Joint Doctrine Publication 3-51

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

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Preface

Purpose

1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-51 *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations* provides insight, guidance and points to consider when planning and conducting non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

Context

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is responsible for evacuating UK nationals from areas of crises, often with support from other government departments, such as the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Integration between the FCO and MOD is paramount to success, whether it is through planning support or providing military assets to conduct a NEO. The necessary interaction for this type of crisis is recognised in a service level agreement between the two departments.

Audience

3. JDP 3-51 is intended for use primarily by military commanders and their staff at the strategic and operational level of command. The publication also acts as a useful guide to diplomatic staff serving in the UK and overseas. It thereby informs local FCO contingency evacuation plans where appropriate. Although the doctrine highlights some tactical-level considerations, it does not attempt to cover tactics, techniques and procedures.¹

4. NEO is a non-discretionary operation often requiring a national response. Differing interests and risk thresholds often result in countries responding to crisis in different ways. Although evacuations are likely to be conducted in a multinational setting, the interaction between nations will probably be limited to the coordination of separate national plans rather than a unified multinational endeavour. However, commanders and their staff should read NATO doctrine on NEO² along with this publication to

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¹ Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is responsible for providing tactical-level guidance on NEOs.
² Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.2 *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*. AJP-3.4.2 also provides a degree of tactical-level guidance.
understand the challenges of operating as part of a coalition when conducting a multinational evacuation.

**Linkages**

5. JDP 3-51 complements JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution*, JDP 4-00 *Logistics for Joint Operations*, and JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* and, therefore, should be read in conjunction with these core publications. JDP 3-51 supersedes Joint Warfare Publication 3-51 Change 1, dated 2001.
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

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Chapter 1 – Context, characteristics and process

Section 1 – Background

101. Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) discharges its responsibilities for the safety and security of British nationals overseas through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). This includes the responsibility for the evacuation of British nationals from abroad in times of crisis.\(^1\) However, depending on the nature of the crisis, the FCO may request support from other government departments, including the MOD. Support from the MOD may vary in scale from a limited planning support function to a fully resourced non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).\(^2\)

102. A NEO is defined as: *an operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety.*\(^3\) It supports a FCO-led evacuation. A non-combatant\(^4\) who is eligible for evacuation by the UK is termed an eligible person (EP). Eligible persons will include British nationals and those individuals from other nations for whom HMG and Her Majesty’s (HM) Representative\(^5\) have accepted responsibility. An individual’s eligibility will be determined by the FCO and UK Border Agency (UKBA).

103. Multiple states are likely to be affected by a crisis in a foreign country where there is a significant multinational community. Their decision to evacuate their nationals will, however, rarely be simultaneous due to their perception of the threat, domestic pressures and the nature of their interests in the given country. However, a decision to respond by one country often has a catalysing effect on others to do likewise. As a result of the inherent variance in national political thresholds for action and the potential speed of

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\(^1\) Crises could include: countries in conflict; civil disorder; or natural disasters.
\(^2\) *Defence Strategic Direction, 2011* (DSD 11) classes a non-combatant evacuation operation as a simple intervention which, in this case, is non-discretionary. A simple intervention conducted beyond the planning assumptions set out in DSD 11 is likely to carry risk elsewhere.
\(^3\) Allied Administrative Publication-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*
\(^4\) Non-combatants are: *those who have no right to participate directly in hostilities. Although usually synonymous with the civilian population, some members of the armed forces of a state (medical personnel and chaplains) are classed as non-combatants.* (*JDP 0-01.1, UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database.*)
\(^5\) Ambassador or most senior diplomat in country.
onset, NEOs are unlikely to be conducted as a multinational operation acting under a single headquarters.\(^6\)

104. **The legal basis.** The provisions of national and international law limit the conduct of all military operations including NEOs. The legal justification for UK Armed Forces to enter another state to evacuate eligible persons may arise in different ways, based on a variety of factors. These may include the consent of the host government and its ability or willingness to protect foreign nationals during crisis. See Chapter 3 for more information.

### Section 2 – The operating environment

105. The degree of permissiveness afforded by the host government, or irregular actors operating within the crisis area, will determine the level of threat and risk to the eligible persons and external military forces during a NEO. There are three levels of permissiveness which, although not designed to be prescriptive, should be considered during the planning process.

a. **Permissive environment.** No resistance to an evacuation is expected in a fully permissive environment. In such circumstances there will be host government consent and, most likely, host nation support for the evacuation of those wishing to leave. Therefore, scheduled or chartered civil aircraft and shipping would be used if possible. Although military resources are unlikely to be required to provide security,\(^7\) they may be needed for logistic support such as emergency medical treatment and transport. Military staffs should monitor the situation closely and plan for a range of contingencies, including a deteriorating situation and descent into a less permissive environment.

b. **Uncertain environment.** Under these circumstances, the host government is likely to have effective control of the majority of its security forces and is not expected to interfere with the conduct of a NEO. However, the host government may not have effective control of the territory and/or population in an area containing eligible persons.

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\(^6\) Although the sharing of resources and need for de-confliction will most likely occur in a multinational context (see paragraph 317 for more information).

\(^7\) There may be a requirement for certain security-related tasks to be carried out by the joint task force, for example, following a natural disaster where local security forces are no longer effective.
The level of host nation support may be affected by the environment. There may be irregular actors, armed or unarmed, organised or disorganised, that will create a climate of insecurity and a threat to eligible persons and the evacuating force. Planning for a NEO conducted in an uncertain environment must anticipate possible escalation to a hostile environment.

c. **Hostile environment.** A NEO conducted in a hostile environment would most commonly occur when either: the host government has lost control (or ceased to function altogether), resulting in a general breakdown in law and order; or are hostile to those countries conducting the NEO. Eligible persons and the evacuating force may be directly targeted and their lives increasingly threatened. The host government’s security forces cannot be expected to support, and may even obstruct, a NEO.

106. Each NEO is likely to be unique in character. The context within which a NEO takes place will provide the information necessary for commanders to decide their force generation and planning options. How these different variables come together will determine the operating environment.⁸

**Section 3 – Characteristics of a NEO**

107. **Speed of response.** The national, regional and international political context and the unpredictable nature of crisis can condense the period available to military forces to plan and execute a NEO.⁹ The constant monitoring of those countries at risk, regular reviews of diplomatic posts’ crisis management plans¹⁰ (CMP) and any associated military contingency planning, all help towards the production of operational plans at short notice.¹¹

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⁸ See JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning, for information on operational analysis and planning.

⁹ Typically, an evacuation will start within 2-5 days of the request for a NEO being made. The Historical Characteristics of NEO, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), 20 December 2011.

¹⁰ A diplomatic post is a generic term for a HMG Embassy or High Commission located in a foreign country.

¹¹ A plan (usually produced by the diplomatic post) which establishes a procedure for responding to crisis, including the evacuation of eligible persons.

¹² Such issues are addressed on a regular basis by the FCO-led cross-government NEO working group.
108. **Understanding.** Paramount to any successful NEO is the level of understanding of the key destabilising factors within a country, along with a realistic assessment of future events. This level of scrutiny cannot be applied to every country, so an FCO/MOD agreed list of high-risk countries helps provide focus and direction. However, what cannot be mitigated against is the possibility that a previously ‘no-risk’ or ‘low-risk’ country degrades rapidly leading to an urgent need for evacuation. The quick and efficient use of an MOD operational liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT) and FCO rapid deployment team (RDT) will help develop an understanding of the crisis as it unfolds to support operational planning.

109. **Recognised eligible persons picture.** Gaining clarity of the number of eligible persons requiring evacuation will be a priority for the planning community. The FCO will endeavour to build an accurate picture of the eligible person population once a crisis appears imminent. It is not possible to provide absolute numbers and locations. This is due to the:

- FCO’s dependence on eligible persons making themselves known;
- constantly shifting numbers and location of eligible persons; and
- FCO’s limited ability to communicate in real time with eligible persons, many of whom may be tourists.

Early liaison between the FCO and MOD will help to establish a common recognised eligible persons’ picture (REPP) for coherent planning. The recognised eligible persons’ picture will be an essential planning tool. However, it can become inaccurate very quickly as eligible persons leave the crisis area without notification. Such anomalies may continue to influence decision makers, especially when they are averse to taking risk. Decision making could be affected until every eligible person is accounted for.

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13 Further guidance on developing understanding is contained in JDP 04, Understanding.
14 From the Crisis Management Department.
15 Information on the operational liaison and reconnaissance team can be found at Chapter 4.
16 A rapid deployment team comprises FCO personnel (typically up to eight) who remain at short notice to deploy in order to assist/augment a diplomatic post in a time of crisis. Typically they deploy to airports and sea ports to assist with processing of eligible persons. They may include representatives from the UK Border Agency.
17 There may be other operational considerations beyond the NEO, such as a parallel response to a natural disaster.
18 The FCO does not maintain a recognised eligible persons' picture until a crisis appears likely. This avoids having a large and out-of-date list which risks containing false information.
110. **An integrated approach.** Early engagement between the FCO and MOD should help overcome potential misunderstandings over resource requirements and associated timelines. The decision to start integrating planning processes may originate from the FCO, or it may be based on an independent assessment by the MOD. An FCO/MOD service level agreement forms the basis to agreed liaison mechanisms that support an integrated approach, including functions such as strategic communication.19

111. **Multinational environment.** Evacuating eligible persons is likely to take place in a multinational setting. Given this context, nations may decide to act unilaterally or as part of a multilateral response.20 Regardless, there is benefit from coordinating national plans at a time when the sudden demand for resources exceeds availability and to synchronise activity, for instance, flights plans into, and out of, the country of crisis.21

112. **Constraints.** Resource constraints, both financial and the availability of assets, may affect the size, method and duration of the joint task force’s (JTF’s) deployment. Political and legal constraints will shape the rules of engagement and are likely to limit the joint task force commander’s (JTFC’s) ability to use force except in self-defence or defence of eligible persons.

113. **Eligible persons’ perceptions.** Only those eligible persons who wish to be relocated will be evacuated. Eligible persons who are non-residents of the country to be evacuated, such as tourists and visiting business people, can be expected to leave early and wish to be repatriated. Resident expatriates may be reluctant to abandon their homes and their livelihoods, and may wish to be evacuated no further than is necessary, if at all. Similarly, if evacuated, they may want to return as soon as possible. Such unpredictability may affect the conduct of a timely and effective evacuation.

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19 Service-level agreement between the FCO and MOD regarding UK Military Assistance to FCO-led evacuations (due to be signed in Spring 2013).

20 The UK may choose to respond with bilateral partners in countries or regions that are of interest to both parties. The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, due to be formed as a result of a bilateral between the UK and France to tackle crisis situations, may be one such organisation that falls into this category.

21 A coordination cell is a useful asset to help coordinate activity between multiple actors and is considered further at Chapter 3.
Section 4 – The process

Contingency planning

114. Contingency planning for possible evacuations will take place routinely for those countries most at risk. The MOD’s involvement in the planning process will be informed by the various HMG risk-management tools and the priorities agreed between the FCO and MOD. Contingency planning will help inform the in-country diplomatic post’s crisis management plan plus subsequent military planning. The crisis management plan details the measures needed to ensure the safety of eligible persons in the event of war, civil disturbance or natural disaster, including arrangements for their evacuation.

The evacuation

115. Request for MOD assets. In the first instance, the FCO will prefer to evacuate all eligible persons through civil means. The MOD is likely to be requested to support an evacuation only when alternative civil options have been discounted. This could be due to civil flights into the area of crisis being suspended or the hostile nature of the environment or because of the scale or urgency of the operation. The decision to deploy military assets to assist an evacuation is taken by the Defence Secretary in consultation with, and usually following a request from, the Foreign Secretary. Engagement between the MOD and FCO should take place as soon as it is felt appropriate to support any potential transition between the use of commercial to military assets.

116. Requirement. The requirement of a NEO is to receive, process and screen eligible persons to determine eligibility as early as possible and then move them, possibly through a number of points, to a place of safety. Although each NEO is unique, the generic elements that make up the evacuation chain will remain largely the same. Figure 1.1 illustrates this

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22 Military support may still be provided, for example, planning support.
23 For the purposes of this publication, the ‘processing’ of eligible persons is the function of establishing their eligibility to evacuation; this is an FCO-led activity supported by UK Border Agency. The screening of eligible persons is the function of establishing that they do not present a threat to other eligible persons, staff or military forces. This can be an FCO or military-led activity depending upon the threat assessment.
24 The UK approach is similar to NATO, although the terminology used may differ slightly.
process. The emphasis, however, should be on function rather than geography.

Note 1: In *extremis*, eligible persons may have to be collected from remote locations.

**Figure 1.1 – The evacuation process**

The evacuation chain

117. Eligible persons will enter the evacuation chain through either a reception centre (RC), evacuation handling centre (EHC), or an evacuation point (EvacPt), depending on their personal circumstances. The fluid nature of the evacuation process means that plans must be agile enough to respond to the crisis situation while reflecting the needs of the eligible persons and the resources available. Not all stages of the evacuation chain will necessarily be used or activated. In particular, the use of reception centres and evacuation handling centres will depend upon the distribution of eligible persons and the accessibility and use of the evacuation points. Stages in the chain may also be skipped or merged. For example, eligible persons could move directly from a reception centre to an evacuation point, or be processed

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25 Further planning considerations for setting up an evacuation chain are provided at Annex 4A.
at the evacuation point. The various components of the evacuation chain are outlined below.

118. **Forward mounting base.** A forward mounting base (FMB) is a secure sea or land base from which an operation may be launched.\(^\text{26}\) It should have the capacity to manage an insertion force and subsequently handle logistic requirements and reserves. In many cases, the forward mounting base will be in the same location as a place of safety, or a temporary safe location. The presence of eligible persons will, therefore, be an additional burden upon local infrastructure.

119. **Forward operating base.** A forward operating base (FOB) is a base established within the operational area, to support tactical operations. It will be resourced to provide minimum services commensurate with sustaining the required level of effort.

120. **Reception centre.** Reception centres are pre-designated sites, selected by HM Representative as part of a diplomatic post’s crisis management plan, where individuals can enter the evacuation chain. Although not often used, the reception centre can provide an initial screening and processing function when there is a need to concentrate eligible persons before onward movement. Or it can be used where there is a particularly high threat of attack, in which case evacuees should be screened before group movement. Responsibility for the control and administration of reception centres lies with the FCO, usually delegated to their in-country staff. HM Representative may request military support in uncertain or hostile environments.

121. **Evacuation handling centre.** An evacuation handling centre is a temporary secure location free from the threat of destabilising influences. Here eligible persons are received and processed by FCO/UK Border Agency officials to establish their eligibility for evacuation. The location is jointly agreed by the FCO and MOD. Its selection is predicated on military capacity, and the FCO’s ability to care temporarily for eligible persons and subsequently source onward means of travel to strategic transport hubs. The evacuation handling centre may be co-located with an evacuation point.

\(^\text{26}\) Examples could include a port, an airfield or on-board a ship.
Military support may be required to secure an evacuation handling centre and provide convoy security to an evacuation point.

122. **Evacuation point.** Evacuation points are secure sites with facilities permitting safe entry and exit for military transport. It is here that eligible persons arrive for military extraction to a temporary safe location (TSL) or a place of safety (PoS).\(^{27}\) Once processing is complete and eligibility confirmed by the FCO/UKBA (either at the reception centre, evacuation handling centre, or in some cases, the evacuation point), functional responsibility for eligible persons is temporarily handed to the military.\(^{28}\) HM Representative and the military commander have a joint responsibility for selecting and administering the evacuation point. The military commander is unlikely to accept responsibility for any person until their eligibility has been established by the FCO/UKBA.\(^{29}\)

123. **Temporary safe location.** The MOD may not be able to transport eligible persons as far as a designated place of safety because of resource or time constraints. Alternatively a temporary safe location could be identified, where eligible persons are safe from threat awaiting onward movement. Responsibility for eligible persons should be passed back from the military to the FCO at the temporary safe location, from which HMG is able to arrange onward movement to a recognised place of safety.

124. **Place of safety.** A place of safety is where eligible persons exit the evacuation chain and are no longer reliant on diplomatic or military assistance.\(^{30}\) The place of safety should:

- be safe;
- have commercial accommodation; and
- have functional regional or international transport links

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\(^{27}\) Evacuation points could include airports, harbours, beaches or alternative locations from which to transport eligible persons across a border to a temporary safe location or place of safety.

\(^{28}\) Responsibility for eligible persons may have to be passed to the military at an earlier point in the evacuation chain following agreement between the military commander and HM Representative. The permissive nature of the environment and the availability of military resources will be among the factors that determine the exact location.

\(^{29}\) Responsibility is likely to be accepted in extreme circumstances.

\(^{30}\) If required, British nationals could still be assisted under standard consular terms for overseas assistance.
There may be a number of different places of safety dependent on the situation and the needs of the eligible persons. The FCO will nominate the place of safety and is normally identified in the crisis management plan. It could exist in the country itself, a neighbouring country or, in exceptional cases, the UK.

125. **Warden system.** The warden system is a network of volunteers located in the country in crisis. Wardens act as a point of contact between HM Representative and the wider community of eligible persons. Using a cascade system, the wardens pass information and instructions on to eligible persons as a crisis evolves. The effectiveness of the system can vary between countries.

126. **Extraction of eligible persons.** There may be occasions where eligible persons are unable to make their way to any part of the evacuation chain due to the hostile nature of the environment, their location or other unforeseen circumstances. In extreme circumstances, military forces may be required to extract eligible persons from their locations and move them to the evacuation point or other suitable location.
Chapter 2 – Responsibilities, command and control

Section 1 – FCO and MOD’s responsibilities and obligations

201. The FCO and MOD recognise that close cooperation, collaborative working and speed of response at all levels are essential to deliver an effective, efficient and timely evacuation.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FCO responsibilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Maintaining the crisis risk register to inform the NEO priority countries list and the Cabinet Office countries at risk of instability (CRI) matrix.²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Requesting MOD assistance and obtaining the required approvals for planned military activity (both at Foreign Secretary and in-country levels). This could include routine contingency planning, or more short-term reactive assistance within compressed timescales.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Working closely with the appropriate UK representatives overseas, notably British diplomatic posts, ensuring the timely preparation and routine maintenance of crisis management plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Updating travel advice³ and arranging call-handling facilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Setting the overall information strategy in consultation with the Cabinet Office and other government departments. Managing Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) press brief and cross-government ‘lines to take’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Selecting reception centres and evacuation points, taking into account military advice as necessary.⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• At the outset, determine (as far as possible) and, on a case-by-case basis, numbers and locations of eligible persons, including those unrepresented European Union (EU) nationals, and by special agreement, nationals from other countries which HMG agrees, or has agreed, to assist.</td>
</tr>
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¹ See Chapter 1, footnote 19. A service-level agreement between the FCO and MOD will form the basis for future cooperation.
² The country priority list is agreed by the FCO and MOD.
³ Changing travel advice may provide an indicator as to HMG’s intentions regarding a crisis situation, including an evacuation.
⁴ The FCO may have pre-determined evacuation points that have to be altered for a NEO following military advice.
FCO responsibilities (continued)

- Deciding on the level of consular support to be given to eligible persons and providing it, in concert with other government departments.
- Selecting and running the evacuation handling centre.
- Processing eligible persons up to, and including, the place of safety. This should include: establishing eligibility; consular screening; requesting immigration support where required; and producing and updating manifests of eligible persons.
- Where practicable, and after consulting other government departments on what is reasonably feasible, reassuring UK allies and partners of HMG’s wider support to their requests for assistance.
- Liaison with EU and other friendly international partners to maintain visibility of partners’ contingency plans and agree special arrangements (for example, EU lead state for the evacuation) in peacetime. At times of crisis, de-conflict and, where required, coordinate, the UK evacuation operation with that of allies.
- Sending representatives from the FCO and other government departments to MOD planning groups, current commitments team meetings and other relevant meetings as appropriate.
- Assisting with burden sharing with allies, over-flight clearance, host nation support, as well as visa and diplomatic bagging of specialist military equipment.
202. Where requested, and in support of FCO obligations, the MOD will generally contribute to the following outcomes.

**MOD contributions**

- Contingency planning for NEOs based on FCO/MOD priority countries.
- Extract eligible persons via an agreed military evacuation chain.
- Contribute to the diplomatic posts' resilience to assist maintaining critical core activities.\(^5\)
- Assist UK diplomatic posts' activities in developing insight into the destabilising factors and influences in-country.
- Reassure UK allies and partners by the demonstrable provision of support to their requests for assistance.
- Contribute to the drafting, reviewing and exercising of crisis management plans at the diplomatic post.

**Funding**

203. Payment for NEOs will be in accordance with the current edition of *Managing Public Money*; or a Treasury instruction advising on the charging/payment of NEOs.

**Section 2 – Command and control**

204. Her Majesty's (HM) Representative will assume the role of crisis leader, responsible for the overall in-country HMG response to a crisis that requires an evacuation. In the UK, command is established under a gold, silver, bronze model, with an FCO Director or Director General assuming the gold command. Gold command, in consultation with HM Representative, is responsible for final decision making on HMG’s crisis response, subject to Ministerial decisions where required. Silver command, reporting to the single gold command, is split between three silver managers:

\(^5\) Examples may include security, communications, command and control, and situational awareness support.
Responsibilities, command and control

- consular (including evacuation operations, staff deployments to theatre, eligible person mapping, consular assistance and administration);
- strategic communications (including media handling, situation reports, public and ministerial interface); and
- political (including policy development and briefing).

In an evacuation, the silver consular manager would lead on the evacuation operation, with significant decisions referred to the gold commander or Ministers as required.

205. **Military in a subordinate and supporting role.** FCO primacy is a key feature of a NEO. It is important for the balance of responsibilities between military and diplomatic/civilian staffs to be understood fully when planning and executing an evacuation.

206. **Complexity.** Coordination and liaison will probably be complex, frequently involving a number of other government departments and multinational actors. Depending on the host government’s degree of control, it may be necessary for a joint task force commander (JTFC) to establish direct liaison in separate areas of the host government, including the local security forces, airspace control and port authorities, as well as with commercial agencies and individual non-governmental organisations.

207. **Military chain of command.** The military chain of command is outlined below.

a. Within the policy determined by Ministers, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) issues military strategic direction and appoints a joint commander (Jt Comd) and a joint task force commander.

b. The joint commander, usually the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), will exercise operational command (OPCOM) from the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). He is responsible for directing, deploying, sustaining and recovering the joint task force.
c. The joint task force commander will exercise operational control (OPCON) usually from the joint task force headquarters (JTFHQ) deployed in the joint operations area. He is responsible for producing the campaign plan and conducting the NEO when ordered. In most NEOs, the joint task force headquarters will be formed from the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) augmented as necessary. The size and location of this headquarters will depend on the situation.

208. **Her Majesty’s Representative/joint task force commander relationship.** Within the joint operations area the joint task force commander will be subordinate to HM Representative, who is not in the military chain of command. The decision to evacuate will be made by the FCO gold commander in London. The senior HM representative will then coordinate the evacuation. Once evacuation has been approved, the decision to commit military forces lies with the joint task force commander. Whenever possible, either the joint task force commander, his deputy, or the Defence Attaché (DA) should collocate with HM Representative to ensure detailed coordination and development of both the diplomatic and military plans. The joint task force commander assumes responsibility for the operation once the decision to evacuate by military means has been made.

209. **Tactical command.** In NEOs characterised as simple operations the joint task force commander may elect to exercise direct command over assigned forces using his staff in an appropriately configured joint task force headquarters. Where the NEO is classified as a complex operation, component commanders may be employed. Component commanders should be identified early enough to contribute to the joint task force commander’s operational estimate. They should be intimately involved in the staffing of the plan. The designated military commander will use his own organic command and control structure, adapted as appropriate, to provide command and control for the evacuation process.

210. **Advance force command and control.** UK Armed Forces already deployed in theatre and operating under different command arrangements, such as forward deployed maritime platforms or military close protection, should normally be placed under operational command of the joint commander as soon as he has the means to command them. Local

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6 Descriptions of simple and complex operations can be found in *Defence Strategic Direction, 2011.*
command arrangements must be established by PJHQ for UK advance forces operating in theatre prior to the establishment of the joint task force headquarters.

211. **Multinational command.** Precedent suggests that national interests mandate separate national operations which, where possible, have been coordinated with other nations’ plans, rather than conduct a single multinational operation. If however, a multinational response was the preferred course of action,\(^7\) then the ability to obtain unity of effort will be a key factor in a time-sensitive NEO.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) An example would be the UK/FR Combined Joint Expeditionary Force.

\(^8\) For further details read Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.2, *Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*. 
Chapter 3 – Planning

Section 1 – Diplomatic planning

301. Normally a NEO is initiated in the final stage of the crisis management plan. Once started, the key to coordinating the crisis management plan and NEO activities, is to identify when military action is needed on the ground to support an ongoing FCO evacuation.

302. Crisis management planning. All diplomatic posts should maintain a crisis management plan. For crisis management planning purposes, diplomatic posts are designated high, medium or low risk, which will determine the extent of the plan and frequency of the crisis management plan review. The FCO may request assistance from the MOD to contribute to the review process.¹ The objectives of a crisis management plan are to:

- ensure the safety and security of the British community in the event of a crisis;
- set out the risks posed to the British community;
- set out diplomatic posts’ arrangements for responding to a crisis, including staff roles, eligible person estimates, warden networks and key contacts; and
- provide a basic framework for conducting an orderly evacuation of eligible persons by commercial or other means.

303. Implementation. Her Majesty’s (HM) Representative is the authority for declaring the stages of the crisis management plan, in consultation with the FCO, as the situation deteriorates. Crisis management plans are tailored according to each country’s situation and are largely based around four stages. The first stage usually starts after British nationals have been advised to avoid non-essential travel to the country concerned.

   a. Stage 1. In this stage the community is advised to ‘be alert and stay at home’.

¹ Reviews are normally supported by JFHQ based on priorities agreed between MOD and FCO.
b. **Stage 2.** ‘Go unless an urgent need to stay’. Those who have no urgent need to remain are advised to leave by normal commercial transport.

c. **Stage 3.** ‘Go’. Members of the community are advised to leave under their own arrangements, if commercial means still exist.

d. **Stage 4.** ‘Evacuate’. Report to reception centres or elsewhere in the evacuation chain for evacuation under arrangements made by HM Representative.\(^2\) If HM Representative believes that the evacuation can be conducted without military support, evacuees will be instructed to report directly to an evacuation point (usually a port or airfield) for onward movement by civil means.

304. **Closure of the diplomatic post.** The decision to close the post will be taken by the Gold Commander in London having taken advice from the HM representative who will have considered the risks to the diplomatic staff. The measures required to effect an orderly closure of a diplomatic post are likely to impact on the conduct of a NEO. Diplomatic staff and resources will be required to prepare the diplomatic post for closure; some military assistance may be required.

305. **Transition to a military NEO.** While civilian transport would almost certainly be used to evacuate eligible persons from a permissive environment and for onward movement from an evacuation point (EvacPt), military assets would be required when civilian carriers:

- become overwhelmed by the demand for spaces;
- terminate the service for security reasons;
- cannot react quickly enough to provide the service; and
- are denied authority to land by the host nation.

When a NEO becomes a likely option, a PJHQ liaison officer or operational liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT)\(^3\) should be deployed to act as a link between PJHQ, the joint task force commander and HM Representative. The

\(^2\) *In extremis* conditions, eligible persons may have to be collected from their place of residence.

\(^3\) The OLRT is drawn from the JFHQ.
liaison function will help facilitate a transition from an evacuation based on commercial means to that which requires military assets. Although highly desirable, it may be impossible to insert the liaison officer or operational liaison and reconnaissance team in uncertain or hostile conditions.

306. **Operational military advice.** If deployed, the following would be able to provide military advice to assist consular staff (in preparing or reviewing a crisis management plan) and HM Representative (in making their decision to request a NEO):

- the Defence Attaché;
- routine staff visits from PJHQ/JFHQ;
- a military intelligence liaison officer (MILO);
- Special Forces; and
- an operational liaison and reconnaissance team.

Section 2 – Military strategic planning

307. **Timelines.** Timelines for planning, ministerial consideration and the issue of directives can vary from hours to weeks. A NEO may be required to start soon after the political decision to commit forces, and as quickly as militarily practicable. On these occasions, the full planning process may have to be abbreviated.

308. **Initiating the planning process.** NEO planning can be initiated in isolation or as part of a wider operation. It may be undertaken in response to a crisis or as part of joint FCO/MOD contingency planning. Regardless of context, planning begins in response to a request from the FCO to MOD; this can originate from a number of sources including the National Security Council or a specific diplomatic post. However, at some point all requests must be formalised by department-to-department correspondence, and usually authorised by Defence at ministerial level. There are two categories of planning.

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4 Strategic-level lessons identified from previous NEOs should be reviewed at the outset of crisis.
a. **Crisis.** Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) standard operating procedures detail the MOD’s crisis response process, including the level of interaction with FCO and other government departments.

b. **Steady state.** FCO and MOD (military strategic planning) agree, develop and maintain a prioritised list of countries to focus NEO planning and monitoring. The prioritisation of planning is informed by: the crisis risk register; the countries at risk of instability (CRI) matrix; the watch list states; and trigger events identified in the FCO’s flashpoints and Defence Intelligence warning and indicators.

### The planning sequence

309. Military planning for NEO should commence as soon as possible; the planning process will be informed by the National Security Council throughout the crisis. Where time and resources permit, daily coordination meetings are held in the FCO bringing together all those departments and agencies involved in the crisis. The MOD crisis management planning process applies to NEOs as it does to any other operation. Although hierarchical, much of the planning sequence occurs concurrently as an iterative process with many steps overlapping. The planning process is outlined below.

310. In response to, or in anticipation of, a request for assistance from the FCO, military strategic planning in the MOD conduct political/military analysis (estimate), informed by a current operations group (COG) and/or a strategic planning group (SPG), to confirm the viability and level of military assistance. Military strategic planning should develop military options based on assessing all the factors, constraints and planning variables to inform and direct more detailed military planning activity. It may conclude that there is no role for the military. Military strategic planning should include input from other government departments as required.

311. Concurrently, and if required, the DCMO will stand up a current commitments team (CCT) in the MOD. This team will strategically manage the operation. Establishing the current commitments team will be preceded by a formal handover of the responsibility of operational planning between military strategic planning and the Operations Directorate. The handover is
normally triggered by a reduction in notice to move (NTM) or actual deployment of UK force elements.

312. The output of the political/military estimate is a CDS planning directive which is issued to PJHQ and the supporting commands to legitimise staff planning effort. The directive does not authorise any deployment at this stage (unless authorised separately by the MOD).

313. On receipt of the planning directive, a PJHQ contingency planning team will form in the PJHQ. In conjunction with the current commitments team, this team will conduct a military strategic estimate to establish a preferred course of action and develop a plan to cover directing, deploying, sustaining and recovering allocated forces. To ensure continuity, the JFHQ is also represented on the PJHQ contingency planning team.

314. Once the course of action has been agreed by Ministers, a CDS directive will be issued to the joint commander authorising the deployment of UK forces.

315. The joint commander will then issue his mission directive for the NEO, formally appointing the joint task force commander, defining the joint operations area and constraints for the operation. The joint commander is responsible for deploying, sustaining and recovering the joint task force. Once the operation moves from planning to execution, the PJHQ contingency planning team will transition to an operations team. The basic composition of the team stays the same, but leadership changes from military plans (J5) to military operations (J3).

316. The joint task force commander and his staff will develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) and the campaign plan. The supporting commands and Director Special Forces are an integral part of the planning process throughout. Much of the development of the campaign plan will require direct consultation and liaison with the FCO. Concurrency of FCO and MOD planning activities during a crisis is shown at Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 – UK planning and conduct of NEO

Legend:
- CCT: Current commitments team
- COG: Current operations group
- CDS: Chief of the Defence Staff
- CPT: Contingency planning team
- CMD: Crisis Management Department
- CMP: Crisis management plan
- DCMO: Defence Crisis Management Organisation
- DIS: Defence Intelligence Services
- FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- HM Rep: Her Majesty’s representative
- JTFC: Joint task force commander
- JTF: Joint task force
- MOD: Ministry of Defence
- MILO: Military intelligence liaison officer
- MSP: Military strategic planning
- NEO: Non-combatant evacuation operation
- OGD: Other government departments
- OLRT: Operational liaison and reconnaissance team
- RDT: Rapid deployment team
- SF: Special Forces
- SPG: Strategic planning group

Planning

HM Rep

Maintain CMP

Assessment of crisis

FCO CMD and MOD MSP horizon scan and determine NEO planning priorities

FCO and MOD MSP agree

FCO daily review drawing in MOD and OGD

FCO warn MOD

FCO/MOD agree to initiate planning for a potential NEO

MOD assistance required

Stage 1

Crisis management plan

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Crisis management plan

COG/SPG informs MSP estimate

DCMO stands up CCT

FCO request recce from MOD

Deploy RDT

CDS planning directive

Deploy MILO, OLRT, SF

CDS directive

Forces allocated

Joint commander directive

JTF campaign plan

JTF deploy

Legend:
- CCT: Current commitments team
- COG: Current operations group
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- CPT: Contingency planning team
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- CMP: Crisis management plan
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- OLRT: Operational liaison and reconnaissance team
- RDT: Rapid deployment team
- SF: Special Forces
- SPG: Strategic planning group
317. **Military contingency plans.** PJHQ, as instructed by the MOD, prepare and update contingency plans for NEOs. The level of detail contained in the plan will vary with the assessed likelihood of its use. In increasing level of detail, there are three types of plan.

a. **Joint planning guide.** Joint planning guides (JPGs) contain general planning data for a particular region or country, which can be used as the basis for more detailed planning during an emerging crisis.

b. **Joint contingency plan.** Joint contingency plans (JCPs) contain detailed information on force requirements, deployment options and readiness states, but will require further detailed work as a crisis develops.

c. **Operation plan.** An operation plan (OPLAN) contains sufficient detail for a specific operation to be conducted. Operational plans require frequent updating to remain current. As a result, they are restricted to operations likely to occur at very short notice.

318. **Defence profiles and intelligence briefing memoranda.** Defence Intelligence produces a classified monthly *Indicators and Warnings* paper, which provides an analysis of recent events and an assessment on the risks of instability in the forthcoming six months. This paper must be considered in conjunction with the countries at risk of instability matrix. To assist with planning, Defence Intelligence will provide intelligence support on the location of a crisis and any potential transit routes. This intelligence support should include geospatial intelligence (including imagery) and multiple-source intelligence. Defence Intelligence will continually update their initial report with more detailed current intelligence as planning continues.
Section 3 – Planning considerations

319. **NEO planning guidance.** Annex 3A provides guidance that could be used to provide a common framework for the planning and conduct of NEOs. It also forms the basis of any dialogue between diplomats and military forces that must precede any successful NEO.

320. **Integrated planning.** Joint analysis and assessment of the crisis will assist collective understanding and integrated planning. Liaison between the FCO and MOD should take place at the earliest opportunity and in accordance with the FCO/MOD service-level agreement. Once a NEO is activated, the Operations Directorate (supported by PJHQ/JFHQ) assumes the lead on engagement with the FCO’s Crisis Management Department (CMD).

321. **Strategic communication.** Strategic communication (STRATCOM) is fundamental to the successful planning and conduct of a NEO, which is likely to take place under an intensive international media and diplomatic spotlight. The strategic communication coordination process provides the mechanism to:

- synchronise words, images and deeds;
- identify communication opportunities in sufficient time to respond in a coordinated fashion; and
- identify areas of potential risk from military activity or inactivity.

It is a fundamental part of NEO planning and should be incorporated from the outset to help shape information activity. The FCO will set the overall information strategy for a NEO in consultation with the MOD, based on the FCO/MOD service-level agreement.

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5 Detailed information on strategic communication can be found in Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/12, Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution.
322. **Media operations.** The joint task force should be prepared to support news media coverage as well as manage HMG’s demand for information. In a NEO a number of media issues should be considered, including:

- developing a media plan using the guidance given from the FCO news department;
- how the FCO will manage the social media interface for news of, and communication with, the eligible person community, including during evacuation operations;
- considering non-governmental organisation (NGO) ‘information-spheres’ such as Reuters’ AlertNet, US State Department’s Global Disaster Info Net and the UN Relief Web;
- what appropriate lines to take on high profile eligible persons and delicate eligible person issues (in accordance with FCO guidance); and
- the need to protect and evacuate the accredited press.

323. **Information operations.** Information operations (Info Ops) provide the MOD’s contribution to the cross-government information campaign. They also incorporate both the management of information (in the form of themes and messages) and specific actions conducted with the intention of promoting a desired message. During initial planning, Targeting and Information Operations (TIO) and PJHQ J3 operations support will prepare information operations guidelines for subsequent detailed planning. Once a NEO is ordered, PJHQ and the joint task force headquarters will implement information operations at the operational and tactical levels under the overall direction of the MOD, through TIO. There are specific issues regarding the use of psychological operations (PYSOPS) assets.

a. **Using psychological operations assets.** Psychological operations assets can facilitate NEOs in uncertain or hostile environments, especially passing important information to eligible persons. Depending on the in-country infrastructure and situation, radio/TV assets may be needed to broadcast information. This should be included in information operations planning. Psychological operations assets could also be used to:
Planning

- explain the purpose of the joint task force action to counter disinformation, confusion and rumour.
- assist the FCO in establishing control of the eligible persons’ community, the local populace and other in-country actors, both friendly and hostile, to minimise casualties and to prevent interference with the evacuation.
- provide initial and continuing analysis of political and cultural factors to aid planning.

324. Multinational force issues. Additional issues to be considered when planning and conducting a NEO in a multinational context are:

a. Coordination between all the foreign and defence ministries and military headquarters of those nations involved.

b. Coordination of different national evacuation plans where appropriate or necessary, ranging from: sharing resources, including transportation and niche capabilities such as joint personnel recovery; the co-location of evacuation nodal points, such as an evacuation handling centre or evacuation point; to a fully integrated response. Mechanisms to coordinate resources could involve the use of a NEO Coordination Cell (NEOCC).

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6 Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.2, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations provides operational-level guidance for NATO-led multinational NEOs.
**NEOCC – Resource de-confliction**

The competition for commercial transport assets is likely to be fierce in times of crisis.\(^7\) Formal groupings, such as the NEO Coordination Group (NCG) allow for sharing of assets through its NEOCC.\(^8\) This cell should be established upon the execution of a NEO or a military assisted evacuation operation to provide a means for partnering nations to share information and assets for the collective success of the evacuation of eligible persons. The principal role of this cell is to act as a non-executive multinational liaison cell, operating to each nation’s own national chain of command. It also coordinates both effort and assets to where they are most needed during an evacuation. The precondition for establishing a NEOCC would be a bid from a NEOCG full member who has volunteered to establish the NEOCC and assume the role of lead nation. Typically, this is the country that has the largest eligible person community in the affected region.\(^9\)

**Example of a NEOCC – Libya 2011**

A NEOCC was established in the UK High Commission in Malta hosting representatives from 16 different nations. The cell helped coordinate the evacuation of 458 British nationals and 1170 of our partners’ nationals on British military assets, and 202 British nationals on our partners’ military assets.

c. The selection of high-grade officers, with appropriate language skills, for staff and liaison functions to coordinate plans with other national contingents, the host nation and other civilian agencies.

d. The selection of forward mounting bases, forward operating bases, reception centres, evacuation handling centres, temporary safe locations, places of safety, joint task force headquarters and NEOCC sites may be influenced by partner nation military and consular intentions.

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\(^7\) Lebanon 2004.

\(^8\) The NEO Coordination Cell concept was initiated by the NEO Coordination Group (NCG), a group comprising several member nations, independent of NATO and EU. The UK is a member of the NCG with representatives from FCO and MOD military strategic planning.

\(^9\) Full details of the NEO Coordination Group and NEO Coordination Cell can be obtained through the NEO Coordination Group terms of reference, held by MOD military strategic planning.
325. **Legal issues and rules of engagement.** Annex 3B covers the legal issues of NEOs and how rules of engagement are developed. It reinforces that states have a right to exercise individual, or collective, national self defence under international law. Also, it remains the commander’s responsibility to make sure that only the degree of force that is necessary, reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances is used.

326. **Force protection and operational security.** Planners considering force protection are likely to find the issue compounded by the nature of a NEO. Widely published evacuation plans will inevitably provide any hostile actors with the information necessary to plan focused attacks against eligible persons or the joint task force. Information freely available to the community and hostile actors could include details of the locations for sites where eligible persons will congregate, or where helicopters will be used to extract eligible persons. Where civilian or military air transport is to be used, planners should consider providing air transport security measures to protect the aircraft from sabotage or hijack.\(^{10}\) Thus, active measures should be considered to mitigate such risk.

327. **Protective measures.** Planners should also take into account eligible persons lack of training and protective equipment, and consideration should be given to the inherent risks of them using military assets, such as helicopters, ships or aircraft.

328. **Communications.** The MOD controls the allocation of strategic satellite communications resources. PJHQ conducts communications planning, based on direction from the MOD.

   a. Prior to the deploying of the joint task force headquarters, requests for communications assistance by HM Representative is authorised by the MOD on application by the FCO. PJHQ J6 (Communications and Information Systems (CIS)) staff will be required to liaise with the FCO to agree the communications between the diplomatic post and the deployed force. Similar liaison will be required for the joint task force headquarters J6 (CIS) staff, when deployed.

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\(^{10}\) More detail on force protection can be found in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-64, *Force Protection.*
b. The joint task force headquarters will require the appropriate communication and information systems to provide appropriate links to other multinational forces (if applicable) and trunk connectivity to deployed UK components/unit headquarters in theatre.

329. **Joint personnel recovery.** Recent NEOs have identified the need for joint personnel recovery in an uncertain or hostile NEO environment. To achieve this, the joint task force commander may establish a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre to plan and coordinate joint personnel recovery and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) missions with other nations involved in the crisis or located within the crisis region. Advice regarding force protection may be necessary, specifically on the need for aircraft defensive aid suites.

330. **Time.** Account must be taken of the readiness preparation time required for the joint task force. Readiness preparation time includes the notice to move, deployment time and any training required in the joint operations area prior to the joint task force being ready to conduct operations. Time is usually at a premium for NEOs requiring rapidly deployable or forward deployed forces held at very high readiness.

### Section 4 – Forces

331. **Force generation.** NEO forces are likely to be generated from two sources. First, those that can be activated at short notice with the means to move to the crisis area at speed. Secondly, those already in the vicinity by chance or design. Suitable forces may include those assigned to the joint contingent force (JCF)\(^{11}\) or deployed on operations or exercise near the affected region.\(^{12}\)

332. **Notice to move.** The MOD Operations Directorate is the authority for the promulgating ‘notice to move’ for all military assets. Early agreement to a reduction of notice, the redeployment of key units, advance sailing of ships (and associated aircraft) and the recovery of RAF air transport aircraft may be essential for the timely implementation of an evacuation plan.

\(^{11}\) The joint contingent force incorporates maritime, land, air, Special Forces and logistic forces with a wide range of capabilities and are held at various levels of notice to move ranging from 24 hrs to 30 days.

\(^{12}\) NEOs are usually conducted using light troops, Special Forces and helicopters. *The Historical Characteristics of NEO*, Dstl, 20 December 2011.
Capability requirements.

333. The composition of the joint task force will depend on the likely military tasks and the situation in the joint operations area. As well as command and control, the capabilities required will include some, or all, of the following and need to be reflected in the task organisation.

334. **Strategic lift.** The strategic estimate will have involved a risk assessment that determined the number of transport assets required for the extraction of eligible persons. Appropriate platforms will also be required to deploy personnel, vehicles, equipment and stores to, and from, the joint operations area.

335. **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.** NEOs often occur in areas where availability of dedicated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) is limited. Consequently, as well as dedicated UK and foreign-partner assets, fusing and disseminating information from other sources (such as open-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting or liaison with host nation’s security forces) will be necessary. ISR assets are tasked in accordance with the joint task force commander’s direction. Therefore, close coordination is vital to ensure priorities are met with scarce resources. Processing and disseminating information is often a key constraint rather than the ability to collect it. Deploying counter-intelligence personnel should be considered when the NEO is likely to be for a protracted period to provide current intelligence on the localised threats. During the execution of the NEO, ISR supports both intelligence priorities and tactical activity, such as tracking eligible persons.

336. **Fire support.** Though NEOs are generally defensive in nature, a strong deterrent posture will often contribute to success especially in uncertain or hostile environments. Thus, a suitable level of offensive capability may be required that may include using fire support for close protection tasks as well as providing extended security to the evacuation chain. For example, the US Marine Corps’ use of AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters in the 1991 US Embassy evacuation in Mogadishu. Conversely, the mission and rules of engagement may dictate the deployment of non-lethal weapons.
337. **Force protection.** The requirement for force protection is likely to be paramount once the initial insertion of the military force is complete. Force elements such as infantry, combat support elements and defensive maritime and air assets may be required to protect: HM Representative; designated VIPs and critical resources; consular staff assisting with the evacuation; eligible persons; and transport assets such as air transport.

338. **Manoeuvre.** At the operational level, maritime and air manoeuvre elements may be required to provide over-the-horizon deterrent activities. Tactical manoeuvre elements may be required to out-flank and/or coerce any potential opposition to guarantee mobility and, when necessary, provide counter-mobility resources.

339. **Control of the electromagnetic spectrum.** Control of the electromagnetic spectrum for offensive and defensive purposes can give the NEO force considerable advantage over any potential adversary. In a complex emergency there may be other military forces and civilian agencies all competing with the host nation and warring factions for space on the electromagnetic spectrum. Most of these forces and agencies will be outside the control of the NEO force. This will greatly complicate managing and protecting the electromagnetic spectrum for the joint task force's use. Liaison and the subsequent coordination of the electromagnetic spectrum should take place where appropriate. In a non-permissive environment, electronic warfare resources may be required to disrupt opposition forces.

340. **Medical.** The capability of medical support needs to be taken into account when considering a NEO to cater for civilian treatment and care during the evacuation. See Chapter 5 for more details.

341. **Sustainability.** A NEO will normally be of short duration thus minimising the sustainability requirements of the force. However, the requirements of HM Representative’s staff, and other eligible persons may be considerable. Certain evacuees, such as pregnant women and young children, may also have specific requirements. Sustainability planning for the eligible persons must be conducted for all phases of the operation until they are in a temporary safe location or place of safety and no longer part of the NEO. The potential requirement for sweep-up operations to evacuate stragglers and other residual eligible persons should also be noted.
Section 5 – Other agencies

342. **The UN, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.** There may be a number of international organisations and non-governmental organisations within the joint operations area. The UN, other international organisations and larger non-governmental organisations will generally have their own evacuation plans. However, there may also be a large number of small independent non-governmental organisations with no contingency plans. In an uncertain or hostile environment, the UN may deploy additional security staff who will attempt to develop and coordinate the various evacuation plans for the humanitarian community at large. Alternatively, they may become eligible persons for military evacuation.

343. **The commercial sector.** Major multinational companies operating in country will frequently have their own security arrangements and evacuation plans. They will have good local contacts and are likely to be well resourced with communications and transport assets. There is also likely to be many eligible persons who will work for medium or smaller companies that will not have their own evacuation plans and be dependent upon HMG assistance. Information regarding UK company plans should be incorporated in the diplomatic post’s crisis management plan.

344. **Liaison with other agencies.** The FCO will take the lead, assisted by other government departments as required, in international liaison with other agency headquarters located in the crisis area. De-confliction is essential to avoid numerous organisations competing for the same resources and evacuation routes. Early coordination with other organisations is desirable to achieve a degree of coherence between different organisations through sharing information, resources and plans. As a minimum, an understanding of each others’ plans is essential to avoid confusion and unnecessary duplication. Military staff should be prepared to conduct liaison early in the planning process.
3A1. Military strategic planning’s political/military estimate will inform CDS’ planning directive. The operational estimate (conducted in conjunction with other government departments where possible) will seek to bring clarity in the key themes listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current situation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The international, regional and local political context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Actors involved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Any influencing factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supporting assets available (host nation, international organisations, non-governmental organisations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The in-country political, security and social framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifying deployed UK assets in the region of crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The worst case scenario.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>UK interests and priorities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Our foreign policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Any standing arrangements, commitments or obligations to other nations.</td>
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<tr>
<th>HMG strategy (ends)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Our national intent/objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Decisive conditions for defence contribution to the evacuation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• A risk analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Any constraints.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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1 The NEO planning guidance notes supplement JDP 5-00 (2nd Edition), Campaign Planning.
Planning

### Implications for MOD (ways/means)

- What military strategic effects are sought.
- Any multinational/agency involvement, for example, NATO, UN, Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF).
- The military planning options.
- Course of action generation.
- A risk analysis.
- The commander’s critical information requirements.

### Presentational issues

- The UK’s, coalition or international will.
- The UK (domestic) and international perception of the NEO.
- The impact of 'do nothing'.
- Any subsequent crisis-related issues.
Annex 3B – Legal issues and rules of engagement

3B1. The conduct of all military operations including NEOs, is circumscribed by the provisions of national and international law. National law includes both the criminal law of the UK, to which UK forces are always subject wherever they are serving, and the law of the particular country to which a force may be deployed, subject to any immunity granted by a status of forces agreement or memorandum of understanding.

3B2. The legal justification for UK forces to enter another state to rescue eligible persons may arise in different ways.

a. Explicit permission to enter for extraction purposes may be given by the receiving state authorities and in certain circumstances a status of forces agreement may even be concluded.

b. Where there has been a breakdown in law and order and a coherent government no longer exists (or where such government exists but it is unable or unwilling to protect UK nationals) intervention to evacuate UK nationals may be justified on grounds of national self-defence (Article 51 of the UN Charter).

3B3. Under both of the above, the use of force will be limited to what is necessary and proportional for accomplishing the mission and the defence of UK forces and evacuees. Rules of engagement (ROE) will be drafted accordingly.

Rules of engagement development

3B4. Ministers provide political direction and guidance to commanders through ROE that control the application of force by UK forces. For our national operations, those ROE will be developed in accordance with Joint Service Publication (JSP) 398. They will reflect the legal basis of the operation and HMG’s political and military objectives. They will be designed to ensure that any application of force is carefully controlled. ROE are not intended to be used to assign specific tasks or as a means of issuing tactical instructions, and must be cleared by the FCO.
3B5. In a multinational NEO, our forces will operate under UK national ROE. Every effort should be made to ensure that the various national ROE are aligned. Established procedures exist for providing ROE within NATO as laid down in Military Council 362/1.

3B6. The ROE for a particular operation will be developed in accordance with the procedures set out in paragraphs 12-19 of JSP 398. These procedures should ensure that the initial profile is realistic according to the circumstances at the time. Once approved by Ministers, the profile will be attached to the joint commander’s mission directive. Upon receipt of that directive, commanders should review the profile to evaluate its impact on their conduct of operations. Proposals for change should be submitted to the issuing authority, copied to the MOD in the form of a ROE request (ROEREQ) message. A full justification for each requested rule change must be given along with the likely consequences of the requested rule being refused. The approval process will be similar to the original authorisation process.

Self defence

3B7. States have a right to exercise individual or collective national self defence under international law in respect of their own nationals at risk of death or serious harm in a foreign state where the state authorities involved are incapable of protecting them (Article 51 of the UN Charter). Additionally, the right of individual service personnel or units to use force in their own self defence is inherent and may not be restricted by any ROE. UK law requires that only reasonable force may be used to defend oneself or others from an act carrying an actual or an imminent threat of harm. Use of lethal force in self-defence is only justified where there is an actual or imminent threat to human life, and no other way to eliminate the threat other than by the use of potentially lethal force.

Rules of engagement implementation

3B8. When implementing ROE, commanders should consider the authorised profile as the limit of permissions available. In their judgement of the situation they may authorise a more restrictive version of any rule. It is
important that ROE are disseminated to the lowest level as quickly as possible and in a form that is readily understood.

3B9. ROE do not by themselves guarantee the lawfulness of any action. It remains the commander’s responsibility in law to ensure that only the degree of force that is necessary, reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances is used.
Chapter 4 – Implementing a NEO

Section 1 – Phase 0: Shape

401. The nature of crises means that, in many cases, the state of FCO and MOD preparations may oscillate through periods of heightened or reduced alertness many times before a NEO is finally required. This could include reviewing plans, building and maintaining situational awareness, and providing security and protection for those in country. Throughout this period, shaping operations, coherent with the prevailing circumstances, will be conducted. This may well involve activity in countries where conditions of violence and austerity exist as part of a normal pattern of life. So, shaping operations are as much a part of a NEO as any eventual evacuation.

402. **MOD/FCO linkages.** Throughout the strategic and operational planning processes, the MOD will maintain regular dialogue with the FCO Crisis Management Department. As a crisis develops, the balance of military engagement with the Crisis Management Department will adjust to become more focussed upon the joint task force commander. Permanent links between the Crisis Management Department and JFHQ (the preferred NEO joint task force headquarters framework) should be maintained to ensure that the transition of focused activity is seamless.

403. **Operational liaison and reconnaissance team.** The principal tool for the development of situational awareness is an operational liaison and reconnaissance team drawn from the JFHQ. The team members are specialist military planners, trained for work in crisis environments and with experience in working in a cross-government environment. The team is able to provide a rapid, guaranteed and continuous link between HM Representative, the joint task force commander and the joint commander. An operational liaison and reconnaissance team often deploys in civilian clothes, and by civilian means, to avoid local sensitivities. The composition of the team is scalable to meet the task at hand. Principle tasks for the team include the following.

a. **Brief.** A briefing to HM Representative on the conduct of a NEO, the likely forces involved, and the military considerations.
b. **Liaise.** Liaise with the diplomatic post staff, the defence attaché, host nation military, and other nations’ military deployed in theatre.

c. **Review.** Review the crisis management plan and coordinate it with military plans as necessary.

d. **Plan.** Commence the operational planning process on behalf of the joint task force commander.

e. **Inform.** Compile local information not otherwise available to update or inform contingency plans. HM Representatives often find that, in a deteriorating situation, their normal methods of maintaining situational awareness become strained and the use of an operational liaison and reconnaissance team is a significant enhancement to their capabilities.

f. **Communicate.** Provide communications equipment at the diplomatic post, or elsewhere, if needed.

404. **Close protection.** Should there be a risk to the HM Representatives, their staff and/or the diplomatic posts, close protection may be requested.

**Section 2 – Phase 1: Deployment**

405. In the majority of cases, carefully applying resources during the *shape* phase will allow the judicious and timely deployment of forces so that, at the point a NEO is requested, the joint task force commander is suitably poised to provide assistance. However, this may not always be the case. In some circumstances, the military response may well have to be conducted in considerable haste and at reach. Here, the dialogue between the MOD, Crisis Management Department, the joint task force commander and HM Representative will be crucial to ensure that eligible persons are given the best possible guidance for their safety and timely evacuation. The joint task force commander may well find he is forced to deploy with his headquarters while the preliminary moves are being made. Even with only a short transit, the pace of events may be rapid. The risk of losing situational awareness is significant. Also, the requirement for a robust method of conducting an update before force elements are placed under command, is paramount.
Where it has not been possible to poise an evacuation force, there will undoubtedly be additional political and media pressures with which the joint task force commander and HM Representative will have to contend.

406. **Basing and commanding.** The selection of the forward mounting base and joint task force headquarters location forms a key first step in the joint task force commander’s concept of operations. There may have been considerable activity in the shaping phase to identify, and agree, suitable locations. It is not uncommon for several forward mounting base or forward operating base options to be developed to allow agility when a NEO is executed. The joint task force commander will need to consider these factors.

a. **FCO regional facilities.** As the supporting commander to the FCO, the joint task force commander may need to align his location to that of the FCO. Regional consular hubs may offer more staff to help process eligible persons, facilities to command from, and a nodal point from which to maintain situational awareness. Agreement will need to be secured with FCO London for any forward military operations that may use embassy sites.

b. **Multinational partners.** So long as capacity and infrastructure allows, the most efficient coordination between nations will often be achieved by selecting a common location to command and base operations. In some instances, where a partner has greater regional influence than the UK, this may also enable smoother negotiation of access, basing and overflight with the host nations. Where capacity is limited, it may still be possible to select a common headquarters location while forces are dispersed to a number of forward operating bases in close proximity.

c. **Internal or external locations.** A forward mounting base/joint task force headquarters location outside the country from which the NEO is to be conducted generally offers easier access and a reduced requirement for force protection in rear areas. However, a forward mounting base within the country may become a viable option if security permits, possibly enabling better situational awareness.
d. **Infrastructure.** The force elements required to conduct a NEO often require considerable strategic lift to deploy and substantial sustainment once in theatre. The availability of a functional infrastructure can considerably ease these burdens. In some cases this might be available from an overseas UK base such as Gibraltar or Cyprus, although the joint task force commander may have to balance the benefits of such locations with their proximity to the NEO and his ability to maintain situational awareness.

e. **Sea basing.** In some circumstances, access or infrastructure may preclude the selection of a suitable land location. With sufficient warning time, sea basing may be a suitable alternative. While it is possible to both command and base from afloat, the joint task force commander will need to consider his ability to maintain situational awareness and/or operate within a multinational environment. This may not be so easily assured afloat as from a land base. Where there is a high risk of a NEO enduring for a prolonged period without execution, afloat basing may offer the ability to poise without the complications of a protracted military footprint ashore.

**Section 3 – Phase 2: Execution**

407. The main effort of this phase is the safe and swift evacuation of eligible persons to a place of safety. This may be enabled by a rapid insertion and withdrawal of military and FCO personnel.

408. The point at which the NEO commences is invariably a matter of careful judgment by the FCO London, in collaboration with MOD and the joint task force commander, having assessed: the risk to eligible persons; the political, coalition and environmental factors; and the readiness of the force. Ideally, HM Representative will order the NEO to start once they are content that the evacuation handling centre is secure and ready to process personnel, and that the means of evacuating eligible persons is available.

409. Before beginning the evacuation, the joint task force commander and HM Representative must agree the point when eligible persons will enter the military evacuation chain and when they will exit again. In many cases, this will have been pre-planned but must still be considered against the prevailing
circumstances. A detailed description of the associated tactical-level considerations for a generic evacuation chain is at Annex 4A, although specific circumstances will require bespoke solutions.\textsuperscript{1}

410. Once received into the evacuation chain, eligible persons are processed by the FCO rapid deployment team/UK Border Agency to ensure eligibility. It may be that FCO/UK Border Agency processing cannot be safely conducted before evacuation. In these circumstances, a further agreement with the joint task force commander will empower evacuating forces to make basic eligibility checks before accepting evacuees. The FCO/ UK Border Agency will conduct more thorough checks at the place of safety or temporary safe location. During processing, it may also be possible to debrief evacuees (either using military or FCO teams) to generate further understanding of the situation, especially the recognised eligible person picture.\textsuperscript{2}

411. In a multinational evacuation the additional allied evacuees will place considerable extra complexity to the recognised eligible person picture. The joint task force commander will need to be responsive to the dynamic political situation in which his obligations may grow quickly, often initially without clarity of the tactical implications. The formation of a NEO Coordination Cell will assist this process.\textsuperscript{3}

Section 4 – Phase 3: Recovery

412. As with the deployment phase, the timing of recovery, either partial or complete, will be a careful judgement in which the joint task force commander and HM Representative will be instrumental in advising FCO London who will make the decision. It is almost certain that, even with the careful tracking of eligible persons, there will be some potential evacuees unaccounted for at the end of the main evacuation effort. A tactical pause may be appropriate to allow time for any remaining eligible persons to be identified and a second wave of extraction may be required (perhaps with a reduced force) before final recovery is ordered. Equally, a careful assessment of the multinational

\textsuperscript{1} Not all stages of the evacuation chain will necessarily be used or activated; stages in the chain may also be skipped or merged depending on the situation.
\textsuperscript{2} More information can be found at paragraph 109.
\textsuperscript{3} More information can be found at paragraph 324.
Implementing a NEO

effort, and residual UK obligations to it, will be required to ensure that the consequences of UK departure are fully understood.
Annex 4A – Considerations for setting up the evacuation chain

Reception centre

4A1. Characteristics. Reception centres should be accessible, recognisable, preferably secure, and close to the eligible persons communities. They should be familiar to eligible persons and easy for untrained civilians to find at night and under difficult conditions. The location and significant aspects of each reception centre should be detailed in the diplomatic post’s crisis management plan. Typical reception centres will use buildings such as expatriate clubs, hotels or offices. There is an inherent risk that reception centres may need protection. Where this cannot be provided, it is often more appropriate not to use reception centres but to instruct eligible persons to report directly to an evacuation handling centre or evacuation point.

4A2. Responsibilities. HM Representative is responsible for selecting reception centres, taking into account military advice as necessary. Through the warden system, he is responsible for ensuring that each eligible person knows where the nearest reception centres is, and how long it will remain open for. HM Representative’s responsibility for administering the reception centres is normally delegated to a warden.

4A3. Activity. When called forward by HM Representative, eligible persons make their own way to their allocated reception centres where they are gathered by the local warden, assisted by diplomatic staff and military personnel.1 The warden should have a nominal roll of those eligible persons expected to report to his reception centres and initial screening will take place if possible. At a pre-arranged time, or on call, the warden will close the reception centres and escort eligible persons to the nearest evacuation handling centre, using eligible persons’ own transport and/or transport arranged by HM Representative. Although not a military responsibility, it may be necessary for the military to escort eligible persons from reception centres to evacuation points to ensure safe passage.

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1 Assuming they have been requested and that the appropriate legal framework (for example, status of forces agreement or memorandum of understanding) has been agreed with the host nation.
Evacuation handling centre

4A4. **Characteristics.** The primary purpose of the evacuation handling centre is to organise the onward movement of the eligible persons to the evacuation point, a place of safety or temporary safe location. It will also provide a screening facility to ensure that only eligible persons are moved and will have the administrative arrangements needed to provide adequate medical and logistic support. It should be of sufficient size to handle the expected number of eligible persons, offer shelter and basic sanitation facilities and enable the processing of eligible persons. Typical buildings used for housing an evacuation handling centre are embassies, hotels, schools, airport cargo sheds, offices, expatriate clubs and sports clubs, but it may be that an open space with temporary shelter is acceptable.

4A5. **Location.** The location of the evacuation handling centre will be dictated by the specific circumstances of the NEO. However, it is most likely to be located at a secure port or airport in an area where the urgency of the evacuation will not be compromised by the screening process. The evacuation handling centre could be co-located with the forward mounting base or forward operating base. It could be located in the country being evacuated, situated in another country, or afloat. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these options are described below.

a. **In the country being evacuated.** The main advantage of locating the evacuation handling centre in the affected country is that the accidental evacuation of non-entitled personnel can be avoided. This is the most attractive option in a benign environment. However, security, administration and time may be factors that may make this option unfeasible.

b. **In another country.** The two main advantages of placing the evacuation handling centre in another country are those of security and ease of administration, especially for the FCO team which may not consist of many personnel. The main disadvantage is the danger of accidental evacuation of non-eligible persons into a country that then subsequently refuses to accept them. In the event that an evacuation handling centre is to be located in another country, the
acceptance of risk by HM Representative will form part of the dialogue they have with the joint task force commander.

c. **Afloat.** Many of the functions of the evacuation handling centre could be carried out in a sea base. Sea basing may be required where there is no suitable land location for an evacuation handling centre, especially in a hasty-NEO with small numbers of eligible persons. The benefits of force protection are particularly evident when sea based. It also has the advantage of simple administration for small numbers.

**Responsibilities**

4A6. The FCO is responsible for:

- establishing and running the evacuation handling centre;
- screening potential eligible persons and establishing an order of priority; and
- coordinating the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation and accommodation.

4A7. The joint task force’s primary duties include:

- controlling transport arriving from the reception centres;
- maintaining order in the evacuation handling centre;
- supporting the FCO’s efforts to care for evacuees;
- providing security, administrative and logistic support to enable an evacuation, if requested by the FCO and sufficient resources exist.

4A8. Should the evacuation handling centre be onboard a Royal Navy or Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship, responsibility for processing eligible persons will rest with the ship’s commanding officer.
4A9. **Factors.** When the FCO establishes an evacuation handling centre, a number of factors should be considered.

- The origin and numbers of the FCO staff to man the evacuation handling centre.
- The requirement for multinational coordination at the evacuation handling centre.
- When sited in another country, the willingness of the host nation to host the evacuees.
- Logistic support available, including accommodation.
- Security.
- Military advice on the location, should there be military involvement.

4A10. **Procedures during processing.** During processing, the procedures to follow will depend upon the location of the evacuation handling centre and the FCO's wishes. Regardless of location, a comprehensive plan for the reception and care of eligible persons should be implemented by the FCO, taking into account the ethnic and cultural diversity of the eligible persons community. The evacuation handling centre should be staffed with security, interpreters (if possible), local immigration, diplomatic post support, liaison, and medical personnel. With advice from the MOD the FCO should consider the following factors.

a. Use of military police to maintain order. This may well be a pre-requisite, but careful consideration should be given since action by the host nation security services may well have contributed to the degradation of security.

b. Use of easily recognisable markings on UK personnel, vehicles and equipment.

c. Disarming of eligible persons prior to evacuation processing.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) Consideration should be given to any UK policy that allows eligible persons to travel with weapons.
d. Debriefing of eligible persons to help develop situational awareness, especially an understanding of the recognised eligible persons picture.

e. Establishing a policy concerning the joint task forces’ responsibility to secure eligible persons’ valuables during processing.

f. Providing interpreters at control sites.

g. Upon initial screening, the use of tags for visual identification.

h. Requirements for searching women, children and disabled and/or injured. This may include providing male and female searchers.

i. The presence of a chaplain, if available.

j. Organising eligible persons to establish a single point of contact between the eligible persons group and the joint task force.

4A11. **Minimum processing requirements.** In the event that there is a concern for the protection and safety of eligible persons and the joint task force, a streamlined process will be adopted. All eligible persons will be screened for verification of identity and documentation before being prioritised for onward movement. In general, persons with life threatening medical problems will be processed first.

**Evacuation handling centre layout**

4A12. On arrival, the evacuation handling centre staff assume control of the evacuees. If eligible persons arrive without having earlier passed through a reception centre, processing teams should verify their identity and eligibility for evacuation prior to allowing the eligible persons to enter the evacuation handling centre. The facility is controlled by an evacuation handling centre control centre. It has three main areas, a:

- reception area;
Implementing a NEO

- registration and medical area; and
- holding area.

4A13. **Evacuation handling centre control centre.** The evacuation handling centre control centre will plan, organise and supervise the running of the evacuation handling centre. Under overall FCO leadership, manning by diplomatic and military personnel will reflect the division of responsibility within the evacuation handling centre. The control centre will also maintain liaison with local authorities and other agencies.

4A13. **Reception area.** This is the point at which eligible persons first enter the evacuation handling centre. It is important that eligible persons feel safe and reassured from the outset. In some cases they will be in a state of shock and possibly have experienced bereavement. Firm, but compassionate, handling is essential. This is also the point at which onward destinations are resolved. This can be difficult and cause considerable distress and commotion. It is, therefore, desirable that the reception area is physically separated from the registration and holding areas. The reception area has certain requirements.

a. **Drop-off point.** Providing signs and diagrams will help evacuees to understand the procedures and routines they are to follow. This should be backed up with guides or personnel whose role it is to provide information and assurance. The injured and sick will be moved directly to the medical area and eligibility checked there if necessary. The physically able will be directed to a screening/search area. In certain circumstances, for example, in the event of an evacuation following a humanitarian disaster, blankets, food and drink will be required while people await screening.

b. **Screening/search area.** Ideally, screening should take place as early in the evacuation process as possible to weed out non-eligible personnel. The longer non-eligible personnel remain within the system, the more difficult it will be to remove them. Force protection issues should be considered during the screening process in regions where there may be threats to the eligible persons or the joint task force. Diplomatic staff, and male and female searchers, who will probably be Service personnel, will be required to carry out
personnel/baggage searches. This is the point when eligible persons should be marked to prove eligibility. Typically this is achieved by the use of tags cards (see paragraph 4A14 for more information).

c. **Provision for special needs.** The reception facility must be able to cater for eligible persons who have special needs, such as the bereaved or disabled persons. This is manpower intensive, but it is important that some form of reserve manpower is ready to deal with any unexpected circumstance. Wherever possible, they should be allocated guides.

d. **Movement control.** Airstrips, landing sites, beach or jetty, traffic circuit and vehicle parking areas should be identified, marked, manned and equipped as required. If the evacuation handling centre is co-located with the evacuation point (for example, an airport or sea port), detailed arrangements for controlling the arrival of military transport will need to be established with local air traffic control or harbour authorities.

e. **Repayment.** In some circumstances, such as when using commercial transport, the FCO or diplomatic staff may require eligible persons to repay the costs of evacuation to HMG. Eligible persons may resent this, particularly if they are not in a stable financial position.

4A14. **Registration and medical area.** It is important not to duplicate effort between the reception and registration areas. Nonetheless, there is likely to be a need for considerable clerical and IT support to the evacuation handling centre.

a. **Registration.** Eligible persons' personal details will be recorded on a registration sheet and their tag cards completed. Essential details are: name, nationality, sex, age, passport number, and contact details so that eligibility can be proven against UK records. In general, personnel who have arrived at the evacuation handling centre together should be kept in a group. If possible, families must not be separated.
b. Medical. The medical station provides emergency medical treatment and possibly any immunisations which may be required before onward movement. Serious medical cases receive priority for evacuation, with the medical officer ensuring that any seriously ill, injured or wounded persons complete processing. Medical personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid identification. After a natural disaster, medical advice may be required for all evacuation handling centre personnel to avoid infection.

4A15. Holding area. After registration, eligible persons will be taken to a holding area. Sanitation suitable for the number of expected eligible persons will be required. The intention should be to move eligible persons from the holding area to the point of embarkation for onward movement as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Temporary safe location or place of safety

4A16. The number and types of places of safety will vary according to the circumstances of each NEO and the eligible persons. For eligible persons who are just visiting, such as tourists, it is probable that they will evacuate by commercial means before a military evacuation is initiated. For eligible persons who were residents of the evacuated country, an internal place of safety may be most appropriate, such as a hotel in an unaffected area. For eligible persons who are resident elsewhere, a place of safety may be repatriation to their country of origin.

4A17. It will be rare that the military will be asked, or will be able to resource, the movement of eligible persons to a place of safety beyond the affected country or the immediate region. In these circumstances it may be necessary to identify a temporary safe location where responsibility for the eligible persons can be passed back from the joint task force commander to the FCO to coordinate their onward movement.

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3 An immunisation plan should be provided by environmental health personnel.
Chapter 5 – Service support

501. Each NEO is likely to be different and therefore, the service support requirements will vary accordingly. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 4-00 (4th Edition) Logistics for Joint Operations provides the overarching concepts for service support, set within the context specific requirements of any evacuation. Because every operation will be different, planners will also have to consider:

- eligible persons’ support requirements;
- coalition partnerships and interaction with non-partner nations;
- availability of strategic and tactical sea/airlift;¹ and
- constraints brought by access, basing and overflight permissions.

Logistic considerations are likely to be critical in the operational planning process. They will influence and shape the potential courses of action for the NEO.

502. Logistic command and control. The joint task force headquarters will centrally control the relatively small force typically deployed for a NEO. It is unlikely that a NEO will be required to deploy a separate logistics command and control node.² The joint task force headquarters J4 may need to be augmented to provide:

- a logistic focus for the enablers within single Service force packages;
- operational level logistic direction; and
- governance across the joint support area.

503. Project. NEOs are characterised by the requirement to project a force rapidly. Refining the force element table is critical to achieve the correct balance of assigned forces, including enablers. It is unlikely that maritime support will have the ability to react within the required timescales if projected

¹ Strategic and tactical airlift, helicopters or maritime lift may already be allocated to enduring operations. Therefore, once a NEO occurs, planners must prioritise and redeploy assets and enablers if required.
² The decision for the deployment of a discrete joint forces logistic component remains with the joint task force commander.
from the UK.\textsuperscript{3} Therefore, if we are going to project forces from the UK, planners will have to consider the optimal use of strategic air assets (including commercial charter).\textsuperscript{4} This may require re-prioritisation of strategic airlift resources from other commitments by the MOD and strictly controlled through PJHQ J4 Mounting and Movements. Access, basing and overflight, including host nation technical arrangements and memorandum of understanding, must be considered early in the planning process as approval may take longer than the desired deployment timelines.

504. **Sustain.** The duration and light footprint of a NEO dictates that sustainment requirements should be limited and planned on a basis of demand. The context of the crisis will shape the sustainment requirements, but, wherever possible planners should reduce these by using host nation support and/or support from multinational partners. Being aware of the potential lack of available maritime assets in the vicinity of a NEO, sea-basing options should still be explored as they offer the advantage of being self-contained. This option would also reduce the reliance on host nation support.

505. **Logistic support.** FCO representatives in the countries where the forward mounting base and evacuation handling centre are located will assist in arranging host nation support. Where the forward mounting base/evacuation handling centre is a permanent joint operating base, it will provide sustainment support. The single Service force packages will generally be responsible for logistics to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} line. The joint task force headquarters will be responsible for:

- monitoring the administrative and logistic support of deployed forces;
- securing host nation support and making sure conflicts of interest do not arise between other nations over potentially scarce local resources;
- sustaining stock levels in theatre (in conjunction with PJHQ J4);
- providing limited medical assistance, food, shelter and transport to eligible persons while under the duty of care of the military;

\textsuperscript{3} Maritime support is most likely to be achieved by re-tasking assets in relative proximity to the area of crisis.

\textsuperscript{4} The nature of the threat will determine whether the use of commercial aircraft is appropriate. All contracts will be set, operated and monitored by Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements.
• casualty reporting and managing the in-theatre casualty evacuation chain; and
• liaising with other forces, agencies and organisations to establish procedural de-confliction to achieve economies of scale through sharing other nations’, international organisations’ and non-government organisations’ capabilities.

506. **Medical.** Within the Defence contingency capability, there are medical elements held at readiness that can provide a scalable medical response based upon NEO planning. JDP 4-03 *Joint Medical Doctrine* covers the specific areas available, but planners must consider that defence medical capability is usually provided for the military population at risk and does not routinely provide civilian treatment, care or evacuation. When considering a NEO, medical capability, in terms of readiness, training and suitable equipment for treating a civilian population, needs to be taken into account.

507. **Environmental health.** Prior to a NEO there has often been a breakdown in civil infrastructure. This could pose an environmental health risk to evacuees and deployed forces, particularly if there is a shortage of potable water. During the planning process, the joint task force should consider how it is going to provide eligible persons with potable water whilst they are in the evacuation chain. Also, specific health protection measures may to be taken or advised, depending on the communicable disease profile of the country.

508. **Deceased evacuees.** Even in a permissive NEO environment, the death of vulnerable eligible persons (such as the elderly, infirm or infants) may be encountered. The decision to evacuate the deceased is dependent on, but not limited to, the specifics of the situation. This may include the tactical environment, religions, host nation laws, local customs, the wishes of any relatives, weather, health related risk, and capacity of receiving ships/aircraft.
Lexicon

Part 1 Abbreviations

The Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions relevant to JDP 3-51, but is not intended to be exhaustive. For reference to extant terminology see the current edition of JDP 0-01.1 *The UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database* and AAP-06 *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>CCT</td>
<td>Current commitments team</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and Information Systems</td>
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<td>CJO</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMD</td>
<td>Crisis Management Department</td>
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<td>CMP</td>
<td>Crisis management plan</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Current operations group</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>Countries at risk of instability</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Defence Attaché</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCMO</td>
<td>Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>Eligible person</td>
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<td>EvacPt</td>
<td>Evacuation point</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>FMB</td>
<td>Forward mounting base</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward operating base</td>
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<td>HM</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s</td>
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<td>HMG</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Government</td>
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<td>Info Ops</td>
<td>Information operations</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
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Lexicon

JCF Joint contingent force
JDP Joint Doctrine Publication
JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters
JPG Joint planning guides
Jt Comd Joint commander
JTF Joint task force
JTFC Joint task force commander
JTFHQ Joint task force headquarters

MEDEVAC Medical evacuation
MILO Military intelligence liaison officer
MOD Ministry of Defence

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCG NEO Coordination Group
NEO Non-combatant evacuation operation
NEOCC NEO Coordination Cell
NGO Non-governmental organisation
NTM Notice to move

OLRT Operational liaison and reconnaissance team
OPCOM Operational command
OPCON Operational control
OPLAN Operation plan

PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
PoS Place of safety
PSYOPS Psychological operations

RC Reception centre
RDT Rapid deployment team
REPP Recognised eligible persons picture
ROE Rules of engagement
ROEREQ Rules of engagement request

SPG Strategic planning group
STRATCOM Strategic communication
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIO</td>
<td>Targeting and Information Operations</td>
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<td>TSL</td>
<td>Temporary safe location</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKBA</td>
<td>UK Border Agency</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Part 2 – Terms and definitions

This Lexicon incorporates three types of definition. Firstly, in **black**, it lists those definitions which have already been endorsed by the Defence community (and the source is shown in brackets). Second, those terms shown in **purple** are working definitions for this publication but are not endorsed. Finally, those definitions in **slate** are proposed new terms and definitions that can be included into the UK’s terminology database once approved.

**area of operations**
A geographical area, defined by a joint force commander within his joint operations area, in which a commander designated by him (usually a component commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

**crisis management plan**
A plan (usually produced by the diplomatic post) which establishes a procedure for responding to crisis, including the evacuation of eligible persons. (JDP 3-51)

**diplomatic post**
A generic term for Her Majesty’s Government Embassies or High Commissions located in foreign countries. (JDP 3-51)

**eligible person**
A non-combatant that is eligible for evacuation by the UK. Eligible persons will include British nationals and those individuals from other nations for whom HMG and Her Majesty’s Representative have accepted responsibility. (JDP 3-51)

**end-state**
That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable terms. The end-state should be established prior to execution. (JDP 0-01.1)

The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6)
evacuation handling centre
A temporary secure location free from the threat of destabilising influences, where eligible persons can be received and processed by Foreign and Commonwealth Office/UK Border Agency officials to establish their eligibility for evacuation. (JDP 3-51)

evacuation point
Secure sites with facilities permitting the safe ingress and egress for military transport; it is here that eligible persons arrive for military extraction to a temporary safe location or a place of safety. (JDP 3-51)

force protection
The coordinated measures by which threats and hazards to the joint force are countered and mitigated in order to maintain an operating environment that enables the joint commander the freedom to employ joint action. (JDP 0-01.1)

forward mounting base
A forward mounting base is a secure sea or land base from which an operation may be launched. (JDP 0-01.1)

forward operating base
A base (also deployed operating base) established within the operational area to support tactical operations. It will be resourced to provide minimum services commensurate with sustaining the required level of air effort. (JDP 0-01.1)

host nation
A nation which, by agreement:
  a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory;
  b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or
  c. provides support for these purposes. (AAP-6)
host-nation support
Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis or war by a host nation to NATO and/or other forces and NATO organisations which are located on, operating on/from, or in transit through the host nation’s territory. (AAP-6)

joint commander
The joint commander, appointed by Chief of the Defence Staff, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployment, sustainment and recovery. (JDP 0-01.1)

joint contingency plan
Deliberate contingency plans prepared for a situation where it is assessed that there is a particular likelihood of an operation being mounted, or the anticipated warning time is reduced. In addition to the planning data contained in joint planning guides, joint contingency plans contain specific information on military capabilities required and deployment options, including readiness states where applicable. (JDP 0-01.1)

joint operations area
An area of land, sea and airspace, in which a designated joint task force commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A joint operations area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)

joint planning guide
Deliberate planning documents which comprise generic planning data for a particular region or for a particular type of operation. (JDP 0-01.1)

joint task force commander
The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)

joint task force headquarters
A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a joint task force commander. (JDP 0-01.1)
**non-combatant evacuation operation**
An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (AAP-6)

An operation conducted to relocate designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. (JDP 3-51)

**non-combatant evacuation operation coordination cell**
A cell providing a means to share information and assets for the collective success of the multinational evacuation operation. (JDP 3-51)

**place of safety**
The point where eligible persons exit the evacuation chain and are no longer reliant on diplomatic or military assistance. (JDP 3-51)

**reception centre**
Pre-designated sites, selected by Her Majesty’s Representative as part of a diplomatic post’s civil management plan, where individuals can enter the evacuation chain. (JDP 3-51)

**task force**
1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission.
2. Semi-permanent organisation of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task.
3. A component of a fleet organised by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. (AAP-6)

**temporary safe location**
A location where eligible persons are safe from threat awaiting onward movement to a place of safety. (JDP 3-51)

**warden system**
A network of volunteers located in the country in crisis, who act as a point of contact between Her Majesty’s Representative and the wider community. (JDP 3-51)
## Record of amendments

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Joint Doctrine Publications

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country’s armed forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in JDPs.¹ From time to time, Interim JDPs (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed through Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). To ensure timeliness, they are not subject to the rigorous staffing processes applied to JDPs, particularly in terms of formal external approval. Raised by the DCDC, they seek to capture and disseminate best practice or articulate doctrinal solutions which can subsequently be developed in due course as more formal doctrine. Alternatively, a JDN may be issued to place some doctrinal markers in the sand, around which subsequent debate can centre.

Details of the joint doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 Joint Doctrine Development Handbook.

¹ Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).