removed using water spray, sponges, cloths etc

• Remove helmet

• Gently wash off and wipe facemask and dampen fire hood

• Wash off boots and gloves

• Step into the undressing area or bag (within the ‘dirty area’)

• Remove contaminated gloves and don disposable medical gloves

• Remove fire hood and breathing apparatus set

  **NOTE:** The method used to achieve this must ensure that no residual contamination can be inhaled by the wearer.

• Remove tunic

• Roll down over-trousers over boots ensuring that they are inside out

• Carry out secondary check for contamination of skin or hair

  **NOTE:** Thoroughly wash any areas found on either the initial inspection above or this secondary inspection

• Carry out inspection of the clothes layer under the structural firefighting kit. If any clothes are believed to have been contaminated, they must be damped down and removed

• Step out of ‘dirty area’ and into the decontamination ‘clean area’

• Remove disposable medical gloves and deposit in ‘dirty area’

• All contaminated clothing and equipment should be assessed and cleaned appropriately. Generally hard items can be wiped and rinsed clean. Soft or textured items may require a more thorough cleaning process. Fire and Rescue Services should risk assess their specific personal protective equipment, respiratory protective equipment and other equipment in liaison with local contractors and add this to their asbestos standard operating procedures.

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⁶ Only Class H vacuum cleaners with true or absolute ‘high efficiency particulate arrestor’ filters should be used. However, it is now generally regarded that dry decontamination by use of a vacuum cleaner is not in its own right a complete decontamination process and should be followed by wet decontamination. Also they are best suited to dry, still-air conditions. As these are rarely encountered at operational incidents, Fire and Rescue Services should ensure that other methods of decontamination are always available.
Where contamination is heavy or the number of wearers is large, this process can be enhanced by the addition of decontamination operatives wearing appropriate respiratory protective equipment and personal protective equipment based on a risk assessment of the hazards and the likelihood of cross contamination between wearers and operatives.

Further information is contained in Section 7 Part C-15 – Firefighter decontamination.

It is good practice for wearers to shower on return to station after any fire or hazardous materials incident for personal hygiene reasons and as an additional safety precaution, this does not form part of decontamination.

DECONTAMINATING FIREFIGHTERS WEARING RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT, OTHER THAN BREATHING APPARATUS, AND STRUCTURAL FIREFIGHTING KIT

This level decontamination should only be considered for ‘lower hazard’ asbestos incidents (ie asbestos cement and textured coatings) and staff who have not been involved in ‘hot’ zone working which would disturb composite particles.

When decontaminating, the principle should be to vacuum/wet/wash/wipe areas that are visibly contaminated (eg dirt, dust, debris etc), or areas that are known to have contacted asbestos containing materials (eg boots and gloves):

- visual inspection for any exposed skin or hair, that has been visibly contaminated note any areas/locations if they are found
- remove and rinse helmet
- gently vacuum (if appropriate), wash off and sponge wipe the areas of personal protective equipment that are visibly contaminated or have been touched by asbestos containing materials
- wash off gloves
- wash off boots
- thoroughly wash any areas of skin or hair with visible contamination
- remove the respiratory protective equipment
- consider further laundering of personal protective equipment dependant on local risk assessments.

NOTE: If the Incident Commander, hazardous materials adviser or decontamination director has any doubt over the effectiveness of the decontamination procedure, or the asbestos hazard level, the decontamination procedures above for breathing apparatus wearers in structural firefighting kit should be used.
Assessment of the effectiveness of decontamination of ‘lower hazard’ asbestos (ie asbestos cement and textured coatings only)

If decontamination has effectively cleaned all visible deposits (eg dirt, dust, debris etc.) from personal protective equipment and other equipment, then no further decontamination action should be necessary.

This is because, although individual asbestos fibres can potentially be detached from the bonding materials, it is more likely that composite particles will be released, especially where the asbestos containing material has been mechanically altered.

This will commonly be visible as dust or fine debris. Composite particles pose a lower risk than fibres, as the body’s normal defences and filtering systems may deal with them, but asbestos containing material dusts should always be treated as an asbestos risk, hence this abridged decontamination option.

NOTE: This decontamination assessment method is only appropriate for ‘lower hazard’ asbestos incidents (ie asbestos cement and textured coatings) and staff who have not been involved in ‘hot’ zone working which would disturb composite particles.

DECONTAMINATING APPLIANCES AND EQUIPMENT

7C13.81 If contamination is found on the outside of an appliance, this may be removed using water spray. The likelihood of contamination of appliance interiors is considered to be extremely low, provided all the foregoing procedures are followed. However, should it occur, cabs should be ventilated and cleaned using disposable damp cloths, these should be disposed of as asbestos waste.

7C13.82 Lockers and equipment should be washed and wiped down with disposable cloths. Hose and other hard-surfaced equipment should be cleaned using water spray. The level of personal protective equipment/respiratory protective equipment for the staff carrying this out should be decided through risk assessment. This procedure should be carried out at the scene of operations to avoid the potential spreading of asbestos containing materials.

Phase 5: Evaluating the response

7C13.83 Incident Commanders should constantly evaluate the risk posed by asbestos containing materials and the effectiveness of asbestos procedures and advice. Evaluation is not a one-off process but should be continual throughout the incident as circumstances change or new information is gathered. After evaluation, if necessary, the Incident Commander should adjust the response plan, amend/implement control measures and communicate the changes to all staff.
Phase 6: Closing the incident

7C13.84 The *Hazardous Waste Regulations* apply to asbestos waste. This must be consigned to a site that is authorised to accept asbestos waste. Contaminated cloths and any other asbestos waste must be appropriately bagged and marked as asbestos waste and sent for specialist disposal.

7C13.85 At the end of any incident involving asbestos, further control measures will include:

- **Liaison between the Incident Commander and the Fire Investigation Officer**
  
  The Fire Investigation Officer must be briefed regarding the location, condition, type and actual involvement of asbestos at the incident. This will allow the Fire Investigation Officer to carry out a risk assessment and decide upon the appropriate level of personal protective equipment/respiratory protective equipment for their task. Consideration should also be given to the method or need for decontamination.

- **Hand-over of the incident to the appropriate authority**
  
  This will be the owner or occupier in most instances, however, if the site/building is derelict, unoccupied or it is not possible to contact the owner/occupier then the site should be handed-over to the police or local authority who have responsibility in these circumstances. The findings of the asbestos risk assessment must form part of the incident hand-over. Where there is a significant risk to the general public and it is not possible to hand-over the site to a responsible person consideration should be given to the positioning of appropriate warning signs.

- **Extent of public health protection requirement**
  
  The local Environmental Health Department and the Health Protection Agency should be informed whenever asbestos is involved. Further information can be found in the Health Protection Agency’s *Responding to large-scale fires involving asbestos Part 1 – HPU Toolkit and Resource Pack*. At large or complex incidents a joint agency debrief should be carried out.

- **Environmental impact and control measures**
  
  Asbestos is an environmentally hazardous substance. The Environment Agency should be informed of substantial asbestos releases or as agreed in the Fire and Rescue Service’s local memorandum of understanding.

**Responsibility for the clean-up**

The *Control of Asbestos Regulations* requires an employer to ensure that premises are thoroughly cleaned, this does not apply to a Fire and Rescue Service in respect of attendance at premises in response to emergency calls. The responsibility for the environmental impact and cleaning up rests with the owner/occupier of the premises.
Records and health surveillance

7C13.86 Fire and Rescue Authorities must maintain a written record of their work activities that involve exposure of staff to asbestos (i.e. inhaled or ingested asbestos fibres). These must be held for 40 years. Authorities should have procedures in place to record the individual circumstances of the exposure along with the asbestos risk assessment and also procedures for recording details of staff who suspect they have been exposed.

7C13.87 Fire and Rescue Services should maintain, and have available for inspection by the Health Safety Executive or local authority inspector as required, the following documentation:

- training records
- details of decontamination procedures
- maintenance records of all decontaminated equipment and test certificates where appropriate
- method statement, i.e. standard operating procedure for dealing with asbestos incidents
- risk assessment
- records of respiratory protective equipment inspections and tests
- records of work activities involving possible exposure of staff to asbestos
- exposure records for personnel.

Additional operational considerations when involved in fire

7C13.88 All operational guidance given in the previous paragraphs of this part is applicable to fire and non-fire situations, however, the following additional information and advice is specific to fire situations.

- Effect of fire and heat on asbestos
  Asbestos fibres can have their mineral structure changed following prolonged exposure to heat. Research has shown that at temperatures above 450°C as asbestos fibres are denatured rendering them of lower hazard than non-heated fibres. In fires the outer layers of asbestos containing materials are altered with the interior often remaining unaffected. This means those asbestos fibres present in the debris and ash may still present a risk to firefighters when turning over and damping down, albeit reduced.

7 The public health significance of asbestos exposures from large scale fires by KR Smith and P Saunders.
• **Effect of fire and heat on cement asbestos containing materials**
  It can be anticipated that temperatures in excess of 450°C would be required to release asbestos fibres from cement bonded asbestos containing materials. Therefore, the risks from asbestos fibres and composite particles released from asbestos cement products during intense fire conditions is of lower risk than other operational scenarios. Also asbestos that exists within a cement material is heavily bonded within the cement matrix and consequently is far more difficult to get into a respirable form. Even where fibres are released, for example following intense heating of asbestos cement roofing sheets where a characteristic ‘popping’ of the sheeting can occur, they will not be released in isolation. It is highly likely that the vast majority of fibres, or composite particles, will be attached to larger fragments of cement. This means that the risk to health of asbestos inhalation is lower than for other asbestos containing materials as the body deals better with larger composite particles should they enter it.

• **Effect of fire and heat on chemical protective clothing**
  Most chemical protective clothing offers very little protection against heat and fire. Chemical protective clothing is likely to melt, burn or malfunction in fire conditions, therefore it is extremely hazardous to commit staff wearing it in to such environments and should be avoided.

• **Hazards posed to the general public at serious fires**
  The Health Protection Agency offers the following advice on serious fires in buildings involving asbestos containing materials:
  
  – main health effect may be anxiety about potential health effects and contamination
  – no evidence of direct health effects of asbestos particles released in fires, although the data are limited
  – available epidemiological evidence shows that long term health effects are negligible
  – majority of asbestos involved in fires is likely to be chrysotile (white asbestos), which is considered to pose a lower hazard that other forms of asbestos, but there is the possibility of all forms of asbestos being involved in a fire
  – risks from short term inhalation contributes only very slightly to total lifetime risk – one estimate of an extreme exposure scenario following a fire indicated that this would add a less than one in a million extra lifetime risk
  – asbestoses containing material debris, if in a good condition (eg unweathered) and if dampened down to suppress any potential release of fibres, does not present a hazard to human health if handled carefully.

• **Public health mitigating factors**:

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8 The public health significance of asbestos exposures from large scale fires by KR Smith and P Saunders.
not all asbestos containing material may be involved in the fire
fibres may be entrapped, in larger pieces of material etc
respirable fibres will be a fraction of the total released
some fibres may be denatured at the temperatures involved
atmospheric dispersion and deposition (particularly as a result of rain) will reduce concentrations

the duration of exposure will be short.

CONSIDERATIONS:
• Operational intelligence eg 7(2)d
• Occupiers asbestos survey/plan
• Appearance of construction/materials
• Age of building/materials

CONSIDERATIONS:
• Type of asbestos containing material and strength of bonding
• Physical condition of asbestos containing material
• Mechanical abrasion/deterioration
• Work processes
• Fire damage
• Will the asbestos containing material be disturbed during operations?
• What will make fibres airborne? (eg fire plume, positive pressure ventilation, wind and weather, air-conditioning systems etc)
• Where will airborne fibres spread?

LOWER HAZARD
Asbestos cement sheeting, textured coatings only

Implement ‘lower hazard’ control measures / Standard operating procedures

COMMAND and CONTROL: Establish initial, inner & outer cordons; strictly control inner cordon; essential work only and limit numbers of staff; brief all staff on hazards; strictly control and monitor work activities; damp down asbestos containing materials to remove the risk of fibres becoming airborne

Respiratory protective equipment: Breathing apparatus but other respirator protective equipment (with face-fit controls) may be acceptable for work which would not disturb fibres, dust and composite particles (NOTE: non-breathing apparatus respiratory protective equipment MUST NOT be used in fire situations)

Personal protective equipment: Structural firefighting kit or chemical protective clothing where large quantities of fibres

DECONTAMINATION: Set-up prior to committing staff to the hazard zone; required if there is visible contamination; vacuum if appropriate; carefully wet, wash and wipe contaminated areas; correct disposal of run-off and cleaning cloths; thorough washing of skin or hair if exposed to asbestos containing materials

HIGH HAZARD
Asbestos containing materials other than asbestos cement sheeting, textured coatings (eg lagging, insulation, boarding etc)

Implement ‘high hazard’ control measures / Standard operating procedures

COMMAND and CONTROL: Establish initial, inner and outer cordons; strictly control inner cordon; essential work only and limit numbers of staff; brief all staff on hazards; strictly control and monitor work activities; damp down asbestos containing materials to remove the risk of fibres becoming airborne

Respiratory protective equipment: Breathing apparatus

Personal protective equipment: Chemically protective clothing where no fire risk, structural firefighting kit in fire situations or where the wearing of chemical protective clothing causes more risk than benefit

DECONTAMINATION: Set-up prior to committing staff to the hazard zone; vacuum if appropriate; carefully wet, wash and wipe outer layer of personal protective equipment; thorough washing of skin or hair if exposed to asbestos containing materials; wash and wipe hard surfaces; appropriate laundering of textiles respiratory protective equipment/personal protective equipment; correct disposal of run-off and cleaning cloths

Monitor operations and keep the risk assessment under review

At any Fire and Rescue Service Incident the Incident Commander should carry out an ASBESTOS hazard assessment

Is asbestos likely to be present?

Yes

No

Can, or have asbestos fibres been released / disturbed?

Yes

Do responders need to enter the hazard zone, Can essential tasks be achieved by not entering it?

Yes

Decide whether the incident is ‘high hazard’ or ‘lower hazard’ and implement asbestos procedures

No

Monitor any work in the vicinity of asbestos containing materials to ensure the situation does not change

NOTE: At large incidents separate ‘high’ hazard and ‘lower’ hazard areas may be designated

No further action

NOTE: consider respiratory protective equipment for other dusts and particulate hazards

Record and investigate any exposure of staff to asbestos fibres, implement health surveillance
PART C–14

Personal protective equipment for hazardous materials incidents

General information

Introduction

7C14.1 This section of operational guidance provides information for Fire and Rescue Services on the selection and use of personal protective equipment at hazardous materials incidents. It is supported by the current relevant personal protective equipment European standards which are prepared under a mandate given to CEN (European Committee for Standardisation) by the Commission of the European Communities and the European Free Trade association. These standards support the requirements of the European Personal Protective Equipment Directive.

7C14.2 The field of chemical protective clothing is one of constant development and change, with new materials and processes becoming available all the time. It is therefore important to understand that the information provided should not be regarded as definitive but as the best available at this time.

7C14.3 It should be recognised that in line with the concept of the ‘hierarchy of controls’ in risk management, personal protective equipment forms the last line of defence for an individual working within a hazardous environment.

7C14.4 The importance of the effective selection and usage of appropriate respiratory protective equipment and chemical protective clothing at an incident involving hazardous materials can not be over stated. This can only be achieved by understanding the performance standards and level of protection afforded by personal protective equipment ensembles, and identifying any additional measures that may be required in order to deal safely with the hazards presented. These could include the following:

- physical properties of the substance
- form (ie solid, liquid, gas)
- toxicity / infectivity
- concentration
- quantity (ie amount of spill)
- likelihood of direct contact (contamination and possibly exposure)
• fire or potential involvement in fire
• nature and extent of proposed action or task to be performed
• environment (eg open air or enclosed compartment or structure)
• prevailing weather conditions (eg, wind direction/strength)
• potential decontamination strategy
• balancing the benefits of chemical protective clothing against negative aspects for the intended application at a particular incident (eg donning time scale, heat stress etc).

7C14.5 This list is not exhaustive, and will have to be considered with the operational circumstances, legal obligations, standard operating procedures, manufacturer’s guidance, suggested levels of protection information data bases, Emergency Action Codes, Additional Personal Protection Codes and scientific advice.

Legislation

7C14.6 It is a requirement of the Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations that personal protective equipment be supplied and used whenever there are risks to health and safety that cannot be controlled in other ways.

7C14.7 The regulations also require that personal protective equipment:

• BE PROPERLY ASSESSED BEFORE USE TO ENSURE ITS SUITABILITY
  This can only be achieved after a full analysis of the hazards presented at an incident, working proximity, weather conditions, etc, and the task to be performed. The selection of the most appropriate level of personal protective equipment, including respiratory protective equipment, at a hazmat incident will require understanding of specifications and performance standards against the chemical or identified hazard of the various options available, to interpret the protection that might be afforded to the wearer and for how long. Additional information such as the Additional Personal Protective Codes will also determine any additional personal protective equipment requirements such as thermal protection and briefing of wearers on potential limitations of protection and aspects of the task in hand to maximise their safety.

• BE MAINTAINED AND STORED PROPERLY
  Correct testing, maintenance and storage regimes are not only essential to ensure that chemical protective clothing remains in a state of operational readiness and is fit for purpose, it can also significantly extend the life of a suit.

• BE PROVIDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO USE IT SAFELY
  Wearers should be provided with instructions on how a chemical protection suit is to be checked prior to wearing, the donning/disrobing procedure, the requirement for additional protection (such as headgear), and the arrangements for distress procedures.
**Technical considerations**

The use of chemical protective clothing must always be evaluated against the nature of the task being undertaken to ensure any benefits of wearing the suit are not outweighed by other hazards. An example of this might be the operation of hydraulic cutting equipment at a road traffic collision balanced against the wearer’s impeded vision, mobility, hand dexterity and the potential for manual handling injuries.

**Respiratory protective equipment**

**Introduction**

7C14.8 The law requires Fire and Rescue Services to prevent or control the exposure of employees and others to hazardous substances at work. Before using respiratory protective equipment, exposure should be controlled by reasonably practicable measures other than the use of personal protective equipment. Personal protective equipment should only be used as a last line of protection to control the exposure.

7C14.9 Respiratory protective equipment is a particular type of equipment. It is designed to protect the wearer against inhalation of hazardous substances in the air.

7C14.10 Due to the nature of the emergency and wide range of Fire and Rescue Service activity, great care must be taken when selecting and purchasing respiratory protective equipment for operational use. Full risk assessments must be carried out to ensure it is fit for purpose and complies fully with the Health and Safety Executive’s legal requirements. Fire and Rescue Services must also consult either:

- safety representatives appointed by recognised trade unions; or
- employees, either directly or indirectly, through elected representatives.

7C14.11 To select the right respiratory protective equipment Fire and Rescue Services will have to take account of:

- the properties of any hazardous substances which could foreseeably be encountered
- the needs of the wearer
- the potential work tasks (eg rescue, leak sealing, decanting, decontamination systems etc)
- foreseeable workplace conditions.

7C14.12 When purchasing respiratory protective equipment, Fire and Rescue Services should consider the issue within their integrated risk management planning process. Within this they should consider their:

- hazardous materials response policy and procedure
• hazardous materials risk profile within their turn-out area (e.g., known hazardous materials sites/risks, transportation risks, transport routes etc)
• Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience commitments
• training and maintenance skills system.

7C14.13 Further information can be found in:
• HSG53 Respiratory protective equipment at work – A practical guide
  www.hse.gov.uk
• www.firebuy.gov.uk

Selecting respiratory protective equipment at emergency hazardous materials incidents

7C14.14 Personal protective equipment should only be used as a last line of protection to control the exposure of staff to hazardous materials. However, due to the dynamic, pressurised environment at emergency incidents, particularly in the initial stages when life may be endangered, it is highly likely that respiratory protective equipment will be required.

Respiratory protective equipment at HazMats incidents

At incidents (‘hot’ zone) where standard structural firefighting kit affords inadequate protection against hazardous materials and chemical protective clothing is required, breathing apparatus must always be worn. It should be noted that:

• There is the potential for increased air consumption and heat stress especially where physical activity and high ambient temperatures are involved
• Exposure time in the risk area may need to be limited to 20 minutes (breathing apparatus entry control to monitor)
• There may be implications for the level of breathing apparatus control, the application of the procedures and communications. In particular the Incident Commander will need to be aware of the potential early deployment of relief crews.

NOTE: The use of National Resilience powered respiratory protective suits may also be considered, subject to the correct application of the powered respirator protective suits ‘hot’ zone decision tool and scientific advice. The use of powered respirator protective suits will alleviate many of the limitations indicated above due to its longer working duration, however it should be noted that powered respirator protective suits are not suitable for all types of hazardous materials and gas tight suits with breathing apparatus remains the default level of protection.
The Incident Commander must ask the following questions:

**Is it essential for staff to be in a location where it is possible that hazardous materials may have been released?**

That is, do they need to enter the hazard zone or can the objectives be achieved without putting staff at risk? If the answer is “YES they must enter the hazard zone” then ask:

**Is the substance potentially hazardous?**

This is often difficult to assess this at emergencies particularly in the early stages of an incident. Incident Commanders must consider the full range of hazards, for example:

- very toxic
- toxic
- harmful
- corrosive
- flammable
- asbestos
- irritant
- carcinogen
- radioactive substance
- biological agent
- oxygen deficiency (eg confined spaces etc).

If the answer is “YES” or it is suspected that hazardous materials are involved then ask:

**Can the substance be inhaled?**

This depends on its physical form. Substances can exist as solids, liquids or gases. Under certain conditions, they can exist in more than one form at the same time (eg during paint spraying) and may be inhaled.

- Particulate solids include aerosols, dusts, fibres, smokes and fume:
  - Dusts and fibres are fine particles that are released into the air
  - Fumes are generated by vaporisation of solids and condensation into fine particles
  - Smokes are formed by the incomplete combustion of materials
– if the solid particulates are very fine, they can behave like gases and vapours and move with air currents. In this way, they can be transported quite a long way from the source of emission.

- Liquids can exist as droplets or as finer sprays, aerosols and mists in air or other gases/vapours

- Gases are like air and behave in the same way. Vapours are the gaseous forms of substances, which normally exist as a solid or liquid at room temperature. These are sometimes wrongly referred to as fumes. Also remember not all vapours will be visible (eg at liquid petroleum gas liquid spills the vapours may extend beyond the visible cloud).

**7C14.20** If the answer is “YES” then respiratory protective equipment is required.

**NOTE:** Additional personal protective equipment in the form of chemical protective clothing may also be required, further guidance on this is contained in 7C14.51.

**7C14.21** Full guidance on the process of selecting appropriate personal protective equipment, including respiratory protective equipment, at hazardous materials incidents is contained within the Generic Standard Operating Procedure in Part B of this guidance.

**Operational key principle**

**Default level of respiratory protective equipment at hazardous materials incidents**

The default level of respiratory protective equipment at hazardous materials incidents should be self-contained, positive pressure breathing apparatus. This should only be varied following a full risk assessment involving a hazardous materials adviser.

**7C14.22** For certain specific foreseeable operational scenarios which have respiratory inhalation hazards (eg glass management at road traffic collisions) Fire and Rescue Services may carry out risk assessments to develop standard operating procedures which vary the default level of respiratory protective equipment. Where this is done it must be incorporated into their operational training programme and their audit and review system.

**7C14.23** Further guidance on the selection of respiratory protective equipment is contained in HSG53 *Respiratory Protective Equipment at Work – A practical guide* (Health and Safety Executive).
Types of respiratory protective equipment

7C14.24 Respiratory protective equipment in the workplace is divided into two main types:

- Respirator (filtering device) – This uses filters to remove contaminants in the air. They should only be used at hazardous materials incidents following a full risk assessment and should never be used for protection in fire situations or where there is any possibility of reduced oxygen levels. They should always be subject to appropriate face-fit assessment.

- Breathing apparatus – This needs a supply of breathing quality air from an independent source (eg air cylinder or air compressor).

Respirators

7C14.25 Types of respirators:

- half mask, particle filters (includes disposable filtering face-piece or ‘dust mask’)
- half mask, gas filters
- full face mask, particle filters
- full face mask, gas filters
- powered (fan-assisted) masks
- powered (fan-assisted) hoods
- powered (fan-assisted) suits.

7C14.26 Types of filters:

- **Particle filters** – These trap and hold particles (dust, mist, fume, smoke, micro-organisms) from the air flowing through them. Large particles are easier to trap than small ones. These filters can be used against both solid particles and liquid mists and droplets. However, particle filters do not trap gases or vapours including organic liquid mists and sprays, or give any protection against oxygen-deficient atmospheres. Some manufacturers may recommend the use of pre-filters (coarse filters) to protect the main filters. Particle filters will be marked with a ‘P’ sign and filtration efficiency number, 1, 2 or 3. If the filter is also usable with fan-assisted respirators then they will also carry the sign ‘TH’ or ‘TM’ and the filtration efficiency number (1, 2 or 3). If colour coding is used, the label will be WHITE.

- **Gas/vapour filters** – These filters are designed to remove gases or vapours as specified by the manufacturer. They do not protect against particles, or oxygen-deficient atmospheres. They don’t last forever – these filters have a limited capacity for removing gases/vapours, so after a time, the gas or vapour will pass straight through (an event known as breakthrough) to the respiratory protective equipment wearer’s respiratory system. Gas/vapour
filters are usually divided according to the type of substance they can be used against, and the capacity of the filter. The filter or the mask it is built into will be marked with a letter (the type) and usually a number to indicate capacity, and a standard colour coding (eg A2 – brown). If the filter is also usable with powered respirators then they will also be marked ‘TH’ or ‘TM’.

**NOTE:** The capacity identification is not a good indicator of break through time of substances. Some substances can break through before the capacity of the filter is reached. This is due to the complications involved in trapping them. The classification of gas and vapour filters is based on how much of the specified contaminant they can hold in a laboratory test at set conditions.

- **Multi-gas filters** – A filter may be manufactured to contain filters for more than one type of gas or vapour. In this case, they will be marked with types of gas/vapour filters included (eg A1B2 – organic vapour with capacity class 1 and inorganic gases with capacity class 2). Warning: They are manufactured in this way to offer an easy choice for employers who are using different gases and vapours at their sites. They are more expensive to buy than single type filters, heavier, and harder to breathe through in use. If you use multi-type filters, you should take extreme care and be certain that the use of this filter against mixtures of gases/vapours (either at the same time or one after the other) will not result in exposure. Always seek clear instructions from the manufacturer on how this filter may be used safely in your workplace and on replacement intervals. If performance against mixtures of gases is needed, it may be safer to consider using breathing apparatus.

- **Combined filters** – Filters are available for situations where protection is needed against both particles and specific gas or vapour. This type of filter will carry markings for particles and vapours, eg A2P3 – organic vapour filter with capacity class 2 and high efficiency particle filter

Further information is contained in *HSG53 Respiratory Protective Equipment at Work – A practical guide and Standards for Personal Protective Equipment, OM 2009/03* ([www.hse.gov.uk](http://www.hse.gov.uk))

### Breathing apparatus

Further information on breathing apparatus is contained in:

- BS EN 137:2006 Respiratory protective devices. Self contained open circuit compressed air breathing apparatus with full-face mask. Requirements, testing and marking. (Type 2 firefighting).
- BS 8468:2006 Respiratory protective devices for use against CBRN agents.
• BS EN 136:1998 class 3 Face masks.
• BS 10999:1010 Specification for distress signal units for the Fire and Rescue Service.
• Standards for personal protective equipment, OM 2009/03 (Health and Safety Executive).
• Manual of Firemanship Book 6, Breathing apparatus and resuscitation.

* BS 8468 specifies performance requirements for respiratory protective devices intended to be used during firefighting, rescue, evacuation, escape, hazard containment, decontamination and similar activities by first responders, fire, ambulance, police and associated civilian agencies and workers, in areas containing and contaminated by CBRN(E) agents.

BS 8468 will be published in seven parts as follows:
Part 1: Positive pressure, self-contained breathing apparatus – Specification
Part 2: Negative pressure air purifying devices with full-face mask – Specification
Part 3: Escape hoods – Specification
Part 4: Powered air-purifying respirators – Specification
Part 5: Dual-mode apparatus – Specification
Part 6: Positive pressure compressed airline equipment – Specification
Part 7: Closed circuit breathing apparatus – Specification.

Self-contained breathing apparatus conforming to this standard might be suitable for use in situations other than those involving the specific CBRN(E) agents identified in the standard.

Self-contained breathing apparatus according to this standard shall be positive pressure equipment conforming to BS EN 137, and conforming to the inward leakage specified in this standard, and conforming to the chemical agent penetration and permeation resistance specified in standard. The face-piece shall conform to BS EN 136:1998 class 3.

Chemical protective clothing

Introduction

7C14.29 As the field of chemical protective clothing is one of constant development and change, with new materials and processes becoming available all the time, it is important to understand that the information provided should not be regarded as definitive but as the best available at this time.
Hazardous material incidents involve a wide range of conditions and uncertainty with a potentially wide range of known and unknown substances involved. Consequently the performance requirements for chemical protective clothing contained in the European standards for the Fire Service use are high, reflecting their special needs.

The chemical protective clothing necessary to provide satisfactory protection for hazardous materials incidents necessitates the consideration of a number of complex issues in both selection and use. It is essential therefore that this operational guidance be considered in conjunction with the latest relevant British and European standards together with information available from the manufacturers and/or suppliers of chemical protective clothing.

Standards and markings for protective clothing

Harmonised European Standards for personal protective equipment have been developed as the preferred means of demonstrating equipment conformity with the basic health and safety requirements (BHSRs) of the EC Personal Protective Equipment Directive (89/686/EEC). Only equipment which meets these BHSRs is entitled to carry the CE mark and to be sold for use in the EC.

The alternative route to obtaining the CE mark involves the manufacturer producing a ‘technical file’ for the equipment which also demonstrates that it satisfies the BHSRs. In such cases, the equipment will carry the CE mark but may not display any Standard number. The manufacturer’s information will contain the performance specification.

Increasingly, European Standards (prefixed EN – European Norm) are being superseded or subsumed by International Standards (prefixed ISO). Where these are adopted in the UK, they will also be issued as British Standards and be prefixed BS.

The British versions of standards (BS EN, BS ISO or BS EN ISO) may have minor differences from the original versions of the standard, usually in the form of a National Foreword or National Annex, to account for legislative or technical variations specific to the UK.

The following tables list the current standards applicable to the various areas of chemical protective clothing.
### Standards applicable to chemical protective clothing – hand protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and title</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 659:2003</strong> – Protective gloves for firefighters</td>
<td>(Suitable for EACs ‘S’, ‘T’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 374-3:2003</strong> – Protective gloves against chemicals and micro-organisms: Resistance to permeation by chemicals</td>
<td>Required by DCOL 2/1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 374-1:2003</strong> – Protective gloves against chemicals and micro-organisms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 455-1:2000</strong> – Medical gloves for single use – Part 1: Requirements and testing for freedom from holes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EN 455-2:2000</strong> – Medical gloves for single use – Part 2: Requirements and testing for physical properties</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EN 455-3:2006</strong> – Medical gloves for single use – Part 3: Requirements and testing for biological evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 374-2:2003</strong> – Protective gloves against chemicals and micro-organisms: Determination of resistance to penetration</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Standards applicable to chemical protective clothing – foot protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and title</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 13832-1:2006</strong> – Footwear protecting against chemicals – Part 1:Terminology and test methods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 13832-2:2006</strong> – Footwear protecting against chemicals – Part 2: Requirements for footwear resistant to chemicals under laboratory conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 13832-3:2006</strong> – Footwear protecting against chemicals – Part 3: Requirements for footwear highly resistant to chemicals under laboratory conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EN 15090:2006</strong> – Footwear for firefighters</td>
<td>F3 – Hazardous materials and structural firefighting – (Suitable for EACs ‘S’, ‘T’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’) (CH – marking for chemical resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home Office Specification A 29 and A30</strong></td>
<td>Suitable for EACs ‘S’, ‘T’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’, however, A30 Leather boots may not provide adequate chemical resistance and therefore caution should be exercised.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Standards applicable to chemical protective clothing – eye protection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and title</th>
<th>Markings:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EN 166:2002 – Personal eye protection</td>
<td>3 – resistant to liquid droplets (goggles), or liquid splashes (face shields, but not mesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– specifications</td>
<td>4 – resistant to coarse dust particles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 – resistant to gas and fine dust particles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 – resistant to molten metals and hot solids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G – resistant to radiant heat (EN 1731 face shields only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S – increased robustness (oculars only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F – high speed particles, low energy impact (any type)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B – high speed particles, medium energy impact (goggles and face shields only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A – high speed particles, high energy impact (face shields only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN 14458:2004 – Face shields and visors for firefighters, ambulance and emergency services</td>
<td><strong>NOTE</strong>: no chemical, dust or particulate protection criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number and title</td>
<td>Comments</td>
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</table>
| **BS 8467:2006** – Protective clothing – Personal protective ensembles for use against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents – Categorization, performance requirements and test methods (* see note 1 below this table) | Category of clothing:  
A – gas tight with breathable air supply  
B1 – high levels of vapour challenge  
B2 – high levels of mainly liquid challenge  
C – low levels without vapour hazard  
D – very low levels or risk of contact contamination |
| **EN 943-2:2002** – Protective clothing against liquid chemicals. Gas-tight (Type 1) chemical protective suits for emergency teams (ET) (NB this was developed with the emergency services in mind and has an increased range of chemical resistance) ** see note 2 below this table | Suitable for Additional Personal Protection codes 'A' and 'B'  
Type 1a-ET: Gas tight chemical protective clothing for use by emergency teams with a breathable air supply independent of the ambient atmosphere, eg a self-contained open-circuit compressed air breathing apparatus worn inside the clothing  
Type 1b-ET: Gas tight chemical protective clothing for use by emergency teams with a breathable air supply, eg a self-contained open-circuit compressed air breathing apparatus worn outside the clothing  
Limited use or reusable |
| EN 463:1995 Protective clothing – Protection against liquid chemicals: Test method. | Determination of resistance to penetration by a jet of liquid (jet test) |
| EN 464:1994 Protective clothing against liquid and gaseous chemicals, including aerosols and solid particles: Test method. | Determination of leak tightness of gas tight suits (internal pressure test) |
| EN 468:1995 Protective clothing against liquid chemicals. Test method. | Determination of resistance to penetration by spray (spray test) |
### Standards applicable to chemical protective clothing – body protection
(in addition to EN340: 2003 – general requirements for protective clothing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and title</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **BS 8428:2004** – Protective clothing against liquid chemicals. Chemical protective suits with liquid-tight connections between different parts of the clothing for emergency teams (type 3-ET equipment) | Suitable when the 2nd character of EAC = ‘P’, ‘R’, ‘W’ or ‘X’ plus either limited use or reusable  
**see note 2 below this table** |
| **EN 14605:2005** – Protective clothing against liquid chemicals. Performance requirements for chemical protective clothing with liquid tight (Type 3) or spray-tight (Type 4) connections, including items providing protection to parts of the body only (Types PB[3] and PB[4]) | Suitable when the 2nd character of EAC = ‘P’, ‘R’, ‘W’ or ‘X’ (Type 3 only)  
– Type 3 liquid tight connections for whole body  
– Type 4 spray tight connections for whole body  
– PB[3] liquid tight partial body protection  
– PB[4] spray tight partial body protection |
| **EN 943-1:2002** – Protective clothing against liquid chemicals. Ventilated and non-ventilated gas tight (Type 1) and non gas tight (Type 2) chemical protective suits which retain positive pressure to prevent ingress of dusts liquids and vapours | 1a gas tight with breathing apparatus inside  
1b gas tight with breathing apparatus outside  
1c gas tight air fed suit  
2 non gas tight air fed suit |
| **EN 13034:2005** – Protective clothing against liquid chemicals. Chemical protective clothing offering limited protection against liquid chemicals (type 6 and type PB [6] equipment) | Type 6 – full body  
Type PB[6] – partial body |
| **EN 13982-1:2004** – Protective clothing for use against solid particulates – Part 1: Performance requirements for chemical protective clothing providing protection to the full body against airborne solid particulates (type 5 clothing) | |
| **EN 14126:2003** – Protective clothing. Performance requirements and tests methods for protective clothing against infective agents | |
| **EN 469:2005** – Protective clothing for firefighters. Performance requirements for protective clothing for firefighting (Superseded EN 469:1995) | Additional requirements may be met for penetration by liquid chemicals  
**Suitable for EACs ‘S’, ‘T’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’ with SCBA**
### Standards applicable to chemical protective clothing – body protection
(in addition to EN340: 2003 – general requirements for protective clothing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and title</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EN 1073-1:1998 – Protective clothing against particulate radioactive contamination – Ventilated suits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN 1073-2:2002 – Protective clothing against particulate radioactive contamination – non-ventilated suits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS 7184:2001 Selection, use and maintenance of chemical protective clothing. Guidance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN ISO 13982-2:2004 Protective clothing for use against solid particulates.</td>
<td>Test method of determination of inward leakage of aerosols of fine particles into suits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO 13994:1998 Clothing for protection against liquid chemicals. Determination of the resistance of protective clothing materials to penetration by liquids under pressure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN 14325:2004 Protective clothing against chemicals. Test methods and performance classification of chemical protective clothing materials, seams, joins and assemblages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN 14786:2006 Protective clothing – Determination of resistance to penetration by sprayed liquid chemicals, emulsions and dispersions – Atomizer test</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR 15419:2006 Protective clothing – Guidelines for selection, use, care and maintenance of chemical protective clothing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note 1:

BS 8467 specifies performance requirements for personal protective ensembles intended to be used during rescue, evacuation, escape, hazard containment, decontamination and similar associated activities by first responders, fire, ambulance, police and associated civilian agencies and workers, for protection during CBRN(E) events.
This standard has been prepared using, wherever possible, existing British and European standards as a base in order to more easily facilitate both the availability of testing facilities and the CE marking process.

The standard covers a variety of ensembles intended to provide varying levels of protection from chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, selected biological warfare agents and contamination by radioactive particles. It is assumed that an equivalent amount of protection from radioactive particles will be provided as a result of the protection that is provided from chemical agents.

The standard does not cover ensembles intended to provide protection from ionizing radiation, ie beta and gamma radiation, and for which no currently available chemical protective clothing will offer protection. Ensembles conforming to this standard might be suitable for use in situations other than those involving the specific CBRN(E) agents identified in the standard. Information supplied by the ensemble suppliers or individual component manufacturers will indicate such additional possible performance applications.

Some typical anticipated environments and activities for which the various categories of ensemble could be used are also provided.

The standard identifies categories of ensembles, their associated performance requirements and test methods in order that ensembles can be categorised including both material specific requirements and whole ensemble testing.

The categories of ensemble have been selected based upon the anticipated activities expected to be undertaken by personnel, and the associated physiological demands, together with the knowledge of ensembles currently available.

**Note 2:**

British Standard BS 8428:2004, Protective clothing – Protection against liquid chemicals. – Performance requirements for chemical protective suits with liquid tight connections between different parts of the clothing for emergency teams (type 3-ET equipment,) may be considered complementary to BS EN 943-2:2002 which is for gas tight, Type 1 chemical protective suits for emergency teams.

However it should be recognised that unlike BS EN 943-2, BS 8428 is purely a British Standard, the European work on such a standard having been discontinued through lack of support. Hence BS 8428 does not carry the ‘presumption of conformity’ that comes with European Harmonised Standards whereby meeting the standard brings with it conformity with the Personal Protective Equipment Directive and the ability by the manufacturer to affix the CE mark.

Therefore Fire and Rescue Services should be aware that any manufacturer wishing to utilise BS 8428 to gain CE certification will have to incorporate the standard into their technical file for submission to their notified body for award of the CE mark.

Fire and Rescue Services wishing to procure either gas tight or liquid tight suits are urged to strongly consider the adoption of BS EN 943-2 or BS 8428 respectively into their own performance specifications.
### Types of chemical protective clothing designated under the standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description and pictogram</th>
<th>Types, standards and comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Gas tight                | BS EN 943: 2002 Protective clothing against liquid and gaseous chemicals, aerosols and solid particles  
                           | EN 464:1994, internal pressure test  
                           | Type 1 – Suits which are intrinsically sealed against the environment  
                           | Type 1a & 1aET – a suit with breathable air supply independent of the ambient atmosphere eg a self-contained open-circuit compressed air breathing apparatus worn inside suit (ET stands for emergency team and relates to firefighters)  
                           | Type 1b & 1bET – a suit with breathable air supply eg self-contained open-circuit compressed air breathing apparatus, worn outside the suit  
                           | BS EN 943:part 2 CPC (1aET and 1bET) satisfy APP codes ‘A’ and ‘B’ |
| Non gas tight            | BS EN 943: 2002 Protective clothing against liquid and gaseous chemicals, aerosols and solid particles  
                           | Suits which retain positive pressure to prevent ingress of dusts liquids and vapours  
<pre><code>                       | Type 2 – chemical protective suit with breathable air providing positive pressure |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description and pictogram</th>
<th>Types, standards and comments</th>
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</table>
| Liquid tight protective clothing against liquid chemicals                                  | BS 8428: 2004  
BS EN 14605: 2005 – Type 3  
EN463: 1994 – “Jet Test” – Determination of resistance to penetration by a jet of liquid  
Type 3 – liquid-tight connections, including items providing protection to parts of the body only Type PB (3)  
**BS 8428 and BS EN 14605 Type 3 CPC satisfies the EACs ‘P’, ‘R’, ‘W’ or ‘X’** |
| Spray tight protective clothing against liquid chemicals                                    | BS EN 14605: 2005 – Type 4  
EN468: 1995 – Spray test – Determination of resistance to penetration by spray  
Type 4 – spray tight connections, including items providing protection to parts of the body only Type PB (4) |
| Protective clothing for use against solid particulates                                     | BS EN ISO 13982-1 & 2: 2004  
Type 5 – chemical protective clothing providing protection to the full body against airborne solid particulates |
| Protective clothing offering limited protective performance against liquid chemicals       | BS EN 13034: 2005 / +A1 2009  
Type 6  
Type PB 6 (part body) |

**Materials of construction**

**7C14.37** The selection of materials and construction methods for chemical protective clothing is a complex process. The two most important performance criteria for materials are:

- Protective performance (e.g., chemical resistance, i.e., the ability to resist penetration and permeation by hazardous substances)
- ‘Wearability’ (i.e., all aspects of fit, mobility, comfort etc)
• Mechanical integrity (ie resistance to abrasion, puncture, etc to ensure safe working conditions and flexibility allowing the material to be assembled into a usable garment)

Performance standards

• Abrasion resistance – This requirement is to ensure that chemical protective clothing material achieving a particular class has a degree of abrasion resistance, depending on the intended use. Due to the arduous nature of chemical protective clothing in Fire Service use, the highest performance level is required.

• Stability to heat – This requirement indicates whether the chemical protective clothing material tends to ‘stick to itself’ when subjected to heat. Chemical protective clothing for Fire Service use shall have no blocking (ie shall not stick to itself) when heated. It is important that this test should not be confused with resistance to ignition.

• Flex cracking – This requirement is designed to reproduce the effect of the folding and creasing action of the suit due to bending down, movement of arms, etc. In addition, there is a requirement to pass a leak-tightness test.

• Flex cracking at low temperatures – A similar requirement to that for flex cracking, but in this case at temperatures of –30°C and –60°C. A leak-tightness test is carried out after the flex cracking test.

• Trapezoidal tear resistance – This requirement indicates the ability of the material to resist tearing, and is dependant on its structure and bonding.

• Burst resistance – This requirement is the ability of a material to resist a stretching force.

• Puncture resistance – The ability of a material to resist the penetration of a sharp object. If the suit is in use and has cuts in the material, any chemical travelling through such cuts or essential openings is said to have penetrated the suit.

• Resistance to ignition – This indicates the material’s resistance to ignition, for example if caught in a flash fire situation. For Fire Service use, the material is exposed to a flame for either 5 seconds or 1 second dependant on the performance level to be achieved. The flame should not burn for longer than 5 seconds, or it shall be self-extinguishing. This should be followed by a leak-tightness test.
Penetration – a physical process

7C14.38 Penetration is a process whereby liquid, gaseous or solid substances penetrate a fabric by passing through pores or holes.

7C14.39 The test for penetration by liquids (EN 6530/EN 368) comprises the material under test having a test sample of 10ml of chemical applied to it for an exposure time of ten minutes. This test rates the resistance of a fabric to permeation by a specified chemical in liquid form.

Penetration

Permeation

A molecular process, where molecules of the hazard pass through a fabric.

1. Absorption of molecules of liquid on to contact surface.
2. Diffusion of the absorbed molecules through material.
3. Disorption from the opposite surface.

7C14.41 Further details on the permeation test can be found by reference to EN ISO 6529/EN 369/EN 374-3.
Categories of material

7C14.42 The two most common categories of materials available are:

- Laminates/film composites – made up of a plastic film that is laminated on to a substrate (backing material).

* Laminated construction of Tychem TK

- Elastomeric – made up of rubber-based materials, such as Butyl, Neoprene, Viton, Hyperlon, and a combination of these coated on to a woven fabric.

Types of usage of chemical protective clothing

- **Reusable chemical protective clothing**
  Generally of elastomeric construction, reuse depends on the type of chemical or chemicals to which the chemical protective clothing has previously been exposed, the effectiveness of any decontamination process, and any possible subsequent degradation of the suit.

- **Limited life chemical protective clothing**
  Generally of laminated construction, provides protection for limited wear life, which is usually determined either by the requirement for repeated hygienic cleaning, or because chemical contamination has occurred.

7C14.43 As the name suggests ‘limited life suits’ have a shelf life advised by the manufacturer, beyond which they should normally be replaced. In certain circumstances the life of suits may be extended in consultation with the manufacturer providing appropriate conditions for storage, transportation, and periodic testing are met. An example of this is the procedures outlined for extending the shelf life of Tychem TK Limited Life Suits in *Fire Service Circular 25-2004*. 
Selection of chemical protective clothing

7C14.44 Chemical protective clothing should only be selected which has the ‘CE Mark’. When selecting clothing the user should have an awareness of the Personal Protective Equipment Regulations, the relevant European or draft European standards.

7C14.45 There are two main categories of chemical protective clothing currently in use in the Fire and Rescue Service:

- gas tight
- liquid tight.

7C14.46 For both categories it is recommended that a coverall design be used as this provides maximum protection to both the user and their breathing apparatus. In addition, the process of decontamination is usually carried out more effectively on coverall design.

7C14.47 It is further recommended that the performance requirements for the materials of liquid-tight chemical protective clothing are the same as for gas tight.

7C14.48 Also available is the choice of either reusable or limited use chemical protective clothing in both gas tight and liquid tight design.

- Gloves – Gloves should meet the requirements of BS EN 374-3 and selection should be made according to the hazard encountered. A dual glove system may afford the best protection. This normally consists of a laminated inner glove having good chemical resistance with an outer elastomeric glove affording protection against mechanical abuse as well as having some degree of chemical resistance.

  Ideally the gloves or combination of gloves should afford the same chemical and physical protection as the chemical protective clothing material.

  Where gloves are permanently joined to the suit, ie not interchangeable, assurance of their performance data, ie physical and chemical barrier properties, should be sought from the chemical protective clothing manufacturer or supplier.

  For exchangeable gloves, similar performance data, ie physical and chemical barrier properties, should be obtained from the glove manufacturer.

- Visors – The visor should be permanently fitted to the chemical protective clothing and should be large enough to afford a satisfactory field of vision. Consideration should be given to the fact that, potentially, the visor represents the weakest part of the clothing from the point of view of chemical resistance, and, therefore, unnecessarily large visors should be avoided. The visor should be tested in accordance with BS EN 146.6-7.
• **Pass-through** – A pass-through should be fitted to gas tight or liquid tight overall chemical protective clothing. Breathing apparatus connections require Certification of Conformity from the manufacturer. Reference should be made to BS EN 14594:2005. If chemical protective clothing is selected without a pass-through, risk assessments and standard operating procedures must be in place to address situations where wearers would need a pass-through (e.g., low air whilst awaiting decontamination etc).

• **Attachment point** – Where an attachment point for a personal line is required, the attachment point should withstand a pulling force of 1000N (Newtons). Any additional exterior attachment points should withstand a pulling force of 250 N.

7C14.49 There are many additional considerations that need to be taken into account when selecting chemical protective clothing. The following lists are not intended to be comprehensive and Fire and Rescue Services should consider other matters as necessary during their risk assessment as to the suitability of the clothing, depending upon the intended application.

**Practical aspects of chemical protective clothing evaluation**

- Is the chemical protective clothing a moderate or severe inducer of heat stress?
- Is the chemical protective clothing material flexible?
- Does the flexibility change with temperature?
- Can the chemical protective clothing accommodate different size wearers?
- Is the chemical protective clothing easy to handle?
- How well is visibility afforded?
- Can the chemical protective clothing accommodate a helmet or hard hat?
- How easy is donning and doffing?
- Does the wearer feel secure and mobile within the chemical protective clothing?

**Questions to ask the supplier**

- From which materials is the chemical protective clothing constructed?
- Are boots attached to the chemical protective clothing or can different size boots be worn?
- To what European standard is the chemical protective clothing manufactured?
- Are manufacturers’ claims supported by data from independent test houses?
- How much does the chemical protective clothing weigh?
- Does the manufacturer provide technical support?
• Is the manufacturer willing to repair/decontaminate damaged chemical protective clothing?
• Will the manufacturer guarantee the integrity of the chemical protective clothing after repair and decontamination?
• Is the manufacturer able to provide comprehensive data on chemical permeation?
• What is the recommended storage time for the chemical protective clothing – how should they be stored?
• How often are pressure tests/visual tests required?
• How does the material perform in specific risks or an incident involving complex mixtures of chemicals, for example pesticides?
• What are the methods of seaming? (Elastomeric materials usually require seaming by adhesives, stitching or curing). What tape material is used?
• How are exchangeable gloves, boots fitted? How easy is the operation of exchange?
• Does the garment provide uniform protection?
• Are the areas of potential mechanical failure minimised (ie seams, joints and interfaces)?
• Does the garment afford maximum comfort, fit and function to the user?
• What special equipment/tooling is required to make the chemical protective clothing functional? Type and amount of labour needed.
• What are the quality control practices of the manufacturer?
• Does the chemical protective clothing require any type of over covers (and why)?
• Can the manufacturer supply contactable references within emergency services?
• Does the manufacturer supply an after-sales service?
• Will the material/chemical protective clothing be of long term availability?
• How is the type of closure fitted?
• How easily are replacement parts available?
• What are the limitations in the manufacturers’ instructions for use?
• Where was the CE Mark obtained?
• Does the manufacturer provide a 24-hour emergency response service?
• What are the visual signs of degradation or fatigue of materials or component parts?
When you have asked all these questions and received satisfactory answers, you should be able to make direct comparison between different products.

Risk assessment

7C14.50 In establishing a policy of operational risk assessment, the following may be considered:

- How long is a chemical protective clothing to be worn? Maximum – minimum duration.
- Is gas tight or liquid tight protection required? Gas tight equipment can be a substitute for liquid-tight equipment, but not the other way round!
- What type of training is necessary?
- What cleaning facilities are available (as opposed to proper decontamination)?
- Are decontamination and after decontamination test facilities available?
- What storage/maintenance facilities are available?
- Is the chemical protective clothing intended for first-response or lengthy clean-up procedure?
- What chemical emergency risk assessments have been made?
- What limitations of use can be expected? Limited mechanical properties and limited chemical resistance properties.
- What fitments/equipment have to be obtained by the user? (Pass-through connections, pressure test kit, gloves, boots, additional over garments, anti-mist/cleaning products, etc)
- Are there site-specific risks?

Selecting chemical protective clothing at emergency hazardous materials incidents

7C14.51 Personal protective equipment should only be used as a last line of protection to control the exposure of staff to hazardous materials. Full guidance on the process of selecting appropriate personal protective equipment at hazardous materials incidents is contained within the generic standard operating procedure (G-SOP) in Part B of this guidance.

7C14.52 There are generally six basic factors that will determine the level and type of protection required by responding crews, which are as follows:

- Toxicity – via inhalation, ingestion or the dermal route
- Corrosiveness – from weak or strong concentrations of acids or alkalis
- Oxidation – where there is a reaction with organics producing heat and/or oxygen
• Temperature – where the substance is at an extreme of temperature hot or cold
• Biohazards – from pathogens and open cultures
• Radiation – (ionising) whether involving an unsealed source or not.

7C14.53 The choice of level of protection may be influenced by reference to the Emergency Action Code; by use of the Powered respirator protective suits ‘hot’ zone decision tool; or by direct access to Chemdata or other similar database.

7C14.54 Before making the final selection, an assessment of the incident should be made, adopting a risk-assessed approach, considering the following aspects:

• The nature of the task to be undertaken
• Whether in the open, or a confined space (eg inside a building)
• Does the substance meet the criteria of being a single substance at normal temperature and pressure? (The basis on which levels of protection are quoted.)
• Is the benefit of wearing chemical protective clothing outweighed by additional hazards presented, ie, fire, working at height, operating hydraulic tools, etc?
• The likelihood of contamination by direct contact with the substance and areas of the wearer most likely to be affected
• Is an immediate life saving action an option, and would the time taken to rig in chemical protective clothing impact on the potential success of that action?

NOTE: It should always be borne in mind that wearing more layers of protection does not always equate to a higher level of safety, and could be detrimental in some circumstances.

7C14.55 It should also be borne in mind that whilst wearing chemical protective clothing incorporating a respirator such as the powered respirator protective suit, constant monitoring for oxygen deficiency in an enclosed working environment should be undertaken.

Dangerous Goods Emergency Action Code List

7C14.56 To determine the level of personal protective equipment required at the initial response phase of an incident involving hazardous materials in a transport scenario, reference may be made to Emergency Action Codes, also known as Hazchem codes. Emergency Action Codes indicate to the emergency services actions that may be necessary, during the first few minutes of an incident involving dangerous goods, should the Incident Commander deem it necessary to take immediate actions.

• Where the 2nd character of the Emergency Action Code is S, T, Y or Z, structural firefighting kit – conforming to BS ENs 469, 659 and 15090) is appropriate with SCBA conforming to BS EN 137
• Emergency Action Code letters P, R, W and X indicate that chemical protective clothing with liquid tight connections for “whole body – Type3” (conforming to the relevant standards such as BS 8428 or BS EN 14605) should be used.

7C14.57 Additional Personal Protection Codes give emergency responders more information on appropriate levels of chemical protective clothing. These codes do not appear on vehicle placards or on Emergency Action Code Cards but are available in the Dangerous Goods Emergency Action Code List generally through mobilising controls or mobile data terminals.

7C14.58 The Additional Personal Protection Codes appear as either “A” or “B” on the list. For both “A” and “B” codes gas-tight chemical protective clothing should be worn conforming to BS EN 943; part 2.
Code letter “A” – structural firefighting kit* should be worn, as an additional protective layer, in addition to gas tight chemical protective clothing to protect against one or more of the hazards, indicated in the list by the appropriate character(s) below:

- **(c)** Liquefied gas with a boiling point below –20°C
- **(fg)** Flammable gas
- **(fl)** Flammable liquid
- **(cf)** Liquefied flammable gas with a boiling point below –20°C
- **(h)** The substance may be carried above 100°C
- **(co)** Oxidising gas with a boiling point below –20°C
- **(!)** The substance may have a particularly deleterious effect on chemical protective clothing

**NOTE:** It should be borne in mind that when directed to apply the Additional Personal Protection Code A, the most vulnerable areas of potential exposure will probably be the hands and feet. Appropriate hand protection relative to the particular hazard must be taken into consideration when conducting the risk assessment of any task to be undertaken. All hazards and control measures must be included in the briefing to the wearers.

Most firefighting gloves cannot be worn with gas tight suits. Even if crews are wearing gloves that meet the additional requirements of Additional Personal Protective Clothing Code “A”, they will still not be fully protected against the extremely low temperatures encountered with cryogenic substances.

Code letter “B” – Gas tight chemical protective clothing to be worn, in conjunction with self-contained breathing apparatus with no additional requirements.

**NOTE:** The structural firefighting kit referred to in code A is specified as tunic and over trousers conforming to BS EN 469, fire fighters gloves conforming to BS EN 659, and fire fighters boots conforming to BS EN 15090 or Home Office Specification. A29 (rubber boots) or A30 (NOTE: Leather boots may not provide adequate chemical resistance and therefore caution should be exercised.

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**Using chemical protective clothing at hazardous materials incidents**

**7C14.59** The use of chemical protective clothing at an incident must be carefully monitored as wearing the suit can create hazards. Chemical protective clothing crew members have been known to suffer from heat, physical, and psychological stress. The potential for heat stress is increased in staff who:
• have suffered a recent illness (especially vomiting or diarrhoea)
• are suffering from sunburn
• have taken medication that could affect their fluid balance
• are suffering from the after-effects of alcohol consumption.

7C14.60 To avoid excessive heat stress in chemical protective clothing a maximum working period of 20 minutes should be considered. This may be extended by the agreement of the Incident Commander and the wearer. If a wearer displays any symptoms of heat stress such as dizziness, nausea, abdominal discomfort, burning sensation to the skin, dilation of the pupils or possible disorientation, they should be withdrawn immediately.

DRESSING/DISROBING PROCEDURE
7C14.61 It is important that correct dressing and disrobing procedures be adopted at all times to ensure the appropriate level of protection and combined safety and welfare of the wearer.

7C14.62 Examples of dressing/disrobing procedures are outlined in the National Resilience Assurance Team guidance issued for chemical protective clothing provided for Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience. An example safe undressing procedure for gas tight chemical protective clothing conforming to BS EN 943; part 2 is contained in section 15 Decontamination, of Part B of this operational guidance.

CLOTHING UNDER CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
7C14.63 Head protection in the form of a fire helmet or bump hat should always be considered. The level of clothing worn beneath a chemical protection suit should be determined following a risk assessment, which should consider the hazards presented by the substance and environment, task to be undertaken, extremes of temperature (hot or cold) and the potential for heat stress.

WEARING CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE CLOTHING IN FLAMMABLE OR EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES
7C14.64 The rubbing action of synthetic materials used in chemical protective clothing against skin or under garments will cause the build up of electrostatic charge on the fabric. The dissipation of this charge via a spark has the potential to ignite a flammable atmosphere or cause an explosion. In circumstances where the relative humidity is below 25 per cent the likelihood is increased.

7C14.65 For this reason, manufacturers of some chemical protective clothing state that their fabric does not have an anti-static treatment, and should not be used in potentially flammable or explosive environments. Fire and Rescue Services should be aware of any such limitations imposed by manufacturers of their chemical protective clothing. In exceptional circumstances (ie imminent loss of life) where chemical protective clothing has to be worn in flammable or explosive environments, wetting the suit before entry will promote conduction of any electrical charge to ground and reduce electrostatic build up.
Other types of chemical protective clothing

7C14.66 In a potential or identified chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRN(E)) or mass decontamination incident, additional forms of chemical protective clothing might be encountered, which could include the following:

POWERED RESPIRATOR PROTECTIVE SUIT

7C14.67 These suits are for use within the ‘warm zone’ at mass decontamination incidents, and are designed to address some of the limitations of gas-tight suits, such as the working duration of a breathing apparatus set, and physiological effects. From June 2012 they may be used within the ‘hot zone at CBRN(E) and hazardous materials incidents subject to a rigorous risk assessment and implementation of strict operating procedures and control measures.

A full description of powered respirator protective suits, operational procedures and storage arrangements can be found in the National Resilience Powered Respirator Protective Suits Manual V2.0 and the Powered Respirator Protective Suits Hot Zone Standard Operating Procedure.

CR1 CHEMICAL PROTECTIVE SUIT

7C14.69 This suit evolved as a result of extensive joint trials on behalf of the Police and Fire Service to provide a second generation of chemical protective clothing to meet the needs of both services at a CBRN(E) incident. The evaluation concept was a suit that could give a working duration of up to two hours within the warm zone, with the ability for the wearer to take on refreshment without compromising the level of protection provided.

The CR1 ensemble has been adopted by the Police Service for CBRN(E) incidents but has yet to find an established role within the Fire Service.
The ‘Swift Responder’ 3 suit has evolved as a result of a requirement to have a personal protective equipment that can be donned in under five minutes.

The SR3 ‘Quick Don’ is a single layer suit manufactured from a high performance lightweight material developed by Du Pont and WL Gore that provides the same level of CBRN protection as the CR1, and like the CR1 is coupled with the Avon respirator to form the complete ensemble. The SR3 ‘Quick Don’ has been supplied to all Police Services within the UK to complement the existing CR1 suits.
PART C–15
Decontamination

General information

Introduction

7C15.1 This section sets out the various types of decontamination systems and procedures that might be employed at hazardous materials incidents. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 much research and development has taken place into chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives CBRN(E) decontamination and it is important to ensure that this work is used to enhance the safety and efficiency of decontamination at conventional hazardous materials incidents where it is appropriate to do so. This operational guidance takes into account the variations between Fire and Rescue Services in the circumstances affecting the rapid provision of full decontamination facilities. Such as the size of the turn-out area, the integrated risk management plan and other geographical features.

7C15.2 Where ever possible reference will be made to some of the tactics, procedures and equipment developed by the Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience programme for CBRN(E) response. This will ensure that all Fire and Rescue Service inter-operability is maintained and all Fire and Rescue Services work to the same principles and definitions. This guidance supersedes all previously issued information including Fire Service Circulars 8/1976 and 10/1981, and the Manual of Firemanship, practical firemanship II, Book 12 part 2. Separate guidance should be read in conjunction with this note for CBRN(E) specific incidents (eg Operational and Tactical and Strategic Guidance Documents, Fire and Rescue Service Response to CBRN(E) Events).

Definitions

7C15.3 It is important that all Fire and Rescue Services adopt common terminology and definitions to improve inter-operability and safety at all hazardous materials incidents whether they are conventional or CBRN(E).

Exposure

7C15.4 Exposure occurs when a harmful substance

- enters the body through a route, for example, inhalation, ingestion, absorption or injection, or

- when the body is irradiated
NOTE: Exposure does not automatically mean you are contaminated.

Contamination

7C15.5 Contamination occurs when a substance adheres or is deposited on people, equipment or the environment, thereby, creating a risk of exposure and possible injury or harm.

NOTE: Contamination does not automatically lead to exposure but may do.

7C15.6 Alpha, beta and gamma emissions in themselves cannot cause contamination, although the actual source materials may be able to depending on their physical properties and their containment.

Cross contamination

7C15.7 Cross contamination occurs when a person who is already contaminated makes contact with a person or object that is not contaminated.

Operational key principle

Decontamination

Decontamination is the physical and/or chemical process of reducing contamination to minimise the risk of further harm occurring and to minimise the risk of cross contamination.

Firefighter decontamination (primary decontamination)

7C15.8 Firefighter decontamination is the use of equipment in a planned and structured manner on the incident ground to minimise the risk of further harm occurring and cross contamination to a level as low as reasonably practicable. This is primary decontamination to minimise risk, carried out on-site.

7C15.9 Firefighter decontamination is divided into two levels:

- Initial decontamination – the decontamination of firefighters using equipment that is immediately available on a pumping appliance. It should be used in all cases where unforeseen contamination of firefighters has occurred or; where there is an immediate life risk or; where, at a minor incident, the hazards posed by the substance can be adequately controlled by the procedures.

NOTE: In all cases the Incident Commander must carry out a risk assessment and remember that initial decontamination is intended as a first-aid measure and not a substitute for the provision of full decontamination.
• Full decontamination – the decontamination of firefighters using decontamination equipment, structured procedures and staff who have been trained fully in its use.

7C15.10 Fire and Rescue Service’s should also have an ‘emergency decontamination’ procedure as an additional control measure for exceptional circumstances such as a break down of personal protective equipment (eg ripped chemical protective clothing, breathing apparatus malfunction, injured wearer etc). The decontamination procedures to be adopted in such circumstances should be adapted from the principles and procedures detailed in this section.

Secondary decontamination

7C15.11 Further off-site decontamination which may involve washing, scrubbing, thermal treatment and airing. This may render the chemical protective clothing clean to visual inspection but does not necessarily assure the complete removal of the contaminant (depending upon the nature of the contaminant). Accurate assessment of the degree of any remaining contamination of clothing or equipment should be made by competent persons.

Decontamination area

7C15.12 This is the area containing the Fire and Rescue Service (and possibly other emergency services’) decontamination staff, equipment and structures. It is a suitable area initially established outside the inner cordon, at first uncontaminated by the initial release, which becomes contaminated by the managed and controlled movement of people who require decontamination. Prior to decontamination commencing, the inner cordon will be adjusted to encompass the decontamination area.

7C15.13 The decontamination area should always be divided into ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ areas to minimise cross-contamination. Additionally disrobing and re-robing areas may be designated.
**Decontamination area**

**Mass decontamination**

*7C15.14* Mass decontamination is the planned and structured procedure delivered by the Fire and Rescue Service using purpose designed decontamination equipment where there are large numbers of contaminated casualties.

**Improvised decontamination**

*7C15.15* Improvised decontamination is the use of an immediately available method of decontaminating members of the public prior to the use of specialist resources (eg removal of clothing, rinsing or washing using on-site facilities etc).

**Interim decontamination**

*7C15.16* Interim decontamination is the use of standard equipment to provide a planned and structured decontamination process for large numbers of the public prior to the availability of purpose designed decontamination equipment (eg Fire and Rescue Service hose reels etc).

**Clinical decontamination**

*7C15.17* Clinical decontamination is the process where contaminated casualties are treated individually by trained healthcare professionals using purpose designed decontamination equipment.
Concepts of contamination

7C15.18 The process of decontamination involves the physical and/or chemical reduction or neutralisation of contaminants from staff and equipment. The process is vital to reduce the potential of transferring contaminants beyond the hazard zone and exposing people to harm from the hazardous materials.

7C15.19 The four basic concepts of contamination are:

- avoid contamination, prevent exposure
- surface contamination versus permeation contamination
- direct contamination versus cross contamination
- types of contaminants.

Avoid contamination, prevent exposure

Operational key principle

Avoid contamination
The best method of decontamination is to avoid contamination. If you don’t get the hazardous materials on you, you can’t be exposed to its harmful properties! (EXCEPTION: Gamma radiation)

Safe systems of work to prevent or minimise contamination should be part of every Fire and Rescue Service’s standard operating procedure for hazardous materials incidents.

7C15.20 A firefighter who has been contaminated when wearing personal protective equipment has not necessarily been exposed. For example, breathing apparatus wearers can be contaminated with asbestos particulates on the outside of their
personal protective equipment without having their respiratory system exposed to the contaminant. In order for exposure they must breathe in the particulates through a breach or failure of their breathing apparatus.

7C15.21 Even if a contaminant makes direct contact with a firefighter inside their personal protective equipment, it still does not necessarily mean they will be harmed by the contaminant. Remember harm depends on the dose, route of exposure and the hazards and properties of the contaminant.

7C15.22 Although exposure can occur through a breach or failure of personal protective equipment the most common cause is poor decontamination. Decontamination is a critical control measure at hazardous materials incidents. Fire and Rescue Services should place great emphasis on developing and implementing a well-planned, structured and disciplined approach to decontamination operations. This must be supported by an appropriate training and auditing programme.

7C15.23 If contact with the contaminant is controlled, the risk of exposure is reduced and the need for decontamination can be minimised. To avoid contamination consider the following basic principles:

- Stay up wind and up-hill/slope where possible
- No eating or smoking on-site, and strictly control hygiene where drinking/hydration is provided
- Cover any open wounds
- Staff should refrain from bringing their hands into contact with their face/mouth whilst on-site
- Emphasise work practices that minimise contact with hazardous materials
- Avoid direct contact with hazardous materials wherever possible
- Do not walk through areas of obvious contamination and stay out of areas that potentially contain hazardous materials. Special care should be taken to avoid slips, trips and falls into contaminants
- Do not kneel in contaminants
- If contact is made with a contaminant, move contaminated staff to the decontamination holding area and remove/reduce the contaminant as soon as possible. Generally the longer hazardous materials are in contact with personal protective equipment/staff/equipment the more harm can be done
- Keep the wearers’ respiratory protective equipment on as long as possible during the decontamination process
- Use of limited use or disposable chemical protective clothing can significantly reduce the decontamination requirements and mitigate permeation or matrix contamination
- Use a systematic approach to decontamination, don’t make it up as you go!
Surface contamination versus permeation contamination

7C15.24 Contaminants can present risks in any physical state (ie gas, liquid or solid). There are two general types of contamination:

- **Surface contaminants** – are found on the outer layer of a material but have not been absorbed into the material. Surface contaminants are usually easy to detect and remove to a reasonably achievable and safe level using Firefighter decontamination procedures (eg dusts, powders, fibres etc).

- **Permeation contaminants** – are absorbed into a material at the molecular level. Permeated contaminants are often difficult or impossible to detect and remove. If the contaminants are not removed they may continue to permeate through the material. Permeation through chemical protective clothing could cause exposure inside the suit. N.B. permeation can occur with any porous material not just personal protective equipment. Factors that influence permeation include:
  - **Contact time**, the longer a contaminant is in contact with an object, the greater the probability and extent of permeation
  - **Concentration**, molecules of the contaminant with flow from areas of high concentration to areas of low concentration. Generally, the greater the concentration, the greater the potential for permeation to occur
  - **Temperature**, increased temperatures generally increase the rate of permeation. Conversely lower temperatures will generally slow down the rate of permeation
  - **Physical state**, generally gases, vapours and low-viscosity liquids tend to permeate more readily than high viscosity liquids or solids.

**NOTE:** A single contaminant can present both a surface and a permeation threat, this is especially the case with liquids.

Direct contamination versus cross contamination

7C15.25 Direct contamination occurs when a person comes into direct physical contact with a contaminant or when a person comes into contact with any object that has the contaminant on it. Direct contamination usually occurs when working in the ‘hot’ zone but can occur during the decontamination process. Gloves and boots are the most common areas that get contaminated.

7C15.26 Cross, or secondary, contamination occurs when a person who is already contaminated makes contact with a person or object that is not contaminated. It is typically the result of poor site management and cordon control; inadequate decontamination and site safety procedures; or failure to follow safety procedures. Cross contamination is a greater risk when dealing with liquids and solids. It can go on and on, spreading from one person to the next as they touch. This is why it is so important to confine contaminated people and separate the “dirty from the clean”.
Types of contaminants

The more that is known about the contaminant the faster and more focused the decontamination operation can be. The types of contaminants can be divided into categories based on their primary hazards. These include the following:

- **Highly acute toxicity** contaminants can cause damage to the human body as a result of a single or short duration exposure. These can be found in solid, liquid or gas forms and will present risks to firefighters from any route of exposure (e.g., chlorine, potassium cyanide etc).

- **Moderate to highly chronic toxicity** contaminants, repeated exposure over time to these substances can cause damage to target internal organs, or the onset of debilitating injuries. These can be found in solid, liquid or gas forms and will present risks to firefighters from any route of exposure (e.g., certain heavy metals, mercury, benzene etc).

- **Teratogens or embryotoxic** contaminants, these are substances that can act during pregnancy to cause adverse effects on the foetus. The period of greatest susceptibility is the first 8 to 12 weeks of pregnancy. This includes the period when female firefighters may not know they are pregnant, therefore, special precautions must be taken at all times (e.g., lead compounds, ethylene oxide, formamide etc).

- **Allergenic** contaminants are substances that produce skin and respiratory hypersensitivity. Firefighters are at risk from allergens from both inhalation and direct skin contact. Two people exposed to the same allergen at the same level may react differently (e.g., chromium, formaldehyde, isocyanates etc).

- **Flammable** contaminants are substances that readily ignite or burn in air and are persistent (i.e., they hang around and can “stick” to personal protective equipment). Although most are liquids some flammable solids and gases will also present hazards especially when confined (i.e., indoors etc). Always expect flammables to present more than one contamination problem. Examples – petrol, acetone, benzene, ethanol etc.

- **Highly reactive or explosive** contaminants can react with the oxygen present, others are heat, shock and friction sensitive. The concentration of these contaminates plays an important role in determining the risk involved in decontamination. For example, hydrogen peroxide below 30 per cent concentration presents no serious fire or explosion hazard. However above 52 per cent hazards increase. It is also important to recognise that evaporation and distillation of these materials can cause high risk scenarios. Metal tools such as spatulas and shovels should not be used to clean up peroxides contaminants because metal contamination can lead to explosive decomposition. Obviously firefighters should avoid friction, grinding and other forms of impact.
• **Water reactive** contaminants that react on contact with water or moisture. In many cases, where the amount of the substance deposited on firefighters’ personal protective equipment in minimal, decontamination with copious amounts of water will still be an effective method.

• **Etiologic or biological** contaminants are micro-organisms such as viruses, fungi and bacteria. They can cause illness, disease and death. They can enter the body through inhalation, ingestion and direct contact. They are not always labelled clearly and on-site detection techniques and equipment may be limited. Fortunately, most biological contaminants are relatively easy to kill using a wide variety of commercially available decontamination solutions. These are divided into disinfectants and antiseptics.

• **Radioactive** contaminants include some isotopes and radioactive nuclides in the form of a very fine dust or powder. Radioactive contamination can only occur if the radioactive material is unsealed. Unsealed, non-shielded materials pose significant hazards to responders if they enter the body and expose its tissues and organs to irradiation. The physical form of the unsealed material will dictate the type of chemical protective clothing required. Generally, water should not be used to decontaminate wearers as it will spread the contamination and also may also make it more difficult for radiation detection and monitoring equipment to detect areas of contamination. The exception to this is mass decontamination because the large numbers of people involved. For mass decontamination the risk assessment may dictate that full disrobing and wet shower decontamination is most appropriate for the circumstances. Sealed sources may present an exposure risk to responders (i.e. irradiation) but they cannot cause contamination. Cordon control and monitoring using radiation survey and contamination meters is essential (NOTE: Time-distance-shielding) but decontamination will not be necessary unless there is a risk of damage to the source’s form of containment. Further information is contained in Section 7 Part C-10 *Radioactive materials*.

**NOTE:** Beware of contaminants that have multiple hazards.

### Decontamination methods

7C15.28 There is no universal decontamination method that will work for every hazardous materials incident. Different decontamination methods will be required for chemical, radioactive and biological contamination. Chemical decontamination for instance may involve mass dilution, whereas minimal quantities of water should generally be utilised for biological and radioactive contamination. Having said that decontamination methods may vary, the general framework of procedures and the structure of Firefighter Decontamination should not. It is vital that operational staff are completely familiar with their set-ups and standard operating procedures. These should be flexible enough to allow for variations in the methods and scale of decontamination. Examples of good practice are detailed in the Chapter 16 of this section.
Physical decontamination

Decontamination methods can be divided into two basic categories:

- **Physical methods** – generally involve physically removing the contaminant from the contaminated person or object. Whilst these methods are often easier to perform and may dilute the contaminant’s concentration (i.e., reducing its harmful effects) it generally remains chemically unchanged.

- **Chemical methods** – generally involve removing the contaminant by some type of chemical process.

**NOTE:** Some methods may introduce other hazards into the process.

Environmental considerations

The Environment Agency should be notified at the earliest opportunity that decontamination is taking place, with details of the contaminant involved and method of decontamination. The default option should be to contain the contaminated decontamination run-off until Environment Agency liaison has taken place.

Physical decontamination

- **Absorption** – is the process of soaking up a liquid hazardous material to prevent enlargement of a contaminated area. It is primarily used in decontamination for wiping off personal protective equipment, respiratory protective equipment, chemical protective clothing, and other equipment using sponges, absorbent pads, towels, or disposable cloths. Contaminants in absorbents remain chemically unchanged. Absorbent materials should be inert or have no active properties.
• **Adsorption** – is the process of a contaminant adhering to the surface of another material. The adhesion takes place in an extremely thin layer of molecules between the contaminant and the adsorbent. It is primarily used for the clean up of equipment or an area (e.g., silica, fuller’s earth etc.). In some cases adsorption can produce heat and can cause spontaneous combustion.

• **Brushing or scraping** – basically involves using physical movement to remove a contaminant. It can be used for the decontamination of personal protective equipment, respiratory protective equipment, chemical protective clothing and other equipment in both dry decontamination and wet decontamination operations using liquid decontamination solutions. The object should be remove as much of the gross contamination as possible before moving on to further decontamination processes or safe undressing (e.g., contaminated dirt and mud should be scraped off of boots before entering decontamination showers etc.).

• **Dilution/washing** – is the use of cold or warm water or soap and water solutions to flush the hazardous materials from protective clothing and equipment. The use of detergent or soap takes advantage of the surfactant properties and works well on oils, greases, polar solvents, dirt, grime, powders etc. Dilution/washing using detergents is the most commonly used method for decontaminating firefighters.

• **Freezing** – has limited use at emergency incidents but is used by clean-up contractors to solidify runny or sticky liquids into a solid so that it can be scraped or flaked up.

• **Heating** – usually involves the use of high temperature steam in conjunction with high pressure water jets to heat up and blast away the contaminant. It is primarily used for the decontamination of vehicles, structures and equipment.

  **NOTE:** Heating techniques should not be used to decontaminate chemical protective clothing or people.

• **Isolation and dispersal** – is a form of dry decontamination and is a two step process that does involve the use of any water or decontamination solution. Firstly contaminated articles are removed and isolated in a designated area where they are then bagged and tagged. Secondly the bags are packaged in a suitable transportation container and taken to an approved hazardous waste facility.

  **NOTE:** Any form of dry decontamination carries the increased risk of cross contamination when the decontamination operatives assist with the removal of chemical protective clothing from wearers.

• **Pressurised air** – may be used to blow dusts and liquids from hard-to-reach places in equipment and structures. It should never be used for firefighter decontamination because pressurised air on skin may result in fatal embolisms. A secondary hazard of this method is the aerosolisation of the hazardous materials.
• **Vacuuming** – involves the use of vacuums to collect a contaminant. This method is primarily used to decontaminate structures and equipment and it can be used on a range of contaminants including asbestos, hazardous dusts, fine powders etc. The vacuum must be designed and approved for the specific application. High efficiency particulate air vacuums should be used for personal decontamination of hazardous dusts and fibres (eg asbestos). High efficiency particulate air filters physically capture the contaminant but must be replaced frequently.

**NOTE:** The use of high efficiency particulate air vacuums in fire related incidents may not be effective due to the amount of wet personal protective equipment, respiratory protective equipment and chemical protective clothing.

• **Evaporation** – is simply allowing a contaminant to evaporate or gas-off particularly useful if the vapours do not present a hazard. Its effectiveness can be limited when dealing with porous surfaces and large quantities of materials.

**Chemical methods**

• **Chemical degradation** – is the process of altering the chemical structure of the contaminant through the use of a second chemical or material. Commonly used degradation agents include calcium hypochlorite bleach, sodium hypochlorite bleach, sodium hydroxide (household drain cleaner), sodium carbonate slurry (washing soda), calcium oxide slurry (lime) etc. Chemical degradation is primarily used to decontaminate structures, vehicles and equipment and should not be used on chemical protective clothing. They should never be applied directly to the skin. Technical advice must be obtained from product specialists to ensure that the solution used is not reactive with the contaminant.

• **Neutralisation** – is the process used on corrosives to bring the pH of the final solution to somewhere within the range of pH 5 to pH 9. The neutralisation process uses an acid to neutralise alkalis or vice versa. Preferably, the less harmful by-product produced is a neutral or biodegradable salt. It is primarily used to decontaminate structures, vehicles and equipment that are contaminated with a corrosive material.

• **Solidification** – is a process by which a contaminant physically or chemically bonds to another object or is encapsulated by it. This method is primarily used to decontaminate equipment and vehicles. Commercially available solidification products can be used for the clean-up of spills.

• **Disinfection** – is the process used to inactivate virtually all recognised pathogenic micro-organisms. Proper disinfection results in a reduction in the number of viable organisms to some acceptable level. It does not cause complete destruction of the micro-organism you are trying to remove.
Consequently, it is important that firefighters obtain technical advice about disinfection techniques prior to their use. There are two major categories of disinfectants:

- chemical disinfectants, the most practical for on-site operations
- antiseptic disinfectants are designed primarily for direct application to the skin.

**Sterilisation** – is the process of destroying all microorganisms in or on an object. Because of the size of the equipment needed to carry out this form of decontamination it has limited emergency use and cannot be used on operational staff. Emergency response equipment may be sterilised through autoclaving but the ability for the item to withstand this process must be confirmed by the manufacturer.

**NOTE:** In 1995 the Home Office Fire and Research and Development Group carried out research into the effectiveness of various methods of decontamination used by Fire and Rescue Services. It was decided to carry out trials using the three following types of chemical protective clothing:

- a non-coverall (breathing apparatus outside) chemical protection suit, made of poly vinyl chloride (PVC)
- a coverall suit, made of neoprene
- a gas-tight suit made of hyperlon/neoprene.

A shortened summary of the effectiveness of various decontamination methods can be seen in the table below. The shower system tested in these trials was of the mass dilution type.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method summary</th>
<th>Overall average reduction (1–8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong detergent scrub and shower</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot detergent scrub and shower</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub with detergent then hose reel</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub with detergent then shower – not rubbing</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosereel only – rubbing</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car wash brush with detergent</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car wash brush – no detergent</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shower – rubbing – no detergent</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shower – no rubbing, no detergent</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** A score of 8 represents the complete removal of containment. All methods cleaned the suits well enough to remove the wearers from them.
It was found that:

- none of the decontamination methods used were completely successful in removing all the contaminant but some methods were found to be more successful than others
- generally methods that used some form of scrubbing with detergent gave a greater degree of decontamination
- methods which used hose reels or main jet/spray branches out-performed the portable shower units, when used alone
- vacuum cleaners appeared to be relatively ineffective against dry powder contaminants.

The Group recommended that after primary decontamination (ie firefighter decontamination on-site) has been effected, Fire and Rescue Services should consider whether any further action is necessary before a used suit is returned to operational service. This will depend on the chemical encountered and the degree of contamination. Appropriate records, including the nature of contaminants, should be kept. For further information see DCOL 8/1995 Item D and CFBAC Research Report No. 63.

Firefighter decontamination

Introduction

Firefighter decontamination is the use of equipment in a planned and structured manner on the incident ground to minimise the risk of further harm occurring and cross contamination to a level as low as reasonably practicable. This the ‘primary decontamination’ and is carried out on-site.

However, it should be recognised that at some incidents the nature or the extent of the contamination may be such that adequate decontamination is beyond the resources of the Fire and Rescue Service and requires specialist treatment. This is the ‘secondary decontamination’.

Fire and Rescue Service firefighter decontamination procedures should aim to:

- minimise the risk of people being exposed to contaminants
- enable responders to remove contaminated clothing, personal protective equipment and respiratory protective equipment without being exposed to hazardous materials
- stop hazardous materials being spread beyond the decontamination area.
Firefighter decontamination (primary decontamination)

The success of decontamination depends on the strict observance of a disciplined procedure within the defined area.

Firefighter decontamination should be set-up prior to crews being committed to the hazard zone.

Selection of the level of decontamination

7C15.36 Firefighter decontamination (primary decontamination) is divided into two levels:

- **Initial decontamination** – is the decontamination of firefighters using equipment that is immediately available on a pumping appliance. It should be used in all cases where unforeseen contamination of firefighters has occurred or; where there is an immediate life risk or; where, at a minor incident, the hazards posed by the substance can be adequately controlled by the procedures.

  **NOTE:** In all cases the Incident Commander must carry out a risk assessment and remember that initial decontamination is intended as a first-aid measure and not a substitute for the provision of full decontamination.

- **Full decontamination** – is the decontamination of firefighters on-site using decontamination equipment, structured procedures and staff who have been trained fully in its use.

7C15.37 Both levels of firefighter decontamination usually involve two processes. Firstly:

- contamination reduction, and then
- safe undressing.

7C15.38 The level of decontamination chosen will be based on the:

- nature of the contamination
- degree of contamination
- type of protective clothing worn
- method of decontamination
- life risk and urgency to intervene.
Positioning of the decontamination area

7C15.39 The factors that will influence the positioning of the decontamination area are the:

- operational circumstances and risk assessment
- level and method of decontamination
- weather conditions
- wind direction (see photos of improvised ‘wind socks’ below)
- slope of the ground
- location of drains, watercourses etc (or their absence)
- position of the inner cordon and ‘hot’ zone
- location of breathing apparatus entry control
- location of a pumping appliance
- welfare of staff.

Decontamination system

7C15.40 The following is a generic Fire and Rescue Service decontamination system. It is a good practice model which should be considered at every hazardous materials incident irrespective of the level of decontamination selected. Elements of it may not be necessary depending on the operational circumstances.
## Generic decontamination system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Considerations for initial decontamination</th>
<th>Considerations for full decontamination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Position the decontamination area</td>
<td>See paragraph 7C15.39 above</td>
<td>See paragraph 7C15.39 above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brief wearers (and operatives if applicable)</td>
<td>Hazards</td>
<td>As for initial decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Avoid contamination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimise contact and note areas of contact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Safe path to decontamination area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decontamination method – make sure they know what to do!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Remove personal items form pockets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Set-out the decontamination area</td>
<td>See photos below under Initial decontamination procedure 7C15.43</td>
<td>See diagrams below 7C15.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Drop tools</td>
<td>Designate an area</td>
<td>Position a suitable sealable container or bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brief wearers</td>
<td>Brief and instruct wearers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Remove or reduce contamination</td>
<td>Before starting check for breaches of personal protective equipment and personal exposure</td>
<td>Before starting check for breaches of personal protective equipment and personal exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(from external surfaces or layers of personal protective equipment)</td>
<td>Likely to be a single stage Eg hose reel spray</td>
<td>Wearers assisted by decontamination operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likely to be self or “buddy” operated procedure</td>
<td>Consider MD4 unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wipe chemical protective clothing zips, personal protective equipment joins and respiratory protective equipment seals</td>
<td>Multiple methods / steps? eg procedure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– remove gross contamination eg boots and gloves</td>
<td>– remove gross contamination eg boots and gloves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– rinse</td>
<td>– rinse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– wash</td>
<td>– wash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– scrub</td>
<td>– scrub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– rinse</td>
<td>– rinse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Considerations for initial decontamination</th>
<th>Considerations for full decontamination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Undress safely (external layers of personal protective equipment or chemical protective clothing depending on degree of contamination)</td>
<td>Standard procedure Peel chemical protective clothing back on its self Wearers don medical gloves when working gloves are removed Breathing apparatus removed last <strong>NOTE:</strong> Weather protection (consider 7C15.44 if applicable)</td>
<td>As for initial decontamination but note: Safe undressing procedures for gas tight chemical protective clothing has been developed for mass decontamination these may be used at conventional incidents and are detailed in 7C15.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Check for exposure</td>
<td>Gaps in personal protective equipment Visual contamination Radiation – contamination meter</td>
<td>As for initial decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Wash hands, face and any areas of exposure</td>
<td>General hygiene requirement Soap and water</td>
<td>As for initial decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Re-robe and welfare</td>
<td>Personal hydration National Resilience re robe packs</td>
<td>As for initial decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Record any exposure</td>
<td>Medical surveillance</td>
<td>As for initial decontamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Manage contaminated personal protective equipment and equipment</td>
<td>Assessment by competent person (eg hazardous materials adviser)</td>
<td>Assessment by competent person (eg hazardous materials adviser, specialist advice, manufacturers etc) Contractor support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Secondary decontamination</td>
<td>See para 7C15.58</td>
<td>See para 7C15.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Initial decontamination procedure

7C15.41 The first level of firefighter decontamination is initial and utilises equipment carried on pumping appliances. The equipment may range from hose reels to primary shower units. This level of procedure may suffice at many minor incidents, but there will be some at which full decontamination procedures will be required.

For initial decontamination the Incident Commander should consider the following:

- select a decontamination method
- set up a decontamination area
- nominate a decontamination officer (this may be the Incident Commander at minor incidents)
- arrange for assisting staff.

7C15.42 The decontamination method adopted depends on the type of contaminant, amount of contaminant and information from sources such as Chemdata. But generally under this level, decontamination will be a simple wet method using hose reels, brushes and/or sponges followed by a safe undressing procedure.

7C15.43 Broadly there are two ways of carrying out wet decontamination currently in use within the Fire and Rescue Service. These are:

- decontamination of the wearers by operatives using a hose reel, brush and containment dam
- self-decontamination or “buddy” decontamination by the wearers using a shower system or using a hose reel, brush and containment dam.

7C15.44 Again, normally under initial firefighter decontamination the latter type will be used.

Salvage sheets overlapped and with suction hose positioned beneath

![Image of salvage sheets and suction hose](image-url)
The photos above show an example layout of initial firefighter decontamination using salvage sheets and hard suction hose to demark the decontamination area and separate clean from dirty respectively. Note also that the dirty area has been clearly divided into a contamination reduction area (with improvised dam) and a safe undressing area (with undressing bags and tripod to assist with breathing apparatus set removal). The clean area contains a bucket for hand-washing and re-robe clothing.

The following photographs illustrate an example of a safe undressing procedure for wearers in breathing apparatus and chemical gauntlets.

1. Stand in decontamination bag and remove helmet
Safe undressing procedure for wearers in breathing apparatus and chemical gauntlets

2. Wipe or sponge down face mask seal area and any areas known to have been contaminated

3. Remove breathing apparatus set from body but keep mask on

4. Wipe or sponge personal protective equipment fastenings and any area where contamination could have gathered unnoticed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Remove chemical gauntlets or firefighting gloves, place in bag. Don surgical/disposable gloves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Remove tunic/fire coat and place in bag. Carefully “peel-back” fire trousers keeping hands inside personal protective equipment as far as possible to avoid touching potentially contaminated areas of personal protective equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Slide fire/flask hood over breathing apparatus demand valve hose and remove breathing apparatus facemask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Step into ‘clean area’. Remove surgical/disposable gloves and drop into decontamination or waste bag in ‘dirty area’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Safe undressing procedure for wearers in breathing apparatus and chemical gauntlets

9. As a final precaution wash hands and face (NOTE: Check for any areas of exposure, then re-robe and proceed to breathing apparatus entry control and then complete any necessary records.

Full decontamination procedure

7C15.47 Full firefighter decontamination is the decontamination of firefighters on-site using decontamination equipment, structured procedures and staff who have been trained fully in its use. Full decontamination should be supported by a decontamination team.

Decontamination team

7C15.48 Most Fire and Rescue Services will mobilise a decontamination unit and team if it is likely that the resources required are greater than those available from the initial decontamination structure. Alternatively the Incident Commander should immediately make-up for decontamination resources if it is anticipated that they may be needed. The team should be supported by a hazardous materials adviser or scientific adviser with regard to technical advice and information.

7C15.49 The decontamination team will, depending on the decontamination method(s), consist of:

- A decontamination officer (or sector commander), who is responsible for:
  - taking charge of decontamination procedures
  - supervising the decontamination area
  - instructing operatives
  - safeguarding contaminated staff
  - taking direction from the Incident Commander (who will be advised by the hazardous materials adviser) with regard to the decontamination method(s)
  - wearing structural firefighting kit and remaining outside the decontamination area.

- A decontamination assistant, who should:
- wear breathing apparatus and chemical resistant gloves and remain in the clean area (this may be varied through the hazardous materials adviser’s risk assessment)
- act on the directions of the decontamination officer
- assist the wearers with safe transition to the clean area.

- Decontamination operatives, who should:
  - wear chemical protective clothing and breathing apparatus - cylinder or airline (this may be varied through the hazardous materials adviser’s risk assessment)
  - remain within the dirty area
  - act on the direction of the decontamination officer
  - decontaminate the wearers’ chemical protective clothing sufficiently to allow safe undressing and transition to the clean area.

**Decontamination equipment**

**7C15.50** A typical list of equipment for use by a decontamination team may include:

- Chemical protective clothing
- Self-contained breathing apparatus
- Powered respirator protective suits
- Airline breathing apparatus equipment
- Vacuum cleaner (approved type only, see note below)

**NOTE:** Only CE marked vacuum cleaners (e.g., Class H for asbestos) with true or absolute “high efficiency particulate arrestor” (HEPA) filters should be used. It is now generally regarded that dry decontamination by use of a vacuum cleaner is not in its own right a complete decontamination process and should be followed by wet decontamination. Also, they are best suited to dry, still-air conditions, as these are rarely encountered at operational incidents. Fire and Rescue Services should ensure that other methods of decontamination are always available.

- Plastic bags (possibly water soluble) with ties and labels
- Barrier tape, cones, poles, signs
- Soda ash, detergent, bleach, disinfectant
- Flexi brush with water control
- Shower system
- Water containment system and pump
- Portable dam
• Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience MD4 firefighters' decontamination unit
• Salvage sheets
• Appropriate tabards and loud hailer
• Clean overalls and footwear
• National Resilience disrobe and re-robe packs
• Radiation survey and contamination meters
• Dry encapsulation material (Fuller’s earth).

Decontamination good-practice

• Note any areas that come into contact with the hazardous materials and ensure these are focused on during decontamination (eg feet and hands)
• When reducing contaminants from wearers start at the top (ie head or helmet) and work down
• When wiping, scrubbing, brushing or spraying wearers focus on the areas of likely contamination and areas where substances could build up (eg creases, folds and joins in chemical protective clothing, under webbing or straps etc) beware forcing contaminants beneath the layer of personal protective equipment
• Safe undressing procedures for mass decontamination crews carrying out firefighter full decontamination have been developed through the Fire and Rescue Service national resilience project. These are contained in Chapter 3 and should be considered for any firefighter decontamination set-up
• Respiratory protective equipment should generally be the last item removed when carrying out the safe undressing procedure
• When using wet decontamination methods ensure that:
  – zips and other joins in personal protective equipment and chemical protective clothing are sponged before they are opened to avoid water entering the wearers’ under-clothing
  – dissolvable bags are of the ‘hot wash’ type not cold to prevent premature degradation.
• Should wearers, following unforeseen circumstances or immediate life saving rescues, need to carry out emergency dis-robing (ie the stripping away of contaminated, or potentially contaminated, personal protective equipment and clothing in the dirty area prior to ‘contamination reduction’ actions) consider using the National Resilience dis-robe packs (see emergency decontamination below)
• All procedures should be set-out clearly on water resistant boards to assist the decontamination team and wearers who may experience difficulty in communications.

7C15.51 Recording should be carried out away from the decontamination area including the clean area. Any exposure of staff to hazardous materials must be recorded. The following details may be needed:

• Names, addresses and contact numbers
• Hazardous materials involved
• Role at the incident
• How exposure occurred
• Period of exposure
• Areas of the body exposed
• Decontamination and medical treatment.

**NOTE:** This information must be immediately available after the incident in case of delayed physical or medical reactions to the exposure.

7C15.52 The following diagrams and photographs show an example set-up of full firefighter decontamination which could be used with the generic decontamination system detailed in 7C15.40.

7C15.53 Fire and Rescue Services should tailor their specific procedures and equipment to their local circumstances and risk assessments which should be informed by their integrated risk management plans. Many Fire and Rescue Services are incorporating the MD4 firefighter decontamination unit, provided through the Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience Programme, into their hazardous materials standard operating procedures.
Diagram 1

DECONTAMINATION AREA

“CLEAN” Decontamination Assistant
- Re-Robe area and hand, face wash

“DIRTY” Undressing area

OPERATIVE(S)

OPERATIVE(S)

Contamination Reduction Area/System(s)
- (e.g., MD4, water dam, shower etc.)

“DIRTY” Boot wash / scrape
- Tool Drop container

Holding Area

Barrier under salvage sheets (e.g., suction hose)

Cold Zone

Warm Zone

Decontamination Officer

HazMats/Scientific Adviser
Use of a “tool drop” bin within a full decontamination set-up

Firefighters in gas tight CPC in the “contamination reduction area” of a Full Decontamination set-up using the “buddy” system to wash down contaminants

MD4 Firefighter decontamination shower incorporated into an example of a full decontamination set-up
Emergency decontamination

7C15.54 Fire and Rescue Services should also have an ‘emergency decontamination’ procedure as an additional control measure for exceptional circumstances such as a break down of personal protective equipment (e.g., ripped chemical protective clothing, breathing apparatus malfunction, injured wearer etc). The decontamination procedures to be adopted in such circumstances should be adapted from the principles and procedures detailed above.

7C15.55 The occasions where emergency decontamination will be necessary include:

• where Fire and Rescue Service staff have:
  – inadequate protection
  – sustained damage to their chemical protective clothing (including boots)
  – sustained injury
  – breathing apparatus set failure, low on air
  – wearer distress; or where there are
• members of the public or site staff who are not protected or who have inadequate protection.

7C15.56 Where responders are wearing chemical protective clothing and require emergency decontamination, every effort should be made to remove the suit whilst ensuring that contamination does not contact the skin of the wearer. A peel-back or dry-peel procedure should be used.

7C15.57 If they have suffered skin contamination, either via a damaged suit or because of inadequate or no protection, contaminated clothing should be removed and affected skin washed with warm soapy water. Casualties should then be removed to hospital, accompanied by details of the extent and type of contamination.

7C15.58 It should be noted that the removal of outer layers of clothing in a controlled way will in most cases remove up to 80 per cent of the contaminant.

7C15.59 The use of a Fire and Rescue Service shower system at normal pressure is not normally recommended for the emergency decontamination of people unless breathing apparatus is worn. This is due to the irrespirable atmosphere created within a shower.

Secondary decontamination

7C15.60 Chemicals which adhere to the surface of the chemical protective clothing (surface contamination) are fairly easy to remove, this means that until the clothing has been decontaminated the surface contamination presents the most significant risk to unprotected staff handling it or to the wearer during disrobing. This is the reason chemical protective clothing is decontaminated
Technical considerations

at the site to remove the surface contamination before undressing (ie primary decontamination). Primary decontamination may or may not remove any chemicals that have been absorbed or permeated into the chemical protective clothing material (permeation or matrix contamination).

7C15.61 Accurate assessment of the degree of any remaining contamination of chemical protective clothing can only be made by proper laboratory procedures which may involve a destructive test, thereby making re-use of a “test suit” impossible.

7C15.62 Chemicals that have been absorbed into the matrix of the chemical protective clothing material may in some cases continue to diffuse through the material during storage thereby presenting a possible risk of contamination to those who next wear or handle the clothing.

7C15.63 The practice of firefighter or primary decontamination of chemical protective clothing on-site after contamination by hazardous materials is intended to clean the suit and reduce any contamination, to assist safer undressing procedures. This should generally be considered as only part of a decontamination process.

7C15.64 Further off-site decontamination (ie secondary decontamination), which may involve washing, scrubbing, thermal treatment and airing, will generally be needed. Fire and Rescue Services should put systems in place to assess chemical protective clothing, respiratory personal equipment, equipment and other kit. This should take place as soon as possible after the incident and should be carried out by a competent person who has access to specialist advice. The assessment and its findings should be recorded.

NOTE: Just because chemical protective clothing appears to be clean to visual inspection, but does not necessarily assure the complete removal of the contaminant, depending upon the nature of the contaminant.

7C15.65 Consideration as to whether re-use is possible should be based upon this assessment of the hazardous materials involved and the circumstances of the particular incident. Care should be taken in the re-use of chemical protective clothing and advice, relating to its ability to continue to be used safely, may need to be sought from the clothing manufacturer/supplier or other competent person/agency.

NOTE: General degradation of chemical protective clothing may lessen the standard of chemical protection afforded. Degradation may be due to:

- exposure to chemicals
- mechanical damage
- ageing
- any combination of the above.

7C15.66 Further information on decontamination is contained in the Home Office Fire Research and Development Group report 9/94 and 2/95 and DCOL 8/1995 Item D.
Mass decontamination

Introduction

7C15.67 Mass decontamination is the planned and structured procedure delivered by the Fire and Rescue Service using purpose designed decontamination equipment where there are large numbers of contaminated casualties.

7C15.68 The responsibility for decontaminating members of public lies with the Department of Health. The decision on whether or not to decontaminate people will be taken by the Ambulance Service in consultation with the Fire and Rescue Service and the police.

7C15.69 Full specific guidance on mass decontamination is outside the scope of this document, further information can be found in the following documents:

- Fire and rescue services Circular 58-2006 – Memorandum of Understanding on Mass Decontamination, DCLG
- Tactical Guidance Document – Fire and Rescue Service Response to CBRN Events, DCLG 2008
- Fire and Rescue Service response to CBRN(E) Events – Strategic Guidance Document, DCLG 2012
Improvised decontamination

7C15.70 Improvised decontamination is the use of an immediately available method of decontaminating members of the public prior to the use of specialist resources.

7C15.71 Generally in the very early stages of the incident and dependant on the symptoms and needs of contaminated people, improvised decontamination may be initiated by emergency service personnel, witnesses to the incident, passers by or even the contaminated people themselves.

7C15.72 The need to commence improvised decontamination depends on the type of contamination, the availability of a means of decontaminating and the symptoms displayed by the contaminated people.

7C15.73 Improvised decontamination may take many forms, including removal of contaminated clothing, wiping down, washing, wiping, rinsing etc and can have a positive effect on the contaminated people eg removing contaminated clothing will achieve reduction of personal levels of contamination.

7C15.74 The Ambulance Service and police may initiate the use of improvised decontamination in the early stages of a CBRN(E) event, dependant on the symptoms and needs of contaminated people.

7C15.75 The Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commander may also consider improvised decontamination but would normally consider establishing the more structured approach of interim decontamination.

7C15.76 Any contaminated people who are subject to improvised decontamination should also subsequently be processed through clinical decontamination or through mass decontamination.

Interim decontamination

7C15.77 Interim decontamination is the use of standard equipment to provide a planned and structured decontamination process for large numbers of the public prior to the availability of purpose designed decontamination equipment.

7C15.78 In the early stages of the incident and dependant on the symptoms and needs of contaminated people the Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commander may decide to establish interim decontamination systems. This decision should be taken in consultation with Ambulance Service and Police Service Incident Commanders where they are present. In the absence of the Ambulance Service or police personnel then the Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commander may make the decision unilaterally.

7C15.79 Consideration should be given to the benefits of establishing interim decontamination and also to the risks (eg dependant on the method used there may be issues around maintaining systems for long periods, little disrobe
provision, no re-robe provision, no ability to warm water, no enclosures, no ability
to capture water run off, limited Fire and Rescue Service personnel protective
equipment, contamination of appliances and equipment etc).

7C15.80 Where interim decontamination is established and used, Fire and Rescue
Service disrobe packs should be deployed if necessary prior to and (if available)
after interim decontamination as people await passage through full clinical
decontamination or mass decontamination systems.

7C15.81 There is no national standard for interim decontamination, each Fire and
Rescue Service having established its own individual methods, however interim
decontamination has the advantage of being a more structured and controlled
method than improvised decontamination.

7C15.82 The following is an example of how standard pumping appliances can be used
to provide interim decontamination. Methods such as this may prove invaluable
where incident response units carrying mass decontamination assets have long
travel and set-up times.

**Position the appliances**

7C15.83 Position two appliances approximately 1.5 to 2 meters apart, with the near side
of both vehicles parallel to each other.

**NOTE:** (Ensure the exhausts face outermost), and the bodies of the vehicle inline
with each other so the rear locker on one vehicle is opposite the front locker of
the other vehicle.

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**Positioning of Fire Service vehicles**

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**Set-up the shower frame**

7C15.84 Separate a short-extension ladder and place the widest extension up against
one appliance inline with the middle locker to use to gain access to the appliance
roofs. At no time should operational staff mount the roof of an appliance. Position
other extensions of ladders to bridge the gap between the vehicles (ensure the
ladder pawls are against the roof of the vehicle).
Set-up the shower units

7C15.85 Using both hosereels from each vehicle. Lock each branch open and set to wide spray on maximum flow. Hang the branches over rounds nearest to the vehicle and position branch to spray inwards. Ensure all windows and doors are shut, and lockers closed as far as possible.

7C15.86 Set in to the nearest hydrant or other water supply and charge hosereels to 10-20 bar. Adjust nozzles to ensure a good ‘mist’ affect is achieved.

7C15.87 This set-up is an example only. Fire and Rescue Services should risk assess it, or any other method, fully before adopting it into their standard operating procedures.
Clinical decontamination

7C15.88 Clinical decontamination is the process where contaminated casualties are treated individually by trained healthcare professionals using purpose designed decontamination equipment.

7C15.89 The Ambulance Service defines casualties and prioritise in the following manner:

- **Priority 1 (P1) Casualties:** Patients with a high priority for either immediate emergency medical care or immediate emergency life-saving decontamination or both
- **Priority 2 (P2) Casualties:** Less severely affected patients who need either emergency medical care or early decontamination to prevent further intoxication
- **Priority 3 (P3) Casualties:** Patients with slight to moderate intoxication and without contamination at a level that requires immediate action. Of these P3 casualties a percentage will leave the scene and self-present to local hospitals and clinics.
- **Fatalities**

7C15.90 Clinical decontamination is the responsibility of the Ambulance Service and is a structured and thorough decontamination process carried out by Ambulance Service personnel for contaminated P1 or P2 casualties, who by definition are unable to proceed unaided through the MD process.

7C15.91 The Ambulance Service consider all contaminated people to be casualties, however all P3 casualties will proceed without physical assistance to the decontamination structures and will then proceed through the Fire and Rescue Service ambulant decontamination structures again without the need for physical assistance. P1 and P2 casualties will normally be rescued by Fire and Rescue Service staff and will be taken to the Ambulance Service decontamination structures for clinical decontamination, which will be undertaken by Ambulance Service personnel. A more in depth casualty sort will be conducted by Ambulance Service personnel as soon as time and resources permit.

7C15.92 It is assumed that there will be a large number of people within the inner cordon who will require precautionary decontamination. These people will proceed to the decontamination structures and will then proceed through the Fire and Rescue Service ambulant decontamination structures without the need for physical assistance.

7C15.93 Clinical intervention within the inner cordon may also be possible. The Ambulance Service has developed a capability to provide hazardous area response capability with the introduction of Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART).
Safe undressing procedures

Gas tight chemical protective clothing safe undressing procedures

7C15.94 The following is an aide memoire for crews carrying out firefighter Full Decontamination using the National Resilience gas tight chemical protective clothing.

7C15.95 Procedure:

1. **Operative:** Provide prepared Tyvek/decontamination bag and place adjacent to veranda ready to receive Wearer

2. **Wearer:** Step into Tyvek/decontamination bag

3. **Operative:** Disarm automatic distress signal unit with spare key provided

4. **Wearer:** Withdraw arms into suit and disconnect gas tight chemical protective suit umbilical from breathing apparatus set and unfasten gas tight chemical protective suit waist belt

5. **Wearer:** Don the pair of *nitrile/medical gloves and cross your arms on your chest

6. **Operative:** Open zip flap and mop zip area from top to bottom with paper towel, place used paper towel in bag

7. **Operative:** Unzip suit, fold back zip carefully and peel down to boot level ensuring the outside of the suit including the zip does not touch the wearer

8. **Wearer:** If necessary use your gloved hands to lean on operatives for support

9. **Wearer:** Step out of suit remove nitrile/medical gloves and place in bag, walk to the edge of salvage sheet and don personal issue **footwear

10. **Operative:** Secure bag by placing hands under roll over and pull up to the closed position, secure with a cable tie

11. **Wearer:** Go to disrobing area, remove breathing apparatus facemask and report to the entry control officer and collect tally and complete suit log sheet.

Note: (a) * These are to be given to the wearer prior to entry and carried within the suit until required in the safe undressing procedures.

(b) ** The Home Office Project ‘Mass Decontamination and Undressing Procedures’ report ECM/2008/01 recommends a safer path for the Wearers to don their shoes and exit the area. The report recommends either a clean path, alternative temporary footwear or a narrow salvage sheet folded back on itself lengthways.
Decontamination operative:

- Avoid kneeling down, and carry out the safe undressing procedure at arms length to prevent unnecessary contact with the wearer
- Ensure the outside of suit does not touch the wearer during disrobe. If any obvious cross contamination is observed immediately seek scientific advice.

Showering times when using the MD4 unit

The showering times used should be decided by hazard assessment. The following times were used in the trials whilst developing the safe undressing procedure and may be an appropriate system to use.

- 3 mins: Self washing with brushes including washing the brush handles themselves
- 2 mins: Rinse each other
- 2 mins: Wearer 1 washes Wearer 2 with brush culminating in zip under Velcro flap
- 2 mins: Wearer 2 washes Wearer 1 with brush culminating in zip under velcro flap
- 2 mins: Rinse each other.
**Gas tight suit safe undressing procedure**

The safe undressing procedure takes place off the MD4 unit’s “veranda” because of difficulties experienced by operatives in removing the gas tight chemical protective clothing when carried out on the higher level of the veranda.

Wearers are passed clean nitrile/medical gloves from the ‘clean area’ as an additional control. These are discarded at the end of the undressing procedure.

The wearer in nitrile/medical gloves crosses his arms to minimise any possible contact with the outside of the chemical protective clothing or decontamination operatives.

The wearer is assisted into the ‘clean area’ by the decontamination assistant who is wearing breathing apparatus as an additional precaution, and for emergency situations.
Powered respirator protective suit safe undressing procedure

7C15.98 The following is an aide memoir for crews carrying out firefighter full decontamination using the national resilience powered respirator protective suit. This procedure should be used after undergoing MD4 showering procedures.

7C15.99 Procedure:

1. **Operative:** Provide prepared Tyvek bag and place in front of veranda ready to receive wearer
2. **Wearer:** Step into Tyvek bag with operatives’ assistance if required
3. **Wearer:** Stretch arms out to your side
4. **Operative:** Open zip flap and mop entire zip area, place used paper towel in bag
5. **Operative:** Unzip suit, fold back zip edge, hold wearer’s gloves to allow wearer to pull their arms from the sleeves
6. **Wearer:** If wearing helmet undo securing strap then cross arms across chest.
7. **Operative:** Hold hood to allow wearer to duck down out of hood
8. **Wearer:** Duck out of suit hood
9. **Operative:** Fold hood to the rear of wearer and roll the suit down away from the wearer to waist level
10. **Wearer:** Release support belt and disconnect hydration tube
11. **Operative:** Fold suit down to top of boots
12. **Wearer:** Step out of boots by steadying yourself on operative if necessary, walk to edge of disrobe area and don personal issue footwear, report to the entry control officer to collect tally and complete log book
13. **Operative:** Switch off the respirator power pack
14. **Operative:** Secure bag by placing hands under roll over and pull up to the closed goose neck position, and secure with cable tie and complete on label and bag
15. **Operative:** Bagged suits are to be stored adjacent to inner cordon to await further advice.

7C15.100 Decontamination operative:

- Avoid kneeling down, and carry out the safe undressing procedure at arms length to prevent unnecessary contact with the wearer
- Ensure the outside of suit does not touch the wearer during disrobe. If any obvious cross contamination is observed immediately seek scientific advice.
PART C–16
Environmental protection

General information

Introduction

7C16.1 This section is deliberately kept focused on the essential risk-critical information required by Fire and Rescue Service staff at emergency hazardous materials incidents as there is a dedicated Fire and Rescue Manual on the subject.

7C16.2 Fire and Rescue Manual (Volume 2 – Fire Service Operations) Environmental Protection, 2008, is published by The Stationery Office and is available at:

http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/environmentprotectvol2

7C16.3 This fire and rescue manual provides information and guidance designed to support firefighters, Fire and Rescue Service managers, and trainers in their work at operational incidents, training events, and during day-to-day activities. It contains guidance for Fire and Rescue Services on preventing and if necessary, dealing with incidents with the potential to pollute. Through its guidance this manual also ensures that services can help minimise their own impact on the environment by providing advice on how to prevent pollution from their own premises.

7C16.4 Fire and Rescue Service intervention can significantly reduce the impact that spillages or firewater runoff containing environmentally damaging materials may have on the environment. Such actions can provide public health benefits. Public drinking water is drawn from rivers, lakes, lochs and groundwater; Fire and Rescue Service activities to protect these waters will help safeguard public and private drinking water supplies and consequently public health. Fire and Rescue Service pollution prevention and control activities can therefore be associated with the Fire and Rescue Service’s stated aim of protecting public safety. This philosophy should be borne in mind by Fire and Rescue Service planners and Incident Commanders when prioritising environmental protection as an objective within their strategic, systematic and placed on Fire and Rescue Services to consider the environment within Fire and Rescue Service legislation and the integrated risk management process or equivalent.
Characteristics and classification

Pollution of the water environment

7C16.5 The environment is often considered as three components:

• air
• land
• water.

7C16.6 The water component is often divided into sections: oceans, rivers, ground waters, lakes, etc. Elements within the water component are all interlinked. River pollution can lead to oceanic pollution; surface water pollution can lead to ground water pollution.

7C16.7 Pollutants are defined as anything that causes harm to the environment. So water pollutants include not only chemicals, oils and pathogens but also organic materials, heat and suspended solids. Pollutants released during fires or other emergency incidents, including hazardous materials and other spills, have the potential to pollute air, land and the water environment. However, the water environment is arguably the most vulnerable to pollution from emergency incidents. It is also the part of the environment that the Fire and Rescue Service can protect most readily.

ORGANIC POLLUTANTS

7C16.8 Not all pollutants are toxic (ie poisonous); for example, organic matter (carbon- and hydrogen-based material that can decompose; associated with living organisms). Sources of organic matter include agricultural wastes (eg slurry, silage), blood, food (eg milk, beer and orange juice, etc), sewage and many other materials. Although many of these pollutants are not toxic to aquatic organisms they can still have serious indirect consequences. This is because rivers, lakes, etc are organic matter processing systems. If large quantities of organic matter (eg sewage or a tanker of milk or beer) are added this has effects that are similar to adding large quantities of dead leaves, etc except that it is finely divided and so easy for the bacteria and fungi to consume rapidly.

BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND

7C16.9 The biochemical oxygen demand is a measure of the quantity of oxygen used by micro-organisms to breakdown organic matter in a liquid. A substance with a high biochemical oxygen demand such as milk or sewage if discharged into a waterbody can cause dissolved oxygen levels to fall in the waterbody resulting in the death of fish and other aquatic life.
Typical biochemical oxygen demand values for different waste/effluents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical biochemical oxygen demand values</th>
<th>(mg oxygen/litre)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural rivers</td>
<td>0.5 – 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated sewage</td>
<td>3 – 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper mill effluent</td>
<td>100 – 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude sewage</td>
<td>200 – 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy waste</td>
<td>300 – 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brewery waste</td>
<td>500 – 1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry waste</td>
<td>24,000 – 67,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical firefighting foam concentrate</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silage liquor</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange juice</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER FORMS OF POLLUTION**

7C16.10 Other forms of pollutants include inorganic substances, like metals and acids, and man-made organics such as pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, phenols, etc. When considering toxic substances entering a watercourse, some key terms in the science of eco-toxicology need to be considered. When Fire and Rescue Services attend incidents which involve substances with these properties they should be prioritised accordingly.

- **Persistence** – Persistence of chemicals indicates that they are stable and long-lived in the environment, resisting degradation, eg lead, cadmium, mercury, polychlorinated biphenyls, and many man-made organics.
- **Xenobiotic** – Not friendly to biological organisms in general (includes many man-made substances, especially pesticides, lead, cadmium and mercury).
- **Bioaccumulation** – Concentration of pollutant; gradient that occurs in moving from one trophic level to another, ie when an animal eats a plant or another animal, also known as biomagnifications.
- **Bioconcentration** – Extraction of chemicals from the environment, and concentration within the organism. For example, seaweed concentrates iodine from the seawater within its tissues, so it is very useful for humans as a source of concentrated iodine. Similarly, plutonium is present at very low levels in seawater. It is concentrated within tiny algae (phytoplankton) that make up the producers in the open sea ecosystem (up to 3,000 times stronger in one of these algae than in the sea water). Algae also concentrate polychlorinated biphenyls to 2,000 times the ambient sea water levels.
- **Biodegradation** – Breakdown of a complex chemical into (simpler) components by actions of biological organisms.

  **NOTE:** Not always broken down into more benign components. e.g. the pesticide dieldrin biodegrades into photodieldrin which is considerably more toxic.

**Incidents that threaten the water environment**

*7C16.11* UK Fire and Rescue Services deal with a variety of emergency incidents where there is often a risk of polluting the water environment. The situation might be a spillage or leak entering a drain, watercourse or seeping into the ground. The highest priority in these situations will always be public and crew safety. However, protection of public and private drinking water supplies and the environment should still be a high priority to Incident Commanders and crews.

*7C16.12* Where fire extinguishments or precautionary actions, such as applying a foam blanket to reduce vapour emission, are taken, it may be the Fire and Rescue Service actions that are either causing the pollution or contributing to its severity. In these circumstances, UK environmental law requires mitigating actions to be taken by the Fire and Rescue Service (see Section 4 Legal framework). Where the risk to the environment is high, Incident Commanders may decide on a course of action to reduce or eliminate environmental impact completely.

*7C16.13* The range of potentially polluting incident types is summarised in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fire and Rescue Service incident types with the potential to pollute the aquatic environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of pollution</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road traffic collisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous materials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fire and Rescue Service incident types with the potential to pollute the aquatic environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of pollution</th>
<th>Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eco-toxic</td>
<td>Incidents involving the spillage of eco-toxic materials such as inks, dyes, detergents etc that are not classified by the UN as hazardous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>Incidents involving the spillage of organic matter such as milk, beer, blood, sewage, etc that enters the water environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inorganic</td>
<td>Incidents involving inorganic matter such as silt, cement, sand etc that enters the water environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sensitivity of watercourse and groundwater

7C16.14 An understanding of the sensitivity of local watercourse and groundwater is useful for Fire and Rescue Service planning officers and crews. For areas that drain to environmentally sensitive locations, a high priority should be given, during the planning process and at incidents, to the containment of spillages and polluting fire water run-off. In less sensitive areas whilst containment is still desirable it is recognised that there may be other priorities which take precedence over environment protection work. Fire and Rescue Services should consult with their local Environment Agency office to obtain this information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensitivity</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Over a major aquifer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Within a major groundwater source protection zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Within 250m of any well, spring or borehole used for drinking water abstraction other than a groundwater source protection zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Above a shallow water table (&lt;2m and with free-draining ground)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Above a fissured rock, eg chalk, posing risk of rapid flow to groundwater or surface water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Less than 5 km upstream of a surface water drinking water abstraction point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Less than 5 km upstream of an important surface water industrial or national agricultural abstraction point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Firewater/spillage would impact on a commercial fishery and/or a national or internationally important conservation site</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Sensitivity of receiving waters in relation to location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sensitivity</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>Firewater/spillage would impact on a site of high amenity value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Situated over a minor aquifer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Between 5 km and 20 km upstream of a surface water drinking water abstraction point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Between 5 km and 20 km upstream of an important surface water industrial or agricultural abstraction point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Firewater/spillage would impact on a coarse fishery or locally important conservation site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>Firewater/spillage would impact on a site of moderate amenity value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Situated on low permeability ground such as clay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Situated over a non-aquifer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Outside any designated groundwater source protection zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Situated above deep water tables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>More than 20 km upstream of a surface water drinking water abstraction point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>More than 20 km upstream of an important surface water industrial or agricultural abstraction point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Firewater/spillage would have limited impact on fish populations or wildlife</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>Firewater/spillage would impact on a site of limited amenity value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Smoke from fires

**7C16.15** The Environment Agency is not responsible for the impact of smoke within the environment from a fire or fire training. This duty rests with environmental health departments in local authorities. The Environment Agency will seek to minimise the likelihood of a fire at sites they regulate by setting conditions relating to accidents as part of the operator’s permit. This could include for instance, fire sprinklers. If a fire should occur they may also be able to provide the Fire and Rescue Service and other responders details of products and processes at the site and their likely environmental impact.

**7C16.16** However, the Environment Agency co-ordinates air quality data during a major incident in England or Wales, to assist the Health Protection Agency in providing fast and effective public health advice.
7C16.17 The Health Protection Agency will provide public health advice directly to Silver or tactical Commanders or, via the Science and Technical Advice Cell, to the Strategic Coordination Centre (or Gold). The Air Quality Cell therefore requires a Silver or Gold multi-agency group to be operating in order to provide an appropriate communications route for their advice.

7C16.18 The Air Quality Cell operates 24/7 and can be contacted through the normal Environment Agency incident route. The request will be passed to a Competent Officer who will assess the information against the triggering criteria:

- Is it a major incident?
- Does it involve a fire, explosion or chemical release?
- Is there likely to be a significant risk to public health?

7C16.19 Further information on the Air Quality Cell is contained in Section 7 Part C-1 7C1.35.

Drainage and sewerage systems

7C16.20 During emergency incidents involving fire or spillages, contaminated firewater runoff or polluting materials including hazardous materials may flow towards and then enter drains and drainage systems. These systems will then transport the polluting materials into streams, rivers, lakes, lochs or groundwaters, or to sewage treatment works or waste water treatment systems. Some industrial sites will have their own waste water treatment system. To facilitate emergency pollution prevention and control strategies effectively, Fire and Rescue Service staff need to have obtained information about the direction and destination of drainage systems both at pre-planning stage and during incidents. The consequence of allowing pollution unchecked into drainage systems is the direct or indirect pollution of the water environment. Further information, which provides a basic understanding of how these systems operate and their vulnerability to polluting material, is found in Fire and Rescue Manual – Environmental protection.

SEWERAGE SYSTEMS

Sewage is the waste water carried in sewers to the sewage treatment works. Sewerage is the network of pipes and sewers (ie sewerage system), which carry the sewage to the sewage treatment works. Fire and Rescue Services can utilise sewerage systems at incidents either to contain polluting material, including fire run-off water, or to divert the material to a holding facility such as a storm tank or balancing pond until it can be safely removed. Caution must be exercised when considering using foul sewers to contain polluting material as they may have storm water overflows built in and blocking the foul system could cause a direct discharge via these overflows to a watercourse. Where practicable permission to discharge polluting materials into sewers must be obtained from sewerage undertakers, not the Environment Agency, before the discharge takes place.
Where polluting material has, either before the arrival of the Fire and Rescue Service or during Fire and Rescue Service intervention, unintentionally entered the sewerage system, notification to sewerage undertakers must take place.

### Types and functions of sewers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sewer type</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface water sewers</td>
<td>Transport rainwater direct to the nearest river, lake or groundwater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>NOTE:</strong> Should have BLUE coloured access chamber covers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foul sewers</td>
<td>Transport sewage to a sewage treatment works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>NOTE:</strong> Should have RED coloured access chamber covers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined sewers (found in urban areas)</td>
<td>Transport both sewage and rainwater to the sewage treatment works. During storms they may overflow into watercourses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sewerage systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cesspool or pit</td>
<td>Sealed tank, no discharge; must be pumped out regularly by tanker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Septic tank</td>
<td>Solids settle out in tank, liquids discharge to ground; should be emptied regularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sewerage treatment plant</td>
<td>Small treatment plant with discharge to ground or surface water. Treats effluent on site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial treatment works</td>
<td>Treatment on site; usually effluent discharges to the foul sewer but may discharge to surface or groundwater</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### OIL SEPARATORS

Oil separators, sometimes referred to as ‘interceptors’, are installed within drainage systems to protect receiving waters (surface or ground) from pollution by oil or fuel. Such pollutants may be present due to minor leaks from vehicles and plant, from accidental spillages or due to deliberate and illegal tipping into drains. Oil separators are found on fuel station forecourts, at oil storage facilities, vehicle workshops, etc. These units are often identified at ground level by the presence of three inspection covers in line and in close proximity, although single chamber models are now the preferred design. They are designed to hold back floating materials such as oils and fuels but to let clean water pass through.
Oil separators will only be effective if they are regularly maintained and emptied. Some installations will have an oil level alarm fitted to indicate when emptying is required. A common misconception associated with oil separators is that they will collect all types of pollutants. This is not the case, as only floating materials such as oil or fuel are contained. Other material that is miscible with water will pass through the system entering the foul or surface water system. Also, a separator will not work effectively for dissolved (soluble or emulsified) oils or detergents (e.g., firefighting foam) or if degreasers are present, as in vehicle wash water. Such discharges should be drained to foul sewer.

Although standard size oil separators are effective at containing fuels and oils in ‘daily’ spillage conditions, they are unable to separate products from large quantities of water that might be found during fire run-off conditions. In these circumstances the system may be overcome by the ‘shock load’ allowing the pollution to pass through into surface water.

**ROAD DRAINAGE**

Unlike urban roads, which are almost all kerbed and drained using gullies, rural roads (which include most motorways) can be drained using a variety of methods. The drainage method chosen for any particular location will vary according to the volume and quality of the run-off, distance from a watercourse, local geological, topographical features and availability of drainage infrastructure in the locality.

Road drainage can be broadly classified into two elements: surface and subsurface. These are not completely separate, as surface water will infiltrate into road foundations, earthworks or structures through any surface that is not completely impermeable, and will then be removed by the sub-surface drainage.

Because it is important that water drains quickly from the road surface, it can be difficult to intercept polluted run-off from an emergency incident before it enters a local watercourse. It is only since the early 1990s that effective pollution prevention measures have been installed in new roads. Their effectiveness will depend on a number of factors, including the type of pollutant involved and the suitability of the pollution prevention measure installed.

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**Operational considerations**

**Pre-planning**

*7C16.21* Considerations:

- To facilitate emergency pollution prevention and control strategies effectively, Fire and Rescue Services need to have obtained information about the direction and destination of drainage systems at pre-planning stage

- Some industrial sites will have their own waste water treatment systems
• Sensitive environmental and groundwater collecting sites within a fire authority’s turn-out area must be established and a system put in place to make this information available to mobilising controls and crews attending hazardous materials incidents. Specific information should include:
  – local watercourse plans
  – water abstraction points
  – local drainage plans
  – vulnerable habitats
  – groundwater
  – vulnerability of the water environment.

• The local highway authority or Highways Agency’s agents for motorways and trunk roads should maintain drainage plans of their local network including the location of any pollution prevention systems. These should be available to Fire and Rescue Services for use during the pre-planning process.

• Fire and Rescue Services should be aware of the types of drainage system most commonly found on roads in their area, whether they discharge into environmentally sensitive receptors, and whether they can be used to contain spillages or firewater run-off. Such information should be included in operational response plans. It is recommended that plans are produced in consultation with environment agencies and highway authorities.

• Fire and Rescue Services should establish local agreements with the Environment Agency, based on the protocol established between the Environment Agency and the Local Government Association, to ensure good liaison and information sharing at operational incidents.

• Fire and Rescue Services should identify ‘at-risk’ sites (ie premises and sites with activities or materials that pose a particular environmental risk eg agrochemical stores, timber treatment plants, plastics manufacturing, recycling sites etc) through 7(2)(d) arrangements and liaison with the Environment Agency and site operators.

• Further information on conducting environmental risk management evaluation and site-specific incident response plans is contained in Fire and Rescue Manual (Volume 2 – Fire Service Operations) Environmental protection, Chapter 2.

Phase 1: Mobilising and en-route

**7C16.22** Considerations:

• Pre-planning information should be readily available en-route in an easy to read and understandable format (eg environmentally protected or sensitive areas, contingency plans, risk cards, site-specific incident response plans etc)
• Notify the responsible agencies. Mobilising notification criteria, including threshold quantities of environmentally damaging substances, are contained in *Fire and Rescue Manual – Environmental protection*, Appendix 4.

• **NOTE:** Fire mobilising controls should also inform the Environment Agency if the actions of the Fire and Rescue Service at an emergency incident cause potentially harmful materials to enter the water system (eg firefighting run-off water). In such case the Fire and Rescue Service should take all steps that are reasonably practicable in the circumstances to minimise the extent of the entry and its polluting effects.

### Phase 2: Arriving and gathering information

**7C16.23** The following table gives a basic guide to the responsibilities of other groups or agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group/Agency</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local authority</td>
<td>Responsible for materials on playing fields, public open spaces, beaches, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowner or occupier</td>
<td>Responsible for materials on own private land or inside premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highways Agency or their</td>
<td>Responsible for materials on motorways and major trunk roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>representative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County, metropolitan or</td>
<td>Responsible for materials on roads not covered by the Highways Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unitary authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
<td>Protection of water resources (eg discharge of pollution, conservation, redistribution/augmentation of surface and groundwater supplies, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authority Environmental</td>
<td>Enforcement of air pollution legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Dept.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/sewerage undertaker</td>
<td>Action following pollution of sewers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Phase 3: Planning the response

**7C16.24** Consider the hierarchy of pollution control – to identify the most effective method of controlling or mitigating the effects of a pollutant, the following hierarchy can be used:

1. Stemming or reduction of leak at source. (Intervention examples – close valves, clay sealing putty, pneumatic leak sealing devices, overpack drums etc)
2. Containment of leak close to source. (Intervention examples – absorbents, pop-up pool etc)

3. Prevention of pollutant entering drains (containment on the surface). (Intervention examples – polyboom, clay drain mats, peristaltic pumps and flexi-dams etc)

4. Control pollutant in drainage system. (Intervention examples – pollution control devices, pipe blockers, sewerage control systems etc)

5. Booming or containment in water courses. (Intervention examples – river booms, damming etc).

7C16.25 Also consider the type of water pollution, its effects and possible treatments:

**Suspended solids – Soils + minerals (mining, farming, etc), industrial by-products (paper mills, etc)**

**EFFECTS**
- Substrates change due to the river bed being covered with silt
- Fish gills and filter feeders become blocked
- The penetration of light is reduced
- Changes in the community of organisms present
- A loss of diversity.

**TREATMENT**
- Point source – settlement or filtration, eg, tanks, filter-beds and reed beds
- Non-point source – barriers, traps and engineered wetlands.

**Thermal pollution – Power stations and other cooling units, sewage works, fire water run-off**

**EFFECTS**
- Water is heated
- Oxygen content of the water is reduced
- The capacity for self-purification is decreased
- Changes in the community of organisms present
- A loss of diversity.

**TREATMENT**
- Cool effluent before discharge, eg, in holding lagoons, or using cooling towers.

**Inorganic chemicals – Mining and industry (eg, heavy metals)**

**EFFECTS**
- Some are toxic
• Some cause change to acidity or alkalinity of the water
• Change in the community of organisms present
• A loss of diversity.

**TREATMENT**
• Chemical – neutralization and precipitation
• For spillages, contain and remove if possible.

**Organic matter – Agriculture and sewage (phosphates and nitrates)**

**EFFECTS**
• Reduction of oxygen levels
• Changes in the community of organisms present
• A loss of diversity.

**TREATMENT**
• Standard sewage works treatment, and land treatment
• For spillages, contain and remove if possible, or dilute and aerate until biochemical oxygen demand recovers.

**Nitrogen and phosphates – Sewage, agriculture and industry**

**EFFECTS**
• Eutrophication
• Toxic algal blooms
• Blockage of drains and filters with algal mass
• Changes in the community of organisms present
• A loss of diversity.

**TREATMENT**
• Phosphate stripping or biological treatments such as reed beds
• For spillage, isolate and remove if possible – or once again be prepared to oxygenate downstream.

**Toxic organic chemicals – Agriculture and industry (pesticides, phenols, etc)**

**EFFECTS**
• Poisonous
• Changes in the community of organisms present
• A loss of diversity.

**TREATMENT**
• For spillage, contain and remove if possible.
Pathogens – Viruses, bacteria, protozoa, etc (sewage and farm wastes)

EFFECTS
• The spread of disease
• Therefore the need to remove them from drinking water supplies.

TREATMENT
• Removal of 99 per cent by standard sewage treatment
• Disinfection of drinking water by chlorination or ozone and ultra-violet light treatment
• Accidental spillage – isolate and allow to die naturally (over a few days in natural UV light from sun, most will die). Avoid use as a drinking water source.

Phase 4: Implementing the response

Pollution control techniques

7C16.26 Once the emergency operations have ceased at an incident, and pollution control is the only issue, the Environment Agency’s representatives would assume the lead role. In doing so, a Fire and Rescue Service may enter into a contractual arrangement with the Environment Agency whereby equipment and personnel are utilised to assist the ‘clean up’

CONTAIN OR DILUTE?
• If given the option to contain or dilute when attending an incident, a fire officer should always opt for containment. Whether this containment is at the source of the leakage or at a distance, a spillage that is contained is preferable. Once the spillage is in a contained state an expert’s advice can be sought for a method of dealing with it. If however vaporization of a product occurs, causing possible flammable or toxic atmospheres, the officer should consider covering the spillage with a foam blanket or alternatively with a salvage sheet, depending on the product’s properties
• Dilution of any spillage should be considered as a last resort, and in liaison with the pollution control officer
• In forming this strategic decision, the officer should consider the identity, properties, qualities and location of the substance involved
• To enable the officer to determine a course of action, the following list identifies certain useful information:
  – chemical name and formula
  – trade name/formulation
  – strength of solution
  – miscibility in water
– heavier/lighter than water
– flammable or explosive risk
– toxicological data
– acid, alkali, oxidizing agent.

• Techniques available when faced with a serious spill:

– **Diversion** – Creating physical barriers or laying booms to direct the flow. The greater the speed of flow, the greater the length and angle of the barrier required to slow and direct the flow.

– **Covering** – A physical method of confinement: usually a temporary measure achieved with a salvage sheet over a solid spill or powder.

– **Damming** – Barriers are constructed to prevent or reduce the quantity of liquid entering the environment mainly by the construction of a dam across a waterway to prevent or reduce product flow and attempt to separate out liquids or solid containments.

– There are two types of dams, overflow and underflow. Overflow dams are built to trap sinking heavier-than-water materials behind the dam (specific gravity greater than 1) whilst allowing uncontaminated water to flow over the dam. This works best on narrow and slow moving waterways. Underflow dams are built to catch floating lighter-than-water materials behind a dam (specific gravity of less than 1). Uncontaminated water flows unobstructed under the dam while containing the contaminant at or near the service.

– **Dilution** – Where water-soluble solutions, usually corrosives, are diluted by adding large volumes of water to the spill. There are four important criteria that must be met before dilution is attempted. These are to determine in advance that the substance:
  – is not water reactive
  – will not produce a toxic gas on water contact
  – will not form any kind of solid or precipitate
  – is totally water soluble.

– **Absorption** – The process of picking up or absorbing a liquid contaminant using an absorbent – clay, straw, sawdust, ‘pigs’, pillows, pads and/or absorbing tubes, etc. Useful only for dealing with spills of less than 250 litres.

– **Dispersion** – Using biological or chemical agents on materials such as hydrocarbon spills.

– **Aeration** – Organic pollutants such as milk and sewage will remove oxygen from water bodies. The Environment Agency and a number of specialist contractors are equipped to oxygenate affected watercourses.
to raise dissolved oxygen levels; either physically, using aeration units which bubble air through the water, or chemically, through the controlled introduction of hydrogen peroxide. Pumping of affected water into the air through hose jets during the initial stages of an incident is less efficient but is a technique which can be used to some effect.

- **Treatment** – Treatment of pollution in a watercourse, for example, using activated carbon or hydrogen peroxide, can be problematical and is a specialised technique used by an environment agency or specialist contractors.

- **Controlled burn** – A controlled burn is a defensive operational strategy to prohibit or restrict the use of extinguishing media on fires so that damage to the environment is minimised. In some cases this strategy can act to protect public health, as an Incident Commander may choose to use a controlled burn strategy when there are significant risks to public drinking water supplies. **(NOTE:** This does not relate to controlled burn of moorland, heathland, etc) agricultural or other waste. This operational strategy will normally be used to prevent water pollution but when applied may also benefit air quality due to the improved combustion and dispersion of airborne pollutants. Conversely, it may have adverse impacts, such as allowing or increasing the formation of hazardous gaseous by-products. The balance of potential water and airborne impacts is one of the factors that must be taken into account before the strategy is used. Ideally this decision should be made at the planning stage. The protection of people will always take precedence over environmental considerations. Incident Commanders may also decide to adopt a controlled burn strategy where there are significant risks to Fire and Rescue Service staff from offensive firefighting tactics. Further information is contained in Fire and Rescue Manual – Environmental protection, Chapter 3.6.

### Phase 5: Evaluating the response

**7C16.27** Incident Commanders should constantly evaluate the risk posed by pollutants at the incident and the effectiveness of specific operational procedures and advice. Evaluation is not a one-off process but should be continual throughout the incident as circumstances change or new information is gathered. After evaluation, if necessary, the Incident Commander should adjust the response plan, amend/implement control measures and communicate the changes to all staff.

### Phase 6: Closing the incident

**Decontamination residual hazards**

**7C16.28** *The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (England) Order 2007* places a requirement on the Fire and Rescue Service to contain, for a reasonable time, any water used for removing chemical, biological or radioactive contaminants
from people in the event of an emergency. Also the Fire and Rescue authority must make arrangements for ensuring reasonable steps are taken to prevent or limit serious harm to the environment.

**Hand-over of the incident to the appropriate authority**

7C16.29 This will be the duty local authority, owner or occupier in most instances. The outcomes of the analytical risk assessment should form part of the incident hand-over.

**Environment Agency**

7C16.30 In general, the Environment Agency will look to the landowner, site occupier/operator or polluter to clean up a site, watercourse or groundwater following an environmental incident. They will advise, wherever possible, on suitable contractors and appropriate disposal routes for any wastes generated during the incident. Where the built or natural environment is contaminated following a pollution incident, the Government Decontamination Service can be contacted for advice on clean-up protocols.

**UK Government Decontamination Service**

7C16.31 The Government Decontamination Service provides advice, guidance, management support and contractual arrangements to support those responsible for decontamination of the built and natural environment.

**Charging protocols**

7C16.32 Pollution prevention activities of the Fire and Rescue Service during the emergency stages of an incident may allow the incident to be closed down quickly or provide the Environment Agency with time to call in commercial clean-up contractors to manage the cleanup and subsequent restoration of the environment. However, on the rare occasions where contractors’ attendance times are not suited to the needs of the incident or a suitable contractor is not available, the Fire and Rescue Service may be able to assist environment agencies over a protracted period. In such cases and when the emergency phase of the incident is over, the Fire and Rescue Service, subject to operational priorities and resources, might agree to a request from the Environment Agency for assistance and commit resources to environmental protection work. When doing so the Fire and Rescue Service will in effect be working as a contractor to the Environment Agency and they will therefore meet Fire and Rescue Service costs. In England and Wales this will be subject to the following:

- Fire and Rescue Service costs will only be met by the Environment Agency when an agreement between the Environment Agency Site Controller and the Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commander about the work required has been made. This agreement can be made verbally at the incident or over the
telephone and will normally involve the provision of an order number. Details of the agreement and the officers involved, including time and date, etc must be recorded and signed at the earliest opportunity.

- When the Environment Agency requests the Fire and Rescue Service to attend an incident that they would not attend under normal circumstances, Fire and Rescue Service costs associated with the incident will be met by the Agency.

- Chargeable activities will conclude when the Environment Agency advises the Incident Commander that no further action is required or the Fire and Rescue Service withdraws due to other operational priorities.
PART C–17
Additional chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRN(E)) considerations

What is CBRN(E)

Introduction

7C17.1 This section does not contain comprehensive details on CBRN(E) but provides a general awareness, including characteristics, possible visual indicators and the overarching strategic objectives for managing a CBRN(E) event.

7C17.2 Specific guidance on the Fire and Rescue Service response to a CBRN(E) event is provided in the following:

- Operational Guidance Document – Fire and Rescue Service Response to CBRN(E) Events 2012
- Tactical Guidance Document – Fire and Rescue Service Response to CBRN(E) Events 2012

7C17.3 If Fire and Rescue Service Commanders follow the generic operational guidance outlined for hazardous materials incidents at CBRN(E) events they would broadly achieve a satisfactory outcome. However, to provide a truly effective response, it is important for Fire and Rescue Service personnel to understand the differences between CBRN(E) events and hazardous materials incidents, particularly the multi-agency dimension.

7C17.4 Initial responders should note that what initially may appear to be a hazardous materials incident, may in fact be a CBRN(E) event.

CBRN(E)

7C17.5 CBRN is a term used to describe chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials. It is often associated with terrorism. CBRN(E) is a term used to describe chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. CBRN(E) terrorism is the actual or threatened dispersal of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear material (either on their own or in combination with each other or with explosives), with deliberate criminal, malicious or murderous intent, targeted at a given population or economic or symbolic points.

7C17.6 CBRN(E) events may not only involve the release of hazardous materials but also include related threats, hoaxes and false alarms. CBRN(E) events are classified into three generic types:

- intelligence led
- device found, not activated
- device activated.

7C17.7 Whereas hazardous materials incidents are predominantly accidental (ie caused by human error or natural or technological reasons), CBRN(E) incidents are deliberate malicious acts with the intention to kill, cause sickness or disrupt society, for example:

- the deliberate dumping or release of hazardous materials with malicious intent
- the malicious poisoning of one or more individuals
- terrorist acts (as defined by law) that involve serious violence to persons or property for a political, religious or ideological purpose and/or that are a matter of national interest
- threats, hoaxes and false alarms involving hazardous substances.

7C17.8 In the hands of terrorists, CBRN(E) materials can pose a significant threat and cause great harm in the form of weaponised or non-weaponised release. Weaponised materials can be delivered using conventional bombs (eg pipe bombs), improvised explosive materials (eg fuel oil–fertilizer mixture) and enhanced blast weapons (eg ‘dirty bombs’). Non-weaponised materials can include contaminated food, livestock and crops.

7C17.9 Chemical, biological, and radiological material can be dispersed in the air we breathe, the water we drink, or on surfaces we come into contact with. Dispersion methods may be as simple as placing an open container in a heavily used area or using conventional garden/commercial spray devices, or as elaborate as detonating an improvised explosive device.

7C17.10 While there are obvious similarities between ‘conventional’ hazardous materials incidents and those termed CBRN(E), the response to an intentional CBRN(E) event will differ because there are unique implications relating to:

- public safety
- public confidence
- national security
- wider international relations
• security measures
• risks to Fire and Rescue Service staff
• complexity of multi-agency working.

7C17.11 It must be stressed that terrorist or CBRN(E) events do require a more specific response due to:
• potential for secondary devices
• potential for perpetrators to use virulent agents that are both persistent and difficult to identify
• potential to conceal the identity and/or remove and/or replace signage and material information
• potential to utilise locations that exploit the characteristics of the agent
• need to exchange information with off site intelligence and scientific advisers.

Characteristics of CBRN(E) incidents

7C17.12 CBRN(E) incidents may include some or all of the following:
• potential for mass casualties and need for immediate medical treatment
• potential for large loss of life
• potential for long term health and environmental effects
• creation of an extremely hazardous environment that may persist
• relative ease and cheapness of production (eg triacetone triperoxide [TATP])
• ambiguity and/or delay in determining the type of material involved
• potential use of a combination of CBRN(E) materials
• narrow time frame in which to administer life saving interventions/treatments
• need for immediately available specialised pharmaceuticals
• need for specialised detection equipment
• need for timely, efficient and effective mass decontamination systems
• need for pre-planning within health services to establish medical treatment protocols, to stock pharmaceuticals and to determine treatment requirements
• need to establish coordinated incident management/multi-agency response procedures for such incidents.

7C17.13 Countermeasures may include:
• technical equipment that can detect chemical/biological/radiological agents
• protective equipment to prevent exposure
• medical therapy and, for some agents, prophylaxis
• organisational strategies, such as standard operating procedures, training and specially developed ‘intelligence’ systems.

Visual indicators of a CBRN(E) event

7C17.14 Visual indicators of a CBRN(E) event may include all or some of the following:
• dead or distressed people, birds and animals
• multiple individuals showing unexplained signs of skin, eye or airway irritation; nausea; vomiting; twitching; sweating; pin-point pupils (miosis); runny nose (rhinorrhea); disorientation; breathing difficulties; convulsions; and death
• the presence of hazardous materials or equipment not relevant to the occupancy
• reports of unexplained smells or tastes out of character with the surroundings
• unexplained vapour or mist clouds
• unexplained oily droplets or films on surfaces or water
• withered plant life or vegetation on the exterior of dwellings.

7C17.15 The initial information that an incident has occurred may come from the public, media, emergency service responders at or near the scene, or other information routes.

Strategic objectives for a combined response to a CBRN(E) incident

7C17.16 Irrespective of the particular responsibilities of individual organisations and agencies responding to the incident, the strategic intention is to coordinate effective multi-agency activity in order to:
• preserve and protect lives
• mitigate and minimise the impact of an incident
• Inform the public and maintain public confidence
• prevent, deter and detect crime
• assist in the early return to normality (or as near to it as can reasonably be achieved).

7C17.17 Additional objectives from these principles:
• ensure the health and safety of all those responding to a CBRN(E) incident
• safeguard the environment
facilitate judicial, public, technical or other enquiries
evaluate the response and identify lessons to be learned.

The nine key tasks

7C17.18 In order to ensure that emergency responders use the same terminology and plan their response around the same principles, nine key tasks have been identified and defined.

7C17.19 The key task definitions provided have been agreed jointly by the Police Service, Fire and Rescue Service and the Ambulance Service and will form the basis for each service’s CBRN(E) event response procedures.

7C17.20 The Nine Key Tasks relate to the management of a known and identified CBRN(E) event on the scale described in A Model Response to CBRN(E) Events, from the time of the incident being confirmed until the time the last decontaminated member of the public leaves the scene (encompassing the response and part of the recovery phase of a CBRN(E) event) and also extending into the restoration phase of the incident.

7C17.21 For CBRN(E) events on a smaller scale the principles of the Nine Key Tasks should always be considered and may be applied in part or in full, but the scale of the response should always be proportionate to the risk involved and to the incident scale.

7C17.22 The tactical guidance document, Fire and Rescue Service Response to CBRN(E) Events, details several response models, based on a number of incident scales, which should be considered by the Fire and Rescue Service Incident Commander when assessing resource requirements for dealing with a CBRN(E) event.

KEY TASK 1 – COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control is an overarching process which directs the CBRN(E) event in the response phase, the recovery phase and part or all of the restoration phases.

KEY TASK 2 – MOBILISATION
The activation and continuous process of deployment and management of resources to a safe area near the scene, following a trigger event and declaration of a CBRN(E) event. The decision to mobilise should follow a process of information/intelligence gathering and assessment.

KEY TASK 3 – ARRIVAL AT SCENE
The structured arrival via safe routes of suitably equipped and resourced responders to a safe area near the scene of a declared CBRN(E) event.
KEY TASK 4 – SCENE ASSESSMENT
The structured and dynamic process of information/intelligence gathering, originating with the trigger event. Refined as further information/intelligence becomes available, allowing hazard/risk assessment to inform the decision-making process. It will inform the decision on the scale and footprint of the scene.

KEY TASK 5 – SCENE MANAGEMENT
The establishment of mechanisms to manage the scene in order to allow a proactive approach to achieve strategic intentions and tactical objectives.

KEY TASK 6 – DELIBERATE RECONNAISSANCE
The planned controlled deployment of suitably protected resources working within defined parameters within the inner cordon. These resources will be deployed to specific locations in order to achieve specific operational objectives.

KEY TASK 7 – RESCUE AND TRIAGE
Rescue: The assisted removal of people unable to remove themselves from the area of greatest danger to a place of relative safety.

Triage: A dynamic method by which people are ‘sieved and sorted’ in order of medical priority. Triage aims to deliver the right patient to the right place at the right time so they receive optimum treatment while doing the most for the most. Triage would be implemented where the number of casualties exceeds the skilled help immediately available.

KEY TASK 8 – DECONTAMINATION
Is the reduction of contamination to lower the risk of further harm to contaminated casualties and to lower the risk of cross contamination.

KEY TASK 9 – SURVIVOR MANAGEMENT
A survivor is defined as any person who has been involved in a CBRN(E) event and no longer presents a cross-contamination risk. Survivors should be managed within each individual emergency service’s existing contingency plans and operational procedures.

Recovery, identification and decontamination of fatalities

7C17.23 Processes and procedures for the recovery, identification and decontamination of fatalities at a CBRN(E) event are subject to ongoing work led by the Home Office.

7C17.24 Further guidance can be found in Home Office publication (RESTRICTED) – The Safe Handling of Contaminated Fatalities, Guidance Document, JUNE 2009.

7C17.25 The Police Service are responsible for:
  • the recovery of fatalities
  • placing fatalities within suitable body bags
• transporting the fatalities to and from the Fire and Rescue Service decontamination structures
• providing suitable storage facilities within the inner cordon
• holding the fatalities within the storage facilities within the inner cordon.

7C17.26 The Police Service responsibilities are delivered by the Police Disaster Victim Identification capability.

7C17.27 The Fire and Rescue Service is responsible for:
• assembling the decontamination and identification tents and maintaining the equipment whilst in use
• undertaking the actual decontamination of the exterior of the closed body bags
• managing any contaminated water run off.

7C17.28 Fire and Rescue Service responsibilities are delivered by the decontamination of body bags capability, managed by CFOA National Resilience.

7C17.29 Provision of decontamination of body bags is located within three English regions that will respond on a national basis to assist the affected Fire and Rescue Service. Further decontamination of body bags provision is located within the devolved administrations.

Fire and Rescue Service National Resilience

Introduction

7C17.30 The concept of ‘resilience’ has long been used to describe individuals with the ability to withstand or recover easily and quickly from illness or hardship. It is a term that can be applied as easily to organisations or societies. The Government uses the term when talking about national security and emergency preparedness, response and recovery. Resilience in this sense means ensuring that the country as a whole can handle and recover quickly from any major emergency, such as a large-scale flood, terrorist attack or major industrial accident.

7C17.31 The Civil Contingencies Secretariat sits within the Cabinet Office at the heart of central government. It works in partnership with government departments, the devolved administrations and key stakeholders to enhance the country’s resilience and ability to prepare for, respond to and recover from the full range of emergencies.
The Civil Contingencies Capabilities Programme was the core framework through which the Government built resilience across all parts of the United Kingdom. ‘Capability’ is a term that includes all of those elements required to respond to an emergency (eg plans, equipment, people, training and supplies).

The ‘programme’ identified the generic capabilities that underpin the UK’s resilience to disruptive emergencies, and ensured that each of these capabilities, split into 18 work streams, was developed. These capabilities include being able to respond to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents. Each of the work streams has been the responsibility of a designated lead department and in the case of CBRN(E) this is the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). DCLG has delivered three projects as part of a wider programme to increase resilience, interoperability and control within the Fire and Rescue Service; these projects make up the Fire Resilience Programme.

New Dimension Programme

The New Dimension project was a collaboration between DCLG, the Fire and Rescue Service and the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA), and has enhanced the ability of the Fire and Rescue Service to respond to major disruptive events involving CBRN(E) agents, collapsed or unstable structures, and the displacement of large volumes of water.

Its origins were a result of the tragic events of the 2001 terror attacks on the World Trade Centre Twin Towers building in New York. Following this, both the UK Government and the Fire and Rescue Service had to adapt to new levels of threat to the population and, at the same time, to the unpredictability of disasters arising from extremes of weather. The aim of the New Dimension programme has been to ensure that Fire and Rescue Services throughout the country are resourced and equipped to provide a fully co-ordinated, coherent and unified national response to the widest possible range of potential national emergency incidents.

The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (England) Order 2007 is a statutory instrument which requires that Fire and Rescue Services make provision for dealing with CBRN(E) (mass decontamination) incidents and incidents involving structural collapse.

As the project concluded, DCLG and CFOA focused on the long-term management plans for New Dimension, or the Fire and Rescue National Resilience Programme as it is now known. DCLG and CFOA aim to ensure the new capabilities are fully integrated into Fire and Rescue Service core business and that standards are maintained to guarantee national interoperability. Long-term arrangements have centred on the following areas:

- physical maintenance of the vehicles and kit
- assurance that the capabilities continue fit for purpose
- funding for the above.
National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT)

7C17.38 The Fire and Rescue National Resilience Programme is one part of DCLG’s contribution to the Civil Contingencies Capabilities Programme. The strategic aim is to continue to enhance preparedness and resilience of the Fire and Rescue Service in England and Wales by maintaining and improving the national resilience assets that have been provided. The programme consists of four distinct capabilities. These are:

- CBRN(E) incorporating mass decontamination and detection, identification and monitoring
- urban search and rescue
- high volume pumping
- command and control.

7C17.39 Operational assurance on a national basis is provided by the Fire and Rescue National Resilience Board, the CFOA led assurance body, which reports to the Local Government Association Fire Services Management Committee. The Fire and Rescue National Resilience Board carries out this function through the National Resilience Assurance Team.

7C17.40 The National Resilience Team provides operational assurance that the national resilience capabilities remain fit for purpose and can be deployed consistently across national and regional boundaries, including managing and monitoring operational practices, procedures and technical advice on the capabilities, and the associated operational IT, communications and training, asset refresh and any siting or re-siting of assets.

Fire and Rescue Service National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF)

7C17.41 The Fire and Rescue Service National Framework 2008-11 outlines the role of the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser (CFRA) and identifies some of the responsibilities of the position for national co-ordination and advice during incidents of national significance. The National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework is the result of work undertaken by the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA) and the CFRA to ensure that these responsibilities are discharged through an effective national framework.

7C17.42 The development of the National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework has been designed to ensure that a robust, yet flexible and adaptable, framework is in place that enhances national support arrangements at significant incidents.
The National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework document provides a structure that offers national support to affected Fire and Rescue Service(s) during incidents of national significance or those requiring a level of national coordination. It sets out the arrangements for an enhanced support provision including:

- guidance and support to the affected Fire and Rescue Service and the government department responsible for the Fire and Rescue Service
- the provision of support and information to the CFRA
- guidance and support to enable national interoperability
- the provision of professional fire and rescue advice and support to ministers and the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR).

The National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework gives guidance for the respective roles and responsibilities for the various components of the framework, demonstrating the direct lines of communications that will ensure accurate and timely information is shared in the support of the requirements of the incident(s). The framework has been designed for co-ordination, advice and to ensure the provision of national support to the affected Service(s). The roles include:

- The Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser (CFRA)
- The National Strategic Adviser Team (NSAT)
- The National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT)
- Subject Matter Adviser (SMA)
- The DCLG Emergency Room (CLG ER)
- The Fire and Rescue Service National Co-ordination Centre (FRSNCC).

The National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework, or any components within it, does not remove any of the statutory duties of the local Fire and Rescue Authority or responsibilities of the Chief Fire Officer or Commissioner. The Incident Commander deployed by the Fire and Rescue Service in question retains the responsibility to resolve the incidents that occur within their area. The framework supplements and augments the existing response arrangements and does not replace them. The National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework should be read in conjunction with the Fire and Rescue Service Manual for Incident Command: 3rd Edition.

The National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework would be an essential part of resolving a major CBRN(E) incident. An electronic version of the document is available at:

http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/fire/opguidancencaf
Section 8
Appendices
APPENDIX A

Generic Standard Operating Procedure Summary

The following pages contain an operational key information summary of the generic standard operating procedure (G-SOP) that may be used as an aide-memoir.
Operational key information summary

Generic standard operating procedure (G-SOP)

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENTS – KEY ACTIONS/CONSIDERATIONS

Mobilising and en-route

• Assess the level and scale of the incident:
  – match incident details to site specific predetermined attendances, operational plans, multi-agency plans etc
  – implement ‘major incident’ plan?

• Mobilise appropriate resources to the incident, marshalling areas or predetermined rendezvous points
  – utilise Firemet information
  – consider use of up-wind, pre-planned marshalling sites or rendezvous points for significant known hazardous materials risks.

• Access incident specific information en-route:
  – request information on, and begin to think about, the likely hazards and control measures when mobilised to known substances and hazardous materials sites
  – access site specific risk inspection information
  – request and use weather information (eg FireMet)
  – assess and review marshalling/rendezvous points arrangements

• Notify and/or request assistance/attendance from relevant agencies.

Arrival and gathering information

• Approach the incident safely and estimate the potential hazard zone:
  – use weather information (eg FireMet) and visual indicators of wind strength and direction (eg wind blown tree foliage etc) to plan your approach to the incident from the upwind direction so that crews are not exposed to hazardous vapours or gases
  – if possible and safe to do so without additional personal protective equipment, approach the incident from higher ground (ie up-slope) especially if hazardous liquids are known to be present
  – ensure response vehicles approach the vicinity of the incident at slow speed
when approaching the vicinity of the incident use senses (sight, hearing) to assess ‘incident-indicators’ to assist in estimating the extent of the hazard zone

– ensure response vehicles approach the vicinity of the incident at slow speed

– estimate the potential hazard zone, and position staff and vehicles outside it

– establish command/contact point in a safe location

– downwind, dilution, obstacle, oscillation and retention (DDOOR) key factors to remember when dealing with a hazardous release in an urban environment.

**Recognise hazards and risks from a safe location and implement an initial cordon:**

– can the hazardous materials cause harm to people by inhalation, ingestion, direct skin contact, absorption through the skin or eyes or entry through cuts and grazes?

– can the hazardous materials to cause harm to property and the environment?

– what additional hazards and risks are there? (eg unsafe structures, road traffic, working at height etc)

– establish an initial cordon (See table)

– if explosives are known to be involved in fire then initial cordon distances must be treated as exclusion distances.

**Liaise with persons on-site**

**Consider the ‘Immediate Life Risk’ (NOTE: Immediate life risk = immediate human life saving rescues; immediate evacuation to prevent serious injury; prevention of catastrophic escalation likely to endanger life). If rescues or other direct intervention is required (NOTE: Risk verses benefit) consider appropriate control measures (consider – personal protective equipment; crew briefing; safe-route; time/distance/shielding).**

**Identify the problem and the likely impact:**

– carry out full survey of the site

– retrieve and interpret hazard and incident information

– assess the condition of damaged hazardous materials containment systems

– predict the likely behaviour of the hazardous materials involved

– estimate the size of the endangered area

– estimate the potential harm/impact

– review the position of the Initial cordon with regard to the information gathered and the predicted hazard zone.

**Estimate the resource requirements and request assistance**
• Implement the incident command system:
  – the benefits of proceeding with a task must be weighed carefully against the risks
  – all commanders must know who they are responsible for
  – all staff must know who they report to
  – all staff must know what their operational brief is
• If a clean area with washing facilities cannot be established prohibit eating, drinking etc. on-site.

Planning the response
• Identify the objectives:
  – Identify any on-going risks to people from the hazardous materials following the initial assessment. Set any human rescues as a critical-priority
  – Identify any fires or fire risks. Set firefighting as a high-priority
  – Identify property that can be saved and that which is already lost
  – Identify the extent of environmental harm
  – Agree and prioritise the objectives in consultation with the relevant agencies/people.
• Develop a response plan with specialist advisers and other agencies:
  – identify the options to achieve the objectives
  – risk asses the options and select the best course of action
  – develop the response plan
  – identify the tactical mode
  – ensure there is sign-up to the response plan from other agencies. where this practicable.
• Identify the level and type of personal protective equipment required:
  – assess the tasks and associated hazards
  – select the most effective personal protective equipment
  – select the most appropriate/capable staff.
• Identify appropriate decontamination procedures:
  – establish the responsibilities of the Fire and Rescue Service for decontamination
  – assess the hazards posed by the hazardous materials, the site and the tasks being carried out, then select the most effective type of decontamination
  – identify the resources and procedures required by decontamination
– identify procedures and precautions to deal with decontamination run-off to prevent or minimise environmental pollution.

• Fire and Rescue Service staff must never be committed to ‘hot’ or ‘warm’ zones without decontamination being available

• The scale, level and complexity of the decontamination set-up will depend on the Incident Commander’s risk assessment but must be based on standard operating procedures

• The outcome of decontamination is, as a minimum, to lower risk of harm/cross-contamination to an acceptable level, that is, as low as reasonably practicable

   NOTE: It is not always possible to totally remove the contaminant or clean the personal protective equipment on-site.

Implementing the response

• Review and monitor inner and outer cordons to control access at the scene

• Establish a clear path to the decontamination zone from the ‘hot’ zone ensuring that the ‘warm’ zone is extended as necessary to encompass it

• Communicate and control the response plan:
  – nominate Safety Officers
  – ensure all responders are briefed by their commanders on the response plan
  – designate clean areas with washing facilities for staff hydration and welfare
  – communicate with the local community to ensure public safety and reduce anxiety/concern.

• Establish and operate decontamination

• Implement deliberate reconnaissance to gather further information

• Implement effective firefighting, containment and pollution control techniques:
  – control or extinguish fires
  – carry out ‘defensive’ hazardous materials containment actions (ie the risk outweighs the benefit of committing staff within the Inner Cordon to control the release)
  – carry out ‘offensive’ hazardous materials containment actions
  – work with the responsible agencies to control pollution from the site
  – ensure that all emergency actions are within the realm of reasonable response.

• Work with people and agencies that may provide additional advice and assistance.
Evaluating the response

• Evaluate the effectiveness of the response:
  – select competent staff to carry out evaluation
  – evaluate the effectiveness of ‘reactive’ stage actions
  – continually evaluate progress of the response plan
  – evaluate the effectiveness of decontamination
  – evaluate the effectiveness of the specialist hazardous materials advice
  – record significant findings.
• Adjust the response plan, implement additional control measures and communicate the changes, if necessary.

Closing the incident

• Close down Fire and Rescue Service operations:
  – minimise the impact to the community by the Fire and Rescue Service leaving the incident
  – return equipment and other resources to the correct place and ensure they are secure and ready for re-deployment
  – report any faults or low levels of supplies
  – extract and clean equipment
  – ensure that correct action has been taken if staff have been "exposed" to hazardous materials.
• Hand-over control of the incident site:
  – identify the responsible person, organisation or agency
  – document the hand-over.
• Carry out on-site incident debrief
• Anticipate post incident considerations:
  – staff health monitoring where exposure has occurred
  – delayed health effects
  – assessment and disposal of contaminated equipment and personal protective equipment
  – repatriation of impounded and/or contaminated equipment
  – trauma incident management – including reassurance briefings for potentially contaminated crews
  – liaison with enforcing authorities where legislation/regulation may have been contravened
  – assess and report any post incident financial liability.
CBRN(E) incidents, nine key tasks

1) Command and control
2) Mobilisation
3) Arrival at scene
4) Scene assessment
5) Scene management
6) Deliberate reconnaissance
7) Rescue and triage
8) Support to decontamination
9) Survivor management
**GENERIC INITIAL CORDON DISTANCES**

(Note: continuous risk assessment should be carried out to ensure that the cordon remains appropriate and proportionate to the risks identified by the Incident Commander)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident type (if known)</th>
<th>Initial cordon distance (metres radius)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explosives – manufacture, storage, transport</td>
<td>100m for transport incident HD1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NOTE:</strong> Pre-planning for known sites should include rendezvous points at safe distances</td>
<td>200m for transport incident HD 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600m Transport HD 1.1, HD 1.2 and HD 1.5 (or when HD is not known)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100m for registered premises (fireworks only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200m for incidents at other registered premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600m for incidents involving licensed storage (under 2000kg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1000m for incidents involving licensed storage (more than 2000kg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives – CBRN, terrorist</td>
<td>100m for an activated device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(<strong>Consider no Fire and Rescue Service attendance or treat as EXCLUSION distances for Fire and Rescue Service staff, take guidance from the Police Service and explosive ordnance disposal experts</strong>)</td>
<td>Unexploded devices:*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100m for a suitcase size device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200m for a car size device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>400m for a lorry (or when size of device is not known)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cylinders involved in fire</td>
<td>Fireball up to 25m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NOTE:</strong> Shielding may reduce distances</td>
<td>Cylinder may be thrown up to 150m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flying fragments up to 200m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiation</td>
<td><strong>Outside buildings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45m – unshielded or damaged potentially dangerous source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100m – major spill from a potentially dangerous source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300m – fire, explosion or fumes involving a potentially dangerous source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>400m or more to protect against an explosion – Suspected bomb (exploded or unexploded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Inside buildings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affected and adjacent areas (including the floor above and below) – Damage, loss of shielding or spill of a potentially dangerous source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entire building and outside distances detailed above – fire or other event that can spread a potentially dangerous source materials throughout the building (eg through the ventilation system)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX B

Hazardous materials incident information record and Fire and Rescue Service Risk assessment template

### Example template

The following is an example of a recording template which Fire and Rescue Services could use at hazardous materials incidents. It enables the hazardous materials adviser to:

- systematically record all relevant information
- assess the risks
- recommend suitable and sufficient control measures to the Incident Commander.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Incident description</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief description of what’s happened</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Précis of Incident</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting information including location, time of day, weather etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Information sources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemdata / CIRUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous Goods List</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MSDS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placards and labelling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product manufacturer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Quantify the scale of the incident</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large scale / Small scale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantities involved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate worse case scenario</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate extent of hazard zones</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential for harm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. **Identify the hazards**

   - Chemical hazards
   - Physical hazards
   - Reactions with other substances
   - Condition of containment system
   - How far will material spread?

5. **Interpret the physical properties**

   - Interpret relevant physical properties
   - Predict the likely behaviour of the substance
   - Effect of weather conditions

6. **Identify who/what is at risk**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From what? (eg contamination, fire fumes, particulates, spillage, run-off etc)</th>
<th>Risk Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firefighters</td>
<td>L M H</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L M H</td>
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<td></td>
<td>L M H</td>
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<td>L M H</td>
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<td></td>
<td>L M H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other emergency responders</td>
<td>L M H</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L M H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>L M H</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L M H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>L M H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L M H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **Level of personal protective equipment, contamination risk and decontamination strategy**

   - Select appropriate personal protective equipment for each task
   - Exposure conditions
   - Identify contamination risk
   - Identify decontamination method
### 8. Risk control measures
- **Tactics**
- **Safe approach**
- **Cordons, inner and outer**
- **Crew size**
- **Firefighting media**
- **Public safety considerations and evacuation**
- **Vapour cloud dispersal / suppression**

### 9. Environmental protection measures
- **Identify environmental vulnerability**
- **Identify pollution pathways**
- **Source, pathway, receptor**
- **Pollution control strategy**

**NOTE:** Hierarchy of control

### 10. Liaison (What agencies and why)
- **Police, ambulance**
- **Environment agency**
- **Water company**
- **Health protection agency**
- **Local authority**
- **Specialist companies**
- **Hand-over and incident closure**

**NOTE:** Responsible person/agency

### 11. Post incident considerations
- **Safe disposal/repatriation of personal protective equipment and equipment**
- **Product recovery**
- **Debriefs (on-site, off-site, multi-agency)**
- **Medical aftercare, occupational health**
- **Personal exposure records**
- **Investigation (eg learning lessons, enforcement action and cost recovery)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF OFFICER</th>
<th>DATE AND TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 9

Acknowledgements
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- Radiation – CFO Dominic Harrison and Justin Johnston (Cumbria Fire and Rescue Service)
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This group was formed specifically to help develop the guidance. It comprised:

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Frank Clayton – CFRA Scotland and Grampian Fire and Rescue Service

Steve Price – CFRA Wales and South Wales Fire and Rescue Service

John Allen – Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service

Jeff Marwood – Fire Service College

Paul MacDonald – Scottish Fire Services College

Dave Beverley – Fire Brigades’ Union

Craig Thomson – Fire Officers’ Association

Phillip Grimes – Retained Firefighters’ Union

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Ian Johnson – CFOA Radiation and Cumbria Fire and Rescue Service

Bill Atkinson – National Chemical Emergency Centre

Stephen Day – Bureau Veritas

Graham Dennis – North East CFOA Region and Cleveland Fire and Rescue Service

Martin Cripps – South East CFOA Region and Kent Fire and Rescue Service

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Section 10
Glossary of terms and abbreviations
Glossary of terms and abbreviations

Sector specific acronyms

This guidance deliberately avoids the use of abbreviations and acronyms. However, as they are routinely used in the Fire and Rescue Service and chemical industry the most common ones are contained below.

7(2)(d)

Section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act. Specifically a fire and rescue authority must put in place effective arrangements for obtaining information which it needs to carry out its statutory functions.

A

Acid – An acid is a material that will liberate $H^+$ ions into solution in excess of any $OH^-$ ions.

ACM – Asbestos containing material. A material which contains the fibrous forms of naturally occurring silicate minerals.

Activity – The amount of radiation being emitted by a source. Usually measured in becquerels.

Acute – Severe often dangerous condition in which relatively rapid changes occur.

Acute toxicity – Adverse health effects occurring within a short time period of exposure to a single dose of a chemical or as a result of multiple exposures over a short time period eg 24 hours.

ADN – European Agreements concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous by Inland Waterways.

ADR – European Agreements concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road.

Aerosol – A colloidal suspension of liquid or solid particles dispersed in gas having a negligible falling velocity (generally considered to be less than 0.25 m/s).

AFFF – Aqueous film forming foam which flows on burning liquid as a film.

ALARP – An acronym used in legislation meaning as low as reasonably practicable.

Alcohol resistant foam – Foam for use on fires involving liquids miscible with water eg alcohol, acetone.

Alkanes – Straight and branched chain saturated hydrocarbons.

ALOHA – Aerial Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres is an atmospheric dispersion model used for evaluating releases of hazardous chemical vapours.
**Alpha (\(\alpha\)) radiation** – Type of radiation involving the emission of an alpha particle from the nucleus of a radioactive atom. Can only travel a few centimetres in air. See Section 7, Part C10.

**Anoxia** – Deficient supply of oxygen to tissues.

**Antibody** – A modified protein circulating in the serum of an animal, synthesized in response to a foreign molecule, antigen, that has entered the body.

**APP** – Additional personal protection code used in the UK Emergency Action Code (also known as HAZCHEM).

**AQC** – Air Quality Cell. An Environment Agency led capability to provide an air monitoring service at major incidents.

**ARA** – Analytical Risk Assessment, Fire and Rescue Service term from the Incident Command System. It is a detailed risk assessment which is performed after the initial assessment.

**Aromatics** – Unsaturated hydrocarbons which contain one or more benzene rings.

**Asbestos** – The generic name given to the fibrous forms of naturally occurring silicate minerals.

**Atopy** – Hypersensitivity where tendency to allergy is inherited.

**Auto-ignition temperature** – The minimum temperature required to initiate or cause self-sustained combustion of material in the absence of any external source of energy.

**B**

**Background rate** – The radiation dose rate due to environmental radioactivity.

**Backfire** – A backfire (a single cracking or ‘popping’ sound) is when a welding/cutting flame has ignited the gases inside the nozzle and extinguished itself. This may happen when the torch is held too near the work piece.

**Barrel** – The standard barrel contains 159.1 litres (35 imperial gallons or 42 US gallons).

**Base** – A base is a material that will react with an acid to yield salt and water only.

**BASIS** – BASIS is an independent standards setting and auditing organisation for the pesticide, fertiliser and allied industries.

**Becquerel** – The unit of activity which measures the number of radioactive disintegrations per second in a source.

**Beta (\(\beta\)) radiation** – Type of radiation resulting from the emission of a beta particle from the nucleus of a radioactive atom. Can only travel about 1 metre in air.

**Bioaccumulation** – Concentration of pollutant; gradient that occurs in moving from one trophic level to another, ie when an animal eats a plant or another animal, also known as biomagnification.
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) – The biochemical oxygen demand is a measure of the quantity of oxygen used by microorganisms to breakdown organic matter in a liquid. A substance with a high BoD such as Milk or Sewage if discharged into a waterbody can cause dissolved oxygen levels to fall in the waterbody resulting in the he death of fish and other aquatic life.

Bioconcentration – Extraction of chemicals from the environment, and concentration within the organism. For example, seaweed concentrates iodine from the seawater within its tissues, so it is very useful for humans as a source of concentrated iodine. Similarly, plutonium is present at very low levels in seawater. It is concentrated within tiny algae (phytoplankton) that make up the producers in the open sea ecosystem (up to 3,000 times stronger in one of these algae than in the sea water). Algae also concentrate PCBs to 2,000 times the ambient sea water levels.

Biodegradation – Breakdown of a complex chemical into simpler components by actions of biological organisms.

BLEVE – Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion is a container failure with a release of energy, often rapidly and violently, which is accompanied by a release of gas/vapour to atmosphere and propulsion of the container or container pieces due to an over pressure rupture. If the substance involved is flammable, it is likely that the resulting cloud of the substance will ignite after the BLEVE has occurred forming a fireball and possibly a fuel-air explosion termed a unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE).

Breathing Apparatus (BA) – Self contained, positive pressure, respiratory protective equipment.

C

CAMEO – Computer-aided management of emergency operations.

Carcinogen – An agent, chemical physical or biological, capable of increasing the incidence of malignant neoplasms.

Catalyst – A substance which alters the rate of a reaction. Most catalysts are used to increase reaction rates.

CBRN – CBRN is a term used to describe chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials. CBRN is often associated with terrorism (see CBRN(E)).

CBRN(E) or CBRNe – CBRN(E) or CBRNe is a term used to describe chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. CBRN/CBRN(E) terrorism entails the assumption or knowledge, based on intelligence or actual evidence, of actual or threatened dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material (either on their own or in combination with each other or with explosives), with deliberate criminal, malicious or murderous intent, targeted at a given population or economic or symbolic points.

CE mark – The application of the CE Mark on a product shows conformity with the essential requirements of the ‘new approach’ directive covering that product.
CEN – CEN: The European Committee for Standardisation.

CFOA – Chief Fire Officers Association.

CFRA – Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser.

CHALETS – An acronym used by initial responders at significant incidents (e.g., CBRN incidents etc) formulate an standard assessment message to their mobilising control. CHALETS stands for casualties, hazards, access, location, emergency, type and safety.

Chemical protective clothing (CPC) – The combined assembly of garments worn to provide protection against exposure to, or contact with, chemicals.

Chemical protective suit (CPS) – Clothing worn to protect against chemicals that covers the whole or greater part of the body. A chemical protective suit may comprise garments combined together to provide protection to the body. A suit may also have various types of additional protection such as hood or helmet, boots and gloves joined with it.

CHIP – Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) Regulations.

Chronic – Occurring for a prolonged period.

Chronic toxicity – Adverse health effects in a living organism resulting from repeated exposures to a chemical for a significant part of the organism’s lifespan.

CIRUS – Chemical Information Retrieval Update System.

Class A fire – Fire involving solids, usually organic, in which combustion generally occurs with the formation of glowing embers.

Class B fire – Fire involving liquids or liquefiable solids.

Class C fire – Fire involving gases or liquefied gases.

Class D fire – Fire involving metals.

CLG – The Department for Communities and Local Government, HM Government.

Clinical Decontamination – The process where contaminated casualties are treated individually by trained healthcare professionals using purpose designed decontamination equipment.

CLP – Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures Regulations.

COBR – Cabinet Office Briefing Room.

COMAH – Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations (replaced CIMAH).

Cold zone – This is the uncontaminated area between the inner cordon and the outer cordon. It is the area within which key operational command positions and other essential activities will be set up. The Police Service, in liaison with the Fire and Rescue Service and the Ambulance Service, should decide whether members of the public need to be evacuated from the cold zone.

Contact dermatitis – Inflammation of the skin due to exposure to a substance that attacks its surface.
**Contact point** – A designated point, usually an appliance not involved in operations, from which a nominated member of staff will carry out the Command Support function at a small to medium size incident.

**Contamination** – Contamination occurs when a substance adheres or is deposited on people, equipment or the environment, thereby, creating a risk of exposure and possible injury or harm.

**NOTE:** Contamination does not automatically lead to exposure but may do. Alpha, beta and gamma emissions in themselves cannot cause contamination, although the actual source materials may be able to depending on their physical properties and their containment.

**Command** – The authority for an agency to direct the actions of its own resources (both personnel and equipment).

**Command line** – The line or chain of command at an incident. The incident command system relies upon a single unified command line. With the exception of urgent safety related issues officers should not take control of operations outside their assigned responsibility and should ensure all information and instruction is passed via the relevant command line officers.

**Command Point** – Point from which the Incident Commander operates; this may be a car, appliance, specialist unit or a part of a building.

**Command Support** – Command support is a role undertaken by one or more staff at an incident. The role typically provides recording, liaison, detailed resource management and information gathering for the Incident Commander. At large incidents command support may comprise a dedicated team working from a mobile command unit and may include individuals tasked with supporting sector commanders. Command support is not directly in the command line.

**Compressed gas** – Gas, which, when packaged under pressure for transport, is entirely gaseous at all temperatures above –50°C.

**NOTE:** All gases with a critical temperature below –50°C belong to this category.

**Cordon control** – Cordons are employed as an effective method of controlling resources and maintaining safety on the incident ground. They must be continuously monitored and adapted to reflect changes in hazards, weather etc.

**Corrosive** – A substance that chemically attacks a material with which it has contact.

**COSHH** – *Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations*.

**CPC** – Abbreviation for chemical protective clothing: The combined assembly of garments worn to provide protection against exposure to, or contact with, chemicals.

**CPS (Chemical Protection Suit)** – Abbreviation for chemical protection suits.

**CPS (Counts per second)** – Number of electrical pulses counted by an instrument arising from ionising radiation and proportional to the level of radioactivity.
**Critical temperature** – The temperature above which a gas cannot be liquefied by the application of pressure alone.

**Cryogen** – A substance used to obtain temperatures far below the freezing point of water (less than –78°C).

**D**

**Dangerous substance** – Defined substances that may be hazardous to the Fire and Rescue Service in an emergency (from the *Notification and Marking of Sites Regulations 1990*).

**DCLG** – The Department for Communities and Local Government, HM Government.

**DDOOR** – Downwind, Dilution, Obstacle, Oscillation and Retention. These are the key factors to remember when dealing with a hazardous release in an urban environment.

**Decompose** – Separate into its constituent elements, with the release of heat/energy.

**Decomposition** – Chemical reaction whereby a substance breaks down into its constituent elements. In the case of acetylene this means carbon and hydrogen. This reaction gives out a great deal of heat.

**Decontamination** – Decontamination is the physical and/or chemical process of reducing contamination to minimise the risk of further harm occurring and to minimise the risk of cross contamination to a level as low as reasonably practicable.

**Decontamination Area** – The area containing the Fire and Rescue Service (and possibly other emergency services’) decontamination staff, equipment and structures. It is a suitable area initially established outside the inner cordon, at first uncontaminated by the initial release, which becomes contaminated by the managed and controlled movement of people who require decontamination. Prior to decontamination commencing, the inner cordon will be adjusted to encompass the decontamination area.

**Deflagration** – Exothermic chemical decomposition of a material in which the reaction front advances into the unreacted material at less than the speed of sound.

**DEFRA** – Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

**Deliberate reconnaissance** – Deliberate reconnaissance is distinct from scene assessment, which is a specific activity carried out prior to any formal structures being in place and as a necessary part of the initial response. Deliberate reconnaissance differs for each of the different agencies involved, for example the police may deploy for deliberate reconnaissance of a building or for the recovery of evidence, whereas the Fire and Rescue Service will primarily deploy for substance analysis and identification.

**Degradation** – The continuing action of chemical attack to which chemical protective clothing may be subject to in use or during storage.

**Detonation** – Explosion in which the flamefront advances at more than supersonic speed.
**DIM** – DCLG, has provided a suite of Detection Identification and Monitoring (DIM) equipment to the Fire and Rescue Service. **Detection** – The recognition of the presence of a CBRN material. **Identification** – The determination of which CBRN material is present. **Monitoring** – A continuous or periodic process of qualitatively or quantitatively determining the presence or absence of CBRN material.

**Dissolved acetylene (DA)** – Acetylene dissolved in acetone.

**Dose rate** – The radiation dose absorbed per unit time.

**DSEAR** – DSEAR stands for the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002. DSEAR puts duties on employers and the self-employed to protect people from risks to their safety from fires, explosions and similar events in the workplace, this includes members of the public who may be put at risk by work activity.

**Dust** – Solid particles generated by mechanical action, present as airborne contaminant (less than 0.076 mm in size).

**E**

**EA** – Environment Agency.

**EAC** – Emergency action code (EAC) (also known as HAZCHEM) is designed to cover the first vital step and gives an immediate indication of any actions that could be taken should it be necessary without the use of reference materials or expert advice.


**Electron** – An elementary particle with low mass and a negative charge.

**EMARC** – Met Office Environment Monitoring and Response Centre.

**EMAS** – European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme.

**Emergency exposure (radiation)** – The exposure of an employee to a dose in excess of the IRR dose limits in accordance with REPPIR. Set at 100 milliSieverts.

**EMS** – Environmental Management Systems.

**Encapsulating** – Protective clothing which protects the whole body including the respiratory protective device against exposure to and/or contact with chemicals.

**Endothermic reaction** – Chemical reaction resulting in absorption of heat.

**EOD** – Explosive Ordnance Disposal – Military specialist units responsible for counter terrorist bomb disposal, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, the recovery and safe disposal of conventional munitions.

**EPD** – Electronic Personal Dosimeter.

**ERG** – Emergency Response Guidebook – which is produced by the USDOT for first responders during the initial phase of a dangerous goods/hazardous materials incident.
**Erythema** – Reddening of skin, inflammation.

**Exclusion Zone** – This is an area containing hazards that have been risk assessed as so dangerous to health that nobody, including Fire and Rescue Service staff, should be allowed to enter (eg, blast area around explosives involved in fire).

**External hazard/external exposure** – Hazard to the person that comes from outside of that person, in this context γ or x-rays from an outside source penetrating a person’s body.

**Exothermic reaction** – Chemical reaction in which heat is released and, unless temperature is controlled, which may lead to runaway conditions.

**Exposure** – Exposure occurs when a harmful substance enters the body through a route, for example, inhalation, ingestion, absorption or injection, or when the body is irradiated.

   **NOTE:** Radioactive exposure, in terms of irradiation, does not automatically mean you are contaminated.

**FEMA** – Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA).

**Firefighter Decontamination** – Is the use of decontamination equipment in a planned and structured manner to minimise the risk of further harm occurring and cross contamination to a level as low as reasonably practicable. Firefighter decontamination may be divided into two levels, Initial and Full. These procedures usually involve two processes. Firstly, ‘contamination reduction’ and then ‘safe undressing’.

**Fire point** – Minimum temperature at which a mixture of gas/vapour and air continues to burn in an open container when ignited.

**Flammable range** – Concentrations of flammable gas/vapour between the LEL and UEL at a given temperature.

**Flashback** – Occurs when flame from a torch burns back into the tip, the torch or the hose. It is often accompanied by a hissing or squealing sound with a smoky or sharp-pointed flame.

**Flash point** – Lowest temperature required to raise the vapour pressure of a liquid such that vapour concentration in air near the surface of the liquid is within the flammable range, and as such the air/vapour mixture will ignite in the presence of a suitable ignition source, usually a flame.

**Fog (mists)** – Liquid aerosols formed either by condensation of a liquid on particulate nodes in air or by uptake of liquid by hygroscopic particles.

**Forward Command Post (FCP)** – Point, near the scene of operations, where the officer delegated responsibility for command in that area is sited. This may be at a bridgehead.

**Fume** – Airborne solid particles (usually less than 0.0001mm) that have condensed from the vapour state.

**FRA** – Fire and Rescue Authority.
**FRS** – Fire and Rescue Service – provided by a fire authority under the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004*.

**FRS Act** – *Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004*.

**FRSNCC** – Fire and Rescue Service National Co-ordination Centre – based in West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service, established to co-ordinate the mobilisation of national resilience assets in collaboration with Fire and Rescue Service mobilising controls.

**G**

**Gamma (\(\gamma\)) radiation** – Type of radiation involving the emission of electromagnetic energy from the nucleus of a radioactive atom. May travel many hundreds of metres in air.

**Generic Risk Assessment (GRA)** – A fundamental element of the Fire and Rescue Service 5-Step Risk Assessment process. To support FRAs in satisfying their regulatory requirements, under the *Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999* (MHSWR), a series of Generic Risk Assessments have been produced by HM Government.

**Gas** – Gas is one of three classical states of matter. Near absolute zero, a substance exists as a solid. As heat is added to this substance it melts into a liquid at its melting point, boils into a gas at its boiling point, and if heated high enough would enter a plasma state in which the electrons are so energized that they leave their parent atoms from within the gas.

A pure gas may be made up of individual atoms (eg a noble gas or atomic gas like neon), elemental molecules made from one type of atom (eg oxygen), or compound molecules made from a variety of atoms (eg carbon dioxide). A gas mixture would contain a variety of pure gases much like the air. What distinguishes a gas from liquids and solids is the vast separation of the individual gas particles.

**Gas tight CPC** – Gas tight chemical protective clothing: Clothing which satisfies the requirements for ‘leak tightness’ when tested according to the internal pressure test given in the current BS EN.

**GHS** – Globally Harmonized System of classification and labelling of chemicals. This is a UN scheme aiming to have, worldwide, the same criteria for; classifying chemicals according to their health, environmental and physical hazards; and hazard communication requirements for labelling and safety data sheets. The GHS is not a formal treaty, but instead is a non-legally binding international agreement. Therefore countries (or trading blocks) must create local or national legislation to implement the GHS.

**H**

**Half life** – Length of time taken for a radioactive material to disintegrate to half its original strength.

**Hazard** – A hazard is anything that may cause harm.
**Hazard zone** – This is an area that contains hazards to which a risk assessment should be applied in order to determine a suitable inner cordon. A hazard zone is not necessarily an ‘exclusion zone’ and would encompass both the hot and warm zones if they exist. The hazard zone is sometimes referred to as the ‘evacuation zone’ by other agencies and generally means the area where they would seek to encourage all members of the public to leave or possibly shelter-in-place.

**HazMats** – Acronym for hazardous materials. HazMats, also referred to as dangerous/hazardous substances or goods, are solids, liquids, or gases that can harm people, other living organisms, property, or the environment. They not only include materials that are toxic, radioactive, flammable, explosive, corrosive, oxidizers, asphyxiates, biohazards, pathogen or allergen substances and organisms, but also materials with physical conditions or other characteristics that render them hazardous in specific circumstances, such as compressed gases and liquids, or hot/cold materials.

**HazMats adviser** – HazMats adviser is a generic term for any person, with enhanced knowledge of HazMats operations, used by a Fire and Rescue Service to provide independent specialist advice to the Incident Commander at emergency incidents involving hazardous materials.

**HERS** – Hazard Emergency Response Service.

**HIN** – Hazard Identification Number.

**HMEPO** – A Hazardous Materials and Environmental Protection Officer is a Fire and Rescue Service emergency management role that provides advice to the Incident Commander on tactics and other issues in relation to environmental protection. Such officers will have gained additional knowledge and understanding on environmental protection through specific development programmes and/or training courses.

**Hot zone** – This is the contaminated area(s) where the initial release occurs or disperses to. It will be the area likely to pose an immediate threat to the health and safety of all those located within it and is the area of greatest risk. It is located within the inner cordon and is part of the hazard zone.

**HPA** – Health Protection Agency. The Health Protection Agency’s role is to provide an integrated approach to protecting UK public health through the provision of support and advice.

**Hydrocarbons** – Compounds which are composed of atoms of hydrogen and carbon only.

**Hydrogenation (de-)** – The addition (removal) of hydrogen.

**Hygienic cleaning** – The process by which CPC is disininfected internally to allow it to be re-used.

**IAEA** – International Atomic Energy Agency.
**IBC** – Intermediate bulk container is a container used for transport and storage of fluids and bulk materials.

**ICS** – Incident Command System.

**Improvised decontamination** – The use of an immediately available method of decontamination prior to the use of specialist resources (e.g., on-site washing facilities, etc.).

**IMDG code** – International Maritime Dangerous Goods code.

**Incident Commander (IC)** – The nominated competent officer having overall responsibility for dictating tactics and resource management.

**Initial cordon** – The initial cordon is temporarily established by the first wave of unprotected emergency responders, before any detailed scene assessment or any other scientific analysis has been conducted. It provides an initial means of controlling, safeguarding, and coordinating the immediate response and adds an element of control to the incident.

**Inner cordon** – The inner cordon surrounds the area where potentially hazardous activity may be conducted and encompasses both the hot and warm zones. It is used to control access to the immediate scene of operations. Access to the area controlled by an inner cordon, which by definition is the hazard zone, should be restricted to the minimum numbers required for work to be undertaken safely and effectively.

**Interim decontamination** – The use of standard Fire and Rescue Service equipment to provide a planned and structured decontamination process prior to the availability of purpose-designed decontamination equipment.

**Internal hazard/Internal exposure** – Hazard to the person after radioactive material has been inhaled, ingested, absorbed or injected inside the body and continues to emit ionising radiation inside the body’s vital organs.

**Intrinsic safety** – Intrinsic safety (IS) is a protection technique for safe operation of electrical equipment in explosive atmospheres. Intrinsically safe equipment is designed to limit the energy available to create a spark or heat surfaces, under both normal and ‘fault’ conditions.

There are varying standards of electrical safety, regulated under BSI and EN.

**Ionisation** – The process by which a neutral atom or molecule acquires or loses an electric charge. The production of ions.

**Ionising radiation** – Radiation that produces ionisation in matter.

**IRR** – The [*Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999*](#).

**Irradiation** – An event where matter has been externally subjected to ionising radiation.

**IRU** – Incident Response Unit

**ISO containers** – Intermodal freight transport containers using standard sizes prescribed by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). There are five common standard lengths, 20-ft (6.1 m), 40-ft (12.2 m), 45-ft (13.7 m), 48-ft (14.6 m), and 53-ft (16.2 m).
Isotope – A description of different forms of the same element which have differing nuclear mass. Some isotopes are radioactive.

L

Limited use CPC – Chemical protective clothing for limited wear life usage, ie to be worn until hygienic cleaning becomes necessary, or chemical contamination has occurred, and disposal is required. This includes protective clothing for single use and for limited re-use according to the manufacturer’s instructions.

Liquid – Liquid is one of the three classical states of matter. Like a gas, a liquid is able to flow and take the shape of a container, but, like a solid, it resists compression. Unlike a gas, a liquid does not disperse to fill every space of a container, and maintains a fairly constant density. A distinctive property of the liquid state is surface tension, leading to wetting phenomena.

Liquid-tight (CPC) – Resistant to puncture by liquids in the form of a continuous jet when considering CPC.

LC$_{50}$ – Lethal concentration for 50 per cent of the population – Calculated concentration of a substance that causes death in 50 per cent of a population under prescribed conditions in a prescribed period of time.

LD$_{50}$ – Lethal dose for 50 per cent of the population – calculated dose of chemical, mg per kg of body weight, causing death in 50 per cent of test population.

LEL – Lower explosive limit – lowest concentration of vapour/gas in air at a given pressure and temperature that will propagate a flame when exposed to an ignition source.

LPG – Liquefied petroleum gas – essentially either propane or butane.

LNG – Liquefied natural gas

M

Mass decontamination (MD) – The planned and structured procedure delivered by the Fire and Rescue Service using purpose designed decontamination equipment where there are large numbers of contaminated casualties.

Major hazard – An industrial activity involving one or more dangerous substances which have the potential to give rise to serious danger to human health or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside an establishment.

Major incident – Event or situation requiring a response under one or more of the emergency services’ major incident plans.

MDT – Mobile data terminal.

MEL – Maximum exposure limit – maximum concentration of an airborne substance to which employees may be exposed by inhalation under any circumstances. **Replaced in COSHH 2005 by the Workplace Exposure Limit WEL.**
MSDS – Material safety data sheets.

MSER – Manufacture and Storage of Explosives Regulations 2005 (MSER).

Mutagen – Chemical or physical agent that can cause a change in the genetic material of a living cell.

N

NAIR – National Arrangements for Incidents involving Radioactivity.

NAME – Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment is the title of a Met Office atmospheric pollution dispersal model which is a much more sophisticated tool than CHEMET for pollution forecasting.

NAMOS – Dangerous Substances (Notification and Marking of Sites) Regulations.

NCAF – National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework.

NIHHS – Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982 (NIHHS) (as amended).

NRAT – National Resilience Assurance Team.

NSAT – National Strategic Advisory Team.

Nucleus – The core of an atom, occupying little of the volume, containing most of the mass and bearing a positive charge.

O

Octane number – A value which indicates how smoothly a petrol burns in an engine. It is based on a scale of 2,2,4-trimethylpentane (100 octane) and heptane (0 octane).

OEL – occupational exposure limits – two types MEL and OES, replaced in COSHH 2005 by the workplace exposure limit (WEL).

OES – Occupational exposure standard – a target level of exposure which was deemed to be safe for the majority of the population

NOTE: replaced in COSHH 2005 by the workplace exposure limit (WEL).

Outer cordon – The outer cordon designates the controlled area into which unauthorised access is not permitted. It encompasses the inner cordon and the hot, warm and cold zones. It should be established and maintained by the Police Service.

Oxygen deficiency – Depletion of oxygen content of air to below the normal 21 per cent. Exposure to less than 18 per cent must not be permitted.

Oxygen enrichment – Increase in oxygen content of air to above the normal 21 per cent. Enrichment above 25 per cent in a room can accelerate combustion.
P

PACRAM – Procedures and communications in the event of a release of radioactive material.

Pass-through (or pass-thru) – A means by which air can be passed through the wall of a CP suit and connected to self-contained breathing apparatus to provide supplementary air.

PCB – Polychlorinated biphenyls known as PCBs.

Penetration – The process by which a chemical flows through holes or essential openings in the material of CPC. The holes may be the result of mechanical damage.

Percutaneous absorption – Absorption via the skin, for example due to local contamination or a splash of a chemical.

Permeation – The process by which a chemical moves through a protective clothing material on a molecular level.

Persistence – Persistence of chemicals indicates that they are stable and long-lived in the environment, resisting degradation, e.g. lead, cadmium, mercury, PCBs, and many man-made organics.

Plasticiser – A chemical added to plastics during manufacture to make them more flexible.

PPE – Personal protective equipment.

Practicable – Capable of being done in the light of current knowledge and invention.

Pressure – Pressure is the force per unit area applied in a direction perpendicular to the surface of an object. Units – 1 atmosphere or bar is approximately 100,000 pascals (100 kPa); 1 bar = 14.5 pounds per square inch (psi).

PRPS – Powered respirator protective suit.

Pulmonary oedema – Production of watery fluid in the lungs.

Pyrophoric substance – A material that undergoes such vigorous oxidation or hydrolysis when exposed to atmospheric oxygen or to water, that it rapidly ignites without an external source of ignition.

R

Radiation – The process by which energy is transmitted away from an energy source.

Radiation emergency – As defined in REPPIR; an event likely to lead to member of public receiving a dose of 5 mSv in the year following the event.

Radiation Protection Adviser (RPA) – A person engaged by a radiation employer to advise on the observance of legislation appertaining to radiation.

Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) – A person of sufficient authority and training to supervise employees with respect to observance of local rules.
**Radioactive material** – A solid, liquid or gas which spontaneously emits ionising radiation.

**Radioactivity** – The phenomenon by which a radioactive atom transforms into a different atom with the spontaneous emission of ionising radiation.

**RCC** – Regional Control Centre – regional Fire and Rescue Service emergency mobilising centre.

**REACH** – Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals.

‘reasonably practicable’ – To carry out a duty ‘as far as reasonably practicable’ means that the degree of risk in a particular activity or environment can be balanced against the time, trouble, cost and physical difficulty of taking measures to avoid the risk. If these are so disproportionate to the risk that it would be quite unreasonable for the people concerned to have to incur them to prevent it, they are not obliged to do so. The greater the risk, the more likely it is that it is reasonable to go to very substantial expense, trouble and invention to reduce it. But if the consequences and the extent of a risk were small, insistence on great expense would not be considered reasonable. It is important to remember that the size or financial position of the employer are not taken into account.

**Reportable disease** – A disease which must be reported to the UK authorities when linked to specified types of work (Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 – RIDDOR).


**Respirable dust** – That fraction of total inhalable dust which penetrates to the gas exchange region of the lung.

**Respiratory sensitisier** – A substance that may cause sensitisation on inhalation, causing, for example, asthma, rhinitis.

**Responsible person** – An individual who has responsibility for a particular area, site, premises, vehicle or other property through ownership (eg owner, occupier, driver etc) or as a representative of a responsible authority or agency (eg local authority, police, environment agency, highways agency etc).

**Reusable CPC** – Chemical protective clothing constructed from materials which allow the clothing to be cleaned after repeated chemical exposures such that it remains suitable for continued use.

**RID** – European agreements concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail.

**RIDDOR** – Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995.

**Risk** – Risk is the probability that somebody could be harmed by a hazard or hazards, together with an indication of how serious the harm could be.
Risk Assessment – A risk assessment is simply a careful examination of what, in the workplace, could cause harm to people, in order to weigh up whether enough precautions have been taken or more should be done to prevent harm. The law does not expect the elimination of all risk, but the protection of people as far as is ‘reasonably practicable’.

RPE – Respiratory protective equipment.

S

Safe air – An environment where the air is breathable and will not be harmful without the use of respiratory protection.

Safe system of work – A formal procedure resulting from systematic examination of a task to identify all the hazards. Defines safe methods to ensure that hazards are eliminated or risks controlled.

Safety – A state where exposure to hazards has been controlled to an acceptable level.

SAGE – Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies. Group of scientific and technical experts that is established to provide a common source of advice to inform decisions made during the central government.

Salts – Salts are the product other than water generated when an acid reacts with a base.

Sealed (or closed) – A radioactive source sealed within impermeable material which cannot easily be dispersed.

Sector Commander – An officer commanding a sector, who is tasked with responsibility for tactical and safety management of a clearly identified part of an incident. Subject to objectives set by the Incident Commander the Sector Commander has control of all operations within the sector and must remain within it.

Sensitisation dermatitis – Inflammation of the skin due to an allergic reaction to a sensitiser.

Sensitiser – A substance that causes little or no reaction in a person upon initial exposure but which will provoke an allergic response on subsequent exposures.

SFK – Structural firefighting kit.

SHA – Strategic holding area – an area with suitable space and facilities to accommodate large numbers of crews, appliances and equipment, where these resources can standby or rest whilst awaiting deployment to marshalling areas for a large or serious incident.

Shielding – A physical barrier or protection against the harmful effects of HazMats. Dense materials, walls, vehicles, rolling stock or earthworks may provide a level of shielding. The effectiveness of any shielding will be dependant on (a) the hazards posed by the HazMats (eg irradiation, explosive fragments, fireball/blast, chemical vapour cloud etc) and (b) the physical characteristics of the shield (eg material, density, thickness, stability, integrity, bonding, perforations etc). Shielding may allow a reduction in the initial or inner cordon.
Sievert (Sv) – The unit of dose used when measuring the degree of harm caused to persons exposed to ionising radiation.

Slurry – A free-flowing mixture of liquid and solid.

Span of control – The number of lines of communication that a single individual has to maintain. This is usually defined by the number of people who potentially require an officer’s attention for briefing, reporting, passing instructions or other incident management concerns, in order to carry out their role at the incident. As a guide, five such reporting lines are considered the usual optimum for an Incident Commander to maintain during an incident. This may be increased at an incident, which is well in hand or have to be reduced to two or three during the early stages of a rapidly escalating or highly complex incident. Management of the span of control must be effective throughout the command line.

SMA – Subject Matter Adviser – members of a national team who have been identified from within the Fire and Rescue Service who work with New Dimension capabilities on a day-to-day basis. At a large or serious incident they are available to provide advice to the incident commander.

Smoke – Particulate matter, usually less than 0.0005 mm in diameter, in air resulting usually from combustion, including liquids, gases, vapours and solids.

Solid – Solid is one of the classical states of matter. It is characterised by structural rigidity and resistance to changes of shape or volume. Unlike a liquid, a solid object does not flow to take on the shape of its container, nor does it expand to fill the entire volume available to it like a gas does. The atoms in a solid are tightly bound to each other, either in a regular geometric lattice (crystalline solids, which include metals and ordinary water ice) or irregularly (an amorphous solid such as common window glass).

Spontaneous combustion – Combustion that results when materials undergo atmospheric oxidation at such a rate that the heat generation exceeds heat dissipation and the heat gradually builds up to a sufficient degree to cause the mass of material to inflame.

STAC – Scientific and Technical Advisory Cell. Group of technical experts from those agencies involved in an emergency response that may provide scientific and technical advice to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group chair or single service gold commander.

Steam explosion – Overpressure associated with the rapid expansion in volume on instantaneous conversion of water to steam.

Surface contamination – Hazardous materials adhering to a vertical surface or resting on a horizontal surface.

Tactics – The deployment of personnel and equipment on the incident ground to achieve the aims of the strategic plan.

Teratogen – Chemical or physical agent that can cause defects in a developing embryo or foetus when the pregnant female is exposed to the harmful agent.
**Time-distance-shielding** – Summary of the three conditions to limit a \( \gamma \) radiation dose (ie minimise exposure time, maximise distance from source and take maximum advantage from available shielding).

**TLV-C** – Threshold limit value – ceiling – USA limit for the atmospheric concentration of a chemical which may not be exceeded at any time, even instantaneously in workroom air.

**TVL-STEL** – Threshold limit value – short term exposure limit – USA limit on the concentration of a chemical in workroom air which may be reached, but not exceeded, on up to four occasions during a day for a maximum of 15 minutes each time with each maximum exposure separated by at least one hour.

**TLV-TWA** – Threshold limit value – time weighted average – USA limit for the atmospheric concentration of a chemical, averaged over an eight hour day, to which it is believed that most people can be exposed without harm.

**TOPS** – Total Operations Processing System, information system for the railway.

**Total inhalable dust** – The fraction of airborne dust which enters the nose and mouth during breathing and is available for deposition in the respiratory tract.

**U**

**UEL** – Upper explosive limit – The maximum concentration of vapour/gas in air at a given pressure and temperature in which a flame can be propagated.

**UKHIS** – United Kingdom Hazard Identification System.

**Unsealed (or open)** – A radioactive source not confined within impermeable material which could potentially be dispersed into the environment.

**USAR** – Urban search and rescue team/capability.

**UVCE** – Unconfined vapour cloud explosion – Explosion involving a large mixed vapour/air cloud in the open (See BEVE).

**V**

**Vapour** – Vapour refers to a gas phase at a temperature where the same substance can also exist in the liquid or solid state, below the critical temperature of the substance. If the vapour is in contact with a liquid or solid phase, the two phases will be in a state of equilibrium.

**Vapour flashing** – If a liquid near its boiling point at one pressure is ‘let down’ to a reduced pressure, vapour flashing will occur. This will stop when the liquid temperature is reduced to a temperature below the saturation temperature at the new pressure.

**VCE** – Vapour cloud explosion (See UVCE and BLEVE).

**Viscosity** – A measure of the resistance to flow of a liquid.
**W**

**Warm zone** – The area uncontaminated by the initial release of a substance, which may become contaminated by the movement of people or vehicles. It is surrounded by the inner cordon and is part of the hazard zone but usually contains lower risks than the hot zone.

**WEL** – Workplace exposure limit – maximum concentration of an airborne substance to which employees may be exposed, averaged over a specific period of time, the two periods used are long term (eight hours) and short term (15 minutes). It is an offence to exceed them (COSHH 2005).

**Wetting test** – Method used initially to establish if an acetylene cylinder is hot from an internal decomposition caused by a flashback or by exposure to fire. The wetting test may also be subsequently used to indicate if an ongoing decomposition is slowing down inside the cylinder and that the external shell has cooled indicating that a spontaneous explosion is unlikely, given ongoing cooling. This test is only applicable to dissolved acetylene cylinders.

**WISER** – Wireless Information System for Emergency Responders.

**WMD** – Weapons of mass destruction.

**X**

**Xenbiotic** – Not friendly to biological organisms in general (includes many man-made substances, especially pesticides, lead, cadmium and mercury).

**X-ray** – A type of radiation caused by the emission of electromagnetic energy from the electrons in an atom.
Section 11

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References and bibliography

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Section 12
Record of obsolete or superseded guidance
Record of obsolete or superseded guidance

The table below lists the hazardous material guidance, issued by Her Majesty’s Government, which is now deemed to be obsolete or, is superseded by this operational guidance document.

The following abbreviations are used in the table:

- **FRSM**  Fire and Rescue Service Manual
- **FSM**  Fire Service Manual
- **MoF**  Manual of Firemanship
- **FRSC**  Fire and Rescue Service Circular
- **DOL**  Dear Chief Officer Letter
- **TB**  Technical Bulletin
- **FSC**  Fire Service Circular

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