What is the strategic objective? What are the main policy objectives and intended effects?

The strategic objective of the Bill is to prevent illegal migration, remove those with no right to be here and protect the vulnerable. The policy objectives are to:

1. Deter illegal entry into the UK by making it clear that illegal entry will result in detention and swift removal to a safe third or home country (through a ‘Duty’ placed on the Home Secretary to remove these individuals);
2. Break the business model of people smugglers and save lives;
3. Promptly remove those with no legal right to remain in the UK; and
4. Set an annual cap on the number of people admitted to the UK for resettlement through safe and legal routes.

What policy options have been considered, including any alternatives to regulation? Please justify preferred option (further details in Evidence Base)

**Option 1:** Do-nothing. Do not implement the Bill. The current Home Office plans to manage and reduce illegal migration will be continued.

**Option 2:** Full Implementation of the Bill, in which the Bill operates as intended. This is the Government’s preferred option as it meets the strategic and policy objectives. This appraisal considers the impact of the Bill measures within the existing operating system and does not consider the impact of system reforms that are yet to be delivered, in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA 2022).

What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?

In 2022 45,755 people entered the United Kingdom (UK), having crossed the English Channel in small boats, more than five times the level of small boat crossings recorded two years previously. In 2022, there were 3,400 recorded detections of people attempting to enter the UK illegally through other routes. This Bill aims to prevent illegal migration through the creation of a scheme whereby anyone arriving illegally in the UK will not be allowed to stay in the UK but will instead be promptly detained and removed to their home country or to a safe third country.

Main assumptions/sensitivities and economic/analytical risks

It has not been possible to undertake a full value for money assessment of the Bill. This is because:

1. The Bill is a novel and untested scheme, and it is therefore uncertain what level of deterrence impact it will have. Therefore, a range is presented to set out varying levels of deterrence that may be achieved.
2. The delivery plan is still being developed, adjusting for changes during legislative passage, so the scale of the Bill’s processes is not yet known. This includes elements such as detention, case working, judicial and third country capacity constraints.
3. No displacement effects of migrants shifting to other clandestine routes of entry are included in the core analysis, meaning wider socioeconomic costs of illegal migration through undetected routes are not included.
4. The baseline does not include impacts of to-be delivered projects within the NABA 2022.

Will the policy be reviewed? It will not be reviewed. If applicable, set review date: N/A
I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that, given the available evidence, it represents a reasonable view of the likely costs, benefits and impact of the leading options.

Signed by the responsible: SELECT SIGNATORY

Date: 26/06/2023
Summary: Analysis & Evidence

Policy Option 2

Description: Option 2: Full implementation of the Bill, in which the Bill operates as intended.

FULL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s):</th>
<th>Price Base</th>
<th>PV Base</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>Estimate of Net Present Social Value NPSV (£m)</th>
<th>Estimate of BNPV (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Best:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Low N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Best:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>High N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Best Estimate N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COSTS, £m

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description and scale of key monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This analysis considers the incremental cost of relocating each individual in scope of the Duty. Significant costs relative to the baseline scenario are an increase in third country return costs, Home Office resource costs, escorting costs, flight costs, detention run costs and costs on the justice system. These costs will be borne by the public sector with no direct impact to business expected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other key non-monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’

The costs of establishing new operations are not included in this assessment. At the time of writing full details of implementation and associated costs are not available and the range of implementation options means it is not practical to hypothetically assess. This would include potential capital expenditure for detention, where potential additional spend could be actual or alternatively be use of current government resources (opportunity cost).

BENEFITS, £m

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description and scale of key monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monetised incremental benefits arise from asylum system cost savings achieved when individuals have either been returned to their home country, been relocated to a safe third country, or have been deterred from entering the UK in the first place. This is achieved irrespective of whether an individual is deterred from entry or is removed after having arrived and therefore is unaffected by the deterrence level achieved. The impact of deterrence is captured in lower running costs for the asylum system in subsequent years, including the costs of accommodating individuals in hotels or other forms of accommodation, and processing them through the asylum system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other key non-monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’

There are a wide range of benefits which, as a result of data constraints or the novelty of the scheme, it has not been possible to monetise. These include: fewer individuals undertaking hazardous journeys crossing the Channel, including in small boats from safe countries, with the effect size dependent on the level of deterrent effect achieved by the scheme; reduced pressures on public services and housing markets; and other wider asylum system benefits from fewer migrants being supported in the system, including reduced pressure on Modern Slavery National Referral Mechanism processes and local authority services.

BUSINESS ASSESSMENT (Option 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct impact on business (Equivalent Annual) £m:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost, £m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Score for Business Impact Target (qualifying provisions only) £m: N/A

Is this measure likely to impact on trade and investment? N
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are any of these organisations in scope?</th>
<th>Micro</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the CO₂ equivalent change in greenhouse gas emissions? (Million tonnes CO₂ equivalent)</td>
<td>Traded:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Non-Traded:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PEOPLE AND SPECIFIC IMPACTS ASSESSMENT (Option 2)

| Are all relevant Specific Impacts included? | Yes | Are there any impacts on particular groups? | Yes |
Evidence Base

A. Strategic objective and overview

A.1 Strategic objective

1. The strategic objective of the Illegal Migration Bill is to prevent illegal migration, remove those with no right to be in the UK, and protect the vulnerable. The main policy objectives of the Bill are to:

- deter illegal entry into the UK by making it clear that illegal entry will result in detention and swift removal to a safe third or home country,
- break the business model of the people smugglers and save lives,
- promptly remove those with no legal right to remain in the UK; and
- set an annual cap on the number of people to be admitted to the UK for resettlement through safe and legal asylum routes.

A.2 Background

2. In 2022 45,755 people entered the UK crossing the English Channel in small boats, reflecting large year-on-year increases in the number of migrants entering the UK on small boats over the past five years. For comparison, in 2018 299 migrants arrived in the UK via small boats. Overall illegal migration to the UK has increased from 13,377 recorded detections in 2018 to 54,563 in 2022, largely driven by the rise in small boat arrivals.¹

Graph 1: Detections at the UK border, by method of entry, 2018 to 2022

![Graph 1: Detections at the UK border, by method of entry, 2018 to 2022](image)

Source: Irregular migration to the UK, year ending December 2022 ²

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Table 1: Detections at the UK border, by method of entry, 2018 to 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Small boats</th>
<th>Recorded detections in the UK</th>
<th>Inadequately documented air arrivals</th>
<th>Recorded detections at UK ports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>7,257</td>
<td>4,769</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>8,239</td>
<td>5,237</td>
<td>962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>8,466</td>
<td>5,465</td>
<td>2,328</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>28,526</td>
<td>5,061</td>
<td>2,561</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>45,755</td>
<td>3,456</td>
<td>5,042</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Irregular migration to the UK, year ending December 2022

3. There is normally a high degree of seasonality in the numbers who have sought to enter the UK using a small boat, reflecting the change in weather and sea conditions, with much higher numbers in the more clement summer months. The chart below shows the numbers arriving each month for the latest two years.

**Graph 2: Number of small boat arrivals by month, January 2021 to March 2023**

4. High levels of illegal migration via small boats in recent years has resulted in increased demands on the UK asylum system. In 2022, 90 per cent of small boat arrivals claimed asylum, accounting for 45 per cent of total asylum claimants in that year.

5. The Government supports the majority of those awaiting asylum decisions by providing accommodation and support payments, and granting access to some public services such as healthcare, education and local support services.

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6. The supported population and costs have increased as:
   - the number of asylum claimants has increased
   - the duration an individual stays on support has increased due to the increased backlog of asylum applications awaiting a decision.

   This has made it more difficult to accommodate arrivals in the limited stock of dispersal accommodation within the private rental market and necessitated the increased use of more costly hotel accommodation and for longer, driving up average nightly costs of the system. The nightly hotel rate has itself increased as we place more demand on the market.

7. These factors have contributed to escalating asylum system support and accommodation costs. In 2018, the average size of the supported population totalled approximately 49,000 with an average per person per night support cost of £14. As of May 2023, the supported population has more than doubled to approximately 114,000, and the average per person per night support cost has risen to £90.

8. If the level of illegal migration to the UK continues to rise, costs and the size of the supported population could increase further. If recent trends from 2020 onwards were to continue, the average per person per night support cost would rise to £126 in 2024, £152 in 2025, and £178 in 2026 (whole year averages). The size of the supported population would increase to 185,000 people by the end of 2026.\(^5\) The total costs of such a system to the taxpayer would be in excess of £32 million per day by the end of 2026.

9. These trends assume no government intervention has occurred to acquire additional non-hotel asylum support beds, or to accelerate the pace of asylum decision-making. Government work is ongoing to address both. Nevertheless, the supported population and associated costs are uncertain and difficult to control. There is a risk that costs continue to rise if action to tackle illegal migration is not taken. This appraisal tests the consequences of such a trend as part of the sensitivity analysis at section F.

Graph 3: The estimated average per person per night (PPPN) cost, £, and the size of the supported population, April 2015 to May 2023

\(^5\) Internal Home Office Data
Table 2: Yearly average estimated supported population (rounded to the nearest 1000) and yearly average per person per night (PPPN) support cost (rounded to the nearest £), 2016 to 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average Supported Population</th>
<th>PPPN Support cost, £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>96,000</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Internal Home Office estimates

10. One of the main purposes of the Bill is to prevent and deter illegal migration into the UK by placing a duty on the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Home Secretary) to make arrangements for the removal of those arriving in the UK illegally, subject to conditions and exemptions specified by the Bill (or to be specified by regulations). Under the Bill it is intended that – with few exceptions – anyone arriving illegally to the UK will be removed to either their home country (if safe) or to a safe third country to have their asylum claim processed there, regardless of whether they make a protection claim (for example, an asylum and/or human rights claim) or referral to modern slavery claim (if they are subject to a public order disqualification).

11. Specifically, the Illegal Migration Bill includes the following measures:

- **Duty to make arrangements for removal.** The Bill places a duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements, as soon as reasonably practical, to remove any persons who enters the UK illegally, and has not come directly from a country where their life and liberty was threatened, either to their home country or to a safe third country for consideration of any asylum claim (any asylum claim and certain human rights claims would be inadmissible in the UK). The duty to make arrangements for removal does not apply to unaccompanied children (until they reach the age of 18), but there is a power to remove them in limited circumstances before reaching the age of 18 set out in the Bill. The Bill makes provision for the accommodation of and other appropriate support for unaccompanied children by the Home Secretary, and includes a power for the Home Secretary to transfer responsibility for the care of an unaccompanied child within the scheme to a local authority.

- **Detention powers.** The Bill confers new powers to detain persons in scope of the scheme pending their removal, with the First-tier Tribunal only being able to consider granting immigration bail once a person has been in detention for 28 days. The Bill also places a restriction on someone challenging their detention during this period by way of judicial review. The Home Secretary will have the power to grant immigration bail at any time.

- **Limitations on in-country legal challenges.** The Bill provides that persons subject to removal will have a limited time in which to bring a claim based on a real, imminent, and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm arising from their removal to a specified third country, or a claim that they do not fall within the cohort subject to the duty to remove. There will also be strict time limits for the consideration of such claims by the Home Office, for the lodging of any appeal, and for its consideration by the Upper Tribunal. Certain decisions of the Upper Tribunal, including decisions refusing permission to appeal where this is required, would not be subject to judicial review. All other legal challenges to removal, whether on Human Rights Act 1998⁶ / European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) grounds or otherwise, would be...

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non-suspensive and would therefore be considered by England and Wales courts following a person's removal.

- **Preventing the opportunity to abuse modern slavery protections.** The Bill extends the public order disqualification provided for in the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings\(^7\) to exclude persons within the scheme from the protections afforded to potential victims of modern slavery (subject to a limited exception where a person is required to remain in the UK to support an investigation or prosecution into the circumstances of their trafficking and it is necessary for them to remain in the UK to provide such cooperation). The Bill will also add those liable for deportation under provisions other than automatic deportation, such as Foreign National Offenders (FNOs), to the non-exhaustive list of persons subject to the public order disqualification.

- **Bar on re-entry, settlement and citizenship.** The Bill provides for a permanent bar on lawful re-entry to the UK for those removed under the scheme and a permanent bar on those who fall within the scheme from securing settlement in the UK or from securing British citizenship through naturalisation or registration. The Bill includes narrow powers to disapply these bans where necessary because of a legal requirement connected with the UK’s obligations under the ECHR or (in the case of limited leave to remain) other international agreement or (in the case of leave to enter or limited leave to remain) where there are compelling circumstances.

- **Age assessments.** The Bill disapplies the right of appeal for age assessments established in section 54 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA 2022)\(^8\) for those subject to the Bill’s removal duty. Instead, those wishing to challenge a decision on age assessment will be able to judicially review the decision, but this challenge will be ‘non-suspensive’, which means it will be able to continue after the individual has been removed. The Home Secretary will also be able to make regulations which would, in certain circumstances, enable (contingent on a well evidenced scientific justification) an automatic assumption of adulthood where an individual refuses to undergo scientific age assessment.

- **Seizure of electronic devices etc.** The Bill confers new powers on immigration officers to search for, seize and retain electronic devices (such as mobile phones) from illegal migrants which appear to contain information relevant to the discharge of their functions, including but not limited to a criminal investigation. In addition, section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004\(^9\) is amended to put beyond doubt that a person’s credibility should be damaged where they make an asylum or human rights claim but refuse to disclose information, such as a passcode, that would enable access to their mobile phone or other electronic device; or fail to produce, destroy, alter or dispose of any identity document without reasonable explanation, or produce a document which is not a valid identity document as if it were.

- **Extension of inadmissibility rules applying to EU nationals.** The Bill extends section 80A of the of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002\(^10\), which provides that asylum claims from EU nationals must generally be declared inadmissible to the UK’s asylum system, to cover nationals of Albania, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland and other safe countries may be specified in regulations. Section 80A is also extended to cover human rights claims as well as asylum claims.

- **Safe and legal routes.** The Bill introduces a power, by regulations subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, to set an annual cap on the resettlement of refugees admitted to the UK via safe and legal routes. The annual cap will be determined following consultation with local authorities and other persons or bodies the Home Secretary considers appropriate.

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\(^7\) CETS 197 - Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (coe.int): https://rm.coe.int/168008371d
12. The Bill builds on the NABA 2022, which introduced new measures to deter illegal entry into the UK and to remove arrivals more easily from the UK those with no right to be here. Through NABA 2022, inadmissibility rules were clarified and placed into primary legislation. To treat a case as inadmissible, the UK does not take responsibility for assessing the asylum claim where individuals have passed through safe countries or have connections to a safe country where they could have made a claim for asylum, and they can be removed to a safe third country in a reasonable period. The aim of the inadmissibility rules is to encourage asylum seekers to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach and therefore deter onward travel to the UK. NABA 2022 also enhanced the enforcement capability of the Home Office by enabling the Department to exclude serious offenders from the National Referral Mechanism (the system for identifying and supporting victims of modern slavery) on public order grounds. A number of provisions of NABA 2022 came into force on 28 June 2022 and 30 January 2023, such as new powers to impose visa penalties where there are returns issues with uncooperative countries, and improving returns through reforms to Early Removal Scheme, Bail and Criminal Thresholds.

13. Further provisions will commence later in 2023, including reforms to speed up cases through the court system.

A.3 Groups affected

14. The Bill will impact a variety of agents and mechanisms within the immigration system, including:
   - Illegal migrants and their family members
   - Unaccompanied children
   - Local authorities and Health and Social Care Trusts.
   - Strategic Migration Partnerships
   - Home Office:
     - Immigration Enforcement
     - Illegal Migration Operations
     - Asylum Support, Resettlement and Accommodation
     - Customer Services
     - UK Border Force
     - Single Competent Authority
     - Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority
   - Ministry of Justice:
     - HM Courts &Tribunals Service
     - Legal Aid Agency
     - Legal Aid Providers
   - Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
   - Department for Health and Social Care
   - Department for Work and Pensions
   - Department for Level Up, Housing and Communities
   - Department for Education
   - Devolved Administrations
B. Rationale for intervention

15. The increase in individuals illegally crossing the UK border is putting financial and economic pressures on UK Border Force, the UK asylum system, wider public sector spending, and local services' capacity and capability under existing processes.

16. The NABA 2022, and the measures set out in the New Plan for Immigration\(^{11}\) to reduce illegal migration, were introduced to help secure the UK’s borders. The Illegal Migration Bill will build on this objective by increasing the consequences of illegal entry, with the aim of deterring people from attempting illegal entry into the UK.

C. Policy objective

17. The Bill aims to create a scheme whereby anyone arriving illegally in the UK will be promptly removed to their home country, or to a safe third country, to have any asylum claim processed. The specific objectives of the Bill include:

- To deter illegal entry into the UK.
- Break the business model of the people smugglers and save lives.
- Promptly remove those with no legal right to remain in the UK.
- Set an annual cap on the number of people to be admitted to the UK for resettlement through safe and legal routes.

D. Options considered and implementation

18. The Home Office has considered the preferred approach against a counterfactual ‘do-nothing’ option. Further options have not been considered as detailed operationalisation plans are still being developed, and this IA has not monetised set-up costs, taking an incremental cost approach rather than a full Value for Money (VfM) analysis. In lieu of set-up costs, further options on how the Bill could be implemented would not concretely add to the illustrative analysis presented.

Option 1 - Current Arrangements (Do-nothing)

19. In the do-nothing option the Bill is not implemented and the existing Home Office plans to manage illegal migration will be continued. There would be no additional costs for either setting up or running the proposed Bill processes.

20. No benefits of the new Bill process would be achieved. Since 2018 we have seen a year-on-year increase in the number of small boats arrivals. The asylum system would be expected to face ongoing pressure and cost as a result of the continued flow of illegal arrivals, especially by small boat. The do–nothing option does not consider the impact of the envisaged system reforms described in the NABA 2022 that are yet to be delivered, nor any other proposed investments in the asylum system which are yet to be completed.

21. The cost to the asylum system of doing-nothing is implicitly captured as part of the monetised benefits of the policy in the later appraisal. Understanding the trajectory of the baseline asylum support system and its associated costs is uncertain and complex. We have derived our assumptions underlying the monetised benefits (or cost-saving) of removing an individual based on a reasonable central case for supported population and likely accommodation mix and associated costs. This reasonable central case is based on our observed experience of dealing with increased migrant flows, which demonstrates that as numbers increase, the costs of accommodating increases (for example, because cheaper dispersed accommodation becomes exhausted, and as hotel costs increase as more of the hotel stock is used). This is an assumption, though as seen in section A, the

recent trajectory has seen costs continually increase. A more pessimistic baseline factoring in
growing asylum accommodation costs is tested as part of the sensitivity in section F.

22. Continuing the current arrangements would also mean that we continue to face a wider set of cost
associated with illegal migration and detailed in the non-monetised benefits part of section E. This
includes costs to UK public services; the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract; and the continued
risk to life in the channel.

Option 2 - Full Implementation

23. In this option, the Bill and measures set out in paragraph 11, are fully implemented with the Bill
operating as intended. This is the government's preferred option as it meets the identified
strategic objectives. This appraisal considers the impact of the Bill measures within the existing
operating system. It does not consider the impact of the envisaged system reforms described in the
NABA 2022 that are yet to be delivered.

Preferred option and implementation date

24. The Government's preferred option is Option 2: full implementation of the Bill, as appraised in
this Impact Assessment (IA). Section E sets out the approach to appraisal. This appraisal is based
on the Bill measures being implemented within the existing operating system. It does not account for
other fundamental operating system reforms, including elements within the New Plan for Immigration
that are yet to be fully delivered, and therefore should not be interpreted as indicative of the full scale
of the Government's ambition.

25. Subject to Parliamentary approval, the measures contained within the Bill will be implemented
following Royal Assent expected in summer 2023.

E. Appraisal

Appraisal

26. This analysis has considered and estimated the approximate costs and benefits of relocating an
individual to a safe third country. The analysis estimates the incremental cost and benefit of
relocating an individual and estimates a net incremental benefit of relocating an individual. Risks and
uncertainties are identified and tested in the appropriate section of the IA. For example, the impact
on the unit costs and benefits if individuals are deterred from entering the UK illegally has been
tested. Costs and benefits are presented in 2023/24 prices.

27. At time of writing the implementation plans for the Bill process is under development and specific
details not yet available. There are also unknowns in terms of the consequential impacts these plans
might have on the behaviour of illegal migrants. These uncertainties have meant this IA has not
attempted to estimate the total costs or benefits of the proposal and so does not provide a Net
Present Social Value (NPSV) figure. The large range in these figures would not be informative given
the uncertainties, and so instead we provide an assessment of the incremental costs and benefits of
the policy. For the same reasons the analysis does not attempt to estimate any costs of implementing
the Bill process and does not attempt to estimate any changes in behaviour of future migrants
following commencement of the Bill – but does test a range of deterrence scenarios and the
deterrence required to break-even. Consequently, this analysis does not consider costs and benefits
across an appraisal period or estimate the volumes of individuals that will be impacted by the Bill.

General assumptions and data

28. The analysis undertaken has assumed individuals in scope of the Bill are detained upon arrival. The
processing of individuals, including legal challenges, is undertaken whilst the individual is in
detention. All remaining relevant assumptions used in this analysis are presented in annex A.

29. This IA has considered the relevant evidence base across illegal migration in developing its
modelling and analysis. This includes Home Office official published statistics such as the Illegal
migration to the UK, year ending December 2022 publication\textsuperscript{12} as well as other internal sources of data and expertise, including covering the period to date.

**Deterring illegal arrivals**

30. One of the main aims of the Bill is to reduce illegal entry into the UK by deterring arrivals in scope of the Bill. There is a reasonable evidence base on interventions that can significantly reduce entry through enforcement and similar measures, particularly with regard to specific routes and crossings (including entry by boat), but evidence regarding the impact of policy changes on illegal migrant behaviour (including overstaying) more generally is more mixed. As a result, it is not possible to estimate with precision the level of deterrence that the Bill might achieve. The material below sets out some important features of the evidence base along with some examples from the international experience, with strategies typically including a range of measures including some aimed at changing migrant behaviour.

31. The academic consensus is that there is little to no evidence suggesting changes in a destination country’s policies have an impact on deterring people from leaving their countries of origin or travelling without valid permission, whether in search of refuge or for other reasons. Non-policy drivers of behaviour (for example diaspora, shared language or culture, and family ties) are also known to be strong factors influencing the choice of final destination. Changes in policy may also give rise to displacement to other forms of illegal entry, which can act to attenuate policy impacts. If unintended consequences become apparent, Governments may then need to take additional action or introduce new policies to address those.

32. The evidence from a variety of countries and border crossings (examples of which are below) provides a stronger basis to think that policies in destination countries can have an impact on the choice of destination country. To make the benefits of arriving in a destination country less than the cost, policies intended to deter illegal migrants typically attempt to reduce the benefits (for example, denying illegal migrants the right to work), raise the costs (for example, removal to a state other than the migrant’s origin), or reduce the likelihood of success (for example, increasing channel patrols).

33. There are three central arguments in the academic literature as to why policies intended to deter illegal migration specifically might not have the desired effect. First, there is a significant ‘legal knowledge’ hurdle: illegal migrants are unlikely to know about the laws of destination countries and the penalties for breaking them. illegal migrants may also be influenced by individuals or groups, such as people smugglers, who have an incentive to misrepresent destination country policies for their own profit. However, these barriers can change over time, as a result of changing situation and messaging. It is also the case that migrants make use of technology and social media to receive information, which can come from a variety of sources and communication channels. If it becomes clear that individuals who attempt to enter a particular country are unsuccessful (for example, because they have been prevented from entering or are transported to a third country), then that may subsequently influence others’ behaviours.

34. Second, the ‘rational choice’ hurdle: even if illegal migrants know about policy changes intended to deter them, they remain undeterred due to cognitive biases, which prevent them from thinking about the implications of policy changes rationally. This may particularly be the case in stressful circumstances, which may cause an individual to believe their chances are better than they are in reality (optimism bias\textsuperscript{13}, egocentric bias\textsuperscript{14}, and conservatism bias\textsuperscript{15}, or if not that, simply believe they


\textsuperscript{13} Optimism bias - The tendency to be over-optimistic about experiencing positive events and underestimating the likelihood of experiencing negative events.

\textsuperscript{14} Egocentric bias - The tendency to not consider situations from other people’s perspectives and rely heavily on personal perspective.

\textsuperscript{15} Conservatism bias - The tendency to maintain a personal view on a situation without recognising the new information available.
have come too far to stop now (sunk-cost fallacy\textsuperscript{16}). However, these cognitive biases may become less influential if policy is clear and predictable.

35. Finally, there is a significant ‘net-cost’ hurdle: even if illegal migrants do know about policies and think about their effects rationally, they may not be deterred because even taking the consequences of the policy into account, they deem it still of greater benefit to try to migrate. This hurdle could be particularly large if the forces causing someone to migrate are hard to overcome, as might be the case if there is a threat to life in their country of origin. These factors may be less likely to apply as strongly where migrants are deciding to move from a safe European country to the UK.

International examples

36. Illegal migration flows are a challenge internationally and so a number of countries have tried a variety of approaches to tackle these issues. Typically, these represent a mixture of enforcement activity and attempts to influence behaviour of migrants. Some examples are discussed below and illustrate how an appropriately targeted set of measures can be associated with changes in numbers of illegal arrivals and, in some circumstances, migrant behaviours.

Australia

37. Annual boat arrivals in Australia were in the hundreds for most of the 1990s. As numbers began to increase the Australian Government in 1992 imposed a system of mandatory detention (initially with a 273-day detention limit, although this was removed in 1994), with cost charged to the migrants themselves, and a complete ouster of judicial review. Numbers remained low but then rose sharply to 3721 people (in 86 boats) in 1999, just under 3,000 the following year and then 5516 arrivals (in 43 boats) in 2001. As a result the Australian Government introduced a number of new policies which became known as ‘the Pacific Solution’. The intention was to discourage non-citizens from arriving unlawfully in Australia by boat, with people attempting to do so intercepted at sea where possible and either returned to Indonesia, removed to third countries in the Pacific, or sent to Australia’s immigration facilities at Christmas Island (which had been made an overseas territory for this purpose). Any claims made by those people for refugee status were then processed by the Immigration Department outside the jurisdiction of Australian courts, and with no guarantee of a resettlement place in Australia.\textsuperscript{17}

38. These policies had a direct impact on the number of boat arrivals and in 2002 only a single arrival on a single boat was recorded. The numbers remained low for most of the decade. Towards the end of that decade the number of boat arrivals began to rise again, and in 2009 increased to 2,726 people (in 60 boats), rising again in the years that followed and reaching a peak in 2012, and 2013. As a result, the Australian Government introduced the Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) programme in 2013, beginning a zero-tolerance policy towards illegal migration by people arriving on boats, through the implementation of a package of measures. The programme was intended to save lives and prevent dangerous sea crossings. The OSB followed a Regional Deterrence Framework with the aim to engage with nearby countries in the region to prevent illegal migration vessels attempting to reach Australia. The programme was also implemented in conjunction with several other policies such as offshoring asylum processing and redirecting small boats. The policy intended that anyone who attempted to enter Australia illegally would be turned back or sent to an offshore centre. In terms of small boat arrivals, the OSB programme was a success and reduced the number of small boats arriving in Australia from around 18,000 in 2013 (over two thirds of Australia's asylum claims that year) to virtually zero.

\textsuperscript{16} Sunk-cost fallacy - When a person is reluctant to change their strategy as they have heavily invested in it even though it would be more beneficial to change their strategy.

Graph 4: Australian boat arrivals by calendar year, excluding crew, and related policy introductions, 1988 to 2017

Source: Data until 2013: Boat arrivals in Australia since 1976 – Parliament of Australia (aph.gov.au)\(^{18}\). For 2013 onwards, official Australian government published figures are not available. Data thereafter is drawn from figures by the Refugee Council of Australia - Statistics on boat arrivals and boat turnbacks (refugeecouncil.org.au)\(^{19}\).

39. However, the OSB was a costly programme and it is difficult to disentangle the impacts of the individual measures, as well as their full applicability in the UK context. There is also evidence of some displacement in the Australian example, including irregular migrants choosing alternative routes of entry such as overstaying or through using fraudulent documentation along with increases in the numbers of onshore applications for protection. On overstayers (measured as the number of people at a given point in time who are still in Australia after their temporary visa has expired or been cancelled) Australian data shows this was 62,100 in 2014 and 62,900 in 2018\(^{20}\), though this will include visitor overstayers. Applications for Protection visa claims (not including small boat arrivals) peaked in 2017/18 at 27,931, up from 8,500 in 2014/15, before falling to 23,266 in 2019/20 and 10,564 in 2021/22 (though this would have been impacted by the pandemic).\(^{21}\)

Spain – Morocco

40. An example of the effectiveness of measures across a shared border is that of Spain-Morocco. Following increases in irregular arrivals to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa in 2018, a collaboration agreement between Spanish and Moroccan authorities from February 2019 led to a sharp reduction in arrivals that year, with irregular arrivals to Spain halving from 65,400 in 2018 to 32,500 in 2019 and remaining low thereafter (Frontex data). The measures adopted by Morocco included security deployments at major departure points towards Spain; deployment of an additional 3,000 police to a short stretch of coast regularly used by irregular migrants to reach Europe; increased efforts by Moroccan authorities to shut down people smuggling networks, and


increased Moroccan involvement in the interception of boats in its territorial waters. While arrivals to Spain departing from Morocco fell sharply, those departing from Algeria did not. In fact, arrivals across the Algerian-Moroccan border increased in the first half of 2019. This could imply that the decline was attributable to enforcement measures rather than a change in migratory demand, but also may indicate a degree of displacement as one route becomes harder to navigate.

**Graph 5: Irregular arrivals to Spain, January 2018 to June 2020**

![Graph 5](https://frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/monitoring-and-risk-analysis/migratory-map/)

Source: Frontex data - Migratory Map (europa.eu)22

**Italy – Libya**

41. The flow of migrants from Libya across the Mediterranean is one of the most dangerous migratory routes, with thousands of migrants having died on what the International Organization for Migration have called “the world’s most dangerous maritime crossing.” It has long been a priority to stop boat crossings along this route.

**Graph 6: Monthly detections of illegal border crossings to Italy, by country of departure, January 2017 to September 2019**

![Graph 6](https://frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/monitoring-and-risk-analysis/migratory-map/)

Source: Internal Frontex data

42. Numbers of irregular migrants recorded arriving in Italy rose sharply in early 2017. However, following a deal between militias and the Libyan government, with support from foreign donors, Libya was able to tackle migrant smugglers with a particularly sharp decline following the bilateral co-

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operation between Italy and Libya introduced in the summer of 2017. Arrivals fell from 181,700 detections in YE June 2017 to 38,400 detections in YE June 2018. Over this period, migrants who were able to embark from Libya were returned at a higher rate and interceptions by the Libyan coastguard increased from 15,000 in YE June 2017 to 19,800 in YE June 2018, despite the sizeable drop in overall crossings.

43. Other interventions at this time included: deals between groups involved in trafficking and people smuggling and the Libyan government; investment from foreign donors supporting policing of traffickers; more effective Libyan navy and coastguard, trained and equipped by the Italian government and the EU; and enhancement to border controls in some of Libya’s southern neighbours, such as Niger. There was a much smaller decline after a ‘closed port’ policy was introduced by the Italian government in the summer of 2018, which prevented vessels (including the Italian coastguard) from disembarking unless other EU Member States agreed to accept a proportion of migrants on board.

44. This example illustrates that a package of interventions based around strong bilateral relationships (comparable to the recent work between UK and France) and clear arrangements for returns or removal (as in our work with Albania and provided for more generally in the Illegal Migration Bill) can have a significant impact on flows.

EU – Turkey

45. Probably the most well-known policy intervention of recent years has been the EU’s deal with Turkey, following the sharp rise in migration in 2015. In the latter half of 2015, irregular arrivals on the route into Europe from Turkey, predominantly to Greece, surged in a period often referred to as the ‘Migration Crisis’ (see graph 7). In the 12 months to March 2016, there were 1.03 million arrivals on the Eastern Mediterranean route, the majority initially being from Syria (55 per cent) but also including large numbers of Afghan (24 per cent) and Iraqi (11 per cent) nationals. Many migrants arriving in Greece then moved onward into the Western Balkans, before attempting to re-enter the EU via Croatia and Hungary; 840,000 were detected on this Western Balkans route in year ending March 2016.

46. In response to these events, the EU reached an agreement with Turkey in March 2016, which was an extension of measures outlined in a Joint Action Plan in November the preceding year. This agreement aimed to prevent irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU whilst at the same time offering better support for Syrians under Temporary Protection in Turkey and for their host communities. Some of the measures outlined in the bilateral agreement included: an agreement to return to Turkey migrants arriving in Greece who did not qualify for protection; increased enforcement activity by Turkey; significant additional EU funding to support refugees in Turkey and labour market access in Turkey for Syrians, and EU agreement to receive resettlement cases in return for Turkey taking back irregular migrants on a 1-for-1 basis.

47. Arrivals on both the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans routes declined sharply in 2016. Numbers peaked in October 2015 but by April 2016 had returned to very low levels. In the year ending March 2017 there were just 34,400 arrivals on the Eastern Mediterranean route, down from more than one million the previous year. This illustrates how strong bilateral arrangements and the knowledge that illegal entry will result in swift removal from the destination country, coupled with a range of other policies, can significantly impact arrivals.

48. Other factors likely to have contributed include the moves by Western Balkan countries to reduce migrant mobility in the region as well as the seasonality in irregular migration which tends to see reductions over the inclement winter months.

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23 EU-Turkey joint action plan (europa.eu): https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/MEMO_15_5860
Scandinavia

49. Scandinavian countries have been active in introducing a variety of new measures to control the flows of irregular migrants following the increase many European countries witnessed in 2015. Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have taken very different approaches, with Denmark’s policy response leaning towards stronger controls than the others. However, their flows are inter-connected and the impact of policy alone is not clear.

50. Sweden was prior to 2015 the Scandinavian country receiving by far the largest numbers of asylum seekers, which was in general due to a liberal policy regime in that country. However, in 2015, asylum applications to Sweden doubled to over 156,000, from around 75,000 the year before. In response, Sweden introduced new measures which combined with changes in the wider context of migration in the EU resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of applications to just 22,000 in 2016 (a reduction of 86 per cent), a level which was broadly maintained over the following three years.

51. The reduced number of asylum seekers in Sweden appears to be strongly correlated with the policy changes introduced there, which were tailored to the country’s specific circumstances and the route many irregular migrants used to arrive there. On 12 November 2015, the Swedish Government introduced temporary internal border controls with other countries in the Schengen area, controls which were subsequently maintained. Sweden also introduced identity checks for travellers from Denmark in December 2015, requiring all travellers in public transport (buses, trains and boats) to present identification documents. This affected the Öresund Bridge, the key route connecting the two countries, and meant that only migrants holding valid documentation could travel into Sweden from Denmark.

52. In response to these Swedish measures, Denmark introduced spot check controls on its border with Germany, its southern neighbour. This combination of measures may have led to large numbers of illegal migrants being stranded in the Copenhagen area, unable to cross the border. However, there were also significant net reductions in newly arriving asylum seekers as were seen in Sweden. Denmark received around 21,000 asylum applications in 2015, but this fell by 70 per cent to just over

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In both Sweden and Denmark’s cases, the reduction in applications followed the very sharp fall in irregular entries into Europe more generally and there were also similar reductions in other Scandinavian countries, which continued into the Covid pandemic lockdown period of 2019-21. In all four countries, following the pandemic, numbers rose again albeit in most cases not to anything like the levels seen in 2015 or earlier.

Table 3: Asylum applications by country, 2013 – 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7,170</td>
<td>2,985</td>
<td>49,230</td>
<td>11,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>14,535</td>
<td>3,490</td>
<td>74,980</td>
<td>10,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>20,825</td>
<td>32,150</td>
<td>156,115</td>
<td>30,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>6,055</td>
<td>5,275</td>
<td>22,335</td>
<td>3,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,125</td>
<td>4,330</td>
<td>22,190</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3,465</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>18,075</td>
<td>2,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>2,445</td>
<td>23,125</td>
<td>2,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>1,445</td>
<td>13,595</td>
<td>1,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1,995</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>10,145</td>
<td>1,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>4,475</td>
<td>4,815</td>
<td>14,045</td>
<td>4,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat Asylum Statistics | Eurostat (ercep.eu)

UK - France

53. The UK and France have a long-standing relationship. Juxtaposed controls (2003) and other measures implemented through a series of bilateral agreements have been crucial for the UK’s border strategy and security. Since 1991 and the introduction of the Sangatte Protocol which set up reciprocal border checkpoints and policing co-operation to prevent illegal migrants using lorries and the Channel Tunnel, there have been a number of France-UK agreements focused on reducing the number of people crossing the Channel in order to enter the UK illegally.

54. Since 2015 in particular, prior to the most recent discussions, there were a number of interventions between France and the UK which sought to increase cooperation between the two countries and contributed to a sharp reduction in new migrant pressures. In August 2015, a Joint Declaration led to increased security at the Tunnel and port, combined with work to clear the ‘Jungle’ camp at Calais. The cooperation was reaffirmed in August 2016, further strengthening links and data sharing, and in 2016 over 56,000 attempts at entry clandestine to the UK were prevented at juxtaposed controls. These interventions helped to address a sharp rise in illegal arrivals in 2015 and by the following year had brought the situation back under control (see graph 8).
UK – Albania

55. A more recent example of the successful introduction of policy measures which appear to be showing good signs of impact is the agreement reached between the UK and Albanian governments following a large influx of illegal migrants from that country on small boats in summer 2022. In the year ending March 2023, more than a quarter (28 per cent) of small boat arrivals were Albanian nationals (Home Office statistics, 2023).

56. Prior to May 2022, Albanians were rarely detected arriving in the UK on small boats crossing the English Channel. However, in 2022 they were the top small boat nationality. They were most prominent from July to September 2022, accounting for 45 per cent of small boat arrivals (over 9,000 people) in that period.

57. In response to the high numbers of Albanian arrivals, and a large number of resultant asylum cases with a low probability of successful claims, the UK Government last year entered into discussions with the Government of Albania, culminating in a Joint Communique signed on 13 December 2022. This agreement aimed to enhance cooperation in three main areas of common interest:

a) Security issues and home affairs (with the main focus on the fight against organised crime and illegal immigration);

b) Economic growth and investment;

c) Innovation, youth and education. The agreement also included a significant returns element, this cooperation on return has likely also reduced the incentives for Albanians to seek to travel illegally to the UK.

58. Numbers decreased from the Autumn and between October and December only 9 per cent (just over 1,000) small boat arrivals were Albanian. So far this year, the number of Albanian small boat arrivals has fallen by almost 90 per cent and in the winter months of January to March 2023, only 28 Albanians arrived on small boats.

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Risks to delivery

59. An observed deterrence impact depends upon the Bill being operationalised – it would be reasonable to assume that deterrence effect would be correlated to the proportion of illegal arrival returned. As with any major policy, there is a risk that the practical complexities of the Bill mean the Bill will not be fully delivered. Any deterrence impact relies on the policy working as intended, with sufficient capacity to detain and remove an appreciable proportion of individuals in scope to a safe third country.

60. Legal challenges could cause a delay in the full implementation of the Bill, preventing removals and reducing the deterrent impact the Bill might have on migrant behaviour, though there are measures under way to mitigate this risk. Any deterrence impact may be dependent not only on the introduction of the Bill, but on the process being implemented and being seen to be implemented.

61. There is a risk that unintended behavioural changes from migrants impact the outcomes achieved by the Bill. Rather than being deterred, migrants might instead be displaced into other UK inbound routes, for example undetected clandestine routes or initially legal routes such as visa overstayers. The Government has long standing measures to frustrate clandestine arrival by alternative routes, helping to mitigate this risk. We have invested heavily in the ports in France to deploy new technology; the Government is introducing electronic travel authorisation for air travel; and we have increased civil penalties.

62. There may be a risk that more unaccompanied children will be arriving or that more people will be claiming to be unaccompanied children as it could perceived that there is a reduced chance of being removed or that removal may be delayed if claiming to be in this cohort. Unaccompanied children may abscond when approaching the age of 18 to avoid removal given the Bill provides for unaccompanied children to fall under the duty on the Home Secretary to remove any person who enters the UK illegally, once they reach adulthood. Measures in the Bill also build on the powers taken in NABA 2022 to provide for the use of scientific age assessment and provisions for where an individual refuses to undertake a specified scientific assessment, to ensure that the UK is brought in line with the practice in many European countries.

Volumes

63. Any individual who arrives illegally in the UK who has not travelled directly from an unsafe country will be subject to the measures in the Bill. There were 45,755 people detected arriving by small boats in 2022 and 3,400 recorded detections (recorded detections of individuals outside of the controlled environment of a port, who when encountered are believed by authorities to have evaded border controls to enter the UK clandestinely, up to 72 hours before being detected) in the UK. This analysis does not attempt to calculate total costs and benefits and so does not attempt to estimate the annual volumes of individuals that may arrive following commencement of the Bill. Any attempt to combine arrival volume estimates with the unit costs in this analysis would need to consider the following issues:

- Certain cohorts of illegal migrants will not be in scope for immediate removal upon arrival, including, in particular, unaccompanied children (UC) – around 13 per cent of small boat arrivals in 2023 claimed to be UCs – except in limited circumstances set out in the Bill. It would not be accurate to apply the unit costs and benefits in this analysis to these individuals.
- Certain cohorts of illegal migrants will remain in the UK rather than being removed to their home country or a safe third country as a result of the small set of legal exemptions provided for within the Bill. These individuals would lead to some costs being incurred. It would not be accurate to apply the unit costs and benefits in this analysis to these individuals.

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28 Recorded detections of individuals outside of the controlled environment of a port, who when encountered are believed by authorities to have evaded border controls to enter the UK clandestinely, up to 72 hours before being detected.
COSTS

64. This analysis has not attempted to calculate a total costs figure for the implementation of the Bill. The costs that have been calculated are the estimated additional cost for relocating an individual from the UK to a safe third country. The appraisal has also undertaken a qualitative review of additional costs that have not been possible to monetise and of potential set-up costs in year one. Further uncertainties and sensitivities are tested in later sections.

Set-up costs

65. Detailed operationalisation plans are currently being developed and therefore accurately estimating the set-up costs for the Bill is not currently possible and will not be considered in this assessment. As a result of this, set-up costs have not been monetised.

66. It is possible that set up costs with respect to additional detention capacity could be incurred to process arrivals following commencement of the Bill process. Various options for how additional detention capacity might be acquired exist, making it difficult to estimate the true cost. It is also not known whether additional detention capacity will be required before Bill commencement. Options include building new detention centres, repurposing current detention capacity, procuring novel forms of detention including detained vessels, or repurposing alternative government owned accommodation such as prison space. Any re-prioritisation of resource would carry an opportunity cost, not fully quantified for this analysis but potentially captured in the detention run costs.

67. Other Home Office set-up costs might be incurred through scaling up Home Office services as required. This might include:

- Hiring and training additional staff for Immigration Enforcement purposes.
- The contracting of additional escorting services from the private sector. Escorting services are required for the purposes of transferring illegal arrivals between locations. The market for escorts is limited. It is possible that for additional escorts to be hired, the salary offer required to encourage new entrants into the market would need to increase. This is not captured in this analysis.
- Hiring or contracting of more medical staff to undertake medical assessments. The market for medical staff is limited. It is possible that for additional medical staff to be hired, the salary offer required to encourage new entrants into the market would need to increase. This is not captured in this analysis.
- Hiring and training more civil servants for back-office purposes.
- Opportunity cost in relation to other workstreams being de-prioritised

68. The hiring of additional escorting and medical resource would likely be supplied by the private sector. This impacts the quantity of business services procured by government but does not cause any change in administrative burden to business and is therefore not considered in the ‘costs to business’ appraisal.

69. There may be set-up costs incurred by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). These could be costs incurred that allow the justice system to process an increased legal caseload as a result of the increase in the removing of individuals to safe third or home countries. This could include:

- Increasing the number of judges.
- Increasing the number of lawyers.
- Increasing the number of staff at the Legal Aid Agency to process the increased applications.
- Increasing the physical space required for legal challenges to be heard.
- Familiarisation costs for current staff to learn new processes will be incurred.
70. Any requirement for additional lawyers and judges will impact those respective professional services. Again, this impact on the private sector is not considered in the ‘costs to business’ appraisal as it is neither a direct nor indirect administrative burden to business.

71. Any up-front costs associated with which the UK makes overseas asylum processing agreements are not monetised. Third country asylum processing costs are uncertain and could be subject to change if more agreements are made.

**Ongoing and total costs**

72. The Bill is expected to increase the number of illegal migrants relocated to a safe third country. Cost estimates included in this appraisal have been made before the Bill process has been confirmed and therefore are not comprehensive. This appraisal provides an approximate estimate of the main costs involved in relocating individuals to safe third countries. For simplicity an approximate average cost for each individual that is relocated under the Bill process has been estimated. Within this average unit cost there are some fixed costs and semi-fixed costs that have been included and approximated. This is a proportionate approach given the substantial uncertainties surrounding the cost estimates. These main costs identified are the costs paid to recipient third countries, flight and escorting costs, detention costs, costs to the justice system incurred via the Ministry of Justice and Home Office resource costs.

**Monetised costs**

73. **Recipient third country costs.** Payments to the recipient third country of relocated migrants will be made. Part of the cost will be a charge on a ‘per individual relocated’ basis. This cost is expected to reflect the cost of processing an individual borne by the third country. This ‘per individual’ cost is estimated as **£105,000** overall (excluding optimism bias) over the multi-year lifetime of the scheme.

74. It is not possible to use estimates of ‘per individual’ relocated from the Migration and Economic Development Partnership (MEDP) programme. These estimates are commercially sensitive and are not necessarily indicative of the costs incurred from future third country agreements. An alternative proxy figure for third country processing costs has instead been used. It should not be considered to represent the actual cost of any current or future relocation agreement with a third country. The National Audit Office (NAO) report on the cost of the UK’s Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Programme was published in 2016. This estimated the total UK Government cost of supporting Syrian refugees for the initial period of refuge in the UK. This comes to a total cost of £86,70029, in 2016/17 prices. Uplifted to 2022/23 prices, this gives a proxy estimated third country processing cost of £105,258.

75. It is uncertain whether this figure is an accurate proxy for processing costs in third countries. It relates to the cost of supporting a specific cohort in the UK which may not be applicable to the cohort covered by the Duty. It also relates to the costs of a third country removal – where individuals are returned to their home country this cost will not apply. Given this uncertainty testing how a higher or lower proxy for recipient third country costs impacts this analysis is included in the sensitivity analysis.

76. **Flight and escorting costs** include all costs associated with the moving of individuals during their processing, and to a third country. This includes their removal flight as well as the contract for resource to monitor and transport individuals from detention to any legal court settings, from detention to the flight for removal, and onboard the flight to the recipient safe third country. Costs have been calculated on a per person basis, assuming a flight can seat 50 individuals to be relocated. This is an uncertain assumption and there remains a risk that, in practice, flights may depart with fewer individuals onboard. Scenarios whereby on average there are 25 individuals and 75 individuals on a flight have been tested in the sensitivity analysis. Costs have been calculated assuming that each individual will take three in-country journeys, each requiring one escort, and one removal flight, requiring three escort personnel. The estimated flight and escorting costs are **£22,000** (excluding

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Detention costs includes all costs associated with detaining individuals whilst they are processed under the Bill arrangements which estimated to be £7,000 per person (excluding optimism bias). This includes providing food, shelter and associated services. Detention costs assume that on average an individual remains in detention for 40 days.

Home Office resource costs covers the expenses related to Case progression, Returns Logistics teams and Enforcement officers that enable the processing of individuals who are assessed on their inadmissibility under the Bill. This cost also includes some Home Office legal costs that will be incurred whenever an individual case is brought in front of the courts. This cost has been estimated based on average legal costs the Home Office incurs when appeals are lodged. This ‘per individual’ cost is estimated as £18,000 (excluding optimism bias).

An estimate for the provision of legal aid for individuals is monetised. This ‘per individual’ cost is estimated as £1,000 (excluding optimism bias). It has not been possible to monetise the average cost of hearing appeals from illegal migrants.

Optimism bias has been applied to costs where there is uncertainty on the estimates, in line with Green Book guidance. Optimism bias has been estimated through discussions with relevant teams across the Home Office. Further detail on the optimism bias levels is provided in annex B.

Non-monetised costs

Familiarisation and administration costs in understanding the new process for all public sector staff impacted by the Bill will be incurred. This includes Border Force officers who encounter arrivals, staff supporting the processing of individual cases and Home Office legal teams considering the impacts the new legislation may have.

MoJ costs will arise through pressure on the justice system, including judicial sitting time and court space for processing appeals tied to the Bill. Many of these additional services represent a cost to government, with the costed service being provided by private enterprise. These costs, other than legal aid costs, have not been monetised.

The Bill impacts the Modern Slavery protections that are available to illegal migrants. Under the new Bill, illegal migrants that are referred into the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) and receive a positive Reasonable Grounds (RG) decision will be considered for a public order disqualification decision by the Competent Authorities, primarily the Immigration Enforcement Competent Authority (IECA). If the IECA recruit more decision makers to bring in additional capacity for these decisions, additional Home Office resource costs would result. Further, for potential victims who are subject to the public order disqualification, they will no longer be eligible to receive the recovery period or the accompanying Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract (MSVCC) support as well as the protections from removal that a positive RG decision offers. This removal of protections could lead to a perceived welfare loss for the individuals relocated to a third country who would otherwise be granted support in the UK although this may be mitigated to the extent that the support provided in a third country is comparable. The exact number of individuals impacted is uncertain and will depend on how many illegal entrants into the UK are referred into the NRM. For context, of the 83,236 people that arrived in the UK on small boats between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2022, 7 per cent (6,210 people) were referred to the NRM.

Unintended consequences arising due to the Bill. Some unintended consequences may arise due to changes in illegal migrant behaviour. This may include more unaccompanied children arriving, or more people claiming to be unaccompanied children as it could be perceived that there is a reduced chance of being relocated or that removal may be delayed if in this cohort. If more people claim to

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30 The Green Book (publishing.service.gov.uk) Page 104:

be unaccompanied children, this could potentially increase the volume of age assessments that are required to take place. Another unintended consequence could be that more arrivals may attempt to enter the UK through alternative routes such as hiding in vehicles or making longer journeys by boat to avoid being detained at the point of arrival and therefore increase risk to life and health – the Government has long standing measures to frustrate clandestine arrival by alternative routes, helping to mitigate this risk. Other issues could arise during attempts to relocate arrivals to a third country, for example there may be an increase in the level of disruption observed in detention prior to removal.

85. Certain cohorts of illegal migrants will remain in the UK rather than being relocated to their home country or a safe third country following the case working and legal processes undertaken. These individuals would lead to some costs being incurred. This has not been captured in the monetised costs, which only consider the costs incurred per individual successfully relocated. However, under the Bill these cohorts are expected to be a relatively small minority.

86. New provisions increasing the powers of Immigration Officers to conduct **Mobile Phone Seizures** could require new equipment, infrastructure and software to download and process the data obtained from the phones. These requirements could also have implications on staffing requirements with the need to consider what is found on the phones from a criminal and case working perspective. Training will also be required to enable the delivery of this capability.

**Costs Summary**

87. An estimated unit cost of £169,000 is found for relocating an individual. This is the estimated additional costs incurred relative to processing an individual through the baseline Option 1, which is the current migration system. This cost will only be incurred for people who arrive in the UK illegally. If an individual is deterred from entering the UK illegally than no cost would be incurred. All non-monetised costs should be considered alongside this monetised cost figure when considering the overall cost impacts of the Bill.

88. Costs that are assumed to incur under both the current migration system and under the proposed Bill process have been excluded from this analysis. This includes the initial screening and processing steps when illegal migrants first arrive in the UK. Costs that will only be incurred on individual arrivals if the Bill process is not implemented are captured in this analysis as cost savings and are presented within the benefits section below.

**Table 4: Estimated costs incurred to relocate a migrant to a third country (rounded to nearest £1,000)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Per individual’ cost to relocate</th>
<th>Cost, £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third country cost</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Office resource cost</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight and escorting cost</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention cost</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoJ Cost</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>154,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Optimism Bias                     | 9%      |
| **Total Costs**                   | **169,000** |

Source: Internal Home Office estimates

89. Optimism bias is applied to costs to recognise that appraisers have a systematic tendency to be too optimistic when estimating costs. Each cost has had an assessment on what level of optimism bias should be applied. Overall, a weighted optimism bias rate of approximately 9 per cent has been added. Further detail is provided in Annex B.
BENEFITS

Set-up benefits Ongoing and total benefits

90. This analysis has not attempted to calculate a total benefits figure for the implementation of the Bill. An estimate has been made of the asylum cost savings achieved when a migrant is no longer processed through the current UK asylum and migration system. The monetised cost saving included is the cost saving from support costs that would otherwise have been incurred on that migrant while they were in the UK. There remain cost savings that have not been monetised. It has also not been possible to monetise additional benefits associated with the policy measures within the Bill. Benefits that are identified but cannot be monetised have been assessed qualitatively and included in the benefits section below.

91. There remains uncertainty concerning the behavioural responses that may be seen from individuals. Alternative scenarios to test the sensitivity of the monetised benefits resulting from these changes has been conducted and is presented in the sensitivity analysis section.

Monetised Benefits

92. Costs savings of relocating individuals to safe third countries will be generated because these individuals will not enter the current UK asylum or migration system. Estimating this is highly uncertain.

93. We are using a static figure for the purpose of the IA, based on assumptions drawn from our understanding of the dynamic nature of asylum support cost estimates. We estimate that the monetised benefit from reduced asylum support equates to £106,000 on a per individual basis. Support costs are sensitive to the size of the supported population (intake and outflow), the available accommodation mix, and it’s associated per night cost of that mix.

94. This approximate cost saving per individual relocated to a third country has been estimated using the following assumptions:

- 85 per cent of future illegal arrivals will require accommodation support to be provided.\(^{32}\)
- An estimated per night cost for providing accommodation space of £85.\(^{33}\)
- An estimated time spent in provided accommodation of 4 years whilst an asylum claim is processed and appeals are heard.\(^{34}\)

95. As the support cost is uncertain, and observed costs have often been higher than expected, we have performed a sensitivity test where the per night cost grows at the trend rate that has been observed since the start of the small boat crisis (see graph 2). If this trend continued, then over a 4-year period of time spend in the system the average per night cost would be a discounted cost of £133 per night. Using this forecast average cost, the monetised benefit from reduced asylum support would rise to £165,000 per individual.

96. The per individual removal cost saving benefit is achieved whether an individual is relocated to a third country or if they are deterred from entering the United Kingdom. This means the estimated cost saving per individual is the same regardless on the deterrence level achieved. The impact of altering assumptions used in developing the benefits estimates is explored within the Risks section.

Non-monetised benefits

97. Additional costs savings beyond accommodation support costs are likely to be realised. Illegal migrants removed or deterred, who would otherwise have been granted asylum in the UK, do not incur costs in the UK associated with their resettlement, such as access to UK benefits, local authority support, social housing, integration spending, healthcare, etc. In addition, the accommodation cost savings considered relate primarily to removing adults. There would also be a

\(^{32}\) Internal Home Office Estimate
\(^{33}\) Internal Home Office Data
\(^{34}\) Internal Home Office Data
further reduction in the cost of care-leavers support for local authorities for those individuals who are removed on reaching age 18.

98. Local Authorities state there is a cost associated with supporting asylum seekers in their communities, though we have not been able to establish a generally useable figure. An indicator to the potential LA costs associated with supporting asylum seekers can be drawn from a recent data collection exercise the Home Office performed with LAs. The available data is inconsistent and incomplete, and it is not possible to determine a point estimate, but for illustrative purposes only and on the basis of 6 returns, an indicative range of ‘per asylum seeker per annum costs’ for financial year 2021/22 was £1,800 - £6,000. The figure is not robust enough to use in the monetised appraisal but provides helpful context.

99. Illegal migrants staying in the UK in the absence of this policy will bring other costs to public services, as well as additional demand on existing infrastructure like transport. Estimating these is very complicated and dependant on an individual’s characteristics and how these change through time. The Home Office do not know the net impact on public services of this cohort – the money they contribute (whether this be directly or indirectly) versus the services they consume – and therefore this has not been monetised in this appraisal.

100. The Home Office do have an indication of what a UK national with full access to public services may be provided in a given year. A broad sense of the costs avoided can be established through studying estimates for the yearly expenditure on an average UK working age adult across different public services. These costs are outlined in table 5, and include annual cost estimates for healthcare, personal social services, wider public services, congestible public goods and welfare. Pure public goods are not considered as these are independent of the size of the UK population.

101. Note that it is assumed that migrant adults require no education spend, self-funding any tertiary education activity.

102. Table 5 shows the average per person cost of providing these services. A relocated individual would not put pressure on these services nor incur cost. The value of the cost will differ from the average as the demographics of individuals falling under the remit of the Bill is likely to be considerably different to the average in the UK and change over time. For example, the UK employment rate of asylum migrants is lower than the employment rate of UK-born, even when socio-economic differences between groups have been controlled for (this gap decreases with length of residence in the UK) meaning the welfare figures are likely to be an underestimate. Non-UK nationals tend to have lower health costs than UK nationals, but this varies according to nationality and age. Therefore, estimates of public services for the average UK population cannot be accurately applied to this cohort, and the magnitude of potential cost savings remains uncertain and non-monetised in this appraisal.

103. These costs are annual, and savings would be higher and reflect the years that they would have otherwise remained in the UK.

It is important to note that these figures only reflect the cost saving to the public purse, they do not include the contribution of an individual through direct and indirect taxation. Again this is highly uncertain and would depend on the characteristics and demographics of the individual as well as their right to work.

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35 Note: the term asylum migrants does not refer to asylum seekers, who in most cases do not have the legal right to work in the UK. The categorisation refers to the main motive for coming to the UK as declared by foreign-born respondents on the 2010-2017 Labour Force Survey data: therefore it includes those who have received protection in the UK - ‘refugee status’ - and those who received protection in the UK but have subsequently applied and received permanent settlement or British nationality - officially no longer under refugee status.

Table 5: Fiscal pressure of annual unit estimates for average working-age adult UK National

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal pressure annual unit estimates, £, in 2023/2024 prices</th>
<th>Average working-age adult UK National (20-64)</th>
<th>Example of public services included in category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health(^{37})</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>Medical services, central and other health services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Tertiary education (assumed to be self-funded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services(^{38})</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>Personal social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider public services(^{39})</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>Police services, law courts, prisons, housing development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congestible public goods(^{40})</td>
<td>3,859</td>
<td>Fire protection services, public transport, waste management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare(^{41})</td>
<td>4,178</td>
<td>Disability and injury benefits, income support, family benefits, etc. Excludes pensions, survivors' benefits, and elderly social care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,912</strong></td>
<td><strong>)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See footnotes

104. Cost savings associated with changes to Modern Slavery provisions have also not been included in the monetised benefits. Under the clauses relating to Modern Slavery referrals, individuals referred into the NRM who are subject to the public order disqualification (POD) will no longer be able to receive the recovery period or accompanying Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract (MSVCC) support that a positive RG decision offers. This will result in savings to the MSVCC as the arrival will no longer be supported by the system. If an individual receives an exemption from the POD, they will remain in the NRM and will be able to access MSVCC support. It is expected that the exemption to the POD will be limited and therefore savings will be generated through reduced MSVCC costs. The cost saving from no longer supporting an individual in the MSVCC would depend on whether an individual is in asylum or MSVCC accommodation and can range from an estimated £146 to £403 per week on average.\(^{42}\) From, 2018-2022, around 7 per cent of small boat arrivals were referred into the NRM, although this figure rises considerably among those detained for removal.\(^{43}\)

105. In addition, for individuals who are referred into the NRM but are disqualified on public order grounds, it is not necessary to make a Conclusive Grounds (CG) decision. Depending on how the policy is implemented operationally, this could reduce staffing resource requirements for the IECA or waiting times for other decisions.

106. If the Bill has its desired impact, people will be less likely to attempt to make the dangerous journey across the channel to arrive to the UK as they would be classed as inadmissible and be subject to removal to a safe third country upon arrival. Reducing the number of journeys across the channel

\(^{37}\) Healthcare estimates are derived based on a variety of sources including, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) data, OBR data, DHSC assumptions and ONS population data

\(^{38}\) Personal social service estimates are derived based on Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) data and ONS population data

\(^{39}\) Wider public services and Congestible public goods estimates are based on Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) data, ONS population data and assumptions on categorising government expenditure

\(^{40}\) Wider public services and Congestible public goods estimates are based on Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) data, ONS population data and assumptions on categorising government expenditure

\(^{41}\) This figure is an indicative estimate calculated by taking total 2016-17 UK welfare spend, excluding pensions, survivors benefits and elderly social care, and dividing it by the total UK working age population at the time, uprated to 2023-24 prices. This was not an official estimate, and is produced for the illustrative requirements here only. ‘How is the welfare budget spent’, March 2016, ONS: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/articles/howisthewelfarebudgetspent/2016-03-16

LFS: Population aged 16-64, ONS: https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/timeseries/lfs2o/lms

\(^{42}\) Internal Home Office Estimate

could reduce the risk of lives lost at sea. Reducing the number of journeys would also reduce the market for people smuggling services and help to frustrate the operations of organised crime groups associated with people smuggling across the English Channel.

107. If the Bill has its desired effect on deterrence, it is also assumed that there will be fewer detected illegal arrivals arriving in the UK. If a migrant was to arrive without the Bill having been implemented, casework would still need to be completed. The additional resource time spent on this activity will be avoided if the intended deterrence impact is achieved. Depending on the appeals and decisions process, there may also be justice system costs avoided, Home Office legal team costs avoided, and additional costs associated with returning individuals to either their country of origin or country the migrant travelled through for which the UK has a returns agreement.

The UK works closely with France in tackling illegal migration and committed more than £230 million to France between 2014 and the end of financial year 2022/23. Deterring illegal migrants from using this route might reduce the requirement for future funding.44

108. There may be perceived disbenefits on individual welfare for migrating individuals that will no longer receive asylum support from the UK.

Benefits Summary

109. An estimated unit cost saving of £106,000 is found for relocating an individual as a result of asylum cost savings.45 The non-monetised benefits should be considered alongside the benefits that have been possible to monetise to accurately capture the potential benefits of the Bill.

110. For the sensitivity analysis of a continuing trend increase in per person accommodation costs the unit cost saving is estimated to be £165,000.

111. A summary of the impacts of the Bill specific to its stated policy objectives are provided below.

Objective 1: Deter illegal entry into the UK

112. Any deterrence achieved by the Bill would reduce the volumes of arrivals progressing through the new Bill process, as well as reduce the volumes of arrivals that interact with other elements of the asylum process, such as unaccompanied children (UC) and those otherwise exempt from removal to a safe country. Any achieved deterrence will lead to reductions in the cost of delivering the Bill process.

Objective 2: Break the business model of the people smugglers and save lives

113. Successful implementation of the Bill aims to deter illegal entry, and in doing so reduce the number of individuals making the dangerous journey across the channel in small boats. This would lead to improved welfare outcomes for those individuals as they would no longer risk losing their lives at sea. Breaking the business model of people smugglers would reduce the strength of international organised crime groups.

Objective 3: Promptly remove those with no legal right to remain in the UK

114. The Bill legislates for a prompter removal of those with no right to remain. This would lead to cost savings from having fewer individuals supported in the asylum and modern slavery system, a quicker returns process. There would be additional benefits from promptly removing those without a legal right to remain, such as reduced pressure on public services.

Objective 4: set an annual cap on the number of people to be admitted to the UK for resettlement through safe and legal asylum routes

115. By setting an annual cap this should reduce the inflow of people entering the UK and therefore reduce the cost associated with processing asylum claims. A secondary benefit of setting an annual

44 Irregular migration: A timeline of UK-French co-operation - House of Commons Library (parliament.uk):
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9681/#:~:text=It%20consists%20of%20%E2%80%9Csubstantial,184%20million)%20for%202025%20F26

45 This figure does not include any cost savings to the MSVCC, as not all illegal entrants are referred to the NRM as potential victims of Modern Slavery, and not all those who are referred enter MSVCC support.
cap is the promotion of safe and legal routes to the UK as this may help encourage those with a right
to come to the UK to do so via legal means rather than making the dangerous journey of attempting
to enter the UK illegally. This will help demonstrate that the UK maintains a fair asylum and migration
process. The Home Office is obligated to ensure public confidence in the system and to increase the
fairness and integrity of the UK asylum system ensuring that only people who have a right to come
to the UK are able to remain.

NPSV, BNPV, EANDCB

116. The Net Present Social Value (NPSV) is an estimate of the present value of benefits minus the
present value of costs. This appraisal has not attempted to estimate total costs or benefits of the
proposal as there are critical unknowns regarding the implementation plans for the Bill process
therefore does not provide a NPSV.

117. The Equivalent Annual Direct Cost to Business (EANDCB) is a monetised estimate of the
administrative burden on business from regulation. It is monitored across government by the
Regulatory Policy Committee. The Bill will not impose any direct additional burden on businesses
and therefore the assessment gives an EANDCB of zero.

118. Business Net Present Value (BNPV) includes not only direct impact on businesses but also indirect
impacts. The Bill provides requirement on government to acquire additional services from
businesses. The requirement for additional services from business because of the Bill does not
represent a change in the administrative burden falling on business, either direct or indirect.

119. It is prudent to identify the potential changes in services that may be acquired from business by
government in enacting the Bill. Whether more or less of these services will be required is dependent
on the degree to which the Bill deters new arrivals. If the number of arrivals falls sufficiently following
Bill implementation, then less services will be acquired by government from businesses. Conversely
if arrival numbers do not fall sufficiently, more services will be acquired by government.

120. It is probable there will be changes in service provision that the Home Office requires following the
implementation of the Bill. This will include changes in:

- Escorting contracts with private escorting services
- Private medical contracts for medical assessments
- The quantity of removal flights required

121. It is probable there will be changes in service provision that the MoJ requires following the
implementation of the Bill. This will include changes in:

- The provision of legal help and legal aid services on behalf of individuals who are subject to
  the Bill process.
- The employment of judges, lawyers and court space to allow legal consideration of individual
cases.

Value for money (VfM)

122. It has not been possible to undertake a full VfM assessment of the Bill using a NPSV approach.
Instead, an assessment has been undertaken which attempts to capture the expected costs and
benefits of relocating a single individual migrant.

123. The analysis does not attempt to forecast volumes or apply the unit costs and benefits to volumes
across appraisal years. The analysis does not attempt to monetise implementation costs for the Bill,
as detailed work on implementation plans are yet to be finalised and agreed across government
departments. Alongside this partial analysis a qualitative review of additional potential non-
monetisable costs and benefits is provided.

124. The cost of processing an individual through the Bill process has been estimated in this analysis as
£169,000. The cost saving achieved because a relocated individual no longer requires
accommodation support while being processed through the current UK migration system is
125. A main aim of the Bill is to deter individuals from arriving in the UK illegally. If an individual is deterred from arriving illegally in the UK there would be no 'per individual' cost associated with that deterrence, whilst the cost saving benefit estimated at £106,000 would still be achieved. This means a net incremental benefit of £106,000 would be achieved if an individual is deterred from entering the UK illegally.

126. The net benefit per individual achieved in both the removal of an individual and the deterrence of an individual is shown below in table 6.

Table 6: Estimated net cost per individual relocated to a third country (rounded to nearest £1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Relocated</th>
<th>Individual Deterred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable cost per individual</td>
<td>-169,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable cost saving per individual</td>
<td>106,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net variable benefit per individual</td>
<td>-63,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Internal Home Office estimates

127. Given the uncertainty around the deterrence impact, the analysis in this impact assessment has tested the sensitivity of the appraisal to a wide range of deterrence impacts that could be observed in order to estimate the range of potential costs or benefits that might be incurred. This approach should not be taken to imply there is any greater likelihood of any particular outcome, as that is not known, and should only be considered as an illustrative figure for different levels of deterrence.

128. A hypothetical scenario of applying the Bill process to one thousand individuals is presented in table 7. If one thousand individuals arrive and are relocated, a net incremental cost of £63 million is incurred in processing those individuals. If one thousand individuals are deterred, a net benefit of £106 million is achieved. Table 7 presents the net incremental cost or net incremental benefit achieved at various levels of deterrence in between these two end-point scenarios.

129. This simplified partial benefit analysis does not capture any of the non-monetised costs and benefits described above. The values, therefore, are indicative of a zero set-up cost and zero-non-monetised cost and benefit world. The deterrence percentages are therefore only indicative figures but serve to indicate that at some level of deterrence VfM is likely to break-even, here the break-even point is calculated to be at 37 per cent deterrence.

Table 7: Estimated net cost for one thousand individuals under the Bill process achieved under different levels of deterrence (£,000's, rounded to nearest £1 million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deterrence percentage</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>40%</th>
<th>60%</th>
<th>80%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total variable costs</td>
<td>169,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total variable benefits</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>106,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total net variable benefit</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>106,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Internal Home Office estimates

130. In addition to the non-monetised costs and benefits, and the uncertainties in the unit cost inputs, it should also be noted that the cost per removal is unlikely to remain the same for every additional removal. For example, there may be higher unit costs when relocating the first few individuals, whilst economies of scale may mean relocating additional individuals could become less expensive. This analysis presents only one unit value estimate and therefore is unlikely to be accurate, particularly
when applied to either very small or very large volumes of removals. Additionally, costs per individual may differ for different individuals with different needs, for example families with children.

Place-based analysis

131. The location of any potential additional detention centres has not been defined and so cannot be assessed. Individuals in detention require access to legal aid, and legal aid services are more easily available in London and the South East. The location of any detention centres would need to consider whether legal help and legal aid provisions can be provided to individuals in that location and how the legal advice could be delivered.

Impact on small and micro-businesses (SMBs)

132. There are no new administrative burdens being placed on businesses, including on SMBs. The impact on businesses is a change in the level of service provision that the government acquires from the private sector. Whether the provision of services goes up or down will depend on the degree to which the Bill deters migrants from arriving illegally in the future. There is potential that larger businesses are more able to adjust to changes in government demand for services. For example, larger law firms may find it easier to pivot and provide legal services following the change in legal migration processes than smaller businesses.

F. Risks

133. Additional analysis has been undertaken to test the sensitivity of the analysis to changes in certain assumptions that have been made in estimating the costs and benefits. Changing the costs and/or benefits changes the level of deterrence that would be required for the net cost of removing an individual to be zero – or the level of deterrence required for the policy to break-even in monetised cost and benefit terms. Table 8 describes the alternative scenarios run and the impacts these changes have.

134. The incremental ‘per individual’ cost incurred because of payment required to the recipient third country is uncertain, with a proxy of £105,000 used in the core analysis. If this cost is increased by 20 per cent, the level of deterrence that achieves a net incremental cost of zero increases to 44 per cent. If this cost is decreased by 20 per cent, the level of deterrence that achieves a net incremental cost of zero falls to 28 per cent.

135. The cost saving benefit of the Bill is calculated as assuming that, on average, an individual would otherwise have an 85 per cent chance of needing support, and that support would be for four years (approximating an average time on support), at an average nightly cost of £85.

136. If UK asylum processes are improved, the average time under support for individuals would reduce in the counterfactual. If the average time needing support reduced to three years, the level of deterrence that achieves a net incremental benefit of zero increases to 52 per cent. This is because the support costs avoided because of removal are now reduced. If the average time claiming support increased from four years to five years, the level of deterrence that achieves a net incremental benefit of zero falls to 23 per cent. This is because the support costs avoided because of removal are now increased.

137. The incremental ‘per individual’ cost incurred for flights is estimated by assuming 50 individuals per flight. This is an uncertain assumption; it could be the case that on average there will be fewer individuals on each flight. The sensitivity finds that if the average number of individuals on a flight is reduced from 50 per flight to 25 per flight, the level of deterrence that achieves a net incremental benefit of zero increase to 43 per cent. Additionally, it could be the case that on average there will be more individuals on each flight. The sensitivity finds that if the average number of individuals on a flight is increased from 50 per flight to 75 per flight, the level of deterrence that achieves a net incremental benefit of zero increase to 35 per cent.

138. The average nightly cost of accommodation for those on support is assumed to be £85. If this continued to grow at the trend rate observed since the start of the small boat crisis it would represent an average discounted cost of £160 per night. This would increase the cost of supporting people in
the counterfactual above the cost of removal and shift the deterrence rate required for a positive NPV to zero.

Table 8: Sensitivity analysis for alternative scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario no.</th>
<th>Scenario description</th>
<th>Deterrence rate needed for incremental net benefit of zero per individual relocated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Recipient third country costs increase 20% from £105,000 to £126,000</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Recipient third country costs decrease 20% from £105,000 to £84,000</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Average time an individual would spend on support in the absence of the Bill reduced from four years to three years</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Average time an individual would spend on support in the absence of the Bill increase from four years to five years</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Average number of individuals on a flight is reduced from 50 per flight to 25 per flight</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Average number of individuals on a flight is increased from 50 per flight to 75 per flight</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Accommodation costs continue to grow at trend observed since 2020</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Internal Home Office Estimates

139. There are several further risks and uncertainties that have been identified but are not captured in the sensitivity analysis.

140. The analysis assumes detaining individuals when applying the Bill process. Constraints on capacity limiting the number of migrants that either the UK asylum system can process or the number of migrants the asylum system of recipient third countries can process, could mean the policy is applied to a proportion of intake rather than all arrivals. This could lead to additional costs associated with bailing individuals and providing non-detained accommodation, a reduced deterrent effect observed and further process issues such as migrants absconding whilst not detained.

141. Reaching removal agreements with recipient third countries may incur additional costs to facilitate agreement and set-up. The only current return agreement with a third country is with the Government of Rwanda (GoR). Agreed and paid as part of the MEDP Programme with GoR has been a total of £120 million in development funding and a further £20 million upfront payment towards accommodation, processing, and integration.\(^46\) Any agreements made with additional countries may incur similar costs, which have not been monetised in this IA. Additionally, if there are further agreements with other third countries then a risk remains that additional year one set-up costs will be expensed back to the UK.

142. **Opportunity cost.** The Home Office and supporting departments may instead choose to use current available resource and reprioritise activities to deliver the actions required under the Bill. This is known as an opportunity cost, the value lost by diverting resources away from the alternative use. In this scenario there will be an opportunity cost incurred for the actions or processes that can no longer be completed because of the reprioritisation. The extent to which reprioritisation will occur is not currently known but could include the slowing down of other migration related casework. Implementation costs could also be measured as opportunity costs if rather than incurring upfront

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\(^46\) UK-Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership report [https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9568/](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9568/)
cost to increase capital spend, current capital assets were used to implement the Bill. These costs are measured at market prices but this may pose a risk that other Home Office work will be diverted which may have an opportunity cost that is not accurately reflected by the market price.

143. There is a risk that the proportion of illegal entrants referred into the NRM could increase if more people are detained for removal as a result of the Bill. Small boat arrivals data indicates that between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2022, 7 per cent of arrivals were referred to the NRM.\textsuperscript{47} However, data also indicates that a higher proportion of people were referred to the NRM after being detained for return following arrival on a small boat (65 per cent from January to September 2022).\textsuperscript{48} If more people are detained for removal following the introduction of the Bill and the referral rate into the NRM was to increase, this would result in an increased number of RG and POD decisions required and, potentially, an increase in people entering the MSVCC.

144. The analysis has not been able to consider the impacts or interactions of other immigration and asylum policy changes, for example the remaining policies introduced as part of NABA 2022 that are yet to be fully delivered and operationalised.

G. Direct costs and benefits to business calculations

145. Equivalent Annual Net Direct Costs to Business measures the annualised value of the present value of net (direct) costs to business. There are no direct costs to business. The Business NPV Measures the total discounted net value to business (direct/indirect benefits – costs) over a given appraisal period. There are no direct or indirect costs to business.

H. Wider impacts

146. The main aim of the Bill is to deter illegal entry into the UK and reform the UK’s approach to illegal migration. By doing so there may be wider positive impacts as a result of the implementation of the Bill. These wider impacts could include, but are not limited to:

- A reduction in people smuggling by criminal organisations.
- A reduction in the size of the illegal employment labour pool and reduced crime related to people smuggling. If the Bill leads to displacement of individuals into other UK inbound routes rather than deterrence, there is the possibility of increases in the size of the illegal employment labour pool. There are some measures in place to mitigate impacts (see para 61).
- A reduction in migrant deaths while attempting to enter the UK illegally, depending on displacement effects.
- Improved integration outcomes through safe and legal asylum routes.
- A possible change in greenhouse gas emissions, though an environmental analysis has not been undertaken to assess the carbon implications of the policy.
- A possible reduction in the number of unaccompanied children entering local authority care as looked after children if the numbers of such children entering the UK reduce.

I. Trade Impact

147. The Bill is not expected to directly impact the UK’s overseas trade and investment. The Home Office does not expect there to be any impacts which require notification to the World Trade Organisation, nor are there expected to be any measures in place to treat UK and overseas businesses differently.

J. Monitoring and evaluation plan

148. The Home Office will monitor and evaluate the Illegal Migration Bill and is establishing a monitoring and evaluation strategy with programme stakeholders. The programme monitoring will involve collecting and analysing data from a range of indicators to monitor whether the measures introduced are meeting the objectives set. Evaluation will be conducted in line with HM Treasury Magenta Book\(^49\) principles to provide detailed insight on the process, impact and value for money of changes implemented and will be integrated into the delivery of the Bill.

### K. Annexes

**Annex A: Detailed assumptions**

**Table 9: Assumptions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Plain English Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Third country cost</td>
<td>Processing cost assumed equal to the Syrian resettlement 5 year cost per refugee, uplifted from 2016/17 prices to 2023/24 prices, £105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Flight and escorting cost</td>
<td>Assumed that there will be 50 individuals per flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Flight and escorting cost</td>
<td>Each individual will need three in-country journeys, each requiring one escort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>Detention run costs assumed equal to costs estimated for the new Campsfield and Haslar build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Detention</td>
<td>Detention days required per individual is 40 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Legal Aid cost per individual is £1,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Resourcing</td>
<td>A full-time equivalent cost of £68,000 is used for all resourcing. This includes an estimate for overhead costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Resourcing</td>
<td>Internal Home Office estimate of resourcing required for returns logistics, returns command, case working, and enforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Asylum Benefits</td>
<td>Average time spent in the asylum system if the new Bill process is not implemented and individuals revert to current process is assumed to be 4 years. This is an internal Home Office estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Asylum Benefits</td>
<td>Average daily accommodation cost and support in the current asylum system is assumed to be £85 per person per night. This is an internal Home Office estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Asylum Benefits</td>
<td>Average support rate for those individuals who fall under the new Bill process is assumed to be 85%. This is an internal Home Office estimate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office internal estimates
Annex B: Optimism Bias Assessment

149. Consideration was given to each cost element regarding the level of certainty in the estimate. Where the cost was known, or a proxy, no optimism bias was applied. Where costs were well understood, but some unknowns remained, such as exact implementation, an optimism bias of 20 per cent was applied. Where costs are fairly well understood, but there remains a number of unknowns, an optimism bias of 40 per cent was applied.

### Table 10: Optimism Bias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Optimism Bias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third country cost</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Office resource cost</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight and escorting cost</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detention cost</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoJ Cost</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weighted total Optimism Bias</strong></td>
<td><strong>9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office internal estimates
# Impact Assessment Checklist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandatory specific impact test - Statutory Equalities Duties</th>
<th>Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## Statutory Equalities Duties

The public sector equality duty requires public bodies to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good relations in the course of developing policies and delivering services.  


Schedule 18 to the 2010 Act sets out exceptions to the PSED. In relation to the exercise of immigration and nationality functions, section 149(1)(b) – advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it – does not apply to the protected characteristics of age, race (insofar as it relates to nationality or ethnic or national origins) or religion or belief.

A full Equality Impact Assessment has been completed.^50^  

The SRO has agreed these summary findings.

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The impact assessment checklist provides a comprehensive list of specific impact tests and policy considerations (as of February 2021). Where an element of the checklist is relevant to the policy, the appropriate advice or guidance should be followed. Where an element of the checklist is not applied, consider whether the reasons for this decision should be recorded as part of the impact assessment and reference the relevant page number or annex in the checklist below. Any test not applied can be deleted except the **Equality Statement**, where the policy lead must provide a paragraph of summary information on this.

The checklist should be used in addition to HM Treasury’s **Green Book guidance** on appraisal and evaluation in central government (Green Book, 2020).

The Home Office requires the **Specific Impact Test on the Equality Statement** to have a summary paragraph, stating the main points. **You cannot delete this and it MUST be completed.**

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[^50]: Equality Impact Assessment - Illegal Migration Bill;  
### Economic Impact Tests – if these apply, insert a summary paragraph

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does your policy option/proposal consider…?</th>
<th>Yes/No (page)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business Impact Target</strong>&lt;br&gt;The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (s. 21-23) creates a requirement to assess the economic impacts of qualifying regulatory provisions on the activities of business and civil society organisations. [Better Regulation Framework Manual] or [Check with the Home Office Better Regulation Unit]</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Review clauses</strong>&lt;br&gt;The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (s. 28) creates a duty to include a review clause in secondary legislation containing regulations that impact business or civil society organisations. [Check with the Home Office Better Regulation Unit]</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small and Micro-business Assessment (SaMBA)</strong>&lt;br&gt;The SaMBA is a Better Regulation requirement intended to ensure that all new regulatory proposals are designed and implemented so as to mitigate disproportionate burdens. The SaMBA must be applied to all domestic measures that regulate business and civil society organisations, unless they qualify for the fast track. [Better Regulation Framework Manual] or [Check with the Home Office Better Regulation Unit]</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clarity of legislation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Introducing new legislation provides an opportunity to improve the clarity of existing legislation. Legislation with multiple amendments should be consolidated, and redundant legislation removed, where it is proportionate to do so.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Authority</strong>&lt;br&gt;Any new Government legislation which is to be enforced by local authorities will need to demonstrate consideration for the inclusion of Primary Authority, and give a rationale for any exclusion, in order to obtain Cabinet Committee clearance. [Primary Authority: A Guide for Officials]</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Burdens Doctrine</strong>&lt;br&gt;The new burdens doctrine is part of a suite of measures to ensure Council Tax payers do not face excessive increases. It requires all Whitehall departments to justify why new duties, powers, targets and other bureaucratic burdens should be placed on local authorities, as well as how much these policies and initiatives will cost and where the money will come from to pay for them. [New burdens doctrine: guidance for government departments]</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competition</strong>&lt;br&gt;The Competition guidance provides an overview of when and how policymakers can consider the competition implications of their proposals, including understanding whether a detailed competition assessment is necessary. [Government In Markets Guidance]</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Social Impact Tests

| **New Criminal Offence Proposals**<br>Proposed new criminal offences will need to be agreed with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) at an early stage. The Justice Impact Test (see below) should be completed for all such proposals and agreement reached with MOJ before writing to Home Affairs Committee (HAC) for clearance. Please allow 3-4 weeks for your proposals to be considered. | No |
### Justice Impact Test
The justice impact test is a mandatory specific impact test, as part of the impact assessment process that considers the impact of government policy and legislative proposals on the justice system. [Justice Impact Test Guidance]

| Yes |

### Privacy Impacts
A Privacy Impact Assessment supports an assessment of the privacy risks to individuals in the collection, use and disclosure of information. [Privacy Impact Assessment Guidance] or [Contact the Corporate Security Information Assurance Team Helpline on 020 7035 4969]

| Yes |

### Family Test
The objective of the test is to introduce a family perspective to the policy making process. It will ensure that policy makers recognise and make explicit the potential impacts on family relationships in the process of developing and agreeing new policy. [Family Test Guidance]

| N/A |

### Powers of Entry
A Home Office-led gateway has been set up to consider proposals for new powers of entry, to prevent the creation of needless powers, reduce unnecessary intrusion into people’s homes and to minimise disruption to businesses. [Powers of Entry Guidance]

| N/A |

### Health Impact Assessment of Government Policy
The Health Impact Assessment is a means of developing better, evidenced-based policy by careful consideration of the impact on the health of the population. [Health Impact Assessment Guidance]

| N/A |

### Environmental Impact Tests

#### Environmental Impacts
The purpose of the environmental impact guidance is to provide guidance and supporting material to enable departments to understand and quantify, where possible in monetary terms, the wider environmental consequences of their proposals. [Environmental Impact Assessment Guidance]

| N/A |

#### Sustainable Development Impacts
Guidance for policy officials to enable government departments to identify key sustainable development impacts of their policy options. *This test includes the Environmental Impact test cited above.* [Sustainable Development Impact Test]

| N/A |

#### Rural Proofing
Guidance for policy officials to ensure that the needs of rural people, communities and businesses are properly considered. [Rural Proofing Guidance]

| N/A |