An inspection of juxtaposed controls

April – May 2022

David Neal
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
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Write to us: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
1st Floor, Clive House, 70 Petty France, London SW1H 9EX
United Kingdom
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This inspection examined the quality of decision making at juxtaposed controls, with inspectors visiting Paris Gare du Nord and Coquelles to observe practices on the ground. Overall, it found that staff were dedicated, and that decision making was generally conducted in line with guidance, policy and the immigration rules. We also found good examples of the newly introduced ‘ethical decision-making model’ being applied. I have 3 key findings.

Firstly, there were issues with poor record keeping and incomplete or inaccurate data entry. This echoes findings from previous inspections and internal Border Force assurance reports. This meant that our conclusions on the quality of decisions were often caveated, even when inspectors may have agreed with the outcome based on the information that was available to them. This also points to wider issues regarding the Home Office’s assurance mechanisms. If my inspectors were unable to understand how or whether a decision was justified, I am not convinced that Border Force would be able to assure themselves of the quality of its decision making either.

Secondly, issues were also identified with the process that allows passengers to ‘elect to embark’, whereby passengers can ‘withdraw’ their application for permission to enter the UK. I am not satisfied that Border Force is using this process according to its intended purpose. Similarly, individuals are not free to leave the control unless escorted by the authorities in the state of departure. It was unclear under what powers these individuals were effectively being deprived of their liberty.

Finally, inspectors noted, from data available, that Romanians attempting to travel to the UK were subject to greater levels of scrutiny by Border Force. Inspectors were not given sufficient evidence to explain how, or whether, this was justified.

The report makes 3 recommendations, relating to issues of poor record keeping, the use of ‘elect to embark’ and clarifying concerns around whether certain nationalities are being directly or indirectly discriminated against. I encourage the Home Office to apply the findings, conclusions and recommendations in this inspection to all juxtaposed controls.

This report was drafted in May 2022 and reflects the position at that time. It was sent to the Home Secretary on 19 May 2022.

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1. Background

Juxtaposed controls

1.1 Border Force, a law enforcement command within the Home Office, is responsible for, among other things, checking the immigration status of people seeking entry to the UK. This responsibility is exercised under Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 1971\(^1\).

1.2 The UK operates border controls through Border Force Europe, a Border Force command, in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, known as ‘juxtaposed controls’. These are underpinned by a number of international treaties and arrangements, as well as domestic secondary legislation. Passengers travelling from juxtaposed controls in these locations to the UK are examined by Border Force officials in a ‘UK Control Zone’ (UKCZ) before they begin their journey, rather than after disembarkation. The juxtaposed controls arrangements are reciprocal, with French officers also based at controls in the UK conducting checks on all passengers travelling to the Schengen area.\(^2\)

1.3 As at May 2022, Border Force Europe operates controls as illustrated in Figure 1.

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\(^1\) [https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/77/schedule/2](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/77/schedule/2)

\(^2\) As France is the first country in the Schengen area, it is only French officers who are responsible for the checks, even if the passenger is travelling onwards to Belgium or the Netherlands.
1.4 Border Force exercises its customs responsibilities in the UKCZ at the Eurotunnel terminal in Coquelles. The other juxtaposed controls only have immigration controls.

**Staffing**

1.5 In April 2022, there were approximately 800 Border Force staff working at the juxtaposed controls. The number of staff varies at each location, but the main responsibilities for each grade and structure are consistent across them all. A breakdown of roles and responsibilities is illustrated in Figure 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job title [Civil Service grade]</th>
<th>Day-to-day responsibilities (not exhaustive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Border Force Officer (BFO) [Executive Officer] | • examination of arriving passengers under Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 1971, to establish the nationality and identity of the passenger  
• in the case of foreign nationals, applying the provisions of the immigration rules to decide whether to grant or refuse permission to enter  
• recording information on Home Office systems and paper files relating to the progression of passengers subject to further immigration examination  
• examining identity documents to establish that they are genuine and have not been forged or counterfeited  
• safeguarding the welfare of vulnerable persons and children encountered at the border  
• monitoring the operation of ePassport gates (where deployed), and undertaking the ‘roving officer’ role to identify vulnerable passengers and children using the ePassport gates  
• (at Coquelles only) exercising Customs functions in accordance with the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979  
• line management responsibility for Border Force Assistant Officers |
| Border Force Higher Officer (BFHO) [Higher Executive Officer] | • management of the immigration control, including resource deployment  
• management of immigration casework  
• authority for the decision to detain passengers under immigration powers in straightforward cases  
• authority for the decision to refuse entry in straightforward cases, such as the refusal of non-European Economic Area (EEA) nationals  
• authority for ongoing reviews of child detention  
• responsible for first-line assurance of port records such as detention logs  
• providing guidance to BFOs on individual cases and policy/procedures  
• line management of BFOs  
• (at Coquelles only) management of frontline customs activity |
### Job title [Civil Service grade]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job title</th>
<th>Day-to-day responsibilities (not exhaustive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Border Force Senior Officer (BFSO) [Senior Executive Officer] | • senior operational manager for either a single port or group of ports. May manage ports on site or remotely  
  • authority for immigration detention in sensitive or complex cases, such as the spouses of British citizens, initial detention of children, or persons with vulnerabilities  
  • authority for the decision to refuse entry in complex cases, such as refusal of EEA nationals, refusals involving children or sensitive and compassionate cases  
  • authority to grant leave outside the rules where it is deemed necessary to do so under the ethical decision-making model  
  • line management of BFHOs  
  • primary point of escalation in the event of issues that cannot be resolved by a BFHO |

1.6 Additionally, some staff have specialist functional responsibilities such as in forgery or safeguarding and modern slavery (SAMS).

### Post EU exit

1.7 Following the end of the EU exit transition period on 31 December 2020, European Economic Area (EEA) nationals who formerly held free movement rights under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 have had to meet the requirements of the UK’s immigration rules. This means either having been granted status under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS), seeking permission to enter at the border, or obtaining entry clearance in advance of travelling to the UK, when their reasons for travelling to the UK require this. Therefore, BFOs apply the immigration rules, as opposed to EEA Regulations, to all people seeking entry through juxtaposed controls.

1.8 In addition, the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement protects the rights of EEA nationals and their family members who were resident in the UK ‘by 31 December 2020’. This cohort had until 30 June 2021 to make applications to the EU Settlement Scheme. This means there are some scenarios where Border Force must examine EEA nationals to determine whether they have ‘saved rights’ or ‘temporary protection status’, and guidance prescribes the steps Border Force must go through in these scenarios.

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3 The European Economic Area consists of the countries of the European Union, as well as Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein.  
4 [Link](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/1052/contents/made)  
5 [Link](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules)  
6 [Link](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840655/Agreement_on_the_withdrawal_of_the_United_Kingdom_of_Great_Britain_and_Northern_Ireland_from_the_European_Union_and_the_European_Atomic_Energy_Community.pdf)  
7 [Link](https://www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-citizens-families/eligibility)  
8 See Annex A for a list of the guidance in use by Border Force and Home Office officials pertaining to decision making at juxtaposed controls.
Previous ICIBI inspection

1.9 An ICIBI inspection of juxtaposed controls (November 2012 to March 2013), published in August 2013, examined how efficiently and effectively Border Force managed its operations at juxtaposed controls, with a particular focus on Calais, Coquelles and Paris. It found that security checks on passengers were being carried out in accordance with the Border Force Operating Mandate, but that there was “significant room for improvement” in complying with guidance and procedures. This was particularly the case in respect of further interviews, issuing correct paperwork associated with detention of passengers and the circumstances in which notes should be taken.

2. **Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1**
Within 3 months, introduce an enhanced first-line assurance mechanism focused on record keeping, to ensure that it is conducted in line with existing policies and guidance, with particular reference to the following areas:

a. enforcing the consistent use and completion of an electronic IS81 log system at all ports as per existing instructions and in the spirit of Recommendation 22 of the Windrush Lessons Learned Review
b. the detail and accuracy of Case Information Database (or superseding case database system) records
c. introduction of a mechanism to record that assurance activities have been completed and to track performance.

**Recommendation 2**
Within 3 months, introduce guidance and policy instructions for Border Force staff on the use of ‘elect to embark’, with particular consideration of:

a. the unique practicalities of using ‘elect to embark’ at juxtaposed controls
b. how officers are informing passengers of their right to ‘elect to embark’ and introducing safeguards where explicit written consent can be obtained from passengers
c. how ‘elect to embark’ is recorded on caseworking databases.

**Recommendation 3**
Within 3 months, conduct and publish a review to ascertain on what grounds particular nationalities are being subjected to a greater level of scrutiny than others at juxtaposed controls.
3. Scope and methodology

Scope

3.1 The scope of this inspection focused on the quality, consistency and proportionality of decision making by Border Force staff in relation to the application of the immigration rules at the juxtaposed controls.

3.2 The exercise of Border Force’s customs powers, staffing, resourcing, queue management and operational efficiency were not included in the scope of this inspection.

Methodology

3.3 Inspectors:

- examined documentary evidence provided by Border Force
- reviewed open-source material, including relevant ICIBI reports
- reviewed Home Office and Border Force operational guidance
- on 11 April 2022, conducted a familiarisation session with Border Force staff
- undertook random case sampling of 109 electronic records of 1,363 passengers subject to further examination (issued form IS81\(^\text{10}\)) at the juxtaposed controls in March 2022
- on 26 and 27 April 2022, undertook site visits to the juxtaposed controls at Coquelles Eurotunnel and Paris Gare du Nord Eurostar terminals to observe Border Force immigration activity
- spoke with Border Force Officers (BFOs), Border Force Higher Officers (BFHOs) and Border Force Senior Officers (BFSOs) during the onsite visits
- on 29 April 2022, provided a debrief to senior Border Force managers on the key findings of this inspection.

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\(^{10}\) Form IS81 informs a passenger that they are to be subject to further examination.
4. Key findings

Decision making

Case sampling outcomes

4.1 Inspectors requested from the Home Office, details of passengers subjected in March 2022 to further examination at juxtaposed controls. This resulted in a dataset of 1,363 cases across all juxtaposed controls, of which 109 (8%) randomly selected cases were reviewed by inspectors. 11 Clandestine entrants were excluded from the dataset, 12 but it otherwise included the remaining range of case types and all recorded outcomes. The sample was anonymised and no personal details were retained by inspectors.

4.2 The data 13 provided the following headline figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Outcome</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elect to embark</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted entry</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form JUXT3 served</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused entry</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown outcome</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case sampling methodology

4.3 In reviewing the case sample, inspectors considered both the statutory requirements of the various immigration acts, as well as Home Office policy and operational procedure. 17 Figure 4 contains a summary of the principal considerations applied by inspectors:

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11 Only electronic Case Information Database (CID) and Atlas system records were examined by inspectors. No paper files were examined.
12 A clandestine entrant is a subject who seeks to evade examination under the Immigration Act 1971 at a port of entry, for example, by concealing themselves in a freight vehicle.
13 This data was provided by the Home Office from an operational dataset, which was not assured by the Performance Reporting and Analysis Unit (PRAU).
14 At any point prior to a Border Force Officer (BFO) completing their examination, a passenger may withdraw their application for permission to enter and depart the UK or control zone at their own expense. This is described as “elect to embark”. Full notes must be entered onto CID.
15 The “JUXT” series of forms are only used by Border Force at juxtaposed controls and are used to request the relevant authorities in the country of departure to remove a passenger from the UKCZ for reasons other than refusal of permission to enter. Reasons may include: inadequate documentation, lack of necessary information in order to make a decision on admissibility, lack of time or resources or the imminent closure of the port, etc. The form may invite the passenger to return for further examination at a later occasion. On CID, the outcome ‘JUXT3 served’ (Eurostar ports) or ‘elect to embark’ (Channel ports) would be recorded.
16 ‘Unknown outcome’ was used where no outcome was recorded. No further information or detail was given about these cases.
17 Refer to Annex A.
Figure 4

Thematic questions asked by inspectors during case sampling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Where a passenger was refused entry, was it a ‘mandatory’ refusal (under Part 9 of the immigration rules – grounds for refusal)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where a passenger was refused entry, was the correct refusal form used? This included a consideration of whether the reasons for refusal on the form were correctly articulated, including considerations around spelling and grammar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where a passenger was refused entry, was the paragraph or paragraphs of the immigration rules under which a passenger was refused recorded on the refusal form?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where a passenger was refused entry, was the appropriate level of authority obtained from either a Border Force Higher Officer (BFHO) or Border Force Senior Officer (BFSO) as required in the immigration rules and policy? Was this authority recorded in the case notes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where identified, were any safeguarding concerns (such as vulnerability) noted and addressed? In cases involving children, was there evidence of Border Force complying with the spirit of the requirements of section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was there evidence of caseworking errors, omissions, or injudicious or subjective comments in the case notes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the decision consistent with decisions in similar cases and proportionate based on all of the circumstances? Was there any evidence of unconscious bias?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was there evidence of consideration of special circumstances pertinent to the individual case, or compelling and compassionate circumstances being considered in line with the ‘ethical decision-making model’?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the decision made justified based on the information recorded on Home Office systems?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General case sampling findings

4.4 Notwithstanding wider concerns around the quality of notes underpinning decision making, inspectors found that in most cases sampled, the decision made by Border Force was justified, as illustrated in Figure 5.

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18 Part 9 of the immigration rules covers general grounds for refusal, and where a passenger falls within the scope of Part 9, they will usually be refused entry.
19 Paragraph 10 of the immigration rules requires that the decision to refuse a passenger entry to the UK requires the authority of a Chief Immigration Officer [BFHO] or Immigration Inspector [BFSO]. As a matter of policy, Border Force requires the refusal of certain categories of passengers, such as European Economic Area (EEA) nationals, to be authorised by a BFSO.
20 Section 55 requires Border Force to “have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom”. While section 55 does not apply overseas, as a matter of policy, Border Force applies the spirit of section 55 at juxtaposed controls.
21 In the Windrush Lessons Learned Review (March 2020), it was recommended that the Home Office set up “a set of ethical standards and an ethical decision-making model”. The Home Office published ethical decision-making guidance in November 2021. This guidance is “intended to help decision makers to articulate and resolve ethical issues” when considering applications.
Figure 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision justified?</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5 Inspectors examined electronic case records and notes to review how the decision in the case had been reached. The ‘Border Force port file etiquette guidance’ requires that:

“...files and case notes are completed accurately and to a professional standard ... In order that action taken on cases is correct [sic] it cannot be overemphasised how important it is that case notes and minutes are accurate and comprehensive.”

4.6 Inspectors considered whether the electronic case notes evidenced the steps taken by the decision maker throughout both initial and further examination and the rationale used to justify the decision. Of the 109 cases sampled, 20% (22) contained insufficient detail on the progression of the case or the rationale behind the decision.

4.7 In 4 of the cases resulting in refusal, the refusal notice was found to contain grammatical, spelling or formatting errors. The same number of refused cases did not include the relevant immigration rules under which that application was refused.

4.8 Inspectors found that safeguarding was considered in 24.1% (26) of cases in the sample. It was not possible for inspectors to conclude whether safeguarding was appropriately considered in all relevant cases (given that not every case involves a safeguarding aspect). However, through conversations with BFOs, it was clear that they were aware of their safeguarding responsibilities. Inspectors also observed BFOs exercising the spirit of section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, whereby BFOs would routinely question the relationship between adult passengers traveling with children.

**Refusal wordings**

4.9 Inspectors identified several cases where the language used in the refusal notice was insufficiently clear, or the wording used was not adequately contextualised for the individual cases. For example, some refusal forms summarised the socio-economic circumstances of the passenger but did not contextualise how those circumstances led the BFO to conclude that the passenger did not meet the requirements of the immigration rules. To demonstrate that the decision is based upon objective considerations rather than subjective perceptions, which may be subject to the BFO’s own unconscious bias, a full explanation should be provided. This would also ensure that the passenger understands why a decision has been made.

4.10 Inspectors considered that 24% (26) of cases sampled included obvious omissions or errors, or inadequate refusal wordings. This ranged from administrative errors on the Home Office’s caseworking systems, to comments inspectors perceived to be value judgements, or which lacked an apparent basis in, or link to, the relevant immigration rules. Some examples are summarised in Figure 6.
**Figure 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>ICIBI comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“You are unemployed”</td>
<td>It is not unreasonable for BFOs to consider the socio-economic circumstances of those who are seeking permission to enter the UK as a visitor. The visitor rules require the BFO to consider, among other things, whether the passenger is genuinely seeking entry as a visitor, whether they will leave the UK at the end of their visit and whether they have the means to maintain and accommodate themselves in the UK during the visit. Consideration of such factors will invariably involve a consideration of the passenger’s individual circumstances. However, inspectors identified instances where the notice simply contained statements about the passenger’s employment status. This did not demonstrate how such a fact had led the BFO to establish that the eligibility requirements of the immigration rules had not been met. The implication of this is that such a comment is reduced to a value judgement. This may provide the impression that only those in employment meet the requirements of the visitor rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Your repeated offences display reckless, risk-taking behaviour and a lack of thought for the consequences your actions may have on yourself and others.”</td>
<td>While previous criminal history can be used to form the basis of a refusal to enter as per Part 9.4.1 of the immigration rules, this passenger was refused as they were suspected not to be a genuine visitor. The comment in the refusal notice appeared to be a particularly personal critique of the passenger’s character, without sufficient explanation or justification as to how this had formed the basis of the refusal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectations about expenditure versus salary</td>
<td>Inspectors encountered cases where BFOs stated that they doubted the passenger’s genuine visit intentions because the financial outlay on the trip was disproportionate when considering the passenger’s monthly income. It is unreasonable, and contrary to guidance, to rely solely on individual and subjective ‘expectations’ of what is and is not a reasonable level of financial outlay, which may differ from one BFO to another. If this fact led the BFO to doubt the credibility of the passenger as a genuine visitor, the refusal notice should have set out the facts derived from the passenger’s own account. Decisions should be free of the BFO’s own value judgements and unconscious bias and should objectively demonstrate why a particular level of financial outlay led the BFO to doubt the credibility of the passenger’s account.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ethical decision-making model

4.11 Inspectors considered whether the principles of the ethical decision-making model had been applied in decision making at the juxtaposed controls. This model requires BFOs to balance the individual circumstances of the passenger with the need to maintain an effective immigration control. It was introduced by the Home Office on 11 November 2021 following Recommendation 17 of Wendy Williams’ Windrush Lessons Learned Review.

4.12 There were 30 cases identified through case sampling where inspectors concluded the decisions were ‘ethical’, in that a wider consideration of the personal circumstances of the passenger was applied. In 23 of these cases, discretion was exercised in favour of the passenger. Inspectors identified examples of ethical decision making, with consideration of individual circumstances, where Border Force had used the options available to make a pragmatic and reasonable decision (such as granting leave outside the rules). Many of the ethical decisions encountered by inspectors were underpinned by existing Home Office policy or directives from the Border Force National Command Centre (NCC). For example, the NCC had advised ports to grant entry to Ukrainian nationals without UK visas intending to transit the UK in order to proceed to the Republic of Ireland for humanitarian reasons.

4.13 Not all decisions in the case sample that exercised discretion cited the ‘ethical decision-making model’. In this regard, even though the ethical decision-making model was not mentioned in the case note, inspectors considered that the spirit of the model was being applied in exercising discretion in this way.

4.14 In one example, a Malaysian national, whose permission to enter as a student had recently expired upon the completion of their studies, sought permission to enter to collect their remaining possessions prior to leaving the UK. Notwithstanding the concerns of the BFO, the passenger was granted permission to enter for a limited period (shorter than the usual period granted to visitors) to be able to collect their possessions. The decision was pragmatic, but also balanced effective immigration control considerations in that doubts remained as to the passenger’s intention to leave the UK. The limited grant of leave would allow the Home Office to test whether the passenger had complied should they have come to notice in the future.

4.15 In another instance, a child who had been refused an EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) family permit was travelling to the UK as a visitor with his parents, who did have settled status but who were not EEA nationals. The BFO dealing with the passenger was able to establish that the child’s parents had erroneously applied for an EUSS family permit, for which the child was not eligible. As the passenger was a child, the BFO put the child at the centre of their decision, fully considering their best interests. While the passenger was seeking permission to enter the UK for a purpose for which they needed entry clearance, there was an obvious need not to separate this child from his parents, a fact which would make his exclusion undesirable. The BFO granted permission to enter the UK as a visitor for 6 months and his parents were advised to regularise his stay in the UK as soon as possible.

4.16 A further example where the ability to grant leave outside of the immigration rules was exercised concerned 2 Ukrainian children who sought entry as the dependents of a dual

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24 Leave outside the rules allows decision makers to grant permission to enter when there are compelling or compassionate circumstances for them to be allowed this. It is used when a passenger’s purpose in the UK is not covered by another provision of the immigration rules, or when a person may not be able to meet those requirements, but their reasons for needing to travel to the UK make their exclusion undesirable.
25 The Border Force NCC provides a 24/7 ‘command and control’ capability for Border Force operations.
Romanian/Ukrainian national with settled status under the EUSS. The immigration rules require that the applicant must obtain an entry clearance for this purpose prior to travel to the UK. It had not been possible for the family to obtain prior entry clearance, owing largely to the political situation in Ukraine. Border Force decided to grant permission to enter outside the immigration rules, which inspectors considered to be a pragmatic and justifiable decision. Inspectors noted this case demonstrated a wider consideration of the passengers’ situation, centred around the best interests of the children, as required by section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, while balancing the need to maintain an effective immigration control.

Interactions with passengers

4.17 Inspectors spent 2 days onsite at 2 juxtaposed control locations, directly observing BFOs exercising immigration functions at the border. Inspectors observed interactions between BFOs and passengers during initial examination, including British citizens, EEA nationals and foreign nationals.

4.18 Inspectors observed BFOs correctly applying the mandatory checks framework under the Border Force Operating Mandate.26 Border Force staff understood their responsibilities and were diligent in ensuring that they undertook all mandatory checks. In this regard, inspectors were satisfied that all necessary border security checks were undertaken at the juxtaposed controls.

4.19 From those observations, and through conversations with BFOs and their managers, it was evident that there was a clear understanding of the changes that had occurred to the UK immigration system following the exit of the UK from the European Union, the end of the transition period and the end of the grace period.

4.20 BFOs had a good understanding of the implications of settled and pre-settled status under the EUSS on the processing of passengers at the controls, and the rights that such status conferred on passengers. However, BFOs told inspectors that it was often difficult to confirm that a passenger had settled or pre-settled status due to limitations on the IT systems available to them at the immigration control. Digital status is linked to the passports or travel documents registered on the passenger’s Home Office account. If a passenger changes their travel document (for example through loss or renewal) and does not register that change on their account, confirmation of the digital status would not show up on front line computer systems.

4.21 Inspectors observed several occasions where passengers with settled or pre-settled status under the EUSS had changed their travel document and were delayed while ‘back office’ checks were conducted to confirm their status.27 This clearly led to frustration for the passenger and for BFOs.

4.22 At both Paris and Coquelles, the initial examination of passengers was aligned with guidance, with BFOs asking clear, open questions to establish whether a passenger qualified for entry to the UK. Inspectors observed BFOs being professional and courteous with passengers.

4.23 Inspectors saw BFOs dealing with conflict in a constructive manner, using de-escalation techniques effectively. At Coquelles, BFOs told inspectors that passenger engagement was

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26 The operating mandate defines the mandatory border security checks that Border Force Officers must undertake on all people and goods arriving in the UK.

27 This involved BFOs using a telephone within the booth to ring colleagues who were in the ‘back office’ to ask them to check Atlas, a Home Office caseworking system, to advise whether the passenger did have settled or pre-settled status.
important not only from an immigration and customer service perspective, but to identify potential customs offences.

Use of EEA national identity cards

4.24 A significant operational consequence of policy post Brexit was the decision that EEA nationals seeking entry to the UK would need to do so using their national passport, as national identity cards were no longer acceptable for travel to the UK in most instances.28

4.25 This policy came into force on 1 October 2021, but with mitigations for freight drivers. All mitigations have now ended and any EEA national seeking to enter on an ID card is considered for refusal in line with the immigration rules.

4.26 Given the geographical location of juxtaposed ports, the relative recent history of EEA identity cards as acceptable forms of identification for the UK and the non-applicability of carrier’s liability legislation at juxtaposed controls, it is likely that more EEA nationals will attempt to travel to the UK using EEA identity cards, which will continue to add pressure to BFOs at juxtaposed controls.

4.27 During the onsite phase, inspectors observed several cases involving non-resident EEA national passengers who were unaware that ID cards were no longer valid for travel to the UK. These cases were resolved either by use of the ‘JUXT’ form process or by granting leave outside the rules. An example of a case where leave outside the rules was used in this context is provided in the case study below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EEA national child without an acceptable travel document</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A family of Dutch nationals, including a young child, arrived at the juxtaposed controls in order to visit the UK. They did not hold settled or pre-settled status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2 adults both held passports and were correctly documented. The child only held a Dutch national ID card. He therefore fell to be refused entry under the general grounds for refusal in Part 9 of the immigration rules, as he did not hold a valid national passport or other document which satisfactorily established nationality and identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The BFO considered that the age of the child was a suitably compelling reason to consider leave outside of the rules. The officer referred the case to a BFSO to obtain the required authority and granted leave outside of the rules for a period of 6 months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ICIBI comment**

Inspectors concluded that this was a good example of a BFO applying applying ethical decision-making principles when assessing the compelling and compassionate circumstances of the case. While a refusal in this case would ordinarily be mandatory, the officer correctly assessed that this would be a disproportionate decision and that granting leave outside the rules would not unduly harm border security. The BFO correctly applied the spirit of section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, in that granting leave outside of the rules ensured that there was due regard for the welfare of the child.

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28 EEA national identity cards may be acceptable for travel where the passenger holds EU settled or pre-settled status, or where a BFSO authorises leave outside the rules.
Record keeping

Level and clarity of detail

4.28 While decision making was largely aligned with the immigration rules, guidance and policy, the level of detail in the notes that accompanied decisions on caseworking databases was lacking. Inspectors were therefore unable to understand the rationale underpinning some decisions, and to consequently draw any conclusions as to their quality.

4.29 Border Force’s own Operational Assurance Directorate (BF OAD), the unit responsible for second line assurance, expects that “files and electronic case records confirm all actions taken in a case, all decisions made, by whom, when, and clearly explain the rationale for the decision”.

4.30 As part of this inspection’s evidence request, Border Force provided a ‘Casework Assurance Summary’ conducted by BF OAD. This review sampled 528 cases from juxtaposed controls between September 2021 and February 2022. The results of this exercise indicated that in 98 cases there were “no or insufficient notes on CID”, representing 18% of the overall cohort of cases sampled. This aligned with inspectors’ observations.

4.31 The following case was identified during case sampling and is illustrative of the lack of case notes. Inspectors deemed this an example of a case where, owing to the specific details of the encounter, detailed case notes would be expected.

**Case study 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A passenger who arrived at the control and was subject to an extant deportation order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NB: No case notes (or form IS10) were available to inspectors from the record on CID.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This case study is established from information provided in the IS82 refusal form.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A passenger was encountered at the juxtaposed control in Coquelles and sought permission to enter the UK as a business visitor presenting a Bahamian passport. The BFO was satisfied that this passport was forged.

Further checks revealed that the passenger had a number of aliases known to the Home Office and that they were subject to a deportation order.

The applicant also sought permission to enter the UK to claim asylum but as this request was made outside of the UK, the Home Office was not obliged to consider the claim.

The passenger was refused under paragraph 9.7.1 of Part 9 of the Immigration Rules for the use of a false document.

**ICIBI comment:**

Inspectors agreed that refusing this passenger entry was aligned with policy and that the correct paragraph of the immigration rules was used. However, inspectors questioned why the refusal was not based on the extant deportation order. Furthermore, it was not possible to determine, due to the lack of case notes in relation to this case, whether the BFO had paid any consideration to the passenger’s overall immigration history.
Of the 109 cases sampled, 22% (24) were highlighted as having poor case notes and 3 contained no notes at all. After onsite observations, it was noted that of the 7 cases observed at the further examination stage at Paris Gare du Nord, 5 had no case notes one week after their entry onto CID.

Of the 109 cases sampled by inspectors, 6 cases related to EEA nationals, and it was not possible to determine how consideration of any potential ‘saved rights’, or where temporary protection status had been fully considered in relation to the Home Office’s policy on EEA nationals at the border post grace period. This applied to cases where permission to enter had been granted and refused, as well as ‘elect to embark’ cases.

In one instance, a passenger who stated they had made an application to the EUSS that was refused in August 2021, was subsequently considered only as a visitor to the UK and against the requirement of Appendix V of the immigration rules. While the decision to do this might have been correct and consistent with policy, the notes did not provide sufficient detail to establish that this was the case. Specifically, inspectors noted it was not possible to determine if or how the policy had been fully considered by the BFO, or that any outstanding appeal or administrative review rights related to a refusal under the EUSS were exhausted.

Equally, inspectors identified 3 cases where temporary protection status might exist and where passengers were granted permission to enter for a period of 28 days to make applications to the EUSS. In those cases, case notes did not provide any detail or rationale to explain how the BFO making the decision had established that the requirements of the policy were met to be able to grant permission to enter.

Throughout onsite observations, inspectors witnessed cases where EEA nationals were seeking permission to enter the UK other than as a visitor and potentially held saved rights or qualified for temporary protection status. It was noted that the common approach taken by BFOs was to initially ask all EEA nationals whether they were resident in the UK, seemingly in order to establish how they should then be considered in line with the relevant policy.

In one instance, a child of a couple with status under the EUSS was seeking to return to the UK. The parents advised that they had not made any application under the EUSS as the child’s passport was due to expire. The child became the subject of further examination and was issued form IS81. The parents and child were seated temporarily at the control. Further checks were conducted to establish the facts of the case, including that the passenger was related as claimed to the adults (a key safeguarding consideration), as well as the reasons why no application under the EUSS had been made. The child was granted permission to enter the UK as someone having temporary protection. The child’s parents were instructed as to the processes they should undertake to regularise the child’s permission to stay in the UK.

As at the time of writing, the associated case on CID contains no case notes and inspectors did not witness any port file established for this case. This fact is made more pertinent given it relates to a child and any safeguarding actions duly considered by Border Force, including the capture of the required authority levels for the detention of a child, have not been recorded.

During onsite observations, inspectors noted that BFOs were generally confident in dealing with EEA nationals and were processing them in line with the correct policy.

29 EEA nationals and their family members who were resident in the UK by 31 December 2020, but failed to apply to the EUSS by 30 June 2021, are no longer protected by the saved EEA Regulations. However, equivalent rights to those provided by the saved EEA Regulations are afforded to individuals who have ‘temporary protection’ status.
In Paris Gare du Nord, inspectors observed all phases of the further examination of a French national who was seeking permission to enter the UK as a visitor. It was noted that a significant amount of work and resourcing was expended to reach what was thought to be a well-informed decision. Following the onsite phase of this inspection, inspectors reviewed this case on CID. Again, inspectors noted that the level and quality of case notes was not sufficient to demonstrate how the decision had been reached. While some summary of the salient points of the interview was documented, other actions taken by Border Force were not included.

During the onsite, inspectors spoke with Border Force staff of all grades who accepted that the quality of case notes was an issue. On multiple occasions, staff spoke of their own frustrations in regard to this and explained how the limited amount of time available to them, as a result of staffing constraints and infrastructure (specifically, IT), had on their ability to produce better and more detailed case notes.

**Data quality**

Another issue identified by inspectors was the quality of the records maintained by Border Force staff at juxtaposed controls. Some of these issues were apparent prior to sampling. For example, the dataset which informed case sampling allowed inspectors to identify the incorrect recording of case outcomes on CID.

It should be noted that while the topic of detention was not part of the scope of this inspection, inspectors considered the accurate recording of detention in cases during case sampling. Through this, 2 cases were identified where no detention record was maintained at all. In one of these cases, the notes indicated the passenger was detained for a period of 4 hours. In another case sampled from Brussels Gare du Midi, a time period for the detention had not been included, and the passenger showed as being detained from 20 March 2022 until the time of writing.

Inspectors identified 2 cases where children had been detained without the appropriate level of authority being obtained from a BFSO. Cases observed by inspectors during onsite inspection also raised this as an issue. In the case of a child returning to the UK with their EEA national parents, subsequent checks of CID by inspectors revealed that detention notes did not record approval from a BFHO or a BFSO.

During onsite observations, inspectors were advised by BFSOs that they had identified that the detention of children was not always escalated to them for the necessary approval. Additionally, BF OAD’s ‘Casework Assurance Summary’ had highlighted a similar finding and had referred specific case examples to juxtaposed controls.

In relation to cases concerning children, inspectors identified 2 cases where children’s records were not linked to associated cases for their parents or guardians. In one case, the passenger was listed as being the main applicant. It is expected that Border Force’s duties under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 extend to ensure that any relevant and applicable policies are adhered to and that records reflect this. During onsite, inspectors established that, in practice, BFOs were exercising their section 55 duties well. No observations of any encounters with children raised any safeguarding concerns.

Another trend identified during file sampling was the significant number of cases where records did not include the UK address, including where passengers were either living in the UK, or where there were addresses associated with the named sponsors. This applied to cases where passengers were both refused and granted permission to enter. In both scenarios, this...
information should be recorded and relevant and proportionate checks on such addresses may form part of further examination. Inspectors deemed that this was a key consideration when a passenger that has been subject to further examination is subsequently granted permission to enter, especially where they are hosted by sponsors.

4.48 In addition to this, inspectors noted that there were intelligence considerations that meant the retention of addresses of sponsors was important.

4.49 Minor caseworking errors were also discovered during case sampling. These included some general misadministration, but inspectors considered these were indicative of the poor quality of caseworking encountered more widely. The following list is illustrative of this point and is not exhaustive:

- incorrect nationalities inputted for holders of refugee travel documents
- ineligible passengers granted permission to enter with code 1/code 1a
- key document tracking not completed
- case notes and refusal forms not being contemporaneous with records
- removal records not recorded for ‘elect to embark’ cases
- incorrect refusal and forgery codes
- duplicate cases entered onto CID.

Safeguarding and modern slavery and ‘section 55’ considerations

4.50 Case notes were lacking in sufficient detail for inspectors to ascertain whether safeguarding duties had always been upheld. In 2 cases, inspectors recorded that the quality and detail of notes was insufficient to demonstrate that the BFOs dealing with them had adequately considered safeguarding and the identification of modern slavery in their decision making. While the BFOs may have exercised these duties, it was not readily apparent from the notes that this was the case.

4.51 In one instance, a passenger who was travelling with friends who was found to have articles thought to be indicative of them being engaged in the sex trade, did not appear to have been considered as being at potential risk of modern slavery or trafficking. The case notes do not demonstrate how the BFO was satisfied that the potential risks to this passenger were mitigated.

4.52 Another instance related to a Ukrainian passenger who was employed in Russia as the domestic worker in the private household of an American and Irish family. The family decided to relocate from Russia to the Republic of Ireland. They were seeking permission to enter the UK with the intention of transiting to the Republic of Ireland. The passenger did not hold entry clearance for this or any other purpose.

4.53 While the case notes indicated that the BFO dealing with this case examined evidence of the passenger’s employment as the nanny of the family they were travelling with and had satisfied themselves that the employment was genuine, the notes do not fully consider the risk that the passenger could have been a potential victim of modern slavery or at risk from domestic

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30 Code 1 and code 1A are case outcomes and passport endorsements which can be used by BFOs when granting someone permission to enter the UK. Code 1A has a time limit but does not impose any restriction on recourse to public funds or employment. Code 1 has a time limit and does not allow recourse to public funds but does permit employment. The endorsement allows those who have been granted time to make any necessary application for permission to stay in the UK.
servitude. The notes suggest that the BFO engaged only with the passenger’s employer: a Russian bank statement shows payments from the bank account of the employer, as well as photographs and evidence of communication between the employer and employee via WhatsApp. It was not clear from the case notes that the passenger herself was spoken to, either in English or via an interpreter.

4.54 Furthermore, as the passenger and co-travellers were seeking permission to enter the UK to transit to the Republic of Ireland, checks with the relevant authorities in the Republic of Ireland should have been undertaken.\textsuperscript{31} When considered against the wider context of the safeguarding concerns, conducting and recording such a check might have been sufficient to mitigate any relevant concerns.

**IS81 and ‘encounters logs’**

4.55 As part of evidence requests, inspectors sought copies of IS81 logbooks,\textsuperscript{32} or their equivalent, from all juxtaposed controls. It was noted from Border Force’s submission that there was an inconsistent approach towards this, with some ports using paper-based logs, and others having SharePoint-based multi-port electronic ‘intelligent’ documents.

4.56 At Paris Gare du Nord, inspectors were given a detailed overview of the electronic ‘encounters log’, which records, amongst other things, the issuance of form IS81 to passengers. Inspectors were given a detailed breakdown of how the documents worked, the benefits of the approach taken in that port and how this specific tool had come to be developed. Inspectors were told that a key reason for the use of this style of electronic logbook was as a result of Recommendation 26 of the Windrush Lessons Learned Review.\textsuperscript{33}

4.57 Inspectors were shown the level of detail, automation and information contained within this document. Specifically, the document was able to automatically indicate when detention under form IS81 had exceeded the 1-hour period, as set out in policy.

4.58 The document also offered several key reporting features, such as ‘dashboard’ features for operational managers. If records were contemporaneously updated, this information could be used by operational managers and staff to understand real-time casework priorities. Inspectors were also told that, as the document was hosted on Border Force Europe’s SharePoint, it was also in use in Brussels. Inspectors considered this an opportunity for Border Force to deploy a consistent approach to recording the issuance of IS81s, supported by advances in IT, moving away from paper-based logbooks and addressing Recommendation 22 of the Windrush Lessons Learned Review.

4.59 Inspectors enquired as to any plans Border Force might have to expand the use of this document to other juxtaposed controls but were not advised of any plans to do so, or any reasons why this was not already the case.

\textsuperscript{32}The IS81 logbook is a maintained record of all passengers issued with the form and, therefore, subjected to further examination. It contains biographical details, the BFO dealing and outcomes. In some ports, other information is retained relevant to the encounter.
\textsuperscript{33}Recommendation 22 – The Home Office should invest in improving data quality, management information and performance measures which focus on results as well as throughput. Leaders in the department should promote the best use of this data and improve the capability to anticipate, monitor and identify trends, as well as collate casework data which links performance data to Parliamentary questions, complaints and other information, including feedback from external agencies, departments and the public (with the facility to escalate local issues). The Home Office should also invest in improving its knowledge management and record keeping.
Quality assurance

4.60 Assurance processes formed part of the inspection of juxtaposed controls. Inspectors asked for evidence in 2 parts: one covering first-line assurance mechanisms relating to casework, and another pertaining to second-line and third-line assurance processes in use, conducted both internally and externally, for the preceding 3 years, as well as subsequent action plans and progress reports as a consequence of any reports.

4.61 The evidence provided in response to the second of these requests included several reports relating to reviews that had taken place. Inspectors noted that the ‘Summary of other findings relating to juxtaposed controls 2022’ review findings were consistent with that of BF OAD’s ‘Casework Assurance Summary’ review. In particular, it was noted that no or insufficient case notes on cases was a key finding, as was the recording of the right authority level for decisions to refuse. However, no action plans or progress reports were received in response to the evidence requests and so inspectors were not able to consider the impact of these reviews on the quality of casework at juxtaposed controls.

4.62 During onsite observations, inspectors spoke with BFHOS and BFSOs about assurance processes. In Paris Gare du Nord, inspectors were shown the daily assurance checklist document that guided port-wide assurance and covered all grades. Inspectors asked the duty BFHO about their role in the assurance process. The duty BFHO explained they felt the port had a robust assurance culture led confidently by the BFSO responsible for assurance at the port.

4.63 Inspectors asked about the assurance of port files and casework. In Paris, it was noted that each port file was affixed with a ‘casework actions’ checklist, which included 17 items, including whether a baggage search had been conducted, whether a sponsor interview had occurred, whether the passenger had a right of appeal or right to administrative review and whether a BFO had concerns as to whether someone was a potential victim of modern slavery.

4.64 Two of the actions on the checklist related to assurance processes. It was noted that, in practice, completion of this assurance does not form part of the routine caseworking process. Alongside other administrative processes, such as the transfer of cases to the Home Office’s new caseworking system, Atlas, assurance is often not completed simultaneously, but are completed “as and when”. Inspectors were, however, told by the duty BFHO that paper port files are routinely assured, with emphasis being placed on a check of a refusal form, but that this check might not always encompass checks of caseworking on CID to assure the quality of data entry.

4.65 In Coquelles, inspectors asked about the local assurance practices. They were told that BFHOS regularly assured the IS81 log but that no records of this assurance were kept. Inspectors observed that the paper IS81 log was only “zedded off” on a limited number of days. One BFHO told inspectors that they always checked CID cases they had authorised but they doubted if other BFHOS did this.

4.66 Overall, inspectors were not able to determine how first-line assurance processes were adequately reviewing casework issues in order to address immediate issues. Although second line assurance was taking place, inspectors were unable to see how it was being used to drive improvements at the controls.

34 Atlas will replace CID as the main immigration caseworking system across all Home Office business areas.
35 The process of drawing a Z-shaped line through a page to indicate its completion.
‘Elect to embark’

4.67 The ‘elect to embark’ process was established prior to the inception of juxtaposed controls. Passengers who have been issued with form IS81, requiring them to submit to further examination, can choose at any point prior to an on-entry application being decided, to withdraw that application and ‘elect to embark’ from the UK. ‘Elect to embark’ is also referred to by Border Force as ‘withdrawn by applicant’.

4.68 In these circumstances, the passenger must pay for their own return journey, their passport should be endorsed with a stamp to signal that they have decided to leave of their own accord, and the case should be entered onto CID to ensure that a contemporaneous record is kept of the interaction between that individual and Border Force.

4.69 The choice to allow or invite a passenger to withdraw their application for permission to enter is less burdensome in terms of administrative actions than the full examination processes, particularly if that examination results in a refusal of permission to enter. Correspondingly, it also results in the passenger spending less time being detained under immigration powers.

4.70 However, the practical application of ‘elect to embark’ measures at juxtaposed controls differs from how it is commonly used at UK-based ports, wherein passengers are often encouraged to ‘elect to embark’ at the juxtaposed locations. There is no operational guidance provided to BFOs at the juxtaposed controls on the use of the ‘elect to embark’ process. What guidance does exist relates to practical matters, such as how to endorse the passenger’s travel document.

4.71 The below case study illustrates the inconsistent and inappropriate use of ‘elect to embark’ at juxtaposed controls.
A family of 4 passengers encountered at Amsterdam who presented counterfeit UK visit visas

A family of 4 presented their passports, which appeared to contain UK visa vignettes, at the UKCZ in Amsterdam seeking permission to enter the UK as visitors for a period of 2 weeks. Home Office systems indicated that the family had recently been refused entry clearances. This discrepancy was put to the passengers who stated that this had been resolved.

Initial checks of the visa vignettes identified that they may not be genuine. The BFO sought the advice of colleagues, including a forgery-trained officer, who confirmed that they were not genuine. The family members were served form IS81 to subject them to further examination. The BFO spoke to the passengers and explained that the entry clearance vignettes were not genuine, which the passengers admitted.

By this time, the train on which the passengers were intending to travel to the UK had departed. At the same time, a colleague of the BFO contacted the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar) [Dutch Police], who arrived at the Primary Control Point and spoke with the passengers. The passengers advised the police that they no longer wanted to travel to the UK and sought asylum in the Netherlands. The KMar asked that the passengers be served form JUXT3, granting them the legal powers to accept responsibility for the passengers, so that they could progress their applications for asylum in the Netherlands. This course of action was approved by a BFHO.

The case details were entered onto the CID and forms JUXT3 were generated. The documents and passports were handed to the KMar and the passengers were escorted away.

After 6 days, the BFO dealing at Amsterdam received a telephone call from a BFHO (location not stated) who asked that the passengers be refused. The BFO dealing amended the case outcome and generated the paperwork refusing the passengers permission to enter and instigating a 12-month ban for use of false documents. The BFO then sought to ask the KMar to both serve the refusal form on the passengers and obtain their passports back so that the correct refusal stamp could be endorsed in them.

The KMar later advised that they could not serve paperwork on behalf of Border Force, nor could they return the passports to be endorsed but assured the BFO dealing that, as they contained counterfeit entry clearance vignettes, the passports would not be returned to the passengers.
ICiBI comments

In this circumstance, inspectors determined that this should have been treated as an ‘elect to embark’ case, as the passengers withdrew their application for permission to enter in order to seek asylum in the Netherlands. It was not considered appropriate to serve refusal to the file after the passengers had left the control zone. Inspectors considered that there was a risk that the subsequent refusal here is not lawful as the passengers were not present in the UKCZ and were therefore not subject to UK immigration law at the time of the refusal. The decision to refuse was made 6 days later.

On the CID, the forgery code has been recorded incorrectly on the document screen on all 4 cases. The correct code should have been F6A (forged UK vignette), not F5 (counterfeit document, which is for counterfeit travel documents). Additionally, the forged document passenger details had not been completed, which might be used to inform intelligence gathering. The location of the documents is not recorded. There was no BFSO authority recorded to detain the children in this case, as required by policy.

It is not clear why the Dutch authorities were contacted before further examination of these passengers was completed, where Border Force could have examined the passengers under UK law. This would have enabled Border Force to refuse the applicants under Part 9 of the immigration rules for the use of false representations, which would have been a mandatory refusal. The form JUXT3 appears to have been used here outside of its intended purpose, which is for use when an examination cannot be completed and the passengers are asked to return the following day. It is not apparent why refusal forms were not generated given that this would have taken only slightly longer than generating forms JUXT3.

‘JUXT3’ forms and ‘elect to embark’

4.72 The ‘JUXT3’ form process is a slightly amended version of the ‘elect to embark’ process. At Paris Gare du Nord, the ‘JUXT3’ form process was designed for use where an examination could not be completed before the station was due to close for the day (as the Eurostar ports do not operate 24 hours per day) or due to insufficient staff availability to conclude a further examination within a reasonable timescale.

4.73 Post onsite observations and following a debrief meeting with Border Force, inspectors were provided with a document titled ‘Instruction on use of JXT3 Forms’ (sic). This document was undated and not presented in the same format as national Border Force guidance or instructions. It referred only to use in France and Belgium and it was not clear when or how this was disseminated to staff.

4.74 The instructions contained some examples of when it was and was not appropriate to use the JUXT3 outcome for applications but stated that ultimately, “managers should continue to consider the individual circumstances in each case and retain discretion to exercise their judgement”.

4.75 The instructions go on to state that all JUXT3 outcomes must be recorded in the ‘encounters log, and that an associated CID record should be created, except where the passenger is advised to leave to obtain a document – a valid EU identity document, replacement Electronic Visa Waiver (EVW) or Certificate Of Sponsorship (COS) and would be immediately admissible on presentation of that document.

36 And other Eurostar juxtaposed controls such as Amsterdam, Brussels and Rotterdam
Inspectors noted the large proportion of cases in the file sampling exercise which resulted in ‘elect to embark’ or ‘JUXT3 served’. During onsite observations, it was clear to inspectors that the ‘elect to embark’/‘JUXT’ form process was being used to expedite the removal of passengers from the UKCZ where they were not properly documented, or where there was insufficient staff or time to conduct a further examination interview. In some cases, these processes were being used for other reasons, such as admissible passengers at Coquelles no longer having a viable means of transport to board a shuttle if the driver of the vehicle that they were travelling in was refused entry to the UK or elected to embark themselves.

Inspectors observed BFOs explaining to passengers that they were unlikely to meet the requirements of the immigration rules if examined (for example, due to the lack of a travel document) and therefore they were offered the opportunity to withdraw their application for permission to enter. This process still required the French authorities to escort the passenger from the UKCZ, and they were not therefore free to leave until the French authorities collected them. Border Force staff told inspectors that this could take a considerable period of time if the French were busy, and in some instances, the French delegated this responsibility to port security.

The same situation also exists at the UKCZs in Belgium and the Netherlands.

Inspectors observed that, in the absence of clear guidelines on the application of ‘elect to embark’ measures, there was potential for this process to be abused, for example, by placing passengers in a position where they felt compelled to withdraw their application for permission to enter.

In the cases observed by inspectors during the onsite phase, no documentation was provided to the passenger to explain their rights prior to them ‘electing to embark’, the implications of the decision to withdraw their application for permission to enter, or for the passenger to evidence their consent to withdrawing their application. This contrasts with a passenger who elects not to exercise a right of appeal, where it is necessary for the passenger to sign a specific form to confirm their consent or intent to waive that right.

There are also ‘grey areas’ regarding co-travellers of those who ‘elect to embark’. In Coquelles for example, inspectors saw co-travellers who were properly documented for travel but were unable to do so as the only driver for their vehicle was unable to travel. These individuals were treated in the same way as improperly documented passengers and were handed to the French Police.

There appeared to be confusion amongst Border Force staff as to whether such individuals were detained under immigration powers and whether they should be recorded as an ‘elect to embark’ case on Home Office IT systems. There was, however, unanimous agreement within Border Force that such individuals were unable to leave the UKCZ and they were therefore in effect ‘quasi-detained’ until the French authorities collected them.

Case recording inconsistencies with ‘elect to embark’

All passengers who are allowed to ‘elect to embark’ or withdraw their application should have their travel document endorsed accordingly and the case recorded on CID. This means that on the next occasion that the individual applies for permission to enter, either in the UK or at a juxtaposed facility, the BFO encountering them will have the previous encounter flagged to them to take into account as part of their consideration.
From the sampling exercise, of the 109 cases examined, 30 had ‘elect to embark’ as an outcome, 2 as ‘JUXT3’ served and one as withdrawn by applicant. This demonstrates how all 3 outcomes are used by Border Force and one of the reasons why accurate statistical analysis of this area of work and its impact is difficult to achieve.

However, this relies on ‘elect to embark’ cases being correctly recorded in the first instance. Inspectors observed that this was not the case during onsite visits.

A check of paperwork at Coquelles revealed that the French authorities had been notified on 24 April 2022 of the decision to ‘elect to embark’ by 2 passengers: a British national and a German national travelling by car. Apart from the 1 piece of paper, no other records, paper or electronic, could be located to indicate the circumstances or details of the encounter. It should be noted that the British national did not have to apply for permission to enter the UK and ‘elect to embark’ is, therefore, not an appropriate outcome to use in any instance for this scenario.

In Paris, inspectors observed that ‘elect to embark’ or ‘JUXT3’ was not always entered on CID but was recorded as an encounter in a locally maintained electronic log. This log is not available to all juxtaposed controls. Therefore, if a passenger who had been recorded on this log attempted to enter at another control, for example, Coquelles, there is no means of BFOs being aware that they had been subject to further examination.

Inconsistency in the exercise of initial and further examination

Inspectors observed differences in the level of scrutiny and questioning applied to different nationality groups. Sometimes it was clear why, as there are various policy and guidance documents that allow for ‘lighter touch’ scrutiny for nationals with permission to use the ePassport gates, for example. However, while inspectors did not observe Romanian nationals entering through Coquelles or Paris Gare du Nord, data provided to inspectors indicated that Romanian nationals were consistently subject to the greatest number of further examinations of all nationalities at the juxtaposed controls.

Nationality data on those subject to further examination during the reference period of the case sampling exercise is provided in Figure 7.
The data showed that 29% (397) of passengers subject to further examination at the juxtaposed controls in March 2022 were Romanian nationals. Excluding Ukrainian national cases 30% (323), French nationals accounted for the next most significant number of further examination cases 4% (64 cases).

The number of Ukrainian nationals subject to further examination at the juxtaposed controls in March 2022 is attributable to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Of the 109 cases sampled by inspectors, 22 (20%) involved Ukrainian nationals.

Inspectors examined a range of media articles and in an article published on 15 September 2021, comment was made following the publication of the quarterly migration statistics in quarter 2 of 2021. It reported that around 60% of those subject to further examination at the border were Romanian nationals. It went on to question whether the Home Office was racially profiling certain nationalities at the border.

Inspectors reviewed the quarterly immigration statistics for further examination at the border at all juxtaposed ports. The data showed that Romanian nationals were consistently subject to further examination more than any other nationality. In the first 3 quarters of 2021, Romanian nationals were subject to further examination at the juxtaposed controls at a rate of 10 times that of the second highest nationality. This is illustrated in Figure 8. Due to the limitations in Border Force’s data collection and the absence of nationality-based arrivals data, it is not possible to say what percentage of Romanians are referred for further examination.

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39 In its factual accuracy response, the Home Office stated: “Whilst there is a caveat around % of referrals, it is noted that these figures are without context as to the number of arrivals and are reflective of the high number of arrivals of Romanian nationals overall.”
Figure 8
Further examination at juxtaposed controls, by nationality as a percentage of total interventions<sup>40</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2021 Q1</th>
<th>2021 Q2</th>
<th>2021 Q3</th>
<th>2021 Q4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>58.07%</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>54.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>6.24%</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4.39%</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>4.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>3.92%</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.94 A similar pattern was identified by inspectors during the file sampling exercise. In March 2022, the number of Romanian nationals subject to further examination at the juxtaposed controls was significantly greater than any other nationality.

4.95 BFOs are instructed not to routinely test the credibility of EEA nationals once the basis on which they are seeking permission to enter has been established. The data analysis found that Romanian nationals accounted for 29% (397) of further examination cases at the juxtaposed controls in March 2022. According to the transparency data, in the period following the end of the grace period, Romanian nationals accounted for between 36% and 57% of those subject to further examination.

4.96 In respect of processing B5JSSK nationals at the border, Home Office guidance issued in 2019<sup>41</sup> (since withdrawn) stated:

“Officers’ powers when examining B5JSSK nationals to test whether they qualify for entry remain unchanged. However, officers should be mindful when conducting initial interviews that the decision to allow B5JSSK to use ePassport gates was taken on the basis of a detailed risk assessment and that, if they had used the ePassport gate, they would not have been questioned at all.”

4.97 While this instruction has since been superseded, it was published at the time the policy decision was made to allow B5JSSK nationals to use the ePassport gates without an assessment by a BFO of whether or not they met the requirements of the immigration rules. The directive of the 2019 B5JSSK guidance to Border Force staff cited above implied that B5JSSK nationals should be subject to less scrutiny at the border. This may explain why inspectors observed a reduced level of scrutiny and questioning of B5JSSK nationals compared with other nationalities during the onsite phase, consistent with the spirit of the guidance above.

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<sup>40</sup> Transparency data includes clandestine entrants who were encountered at juxtaposed controls.

Current Border Force guidance on the use of ePassport gates by B5JSSK nationals states that if rejected by the ePassport gates, B5JSSK nationals should be subject to intention checking by the referrals officer. Inspectors were unable to identify any further extant internal guidance on the processing of B5JSSK nationals, beyond the requirements of the Border Force Operating Mandate. In relation to staffed ports of entry, in respect of non-visa nationals, the Operating Mandate requires that BFOs:

“Interview the individual to establish the purpose and duration of stay, to be satisfied that they qualify for entry under the appropriate category of the Immigration Rules and that there are no general grounds for refusal.”

As part of the evidence request to the Home Office, inspectors requested copies of all equality impact assessments (EIAs) directly or indirectly related to operations at juxtaposed controls. Four EIAs were provided. The first was related to the extension of the power to use reasonable force in accordance with section 146 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to the juxtaposed controls. The second for the approach taken to passengers who may have a claim to settled or pre-settled status post grace period. The third, for allowing EEA nationals to continue to use the ePassport gates post EU exit; to obtain permission verbally; and for BFOs to examine any EEA national presenting to a BFO at a staffed control desk. The fourth on eligibility to enter the UK using ePassport gates, updated in September 2021.

The third and fourth EIA considered the disparity of treatment between those who are subject to a credibility assessment by a BFO, and those who can use an ePassport gate (and are therefore not subject to a credibility assessment). This did not, however, explain why or refer to certain EEA nationals being more likely to be subjected to scrutiny than others.

Section 29 of the Equality Act 2010 (as amended) requires that government departments in the exercise of a public function, do not subject end users to discrimination, harassment, or victimisation based upon protected characteristics. It should be noted that section 17 of schedule 3 of the Equality Act 2010 exempts the exercise of functions under the various immigration acts from the requirements in section 29 in relation to nationality or ethnic or national origins, providing that a ministerial authorisation is provided to this effect.

Home Office guidance on discrimination and differentiation states that:

“There is an existing, rolling ministerial authorisation which is renewed every 3 months, which permits direct discrimination on grounds of nationality. It sets out nationalities which can be:

• subject to additional checks for visa applications, or applications in the UK, while travelling to the UK and at the border

• given priority for setting removal directions.

To check what nationalities are currently on the list, or to obtain a copy of the most up-to-date ministerial authorisation, please contact your directorate secretariat.”

42 S146 empowers a BFO to use reasonable force when exercising any powers under the various immigration acts.
45 In its factual accuracy response, the Home Office stated: “There is no EIA (or MA [ministerial authorisation]) authorising treating Romanians differently, because there is no policy or operational instruction to do so.”
## Annex A: Border Force guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document title</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOI [Interim Operational Instruction] Primary Check Point (PCP) log – completion of hard copy version (internal)</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
<td>Instruction to staff advising them of the establishment and use of a new Border Force PCP log.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary control point (PCP) log: completing the hard copy version (internal)</td>
<td>August 2019</td>
<td>Guidance informing Border Force Officers (BFOs) about how to complete the PCP log.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ePassport gate – eligible nationalities (internal)</td>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs how to process passengers who are eligible to use ePassport gates by virtue of their nationality through the UK border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Work: refusal wordings (internal)</td>
<td>April 2022</td>
<td>Guidance informing Home Office staff of the standard wordings to be used when drafting a refusal decision to be served to an applicant on the Temporary Work routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI Withdrawal of ID cards (update) – mitigation extension to 28 February 2022 (internal)</td>
<td>January 2022</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs of the extension of the freight driver and passenger ‘one-strike’ mitigations for EU, European Economic Area (EEA) or Swiss national ID card holders (presenting no passport at point of entry) to 28 February 2022.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI Processing arrivals from Ukraine and Leave outside the rules (LOtR) at the border (internal)</td>
<td>March 2022</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs about the updated process for dealing with refugees under the Ukrainian Scheme [Not mentioned again in report], in particular those needing to defer the enrolment of their biometrics until arrival in the UK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOI 101 – 21 (BF) End of Grace Period (internal)</td>
<td>June 2021</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs on how to deal with passengers seeking entry to the UK under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) following the end of a grace period at midnight on 30 June 2022.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ethical Decision-Making Model</td>
<td>November 2021</td>
<td>Publicly available guidance informing Migration and Borders decision-makers about the ethical decision-making model and how to use it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document title</td>
<td>Date of publication</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endorsements and signals</strong> (internal)</td>
<td>August 2019</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs about the significance of the most frequently used endorsements and signals placed into passports by on-entry, after entry and pre-entry officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigration interviews</strong> (internal)</td>
<td>February 2018</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs on how to conduct immigration interviews. This includes interviews at the PCP and further interviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visit guidance</strong></td>
<td>October 2021</td>
<td>Guidance informing the public about applications for visas, permission to enter and permission to stay in the UK for visitors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EEA nationals: refusal of admission</strong> (internal)</td>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs how to refuse admission for EEA nationals and their dependants under the saved EEA Regulations 2016, as well as under the immigration rules where grounds for refusal derive from EU law thresholds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Settlement Scheme: Border Force Guidance – EEA nationals and family members</strong> (internal)</td>
<td>April 2021</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs of operational changes for the processing of EEA nationals and their family members at the border following the introduction of the EU Settlement Scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examination powers and Home Office form IS81</strong> (internal)</td>
<td>March 2022</td>
<td>Guidance informing BFOs about examination powers, issuing an IS81 and referral procedures to a Border Force Higher Officer at the primary control point. It also provides details of the responsibilities of BFOs for detained individuals at the PCP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visiting the UK as an EU, EEA or Swiss citizen</strong></td>
<td>April 2022</td>
<td>UK government-issued advice about crossing the UK border and visiting the UK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B: Photographs and forms

UK Control Zone, Coquelles
UK Control Zone, Paris Gare du Nord
Example of a JÜXT3 form (from Paris Gare du Nord

Port Reference:  
Home Office Reference:  

Home Office  
Border Force, Border Force South & Europe  
Martello House  
Sheerway Road  
Folkestone  
CT19 4RH  

Telephone Fax  

IMMIGRATION ACT 1971  
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM ACT 1999  
IMMIGRATION (LEAVE TO REMAIN) ORDER 2000  
THE CHANNEL TUNNEL (INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS) ORDER 1993  
THE CHANNEL TUNNEL (INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS) (AMENDMENT NO.3) ORDER 2001

To/À la Police aux frontières  
The under-mentioned person is not in possession of the necessary documents for entry to the U.K.:  
La personne sous nommée n’est pas en possession des documents requis pour pénétrer en Royaume-Uni:  

Name/Nom:  

Date of Birth/Date de naissance:  

Nationality/Nationalité:  

Reason/Motif:  

☐ UK Border Force has had insufficient time to assess his/her admissibility.  
  Le Service frontalier britannique n’a pas eu assez de temps pour évaluer son admissibilité.  

☐ UK Border Force has insufficient information to assess his/her admissibility.  
  Le Service frontalier britannique n’a pas pu prendre une décision sur son admissibilité par manque d’informations.  

☐ The person is not in possession of a valid national passport or other document satisfactorily establishing identity and nationality.  
  La personne n’est détenteur ni d’un passeport en cours de validité, ni d’un autre document faisant preuve de manière satisfaisante de sa nationalité et identité  

☐ Other reasons  
  Autres motifs  

The person has been invited to return with the necessary information to be fully examined in accordance with the Immigration Acts. The person is now handed over to the Police aux frontières in accordance with Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol  

La personne a été invitée à revenir avec les informations nécessaires afin que le service britannique puisse effectuer un contrôle ultérieurement, conformément à la législation en vigueur. La personne est maintenant remise à la Police aux frontières conformément à l’Article 3 du Protocole additionnel au Protocole de Sangatte  

Immigration Officer:  
Date:  

1 In accordance with Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol  
2 Conformément à l’Article 3 du Protocole additionnel au Protocole de Sangatte
Annex C: Role and remit of the Independent Chief Inspector

The role of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (until 2012, the Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency) was established by the UK Borders Act 2007. Sections 48-56 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (as amended) provide the legislative framework for the inspection of the efficiency and effectiveness of the performance of functions relating to immigration, asylum, nationality and customs by the Home Secretary and by any person exercising such functions on her behalf. The legislation empowers the Independent Chief Inspector to monitor, report on and make recommendations about all such functions in particular:

- consistency of approach
- the practice and performance of listed persons compared to other persons doing similar activities
- the procedure in making decisions
- the treatment of claimants and applicants
- certification under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum act 2002 (c. 41) (unfounded claim)
- the law about discrimination in the exercise of functions, including reliance on section 19D of the Race Relations Act 1976 (c. 74) (exception for immigration functions)
- the procedure in relation to the exercise of enforcement powers (including powers of arrest, entry, search and seizure)
- practice and procedure in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of offences
- the procedure in relation to the conduct of criminal proceedings
- whether customs functions have been appropriately exercised by the Secretary of State and the Director of Border Revenue
- the provision of information
- the handling of complaints; and
- the content of information about conditions in countries outside the United Kingdom, which the Secretary of State compiles and makes available, for purposes connected with immigration and asylum, to immigration officers and other officials.

In addition, the legislation enables the Secretary of State to request the Independent Chief Inspector to report to her in writing in relation to specified matters.

The legislation requires the Independent Chief Inspector to report in writing to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State lays all reports before Parliament, which she has committed to do within eight weeks of receipt, subject to both Houses of Parliament being in session.
Reports are published in full except for any material that the Secretary of State determines it is undesirable to publish for reasons of national security or where publication might jeopardise an individual’s safety, in which case the legislation permits the Secretary of State to omit the relevant passages from the published report.

As soon as a report has been laid in Parliament, it is published on the Inspectorate’s website, together with the Home Office’s response to the report and recommendations.
Annex D: ICIBI ‘expectations’

Background and explanatory documents are easy to understand and use (e.g. statements of intent (both ministerial and managerial), impact assessments, legislation, policies, guidance, instructions, strategies, business plans, intranet and GOV.UK pages, posters, leaflets etc.)

- They are written in plain, unambiguous English (with foreign language versions available, where appropriate)
- They are kept up to date
- They are readily accessible to anyone who needs to rely on them (with online signposting and links, wherever possible)

Processes are simple to follow and transparent

- They are IT-enabled and include input formatting to prevent users from making data entry errors
- Mandatory requirements, including the nature and extent of evidence required to support applications and claims, are clearly defined
- The potential for blockages and delays is designed out, wherever possible
- They are resourced to meet time and quality standards (including legal requirements, Service Level Agreements, published targets)

Anyone exercising an immigration, asylum, nationality or customs function on behalf of the Home Secretary is fully competent

- Individuals understand their role, responsibilities, accountabilities and powers
- Everyone receives the training they need for their current role and for their professional development, plus regular feedback on their performance
- Individuals and teams have the tools, support and leadership they need to perform efficiently, effectively and lawfully
- Everyone is making full use of their powers and capabilities, including to prevent, detect, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute offences
- The workplace culture ensures that individuals feel able to raise concerns and issues without fear of the consequences
Decisions and actions are ‘right first time’

• They are demonstrably evidence-based or, where appropriate, intelligence-led
• They are made in accordance with relevant legislation and guidance
• They are reasonable (in light of the available evidence) and consistent
• They are recorded and communicated accurately, in the required format and detail, and can be readily retrieved (with due regard to data protection requirements)

Errors are identified, acknowledged and promptly ‘put right’

• Safeguards, management oversight, and quality assurance measures are in place, are tested and are seen to be effective
• Complaints are handled efficiently, effectively and consistently
• Lessons are learned and shared, including from administrative reviews and litigation
• There is a commitment to continuous improvement, including by the prompt implementation of recommendations from reviews, inspections and audits

Each immigration, asylum, nationality or customs function has a Home Office (Borders, Immigration and Citizenship System) ‘owner’

The BICS ‘owner’ is accountable for:

• implementation of relevant policies and processes
• performance (informed by routine collection and analysis of Management Information (MI) and data, and monitoring of agreed targets/deliverables/budgets)
• resourcing (including workforce planning and capability development, including knowledge and information management)
• managing risks (including maintaining a Risk Register)
• communications, collaborations and deconfliction within the Home Office, with other government departments and agencies, and other affected bodies
• effective monitoring and management of relevant contracted out services
• stakeholder engagement (including customers, applicants, claimants and their representatives).
Acknowledgements

The inspection team is grateful to the Home Office for its co-operation and assistance during this inspection and for the contributions from the staff who participated.

Inspection team members

Lead Inspector: Tessa Wilson
Project manager: Gary Slevin
Inspector: Chris Thompson
Inspector: Daniel Cartwright