

Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles: An Updated Guide

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ASSOCIATION OF
CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS


Home Office

COUNTER-TERRORISM LOCAL PROFILES AN UPDATED GUIDE 2012

Produced by the Home Office and Association of Chief Police Officers in
partnership with the Welsh Government

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Foreword

Foreword

The new *Prevent* Strategy was published in June 2011. This strategy sets out how the UK Government aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The new strategy looks at all forms of terrorism, including domestic extremism, and ensures that we are only funding groups which support core British values. The *Prevent* Strategy reminds us that focused and coordinated partnership activity, working with communities, is vital if we are to *Prevent* people becoming terrorists or supporting extremism relating to terrorism.

Much has been achieved since the development of the first Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs) in 2009. An essential part of engaging partners in *Prevent* is making relevant information available to them to help them target activities and resources as effectively as possible. CTLPs help to achieve this by outlining the threat, vulnerability and risk from extremist activity relating to terrorism within a specific area, providing partners with a practical and consistent approach to sharing counter-terrorism related information.

This guidance has been written for local partners and CT leads who should be using CTLPs to inform their local *Prevent* programme of action, taking into account learning from the last twelve months. It sets out the key principles to encourage a consistent approach, particularly around the sharing of CTLPs. Partners, including the police, should be working collaboratively and sharing their expertise and experience to ensure that the CTLP meets the needs of the partnership.

We continue to see value in renewing CTLPs at least every twelve months. However there may be circumstances, such as a change in the level of risk, where an earlier renewal is appropriate.

This timeline is intended to reflect a minimum standard for assessing risks within communities, while providing the flexibility to accommodate other planning cycles. This flexibility should help partners to mainstream CTLP development and delivery within core business.

We have already seen how well partnerships can work using the strategic information provided by a CTLP to tackle extremism and terrorist-related activities in many areas across England and Wales. *Prevent* continues to be a core part of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy and sharing information and effective local partnerships remain crucial elements of implementing that strategy.




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Purpose of this document

Purpose of this document

This guidance provides an overview of the development, distribution and effective use of Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles (CTLPs).

Prevent is the counter-terrorism programme which aims to stop people being drawn into terrorist-related activity and it is one of the key elements of CONTEST, the Government's counter-terrorism strategy. The other elements of CONTEST are *Pursue, Prepare and Protect*.

The Government's revised *Prevent* strategy was launched in June 2011 with the aim of stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The key objectives of this strategy are to challenge the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it, *Prevent* people from being drawn into terrorism, and work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation.

The scope of the *Prevent* strategy covers all forms of terrorism, including domestic extremism.

CTLPs have been produced since 2009, and have been subject to a comprehensive national review of their production and delivery process as well as a stakeholder survey¹. The review identified both examples of good practice and

key areas for improvement. The findings were positive and provide a useful evidence base for the content of this guidance. Key findings were as follows:

- CTLPs remain a useful and engaging resource and a catalyst for closer partnership working and local action on *Prevent*;
- CTLP briefings are generally well received and valued and are becoming business as usual for many force areas;
- CTLPs need to contain information that is relevant, fresh and localised;
- CTLPs should provide practical recommendations that partners can own and progress; and
- greater consistency is required on how reports are shared.

This guidance is aimed particularly at local *Prevent* partnership and CT leads who should be using CTLPs to inform their local *Prevent* programme of action. It may also be shared with other *Prevent* partners where appropriate. Much of the information it contains will also be helpful to non-Home Office police forces and partners in devolved administrations who are responsible for delivering *Prevent* or promoting integration.

¹ National Counter-Terrorism Local Profile Review (December 2009) commissioned by the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit & Information Sharing Scheme – Evaluation and Development, Ipsos MORI (January 2010) commissioned by the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, Home Office & the ACPO *Prevent* Delivery Unit.

What is a CTLP
and how should it
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What is a CTLP?

- A CTLP is a report that outlines the threat and vulnerability from terrorism-related activity within a specific area (e.g. police Basic Command Unit (BCU) / Local Policing Unit (LPU), local authority area or force).

The aims of the CTLP are to:

- develop a joint understanding amongst local partners of the threats, vulnerabilities and risks relating to terrorism and non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism;
- provide information on which to base local *Prevent* programmes and action plans;
- support the mainstreaming of *Prevent* activity into day-to-day policing, local government and partnership work; and
- allow a targeted and proportionate use of shared resources.

A CTLP is a strategic document and does not provide a complete assessment of activity in an area. It should therefore be read in conjunction with other available information to produce a more complete overview of the risks in an area.

What the CTLP includes

Although the content of each individual CTLP will vary greatly, depending on the locality, the RESTRICTED CTLP should include:

- a crime overview;
- information on community tensions; and
- the context of threats from other forms of extremism.

Some other areas that a CTLP might cover include:

- **Other strands of CONTEST** – for example, data on crowded places and hazardous sites may be included to enable partners to consider where they can contribute to reducing vulnerability to a terrorist attack. Local partners may also wish to use the CTLP to ensure their contingency planning is current and regularly exercised (*Prepare*).
- **An international perspective** – this might include information from ports and United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) on national and international migration and demographics. It may be useful to consider how the CTLP can help provide an understanding of communities at a national and international level.

- **Cross boundary issues** – the CTLP might present an opportunity to raise some of the issues that cut across BCU/LPU, local authority areas, force/county or even regional boundaries. This might, for example, include commuting or migration patterns.

In essence, whatever information sources end up contributing most significantly towards the CTLP should be included. It must include priority locations, identification of the vulnerable communities within them, the ideologies and forms of extremism to which they are vulnerable and the factors that contribute towards those vulnerabilities. However, given the potentially highly sensitive information about communities, staff producing the CTLP should consider carefully how to best present this information so that it is clearly understood by all and not misinterpreted.

It must go beyond superficial acknowledgement of demographic groupings and the existence of vulnerable locations. It should consider wider factors linked to community tensions, social factors, crime and issues relating to integration.

Basic principles of guidance

1. That all senior partners recognise that CTLPs are a critical mechanism in driving the **information sharing** necessary to identify threat and vulnerability in a local area.
2. That all CTLP authors will be provided with the necessary **support and leadership** by senior partners, and any additional advice or support from OSCT and ACPO (TAM)'s *Prevent* Delivery Unit (PDU), to ensure that the CTLP product is fully able to articulate threat and vulnerability in the local area.
3. That all areas **have in place a structure** that governs a programme of sustainable delivery emanating from the CTLP that ensures a clearly **defined, targeted and proportionate approach** to managing threat and vulnerability in the local area.

How the CTLP should be used by the partnership

An effective CTLP process should provide a framework which supports and enables lawful, necessary, proportionate, secure and accountable information sharing. As structures, processes and relationships develop, CTLPs should start to become a shared assessment of risk that informs the local partnerships' strategic approach to preventing terrorism and non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism.

Partnership consideration of the totality of available information is vital. Information needs to be interpreted, tested and discussed by partnerships to identify what action needs to be taken and where it needs to be targeted.

The police should produce two CTLPs: one for local partners that should be classified as RESTRICTED under GPMS (Government Protective Marking System) and one for police CT practitioners which, due to its sensitive content, will be marked at a higher classification.

The Stoke on Trent (Staffordshire) CTLP highlights areas of risk and vulnerabilities, and then clearly demonstrates how *Prevent* related activities can be suggested to address the issues. These actions support both police and partnership engagement. The activities are managed through a '*Prevent* plan'.

Understanding protective markings

The GPMS is the Government's administrative system to ensure that access to information and other assets is correctly managed and safeguarded to an agreed and proportionate level². GPMS comprises five markings. In descending order of sensitivity they are: **TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, RESTRICTED** and **PROTECT**. The originator or nominated owner of information (the CTLP Owner) is responsible for applying the correct protective marking. This should be based on a damage or 'harm test' to consider

² MG Security Policy Framework, Cabinet Office, Pg 17 (October 2009). http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/207318/hmg_security_policy.pdf

the likely impact if the information were to be compromised. For restricted documents the test includes:

- substantial inconvenience or distress to any party;
- risk to any party's personal safety;
- substantial financial loss to any party, or cause loss of earning potential to, or facilitate improper gain for, individual companies;
- substantial damage to any party's standing or reputation;
- prejudice the investigation or facilitate the commission of crime;
- breach proper undertakings to maintain the confidence of information provided by third parties;
- make it more difficult to maintain the operational effectiveness or security of UK or allied forces;
- impede the effective development or operation of government policies; and
- undermine the proper management of the public sector and its operations.

Unlike the CTLP for local partners, the version for police CT practitioners may contain information that, if it were subject to unauthorised readership, could, for example, threaten life directly or cause serious damage to operational effectiveness. It is therefore marked at a higher classification to afford it the appropriate level of protection under GPMS.

The RESTRICTED CTLP is for briefing BCU command teams, local authorities and an agreed partnership group on the threat from terrorism and non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism, and how it is contextualised locally. It will allow partners to develop appropriate and proportionate responses to any possible threats, risks or vulnerabilities in the area. The information must be relevant to partners and their remit.

The CTLP will provide clear recommendations to deal with any identified risks and vulnerabilities. This should include the

appropriate background and contextual information so that recommendations can be translated into local actions. These should be considered by local partners so that an appropriate course of action can be instigated. The local *Prevent* partnership or other groups³ should develop the recommendations into an agreed set of actions with timescales, milestones and named owners. This should be used to inform the local *Prevent* programme of action to ensure that recommendations are acted upon locally.

GPMS advocates the 'need to know' principle which recognises that individuals with a business need should be granted access to sensitive and protectively marked information. This principle should be balanced with a need to share or to protect the information. The over-classification of documents relating to 'risk' is regularly cited as an inhibitor to information sharing. The CTLP Owner⁴ should therefore apply the 'need to know' principle when producing and sharing the RESTRICTED CTLP. **A CTLP is only for the agreed recipient and should not be copied for internal use, as they are classified as RESTRICTED documents.**

The section on *Commissioning* provides further details on how partners should be involved.

1. The RESTRICTED CTLP explains the threat from terrorism and non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism and how it is contextualised locally. It should be shared with BCU Command Teams, local authorities and an agreed partnership group. It should be used to shape a local response and assist with partnership activity and the development of the local Prevent programme of action.


2. The RESTRICTED CTLP should contain recommendations and actions that are clear and tangible and can be used to inform local Prevent planning.

³ A partnership group should be clearly tasked to take forward local action on *Prevent*. This could be new or existing structure such as the Community Safety Partnership.

⁴ The CTLP Owner has overall responsibility for the production of the CTLP. This will usually be the head of the force Special Branch/CT Branch. For more information see APPENDIX 2.

The CTLP process:
Who owns it and
what are their
responsibilities?

The CTLP process: Who owns it and what are their responsibilities?



The CTLP process should not interfere with established communication channels with BCU/ LPU and partners, but provide an additional structured system in the sharing of counter-terrorism information.

Multi-agency working is vital to producing an effective CTLP that will help inform local Prevent action plans. This section explains how partners can support the development and delivery of CTLPs. ACPO (TAM)'s PDU produces a number of products to help partners improve their information sharing services around CTLPs and they can be contacted at Prevent@acpo.pnn.police.uk

Local Prevent Partnership

Prevent is typically managed locally through a Prevent Board. A local Prevent Board is usually jointly led by the police and local authority Prevent leads and includes representatives from other statutory groups and the community. The partnership is led jointly in this way because of the critical role that both the local authority and the police play in supporting the local community to address the threat of terrorism and considering the wide range of factors that can contribute towards a community's vulnerability to that threat. The Board therefore has a key role to play in the CTLP process.

BCUs / LPUs

BCU/LPU Commanders or their designated representatives (e.g. BCU/LPU *Prevent* lead) are well placed to:

- provide advice around the local parameters of the CTLP and provide local information e.g. neighbourhood profiles;
- support the delivery of key milestones along the CTLP process;
- ensure that key BCU/LPU staff are identified and committed to support the CTLP production team in relation to the data collection plan and local infrastructures;
- act as a conduit between the local authority, policing CT structures and operational tasking within each BCU/LPU; and
- work in partnership with the local authority and other partners to use the CTLP to inform the local *Prevent* programme of action.

Local Authorities

Local authorities are a key driver at a local level in tackling terrorism and non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism. They are central to facilitating partnership working, offering a gateway to a range of service provision and local partners who may have responsibilities for delivering the CTLP recommendations and/or may possess information and data relevant in the production of CTLPs. This may include information from local authorities, such as Indices of Multiple Deprivation factors, Community Safety Partnership (CSP) data and health data. Examples of relevant local authority partners are:

- housing departments;
- environmental health departments;
- licensing departments;
- local authority planning departments;
- benefits and tax departments;

- health departments (including mental health);
- Social Services (adult and children's services);
- statutory and voluntary youth services;
- arts and cultural delivery bodies;
- schools, colleges and universities;
- community safety and engagement officers;
- council neighbourhood management officers; and
- integration teams.

Integration

Local authorities are also the main drivers in promoting integration across local communities. It is important to note that under the new *Prevent* strategy, *Prevent* remains distinct from integration but linked to it, tackling non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism and popularises ideas which are espoused by terrorist groups.

In February 2012 the Department for Communities and Local Government published the report '*Creating the Conditions for Integration*' which outlines the Government's approach for creating an integrated society. The report highlights the role of local authorities in promoting integration and challenging extremism as follows:

'We strongly encourage the different local partners to work together to drive action and to learn from each other in promoting integration and challenging extremism. Local authorities are well placed to take a leading role working through existing partnerships with the police, other agencies and the business and voluntary sectors. Local areas need to create opportunity for all and tackle disadvantage by promoting economic regeneration. Alongside this they should ensure that extremist narratives are robustly challenged, that groups and individuals promoting division and prejudice are not implicitly endorsed by engagement or use of public buildings and that early interventions take place in order to protect vulnerable individuals.'

Prevent leads

It is particularly important to engage the local authority and BCU/LPU *Prevent* leads as they have key responsibility for taking forward local *Prevent* programmes and will be the people who will use the information from the CTLP to inform the local *Prevent* programme of action.

Their contribution will relate to:

- providing local authority data sets;
- ensuring local *Prevent* action plans reflect recommendations made in the CTLP; and
- providing advice and guidance on sharing the contents of the CTLP.

Elected members

Local councillors can play a key role in the delivery of *Prevent* through their knowledge and relationships in a local area. This includes, for example:

- ensuring that effective partnerships are established and maintained;
- connecting with constituents' concerns and listening to and understanding grievances, whether perceived or legitimate;
- feeding back relevant information (for example, a possible rise in community tensions) into their local authority; and
- using their established relationship with the local media to send out positive key messages about local communities.

Through talking to councils, the Local Government Association (LGA)⁵ identified a number of key issues for elected members which they felt inhibited their ability to help deliver *Prevent*, including a lack of relevant, community-specific information on the local threat. In order to be able to contribute effectively, elected members need to understand why *Prevent* is relevant in their community. The CTLP offers a mechanism to inform elected members and allow them to

engage more effectively on the *Prevent* agenda.

Any decision on sharing the document with elected members must be made at a local level by the CTLP Owner and should be ratified by the regional Gateway Group, and should not be based solely on the fact that an individual is democratically elected. The sections 'Sharing beyond the Briefing Group' and 'Vetting' provide further guidance on the key issues to consider when making decisions around sharing the CTLP.

Local Policing Bodies⁶

Local policing bodies work to ensure the provision of effective and efficient policing, and consult with the public on policing matters. They will agree how local *Prevent* activity ought to be included in the local Police and Crime Plan. They will hold the Chief Constable to account for the delivery of the policing aspects of *Prevent* within the police-force area, specifically that delivery is effective, efficient and makes good use of partnership arrangements. This should include ensuring that, wherever possible, information is effectively shared and supports collaborative working.

To fulfil their duties effectively, including holding Chief Constables to account for delivery around counter-terrorism and ensuring that the force has sufficient resources, policing bodies will need to be aware of the local assessment of threat and risk. They are a key recipient of the CTLP product and should be part of the readership to ensure that they can hold the police to account for delivery on behalf of the communities that they are elected to represent. Representation, in some cases, may be appropriate at the commissioning meeting and/or briefing group. CTLPs will assist local policing bodies specifically in:

- focusing on key risk areas in relation to *Prevent* (and other areas of CONTEST);

⁵ The LGA works with and on behalf of the local government sector. For more information please refer to the LGA website: www.local.gov.uk

⁶ Local policing bodies are: in London, the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime and the Common Council of the City of London; and elsewhere in England and Wales, police authorities until their abolition and Police and Crime Commissioners after.

- effective and informed challenge of the force on delivery of *Prevent* - the content of the CTLP should help to put the response of the force into context;
- decision-making on resourcing specialist functions;
- monitoring potential community impacts of counter-terrorism policing;
- enabling the local policing body to encourage involvement of strategic partners in *Prevent* delivery;
- directing consultation and engagement activity with the public around counter-terrorism;
- providing evidence that the force is taking a measured and progressive stance i.e. that information is being shared and threat levels monitored; and
- where bodies are involved in local *Prevent* partnership boards, ensuring partners consider the CTLPs in their action planning process.

Which members of police authorities (until the authorities are abolished) should see the CTLP may vary greatly between authorities depending on the different organisational structures but will usually include the Chair, counter-terrorism/*Prevent* lead and Chief Executive. CTLP Owners will need to work with police authorities to agree the most appropriate methods for sharing. There may be instances where the CTLP is shared with police authority members who are also elected local councillors. In such cases, it should be made clear that they have been given access to the CTLP as a police authority member and not as a local councillor and to treat the information appropriately in that regard.

Home Office Crime Team in Wales

In Wales, the Home Office Crime Team (HOCT) works closely with the Welsh Government in taking forward non-devolved crime matters, ensuring that, where appropriate, policy development reflects the shared priorities across a range of Government

work and that the Welsh context is sustained. The team works with the Welsh Government, police forces and other key stakeholders to support delivery of CONTEST, including *Prevent* in Wales. CTLP Owners, managers and the HOCT will work closely together to agree the role of the HOCT in the CTLP process and identify opportunities where they can add value.

The CTLP Process

I: Commissioning

The commissioning stage, similar to the Strategic Assessment process run by many partnerships, is likely to consist of a meeting or series of meetings between CT police and local partners, the purpose of which is to:

- involve local partners, including the local authority *Prevent* lead, and understand their needs;
- encourage shared ownership of the issues raised in the CTLP;
- set the parameters and requirement for the content of the CTLP, including the development of achievable and measurable recommendations aligned to existing partnership activity;
- consider available data sets and identify any information gaps across the partnership;
- identify the appropriate leadership and resources for production and delivery
- identify timescales and key milestones; and
- discuss methods for sharing the CTLP, access and retention of hard copies and extended readership for approval by the Gateway Group.

APPENDIX 3 provides a suggested list of attendees.

This stage is important in producing an accurate, informative and relevant assessment which reflects the needs of the CTLP recipients. The benefit of this is that they can advise on what they would like to see in the CTLP and bring a range of knowledge and information that can help enhance the content.

A failure to engage effectively with partners and provide them with the opportunity to contribute is likely to be a source of frustration later on in the process, for example, where a CTLP identifies information gaps on which a partner already holds the information. This has the potential to undermine partnership arrangements and collaborative working.

A commissioning document should be developed and agreed by the commissioning group with the purpose of providing direction and clarity during the production process. This should include a list of membership for the Briefing Group and a list of other individuals that the group proposes to share the CTLP with, for example, force and/or BCU/LPU Prevent leads, Channel Co-ordinators, police authorities and elected members. This should include supporting rationale and the proposed method of briefing (see the section on 'Briefing' for further details). This will be submitted to the Gateway Group for approval.

CTLPs should be commissioned and written locally by the force. This will help ensure that the CTLP reflects local circumstances and context.

3. A representative from the relevant BCU command team and local authority should be included in the commissioning process and become the point of contact to support production of the CTLP.

4. A commissioning document is developed and agreed by the commissioning group with the purpose of providing direction and clarity during the production process. This should include membership of the Briefing Group and a list of other individuals for wider sharing for submission to the Gateway.

2: Production

This first stage of production should be to draw on relevant sources of information from police and partners to produce an assessment for the CTLP. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary's (HMIC) report identified that a number of forces have data warehousing or hub arrangements with local partners that

enable shared access to data⁷. These types of arrangements will help to produce a better picture of risks and vulnerabilities to terrorism and extremism in an area.

Examples of data sources might include:

- neighbourhood profiles and maps;
- local authority demographics data;
- housing and benefits data;
- immigration and demographic data from UKBA and ports police;
- local assessments of community tensions and hate crime (e.g. Operation Element or local authority assessments);
- local partnership strategic assessment; and
- police data sets.

This list is not exhaustive and there is likely to be a whole range of information available at a local level.

The production team must have an understanding of the communities about which they are writing and an awareness of the intended audience. They should not work in isolation but, instead, be pro-active in engaging those who are best placed to inform them of the dynamics of their communities. For example:

- engaging with neighbourhood policing staff and Prevent Engagement Officers (PEOs) who are ideally placed to add the local context;
- visiting the BCU/local authority area to improve understanding of the communities and geography of the area and building a relationship with the local authority and BCU Prevent leads in order to understand their needs; and
- working with local authorities and other partners to collect relevant data sets and ensure the developing recommendations are clear and tangible.

⁷ HMIC: Prevent – Progress and Prospects (June 2009), pg 23. http://www.hmic.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Thematics/THM_20090623.pdf

The production team should ensure that the language and style used in the CTLP is appropriate and relevant to partners. Where police and partner interventions and operations are mentioned, the production team should include a brief summary to provide an explanation to partners.

The RESTRICTED CTLP is intended to be as informative and detailed about the nature of the threat as possible and authors should consider the language and phraseology they use and the impact it may have. The language used to describe any threat and its response needs to be carefully chosen. It must be accurate and sensitive to history, culture and interpretation and avoid creating or exacerbating existing grievances.

The Welsh CT region have local working groups which involve the analysts who are writing the CTLP, analysts from the local BCU and community safety partnership, Channel project and Prevent Engagement Officers (where relevant). In some areas these groups have expanded to include representatives from the health and education sectors. These groups sit underneath and feed into the Contest board structure within each local area.

Further advice and guidance on language can be obtained from the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU@homeoffice.x.gsi.gov.uk) based at the Home Office.

CTLPs should be produced and delivered to the Briefing Group within twelve months from the previous date of delivery. In some cases, for example in a priority area, it may be considered that the production and delivery is required more frequently.

5. Wherever possible the production team should work with partners, ideally by visiting and, where appropriate, touring the communities being assessed.

6. The production team should ensure the language and style of the RESTRICTED CTLP is clear, relevant and appropriate for its intended audience.

3: The Gateway

The Gateway process is necessary to ensure that information in the CTLP is safeguarded. Oversight should be provided by a regional Gateway Group made up of CT specialists and practitioners whose role is to:

- authorise the use of the information in the CTLP;
- manage any risk around the inappropriate sharing of information and ensure the process is in line with GPMS guidance;
- approve the readership list drawn up during the commissioning stage and any additional proposals for wider dissemination;
- provide advice and guidance around briefing and vetting;
- quality assure the document;
- ensure any regional standards and policies are met;
- recommend the deployment of regional resources to support the CTLP process; and
- provide feedback to forces on identified good practice.

The group should balance the need to safeguard the information with the need to share⁸, which is critical to the effective delivery of *Prevent*. They should apply the principles of necessity, proportionality and 'need to know' when making decisions around dissemination and briefing. They should also make every effort to ensure that the agreed version of the CTLP retains as much relevant information and detail as possible. The group should be prepared to explain the rationale behind any decision they make to the CTLP Owner. Where appropriate, the CTLP Owner will feed this back to partners.

7. The Gateway Group should balance the need to safeguard the information with the need to share, applying the principles of necessity, proportionality and 'need to know' when making decisions.

⁸ HMIC: *Prevent – Progress and Prospects* (June 2009), pg 21. http://www.hmic.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Thematics/THM_20090623.pdf

4: Briefing

Once the RESTRICTED version of the CTLP has completed the Gateway process, it will go to a Briefing Group who should be given their own hard copies of the CTLP which they must handle and store in accordance with the GPMS⁹. The purpose of the briefing group is to:

- discuss the content;
- decide the most appropriate way to take forward recommendations and actions; and
- consider the need to share elements of the profile with partners not on the original list approved by the Gateway Group.

APPENDIX 4 suggests a list of invitees for the Briefing Group.

Prior to reading the CTLP, members of the Briefing Group or any other individuals who will be granted access to the RESTRICTED version of the CTLP will sign a 'user security agreement' clearly stating the terms and conditions in handling the document. This should ensure that the CTLP and its entire contents is protected and handled in accordance with GPMS. Copies will be supplied by the CTLP Owner. Each CTLP should be individually numbered to help maintain control over circulation.

The CTLP Owner and Briefing Group should also consider whether there is any benefit in providing further briefing on CTLPs that border their particular geographic area or inviting representatives from other neighbouring areas where there are cross border issues relating to terrorism or extremism.

The West Midlands CTU and South East CTU now use a one page visual executive summary to brief their CTLP to partners. The briefing clearly identifies risk and vulnerabilities by looking at the key points identified within the CTLP.

⁹ HM Government: *National Guidance on Counter-terrorism Local Profiles for BCU Commanders and Local Authority Chief Executives*, pg 12 and Annex 1 (April 2009). For more information please contact: Prevent@acpo.pnn.police.uk

Vetting

Vetting should not be a barrier to sharing counter-terrorism related material even above a RESTRICTED level. This view is supported in the HMIC Inspection Report on *Prevent* which notes that 'vetting is an unnecessary distraction in taking forward information sharing – a 'red herring'¹⁰.

The national GPMS guidelines clearly state that satisfactory completion of the Baseline Personnel Security Standard (BPSS)¹¹ "allows regular access to UK RESTRICTED and UK CONFIDENTIAL assets, and occasional access to UK SECRET assets, provided an individual has a 'need to know'"¹². Local Authority Chief Executives for example regularly have access to and handle sensitive data in other areas of crime and disorder which they are trusted to safeguard. Consideration should therefore be given to whether a vetting requirement specifically for the sharing of RESTRICTED CTLPs is necessary.

Any decision on whether it is appropriate for an individual to be subject to National Security Vetting (NSV)¹³ should take place at a local/ regional level (by the owners of the CTLP in consultation with the Gateway Group) and on a case-by-case basis. This decision should be compliant with GPMS guidance which states that vetting should only be applied: 'where it is necessary, proportionate and adds real value'¹⁴.

¹⁰ HMIC: *Prevent – Progress and Prospects*, pg 25 (June 2009). http://www.hmic.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Thematics/THM_20090623.pdf

¹¹ For more information in BPSS see HMG Baseline Personnel Security Standard, Cabinet Office (October 2009), http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/45160/hmg_bpss.pdf

¹² HMG Security Policy Framework, Cabinet Office, pg 30 (October 2009), http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/207318/hmg_security_policy.pdf

¹³ For more sensitive posts there are an additional range of security controls, collectively referred to as National Security Vetting (NSV). There are three levels of National Security Vetting: Counter-Terrorist Check (CTC), Security Check (SC) and Developed Vetting (DV). These **must only** be applied where they are necessary, proportionate and add real value. For further information see http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/45160/hmg_bpss.pdf

¹⁴ HMG Security Policy Framework, Cabinet Office Mandatory Requirement 24, pg 31, (October 2009). http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/207318/hmg_security_policy.pdf

Consideration should also be given to the impact it may have on sharing the information in a timely and effective manner. For example, it is unlikely that individuals who are receiving a verbal briefing or selected sections of the CTLP will need to be considered for vetting.

There should be a consistent approach to vetting in each region that is compliant with GPMS guidelines and ensures that decisions are not made arbitrarily. Where appropriate, CTLP owners should be prepared to explain the rationale behind their decision to partners.

Any briefings that draw upon the police CT practitioners version should consider capturing the information and presenting it in a way that is appropriate for the specific audience. These briefings must be supervised, conducted within a secure environment, and should only be given to individuals who have a minimum of BPSS or National Security Vetting. It should also have been approved by the Gateway Group. If it is likely that the practitioners document will be shared on a more regular basis with an individual, then a Counter-terrorism Check (CTC) should be carried out.

For further advice on information sharing and vetting, including the possibility of funding for vetting, please contact ACPO by emailing Prevent@acpo.pnn.police.uk.

8. Vetting should not be a barrier to sharing counter-terrorism related material. Vetting of individuals is a local decision for the CTLP Owner and should take place in consultation with the Gateway Group who have responsibility for ensuring compliance with national GPMS guidelines and ensuring that vetting is applied where it is necessary, proportionate and adds real value. The CTLP Owner should be responsible for explaining to partners the rationale behind any decision to request National Security Vetting.

Sharing beyond the Briefing Group

Individuals with whom the RESTRICTED CTLP will be shared should have been identified at the commissioning stage to ensure a more efficient process through the Gateway. However, the Briefing Group may identify a need to share the content with a wider group (beyond the list already agreed by the

Gateway). Wider sharing should help to:

- deliver any actions falling out of the recommendations from the RESTRICTED CTLP;
- influence strategic decision making;
- support *Prevent* /CONTEST activity, including ensuring the police and local authority owners of the joint local *Prevent* programme of action have seen the RESTRICTED CTLP;
- promote a shared understanding of threat, risk and vulnerability; and
- engender trust and confidence between partners.

Proposals for wider sharing of the RESTRICTED CTLP should be fed back to the CTLP Owner with a supporting rationale. This will then go to the Gateway Group for consideration and approval. The decision must be compliant with GPMS guidelines and should be based on whether there is a need for an individual or group to act on the information, the potential community impact and risk of unauthorised readership. Consideration should also be given to the impact the decision might have on the relationship between local partners. The need to share RESTRICTED CTLPs has been emphasised by the *Prevent* Police Thematic Board, chaired by Chief Constable Sir Norman Bettison, the ACPO lead on *Prevent*.

Some examples of methods already being used to share the content of the RESTRICTED CTLP include:

- briefings on the full CTLP, allowing attendees access to the RESTRICTED version for the duration of the meeting. Attendees would need to sign a 'user security agreement';
- bespoke verbal briefings, which may be general or focus on particular themes, for example, health or education; and
- separating the recommendations and summary bullet points from the main document (which could be non-protectively marked) to share widely with delivery partners.

Police should ensure that partners have a feedback mechanism through to the CTLP Owner to discuss issues on the content of the CTLP and make any requests around extended readership.

All CTLPs should be forwarded to the ACPO Counter-Terrorism Co-ordination Centre (ACTCC) for retention. Requests from OSCT for a copy of a CTLP should be directed to ACPO (TAM) PDU.

The following table suggests a sharing protocol for a RESTRICTED CTLP. This is not prescriptive and decisions on sharing must be made locally by the Gateway Group.

Suggested Sharing Protocol For a Restricted CTLP

	BCU	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER PARTNERS
One hardcopy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander • Command team • Force <i>Prevent</i> lead 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chief Executive • Deputy Chief Executive • Executive team (one hardcopy or access) • Local Authority OSCT-funded <i>Prevent</i> Co-ordinator • Director-level posts, in upper and lower tier authorities, for integration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Home Office Crime Team in Wales/Welsh Government- • ACTCC • ACPO (TAM) <i>Prevent</i> Delivery Unit
Access / verbal briefing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence Manager • <i>Prevent</i> Engagement Officer • Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officer • Community Tension Officer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local Council (either directly elected mayor or leader of the council, and the portfolio holder for counter-terrorism issues) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police Authority or Police & Crime Commissioner (once established)
Selected verbal briefing only			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statutory Agency leads • Other key local partner leads • Chief Executive of the Primary Care Trust • Individuals/ groups from the local community (including the voluntary sector)

In order to manage their resources and target their activity, local authority Chief Executives need to understand the scope and magnitude of the threat, vulnerability and risk in their local authority area. They are therefore a key recipient of the RESTRICTED CTLP and should ensure that information is cascaded, where relevant, to other local authority personnel, for example, the *Prevent* lead, deputy Chief Executive, those responsible for integration, and/or elected members, where appropriate.

Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI)

Any freedom of information request received around CTLPs should be referred to the relevant internal FOI department that handles such applications. As the information in CTLPs is protectively marked local partners must also consult with the CTLP Owner before any decision on disclosure can be made. Exemptions under the act will be dependent on the content and should be done on a case-by-case basis. The ACPO FOI Central Referral Unit can provide advice from a national perspective acpo.advice@foi.pnn.police.uk.

9. Any decision to share the content of the CTLP must be agreed at a local level and approved by the Gateway Group. It should be compliant with GPMS guidelines and balance the benefits of sharing the information against any potential community impact, risk of unauthorised readership and the effect the decision might have on the local relationships.

10. Partners should have a feedback mechanism to discuss issues on the content of the CTLP, including the recommendations and make any requests around extended readership.

5. Delivery

Embedding the response to CTLPs in existing partnership work presents the best opportunity for sustainable delivery.

Actions derived from the recommendations should feed into the local *Prevent* programme of action and multi-agency groups for progression. The most appropriate existing local partnership structures (which could be LSPs, CSPs or the local *Prevent* partnership board) should decide how the actions and recommendations should

be addressed through a targeted programme of action and how they should be prioritised and analysed to ensure a proportionate response. This should include assigning ownership to the actions and monitoring their progress (see the section on partnership planning for more information).

The BCU *Prevent* lead or other suitable representative should attend the partnership group meetings to monitor the progress of the recommendations, deliver and receive information and provide advice and guidance from a police perspective.

Partnership delivery is crucial in ensuring that work is undertaken to try and reduce the local threats and vulnerabilities. *Prevent* should be routinely considered at partnership meetings and mainstreamed into everyday partnership activity. The work of the partnership group must be fed back into the CTLP process to inform the updated CTLP and complete the CTLP cycle. Consideration should be given to this being done at any time during the twelve month cycle as part of a regular process, for example, following a CT incident.

*11. Actions derived from the recommendations should feed into the local *Prevent* programme of action and multi-agency groups for progression.*

*12. The BCU *Prevent* lead or other suitable police representative should attend the partnership group meetings to monitor the progress of the recommendations, deliver and receive information, provide advice and guidance and feedback any issues from local partners to the police CT environment.*

*The Luton CT Tasking and Action Group (TAG) meet every three weeks to discuss *Prevent* activity within their area. It is a multi-agency meeting, chaired by the local police *Prevent* lead and includes within their standing agenda the management of actions that emanate from their CTLP. In addition to this the group will also discuss potential submissions for the next refreshed CTLP.*

Partnership planning

Partnership Planning

Multi agency working is important in producing an effective CTLP that will help inform local *Prevent* action plans. This section explains how partners can support the development and delivery of CTLPs.

Partnerships are the key to the successful local delivery of *Prevent*. Local authorities and the police both have leading roles to play but the breadth of the *Prevent* challenge in terms of the range of relevant places, communities, institutions and issues, requires a multi-agency approach. An effective partnership will have agreed:

- aims, objectives and a collective delivery plan, with individual activities/ projects clearly assigned to a range of different partners;
- arrangements for oversight, monitoring and accountability;
- a decision-making and commissioning process;
- coverage of geographical areas, institutions and communities; and
- effective mechanisms for shared learning.

To achieve this, partners need to understand the individual challenge and context of a local area. Many local *Prevent* partnerships will have undertaken a strategic assessment which

matches an analysis of the local threat against local vulnerability, thereby giving an indication of the local risk. CTLPs should be at the heart of this process.

Local authorities and the police are responsible for ensuring that the local partnership action plan:

- addresses the main objectives of the *Prevent* Strategy;
- is jointly agreed and managed by the police, local authority and other partners;
- is proportionate to the level of threat in the area;
- reflects local needs;
- sets out clear and tangible milestones in tracking progress and sets a process out for evaluation; and
- is fed back into ACPO (TAM)'s *Prevent* Performance Framework to demonstrate progress against priority issues.

Appendix 1: Key Elements

Appendix 1: Key Elements

NUMBER	KEY ELEMENT
1	The RESTRICTED CTLP informs local <i>Prevent</i> partnerships, in particular BCU command teams, local authorities and other relevant partners, of the threat from terrorism and non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism and how it is contextualised locally. It should be used to shape a local response and assist with partnership activity and the development of the local <i>Prevent</i> programme of action.
2	The RESTRICTED CTLP should contain recommendations that are clear and tangible and can be used to inform local <i>Prevent</i> planning.
3	A representative from the relevant BCU command team and local authority should be included in the commissioning process and become the point of contact to support production of the CTLP.
4	A commissioning document is developed and agreed by the commissioning group with the purpose of providing direction and clarity during the production process. This should include membership of the Briefing Group and a list of other individuals for wider sharing for submission to the Gateway.
5	Wherever possible, the Production Team should work with partners, ideally by visiting and, where appropriate, touring the community (ies) being assessed.
6	The Production Team should ensure the language and style of the RESTRICTED CTLP is clear, relevant and appropriate for its intended audience.
7	The Gateway Group should balance the need to safeguard the information with the need to share, applying the principles of necessity, proportionality and 'need to know' when making decisions.
8	Vetting should not be a barrier to sharing counter-terrorism related material. Vetting of individuals is a local decision for the CTLP Owner and should take place in consultation with the Gateway Group who have responsibility for ensuring compliance with national GPMS guidelines and ensuring that vetting is applied where it is necessary, proportionate and adds real value. The CTLP Owner should be responsible for explaining to partners the rationale behind any decision to request National Security Vetting.
9	Any decision to share the content of the CTLP must be agreed at a local level and approved by the Gateway Group. It should be compliant with GPMS guidelines and balance the benefits of sharing the information against any potential community impact, risk of unauthorised readership and the effect the decision might have on the local relationships.
10	Partners should have a feedback mechanism to discuss issues on the content of the CTLP including the recommendations and make any requests around extended readership.

11	Actions derived from the recommendations should feed into the local <i>Prevent</i> programme of action and multi-agency groups for progression.
12	The BCU <i>Prevent</i> lead or other suitable police representative should attend the partnership group meetings to monitor the progress of the recommendations, deliver and receive information, provide advice and guidance and feedback any issues from local partners to the police CT environment.

Appendix 2: Roles of CT police in CTLTP production

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CTLP Owner

The Owner has overall responsibility for the production of the CTLP. This will usually be the head of the force Special Branch/CT Branch as they will usually have the control and understanding of CT operational activity in a force area.

Regionally it may be agreed that assistance and support in the production of CTLPs will be provided by the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU)/Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Unit (CTIU).

CTLP Co-ordinator

The Co-ordinator acts on behalf of the Owner to ensure that the final draft is delivered on time and to an acceptable standard. They are responsible for day to day management of the Production Team and will usually be a Detective Inspector/Detective Sergeant or a Senior Analyst from the force Special Branch/CT Branch.

CTLP Production Team

The author(s) of the CTLP will usually be an analyst or group of analysts from the force Special Branch/CT Branch, CTU/CTIU/CTC. Researchers, CTU/CTIU/CTC desk officers, Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs) and Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA) may also be involved in

writing the document. This team will produce both the RESTRICTED CTLP and CTLP for police CT practitioners, and will be led by the Co-ordinator. They should work closely with partners during the production process.

Appendix 3: Commissioning – list of invitees

Appendix 3: Commissioning – list of invitees

Invitee	Requirement	Comment
CTLP Owner	Essential	This will usually be the Head of the force Special Branch/CT Branch. They will usually chair the meeting.
Production Team	Essential	The analyst/analytical team responsible for writing the document.
BCU representative	Essential	This will usually be the BCU Commander, but may also be another appropriate representative from the BCU command team. This will help to ensure that the CTLP reflects a more local context.
Local Authority representative	Essential	This may be the Local Authority Chief Executive and/ or a representative such as the Local Authority <i>Prevent</i> lead/Community Safety Manager/CT lead, or councillor responsible for <i>Prevent</i> , who will have a detailed understanding of Local Authority and regional work streams that cross cut <i>Prevent</i> and will have access to strategic documents to assist the analyst.
Home Office Crime Team in Wales	Optional -decision for the HOCT	The HOCT <i>Prevent</i> Lead should be considered as an invitee. They can provide advice and guidance on strategic issues and should have an understanding of local <i>Prevent</i> programmes of action.
Force <i>Prevent</i> Lead	Optional	Can provide advice and guidance on force approach to <i>Prevent</i> .
Police Authority (or Police & Crime Commissioner once established)	Optional	The Authority / Commissioner can, for example, assist in discussions around ensuring that police forces have sufficient resources for the commissioning of CTLPs.
Other Partners	Optional	Consideration should be given to how other partners could contribute to the process e.g. representation from local partnership boards (<i>Prevent</i> board, CSP, LSP), Partnership Community Safety Managers, police authority / Police & Crime Panel <i>Prevent</i> leads.

Appendix 4: Briefing – list of invitees

Appendix 4: Briefing – list of invitees

Invitee	Requirement	Comment
Force Special Branch/CT Branch	Essential	This may be the head of force Special Branch/CT Branch or another appropriate representative.
Analyst	Essential	An analyst from the Production Team can help assist with the briefing and answer any questions on the analytical content.
BCU Commander	Essential	In addition to the Commander it may also be appropriate to invite other relevant members from the command team including local Police <i>Prevent</i> lead
Local Authority Chief Executive	Essential	In addition to the Chief Executive it may also be appropriate to invite other relevant members from the LA e.g. the <i>Prevent</i> lead/Community Safety Manager/CT lead.
Home Office Crime Team in Wales	Decision for the HOCT	The HOCT <i>Prevent</i> Lead should be given the option to attend as they need to have an understanding of threat, risk and vulnerability across the region in order to effectively execute their role in quality assuring local <i>Prevent</i> programmes of action.
CTU/CTIU/CTC	Essential	CT representatives from the region should attend to with their understanding around risks at a local and force level.
CTSA	Optional	The CTSA may support the CT lead where their specialist knowledge may add value to the process. [§]
Other Partners	Optional (if previously agreed by the Gateway Group)	It may be appropriate for other partners, for example lead officers within the Devolved Administrations, the police authority / Police & Crime Commissioner and/ or representatives from local partnership boards (<i>Prevent</i> board, CSP, LSP) to be part of the Briefing Group.

§ Any specific briefing on Crowded Places and Hazardous Sites data must be conducted by the CTSA

List of abbreviations

List of abbreviations

ACPO (TAM)	Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters)	DCLG	Department of Communities and Local Government
APA	Association of Police Authorities	GPMS	Government Protective Marking Scheme
AQ	Al Qa'ida	HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
BCU	Basic/Borough Command Unit	HOCT	Home Office Crime Team (in Wales)
CEO	Community Engagement Officer	KDI	Key Diagnostic Indicator
CONTEST	UK Government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy	LGA	Local Government Association
CPA	Central <i>Prevent</i> Analysis	LSPs	Local Strategic Partnerships
CSPs	Community Safety Partnerships	NCTT	National Community Tension Team
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Command	OSCT	Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
CT	Counter-terrorism	PEO	<i>Prevent</i> Engagement Officer
CTIO	Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officer	SC	Security Check
CTIU	Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Unit	UKBA	United Kingdom Border Agency
CTLP	Counter-Terrorism Local Profile	XRW	Extreme Right Wing
CTSA	Counter-Terrorism Security Advisor		
CTU	Counter-Terrorism Unit		

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Ipsos MORI National Survey Information Sharing Evaluation and Development (commissioned OSCT/ ACPO (TAM). (January 2010)

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The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism - CONTEST 2009 <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/contest/contest-strategy/contest-strategy-2009.html>

