

United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2022

Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 10 of the Export Control Act 2002
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 19th July 2023

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Foreword

This is the 26th edition of HM Government's Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls. The report provides details of strategic export controls policy and export licensing decisions for the period January to December 2022.

Export controls are a powerful lever for promoting both United Kingdom (UK) prosperity, and national and global security. HM Government is committed to maintaining a robust and transparent export controls system as a key enabler of economic security. A trusted export controls system, with global security and human rights at its heart, is a UK strength and is part of the UK's appeal as a trading partner.

The controls are important for the UK's defence and security industry. The legitimate international trade in military equipment and technology, as well as in dual-use items, enables governments to protect citizens, to preserve law and order against terrorists and criminals, and to defend against external threats. These are important controls in the context of enabling the growth of UK business by selling products overseas, and enabling legitimate trade in items that are subject to controls.

The objective of export controls is therefore to facilitate responsible exports. HM Government controls a range of military and "dual-use" exports, depending on their nature and destination, because of:

- foreign policy and international treaty commitments and obligations
- concerns about regional peace and security, internal repression or other human rights violations
- concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- national and collective security of the UK and its allies.

Our export controls seek to ensure that goods exported from the UK do not contribute to the proliferation of WMD or a destabilising accumulation of conventional weapons; they protect the UK's security and our expertise by controlling who has access to sensitive technologies and capabilities. Export controls also help ensure that controlled items are not used to commit or facilitate internal repression or to commit or facilitate the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

During 2022, HM Government continued to assess each export licence application on a case-by-case basis against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria (see Annex A), taking into account all relevant information available at the time the licence application was assessed. We keep our controls under regular review to ensure that they properly address the threats we face, keep pace with new technologies, and adapt to changing circumstances. Throughout 2022, HM Government has ensured that export licensing and the gifting of military equipment and support to Ukraine, following its illegal invasion by Russia, has remained consistent with the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria. We have also worked rigorously with international partners to introduce and apply the most severe package of sanctions ever imposed on a major economy, to help cripple Russia's war machine. This includes sanctioning key defence sector organisations and banning the export of critical technologies.

A key change to our assessments during 2022 was the introduction of the revised military end-use control (MEUC), which came into force on 19th May 2022. These revisions were introduced to allow us to address threats to national security, international peace and security, and human rights arising from the use of non-listed items by the military, police or security forces, or entities acting on their behalf, in an embargoed destination. At the same time China, and the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macao, were also added to the list of 17 destinations already subject to the MEUC.

These changes have contributed to a wider trend of increasing volumes of complex export licence applications which take longer to scrutinise and assess. The operational performance of the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) was also impacted by the urgent need to set up and deliver a licensing function for the trade sanctions against Russia. During 2022, ECJU processed around 17,200 Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) applications, completing 62% within 20 working days. As in 2021, this is below our target of 70%, which reflects the challenging operational context. Adapting to these changing demands on our system will be a key priority for ECJU in 2023.

Strengthening the arms export control regimes remained a high priority in 2022. The UK continued to play a leading role in supporting the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and effective Treaty implementation. The Eighth Conference of States Parties (CSP8) to the ATT took place in person for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. The UK supported the universalisation of the ATT and continued to lobby potential States Parties to encourage them to accede, as well as offering support to States considering accession. Through the United Nations (UN), the UK has been a strong supporter of the need to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), working to provide a common set of standards for establishing effective national controls. The UN General Assembly Resolution 76/233 established an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Conventional Ammunition. The UK participated in discussions to establish a politically binding and comprehensive framework to support safe, secure and sustainable through-life ammunition management.

As part of the Summit for Democracy¹, the UK worked closely with likeminded states to develop a voluntary Code of Conduct on Export Controls and Human Rights. This code aims to establish human rights considerations when transferring technologies which could be used to facilitate human rights abuses or violations.

The UK took part in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention meetings in June and November. In March, the UK held a Wilton Park Conference to raise awareness of the mine action sector's desire to explore innovative finance models to address funding challenges for stockpile destruction, mine clearance and victim assistance. The UK held the Presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) from September 2021 to September 2022, organising and chairing meetings to promote the CCM and its humanitarian objectives.


As part of the HM Government's commitment to supporting global implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 (prevention of access to WMD), the UK funded a project to support Pacific states to meet their obligations under the resolution, with an emphasis on export controls.

1 <https://www.state.gov/summit-for-democracy/>

The UK continues to operate one of the most transparent licensing regimes in the world, publishing information on all licences issued, refused or revoked. This Annual Report demonstrates our continued commitment to transparency and accountability. As we saw throughout 2022, there remains strong Parliamentary, public and media interest in strategic export control issues. Accordingly, we trust that the information contained in this Annual Report will be of interest to a wide range of people. We commend it to Parliament.



The Rt Hon James Cleverly MP
Secretary of State for Foreign,
Commonwealth & Development Affairs



The Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP
Secretary of State for Defence



The Rt Hon Kemi Badenoch MP
Secretary of State for Business and Trade, President of the Board of Trade,
and Minister for Women and Equalities

Section 1:

Export licensing process and basics

1.1 The need for Export Licensing

The Export Control Act 2002 and the Export Control Order 2008 provide the legal framework for the UK's export controls. A body of retained EU legislation and current EU legislation is also relevant.

Through this legislative framework, HM Government controls the export of a range of military and "dual-use"² items. At the end of the Transition Period³, some parts of EU legislation became retained legislation under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and are applicable to exports from Great Britain. Under the terms of the Northern Ireland Protocol, EU legislation continues to apply to the movement of controlled goods in Northern Ireland. Section 3 sets out the changes to applicable legislation that occurred in 2022.

Export controls protect global security by restricting who has access to sensitive technologies and capabilities, ensuring UK exports do not contribute to WMD proliferation, a destabilising accumulation of conventional weapons, or are used to commit or facilitate internal repression or to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law. They are a means by which we implement a range of international legal commitments, including the ATT and those resulting from United Nations arms embargoes or trade sanctions.

A product needs an export licence if it is included in:

- the UK Military List or national control list
- lists of controlled dual-use items covered by retained Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. For exports from Northern Ireland, the relevant regulation is Regulation (EU) 2021/821. These dual-use items are derived from the international export control regimes (set out in more detail in Section 7), which are:
 - The Nuclear Suppliers Group⁴

2 Dual-use items are goods, software, technology, documents and diagrams which can be used for both civil and military applications. They can range from raw materials to components and complete systems, such as aluminium alloys, bearings, or lasers. They could also be items used in the production or development of military goods, such as machine tools, chemical manufacturing equipment and computers.

3 11pm on 31st December 2020

4 <https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/about-nsg>

- The Missile Technology Control Regime⁵
- The Australia Group⁶
- The Wassenaar Arrangement⁷
- The Zangger Committee⁸
- the list of goods covered by retained Regulation (EU) 2019/125 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (“the Torture Regulations”), for exports from Northern Ireland, the relevant regulation is Regulation (EU) 2019/125
- the list of items covered by retained Regulation (EU) No 258/2012, which establishes export, import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, for exports from Northern Ireland, the relevant regulation is Regulation (EU) 258/2012
- the list of goods covered by the Export of Radioactive Sources (Control) Order 2006.

Even if an item does not appear on one of these lists, it may still require an export licence under Article 4 of retained Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (for Northern Ireland it is Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2021/821), if there are concerns about its end-use. “End-use” or “catch-all” controls aim to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, or the supply of items intended for a military end-use in an embargoed destination.

1.2 The Export Control Joint Unit

In July 2016, HM Government established the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU), following the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. During 2022, the reporting period for this report, ECJU was part of the Department for International Trade (DIT). However, since the announcement of the creation of the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) by the Prime Minister on Tuesday 7th February 2023⁹, ECJU has become part of DBT. Given this report provides details of strategic export controls policy and export licensing decisions for the period January to December 2022 when DIT and BEIS were both in existence and involved in the licensing process, we continue to make reference to both throughout this document.

ECJU administers HM Government’s system of export controls, and brings together policy and operational expertise from DIT, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The individual Departments within ECJU have distinct roles, and these are outlined below, under “Advisory Departments”.

5 <https://mtcr.info/>

6 <https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/index.html>

7 <https://www.wassenaar.org/genesis-of-the-wassenaar-arrangement/>

8 <http://zanggercommittee.org/>

9 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/making-government-deliver-for-the-british-people/making-government-deliver-for-the-british-people-html>

Departments Involved in Export Control

The licensing process, and all the departments involved in licensing and/or enforcing the implementation of export controls, are set out below.

Departments involved in export control

Licence Assessment

- Department for International Trade
- Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
- Ministry of Defence
- National Cyber Security Centre.
- Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.

Licence Enforcement

- HM Revenue and Customs
- Border Force
- UK Prosecution Authorities*

* Crown Prosecution Service (CPS in England and Wales); the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS in Scotland); and the Public Prosecution Service (PPS in Northern Ireland).

Department for International Trade (DIT)

DIT has overall responsibility for the export licensing process. The Secretary of State for International Trade is ultimately responsible for:

- the statutory and regulatory framework of the controls (i.e., what items and activities are controlled)
- the decision to grant or refuse an export licence in any individual case; and where necessary, the decision to suspend or revoke extant licences in accordance with the relevant legislation and announced policy.

DIT perform a variety of roles to support the licensing process via a Licensing Unit, a Technical Advisory Unit, a Business Engagement Team, Compliance and Enforcement teams, and a Corporate Business Management Team and Secretariat. Temporary teams have also been recruited to deliver the new online export licensing system, known as LITE, and ECJU's Transformation Programme.

On 1st January 2022, DIT had a total number of 120 posts within ECJU, with 94 people in post and 26 vacant posts (22% vacancy rate) including 20 staff working on temporary project teams. By the end of 2022, DIT's total number of posts within ECJU had increased to 122, with 102 people in post and 20 vacant posts (16% vacancy rate).

Advisory Departments

The principal advisory departments are the FCDO and the MOD.

Together, they provide DIT with advice and analysis on foreign policy, defence and development matters relevant to licensing. They do this by assessing all applications on a case-by-case basis against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)

The FCDO team considers, among other issues, whether an export:

- would comply with the UK's international obligations and commitments and sanctions regimes
- might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression or to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law
- would contribute to or undermine peace and security
- could be used to commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols to which the UK is a Party, relating to transnational organised crime
- might be diverted to an undesirable user or for an undesirable end-use
- is compatible with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, if the country is on the World Bank's International Development Association list.

In making its assessment on a case-by-case basis, the FCDO takes account of the proposed end uses of the equipment, the situation in the destination, and the end user. They seek detailed political, sanctions, human rights advice as necessary from posts overseas and other sources, including Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), or media reporting.

On 1st January 2022, FCDO had 12 posts within ECJU, with 11 people in post and one vacant post (8% vacancy rate). By the end of 2022, FCDO had 16 posts within ECJU, with 14 posts filled and two vacant posts (13% vacancy rate). This increase in resourcing was due to the additional casework for Ukraine and to assess applications under the Russia Trade measures, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the FCDO now provides advice on certain applications, following the introduction in May of the enhanced MEUC.

Ministry of Defence (MOD)

The MOD considers the military, operational, technical and security aspects of proposals to release classified material or export-controlled goods to foreign end-users. The MOD advises on the risk of any export being used against the UK Armed Forces and those of our Allies, and any potential threat to the security of the UK or Allies. The MOD jointly leads with the FCDO on assessing the risk of diversion or re-export of goods to end-users of concern.

The MOD's advice on export licence applications is given on a case-by-case basis and assesses the views of those responsible for protecting the capability of the UK's Armed Forces, as well as security and intelligence specialists. The MOD also operates the MOD Form 680 (F680) approval process which enables HM Government to control the release of classified equipment or information to foreign entities without compromising the UK's national security. The MOD is also responsible for processing gifting applications on behalf of HMG (further details can be found in Sections 5 & 6).

On 1st January 2022, MOD had 9 posts within ECJU, with 7 posts filled and 2 vacant posts (22% vacancy rate). By the end of 2022, MOD had 9 posts within ECJU, with 8 posts filled and one vacant post (11% vacancy rate).

National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)

The NCSC is HM Government's national technical authority for information security and advises on applications for goods involving sensitive communications or computer technology.

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)


BEIS plays a key role in HM Government's biological, chemical and nuclear non-proliferation policy, for example by making sure that HM Government continues to meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Department advises if there are concerns that proposed exports might be used in a WMD programme.

HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC)

Whilst HMRC does not provide direct advice on applications, it does have responsibility for the enforcement of export and trade controls, as well as sanctions and embargoes. HMRC works with the Border Force to prevent, detect and investigate breaches.

A decision whether to commence a prosecution, arising from an HMRC criminal investigation is made by the relevant prosecuting authority, who will also undertake the conduct of any subsequent prosecution. This is the Crown Prosecution Service for England and Wales, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland.

Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) Process



1.3 Overview of export licence types and processing times

Applications for export, trade ('brokering'), or transshipment licences for controlled goods are submitted to ECJU through the digital Shared Primary Information Resource Information (SPIRE) licensing system and, as part of the phased introduction of Licensing for International Trade and Enterprise (LITE), the new online export licensing system. Further detail is available in Section 9.2.

Applications must include details about who will use the goods and what they intend to do with them. This information is considered as part of the overall assessment process. Applications must include technical specifications, sufficient to allow experts in ECJU to determine whether the goods are specified by the control lists and therefore need an export licence.

Most export licences granted are SIELs. While all applications are processed as efficiently as possible, we encourage all exporters to apply for licences at the earliest opportunity and advise applicants not to enter into a binding contract, or to start special production until an export licence has been issued.

Table 1.1 Summary of applications and registrations

Licence type	Applications and registrations received in 2022
Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs)	16,664 ¹⁰
Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)	435
Open General Export Licences (OGELs)*	977
Retained General Export Authorisations (GEAs)*	196
Union General Export Authorisations (GEAs)*	23
Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs)	190
Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs)	46
Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs)*	64
Standard Individual Transshipment Licences (SITLs)	15
Open General Transshipment Licences (OGTLs)*	4
General Trade Licences*	161

*Registrations

Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs)

- Applications received in 2022: 16,664¹¹

SIELs allow shipments of specified items to a specified consignee or end-user up to a quantity specified in the licence. If the export will be permanent, SIELs are generally valid for two years or until the quantity specified has been exported, whichever occurs first.

¹⁰ 16,286 SIEL applications were made on the SPIRE system and 378 were made on the new online export licensing system, LITE.

¹¹ Data taken from SPIRE and LITE as of 3rd January 2023.

If an export is temporary, for example for the purposes of demonstration, trial or evaluation, a SIEL is generally valid for one year only and the items must be returned to the UK before the licence expires. Checks are in place to ensure that items have returned to the UK.

Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)

- Applications received in 2022: 435¹²

OIELs cover multiple shipments of specified items to specified destinations and/or, in some cases, specified consignees. An OIEL is a tailored and flexible licence and generally valid for five years. The exceptions are OIELs for the transfer of military items from Northern Ireland to destinations in EU Member States, which are valid for three years, but may be renewed at the exporter's request; and "dealer-to-dealer" OIELs, which allow firearms dealers to export certain categories of firearms and ammunition solely to firearms dealers in the EU, and which are also valid for three years.

Applications must include items to be exported and destinations, but specific quantities and named end-users do not necessarily need to be provided before a licence is issued. This data must be provided over the lifetime of the licence. The rejection of an application for an OIEL; or an amendment to exclude destinations and/or items; or the revocation of an OIEL, does not prevent a company from applying for SIELs covering some, or all of the items to specified consignees in the relevant destinations. The factors that led to the original decision on the OIEL would be considered in the decision about a SIEL application.

Open General Export Licences (OGELs)

- Number of registrations in 2022: 977¹³

OGELs are pre-published licences that permit the export of specified items to specified destinations, following an online registration. They remove the need for exporters to apply for individual licences if the exporters can meet the terms and conditions set out in the licence. Failure to meet the terms and conditions may result in the licence being withdrawn. An OGEL or other type of Open General licence is only published when the exports are consistent with the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria. If the assessment changes, for the items and destinations permitted, then the OGEL is amended or revoked. OGELs generally remain in force until they are revoked. All OGELs are published on GOV.UK. OGELs in force in 2022 are listed in Section 2.7.

Retained General Export Authorisations (GEAs)

- Number of registrations in 2022: 196¹⁴

There are six retained General Export Authorisations (GEAs) under the retained Dual-Use Regulations. These permit the export from Great Britain of certain specified dual-use items to specified destinations, subject to the terms and conditions of the licences. They are equivalent to OGELs and are available for use by any exporter in Great Britain. The GEAs are contained in Annexes II(a) to II(f) of the retained Dual-Use Regulation. There is also one retained GEA under the retained

¹² Data taken from SPIRE as of 3rd January 2023.

¹³ <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data>

¹⁴ <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data>

Torture Regulation. This covers the goods listed in any entry in Annex IV of the retained Torture Regulation to certain destinations that have abolished capital punishment. All the GEAs are listed in Section 2.7.

Union General Export Authorisations (GEAs)

- Number of registrations in 2022: 23¹⁵

There are eight Union General Export Authorisations (GEAs) under the recast Dual-Use Regulation 2021/821 that is applicable in Northern Ireland. These permit the export from Northern Ireland of certain specified dual-use items to specified destinations, subject to the terms and conditions of the licences. They are equivalent to OGELs and are available for use by any exporter in Northern Ireland. The Union GEAs are contained in Sections A-H of Annex II of the retained Dual-Use Regulation. There is also one Union GEA under the Torture Regulation applicable in Northern Ireland. This covers the goods listed in any entry in Annex IV of the Torture Regulation to certain destinations that have abolished capital punishment. All the Union GEAs are listed in Section 2.7.

Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs)

- Applications received in 2022: 190¹⁶

A SITCL is specific to a named UK trader or broker and covers involvement in the trade of a specified quantity of specific goods between a specified overseas country, known as the source country, and between a specified consignor, consignee and end-user in an overseas destination country. SITCLs will normally be valid for two years. When a licence expires, either due to the length of time since it was issued or because the activity has taken place, the licence ceases to be valid. If further similar activity needs to take place, another licence must be applied for. Trade controls only apply to Category A, B and C goods as specified in Article 2 and Schedule 1 of the Export Control Order 2008. They do not apply to software and technology.

Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs)

- Applications received in 2022: 46¹⁷

An OITCL is specific to a named UK trader and covers involvement in the trade of specific goods between specified overseas source and destination countries and/or specified consignor(s), consignee(s) and end-user(s). OITCLs are generally valid for five years. The refusal of an application for an OITCL; an amendment to exclude destinations and/or items; or the revocation of an OITCL, does not prevent a broker from applying for SITCLs covering some or all of the items to specified consignees in the relevant destinations. The factors that led to the original decision on the OITCL would be considered in the decision about a SITCL application.

15 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data>

16 Data taken from SPIRE as of 3rd January 2023.

17 Data taken from SPIRE as of 3rd January 2023.

Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs)

- Number of registrations in 2022: 64¹⁸

An OGTCL is a pre-published licence that permits the supply of specified goods from specified source countries outside the UK to specified destinations, subject to the specific terms and conditions of the licence. There are currently four OGTCLs available.

Standard Individual Transshipment Licences (SITLs)

- Applications received in 2022: 15¹⁹

A SITL is specific to a named transit/transshipment provider and covers a set quantity of specific goods between a specific source and destination country with a specified consignor, consignee and end-user. SITLs are normally valid for two years.

Open General Transshipment Licences (OGTLs)

- Number of registrations in 2022: 4²⁰

OGTLs are like Open General Export Licences. They relate to transit rather than export and are subject to specific terms and conditions. There are currently four different types of OGTL. Holders of Open Individual and Open General licences are subject to audit by ECJU Compliance Officers, to ensure that they are using the correct licence and meeting the terms and conditions of their licences.

Information on Financial Services, Brokering Services, Technical Assistance, Syria Humanitarian and Global Project Licences, is provided in Section 2.6.

General Trade Licences

- Number of registrations in 2022: 161

General Trade Licences are a type of Open General Licence. In 2022, there were three General Trade Licences, which were all related to Russia Sanctions.

18 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data>

19 Data taken from SPIRE as of 3rd January 2023.

20 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data>

Section 2:

Export licensing data

2.1 Transparency

HM Government publishes comprehensive Official Statistics²¹ each quarter providing data about decisions made on licence applications including those issued, refused, rejected, or revoked. In addition, we provide an online searchable database²² allowing users to produce bespoke reports drawing on this data. HM Government remains committed to openness and transparency of strategic export licensing to provide the means for Parliament and the public to hold HM Government to account.

2.2 Data for each licence type

The following tables and charts provide details of the number of outcomes during 2022 on each of the main types of licence. Those processed to completion in 2022 will include applications received during as well as prior to 2022. Any data referred to as “Issued”, “Refused”, “Rejected” or “Revoked” is taken from the Official Statistics available on GOV.UK.

Comprehensive data on export licences by country is published every three months on GOV.UK. All other data in this section is taken from the SPIRE licensing database as of 3rd January 2023, unless an alternative date is otherwise stated.


Table 2.1 Summary of application outcomes

Outcome	SIELs	SITLs	OIELs	SITCLs	OITCLs
Issued	13,188	3	387	121	16
Refused / Rejected	423	0	73	10	3
No Licence Required	2,373	0	4	14	1
Withdrawn, Stopped or Unsuitable	1,220	9	123	60	39
Revoked	103	0	1	3	1

21 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data#quarterly-reports>

22 <https://www.exportcontroldb.trade.gov.uk/sdb2/fox/sdb/>

Chart 2.I Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs)



* Applications may be withdrawn by the exporter during processing. They may also be stopped by ECJU, if an exporter has not provided further information, when requested, that is necessary to allow the application to be processed.

** Some applications are submitted for goods that do not require an export licence. Where this is determined, the applicant is informed that no licence is required.


SIEL data published on GOV.UK shows how many licences are issued, refused or revoked for the export of items to the destination concerned and whether they were for a permanent or temporary export. The data is split into:

- Military List
- Non-Military items
- both (covering licences with military and non-military goods)
- items covered by the Torture Regulation and/or a mix of both Military List and non-military items.

The total value of SIEL licences granted does not indicate the actual value of exports shipped during the reporting period, it is the stated export value from the application. Licences usually cover a two-year validity period and goods can be exported at any time during that period. Moreover, some licences will not be used to carry out all the exports authorised, and others will not be used at all. In addition, some items may be exported only temporarily and later returned to the UK within the validity of the licence. Licences may expire before being used or only partially used. In these circumstances, exporters may then apply for new licences which can lead to an element of “double counting” in statistics.

Information is provided separately within the Official Statistics on items licensed under SIELs, intended to be incorporated into a good or product, for example, sensors for a military aircraft being exported to the aircraft manufacturer in one destination, who intends to export the complete aircraft to one or more ultimate end-user destinations. An aggregated summary of the ultimate end-user destinations for the goods, after incorporation, is included as part of the Official Statistics data.

Chart 2.II Standard Individual Transshipment Licences (SITLs)




* Some applications are submitted for goods that do not require an export licence. Where this is determined, the applicant is informed that no licence is required.

** Applications may be withdrawn by the exporter during processing. They may also be stopped by ECJU, if an exporter has not provided further information, when requested, that is necessary to allow the application to be processed.

Information on SITLs is provided in the same format as for SIELs on GOV.UK. The licensing information can be found under each destination, listed as “SIELs – transshipments”. As the items covered by SITLs only pass through the UK, it would be misleading to compare the monetary value for these licences with the value of items originating in the UK.

Chart 2.III Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)



* Some applications are submitted for goods that do not require an export licence. Where this is determined, the applicant is informed that no licence is required.


**Some applications are not suitable for open individual export licences and may need the scrutiny that a standard individual export licence application provides to fully address and assess the risk. In such cases the OIEL application is rejected, and exporters are recommended to apply for SIELs.

***Applications may be withdrawn by the exporter during processing. They may also be stopped by ECJU, if an exporter has not provided further information, when requested, that is necessary to allow the application to be processed.

The OIELs data on GOV.UK include the number of licences issued, rejected or revoked for each destination. As OIELs cover multiple shipments of specified goods to specified destinations or specified consignees, exporters holding OIELs are not asked to provide details of the quantities, or values of goods they propose to ship, and it is therefore not possible to provide information on the total value of goods that are licensed. Companies are however required to submit annual open licence returns about usage for each of their OIELs (and/or OGELs).

HM Government is continuing to improve the reliability of the data we collect about open licence use, including the development of a new online export licensing system and a new Customs Declaration System (CDS). Once new systems are in place, we will be able to explore options for greater transparency, particularly with respect to open licences.

Chart 2.IV Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs)




* Some applications are submitted for goods that do not require a trade control licence. Where this is determined, the applicant is informed that no licence is required.

** Applications may be withdrawn by the exporter during processing. They may also be stopped by ECJU, if an exporter has not provided further information, when requested, that is necessary to allow the application to be processed.

As SITCLs cover the trading of specific goods between overseas source and destination countries, there is no physical export from the UK, and traders are not asked to provide information on the monetary value of goods.

Chart 2.V Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs)



* Some applications are submitted for goods that do not require a trade control licence. Where this is determined, the applicant is informed that no licence is required.

** Some applications are not suitable for open individual trade control licences and may need the scrutiny that a standard individual licence application provides to fully address and assess the risk. In such cases the OITCL application is rejected, and exporters are recommended to apply for SITCLs.

*** Applications may be withdrawn by the exporter during processing. They may also be stopped by ECJU, if an exporter has not provided further information, when requested, that is necessary to allow the application to be processed.

As OITCLs cover the trading of specific goods between an overseas source and one or more destinations, exporters holding OITCLs are not asked to provide details of the monetary value of goods they propose to trade.

2.3 Performance against targets

In its service to exporters, ECJU abides by HM Government’s Service and Performance Code²³.

ECJU’s current performance targets are to complete 70% of applications for SIELs within 20 working days, and 99% within 60 working days.

The targets apply once the applicant has supplied the documentation necessary to begin the assessment of their application. Where further information is requested, the time required for the exporter to provide that information is not counted against the targets.

The targets do not apply to OIELs, nor OITCLs because they are tailored specifically to address an exporter’s requirements. The flexibility and complexities mean there is a wide variation in the goods and destinations covered by such licences, so it is not possible to offer standard target processing times. However, ECJU still seeks to process 60% of OIEL applications within 60 working days.

23 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/service-and-performance-code-for-export-licensing/ecju-service-and-performance-code>

We monitor performance against our government targets on SIELs on a monthly basis and new and completed applications on a weekly basis, looking for trends or emerging issues that we need to address. We monitor long outstanding applications on a weekly basis and have established a dedicated monthly meeting with all Advisory Departments to help resolve these cases.

Table 2.2 (*SIEL and SITCL Processing Performance*) gives a breakdown of the performance of HM Government in 2022 against the two main published SIEL and SITCL targets. Information for 2020 and 2021 is also provided for comparative purposes.

Table 2.2 SIEL and SITCL Processing Performance

Outcomes	2022		2021		2020	
	SIELs	SITCLs	SIELs	SITCLs	SIELs	SITCLs
Number of applications completed in 20 working days	10,676	108	11,289	94	9,813	96
% of applications completed in 20 working days	62%	53%	69%	45%	62%	35%
Number of applications completed in 60 working days	15,329	166	15,028	169	13,393	185
% of applications completed in 60 working days	89%	81%	91%	81%	85%	68%
Median processing time	16 days	20 days	15 days	23 days	14 days	32 days

ECJU is extremely mindful of the commercial pressures that businesses face – and of the need to process licence applications with minimum delay – which is why it strives to meet its licensing targets. However, some destinations remain more challenging and will take longer than our target times to complete as we continue to maintain our robust export controls regime. We have experienced an increase in applications which require a more complex and time-consuming assessment which has presented a serious challenge to our timeliness targets in 2022.

A combination of factors during 2022 impacted upon ECJU’s ability to meet processing targets. These included the added complexity in considering a significant number of cases now captured by the enhanced MEUC from May 2022; expediting applications to Ukraine following Russia’s illegal invasion in February 2022 and the introduction of sweeping new sanctions on exports to Russia; continuing the transition from our existing digital service (SPIRE) to an improved new digital licensing service (LITE); resolving the historic backlog of certain applications to Turkey at the start of 2022 following the announcement to Parliament of 15 October 2019²⁴; and a sustained period of recruitment and onboarding that was needed to address ECJU’s resourcing challenges.

A range of factors has contributed to an increase in applications that are refused. These are more time consuming to process effectively and have inevitably impacted on our timeliness targets. In 2023 ECJU is conducting analysis of the evidence underpinning this increase and its implications for our processes.

²⁴ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-10-15/debates/2B8E0C47-5C9F-4153-8B48-7DEC53FE03C4/TurkishIncursionIntoNorthernSyria>

Key operational priorities for ECJU in 2023 will be adapting its processes to efficiently manage the impact of increasing volumes of complex applications, and focussing on the development of the new LITE service to ensure it facilitates and supports an efficient and transparent licensing system.

2.4 Refusals

There were 433 SIELs and SITCLs refused in 2022, compared to 254 in 2021. Table 2.3 contains the number of refusals per Strategic Export Control Criteria.

The refusal rate of applications has increased from 1.5% of applications in 2021 to 2.5% in 2022 and that rate is expected to increase with the effect of the enhanced MEUC. ECJU only refuses licence applications once a thorough and robust process has been followed to ensure that the risks involved have been sufficiently assessed to justify a decision to refuse.

Table 2.3* Reasons for refusals of SIEL and SITCL applications

Reason for refusal	2022	2021	2020
Criterion 1 – UK’s international obligations and commitments under non-proliferation Treaties and Conventions and export control regimes, particularly with regard to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles	62	57	64
Criterion 1 – UK’s commitments and obligations to observe UN, OSCE and UK arms embargoes	119	39	49
Criterion 1 – Announced national measures or restrictions	62	12	10
Criterion 1 – UK’s obligations under the Ottawa Convention and the 1998 Land Mines Act	0	0	0
Criterion 2 – Risk of use to commit or facilitate internal repression or to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law	24	23	47
Criterion 3 – Preservation of internal peace and security	0	0	0
Criterion 4 – Preservation of peace and security	2	1	3
Criterion 5 – National security of the UK, as well as that of friendly and allied countries	94	82	71
Criterion 6 – Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community	1	0	0
Criterion 7 – Risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use	199	148	128
Criterion 8 – Compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country	0	0	0

* Decisions to refuse often involve more than one criterion. Therefore, the figures quoted in this table, when they are added together will exceed the total number of applications refused in 2022.

The data above does not include decisions to reject OIELs or OITCLs in full or in part, or amendments to the coverage of an OIEL to exclude destinations and/or goods. This is because a decision to exclude a destination from OIELs or OITCLs does not prevent a company applying for SIELs or SITCLs, covering some or all the goods concerned to specified consignees in the relevant destinations.

2.5 Revocations

There were 106 revocations of SIELs and SITCLs in 2022. Table 2.4 provides an overview of the number of times each of the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria was used to justify the revocation of an export licence.

Table 2.4* Reasons for revocations of SIEL and SITCL licences

Reason for revocation	2022	2021	2020
Criterion 1 – UK’s international obligations and commitments under non-proliferation Treaties and Conventions and export control regimes, particularly with regard to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles	0	0	6
Criterion 1 – UK’s commitments and obligations to observe UN, OSCE and UK arms embargoes	105	0	4
Criterion 1 – Announced national measures or restrictions	0	0	0
Criterion 1 – UK’s obligations under the Ottawa Convention and the 1998 Land Mines Act	0	0	0
Criterion 2 – Risk of use to commit or facilitate internal repression or to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law	1	0	0
Criterion 3 – Preservation of internal peace and security	0	0	0
Criterion 4 – Preservation of peace and security	0	0	0
Criterion 5 – National security of the UK, as well as that of friendly and allied countries	0	0	0
Criterion 6 – Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community	0	0	0
Criterion 7 – Risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use	1	22	0
Criterion 8 – Compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country	0	0	0

* Decisions to revoke often involve more than one criterion. Therefore, the figures quoted in this table, when they are added together will exceed the total number of licences revoked in 2022. Decisions to revoke during 2022 were for extant licences issued during 2022 or the previous two years.

2.6 Appeals

Table 2.5* Appeals outcome and performance

Outcomes	2022	2021	2020
Number of Appeals received**	38	47	40
Number of Appeals finalised	19	53	9
Median processing time for finalised Appeals	46 days	108 days	89 days
Number of Appeals where refusal was upheld	18	47	6
Number of Appeals where refusal was overturned	1	6	3

* Data is based on management information records as of 2nd April 2023.

** An Appeal can be withdrawn, finalised in a later year, or can be still under consideration.

Appeals against refusals will often raise difficult and complex issues and are considered by a senior official not involved in the original decision. Any new information not available at the time of the initial application will be considered. The time taken to decide an appeal can be lengthy because of the need to examine afresh all relevant information.

An applicant may appeal a decision to refuse a SIEL, SITCL, SITAL or OITAL (see Section 2.7 for definition of SITAL and OITAL), or against a decision to revoke a SIEL or SITCL. There is no provision for a formal appeal against reject or revocation decisions relating to OIELs or OITCLs. This is because such decisions do not prevent a company from applying for SIELs or SITCLs.

The time taken to handle an appeal is calculated from the date on which the appeal is received by ECJU and not the date of the original application. Decisions to refuse licences are not taken lightly and are only made in those cases where refusal is clearly justified.

2.7 Data on other types of licence

Technical Assistance Licences

Standard Individual Technical Assistance Licences (SITALs) are issued for separate ad hoc requirements, for example the repair of a single item or simple maintenance tasks. In 2022, no SITALs were issued, refused or revoked.

Open Individual Technical Assistance Licences (OITALs) cover wide-ranging contractual issues which may form the basis of a rolling programme of work.

Under Article 19 of the Export Control Order 2008, as amended, licences are required for the provision of technical assistance for any activity where a person is aware or has been informed that the items are or may be intended for the purposes of WMD. This could include the transfer of documents or personnel. In 2022, no WMD OITALs were issued, two were refused, and none were revoked.

Where an application is for goods and services and a refusal has been recommended under the WMD end-use control²⁵ we may combine the Standard Individual Export Licence application with the Standard Individual Technical Assistance Licence application and refuse them together. In 2022, no such cases were refused.

OITALs are issued for the provision of technical assistance relating to military or dual-use items and activities where this is permitted under exemptions to international sanctions and embargoes. In 2022, no sanctions OITALs were issued, refused or revoked.

Following the UK's departure from the EU, broader measures were introduced including activities related to restricted goods (critical-industry goods, dual-use goods, military goods, aviation and space goods, oil refining goods, quantum computing and advanced materials goods, defence and security goods, and maritime goods), and energy related goods and technology. In 2022, 14 OITALs were issued covering technical assistance for energy related goods under the Russia sanctions, none were refused and one was revoked.

Under the Northern Ireland Protocol, existing EU export control regulations and current licensing requirements continue to apply to sanctioned and prohibited activities within Northern Ireland. No licences for the provision of technical assistance were issued, refused or revoked under the Protocol in 2022.

Financial Services and Brokering Services Licences

DIT is the UK competent authority for the licensing of the provision of brokering services and financial services and funds related to prohibited or restricted trade transactions. The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) in HM Treasury is the UK competent authority for implementing financial sanctions, including asset freezes.

UK sanctions may contain prohibitions or restrictions on the provision of brokering services and financial services and funds related to the sale, supply, transfer, or export of goods and services prohibited or restricted under the sanctions. In cases where the provision of such services is subject to prior authorisation, a Brokering Services Licences and/or a Financial Services Licence may be granted.

Under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, there is a requirement for licences for the provision of brokering services, financial services and funds relating to the supply of energy-related goods used in the oil and gas industry and relating to restricted goods and restricted technology. In 2022, 14 Standard Individual Financial Services Licences relating to the supply of energy-related goods and one Financial Services Licence relating to restricted goods and restricted technology were issued, but no Open Individual Financial Services Licences were issued. A further nine Brokering Services Licences relating to the supply of energy-related goods were issued. No Financial Services, or Brokering Services Licences were refused or revoked under the Russian sanctions that were in force during the period covered by this report.

Financial Services, Brokering Services and Technical Assistance Licences

In 2022, three licences relating to restricted goods and restricted technology were issued covering more than one prohibited service (Financial Services, Brokering Services and Technical Assistance), none were refused or revoked.

²⁵ <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/supplementary-wmd-end-use-controls>

Professional and Business Services Licences

DIT is the competent authority for the licensing of trade prohibitions relating to the provision of professional and business services.

As a result of further sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022, there is a requirement for licences for the provision of prohibited professional and business services. Sanctions related to accounting, business and management consulting, and public relations services came into force on 21st July 2022. Further sanctions related to advertising, architectural, auditing, engineering and IT consultancy and design services, came into force on 16th December 2022.

In 2022, 25 Individual Professional and Business Services Licences were issued. Four Individual Professional and Business Services Licences were refused under the Russian sanctions that were in force during the period covered by this report, and none were revoked.

Syria Humanitarian Licences

DIT is the competent authority for the issuing of humanitarian licences in respect of prohibited or restricted trade transactions.

Under the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, it is prohibited to purchase and transport crude oil; or petroleum products; or directly, or indirectly provide financial services or funds for these prohibited activities. However, these activities may be authorised under a licence issued by the Secretary of State, if the purchase and transport in Syria of petroleum products; or the provision of related financial services or funds, are for the sole purpose of providing humanitarian relief in Syria; or assistance to the civilian population in Syria.

There is also a humanitarian assistance exception from the relevant prohibitions within the Regulations. This exception applies to a “UK funded person” who receives funding from the UK government for the purpose of providing a humanitarian assistance activity in Syria. It applies when a “UK funded person” makes available funds or economic resources for the purposes of either:

- purchasing, supplying or delivering petroleum products; or
- providing funds, economic resources or financial services in relation to those activities; and
- where the petroleum products are purchased, supplied or delivered exclusively for the purposes of providing a humanitarian assistance activity.

A licence is required if an entity wishes to carry out an activity prohibited by the Regulations, where the exception does not apply. In 2022, five Syria Humanitarian Licences were issued, and none were refused or revoked.

Licences for drugs used in execution by lethal injection

The retained torture regulation (2019/125) and the EU regulation that applies in Northern Ireland, require licences from ECJU to export short and intermediate-acting barbiturate anaesthetic agents to any destination from Great Britain, or outside the EU from Northern Ireland. These drugs which have legitimate medical uses include the following:

- Amobarbital (CAS RN 57-43-2)
- Amobarbital sodium salt (CAS RN 64-43-7)

- Pentobarbital (CAS RN 76-74-4)
- Pentobarbital sodium salt (CAS 57-33-0)
- Secobarbital (CAS RN 76-73-3)
- Secobarbital sodium salt (CAS RN 309-43-3)
- Thiopental (CAS RN 76-75-5)
- Thiopental sodium salt (CAS RN 71-73-8), also known as “thiopentone sodium”.

SIEL applications must be submitted for any intended export of these drugs. A licence cannot be issued when there are reasonable grounds to believe that these drugs might be used for capital punishment in a third country.

In recent years OIEL applications have largely been replaced by registration for the EU General Export Authorisations under the torture regulations. This licence covers multiple exports of these drugs to end users in all destinations, other than those destinations specified above.

The UK controls Pancuronium Bromide and Propofol under the listing of human and veterinary medicinal products that are prohibited for export to the US, when they are in a form suitable for injection or for preparation of an injection.

In 2022, 48 SIELs for these items were issued and none were refused or revoked. No OIELs for these items were issued, rejected or revoked.

Global Project Licences

Global Project Licences (GPLs) are a form of Open Individual Export Licence introduced by Framework Agreement Partners (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) to streamline the arrangements for licensing military goods and technologies between partner states who are participating in specific collaborative defence projects. In relation to the collaborative project, each partner state will, as appropriate, issue its own GPLs to permit transfers of specified goods and technology required for that project.

Applications for GPLs are assessed against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria in the UK, and against the EU Common Position²⁶ in other Framework Partner countries. In 2022, no GPLs were issued, rejected or revoked.

2.8 Open General Export Licences and Retained and Union General Export Authorisations

The nature and purpose of Open General Export Licences (OGELs) is set out in Section 1.3.

OGELs may be republished²⁷ as a result of updates to the UK Strategic Export Control Lists and/or due to changes to the general terms and conditions or permitted destinations.

A summary of key changes affecting OGELs in 2022 is set out in Annex B. A list of OGELs and other general licences in force in 2022 is set out in Annex C.

²⁶ Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 9th December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

²⁷ <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/open-general-export-licences-ogels>

Section 3:

UK legislation and licensing assessment criteria

3.1 Changes in UK and EU legislation in force relating to export licensing

Firearms

The retained Regulation (EU) No 258/2012²⁸ establishes export, import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. It applies to exports from the customs territory of Great Britain. There were no changes to the Regulation in 2022.

In Northern Ireland, Regulation (EU) No 258/2012²⁹ establishes export, import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition. It applies to exports from Northern Ireland to non-EU Member States and goods moving to Great Britain. The EU made no changes to the Regulation in 2022.

In Northern Ireland, Directive (EU) 2021/555³⁰ of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24th March 2021 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons (codification) applies and is implemented as an exception within UK legislation.

Dual-Use Regulation

The retained Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009³¹ provides the legislative framework of controls on dual-use items (goods, including software and technology which can have both civil and military applications) and controls their export, transfer, brokering and transit in Great Britain.

In Northern Ireland, from May 2021, dual-use Regulation (EU) 2021/821³² applies. This updated and consolidated the earlier EU dual use regulation.

28 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2012/258/contents>

29 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32012R0258>

30 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021L0555>

31 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2009/428/contents>

32 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/821>

The Torture Regulation

The retained Regulation (EU) 2019/125³³ applies to the trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

In Northern Ireland, Regulation (EU) 2019/125³⁴ continues to apply, meaning exports from Northern Ireland to EU Member States do not require a licence (except in specific circumstances set out in the regulation). Movement of these goods from Northern Ireland to Great Britain requires a licence.

3.2 Changes in UK and EU legislation in force

Table 3.1 Amendments to export control legislation in 2022

Title	Reference	Description
The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2022 ³⁵	2022 No.491	<p>The instrument makes amendments to the Export Control Order 2008, which implements the strategic export controls of the UK. The prohibition applies where the Secretary of State has informed the relevant person that the goods, software or technology are, or may be intended for use by military or para-military, police, security or intelligence end users of concern, of a UK embargoed destination or country subject to an arms embargo by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the United Nations Security Council.</p> <p>This instrument also moves China (and its Special Administrative Regions, Hong Kong and Macao) into the list of countries, in Part 2 of Schedule 4, that are embargoed destinations and subject to transit control for military goods, thereby giving it the same status as other countries subject to an arms embargo.</p>
The Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2022 ³⁶	2022 No.1042	This instrument amends Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008, which lists the military goods, software and technology subject to strategic export controls, to reflect changes to the UK's international export control commitments.

33 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R0125>

34 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R0125>

35 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/491/contents/made>

36 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1042/contents/made>

Title	Reference	Description
The Export Control (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2022 ³⁷	2022 No. 1300	<p>This instrument amends the Export Control Order 2008 to ensure that the new Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (recast) operates effectively in Northern Ireland in accordance with the requirements of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the EU withdrawal agreement.</p> <p>This instrument amends the retained Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items to correct a deficiency arising from the UK's withdrawal from the EU and to remove the Russian Federation as a permitted destination from the scope of certain general export authorisations.</p>

For exports from Northern Ireland, EU legislation governing firearms, dual-use and torture exports continue to apply under the terms of the Northern Ireland Protocol.

The Open General Export Licence (Export of Dual-Use Items to EU Member States³⁸) can be used to export most controlled items from Northern Ireland to the Channel Islands and Isle of Man.

3.3 Licensing assessment criteria

The licensing criteria for strategic export controls, the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, apply to all licence decisions (including decisions on appeals) on goods, software and technology subject to control for strategic reasons for: export, transfer, trade (brokering), transit / transshipment. The Criteria also apply to the provision of technical assistance or other services related to those items, to the extent that these activities are subject to control.

The Strategic Export Licensing Criteria are set out in Annex A.

3.4 Parliamentary relations

UK export licensing is accountable to Parliament. Parliamentary oversight is provided through the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC), with members from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and International Trade and International Development Committees. This arrangement ensures that appropriate scrutiny can be applied to arms exports.

ECJU has continued regular engagement with the CAEC throughout this year. On 28th October 2022, the CAEC published its report "Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls" which called for a formal response from ECJU to that report by 9th January 2023. Shortly after publication of their

³⁷ <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1300/contents/made>

³⁸ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-general-export-licence-export-of-dual-use-items-to-eu-member-states>

report, on 15 November 2022, the CAEC were invited to meet with the Minister for International Trade, Minister Huddleston and a number of ECJU officials at DIT's Old Admiralty Building offices in London. During that visit, the CAEC were provided with more detailed information regarding the strategic export licensing process and the wider work of ECJU.

Section 4:

Outreach to industry and stakeholders

4.1 Raising awareness of export licensing with industry and academia

During 2022, ECJU completed a programme of engagement with industry and academia to raise awareness of export controls and changes to legislation, to ensure their compliance and to facilitate responsible exports.

One of the main focuses of these was the implementation of sanctions on Russia and Belarus after the invasion of Ukraine, including:

- Suspension of licences and OGELs revised for dual-use licences to Russia³⁹
- Introduction of sanctions against Russia⁴⁰.

ECJU led a webinar on the UK sanctions against Russia and the impact on strategic export controls, with presentations by Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, HM Treasury Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, Export Support Service Ukraine/Russia and HM Revenue and Customs. This attracted 1,000 registrants and over 700 attendees.

Thirty-four Notices to Exporters⁴¹ were published. Many were related to the UK's response to the invasion of Ukraine, but others alerted exporters to changes in legislation and actions taken by HM Revenue and Customs, including:

- The enhanced military end-use control and the addition of China to the list of destinations subject to an arms embargo
- End user, consignee and stockist undertakings, and the expiration of previous templates
- Amendments to Export Control Order 2008
- Updated list of dual-use controlled items.

39 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notice-to-exporters-202203-licence-suspensions-and-ogels-revised/note-202203-licence-suspensions-and-ogels-revised>

40 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notice-to-exporters-202204-introduction-of-new-sanctions-against-russia>

41 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/notices-to-exporters#notices-to-exporters-2022>

ECJU participated in several trade, defence and security exhibitions, including:

- The Security and Policing Home Office event, hosted by the Joint Security and Resilience Centre (JSaRC)
- The Farnborough International Airshow and
- The Defence Procurement Research Technology and Exportability (DPRTE).

ECJU also hosted the annual ECJU Symposium in London, supported by various trade associations and HM Revenue and Customs. This attracted over 200 attendees and provided updates on UK export controls as well as the ECJU transformation and LITE programmes.

In addition to three new on-line training videos, available via GOV.UK⁴², ECJU delivered 33 classroom-based courses aimed at improving industry compliance in export and trade controls. These were held in 10 locations across England and Scotland, including Southampton; Manchester; Newcastle; Aberdeen and London. The courses were an intermediate overview of the export control process, a licensing workshop and a new 'Are My Items Controlled' workshop looking at why items are controlled. These three courses were held over a two-day period in each location. In total 862 delegates attended from 282 businesses. The recorded webinars on GOV.UK were used as pre-course work for these classroom-based courses. The training bulletin⁴³ is published on the home page of ECJU on GOV.UK⁴⁴. The homepage provides access to all detailed guides; licensing tools; and notices to exporters.

Under ECJU's new structure, it will be developing a new engagement strategy, seeking more opportunities for peer-to-peer training with trade bodies, industry and academia through a variety of ECJU Awareness events, online platforms, exporter and association events and forums.

ECJU also has representation on the board of the Export Control Profession⁴⁵ as a founding board member. The Profession has been developed in association with the Institute of Export and International Trade and promotes excellence in compliance with export and import controls and trade sanctions in the UK and globally.

4.2 Internet-based guides and licensing tools

Information about export controls is hosted on GOV.UK.⁴⁶ The ECJU home page includes links to all key guidance and tools to make applications and check control list entries. It also provides accessible links to the Notice to Exporters collection and statistical data.

Exporters can make use of the two web-based search tools which help to identify which products need a licence (the 'goods checker') and, if licensable, whether an Open General Export Licence (OGEL) potentially covers the proposed exports (the 'OGEL checker').

The goods checker tool provides an internet-based search function across the Consolidated UK Strategic Export Control List⁴⁷.

42 https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLx8TFJYkqt4_8Mv364DJzTOUUKBdRDzju

43 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/export-control-training-bulletin>

44 <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/export-control-joint-unit>

45 <https://www.exportcontrolprofession.co.uk/who-we-are/>

46 <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/export-control-joint-unit>

47 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-strategic-export-control-lists-the-consolidated-list-of-strategic-military-and-dual-use-items-that-require-export-authorisation>

The OGEL checker assists users who know the rating (control list classification) of their goods and the destination for the proposed export to find out which OGEL(s) may cover the export, provided all the conditions can be met. Both tools can be accessed on SPIRE.

4.3 Advisory Services

The End-User Advisory Service

Exporters can use this service to request advice on whether ECJU has concerns related to WMD or Military End-Use, related to specific organisations or persons with whom they wish to do business.

As it is a non-statutory advisory service there are no published targets for End-User Advice enquiries. During 2022 ECJU received and responded to 13,550 enquiries.

Demand for the end user advisory service has continued to increase significantly since its inception in 2005, far in excess of the 2,000 annual requests originally considered the maximum for the service. This service will therefore be within scope of the proposed engagement strategy to ensure that it is providing value for money and the information exporters need.

Section 5:

Ukraine

Following Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, which commenced on 24th February 2022, the UK has been at the forefront of efforts to support Ukraine, from diplomacy, through to the provision of military equipment, including sophisticated missiles; armoured vehicles; ammunition and other supplies. The UK has provided multiple gifts of lethal and non-lethal aid to Ukraine during 2022 to help them defend their territory and expel Russian invaders. The UK has provided £2.3 billion of aid to Ukraine in Financial Year 2022/23 and has been a leading equipment donor. In June 2023, the UK and Ukraine co-hosted the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London to support Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction.

The urgent nature of Ukraine's military needs following the Russian invasion and the volume of support required has meant that HM Government has needed to source military equipment through multiple routes, namely:

- UK defence stocks
- Rapid procurement from UK and overseas defence industries
- Purchasing surplus equipment from foreign governments which has then been gifted by HM Government
- Coordinated international procurement through the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine.

This has been achieved through close coordination between the MOD and DIT, to support the urgent defence equipment requirements of the Government of Ukraine.

Recognising the UK as a major exporter of defence equipment, UK Defence & Security Exports (DSE) in DIT has played a vital liaison role to ensure UK industry is well placed to support Ukrainian requirements. DSE has been responsible for providing advice from the MOD to UK Industry on how best to support Ukraine's Urgent Operational Requirements, as well as liaising with the Ukrainian Embassy in London to raise awareness of UK capabilities. DSE has also advised ECJU on the relative priority for all licence applications to Ukraine.

As the licensing authority for strategic export controls, the DIT team in ECJU have administered all licence applications to Ukraine from UK Industry, providing military equipment as part of the rapid procurement for the end-use of the Ukrainian Armed and Security Forces, and treated these as priority cases. HM Government publishes comprehensive Official Statistics every quarter on data

about decisions made on licence applications including those issued, refused, rejected, or revoked to all destinations, including Ukraine⁴⁸. These Official Statistics contain detailed information, including the overall value, the type and a summary of the items covered by these licences.

The MOD team within ECJU are responsible for managing gifting applications from HMG, providing assessments and seeking advice from Advisory Departments, such as the FCDO and have treated the gifting applications for Ukraine as a priority. Gifts from the FCDO and the Home Office to the Government of Ukraine are set out in Table 5.1 below. On 21 July 2022 Parliament was updated⁴⁹ on the military support to Ukraine by the Secretary of State for Defence. A further Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) and a breakdown of equipment and munitions gifted by the MOD from the start of the Russian invasion to date, will be presented to Parliament separately. For gifting cases to other destinations, these are set out in Section 6.1.

The MOD carefully calibrates all potential gifted equipment against the current context on the ground in Ukraine, ensuring that equipment can be both received and used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the purpose of defending their sovereign country. End-User Undertakings have been provided by the Ukrainian Armed Forces upon receipt of lethal aid.

Table 5.1* Gifted Controlled Equipment to the Government of Ukraine in 2022

Goods description	Sponsoring Department
<50 x Personal Radiation Detector	FCDO
<20 x Armoured Land Vehicles	FCDO
<4,000 x Ballistic Vests >6,000 x Hard Plates >6,000 x Helmets	FCDO
<50 x Information security equipment, Information security, software and technology	FCDO
<500 x Ballistic vests <500 x CBRN protective splash suits	Home Office Border Force
<1,000 x Ballistic Vests <400 x Helmets <300 x Fire Retardant Overalls <100 x General Overalls	Home Office

* This table refers to equipment assessed and approved to be gifted by HM Government to Ukraine. It does not contain definitive information on equipment delivered. Data is based on Management Information records as of 23rd May 2023. Within the table, < refers to less than, and > refers to more than.

48 <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/strategic-export-controls-licensing-data>

49 <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2022-07-21/hcws259>

Section 6:

HM Government support to Allies and Partners

6.1 Gifting

The term 'gifting' is applied to the donation of any export-controlled equipment by HM Government to a foreign government in support of its wider security and foreign policy aims. For financial and accounting purposes the donation might be classed as a gift; a grant-in-aid; or grant-in-kind, depending on whether the export is a surplus asset; has been purchased specifically to achieve a strategic aim; or has been funded from a departmental budget or centrally held funds. In the context of this report however, the generic term 'gifting' is applied to all donations by HM Government of export-controlled equipment.

In 2022, three applications to gift equipment (to countries other than Ukraine, which is covered in Section 5) were approved. These are set out in Table 6.1 below. Two of the applications, to Azerbaijan and the Dominican Republic, were in pursuit of the aims established by the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). The CSSF provides development and security support to countries which are at risk of conflict or instability, using both Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA spend to deliver and support security, defence, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and stability activity. Through the CSSF, the UK and our international partners are more secure from threats such as terrorism, corruption and illegal migration or trafficking.

All proposals to gift controlled military equipment and dual-use equipment, including gifts funded through the CSSF, are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, in the same way as commercial applications and with the same degree of rigour. The MOD manages the assessment process and seeks advice on gifting proposals from advisers in the MOD and the FCDO.

Where gifts of controlled military equipment are approved these are exported under a Crown Exemption letter. As a result, they do not require an export or trade licence. In the case of gifts of dual-use items (including software and technology), export licence coverage must be in place prior to using the open licence for the export of dual-use goods by the Crown.

Gifts exceeding £300,000 in value are notified to Parliament before the gift is made.

Table 6.1* Gifted controlled equipment in 2022

Country	End-User	Goods Description	Sponsoring Department	Approx. Value £
Azerbaijan	State Customs Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan	1 x dual-use analyser for chemical detection	Home Office (Border Force)	50,000**
Dominican Republic	Law Enforcement	4 x dual-use imaging cameras	Home Office	8,200**
Qatar	Qatar Emiri Air Force	360 x armour piercing rounds; 40 x re-cocking cartridges; 20 x drill rounds	MOD	66,700

* This table refers to equipment assessed and approved to be gifted by HM Government to nations other than Ukraine. It does not contain definitive information on equipment delivered. Data is based on Management Information records as of 17th March 2023.

** Equipment purchased through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF).

With reference to the dual-use gift to Azerbaijan, the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology that could be used in the Nagorno-Karabakh region or on the land border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, or to end-users where there is a clear risk of diversion to the armed forces, police or security forces of either state. This dual-use item for counter narcotics is considered out of scope of the embargo.

6.2 Government to Government Exports

The Defence Equipment Sales Authority of the MOD may dispose of certain military equipment that is surplus to the requirements of the UK Armed Forces. These disposals are subject to licensing controls. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 list these exports delivered in 2022 by destination, equipment type and quantity.

Table 6.2* Disposals to foreign armed forces

Country	Type of Equipment	Quantity
USA	Sentinel Aircraft	4
USA	Sentinel Inventory Spares & Ground Support Equipment	137,890
Chile	E-3D Sentry Aircraft	2
Chile	Sentry Inventory Spares & Ground Support Equipment	75,334
Finland	DAF DROPS Vehicle Spares	111,890
Latvia	Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked)	28
Slovakia	Light Machine Guns (LMG) and Parts	1,567 x LMG, 51,350 x spare parts
Egypt	Former RFA Austin Replenishment Ship	1
Ghana	Husky Tactical Support Vehicle	20
Australia	Hellfire Missiles	150

* Data is based on Management Information records as of 4th April 2023.

Table 6.3* Other overseas transfers to commercial entities

Country	Type of Equipment	Quantity
United States	Tucano Aircraft	14

* Data is based on Management Information records as of 4th April 2023.

6.3 Government to Government Projects

The UK has a longstanding government-to-government defence cooperation programme with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under which the UK has provided Typhoon, Tornado, and Hawk aircraft, mine countermeasure vessels, and associated munitions, infrastructure, logistics and manpower support packages.

During 2022, the UK continued to provide substantial support for in-service aircraft, naval vessels and their associated systems; no kinetic weapons were exported. All goods were exported under export licences obtained by industry. Where a SIEL was issued, the data is included in the corresponding Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Reports.

Section 7:

International policy developments

7.1 Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the only legally-binding, international, conventional arms control treaty. It seeks to establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating the global trade in conventional arms. The UK ratified the ATT on 2nd April 2014 and it entered into force on 24th December 2014. On 31st December 2022, the Treaty had 113 States Parties.

In 2022, the UK continued to play a leading role in the ATT. As a large donor to the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF)⁵⁰ and member of its Selection Committee, the UK was closely involved in the approval of six projects for funding in the 2022 project cycle, aimed at supporting effective Treaty implementation. The UK intends to use its membership of the Selection Committee to ensure transparency in the selection process and improving outreach on the application process to ensure that quality of application is improved.

In August, the Eighth Conference of States Parties (CSP8) to the ATT took place in person for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic. The Conference adopted a number of procedural decisions presented by the German Presidency and saw the inaugural meeting of the Diversion Information Forum. Ambassador Seong-mee Yoon of South Korea was elected as President of the Ninth Conference of States Parties.

At CSP8 the UK, alongside others, called for a review of the programme of work of the Treaty. Additionally, the UK continued to stress the need for the financial sustainability of the Treaty, as late or non-payment of mandatory subscriptions continues to pose a challenge. We will continue to press States Parties to settle arrears and pay contributions in full and on time, including through payment plans where appropriate.

The UK supports universalisation of the ATT and continued to lobby potential States Parties to encourage them to accede to the Treaty and offering support to States considering accession. The Philippines, Gabon and Andorra joined the ATT in 2022 and the Gambia stated again its intention to accede.

⁵⁰ <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/voluntary.html>

We also encouraged major arms exporters and importers to align with important principles of the Treaty, expanding the positive influence of the Treaty beyond its immediate membership. The UK submitted its Annual Report to the Secretariat in accordance with Article 13 (3) of the Treaty. This report covers authorised or actual exports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) of the Treaty during the calendar year 2022. The UK does not collate comprehensive data relating to the import of all goods covered by the ATT.

7.2 Small Arms and Light Weapons

Preventing small arms and light weapons (SALW) falling into the hands of terrorists, organised criminals and other unintended recipients, including through strong and effective multilateral instruments, remains a UK priority. Throughout 2022, the UK remained active in international efforts to prevent the illicit trade and diversion of SALW and their ammunition.

The UK remains a strong supporter of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). As the only globally accepted politically binding agreements on SALW, they provide a common set of standards for establishing effective national controls over the full lifecycle of small arms and light weapons, from production, transfer, possession and storage, to eventual disposal. In addition, they promote law enforcement cooperation in order to disrupt illicit trafficking networks. The UK also supports implementation of relevant technical guidelines in the management of SALW and their ammunition, including the Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) and through the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The Eighth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the PoA (BMS8) was held from 27th June to 1st July 2022. The UK was pleased that states were able to reach consensus on an outcome document. The 4th Review Conference of the PoA will take place in 2024. HM Government regularly reports on the UK's implementation of international instruments to promote transparency and for confidence-building. Previous and current UK national reports are published and available at:

- <https://smallarms.un-arm.org/national-reports/>
- <https://www.unroca.org/>
- <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/annual-reports.html>

HM Government has funded capacity-building projects⁵¹ to support the universalisation and implementation of global arms control and counter-proliferation norms, treaties and obligations. The UK also supports projects to reduce illicit flows and the destabilising accumulation of SALW and their ammunition. These projects have been funded through the Counter-Proliferation Programme Fund⁵² and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), both bilaterally and through multilateral trust funds such as the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) SALW Assistance Mechanism.

51 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/official-development-assistance-oda-fcdo-international-programme-spend-objectives-2020-to-2021>

52 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-proliferation-programme>

7.3 Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Conventional Ammunition

In response to the Group of Government Experts (GGE) report on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, UN General Assembly Resolution 76/233 established an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Conventional Ammunition to elaborate a set of political commitments in this area.

The OEWG on Conventional Ammunition met, in New York, on 23rd to 27th May and, in Geneva on 18th to 22nd August, the UK participated in both sessions. It will meet again from 13th to 17th February 2023 and 5th to 9th June 2023. Discussions focused on establishing a politically binding and comprehensive framework to support safe, secure and sustainable through-life ammunition management at the national, sub-regional, regional and global levels, building upon and complementing existing frameworks.

7.4 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) aims to prohibit or restrict the use of conventional weapons deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects, including weapons with non-detectable fragments, mines, booby-traps, incendiary weapons, and blinding laser weapons.

The Convention itself contains only general provisions, with annexed Protocols – a structure adopted to allow flexibility and the inclusion of other types of conventional weapon in the future. Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons or weapon systems are contained in five Protocols, which cover:

- Protocol I – Non-Detectable Fragments
- Protocol II – Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Amended)
- Protocol III – Incendiary Weapons
- Protocol IV – Blinding Laser Weapons
- Protocol V – Explosive Remnants of War

The Convention with three annexed Protocols (I, II and III) was adopted on 10th October 1980 and entered into force on 2nd December 1983. Protocol IV and Amended Protocol II entered into force in 1998. Protocol V entered into force in 2006. The UK ratified Protocols I, II and III on 13th February 1995, and Amended Protocol II and Protocol IV on 11th February 1999. The UK has not ratified Protocol V; a review of the implications of ratification is ongoing.

The UK attended the CCW Amended Protocol II Group of Experts meeting of 20th to 21st July 2022. The UK also attended the 16th Annual Conference of Protocol V as an observer state on 14th November 2022, the 24th Annual Conference of Amended Protocol II on 15th November 2022, and the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties (MHCP) on 16th to 18th November 2022. At the MHCP, the UK delivered a joint statement on Russia's actions in Ukraine on behalf of 41 delegations.

The CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Emerging Technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) continued discussions for 10 days in 2022, fulfilling the existing mandate. The UK was closely engaged with the Group's work, seeking to make substantive progress, which resulted in five days being held in informal session. UK efforts

included the introduction of a proposal for the GGE to develop a document that would constitute an authoritative and comprehensive statement of the application of international humanitarian law and agreed best practice with regard to LAWS; and co-sponsorship alongside USA, Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea of a proposal on “Principles and Good Practices on LAWS”.

A final report was submitted to the Meeting of High Contracting Parties (MHCP) in November 2022. The MHCP agreed to renew the GGE’s mandate for a further 10 days in 2023 to consider proposals and elaborate possible measures related to the normative and operational framework on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS, building upon the recommendations and conclusions contained in the reports of the previous GGE, and bringing in expertise on legal, military, and technological aspects.

7.5 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (the ‘Ottawa Convention’)

Anti-personnel mines (APMs) continue to cause death, injury and wider suffering in many parts of the world and hamper efforts to achieve sustainable development goals.

The Ottawa Convention was adopted on 18th September 1997.⁵³ It entered into force for signatory states, including the UK, on 1st March 1999. There are 164 States Parties to the Convention that ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of APMs.

The UK took part in the Convention’s 20th Meeting of States Parties from 20th to 24th November 2022, as well as the Intersessional meeting on 20th to 22nd June 2022, during which the Conference reviewed progress against the Convention’s Articles, and against the goals set out in the 2019 Oslo Action Plan. The Oslo Action Plan’s goals include universalisation of the Convention, stockpile destruction, mine clearance, mine risk education, victim assistance, and international cooperation and assistance.

In March, the UK held a Wilton Park Conference to raise awareness of the mine action sector’s desire to explore innovative finance models to address funding challenges. The UK continued work to standardise the mine action Theory of Change (ToC) to create an adaptive process that can be used by operators and donors to improve reporting standards. In May, the UK held a side event at the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Intersessional meeting to socialise this work and encourage donors to use this new ToC when designing demining programmes. In November, under the accountable grant agreement, the UK commissioned Social Finance to design a pilot demining development bond (DIB) programme. In collaboration with partners, funding was allocated for the project to be implemented in the Preach Vihear region of Cambodia. The aim of which is to increase farmer net income on demined land by offering the resources and training necessary to grow and sell organic rice.

The UK remains committed to mine action through its support to countries where the clearance of landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war contributes significantly to relieving the suffering of some of the world’s most disadvantaged communities.

In April 2018, the UK launched its second Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP2)⁵⁴, which expanded the geographic scope of the programme, increasing support to the most heavily contaminated countries around the world, particularly in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The UK invested £146 million in GMAP2, which finished in 2022, clearing and confirming safe

53 <https://www.apminebanconvention.org/en/the-convention/history-and-text/>

54 <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300544/documents>

496 million m² of land during its lifespan. In April, the UK began the next iteration GMAP3, which provided survey and clearance, mine risk education, and support to mine action authorities and organisations working in Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine and Zimbabwe. As of December, GMAP3 had cleared and confirmed safe 4.9 million m² of land.

7.6 Convention on Cluster Munitions (the 'Oslo Convention')

Cluster munitions can have a devastating humanitarian impact on civilian populations, both at the time of use and subsequently. Unexploded sub-munitions can threaten the lives of civilians and hamper post-conflict reconstruction and development for years afterwards.

In 2008, several governments, including the UK, established the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions.⁵⁵ The UK became the 32nd State Party to the CCM in 2010. As of 31st December, the Convention had 110 full States Parties and 13 signatories.

The UK held the Presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions from September 2021 to September 2022. The UK organised an Intersessional Meeting that took place on 16th to 17th May that reviewed progress against Convention objectives and against goals outlined in the Lausanne Action Plan. The UK chaired the 10th Meeting of States Parties that took place from 30th August to 2nd September.

The 10th Meeting of States Parties highlighted grave concern at reports of cluster munitions in Ukraine, the first time a Meeting of State Parties report has raised specific instances of use, rather than general condemnation. The UK outlined work undertaken on two of its main priorities: universalisation and developing innovative finance solutions for mine action. In 2022, the UK led work to promote the universalisation of the Convention with a focus on Africa and the Caribbean, including co-hosting a regional workshop that took place in Abuja. The UK held a lunch in the margins of the 10th Meeting of States Parties to follow up with states that had participated in the Abuja workshop. The UK also utilised its diplomatic and military networks to promote the Convention and its humanitarian objectives.

7.7 UN Register of Conventional Arms

The UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNRoCA) is a voluntary reporting instrument, intended to create greater transparency in international arms transfers and help identify excessive build-up of arms in countries or regions. The Register was established in 1991; the UK has reported to the UNRoCA since its inception. The UN Register currently covers seven categories of conventional weapons:

- battle tanks
- armoured combat vehicles
- large-calibre artillery systems
- combat aircraft
- attack helicopters
- warships (including submarines)
- missiles and missile-launchers (including Man-Portable Air Defence Systems)

⁵⁵ <https://www.clusterconvention.org/>

It also includes an additional '+1' category covering small arms and light weapons. The UK submits an annual report to the UN Register on all exports of military equipment in these categories, including small arms and light weapons. The UK report also includes information on procurement through national production and military holdings. HM Government actively encourages all UN Member States to make reports with similar levels of transparency. Transparent systems, underpinned by strict export controls, are less vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation. Previous and current UK national reports are available here: <https://www.unroca.org/>

7.8 Nuclear Suppliers Group

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)⁵⁶, which was established in 1974, seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the adoption into national export controls guidelines on the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related material, dual-use material, equipment, software and technology. The NSG Guidelines are not intended to hinder international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and instead allow states to trade with confidence; the NSG also promotes effective safeguards and the physical protection of existing nuclear materials. The NSG in 1994 adopted into the Guidelines the "Non-proliferation Principles" whereby a supplying country, notwithstanding any other provisions in the NSG Guidelines, will only authorise a transfer when satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The NSG Guidelines are consistent with, and complement, the various international, legally binding nuclear non-proliferation instruments. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).

As of December, there were 48 Participating Governments (PGs) with the European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participating as observers.

In 2022, the NSG held its Consultative Group meetings in Vienna (25th to 26th April and 24th to 25th October); and Warsaw (20th to 21st June) and its Plenary in Warsaw (22nd to 24th June). The Group also held technical meetings in Vienna (27th to 29th April and 26th to 28th October) on technical issues important to the implementation of the Control Lists and updating the NSG Guidelines to keep pace with the evolving global security landscape and a fast-paced nuclear and nuclear related industry.

The Group continued to exchange information on global proliferation and reiterated its firm support for the full, complete, and effective implementation of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. The Group reconfirmed its commitment to UN Security Council Resolutions, including UNSCR 1540 in respect to the establishment of effective export control as an international obligation under the resolution.

56 <https://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/about-nsg>

7.9 Zangger Committee

The Zangger Committee⁵⁷, also known as the NPT Exporters Committee, consists of 39 states, which, since 1971, has the remit to serve as the “faithful interpreter” of Article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT to harmonise the interpretation of nuclear export control policies for NPT Parties regarding what is meant in the article by “especially designed or prepared equipment or material for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material”. The Zangger Committee maintains a trigger list (triggering safeguards as a condition of supply) of nuclear-related strategic goods to assist NPT Parties in identifying equipment and materials subject to export controls. The Zangger Committee trigger list forms the basis of the NSG Trigger List.

The UK, through the UK Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Vienna, acts as the secretariat for the Zangger Committee.

The Zangger Committee held its annual meeting in Vienna on 25th October. The Committee continued to review the trigger list in light of parallel developments in the NSG to ensure alignment. The NSG and Zangger Committee also convened a joint side event at the 10th Review Conference of the NPT in August.

7.10 Australia Group

The Australia Group (AG)⁵⁸ is an informal forum of 42 states and the European Union which seeks to ensure, through the harmonisation of export controls, that exports do not contribute to the development or proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Co-ordination of national export control measures assists AG participants in fulfilling their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

In 2022, the group resumed its pre-COVID-19 schedule, meeting in Paris for three days of technical and enforcement meetings followed by two days of plenary. The UK attended. The meetings comprised the New & Evolving Technologies Technical Experts’ Meeting (NETTEM), Enforcement Exchange (EE) meeting, and the Implementation Meeting (IM) – all of which took place in July 2022. During the meetings members exchanged information on enforcement activities and reviewed implementation. The AG adopted the public statement with clear, strong language on Ukraine.

The UK briefed the AG on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Article V process initiated by Russia.

7.11 Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a politically binding instrument, formed in 1987.⁵⁹ As of 31st December 2022, the MTCR had 35 Partner countries, working together to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction by coordinating national export licensing efforts. The UK is a founding member and plays a leading role, including as part of the MTCR’s Technical and Law Enforcement Experts Groups.

The MTCR guidelines and lists of controlled items form an international benchmark for controlling exports of missile-related items and technologies.

57 <http://zanggercommittee.org/>

58 <https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/index.html>

59 <https://mtcr.info/>

The 2022 MTCR plenary and subgroup meetings were held in Montreux, Switzerland. The Swiss assumed the chair from Russia. This had been the first meeting since the disruption of COVID-19 where member states were able to send full delegations. The UK was represented at all meetings and delivered presentations. As chair of the Technical Experts Group, the UK were able to rebuild momentum on technology listing, and considered 21 proposals to amend the MTCR technical annexe.

7.12 Wassenaar Arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was established to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and helping to prevent destabilising accumulations of conventional arms and associated sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.⁶⁰ The WA was established on 19th December 1995 by 28 Participating States, including the UK. As of 31st December 2022, the WA had 42 Participating States.

WA Control Lists, which underpin the arms export control regimes of all Participating States (as well as many non-participating states), are the WA's most important contribution to global security. The WA produces two Control Lists – one for conventional weapons (the Munitions List) and one for dual-use goods and technologies. Participating States report to the WA exports of controlled arms, goods, or technology to non-members every six months.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine resulted in the cancellation of the first Technical Experts Group meeting of 2022; however future meetings were able to progress as scheduled. Most notably this year the WA was able to confirm the appointment of a new Head of Secretariat. HM Government conducted bilateral meetings in the margins of the WA plenary including with India, who will chair the 2023 Plenary, and multilaterally to discuss WA policy with partners.

7.13 The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)⁶¹ was created to address and mitigate the regional and global threat from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and related materials. Established at the 2002 Kananaskis G7 Summit, the G7-led GP has proven itself to be the primary international WMD threat reduction coordination mechanism. 30 member states, plus the EU, are active in the GP. The GP CBRN Working Group (CBRN WG), one of four working groups, covers activities relating to UNSCR 1540⁶² and other export control relevant mechanism to prevent the access to WMD technology and materials by non-state actors and terrorists.

In 2022, the UK continued funding to develop an export controls information hub for the G7 GP. This resource will help to strengthen the implementation of export controls, by giving states access to a range of useful resources such as best practice and case studies.

As part of the UK's support to full implementation of UNSCR 1540, the UK funded a project to support Pacific states to meet their obligations under the resolution. A strong emphasis was on export controls. The Pacific Islands Forum have now included UNSCR 1540 in the Transnational Organised Crime Strategy. In addition, there are now plans to agree and implement a regional

60 <https://www.wassenaar.org/genesis-of-the-wassenaar-arrangement/>

61 <http://www.gpwmd.com/>

62 <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/sc1540/>

control list. Through this project, the Fijian Home Affairs Minister is now driving efforts to ensure that Fiji progresses work to meet its 1540 obligations. Fiji Customs have committed to carrying out awareness raising to Customs officers at the border on the subject and to design a controlled goods list for their use especially for dual purpose or dual-use goods.

7.14 Academic Technology Approval Scheme

The UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) student vetting scheme was introduced in November 2007. It seeks to protect sensitive scientific and engineering-based technologies relating to advanced conventional military technology, weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery from misappropriation.

ATAS operates with the cooperation of UK higher education institutions. Overseas students from outside the European Economic Area, Switzerland, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Japan wishing to study or research an established set of sensitive subjects must first obtain an ATAS certificate before applying for a visa or commencing research. The applicant makes an application online at no cost.

The number of applications continued to grow in 2022 on top of 2021's record numbers. The scheme is kept under constant review to ensure that it remains proportionate and targeted. In 2022, ATAS approved 31,000 applications, of which 26,142 were students and 4,858 researchers, and denied clearance on 1,400 occasions, of which 1,038 were students and 362 researchers⁶³.

7.15 International outreach

The easing of COVID-19 travel restrictions in 2022 allowed for some resumption of in-person international outreach activities.

Much of this outreach was through the GP's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Working Group (CBRNWG), with export controls under its remit, as well as supporting outreach efforts under the MTCR. Moreover, the UK was able to restart regular bilateral discussions with international partners on cooperation on export controls.

Additionally, universalisation efforts as part of our Chairmanship of the CCM were also significant in 2022, through the UK co-hosted regional workshop in Abuja and follow up lunch in the margins of the 10th Meeting of States Parties.

The annual Asian Export Control Seminar (AECS) resumed in February, but due to ongoing restriction on entry into Japan, the event was held virtually. The UK was also invited to present at the International Defence Industry, Technology and Security (IDITS) Conference in Abu Dhabi in March. The IDITS Conference was the first event of this nature to be held in the region.

⁶³ Data is based on management information records as of 31st December 2022.

Section 8:

Compliance and enforcement

8.1 Compliance

ECJU carry out thorough compliance inspections at the sites of companies and individuals that hold Open Individual or Open General Licences, and Standard Individual Licences where electronic transfers arise. The aims of this activity are to:

- Provide assurance to HM Government that all licence holders are meeting the terms and conditions of their licences; and to
- Raise awareness of export controls within businesses (including on wider controlled activities, such as employees accessing technology while overseas, or undertaking activities under trafficking and brokering legislation). This is particularly important for those new to export controls.

ECJU undertakes three types of compliance inspections:

- 1) First compliance inspections: with the aim to conduct this within six months of the first use of the licence(s)
- 2) Routine compliance inspections: Follow-up checks at a frequency determined by risk assessment and/or changes in circumstances, such as a business take-over or change in key staff, and
- 3) Revisits: where a company has been found non-compliant at a previous compliance inspection. ECJU aims to revisit these sites within six to eight months of the previous visit.

The Compliance Team use four predefined criteria, agreed with HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), to determine the level of compliance and to ensure a consistent approach.

The four pre-defined criteria are:

- 1) Compliant: where all documentation is fully in order
- 2) Generally compliant: where minor (for example, typographical) errors are identified on undertakings and/or licence identifiers on documentation

- 3) Not fully compliant: where repeated minor administrative errors are identified or a substantive error is identified in one of multiple shipments; and/or an incorrect licence was quoted, where another extant licence held by the exporter permitted the export, and
- 4) Non-compliant: where significant errors have been identified such as incorrect use of licences; goods or destinations not permitted; or a failure to obtain prerequisite permissions and/or undertaking prior to export/transfer. Serious or repeated non-compliance may lead to open licences being withdrawn. All instances of non-compliance are reported to HMRC.

UK-based businesses are usually subject to on-site compliance inspections as these provide greater efficiency and scrutiny at inspections. Where onsite inspections were not viable, or if more practical for follow up action, remote inspections were undertaken via video calls.

Businesses whose operations are based overseas continued to be subject to remote compliance inspections for trade or trafficking and brokering activities. Such licence holders do not usually undertake tangible exports. In these cases, the business is required to send to the ECJU Compliance Inspector for review a log of its activities and any supporting information or documentation required by the licence utilised.

In 2021, the team carried out an internal review, which focused on sites that had not had an inspection for a number of years. The Team identified and successfully carried out 265 routine, first time and priority intelligence led visits in 2022. In 2022, the Compliance Team carried out 23 first time contact engagements with those new to exporting, and 377 site checks (including revisits). Tables 8.1 to 8.3 show compliance levels for sites inspected in 2022. Information for 2021 and 2020 is also provided for comparative purposes.

With the Compliance Team onboarding and recruiting into a number of roles during 2023, the focus will be on more intelligence-led visits to make most efficient use of trained and experienced resources, as well as the recruitment and training of new staff. The move to more targeted compliance audits is likely to result in an increase in the percentages of not fully and non-compliant visits.

Table 8.1* Compliance check outcomes

Outcomes	2022	2021	2020
Number of compliance checks undertaken	377	519	385
Number of compliance checks during which no audit was undertaken, or the outcome was inconclusive	0	0	0

* Data is based on management information records as of 11th April 2023.

Table 8.2* Compliance checks – substantive infractions

Outcomes	2022	2021	2020
Number of warning letters	54	81	51
Number of suspensions	1	5	3

* Data is based on management information records as of 11th April 2023.

Table 8.3* Compliance checks – compliance

	2022	2021	2020
% of first compliance checks	% (total)	%	%
compliant	62% (23)	55%	48%
generally compliant	11% (4)	13%	18%
not fully compliant	11% (4)	12%	16%
non-compliant	16% (6)	20%	18%
% of routine compliance checks			
compliant	39% (90)	48%	33%
generally compliant	21% (48)	18%	28%
not fully compliant	20% (45)	15%	18%
non-compliant	20% (45)	19%	21%
% of revisits			
compliant	68% (76)	65%	50%
generally compliant	14% (16)	11%	35%
not fully compliant	10% (11)	10%	3%
non-compliant	8% (9)	14%	12%

* Data is based on management information records as of 11th April 2023.

The Compliance Team issued 54 warning letters to company directors during 2022, where breaches of licence conditions were identified. Exporters with licences that did not cover their goods or exports were recommended to surrender the licences. This removes the risk of becoming non-compliant by using these licences in error. One exporter had a licence suspended due to repeat infractions.

8.2 Enforcement activity undertaken by HMRC, Border Force and the UK Prosecution Authorities

HMRC continued to work with Border Force and UK prosecuting authorities⁶⁴ to undertake a wide range of enforcement activity throughout 2022. This activity included:

- 177 seizures of strategic goods. These are cases where goods were presented for export and found to be in breach of licensing requirements or sanctions and embargoes (see Table 8.5)
- 157 end-use cases, where non-listed items were stopped from leaving the UK and brought within export controls. This control is used if there is a risk that the goods would be put to an illicit military or WMD end-use
- HMRC issued 22 compound settlements totalling £6,900,587.14. These covered unlicensed exports of military goods, dual-use goods and related activity controlled by The Export Control Order 2008

⁶⁴ Crown Prosecution Service (CPS in England and Wales); the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS in Scotland); and the Public Prosecution Service (PPS in Northern Ireland)

- 123 HMRC warning letters issued as a result of voluntary disclosures
- There was one strategic exports prosecution in 2022.

A compound settlement is an offer made by HMRC in lieu of a referral to a prosecuting authority for the consideration of a charge. A compound settlement offer can only be made once a case has been assessed as suitable for referral to a prosecuting authority with each case thoroughly researched by specialist HMRC investigators. There is no obligation on an exporter to accept an offer and they are free to decline or make a counter-offer.

There were 14 ongoing criminal investigations throughout the period and one finalised in the courts in 2022. HMRC assesses all breaches of arms export controls and sanctions. Where serious and/or deliberate breaches of export controls are identified, or where there are aggravating features, cases will be adopted for criminal investigation. These cases will be investigated and, if appropriate, referred to the relevant prosecuting authority to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute and whether that prosecution is in the public interest.

HMRC continues to receive and process voluntary disclosures made by exporters. These disclosures are assessed by HMRC and appropriate action taken. This ranges from educational visits or the issuing of written warnings, through to compound settlements and, in the most serious cases, referral to the UK prosecution authorities, for consideration for criminal prosecution. Table 7.4 shows voluntary disclosures that were disposed of in 2022.

Table 8.4 Voluntary disclosures disposed in 2022

Disposal*	Total
Voluntary Disclosures received	317
Warning Letters issued as a result of voluntary disclosures	123
No Further Action (NFA)	61
Compound settlement offers issued as a result of voluntary disclosures	22 Offers, totalling £6,900,587.14

* This represents 2022 activity only. This means some outcomes may originate from voluntary disclosures received in 2021 as some will not be recorded until the following period. The warning letters and compound settlement offers recorded here form part of the totals for this period and are not additional to those presented at the opening of this section. Data is based on Management Information records as of 17th March 2023.

HMRC works with DIT and other agencies to contribute to raising awareness of strategic export controls through educational outreach to business. HMRC also participates in outreach and capability-building events. This activity strengthens links with other enforcement agencies in the field of strategic export control and improves the capabilities of our international partners. HMRC supports the international export control commitments of HM Government through its contributions to international operational expert groups. These groups help improve international arms controls and aim to improve processes by sharing expertise and best practice.

This work includes supporting and contributing to the enforcement expert meetings of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia Group (AG) and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) (see Section 7). HMRC contributes to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), working alongside international partners to strengthen capabilities to prevent the smuggling of illicit goods.

Table 8.5* Number of HMRC Strategic Exports and Sanctions Seizures

Year	Total
2022	177
2021	202
2020	160
2019	194
2018	160

* Data is based on Management Information records as of 17th March 2023.

Table 8.6* Convictions

Year	Goods	Destination	Individual/ company	Offence	Penalty
2022	4kgs disodium sulphide hydrate	Pakistan	VWR International Ltd	Export of controlled chemicals contrary to Customs & Excise Management Act 1979 68(1)	£1,000, reduced for early plea £660 + costs £2,650.50
2021	-	-	-	-	-
2020	-	-	-	-	-
2019	-	-	-	-	-
2018	Controlled Chemicals	Japan South Korea India Israel USA Canada Germany	Carbosynth Ltd	Export of controlled goods contrary to Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 section 68(1)	£4,269.96 plus costs
2018	Fighter jet parts	Iran (Malaysia and Dubai)	Alexander George Paul Attwater Iris Attwater	Export of military and dual-use goods contrary to Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 section 68(1)	2 and half years' imprisonment for Alexander George 6 months of imprisonment suspended for 12 months (Attwaters)
2018	Controlled chemicals including sodium Sulphide	Pakistan Jordan South Africa Saudi Arabia	VWR International Ltd	4 counts of exporting goods contrary to Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 section 68(1)	£ 7,039.00

* Data is based on Management Information records as of 17th March 2023.

Section 9:

Modernising ECJU

9.1 ECJU Transformation Programme

At the end of 2022, ECJU's change programme, known as the Transformation Programme, was formally closed, having delivered all outputs within its scope. Work is currently ongoing within ECJU to support the successful implementation of the Programme's products by operational teams. In line with the agreed scope, some of the outputs were implemented before the Programme closed, including a range of tools, guidance and frameworks under the 'People', 'Culture' and 'Governance' workstreams.

Other outputs including templates, tools, and underpinning analysis and guidance will be developed and implemented over the next 12 to 18 months by ECJU as part of its continuous improvement model. Completing these other outputs gradually throughout 2023 and 2024 will mean that operational teams can give meaningful input and engagement with these improvements whilst also maintaining effective delivery of the day-to-day export licensing service and engaging with the design and delivery of LITE.

The deliverables we will be working on during 2023 and 2024 include the creation of documented Standard Operating Procedures and a quality assurance framework to ensure we can demonstrate our processes are consistent and accurate. ECJU will also build on the 'People' products, including a Learning and Development (L&D) platform that will provide tailored learning for different ECJU staff appropriate to their role and future development.

9.2 A new online application system for export licensing – LITE

A new online digital system called the Licensing for International Trade and Enterprise (LITE) is available to a small but increasing number of exporters to make applications for SIELs. At the end of 2022, over 500 applications for SIELs were made by a limited number of exporters, using a private beta service. Over the course of 2023, the number of exporters will be expanded, which will increase the number of LITE SIEL applications. Once the number of applications has increased to an acceptable level, the plan is to move towards public beta, that will allow any exporter to apply for a SIEL using LITE.

The current system, SPIRE will eventually be retired. LITE will bring new technology as well as automation and streamlining of processes. Work is ongoing to plan in the remaining services that are available through SPIRE into the development of LITE. As we are working through the plans, more communications will be published as well as engagement with the exporter community and interested parties.

As well as bringing other benefits to the organisation, LITE will interact with other government organisations allowing export controls to be monitored across multiple systems.

Section 10:

Case Studies

HM Government keeps export controls under regular review, seeking to ensure they continue to address evolving threats, keep pace with new technologies, and adapt to changing circumstances. On 8th December 2021, the Secretary of State for International Trade announced revised Strategic Export Licensing Criteria (replacing the Consolidated Criteria announced on 25th March 2014) and announced the proposed introduction of enhancements to the military end-use control (MEUC).

The revised Criteria reflect HM Government's policy considerations and take account of a range of factors including the UK's international legal obligations including the ATT. The revised Criteria remain compatible with the EU Common Position. During 2022, the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria were applied on a case-by-case basis, taking account of all relevant information available at the time of assessment, or if circumstances changed, extant licences that were subject to reassessment.

The main changes were in respect of Criterion 3 ("preservation of internal peace and security") and Criterion 4 ("preservation of peace and security"). The new Criterion 4 addresses ambiguities in the previous formulation under the old Criteria, and Criterion 3 had been updated to mirror Criterion 4 given they both concern peace and security. Both criteria provide for a more holistic assessment of peace and security consistent with international obligations. HM Government will not grant a licence if it determines there is a clear risk that the items would, overall, undermine internal peace and security (Criterion 3) or regional/international peace and security (Criterion 4). Other changes include:

- Criterion 2a and Criterion 2c of the Criteria now include an express reference to not granting a licence where there is a clear risk that the items might be used to "commit or facilitate" internal repression or a serious violation of international humanitarian law – strengthening the previous reference to a clear risk that items might be used to "commit" internal repression or a serious violation of international humanitarian law.
- Criteria 3, 4 and 6 now include an express reference to whether the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children.
- Criterion 6a, which considers the potential that items could be used to commit or facilitate an offence under international conventions or protocols, such as terrorism. It is now a mandatory criterion.

- Under 'Other Factors' the language has been clarified and narrowed down, and now states that HM Government may decide not to grant a licence, in exceptional circumstances, where the items may have a significant negative impact on the UK's international relations. This provides a degree of 'future-proofing' for unforeseen challenges.

This section provides case studies to illustrate how the Export Control Joint Unit applies HM Government policy on export controls. Unless there is a clear basis for refusal, all criteria are assessed for each application. Some criteria will require a more detailed assessment than others depending on the nature of the application. The examples covering 2022 detail issues in relation to licensing, including where there is a change in circumstances or amendment to sanctions or export controls.

10.1 Belarus

The UK has adopted a range of sanctions regimes⁶⁵ through regulations made under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018⁶⁶ (the Sanctions Act). Regulations made under the Sanctions Act can impose a variety of different sanction measures designed to achieve certain specified purposes. The export restrictions applicable to the UK as set out in EU Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 18 May 2006 were replaced by the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, made under the Sanctions Act in March 2019, coming into force at the end of the Transition Period on 31st December 2020, to ensure the UK could continue to operate an effective sanctions regime for Belarus. The original purpose for this sanctions regime included encouraging the Government of Belarus to: respect democratic principles and institutions; refrain from actions, policies or activities which repress civil society; investigate properly and institute criminal proceedings against persons responsible for the disappearances of Yury Zakharenka, Viktor Hanchar, Anatol Krasouski and Dzmitry Zavadski; and comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. The Regulations included financial, trade and immigration measures.

Following the forced landing of Ryanair FR4978 on 23rd May 2021, HM Government added further financial, trade and aircraft sanctions, and added to the list of activities for which a person could be designated. On 5th July 2022, in response to Belarus' support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the UK, EU, and United States, extended sanctions on Belarus to cover a wider range of financial, trade, shipping and aircraft items and entities, and to extend the purposes of the regime. Not all items subject to Belarus Sanctions engage the UK's export licensing regime.

However, for controlled items from the UK's consolidated military and dual-use lists, as well as certain non-listed dual use items subject to the MEUC, in line with Criterion 1, the Government will not grant an export licence if to do so would be inconsistent with UK Sanctions. Applications are assessed against the prohibited items set out in the relevant Sanctions Regulations, as well as whether the export would breach sanction measures imposed on any designated entities or individuals.

If the export is consistent with UK Sanctions, the application is refused. If not, the Government considers the application against the other parts of Criterion 1 and the remaining Criteria, in particular Criterion 2, risk of the goods being used to commit or facilitate internal repression, and Criterion 7, risk of diversion to countries of concern, for example, Russia, or diversion to an undesirable end user or end-use within Belarus.

65 <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-regimes-under-the-sanctions-act>

66 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/13/contents/enacted>

Belarus was already subject to MEUC, and since May 2022, the enhanced MEUC. The MEUC allows the Government to assess applications for non-listed items against the risk of internal repression and national security.

ECJU continued to assess applications in relation to the revised Sanctions, in addition to considering the rest of the Standard Export Licensing Criteria.

10.2 China

A positive trade and investment relationship is beneficial for both the UK and China, where consistent with UK values and national security. We continue to strengthen our national security infrastructure and supply chain resilience to protect UK economic security while maintaining the space for a trade and investment relationship.

China is the destination with the highest number of SIELs, 1,074 in 2022. This is because it is a permitted destination on fewer Open General Export Licences than other countries, and a large destination for commercial exports. Each export licence application for controlled items is assessed against the UK's announced policies and the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria on a case-by-case basis. Our processing times and refusal rates are higher for exports to China than most other destinations. In 2022, we completed 53% of SIEL applications for China in 20 days compared to 62% for all destinations, and 81% in 60 days compared to 89% for all destinations. The refusal rate for China SIEL applications in 2022 was 11.9% compared to 2.5% for SIEL applications to all destinations.

A declaration by the European Council meeting at Madrid on 27 June 1989 expressed the shared intention of all Member States to establish an arms embargo on China. Successive ministerial statements to Parliament have set out the terms of the embargo and subsequently extended it to both Macao and Hong Kong. As announced on 3 June 1998⁶⁷, the UK interprets it to include lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles; specially designed components of these items and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms; and any equipment which might be used for internal repression. Licence applications are considered on a case-by-case basis in light of these criteria as well as the usual criteria applying to controlled exports. All licences for this destination were reviewed against these criteria.

On 12th January 2021 the Foreign Secretary announced a review of export controls as they apply to the situation in Xinjiang, to make sure the UK is doing everything it can to prevent the export of goods that could directly or indirectly contribute to human rights violations in that region. The results of the review were announced in a Written Ministerial Statement on 8th December 2021, and strengthened the UK's ability to prevent exports that might be used directly or indirectly to facilitate human rights violations in all destinations subject to military end-use controls.

Limitations in the MEUC, derived from the retained EU Dual-Use Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009), meant it had never been fully effective at controlling non-listed items intended for use by military or security forces in an embargoed destination and whose export posed a risk to UK national security or might be used to facilitate internal repression.

67 <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980603/text/80603w12.htm>

Government legislative enhancements came into force on 19th May 2022. They addressed the shortcomings by permitting case-by-case control for certain non-listed dual-use items that are or may be intended for use by military, paramilitary, security forces (including government intelligence organisations) or police forces of a destination subject to an arms embargo or, in some cases, by those acting on their behalf or at their direction. The review had also concluded that there were anomalies and inconsistencies in the UK's export control regime and China was added to the list of destinations subject to military end-use controls.

Recognising the expanded control, the FCDO now assesses some export licence applications for non-listed items, including where they could have an adverse effect on peace or security or be used to breach human rights. The FCDO also now reviews referrals from HMRC for non-listed exports which may be in scope of the MEUC and provides advice to companies through DIT's End User Advisory Service.

Since the changes, the control was applied on over 90 occasions for proposed exports to China in 2022, including on exports intended for use by the People's Liberation Army, defence State Owned Enterprises and universities engaged in research on behalf of the military.

The recent enhancements to our export controls are intended to protect our national security and democratic values, whilst also enabling UK companies to engage and trade with China. We are progressing work to understand and review the impact of the changes in the export control regime, including for exports to China.

Annex A:

The Strategic Export Licensing Criteria

Statement to Parliament on 8th December 2021⁶⁸

Statement

HM Government is committed to a robust and transparent export control regime for military, dual-use and other sensitive goods and technologies. The purpose of these controls is to promote global security and facilitate responsible exports. They help ensure that goods exported from the UK do not contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or a destabilising accumulation of conventional weapons. They protect the UK's security and our expertise by restricting who has access to sensitive technologies and capabilities. Export controls also help ensure that controlled items are not used for internal repression or in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law. They are one of the means by which we implement a range of international legal commitments including the Arms Trade Treaty.

The controls also support the UK's defence and security industry. The legitimate international trade in military equipment and technology, as well as in dual-use items, enables governments to protect ordinary citizens, to preserve law and order against terrorists and criminals, and to defend against external threats. The Government therefore remains committed to supporting the UK's defence and security industry and to promoting the legitimate trade in items controlled for strategic reasons.

We keep our controls under regular review to ensure that they continue to properly address the threats we face, keep pace with new technologies, and adapt to changing circumstances such as our exit from the EU, while providing an efficient service which does not impose an unworkable administrative burden on the defence and security industry.

That is why today I am announcing a package of measures to update the export control regime.

First, I am laying before Parliament a revised version of the licensing criteria for strategic export controls, to be known as the Strategic Export Licensing Criteria, as set out at the end of this statement.

⁶⁸ <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-12-08/hcws449>

These Criteria will be applied with immediate effect to all licence decisions (including decisions on appeals) for export, transfer, trade (brokering) and transit/transshipment of goods, software and technology subject to control for strategic reasons (referred to collectively as “items”); and to the extent that the following activities are subject to control, the provision of technical assistance or other services related to those items. Certain of the Criteria may also be applied to MOD Form 680 applications alongside other considerations and assessment of proposals to gift controlled equipment to other nations’ governments.

As before, they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis taking into account all relevant information available at the time the licence application is assessed. While the Government recognises that there are situations where transfers must not take place, as set out in the following Criteria, we will not refuse a licence on the grounds of a purely theoretical risk of a breach of one or more of those Criteria. In making licensing decisions I will continue to take into account advice received from FCDO, MOD, and other government departments and agencies as appropriate.

The application of these Criteria will be without prejudice to the application to specific cases of specific measures as may be announced to Parliament from time to time. This statement does not impact upon existing specific measures which remain extant until revoked.

Second, the Government will be taking steps to enhance the Military End-Use Control. Currently, the control can only be applied to the export of otherwise non-controlled items which are intended for use as components in, or production equipment for, military equipment in an embargoed destination. This does not allow us to fully address threats to national security, international peace and security, and human rights arising from the use of non-listed items by the military, police or security forces, or entities acting on their behalf, in an embargoed destination.

We will therefore be amending the definition of “military end-use” to remove this limitation. The control would only be applied where the Government informs the exporter that the proposed export is or may be intended for a military end-use in an embargoed destination. To minimise the impact on legitimate trade, there will be exemptions for medical supplies and equipment, food, clothing and other consumer goods.

The review also concluded that there were anomalies and inconsistencies within the UK’s export control regime. As a result of this review, China will be added to the list of those destinations subject to military end-use controls.

Taken together, these changes will also strengthen our ability to prevent exports that might be used directly or indirectly to facilitate human rights violations in all destinations subject to military end-use controls. It also completes the export control review announced to Parliament on 12 January 2021 by the then Foreign Secretary.

Both of these changes concerning military end-use controls require amendments to the Export Control Order 2008. We intend to lay the secondary legislation to implement these changes in the Spring of 2022.

The Strategic Export Licensing Criteria

This statement of the Criteria is guidance given under section 9 of the Export Control Act 2002. It replaces the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria announced to Parliament on 25 March 2014.

Criterion One

Respect for the UK's international obligations and relevant commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

The Government will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

- a. the UK's obligations and its commitments to enforce United Nations and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) sanctions, as well as national sanctions observed by the UK and other relevant commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls
- b. the UK's obligations under the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty
- c. the UK's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention
- d. the UK's obligations under the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (the Oslo convention), the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the Ottawa convention) and the Land Mines Act 1998
- e. the UK's commitments in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement
- f. the OSCE principles governing conventional arms transfers.

Criterion Two

Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law.

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will:

- a. Not grant a licence if it determines there is a clear risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression

Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary or arbitrary executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

For these purposes items which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, items where there is evidence of the use of these or similar items for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the items will be diverted from their stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. The nature of the items to be transferred will be considered carefully, particularly if they are intended for internal security purposes.

b) Exercise special caution and vigilance in granting licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN or the Council of Europe

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law, the Government will:

c) Not grant a licence if it determines there is a clear risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

In considering the risk that items might be used to commit or facilitate internal repression, or to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children.

Criterion Three

Preservation of internal peace and security

The Government will not grant a licence if, having assessed the potential that the items would either contribute to or undermine internal peace and security, it determines there is a clear risk that the items would, overall, undermine internal peace and security.

When assessing the potential that the items would contribute to or undermine internal peace and security, the Government will take into account, inter alia and where relevant:

- a. Whether the grant of the licence would provoke or prolong armed conflicts
- b. Whether the items are likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security or defence of the recipient
- c. Whether the items would be likely to cause, avert, increase or decrease conflict or instability in the country of final destination, taking into account (inter alia):
 - i) the balance of forces between states or actors concerned
 - ii) the potential for the equipment to have a significant impact on the effectiveness of existing capabilities or force projection
 - iii) humanitarian purposes or impacts
 - iv) the nature of the conflict, including the conduct of all states or actors involved, and any involvement by the UK and allied states
 - v) border stability and legitimate national security interests of the recipient.
- d. Whether the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children.

Criterion Four

Preservation of peace and security

The Government will not grant a licence if, having assessed the potential that the items would either contribute to or undermine peace and security, it determines there is a clear risk that the items would, overall, undermine peace and security.

When assessing the potential that the items would contribute to or undermine peace and security, the Government will take into account, inter alia and where relevant:

- a. The existence or likelihood of armed conflict in which the recipient would take part
- b. Whether the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue, by means of force, a claim against the territory of another country
- c. The likelihood that the items would be used in the territory of another country other than for legitimate purposes, including national or collective self-defence
- d. Whether the items would be likely to cause, avert, increase or decrease conflict or instability in the region, taking into account (inter alia):
 - i) the balance of forces between the states or actors in the region concerned
 - ii) their approach to expenditure on defence
 - iii) the potential for the equipment to have a significant impact on the effectiveness of existing capabilities or force projection
 - iv) humanitarian purposes or impacts
 - v) the nature of the conflict, including the conduct of all states or actors involved, and any involvement by the UK and allied states
 - vi) border stability and legitimate national security interests of the recipient.
- e. Whether the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children.

Criterion Five

The national security of the UK and territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.

The Government will take into account:

- a. the risk of the items undermining or damaging the UK's national security or those of other territories and countries as described above
- b. the risk of the items being used against UK forces or against those of other territories and countries as described above
- c. the need to protect classified information and capabilities.

Criterion Six

The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism and transnational organised crime, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.

- a. Having assessed the potential that the items could be used to commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols to which the UK is a Party relating to terrorism or transnational organised crime, the Government will not grant a licence if it determines there is a clear risk that the items could be used to commit or facilitate such an act.

In making this assessment, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women or children.

- b. The Government will also take into account, inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to:
 - i) its compliance with relevant international obligations, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts
 - ii) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament instruments referred to in Criterion One.

Criterion Seven

The existence of a risk that the items will be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use

In assessing the risk that the items might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use, the Government will take into account:

- a. the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in United Nations or other humanitarian or peace-keeping activity
- b. the technical capability of the recipient country to use the items
- c. the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls
- d. the risk of re-export to undesirable destinations
- e. the risk of diversion to terrorist organisations, individual terrorists or to transnational organised crime
- f. the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer
- g. the risk of an undesirable end-use either by the stated end-user or another party.

Criterion Eight

The compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.

The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed transfer would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.

The Government will consider in this context, amongst other factors, the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any bilateral or multilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.

Other Factors

In exceptional circumstances the government may decide not to grant a licence for reasons other than those set out in Criteria 1 to 8 where the items may have a significant negative impact on the UK's international relations.

Annex B:

A summary of key changes affecting OGELs in 2022

February – Russia was removed as a permitted destination from the following open general export licences:

- chemicals
- chemicals from December 2019
- cryptographic development
- cryptographic development from December 2019
- export after exhibition (dual-use items)
- oil and gas exploration (dual-use items)
- oil and gas exploration (dual-use items) from December 2019
- X
- X from December

March – A new Russia sanctions General Trade Licence published:

- Russia sanctions aviation insurance

March – Belarus was removed as a permitted destination from 9 open general export licences:

- chemicals
- chemicals from December
- cryptographic development
- cryptographic development from December 2019
- export after exhibition: dual-use items
- export for repair/replacement under warranty: dual-use items
- export for repair/replacement under warranty: dual-use items from December 2019
- X
- X – from December 2019
- Export After Exhibition: Dual-Use Items

- Export for Repair/Replacement Under Warranty: Dual-Use Items – from December 2019
- Export for Repair/Replacement Under Warranty: Dual-Use Items
- X – from December 2019
- X

March – A new Russia sanctions General Trade Licence published:

- Russia sanctions – Vessels

March – the following OGELS were revised to require registration before first use of the Licence:

- export after repair/replacement under warranty: dual-use items
- export after repair/replacement under warranty: dual-use items – from June 2019
- PCBs and components for dual-use items
- PCBs and components for dual-use items – from June 2019

March – The following OGELS were revised to allow items to be exported from the UK, after repair in the UK, or the country of original manufacture:

- export after repair/replacement under warranty: military goods
- export after repair/replacement under warranty: military goods – from June 2019.

March – The following OGEL was revised to include Iceland as a permitted destination:

- export of dual-use items to EU member states.

April – The following General Licence was revised to include aircraft and aeroengines and the provision of insurance services relating to aviation within the scope of the licence:

- Russia sanctions – Vessels

June – Two new Open General Export Licences published:

- dual-use items: India
- military goods and technology: India

July – The following Open General Export Licence had its conditions of use updated:

- military goods and technology: India

August – The scope of the following General Licence was revised:

- Russia sanctions – Vessels

September – the following 26 open general licences were made available for registration:

Open General Export Licences

- export for repair/replacement under warranty: dual-use items
- information security items

- low value shipments
- military and dual-use goods: UK forces deployed in non-embargoed destinations)
- oil and gas exploration: dual-use items)
- technology for dual-use items
- PCBs and components for dual-use items
- X
- chemicals
- cryptographic development
- export after repair/replacement under warranty: dual-use items
- access overseas to software and technology for military goods: individual use only)
- export after repair/replacement under warranty: military goods
- export for exhibition: military goods
- export for repair/replacement under warranty: military goods
- exports or transfers in support of UK Government defence contracts
- historic military goods
- military goods: collaborative project typhoon
- military goods: for demonstration
- military goods: A400M collaborative programme
- military surplus vehicles
- PCBs and components for military goods
- software and source code for military goods
- technology for military goods

Open General Trade Control Licences

- category C goods
- trade and transportation: small arms and light weapons

November – A new Russia sanctions General Trade Licence published:

- Russia Sanctions – Financial Services and Funds related to Fertilisers

December – the following 26 open general licences were revoked:

Open General Export Licences

- Export for repair/replacement under warranty: dual-use items – from December 2019
- Information security items – from December 2019
- Low value shipments – from December 2019
- Military and dual-use goods: UK forces deployed in non-embargoed destinations – from December 2019
- Oil and gas exploration: dual-use items – from December 2019
- Technology for dual-use items – from June 2019

- PCBs and components for dual-use items – from June 2019
- X – from December 2019
- Chemicals – from December 2019
- Cryptographic development – from December 2019
- Export after repair/replacement under warranty: dual-use items – from June 2019
- Access overseas to software and technology for military goods: individual use only – from December 2019
- Export after repair/replacement under warranty: military goods – from June 2019
- Export for exhibition: military goods – from December 2019
- Exports for repair/replacement under warranty: military goods – from December 2019
- Exports or transfers in support of UK government defence contracts – from June 2019
- Historic military goods – from December 2019
- Military goods: collaborative project typhoon – from June 2019
- Military goods: for demonstration – from December 2019
- Military goods: A400M collaborative programme – from February 2020
- Military surplus vehicles – from December 2019
- PCBs and components for military goods – from June 2019
- Software and source code for military goods – from June 2019
- Technology for military goods from June 2019

Open General Trade Control Licences

- Category C goods – from November 2019
- Trade and transportation: small arms and light weapons – from December 2019

Annex C:

OGELs and other general licences in force in 2022

Dual-use OGELs: these permit the export of certain controlled dual-use goods:

- Chemicals
- Chemicals – from December 2019
- Cryptographic Development
- Cryptographic Development – from December 2019
- Dual-Use Items – India
- Export After Exhibition: Dual-use Items
- Export After Repair/Replacement Under Warranty: Dual-use Items
- Export After Repair/Replacement Under Warranty: Dual-use Items – from June 2019
- Export for Repair/Replacement Under Warranty: Dual-use Items
- Export for Repair/Replacement Under Warranty: Dual-use Items – from December 2019
- Export of Dual-Use Items to EU Member States
- Exports of non-lethal Military and Dual-use Goods: to UK Diplomatic Missions or Consular posts
- Information Security Items
- Information Security Items – from December 2019
- Low Value Shipments
- Low Value Shipments – from December 2019
- Military and Dual-Use Goods: UK Forces deployed in embargoed destinations
- Military and Dual-Use Goods: UK Forces deployed in non-embargoed destinations
- Military and Dual-Use Goods: UK Forces deployed in non-embargoed destinations – from December 2019
- Oil and Gas Exploration: Dual-Use Items
- Oil and Gas Exploration: Dual-Use Items – from December 2019
- Technology for Dual-Use Items
- Technology for Dual-Use Items – from June 2019

- PCBs and Components for dual-use items
- PCBs and Components for dual-use items – from June 2019
- X
- X – from December 2019

Military Goods OGELs: these permit the export of certain controlled military goods:

- Access Overseas to Software and Technology for Military Goods: Individual Use Only
- Access Overseas to Software and Technology for Military Goods: Individual Use Only – from December 2019
- Certified Companies
- Export After Exhibition or Demonstration: Military Goods
- Export After Repair/replacement under warranty: Military goods
- Export After Repair/replacement under warranty: Military goods – from June 2019
- Export for Exhibition: Military Goods
- Export for Exhibition: Military Goods – from December 2019
- Exports for Repair/replacement under warranty: Military goods
- Exports for Repair/replacement under warranty: Military goods – from December 2019
- Exports in Support of Joint Strike Fighter: F-35 Lightning II
- Exports in support of Turkish Aerospace Industries TF-X programme
- Exports or transfers in Support of UK Government Defence Contracts
- Exports or transfers in Support of UK Government Defence Contracts – from June 2019
- Exports under the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty
- Historic Military Goods
- Historic Military Goods – from December 2019
- Historic Military Vehicles and Artillery Pieces
- Military Components
- Military Goods, Software and Technology
- Military Goods: Collaborative Project Typhoon
- Military Goods: Collaborative Project Typhoon – from June 2019
- Military Goods: For Demonstration
- Military Goods: For Demonstration – from December 2019
- Military Goods: A400M Collaborative Programme
- Military Goods: A400M Collaborative Programme – from February 2020
- Military Goods, Software and Technology: Government or NATO End Use
- Military Goods and Technology – India
- Military Surplus Vehicles
- Military Surplus Vehicles – from December 2019
- PCBs and Components for Military Goods
- PCBs and Components for Military Goods – from June 2019

- Software and Source Code for Military Goods
- Software and Source Code for Military Goods – from June 2019
- Technology for Military Goods
- Technology for Military Goods from June 2019
- Vintage Aircraft

Other types of General Licences:

- Iraq
- Radioactive sources
- General Trade Licence (Russia: Sanctions)
- General Trade Licence (Russia Sanctions – Financial Services and Funds related to Fertilisers)
- General Trade Licence (Russia Sanctions – Vessels)

Open General Transshipment Licences (OGTLs): these allow, subject to certain conditions, controlled goods to be exported from one country to another via the UK:

- Sporting Guns
- Postal Packets
- Transshipment Licence

Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs): these control trafficking and brokering activity between one third country and another where the transaction or deal is brokered in the UK or by a UK person:

- Open General Trade Control Licence
- Category C Goods
- Category C Goods – from December 2019
- Insurance or Re-Insurance
- Maritime Anti-Piracy
- Trade and Transportation: Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Trade and Transportation: Small Arms and Light Weapons – from December 2019

The Retained General Export Authorisations are as follows:

- GEA001 – export of most dual-use items to Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the United States
- GEA002 – export of certain dual-use items to certain destinations
- GEA003 – export after repair/replacement
- GEA004 – temporary export for exhibition or fair
- GEA005 – telecommunications
- GEA006 – chemicals
- GEA 2019/125

The Union General Export Authorisations are as follows:

- EU001 – export of most dual-use items to Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the United States
- EU002 – export of certain dual-use items to certain destinations
- EU003 – export after repair/replacement
- EU004 – temporary export for exhibition or fair
- EU005 – telecommunications
- EU006 – chemicals
- EU007 – Intra-group export of software and technology
- EU008 – Encryption
- EU GEA 2019/125

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