

CMA Economic Research Strategy

Microeconomics Unit

8 March 2023

CMA178



© Crown copyright 2023

You may reuse this information (not including logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence.

To view this licence, visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: psi@nationalarchives.gov.uk.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
1. Purpose of the research strategy	2
2. Why do research at the CMA?	4
3. Research to date.....	5
4. Areas of research interest, 2023-2025.....	6
5. Research governance.....	15

1. Purpose of the research strategy

- 1.1 The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)'s purpose is to help people, businesses and the UK economy by promoting competitive markets and tackling unfair behaviour. Ongoing research means that the state of knowledge on competition, innovation and consumer welfare is constantly evolving. This strategy sets out:
 - why it is essential that the CMA should engage in economic research,
 - what areas of research are of particular interest in the medium term, and
 - how the CMA will initiate, conduct, and disseminate research to ensure maximum benefit to the organisation, wider government, and the public.
- 1.2 The CMA has established a new Microeconomics Unit, based at the Darlington Economic Campus, to lead and expand its economic research function. The creation of a new, separate unit demonstrates the CMA's and the government's belief in the importance of independent, open-access, collaborative research in informing evidence-based policy.
- 1.3 This research strategy covers the CMA's novel, explorative analysis to be published externally and aimed at contributing to the academic, policy and public debate of open issues related to competition and productivity. Regular CMA analysis underpinning casework, such as market research and market studies, continue to be governed by existing governance structures and principles. Likewise, other parts of the CMA might also carry out economic research to inform their work, outside of this strategy.
- 1.4 The CMA's economic research also sits alongside existing data science and behavioural research functions housed in our Data, Technology and Analytics (DaTA) Unit. The Microeconomics Unit and the DaTA Unit are separate units with separate research interests and strategies but will cooperate closely on any issues of mutual interest (for instance, the economics of data).
- 1.5 The Office for the Internal Market similarly conducts economic research on the effectiveness of the operation of the UK's internal market and the Microeconomics Unit and the OIM will cooperate closely on matters relating to the competition aspects of this work.
- 1.6 The CMA has published this economic research strategy to ensure transparency about our research interests, practices, and outputs, and to enable stakeholders and potential collaborators to understand how best to work with us and how to access CMA research outputs.

- 1.7 Setting out this research strategy puts the CMA in line with many similar institutions in the United Kingdom (such as the Bank of England, the Financial Conduct Authority, and the Office for National Statistics) and abroad (such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the US Federal Trade Commission, the EU Directorate General for Competition, and the US Federal Reserve system) with similar principles to guide their research activities.
- 1.8 The CMA Microeconomics Unit can be contacted at MicroeconomicsUnit@cma.gov.uk

2. Why do research at the CMA?

- 2.1 There are three reasons to do economic research in the Competition and Markets Authority. First, competition, innovation and productivity are vitally important to the work of the CMA and wider government, and critical to UK economic growth. Therefore, the CMA has established the Microeconomics Unit to provide economic expertise on these issues.¹
- 2.2 Second, economic research ensures that the CMA is abreast of emerging issues in industrial economics and is as effective as possible in helping people, businesses and the UK economy by promoting competitive markets and tackling unfair behaviour. For instance, issues of common ownership, labour market monopsony, killer acquisitions and the link between market concentration and political lobbying are active areas of academic debate and could have significant implications for the types of cases the CMA pursues, and how it builds a theory of harm. An active research function improves the analysis conducted in the core casework of the CMA by exposing colleagues throughout the organisation to cutting-edge thinking and methods, attracting high-quality staff and providing the organisation with a deep pool of knowledge to draw on as required in particular cases. It also enables us to access resources and funding outside the organisation, allowing the CMA to provide better value for public money.
- 2.3 Third, an active economic research function allows the CMA to engage in the wider regulatory debate and to influence competition policy in the UK and globally. By anticipating emerging competition issues and leading innovative thinking on remedies, the CMA can leverage its resources to play an outsized role in global competition economics.

¹ The Penrose report recommended that the CMA should become “a microeconomic sibling for the Bank of England’s well established public macroeconomic role”. (Penrose, 2021, p.15)
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/power-to-the-people-independent-report-on-competition-policy>

3. Research to date

- 3.1 The Competition and Markets Authority already has a small economic research function, to date conducted within the Office of the Chief Economic Advisor. This includes:
- (a) The State of UK Competition Report – our regular assessment of how well competition is working in the UK and what this means for people and businesses²
 - (b) The Annual Positive Impact Assessment – our report on the expected direct financial benefits to consumers of the CMA’s work, and assessment against our target of delivering benefits at least ten times our relevant costs to the taxpayer³
 - (c) Ex-post studies of interventions (e.g., the Lear Report on merger control decisions in digital markets,⁴ the impact of BAA divestments⁵)
 - (d) Ad-hoc research studies (e.g., a 2015 study on the effect of competition policy on productivity,⁶ a study of the effects of algorithms on pricing⁷)
- 3.2 These regular outputs will continue to be part of the CMA’s published work. The State of UK Competition report in particular has already proved to be an important part of the public debate, and we aim to build on it.
- 3.3 However, the ambition set out in this document is to collaborate with partners across government and the wider research community to deliver a broad, consistent, and high-quality stream of relevant research to support the competition and other work of the CMA and wider government work on topics around investment, innovation, competition, and productivity.

² <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-of-uk-competition-report-2022>

³ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cma-impact-assessment-2021-to-2022>

⁴ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/assessment-of-merger-control-decisions-in-digital-markets>

⁵ <https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/baa-airports-evaluation-of-remedies>

⁶ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/productivity-and-competition-a-summary-of-the-evidence>

⁷ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/algorithms-how-they-can-reduce-competition-and-harm-consumers>

4. Areas of research interest, 2023-2025

- 4.1 This research strategy aims to cover issues in competition, investment, innovation and productivity. In consultation with stakeholders across government and independent experts, the Competition and Markets Authority has identified a series of high-level topics of interest to guide staff research and external collaborations.
- 4.2 Within these areas of interest, the CMA supports the development of new methods and data, theoretical contributions and empirical, econometric work that provides new causal estimates on open questions within the broader remit of the CMA.
- 4.3 These areas of research interest aim to guide work of CMA staff and to inform potential collaborators. Progress towards these priorities will depend on available resources and emerging areas of policy interest. The CMA will review and revise its areas of interest regularly to ensure its economic research function still serves the goals outlined in this strategy.
- 4.4 Each area of interest contains a list of recent papers relevant to the research interests of the CMA. The list is indicative only and does not mean to provide a full review of the literature on the topic. A paper citation should not be taken as an endorsement of its conclusions by the CMA.

Innovation, investment, and productivity

- 4.5 The UK productivity puzzle in recent decades is well documented, as is the degree to which investment and innovation activity has fallen since at least 2008. The causes behind these trends are however less well understood. Relevant research topics include:
 - Improved measurement of innovation inputs, outputs, and outcomes beyond patents
 - Theoretical and empirical research on the link between competition and productivity
 - Research on the drivers of investment (especially in intangibles), including market structure

4.6 Recent articles of interest in this area include:

- Philippe Aghion, Antoine Bergeaud and John Van Reenen, “The Impact of Regulation on Innovation” [Working Paper](#) (2022).⁸
- Carol Corrado, Jonathan Haskel, Cecilia Jona-Lasinio and Massimiliano Iommi, “Intangible Capital and Modern Economies”, [Journal of Economic Perspectives](#) (2022).⁹
- Nicolas Crouzet and Janice Eberly, “Understanding Weak Capital Investment: The Role of Market Concentration and Intangibles”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2019).¹⁰
- Maarten De Ridder, “Market Power and Innovation in the Intangible Economy”, [Working Paper](#) (2021).¹¹
- Xiang Ding, Teresa Fort, Stephen Redding and Peter Schott, “Structural Change Within Versus Across Firms: Evidence from the United States”, [Working Paper](#) (2022).¹²
- Enrico Moretti, Claudia Steinwender and John Van Reenen, “The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense R&D, Productivity and International Spillovers”, [Working Paper](#) (2021).¹³

Understanding markets and market power in the aggregate

4.7 A primary aim of the new CMA Microeconomics Unit and this research strategy is to better understand the causes and consequences of market power in the economy as a whole. This requires better data on market and substitution patterns, and a better understanding of the relationship between market structure, technological fundamentals, and market power. Relevant research topics include:

- New data or methods to measure markets and substitution patterns
- Improved data or methods for production function estimation

⁸ <https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1744.pdf>

⁹ <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.36.3.3>

¹⁰ <https://www.nber.org/papers/w25869>

¹¹ http://www.maartenderidder.com/uploads/6/2/2/3/6223410/maarten_de_ridder_jmp.pdf

¹² <https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1852.pdf>

¹³ <https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1662.pdf>

- Research on drivers of economy-wide trends in market power

4.8 Recent articles of interest in this area include:

- Pauline Affeldt, Tommaso Duso, Klaus Peter Gugler and Joanna Piechucka, “Market Concentration in Europe: Evidence from Antitrust Markets”, [Working Paper](#) (2021).¹⁴
- Lanier Benkard, Ali Yurukoglu and Anthony Lee Zhang, “Concentration in Product Markets”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2021).¹⁵
- Andrea Chiavari, “The Macroeconomics of Rising Returns to Scale: Customer Acquisition, Markups, and Dynamism”, [Working Paper](#) (2021).¹⁶
- Joel Kariel and Anthony Savagar, “Returns to Scale and Productivity in the Macroeconomy”, [Working Paper](#) (2022).¹⁷
- Spencer Yongwook Kwon, Yueran Ma and Kaspar Zimmermann, “100 Years of Rising Corporate Concentration”, [Working Paper](#) (2022).¹⁸
- Bruno Pellegrino, “Product Differentiation and Oligopoly: a Network Approach”, [Working Paper](#) (2022).¹⁹

Data, platforms and digital markets

4.9 Digital markets and platforms sit at the heart of the modern intangible-heavy service economy. Data has the potential to drive both consumer-serving innovation and to entrench market incumbents. Competition authorities are grappling with the implications of these competing forces for policy. Relevant research topics include:

- Implications of platform structure and contractual arrangements for welfare
- Theoretical and empirical research into digital platform ecosystems
- The economics of privacy regulation and the value of data for firms and consumers

¹⁴ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3783914

¹⁵ https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28745/w28745.pdf

¹⁶ https://603d026c-46f3-4771-9249-ce1824ccd6c3.filesusr.com/ugd/200766_c7aa82853b8b4f38b7eff5f24ece5f3e.pdf

¹⁷ https://www.joelkariel.com/publication/returns_to_scale/returns_to_scale.pdf

¹⁸ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3936799

¹⁹ https://www.dropbox.com/s/tnd0709mxkyakq6/JMP_draft_2nd_round.pdf?dl=0

4.10 Recent articles of interest in this area include:

- Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow and Lena Song, “Digital Addiction”, [American Economic Review](#) (2022).²⁰
- Guy Aridor, Yeon-Koo Che and Tobias Salz, “The Economic Consequences of Data Privacy Regulation: Empirical Evidence from GDPR”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2020).²¹
- Martin Beraja, David Yang and Noam Yuchtman, “Data-Intensive Innovation and the State: Evidence from AI Firms in China”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2020).²²
- Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Tan Gan, “The Economics of Social Data”, [Working Paper](#) (2022).²³
- Gregory Crawford, Matteo Courthoud, Regina Seibel and Simon Zuzek, “Amazon Entry on Amazon Marketplace”, [Working Paper](#) (2022).²⁴
- Brian McManus, Aviv Nevo, Zachary Nolan and Jonathan Williams, “The Steering Incentives of Gatekeepers in the Telecommunications Industry”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2022).²⁵

Supply chains, monopsony and labour markets

4.11 Traditionally, competition authorities have focused on horizontal product market competition. Market structure may also influence supply chains, including their resilience in the face of unanticipated shocks. Market power may also take the form of monopsony in labour or other input markets, distorting employment and investment choices and harming consumers welfare. Relevant research topics include:

- Supply chain structure, monopsony power in input markets and resilience to shocks
- Measuring labour markets, measuring search frictions, and estimating labour market power

²⁰ <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20210867>

²¹ https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26900/revisions/w26900.rev0.pdf?sy=900

²² <https://www.nber.org/papers/w27723>

²³ <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.03107.pdf>

²⁴ https://www.econ.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:f31caa9d-9a59-47c1-bdc6-3c35c55f499e/crawford_etal_CEPR_DP17531.pdf

²⁵ <https://www.nber.org/papers/w30399>

- Theoretical and empirical research on the role of labour unions and other institutions

4.12 Recent articles of interest in this area include:

- Jose Azar, Steve Berry and Ioanna Marinescu, “Estimating Labor Market Power”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2022).²⁶
- Vasco Carvalho, Makoto Nirei, Yukiko Saito and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, “Supply Chain Disruptions: Evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake”, [Quarterly Journal of Economics](#) (2021).²⁷
- Shubhdeep Deb, Jan Eeckhout, Aseem Patel and Lawrence Warren, “What Drives Wage Stagnation: Monopsony or Monopoly?”, [Journal of the European Economic Association](#) (2022).²⁸
- Elena Prager and Matt Schmitt, “Employer Consolidation and Wages: Evidence from Hospitals”, [American Economic Review](#) (2021).²⁹
- Michael Rubens, “Oligopsony Power and Factor-Biased Technology Adoption”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2022).³⁰
- Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury and Bledi Taska, “Employer Concentration and Outside Options”, [Working Paper](#) (2021).³¹

Non-market effects of market power

4.13 Market power may interact with other market failures in ways that are hard to predict. Decarbonisation for instance is a key topic for economic policy, and one potentially fraught with market failures. The CMA is keen to explore if and how competition policy and regulation might play a beneficial role in the structural transformation towards Net Zero, alongside other policies. Similarly, market power may affect externalities on consumers in markets with addictive goods, insurance markets with pooling and separating equilibria and where companies attempt to translate market power into political influence via lobbying. Relevant research topics include:

²⁶ <https://www.nber.org/papers/w30365>

²⁷ <https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/136/2/1255/6030033>

²⁸ <https://academic.oup.com/jeea/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvac060/6763598>

²⁹ <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190690>

³⁰ <https://www.nber.org/papers/w30586>

³¹ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3599454

- Research on regulatory policies in support of decarbonisation
- Optimal pricing and advertising of addictive goods or with habit formation
- Corporate behaviour with non-market influence, for instance through lobbying

4.14 Recent articles of interest in this area include:

- Charles Angelucci, Julia Cage and Michael Sinkinson, “Media Competition and News Diets”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2021).³²
- Bo Cowgill, Andrea Prat and Tommaso Valletti, “Political power and market power”, [Working Paper](#) (2021).³³
- Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Yunan Ji and Neale Mahoney, “Randomised trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform”, [Proceedings of the National Academy of Science](#) (2020).³⁴
- Luis Gonzales, Koichiro Ito and Mar Reguant, “The Dynamic Impact of Market Integration: Evidence from Renewable Energy Expansion in Chile”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2022).³⁵
- Nicholas Ryan, “The Competitive Effects of Transmission Infrastructure in the Indian Electricity Market”, [American Economic Journal: Microeconomics](#) (2021).³⁶
- Katalin Springel, “Network Externality and Subsidy Structure in Two-Sided Markets: Evidence from Electric Vehicle Incentives”, [American Economic Journal: Economic Policy](#) (2021).³⁷

Corporate ownership and firm organisation

4.15 Corporate ownership structures and the organisation of the firm are active areas of research both in antitrust economics and for wider productivity concerns. Within competition economics, common ownership and vertical mergers have received increasing attention. More widely, managerial

³² <https://www.nber.org/papers/w26782>

³³ <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2106.13612.pdf>

³⁴ <https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2004759117>

³⁵ <https://www.nber.org/papers/w30016>

³⁶ <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20180191>

³⁷ <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20190131>

incentives, organisational practices and the boundaries of the firm may be behind major trends for productivity, wages, and investment. Relevant research topics include:

- The importance and impact of common ownership and interlocking directorates
- Efficiency and anticompetitive explanations of vertical mergers
- Outsourcing, organisational practices and within versus between-firm wage inequality

4.16 Recent articles of interest in this area include:

- Amir Amel-Zadeh, Fiona Kasperk and Martin Schmalz, “Mavericks, Universal, and Common Owners – the Largest Shareholders in US Firms”, [Working Paper](#) (2022).³⁸
- Miguel Anton, Jose Azar, Mireia Gine and Luca Lin, “Beyond the Target: M&A Decisions and Rival Ownership”, [Journal of Financial Economics](#) (2022).³⁹
- Renji Bao, Jan De Loecker and Jan Eeckhout, “Are Managers Paid for Market Power?”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2022).⁴⁰
- Maria Rosa Battaglion and Vittoria Cerasi, “Strategic Interlocking Directorates”, [Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization](#) (2020).⁴¹
- Paul Eliason, Benjamin Heebsh, Ryan McDevitt and James Roberts, “How Acquisitions Change Firm Behavior and Performance: Evidence from the Dialysis Industry”, [Quarterly Journal of Economics](#) (2020).⁴²
- Jean-Francois Houde, Peter Newberry and Katja Seim, “Economies of Density in E-Commerce: A Study of Amazon’s Fulfillment Center Network”, [NBER Working Paper](#) (2021).⁴³

³⁸ https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4219430

³⁹ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304405X22000058>

⁴⁰ <https://www.nber.org/papers/w29918>

⁴¹ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268120302377>

⁴² <https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/135/1/221/5607794>

⁴³ <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hN1Rdlg55IS-rZBIYvH6BE41phtqznEw/view>

Evaluating competition policy

4.17 A large and growing literature evaluates individual mergers ex post, but less is known about the ex-ante desirability of specific antitrust rules or competition policies. These practical rules are not always rigorously founded in scholarly work. Even less is known about the desirability of entire competition regimes over many cases, yet this question is crucial for competition authorities.

Relevant research topics include:

- Theoretical and empirical work on merger decision rules, including deterrence effects
- Empirical cross-country comparisons of competition regimes
- Theoretical and empirical research into novel issues arising from competition casework

4.18 Recent articles of interest in this area include:

- Laurent Cavenaile, Murat Alp Celik and Xu Tian, “The Dynamic Effects of Antitrust Policy on Growth and Welfare”, [Journal of Monetary Economics](#) (2021).⁴⁴
- Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer and Song Ma, “Killer Acquisitions”, [Journal of Political Economy](#) (2021).⁴⁵
- Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta and Emanuele Tarantino, “Shelving or Developing? Optimal Policy for Mergers with Potential Competitors”, [Working Paper](#) (2022).⁴⁶
- Chris Conlon and Julie Holland Mortimer, “Empirical properties of diversion ratios”, [RAND Journal of Economics](#) (2021).⁴⁷
- Carl Shapiro, “Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control, Tech Titans, Labor Markets”, [Journal of Economic Perspectives](#) (2019).⁴⁸

⁴⁴ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304393221000490>

⁴⁵ <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/712506>

⁴⁶ https://wwws.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/clbe/events/antitrust/documents/fumagalli_shelving_or_developing.pdf

⁴⁷ <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1756-2171.12388>

⁴⁸ <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.3.69>

- Thomas Wollmann, “Stealth Consolidation: Evidence from an Amendment to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act”, [American Economic Review: Insights](#) (2019).⁴⁹

⁴⁹ <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20180137>

5. Research governance

CMA research principles

- 5.1 All Competition and Markets Authority researchers need to be aware of, and abide by, legal, ethical and confidentiality standards when conducting research. The Government Analysis Function, which includes economists at the CMA, has signed up to the Concordat to Support Research Integrity⁵⁰ and is committed to upholding rigour and integrity in all aspects of its research.

Initiating research projects

- 5.2 The economic research function of the Competition and Markets Authority sits in the newly created Microeconomics Unit. Research at the CMA will be informed by the needs of our stakeholders in competition enforcement, wider government, and the public. Economic research projects can be initiated at any level of the organisation, with governance proportional to the scale of the work. The leadership of the Microeconomics Unit will provide a steer on prioritisation where necessary.

Collaborations and funding

- 5.3 The Competition and Markets Authority recognises that collaborations and partnerships with academics, research institutes, data providers, regulators (including competition authorities worldwide) and other government departments are crucial for successful research.
- 5.4 Collaboration may take many forms. The CMA will explore formal and informal collaborations with academics, postgraduate students and researchers at other competition regulators and policy research institutions. These might include secondments, sponsored studentships, joint grant applications and more informal knowledge-sharing arrangements. The CMA also views favourably joint work between CMA employees and outside collaborators on research projects where interests overlap, and skills are complementary.
- 5.5 The CMA will use its wider academic engagement activities (seminars, workshops, and conference participation) to build links in line with the research strategy and the topics outlined in the research priorities.

⁵⁰ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/implementing-the-concordat-to-support-research-integrity-within-government/guidance-to-implement-the-concordat-to-support-research-integrity-within-government>

- 5.6 Finally, the CMA aims to become an accredited public sector research establishment (PRE). Like current PREs (such as the UK Health Safety Agency, the Office for National Statistics and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory), the CMA will need to show evidence of research capabilities and complete accreditation. Obtaining accreditation will allow the CMA to access research funding directly and underscore the ambition to become a government-wide centre of expertise on competition, innovation, and productivity.

The academic advisory panel

- 5.7 Over the past few years, the Competition and Market Authority academic advisory panel has fulfilled many functions. It has acted as a sounding board for the CMA, provided advanced training and (in previous years) technical expertise on specific cases. With the establishment of the new Microeconomics Unit and the publication of this research strategy, administration of the academic advisory panel will move closer to the CMA economic research function.
- 5.8 An expanded panel with expertise aligned with the CMA topics of research interest will be established to interact regularly with CMA researchers and provide feedback and advice on research projects undertaken at the CMA, which could also include wider CMA research work. Where of mutual interest, academic advisors may collaborate with the CMA on joint research projects.

Dissemination

- 5.9 Research needs to reach the right audiences to have the most impact. It also needs to be able to challenge existing views and posit and test hypotheses in an evolving data and knowledge landscape. The policies the Competition and Markets Authority establishes around dissemination need to make sure CMA research can do that in a way that builds public trust.
- 5.10 In line with similar policy institutions, the CMA will draw clear distinctions between three different types of research output: (i) outputs that represent the institutional view of the CMA and feature CMA branding, (ii) outputs produced by CMA staff as part of their work time that do not represent the settled view of the organisation, (iii) outputs produced by CMA staff in their own time without the use of CMA resources.
- 5.11 Outputs representing the institutional view of the CMA need not carry a disclaimer. Staff outputs or outputs produced by staff in their own time however need to make clear the distinction between the author's views and those of the organisation.

- 5.12 Regardless of the type of output, CMA research will follow best practices in disseminating research in a way that increases public trust. Where possible, methods and data will be shared with others, and research outputs should be openly accessible to all users.
- 5.13 CMA research staff will work with colleagues across the organisation to make sure research findings reach all interested stakeholders and the wider public through appropriate means for maximum impact. This might include a blog post, social media outreach, presentations, or a policy paper in addition to a technical working paper or peer-reviewed journal submission. The CMA recognises that the value of its research comes primarily from an ability to improve policymaking in the UK on issues of competition, innovation, and productivity.

Intellectual property and open access

- 5.14 The UK government and UKRI have committed to full and immediate open-access publication of peer-reviewed research funded by public or private grants. The Competition and Markets Authority aims to adhere to these standards as soon and as fully as is feasible.
- 5.15 In line with government best practice, the default copyright for CMA research should be Open Government Licence (OGL). This should be specified when submitting research to peer-reviewed journals, and suitable disclaimers should be added to pre-prints and working papers.

Evaluation

- 5.16 To ensure public resources funding research are spent effectively, the Competition and Markets Authority will collect and evaluate quantitative and qualitative evidence on the impact of its research. The CMA recognises that the primary impact of its research should come from improvements in the evidence base for policy on issues of competition, innovation, and growth.
- 5.17 Evaluation and monitoring activities will be proportionate to the amount of resource expended and the expected impact of the project. Evaluations will not only inform individual research projects, but also future versions of the CMA research strategy and topics of research interest.