Country Policy and Information Note
Somalia: security and humanitarian situation in Mogadishu

Version 1.0
May 2022
Preface

Purpose

This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme.

It is split into 2 parts: (1) an assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below.

Assessment

This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note - that is information in the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw - by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies:

- a person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm
- that the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
- that the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules
- a person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)
- a person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory
- a claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and
- if a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

Country of origin information

The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

The structure and content of the country information section follows a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to this note.
All information included in the note was published or made publicly available on or before the ‘cut-off’ date(s) in the country information section. Any event taking place or report/article published after these date(s) is not included.

All information is publicly accessible or can be made publicly available. Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

- the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
- how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
- the currency and detail of information
- whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources.

Multiple sourcing is used to ensure that the information is accurate and balanced, which is compared and contrasted where appropriate so that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture is provided of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote. Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

**Feedback**

Our goal is to provide accurate, reliable and up-to-date COI and clear guidance. We welcome feedback on how to improve our products. If you would like to comment on this note, please email the [Country Policy and Information Team](mailto:countrypolicyandinformationteam@home.gsi.gov.uk).

**Independent Advisory Group on Country Information**

The [Independent Advisory Group on Country Information](http://www.home.gsi.gov.uk) (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to support him in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of COI produced by the Home Office.

The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. The IAGCI may be contacted at:

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Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s pages of the [gov.uk website](http://www.gov.uk).
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Assessment

Section 1 updated: 16 May 2022

1. Introduction

1.1 Basis of claim

1.1.1 That the general humanitarian situation in Mogadishu is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

and/or

1.1.2 That the security situation in Mogadishu is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict, as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

1.2 Points to note

1.2.1 This CPIN contains an **update to the assessment only** to include the Upper Tribunal’s (UT) new country guidance for Somalia: [OA (Somalia) Somalia CG [2022] UKUT 00033 (IAC)](https://go.nationalarchives.gov.uk/129826), heard 14-21 June 2021, promulgated 2 February 2022.

1.2.2 The COI sections have **not** been updated since the previous iteration of this CPIN was published (November 2020). The COI contained in each section covers the period up until the date indicated in the respective section heading.

1.2.3 At present it is only possible to remove nationals of Somalia to Mogadishu or, in some cases, to Puntland or Somaliland for those formerly resident and having clan connections in those areas. Therefore, unless the person can be removed to Somaliland or Puntland, the consideration is whether the person would be at risk on return to Mogadishu.

1.2.4 In [OA](https://go.nationalarchives.gov.uk/129826), the UT largely reaffirmed the country guidance given in [MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC)](https://go.nationalarchives.gov.uk/129826), and provided additional country guidance regarding the assessment of all of the circumstances of a potential returnee to Mogadishu.

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Section 2 updated: 16 May 2022

2. Consideration of issues

2.1 Credibility

2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on [Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status](https://go.nationalarchives.gov.uk/129826).
2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

2.2 Exclusion

2.2.1 All sides of the conflict including Al Shabaab, government security forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have been responsible for serious human rights abuses. Al Shabaab was proscribed by the UK government as an international terrorist group in March 2010 (see, Actors in conflict: Al Shabaab and Nature of violence).

2.2.2 If it is accepted that the person has been involved with any of the above groups, then decision makers must consider whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses applies. If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection. Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits.

2.2.3 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instructions on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Restricted Leave.

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2.3 Convention reason(s)

2.3.1 A severe humanitarian situation and/or a state of civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down, which might exist in some places outside of government control, do not of themselves give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

2.3.2 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP).

2.3.3 However, before considering whether a person requires protection because of the general humanitarian and/or security situation, decision makers must consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Where the person qualifies for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to consider if there are substantial grounds for believing the person faces a real risk of serious harm meriting a grant of HP.
2.3.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds see the Asylum Instruction, *Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status*.

2.3.5 For guidance on Humanitarian Protection see the Asylum Instruction, *Humanitarian Protection*.

2.4 Risk: humanitarian situation in Mogadishu

a) Summary

2.4.1 There are not substantial grounds for believing the general humanitarian situation in Mogadishu is so severe that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as set out in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii). However decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk.

2.4.2 For guidance on Article 3 / paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the immigration rules, see the *Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection*.

b) General findings

2.4.3 The UT in *OA* held in paragraph 356a that the country guidance given in paragraph 407 of *MOJ* remained applicable.

2.4.4 This set out whether the humanitarian situation is such that there is a real risk of serious harm for someone returning to Mogadishu:

‘A person returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will look to his nuclear family, if he has one living in the city, for assistance in re-establishing himself and securing a livelihood. Although a returnee may also seek assistance from his clan members who are not close relatives, such help is only likely to be forthcoming for majority clan members, as minority clans may have little to offer.

‘The significance of clan membership in Mogadishu has changed. Clans now provide, potentially, social support mechanisms and assistance with access to livelihoods, performing less of a protection function than previously. There are no clan militias in Mogadishu, no clan violence, and no clan based discriminatory treatment, even for minority clan members.

‘If it is accepted that a person facing a return to Mogadishu after a period of absence has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return, there will need to be a careful assessment of all of the circumstances. These considerations will include, but are not limited to:

(i) circumstances in Mogadishu before departure;
(ii) length of absence from Mogadishu;
(iii) family or clan associations to call upon in Mogadishu;
(iv) access to financial resources;
(v) prospects of securing a livelihood, whether that be employment or self employment;
(vi) availability of remittances from abroad;
(vii) means of support during the time spent in the United Kingdom;
(viii) why his ability to fund the journey to the West no longer enables an appellant to secure financial support on return.

‘Put another way, it will be for the person facing return to Mogadishu to explain why he would not be able to access the economic opportunities that have been produced by the “economic boom”, especially as there is evidence to the effect that returnees are taking jobs at the expense of those who have never been away’ (paragraph 407, sub-paragraphs f to h)

2.4.5 Paragraph 407h of MOJ (see 2.4.4 above) addressed the considerations relevant to the ‘careful assessment of all of the circumstances’ of a person facing a return to Mogadishu where it is has been accepted that he/she has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city. In paragraph 356 of OA the UT provided additional country guidance to supplement paragraph 407h of MOJ, to be applied when considering the circumstances of potential returnees to Mogadishu:

- ‘The Reer Hamar are a senior minority clan whose ancient heritage in Mogadishu has placed it in a comparatively advantageous position compared to other minority clans. Strategic marriage alliances into dominant clans has strengthened the overall standing and influence of the Reer Hamar. There are no reports of the Reer Hamar living in IDP camps and it would be unusual for a member of the clan to do so.

- ‘Somali culture is such that family and social links are, in general, retained between the diaspora and those living in Somalia. Somali family networks are very extensive and the social ties between different branches of the family are very tight. A returnee with family and diaspora links in this country will be unlikely to be more than a small number of degrees of separation away from establishing contact with a member of their clan, or extended family, in Mogadishu through friends of friends, if not through direct contact.

- ‘In-country assistance from a returnee’s clan or network is not necessarily contingent upon the returnee having personally made remittances as a member of the diaspora. Relevant factors include whether a member of the returnee’s household made remittances, and the returnee’s ability to have sent remittances before their return.

- ‘A guarantor is not required for hotel rooms. Basic but adequate hotel accommodation is available for a nightly fee of around 25USD. The Secretary of State’s Facilitated Returns Scheme [FRS] will be sufficient to fund a returnee’s initial reception in Mogadishu for up to several weeks, while the returnee establishes or reconnects with their network or finds a guarantor. Taxis are available to take returnees from the airport to their hotel.

- ‘The economic boom continues with the consequence that casual and day labour positions are available. A guarantor may be required to vouch for some employed positions, although a guarantor is not likely to be required for self-employed positions, given the number of recent arrivals who have secured or crafted roles in the informal economy.'
• ‘A guarantor may be required to vouch for prospective tenants in the city. In the accommodation context, the term “guarantor” is broad, and encompasses vouching for the individual concerned, rather than assuming legal obligations as part of a formal land transaction. Adequate rooms are available to rent in the region of 40USD to 150USD per month in conditions that would not, without more, amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR.

• ‘There is a spectrum of conditions across the IDP camps; some remain as they were at the time of MOJ, whereas there has been durable positive change in a significant number of others. Many camps now feature material conditions that are adequate by Somali standards. The living conditions in the worst IDP camps will be dire on account of their overcrowding, the prevalence of disease, the destitution of their residents, the unsanitary conditions, the lack of accessible services and the exposure to the risk of crime.

• ‘The extent to which the Secretary of State may properly be held to be responsible for exposing a returnee to intense suffering which may in time arise as a result of such conditions turns on factors that include whether, upon arrival in Mogadishu, the returnee would be without any prospect of initial accommodation, support or another base from which to begin to establish themselves in the city.

• ‘There will need to be a careful assessment of all the circumstances of the particular individual in order to ascertain the Article 3, humanitarian protection or internal relocation implications of an individual’s return.

• ‘If there are particular features of an individual returnee’s circumstances or characteristics that mean that there are substantial grounds to conclude that there will be a real risk that, notwithstanding the availability of the FRS and the other means available to a returnee of establishing themselves in Mogadishu, residence in an IDP camp or informal settlement will be reasonably likely, a careful consideration of all the circumstances will be required in order to determine whether their return will entail a real risk of Article 3 being breached. Such cases are likely to be rare, in light of the evidence that very few, if any, returning members of the diaspora are forced to resort to IDP camps.

• ‘It will only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes.

• ‘There is some mental health provision in Mogadishu. Means-tested antipsychotic medication is available.

• ‘Hard drugs are not readily available in Mogadishu, and the focus of substance abuse is khat, cannabis, alcohol and tobacco. It is not reasonably likely that an ordinary returnee, without significant means or pre-existing connections to criminal elements in Mogadishu, would be able to procure hard drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, upon their return.’ (paragraphs 356, sub-paragraphs c to o)
c) Minority clan assistance

2.4.6 On the issue of clan assistance available to returnees from minority clans, the UT in OA held in the analysis of the determination (not the country guidance section):

‘We also accept that, as a general rule, minority clans may struggle to offer significant levels of practical assistance (although, as we set out below, clan-specific additional considerations may apply, as may be the case with the Reer Hamar)…

‘[However] the evidence before us does not support the contention that a network or connections in a minority clan would be of no assistance at all. Rather, it may be an issue where some positive, practical or otherwise costly contribution would be required on the part of the clan. Where there is a dispute requiring resolution, or where some form of practical provision from the clan is required in order to access accommodation or services, in those circumstances, and as a general rule, the assistance provided by a minority clan may rank below that which would be provided by a majority clan in corresponding circumstances. But there is no evidence to support the view that a member of a minority clan would be unable to act as a guarantor, whether formal or informal…’ (paragraph 241)

2.4.7 And: ‘…even a minority clan would, in principle, be able to provide some assistance to a returnee seeking accommodation, primarily in the form of vouching for the individual concerned.’ (paragraph 259)

2.4.8 On the support available to the Reer Hamar minority clan, OA held in the analysis section of the determination (not the country guidance):

‘…being a member of a clan such as the Reer Hamar has the potential to place an individual returnee in a relatively advantageous position upon their return when compared to other, less senior minority clans, or at least go some way to mitigating the otherwise harsh conditions they would encounter. The Reer Hamar will be better placed to exploit network links than some other minority clans in Mogadishu; they will be more familiar with the city through the concentrated residential focus of the clan, and are less likely to be residing in IDP camps. They have made some gains in placing their clan on the trajectory to resumed influence and significance.

‘Drawing this together, the assistance likely to be available to a Reer Hamar returnee will depend very much upon the individual links and network of the individual concerned, and the links they have, or through connections, could cultivate. It will be for an individual returnee to demonstrate why they will be unable to enjoy clan or network-based protection or assistance upon their return.’ (paragraphs 248 and 249)

d) Remittances

2.4.9 The UT in OA held in the analysis of the determination (not the country guidance): ‘The extent to which a prospective returnee has been financially supported by members of their community while in this country [UK] will also be relevant to that assessment, for support enjoyed by a returnee while living here will, absent good reasons to conclude to the contrary, be strong
evidence of such support being continued [via remittances] in the future.’ (paragraph 265)

e) IDP camp gatekeepers

2.4.10 In relation to the operation of IDP camp gatekeepers, the UT in OA held in the analysis of the determination (not the country guidance):

‘While MOJ addressed the worst excesses of the gatekeepers, and considered what was, at that time, relatively recent evidence concerning human rights abuses committed by or with the apparent acquiescence of gatekeepers, we have had the benefit of a body of evidence which demonstrates that the conditions in some camps, and the conduct of some gatekeepers, have improved… the material to which we were taken not only ostensibly demonstrates that some gatekeepers operate at a level significantly above the worst excesses of the poorest conduct documented, it demonstrates that a number of gatekeepers operate in the interests of their residents, in some cases to their residents’ satisfaction… We do not consider the fact that some gatekeepers take a portion of aid intended for camp residents, in isolation, to be indicative of dire conditions, abuse or exploitation in itself; many of the background materials describe gatekeepers as service providers, having filled the void left by the absence of an effective state. They provide services, and take commission in response.’ (para 324)

2.4.11 The UT added:

‘We find that the resolve of the FGS [Federal Government of Somalia] and the BRA [Benadir Regional Administration], combined with the CCCM [Camp Coordination and Camp Management – a UNHCR and IOM programme] approach which has been adopted in 36% of IDP camps in the city (a significant post-MOJ development), and the evidence outlined above, to demonstrate that a substantial number of IDP camps now feature improved conditions to those which were prevalent at the time of MOJ.’ (para 326)

f) Evictions

2.4.12 On the issue of risk of eviction OA held: ‘…the practice of forced evictions most frequently occurs at less formal, improvised settlements. Established IDP camps manned by gatekeepers are not immune from the phenomenon of forced evictions, but some gatekeepers do insulate their residents from the practice.’ (paragraph 332)

2.4.13 And: ‘We do not consider the prospect of insecurity of tenure, however troubling, to amount to a very exceptional case where the humanitarian considerations are sufficiently compelling such that removal to Mogadishu would breach the obligations of the United Kingdom under Article 3 ECHR.’ (paragraph 335)

2.4.14 And: ‘Where eviction is enforced in arbitrary circumstances with no-notice or legal oversight, the individual concerned will be required to search for further accommodation elsewhere. That being so, the returnee will draw on the coping mechanisms he or she relied upon in order to establish themselves in the first place, such as network, work and remittances, coupled with the possible benefit of a stronger network forged through time, and greater recent familiarity with the city.’ (paragraph 337)
g) Arrival at airport

2.4.15 On the issue of scrutiny from the authorities upon the arrival of a deportee in Mogadishu, the UT in OA also held: ‘…there is no evidence that it is reasonably likely that forced returnees will be questioned at the border.’ (paragraph 231)

h) Foreign national offenders and drug users

2.4.16 The UT un OA held: ‘…we do not accept that a criminal record or drugs problem in the United Kingdom places a returnee at an enhanced degree of risk of societal or clan-based rejection.’ (paragraph 280)

2.4.17 The UT in OA accepted evidence from TANA on the provision of medical services in Somalia, specifically, details of the mental health centre at Forlanini Hospital in Mogadishu. The UT said:

‘At Forlanini, patients who cannot afford the consultation fees are treated free of charge, including ‘drug abusers’ referred by the police. The hospital treats those from poor socio-economic groups, and, of those who do pay on their first visit, 60% are not charged any fees for their second visit.

‘TANA is a respected organisation. We see no reason not to accept the product of this fact-finding report. We accept its contents and make findings accordingly.’ (paragraphs 350 and 351)

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2.5 Risk: security situation in Mogadishu

a) Summary

2.5.1 There are not substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm in Mogadishu as a result of indiscriminate violence as set out in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules. However, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk.

2.5.2 For guidance on paragraphs 339C and 339 CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules, including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.

b) ‘Ordinary civilians’ - general

2.5.3 The UT in OA held in its analysis of the determination (not the country guidance):

‘There are no very strong grounds, supported by cogent evidence, not to follow the assessment of MOJ concerning the security situation in Mogadishu. While the security situation remains volatile, in Somali terms there has been relative stability over the last seven years. The withdrawal of Al-Shabaab remains complete, and the city is under the control of government forces and security officials. Terrorism and targeted bomb attacks continue to form a significant part of the security landscape and daily life, and so impact on humanitarian and other conditions accordingly, but it remains the case that, as held in MOJ, an ordinary civilian does not face a real risk of a serious and individual threat to their person by reason of
indiscriminate violence for the purposes of paragraph 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules (that is, the threshold contained in Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive).’ (paragraph 222)

2.5.4 The UT in OA further held in paragraph 356a in its section issuing Country Guidance that paragraph 407 of MOJ remained applicable. The relevant sections of paragraph 407 of MOJ are set out below.

- ‘Generally, a person who is “an ordinary civilian” (i.e. not associated with the security forces; any aspect of government or official administration or any NGO or international organisation) on returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will face no real risk of persecution or risk of harm such as to require protection under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive or Article 3 of the ECHR…

- ‘There has been durable change in the sense that the Al Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu is complete and there is no real prospect of a re-established presence within the city…

- ‘The level of civilian casualties, excluding non-military casualties that clearly fall within Al Shabaab target groups such as politicians, police officers, government officials and those associated with NGOs and international organisations, cannot be precisely established by the statistical evidence which is incomplete and unreliable. However, it is established by the evidence considered as a whole that there has been a reduction in the level of civilian casualties since 2011, largely due to the cessation of confrontational warfare within the city and Al Shabaab’s resort to asymmetrical warfare on carefully selected targets. The present level of casualties does not amount to a sufficient risk to ordinary civilians such as to represent an Article 15(c) risk.

- ‘It is open to an “ordinary citizen” of Mogadishu to reduce further still his personal exposure to the risk of “collateral damage” in being caught up in an Al Shabaab attack that was not targeted at him by avoiding areas and establishments that are clearly identifiable as likely Al Shabaab targets, and it is not unreasonable for him to be expected to do so.

- ‘There is no real risk of forced recruitment to Al Shabaab for civilian citizens of Mogadishu, including recent returnees from the West’ (paragraph 407, sub-paragraphs a to e)

  c) ‘Ordinary civilians’ – particular characteristics

- Perceived wealth of returnees

2.5.5 The UT in OA considered in paragraph 228 whether returnees would be targeted for robbery or extortion on account of their perceived wealth and held:

‘We accept that levels of crime in the city are high… [b]ut there is no evidence that the incidence of such crimes gives rise to a real risk that a person’s mere presence in the city gives rise to a substantial likelihood that they will fall victim to such crime. As in many major cities, it will be possible for a returnee to take steps to minimise their exposure to risk of this sort, such as avoiding certain areas at night while alone. There has been no
durable change to the findings reached in MOJ that returnees are not targeted on account of that status. Those who fall victim to street crime in Mogadishu will do so on account of being in the wrong place, at the wrong time.’

- 'Westernised’ returnees

2.5.6 The UT in OA further held in paragraph 356a in its section issuing Country Guidance that paragraph 407 of MOJ remained applicable. Paragraph 407a of MOJ held:

2.5.7 ‘[An ordinary civilian] will not be at real risk simply on account of having lived in a European location for a period of time of being viewed with suspicion either by the authorities as a possible supporter of Al Shabaab or by Al Shabaab as an apostate or someone whose Islamic integrity has been compromised by living in a Western country.’

d) Violence in IDP camps

2.5.8 In paragraph 303 of OA the UT held:

‘Insofar as indiscriminate violence is concerned, we recall the findings at paragraph 420 of MOJ... that the indiscriminate violence in Mogadishu was not at levels sufficient to give rise to an enhanced Article 15(c) risk. Those findings concerned the risk of indiscriminate violence within IDP camps, as well as elsewhere in the city. To the extent that the materials to which we have been taken address the risk of indiscriminate violence, we do not consider there to have been a durable change such that we may depart from the findings in MOJ. Indeed, as we have already set out, the evidence suggests that the ongoing terrorist activity of Al Shabaab is not targeted at civilians.’

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2.6 Internal relocation

2.6.1 In general, internal relocation to Mogadishu is viable but will depend on the individual’s circumstances.

2.6.2 Paragraph 424 of MOJ held:

‘The evidence indicates clearly that it is not simply those who originate from Mogadishu that may now generally return to live in the city without being subjected to an Article 15(c) risk or facing a real risk of destitution. Large numbers of Somali citizens have moved to Mogadishu where, as we have seen there is now freedom of movement and no clan based discrimination. Such a person seeking to settle in Mogadishu but who has not previously lived there would be able to do so provided he had either some form of social support network, which might be in the form of membership of a majority clan or having relatives living in the city, or having access to funds such as would be required to establish accommodation and a means of ongoing support. That might be in terms of continuing remittances or securing a livelihood, based on employment or self employment.’

2.6.3 The UT in OA do not comment on paragraph 424 but there is nothing in their findings that contradict its conclusion that persons not originally from Mogadishu may be able to relocate there. The UT in OA held that:
‘There will need to be a careful assessment of all the circumstances of the particular individual in order to ascertain the Article 3, humanitarian protection or internal relocation implications of an individual’s return…

‘It will only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes.’ (paragraph 356, sub-paragraphs k and m)

2.6.4 The UT in OA found that: ‘very few, if any, returning members of the diaspora are forced to resort to IDP camps,’ (paragraph 356l). However, the Tribunal did set out how the circumstances of these cases – whereby a returnee to Mogadishu would live in an IDP camp – should be assessed. The UT explained that the assessment of internal relocation cases was different from the assessment of claims under Article 3 ECHR:

‘Where an individual has established that they face a well-founded fear of being persecuted such that internal relocation is a live issue, the analysis is different. Such an assessment necessarily entails an examination of the prospective, longer term, living arrangements. In those circumstances, as was the case in MOJ as held by Said, the humanitarian conditions in the IDP camps and informal settlements acquire a greater potential relevance. It is established refugee law that the “unduly harsh” test for internal relocation entails a materially lower threshold than that necessary to establish an Article 3 ECHR claim, and to that extent it will be necessary to consider whether residence in an IDP camp or informal settlement will be unduly harsh, consistent with the guidance in MOJ at [408] which, as clarified by Said, was referring to internal relocation.’ (paragraph 340)

2.7 Certification

2.7.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

2.7.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Back to Contents
3. Humanitarian conditions

3.1 Demographic context

3.1.1 The UN Somalia Common Country Analysis 2020 report, published in September 2020 based on a number of sources, observed that:

‘According to the Population Estimation Survey, Somalia’s population in 2014 was 12.3 million and is estimated to have increased to over 15 million by the end of 2018. Its people are extremely young. An estimated 46 per cent of the Somali population are children (aged 0–14), and 27 per cent are adolescents and youth (aged 15–29). Together they make up almost three-quarters of the Somali population… Forty-two per cent of the population are urban dwellers, 23 per cent are rural, 26 per cent are classified as nomadic, and 9 per cent are IDPs… The Somali diaspora forms an important part of the larger Somali population and can be found all around the world.’

See the Somalia: Country Background Note for more information on demography.

3.2 Humanitarian context

3.2.1 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview’, December 2019 explained:

‘Somalia's politics, security and development collectively create a complex environment, with much of the country's recent past marked by recurrent climatic shocks, armed conflict and violence. With most Somalis dependent on agriculture, forestry and fisheries, climate change is a major concern, as disruptions to the weather lead to phenomena such as drought and flood, two common factors that drive humanitarian need in the country.

‘The humanitarian context in Somalia has remained fragile for a number of seasons; the impact of the prolonged 2016-17 drought is still being felt. Subsequent hurdles, including poor Deyr rains in 2018 (October December), an unusually hot dry Jilaal season in 2019 (December March), and abnormal, erratic rainfall during the same year's Gu rainy season (April-June).’

3.2.2 The European Commission ‘Somalia Factsheet’, 1 July 2020 noted:

‘Somalia has suffered for decades from prolonged conflict combined with extreme weather, especially recurrent droughts and floods. Against a background of widespread poverty, it is now also facing the worst desert locust infestation in 25 years and a rapidly escalating coronavirus outbreak…For almost 3 decades, conflict has been the main driver of Somalia’s humanitarian crisis…Pervasive insecurity in Somalia impedes

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1 UN Somalia, ‘Common Country Analysis 2020’ (page 10), September 2020
2 OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia’. December 2019
access for humanitarian organisations and restricts the ability of Somalis to support themselves economically.  

3.2.3 The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) noted the triple shock or threat of Covid-19, seasonal floods and desert locust. The NRC noted this affected 1.2 million people in 2020 including 436,000 people who were displaced. UN OCHA and the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted in August 2020, that these three factors continued to aggravate the humanitarian situation and that ‘These challenges have resulted in the further displacement of populations and exacerbated existing inequalities, discrimination and protection gap. The Independent Expert was informed of an upsurge in school dropout rates and in domestic, sexual and gender-based violence, with women and girls being disproportionately affected.’

3.2.4 The UNSC in the August 2020 ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ covering the period of 5 May to 4 August 2020 noted the economic impact of the triple shock ‘… disrupted the trajectory of Somalia towards economic recovery. According to World Bank estimates from June, gross domestic product is projected to decline by 2.5 per cent in 2020. It is estimated that remittances will fall by 17 per cent in 2020 owing to the reduced financial capacity of the Somali diaspora and increased difficulties sending funds to Somalia.’. The UN country analysis 2020 report of September 2020 noted around 20% of Somali households depend on overseas remittances.

3.2.5 The May 2020 UNSC ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ noted these factors were likely to ‘exacerbate an already vulnerable situation for the 5.2 million people in need’.

3.2.6 The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) ‘Somalia Country Report 2020’, covering events between February 2017 and January 2019, explained the role remittances played in the ability to access services: ‘Diaspora remittances provide many individuals and families with basic income. They enable large segments of the population to sustain themselves, including covering the costs of basic but privatized services such as clean water, health care, education and electricity.’

3.2.7 The World Bank in ‘Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey’, April 2019 stated ‘Poverty is widespread and deep, particularly among rural residents, internally displaced persons (IDPs) in settlements, and children…'
‘Mogadishu … provide[s] better access to services compared to Baidoa, Kismayo, and Central urban areas. While poverty is higher in Mogadishu than all urban areas except Baidoa, access to basic services such as electricity, water, sanitation, improved housing, education, and health is higher in Mogadishu…

‘Cities consistently provide better access to services and more stable income sources than rural areas except for land and housing. Access to [basic services] and the Internet, is consistently higher in urban areas irrespective of people’s levels of poverty or whether they are IDP or female-headed households…. The relatively better conditions in urban areas compared to rural areas, however, should not mask the low base cities are at.’

3.2.8 The Department for International Development (DFID) in their September 2020 Somalia profile explained:

‘Somalia is one of the world’s poorest and most fragile states … It sits at the bottom of most development league tables, with widespread poverty and inequality, very low human development indicators, endemic violence and discrimination against women and girls, a persistent humanitarian crisis, a weak economy, and a tiny public purse. Four out of five Somalis live below the national poverty line, and more than 1 in 10 of Somalia’s 12 million people are now internally displaced as a result of conflict and humanitarian crisis. State capability and financial governance are weak, and corruption is a concern. Environmental conditions in many parts of Somalia are extreme and the effects of climate shocks add significantly to the risks to lives and livelihoods…’

For information on socio-economic indicators in Somalia see the relevant sections in the country policy and information note Somalia: Background note. For further more detailed information on the humanitarian situation see the UN OCHA ‘Humanitarian Bulletins’ and the United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA) COVID-19 situation reports.

3.3 Poverty and people ‘in need’

3.3.1 A universal definition of ‘people in need’ used by organisations when discussing humanitarian conditions could not be found (see Bibliography for sources consulted). The World Bank sets the international poverty line and it has been set at US $1.90 per day since 2015.

3.3.2 The UN OCHA stated in January 2020 the total number of people estimated to be in need (in Somalia as a whole, not just south central areas) increased by 19 % from 4.2 million in 2019 to 5.2 million in 2020. The same figure was cited by the UNSC in May 2020, UNICEF in June 2020 and the UN September 2020 country assessment. Of the 5.2 million people in need the

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14 World Bank ‘Somali Poverty …’, (Executive summary, page 20), April 2019
15 DFID, ‘Somalia’, 2 September 2020
16 World Bank, ‘Poverty’, 7 October 2020
18 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 63), 13 May 2020
19 UNICEF, ‘Somalia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6’ (page 2), June 2020
20 UN Somalia, ‘Common Country Analysis 2020’ (page 10), September 2020
UN September 2020 country assessment noted 49% are males and 51% are females and 63% are children under the age of 17.

3.3.3 UN OCHA in the Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2020 noted: ‘Most Somali households live on less than US$2 a day. Poverty remains a key barrier for both non-displaced and displaced population groups… The majority of households with severe or extreme needs are located in the southern and central regions (Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Lower Juba).’

3.3.4 The Federal Government of Somalia ‘Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs Somalia Social Protection Policy’, noted in March 2019:

‘The High Frequency Survey of 2016 indicates that 52 percent of the Somali population lives below the extreme poverty line of US$1.9 per day. These poverty rates are higher in rural (53 percent) than urban areas (41 percent excluding Mogadishu). Poverty incidence is highest in IDP settlements (72 percent) and Mogadishu (58 percent). Urban areas have higher absolute numbers of the extreme poor due to the consistent trend of urbanisation in the last 15 years — 61 percent of the poor are now thought to be concentrated in urban areas, particularly Mogadishu, compared to 9 percent in rural areas. The remaining 32 percent live in IDP settlements.

3.3.5 The World Bank report noted ‘Although about 70 percent of Somalis are poor, IDPs are especially marginalized: over 3 in 4 IDPs live on less than $1.90 per day, and more than half of IDP households face hunger.’

3.3.6 UN OCHA noted ‘…people targeted for assistance has decreased by 12 percent (400,000 people), from 3.4 million people in 2019 to 3 million in 2020 [of 5.2 million].’ The source explained ‘…the reduction in targets for 2020 is partly due to the change in the methodology used in targeting people for assistance, with more focus placed on prioritisation and targeting. There is also a realisation that many of the people in need, despite their vulnerability level, do not necessarily need humanitarian assistance and would benefit more from development, recovery and resilience programmes.

3.3.7 In a February 2020 update, the Global Shelter Cluster provided the following map of people in need.

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21 UN Somalia, ‘Common Country Analysis 2020’ (page 14), September 2020
22 OCHA, ‘Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2020’ (page 22), 22 January 2020
23 FGS, ‘Somalia Social Protection Policy’ (page 6), March 2019
24 World Bank ‘Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment …’, April 2019 (Executive summary)
3.3.8 The UN country analysis 2020 report of September 2020 based on a number of sources, observed that: ‘It is estimated that nearly seven out of ten Somalis live in poverty, making Somalia one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and this rate is higher among children below 14 years of age, at 73 per cent.’\(^\text{28}\)

3.4 Impact of COVID-19

3.4.1 The UNSC noted in May 2020:

‘The COVID-19 pandemic presents specific risks, given the limited health-care facilities, the potential disruption of aid delivery and the reliance of many Somalis on diminishing remittances from the diaspora…

‘… To support government efforts, United Nations entities and partners launched the Somalia COVID-19 country preparedness and response plan on 23 April, seeking $689 million to bolster preparedness for and response to the direct public health and indirect immediate humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences of the disease.’\(^\text{29}\)

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\(^\text{28}\) UN Somalia, ‘Common Country Analysis 2020’ (page 15 and 20/21), September 2020

\(^\text{29}\) UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 59-60), 13 May 2020
3.4.2 International Crisis Group (ICG) in ‘COVID-19 in Somalia: A Public Health Emergency in an Electoral Minefield’ of 8 May 2020 noted: 'With one of Africa’s most fragile health care systems, millions of internally displaced people and a bureaucracy still recovering from state collapse and civil war, Somalia might be less prepared for the COVID-19 pandemic than almost any other country in the world.'

3.4.3 The Somali Young Doctors Association (SOYDA) noted in June 2020: ‘The socio-economic and healthcare impact of COVID-19 is likely to lead to worsening nutrition outcomes among vulnerable groups, including poor households in urban areas and among Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who live in crowded, unhygienic conditions and makeshifts shelters in urban areas in the context of declining employment and income earning opportunities and rising food prices.’

3.4.4 Covering the period 1 August 2019 to 30 June 2020 the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted with regards to the coronavirus pandemic that ‘…the price of basic items and commodities have spiked in various parts of the country, posing additional risks to food security for vulnerable populations, including internally displaced persons, persons with disabilities and persons living in poverty. The pandemic has also disrupted the flow of remittances, which is a major source of revenue for many.’

3.4.5 The UN country analysis 2020 report observed, that:

‘As the direct impact of COVID-19 on the health of the Somali people becomes clearer, so will the secondary consequences and the required mitigating and response measures. Early estimates during the onset of the pandemic suggested the COVID-19 induced economic fallout would lead to a sharp contraction in the GDP, a fall in export revenue, severely reduced employment and livelihood opportunities – including a reduction in human mobility intra- and inter-regionally – and reduced remittances. Federal, state and local governments expected shortfalls in domestic revenue, greatly hindering their ability to respond to the increased needs of Somalis.

‘… the urban poor, displacement-affected communities and the elderly are hardest hit by the impact of COVID-19....’

3.4.6 The United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA) in ‘Covid-19 Situation Report’ of 29 September 2020 stated: ‘A total of 3,442 COVID-19 cases were confirmed in Somalia as of 20 September, with 2,877 recoveries and 98 fatalities.’

See also Evictions and Food security and nutrition and country policy and information note Somalia: Background note
3.5 Food security and nutrition

3.5.1 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview’ of December 2019 explained:

‘Food security deteriorated in 2019, reversing positive trends of the previous year. An estimated 6.3 million Somalis are acutely food insecure through December – a 36 per cent increase compared to late 2018. This includes an estimated 2.1 million Somalis in Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phases 3 & 4) who face significant consumption gaps. An additional 4.2 million Somalis are Stressed (IPC 2) – the highest IPC 2 prevalence ever recorded in Somalia – and are engaging in negative coping strategies to meet their food and non-food needs.’

3.5.2 The May 2020 UNSC report noted ‘Despite some improvement in food security, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia remains worrying… Levels of food insecurity and malnutrition remained high in many areas despite the favourable deyr rains (from October to December 2019).’

3.5.3 UNSC noted in August 2020 ‘In May [2020], 2.3 million people received food assistance, a more than three-fold increase from the 700,000 people reached per month from January to March. A total of 1.8 million people were reached in June [2020].’

3.5.4 The Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (CCCM Cluster – co-lead by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and UNICEF noted projections of 3.5 million people in Somalia to face food insecurity in 2020. USAID noted that this was ‘…an increase from the previous estimate that nearly 1.2 million people faced crisis food insecurity in early 2020.’ UNICEF estimated that of the 3.5 million people faced with food insecurity, one million were children.

3.5.5 Factors contributing to or exacerbating food insecurity in 2020 were the COVID-19 pandemic, seasonal floods and desert locusts. As a result of this ‘triple threat’ the NRC observed ‘…6.3 million people are acutely food insecure. One in 10 children under the age of five are acutely malnourished.’

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35 OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia’, December 2019
36 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 59, 62-63), 13 May 2020
37 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 63), 13 August 2020
38 CCCM Cluster, ‘Somalia’, undated
39 USAID, ‘Somalia’, undated
40 UNICEF, ‘Somalia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6’ (p.2), June 2020
41 USAID, ‘Somalia’, undated
42 UNICEF, ‘Somalia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6’ (p.2), June 2020
43 USAID, ‘Somalia’, undated
44 CCCM Cluster, ‘Somalia’, undated
45 FAO, ‘Desert Locust Emergency in Somalia’ (p.2), 9 June 2020
46 AA, ‘Somalia allocates $500K to help flood victims’, 23 July 2020
47 NRC, ‘NRC in Somalia’ (Humanitarian Overview), undated
48 NRC, ‘NRC in Somalia’ (Humanitarian Overview), undated
3.5.6 The UNSC noted ‘… the desert locust infestation in the Horn of Africa, [was] the worst such outbreak in over 25 years. On 2 February [2020], the Federal Government declared a national emergency over the locust upsurge...’

3.5.7 CCCM Cluster noted in its undated overview, but which provided information at least up to March 2020 that ‘Food security and nutrition are deteriorating, particularly in northern and central Somalia… Further deterioration of food security is expected in the dry season of July to September [2020]...’

3.5.8 The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations in ‘Desert Locust Emergency in Somalia’, 9 June 2020, noted ‘…preliminary estimates indicate the overall 2020 Gu season crop harvest could be 10 to 15 percent lower compared to the long-term average due to the impact of Desert Locust and this in turn will compromise the food security of poor households in the affected areas...’

3.5.9 The USAID noted on its undated Somalia webpage ‘Despite modest improvements in recent years, malnutrition rates in Somalia remain among the highest in the world...’

3.5.10 The Refugees International produced the report ‘Durable Solutions in Somalia Moving from policies to Practice for IDPs in Mogadishu’, December 2019, based on interviews in Mogadishu in October 2019 with displaced people, representatives of the local and federal government, UN aid agencies, development institutions, foreign embassies, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The report noted, in relation to food security and nutrition for IDPs in Mogadishu:

‘According to the Famine Early Warning System Network, the Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate among displaced people in Mogadishu is at 16 percent—above the emergency threshold. The GAM rate is a measurement of nutritional status among children, used as an indicator to assess the severity of a humanitarian crisis. When the rate is above 15 percent, the situation is deemed critical. In Mogadishu, it has been critical for years. Although a lack of food is one contributing cause, experts told Refugees International that this consistently high rate is also partially the result of extremely poor and congested living conditions, as well as poor hygiene and sanitation. These factors promote disease and illness that can contribute to malnutrition. Also, many people are malnourished even before they arrive in Mogadishu. Further, when IDPs face forceable evictions and must relocate to a new site with no notice or planning, those being targeted by nutrition programs can become “lost” to aid agencies and disconnected from consistent support.’

3.5.11 UN OCHA in undated information on its website noted ‘Among poor agropastoral, marginalized and displaced communities, huge food and nutrition gaps exist. Severe acute malnutrition rates among children are high, with some areas having global acute malnutrition rates higher than 20 per

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49 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 59, 62-63), 13 May 2020
51 FAO, ‘Desert Locust Emergency in Somalia’ (p.2), 9 June 2020
52 USAID, ‘Somalia’, undated
cent (above the WHO [World Health Organisation] emergency threshold of 15 per cent).\textsuperscript{54}

3.5.12 UNICEF noted in its 2018 ‘Annual Report’ that ‘…nutrition services were provided to 200,000 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition.’\textsuperscript{55} And Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) noted that in 2019 ‘…malnutrition rates among children were well above the emergency threshold in many areas…’\textsuperscript{56}

3.5.13 The Somali Young Doctors Association (SOYDA) report for the period April - June 2020 stated: ‘In Somalia, the median Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) prevalence has remained Serious (10–14.9%) for the past three consecutive seasons … High levels of acute malnutrition tend to persist across Somalia due to several factors, including high morbidity, low immunization and Vitamin-A supplementation, poor care practices and acute food insecurity.’\textsuperscript{57}

3.5.14 The UN country analysis 2020 report noted:

‘In Somalia, a significant portion of the household income is spent on food, while millions face the threat of hunger. In addition, a recent study showed that a nutritious diet (US$ 6.90) is almost four times more expensive than the energy-only diet (US$ 1.90). From 2012 to 2019, an average of 3 million Somalis faced moderate food insecurity, and 1.6 million people faced severe food insecurity. Food security is on the decline in 2020 as a result of persistent threats. A widespread increase in the number of people in crisis is anticipated in the absence of humanitarian assistance. Malnutrition likewise remains widespread. By the end of 2019, the national prevalence of Global Acute Malnutrition or wasting was at 13.1 per cent, and urgent treatment and nutrition support were needed for approximately 963,000 children below the age of 5 years. The level of Severe Acute Malnutrition stood at 1.8 per cent at the end of 2019, however, prevalence is increasing, particularly among IDP children. Twenty-eight per cent of children under 5 years are stunted (short for their age). However, there was a slight decreasing trend in the prevalence of wasting in Somalia over the past decade.’\textsuperscript{58}

See also Humanitarian context.

For more information on children and healthcare see the country policy and information note Somalia: Background note.

3.6 Water, sanitation and hygiene

3.6.1 The December 2019 UNICEF, WASH Cluster and REACH Initiative ‘Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Assessment Report’ noted 2.7 million people in Somalia were in need of humanitarian water, sanitation, and hygiene

\textsuperscript{54} UN OCHA, ‘About OCHA Somalia’, undated
\textsuperscript{56} MSF, ‘International Activity Report 2019 Somalia and Somaliland’, undated
\textsuperscript{57} SOYDA, ‘Quarterly Progressive Narrative Report, April-June 2020’, (section 1), 29 June 2020
\textsuperscript{58} UN Somalia, ‘Common Country Analysis 2020’ (page 21/22), September 2020
(WASH) support. The report provided a graph to show the proportions of households surveyed with or without access to basic WASH services.

![Graph showing proportions of households with or without access to basic WASH services](image)

3.6.2 For further information on the data included, surveys undertaken and methodologies used to compile the UNICEF, WASH Cluster and REACH Initiative report, see the report summary.

3.6.3 The UNICEF, WASH Cluster and REACH Initiative report stated:
‘There is an inadequate quantity of improved latrines… Hygiene practices remain insufficient, leading to a heightened risk of water-borne disease… A majority of latrines lack basic fixtures such as lights, locks, or are inaccessible to disabled persons, with a greater proportion of latrines accessed by displaced households reportedly lacking basic fixtures… The key figures above [graph as included above] indicate a high level of WASH needs in Somalia. Physical wellbeing and living standards conditions remain severely low.’

3.6.4 The UNSC’s May 2020 report noted: ‘The rains [April – June 2020] should … replenish… water sources… The rains will also elevate the risk of water-borne diseases... Since January, at least 2,789 cases of acute watery diarrhoea and cholera have been reported in Somalia, mostly in Hiraan, Banaadir, Bay and Shabelle Hoose, compared with the same period in 2019. The numbers are expected to rise as the rains intensify.’

3.6.5 UNICEF noted in June 2020 ‘The likelihood of water borne diseases are of concern especially with acute watery diarrhea cases increasing compared to 2019 caseloads across 23 districts.’

3.6.6 UNICEF noted in its 2018 ‘Annual Report’ that ‘…one million people were given temporary access to safe drinking water’ and that in the first half of 2020 their organisation provided:
‘…520,123 people…with safe water in Gedo, Bay, Middle and Lower Shabelle regions. Many of these people were reached as a response to flooding, particularly internally displaced people (IDP) settlements in South-Central Somalia. .. In emergency sanitation, UNICEF supported the construction of 1,155 new shared latrines, mostly in IDP camps, and rehabilitation of others to reach 115,975 people with access to gender

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60 WASH Cluster, UNICEF, and REACH Initiative ‘Water, Sanitation...’ (page 3) December 2019
61 WASH Cluster, UNICEF, and REACH Initiative ‘Water, Sanitation...’ (page 5) December 2019
62 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (paras 101 to 2), 13 May 2020
63 UNICEF, ‘Somalia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6’ (page 2), June 2020
sensitive sanitation in Hiraan, Mudug, Bay, Lower Shabelle and Juba regions.\textsuperscript{65}

3.6.7 UN OCHA in the Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2020 noted ‘Comparing the current situation to last year, Gedo and Lower Juba still present some of the poorest humanitarian indicators, particularly in terms of low water and sanitation access, high proportions of households experiencing water-borne diseases, and high proportions of households living in emergency or temporary shelter.’\textsuperscript{66}

3.6.8 The Federal Government of Somalia in comments to the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, for the UN Human Rights Council Forty-second session 9-27 September 2019 stated: ‘The Government remains committed to safeguarding the public interest and equitable access to water and sanitation. This is reflected in the government’s long-term goals stipulated in the National Development Plan 8 (NDP8) for the period 2017 – 2019 (and set out in the draft NDP 9, covering 2019-2024).’\textsuperscript{67}

3.6.9 The BTI Somalia Country Report 2020 noted ‘President Farmaajo has made no improvements to the provision of public goods. Most services such as water…are privatized and therefore difficult to access for large parts of the population.’\textsuperscript{68}

3.6.10 The UN country analysis 2020 report provided detail on access to WASH facilities countrywide and reported on the differences in rural and urban areas. OCHA published a Somalia WASH Cluster Dashboard which provided information on the number of people targeted and reached for access to WASH between January and August 2020, with a regional breakdown.

3.6.11 There are a number of organisations who provide WASH funding, promotion and support in Somalia see Support services and humanitarian aid. See also Displacement and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

For information on medical and health facilities see country policy and information note Somalia: Background note

\textbf{3.7} Employment, healthcare and education

3.7.1 For information on employment, healthcare and education in Somalia see country policy and information note on Somalia: Background note.

\textbf{3.8} Accommodation and shelter

3.8.1 The Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF) in ‘Housing Finance in Somalia’, 2019 noted:

\begin{footnotes}
\item[65] UNICEF, ‘Somalia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6’ (page 3), June 2020
\item[66] OCHA, ‘Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2020’, 22 January 2020
\item[67] UNHRC, ‘Report of the Independent Expert … Comments by the State’, 6 September 2019
\item[68] BTI, ‘Somalia Country Report 2020’ (Stateness), 2020
\end{footnotes}
Access to adequate housing is an increasing problem in Somalia given the high urbanisation rate, exacerbated by IDPs seeking refuge in urban areas. According to Somalia’s National Development Plan 2017-2019, 14.7 percent of households in Somalia are IDPs living in informal settlements or camps. Eighty-five percent of the population live in slums or partially destroyed housing. Housing is mainly provided informally by individuals and typically lacks access to basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation.69

3.8.2 The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in ‘The challenge of finding money to build shelter in Mogadishu’s informal settlements’ published on 28 January 2019 noted:

‘…the influx of people arriving daily into Mogadishu is mostly made up of very low-income populations. The city simply cannot house these growing numbers. In 2018, an estimated 2.6 million people lived in Mogadishu, of which over 600,000 were displaced persons, scattered across over 480 informal settlements in and around the city.

‘These settlements are home to Mogadishu’s most vulnerable people: not only Internally Displaced People (IDPs), but also urban poor and returnees, and across these categories, many female-headed households, youth, and people living with disabilities. The increasing number of displaced people and other urban poor communities arriving in Mogadishu make it the second-fastest growing city in the world, with a 4% annual rate of urbanisation growth…

‘… the city’s housing development is not catering to its largest potential customer base: the poor. New buildings are completely out of financial reach for most of Mogadishu’s inhabitants: the cheapest newly built type of house in 2018 cost an estimated US$70,000 [just under £56,00070] – unaffordable to almost all of Somalia’s population.

‘These exorbitant prices are partly due to the value of land, Mogadishu’s scarcest resource, skyrocketing in the last decade. This rules out formal home ownership for the majority of Mogadishu’s population…

‘In informal settlements, the most common way for people to put a roof over their heads is to build it themselves with scrap materials such as wood, plastic sheets, and sometimes corrugated metal sheets. But even building these houses costs money …which most don’t have on hand.

‘…only 15% of the population has an account with a formal bank... Instead, the vast majority of this population relies on personal networks. They borrow from family, friends, relatives from abroad and within Somalia, either in cash or via mobile services, to pay for housing materials. Connections in Somali society are pivotal and override the formal institutions that are inaccessible to much of the general population.’71

3.8.3 The IIED, Econvalue Consult, SDI Kenya, SDDirect and Tana joint report
‘Shelter provision in East African Cities: understanding politics for inclusive

69 CAFH, ‘Housing Finance in Somalia’, 2019
70 XE.Com, Currency converter, as at 28 September 2020
71 IIED, ‘The challenge of finding money to build shelter…’, 28 January 2019
cities, Summary report’ of September 2019 considered the ability of vulnerable groups to access accommodation and shelter in Mogadishu:

‘In terms of access to housing in Mogadishu, the biggest discriminating factor is wealth. Any person who cannot afford property or rent can be considered vulnerable, because they will have limited options and will most likely have to find shelter in the city’s informal settlements or poorer sections of the city. IDPs make up the majority of the informal settlement residents, but the city’s poor also reside there for a variety of reasons: affordability of shelter, access to services and security. Within these two groups, there are cross-sectional categories of vulnerable people: female- and youth-headed households, persons with disabilities, and also young single men, identified as marginalised people....

‘Somalia’s patriarchal society limits women’s rights and opportunities to access decent housing, and the poor infrastructure in the settlements does not cater in any way to the special needs of physically or mentally disabled people. Young men often carry the stigma of causing trouble or being likely to join the ranks of al-Shabaab, so are denied access to shelter....’

3.8.4 The World Bank in ‘Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey’ of April 2019 stated

‘The only area where rural areas fare better than urban areas is the tenure of land and housing. Due to land scarcity and high land values in urban areas, urban households are less likely to own their land and houses. …

‘The situation is exacerbated by the influx of the IDPs… With many new IDPs moving into cities, the pressure on land, housing, and services is increasing. In many cases, urban centers have ben [sic] unable to cope with the constant and large influxes of the displaced, and have been unable to keep up with the provision of land, housing and basic services that are acutely needed.’

3.8.5 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview’ of December 2019 explained ‘Conflict, drought, flooding and evictions are the key drivers of humanitarian shelter and NFI [non-food items] needs in Somalia. 2.2 million people, including IDPs, host communities, refugee returnees, refugees and asylum seekers are in need of shelter and NFI assistance due to inadequate conditions in existing shelters, economic hardship and a lack of security of tenure. The scale of shelter and NFI needs in 2020 remains similar to 2019.’

3.8.6 The Refugees International December 2019 report noted:

‘UN-Habitat and the Norwegian Refugee Council are piloting a rental subsidy and livelihood project for 80 IDP households in Mogadishu. Also, the EU is supporting housing accompanied by security of land tenure for 300 households on property allocated by the municipality of Mogadishu. These endeavors are worthwhile, but the reality is that most IDPs in Mogadishu—

72 IIED et al, ‘Summary report’ (p.44), September 2019
73 World Bank ‘Somali Poverty …’, (page 20), April 2019
74 OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia’, December 2019
whether new or protracted—continue to live in dire conditions with high rates of malnutrition and limited access to basic services.’

See also Displacement and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

3.9 Displacement and internally displaced persons (IDPs)

3.9.1 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview’, December 2019 explained:

‘Displacements continue to impact the humanitarian situation in Somalia. Insecurity and lacking resources continue to force people to move and to compromise their access to basic assistance…The underlying causes of displacement in Somalia are often complex and intertwined - since November 2016, the effects of prolonged drought, the associated weakened livelihoods, lacking access for humanitarian support, and insecurity in much of the country, have led to the massive increase in forced internal displacements, primarily from rural villages to informal IDP sites in urban and peri-urban locations. Overall, 2.6 million IDPs continue to face serious risks of evictions, marginalization and exclusion across the country.’

3.9.2 The UNSC’s February 2020 report ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ covering the period 5 November 2019 to 4 February 2020 noted: ‘The rapid shifts from severe droughts to flooding are a reminder that Somalia is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, which has an impact on populations already vulnerable owing to chronic poverty and conflict. Before the flood-related displacements, more than 2.6 million persons had been displaced internally and were living at 2,000 sites across Somalia.’

3.9.3 The UNSC’s May 2020 report repeated its assessment from the previous period that ‘Overall, at least 2.6 million people remain displaced by ongoing conflict and recurring climatic shocks.’

3.9.4 International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in its May 2020 report that IDPs are concentrated around cities such as Mogadishu. Refugees International’s field report, December 2019 noted that Mogadishu has approximately half a million IDPs, the largest concentration of displaced people in Somalia and about 20% of all IDPs in the country. The report noted ‘A recent assessment identified more than 700 IDP settlements throughout the city, but the exact number is constantly in flux.’

3.9.5 In an October 2019 paper, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) – citing reports from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

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75 Refugees International, ‘Durable Solutions in Somalia…’ (page 9), December 2019
76 OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia’, December 2019
77 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 62), 13 February 2020
78 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 61), 13 May 2020
79 CCCM Cluster, ‘Somalia Dashboard’, August 2020
81 Refugees International, ‘Durable Solutions in Somalia…’ (page 13), December 2019
82 Refugees International, ‘Durable Solutions in Somalia…’ (page 13), December 2019
‘UNHCR and NRC-led Protection Return and Monitoring Network (PRMN)’ – reported that ‘A total of 302,000 people were displaced between January and September [2019].’

3.9.6 The NRC report broke those figures down to explain that ‘Conflict and insecurity accounted for more than half of all displacements (158,000) while drought (126,000) caused extreme hardship for many. ‘Flooding’ and ‘other factors’ were cited as drivers of displacement for more than 20,000 others.’

3.9.7 UNHCR PRMN noted a total of 893,000 displacements between January and August 2020. The PRMN in partnership with NRC reported ‘60,000 new internal displacements in the month of August 2020. Of these, 43,000 were triggered by flood, 7,000 conflict/insecurity and 8,000 related to drought or lack of livelihoods.’

3.9.8 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) in ‘Internal Displacement 2020 Mid-year update’ noted conflict and violence-related displacement figures at the mid-point in 2020 were roughly the same as those for the whole of 2019. There were 189,000 displacements due to conflict and violence in the first half of 2020 and 514,000 due to disasters.

3.9.9 UN OCHA in a tweet on its Twitter page on 24 September 2020 noted: ‘In Aug 2020, 60,000 people were displaced in …Somalia; 43,000 by …floods mostly in Middle & Lower Shabelle, 7,000 by …conflict/insecurity & 8,000 by …drought/lack of livelihoods. Humanitarian partners have ramped up efforts to meet their needs but need more resources.’

3.9.10 UN OCHA in another Tweet of 24 September 2020 observed: ‘Confronting challenges such as congested communal spaces, the risk of forced evictions, increased need for WASH, health, water & food assistance, is the daily struggle of 893,000 people displaced from Jan-Aug 2020, who live in the 2,300 …IDP sites in peri-urban areas in …Somalia.’

3.9.11 CCCM Cluster noted in its undated overview, but which provided information at least up to March 2020:

‘Populations in Somalia continue to be affected by climatic shocks and insecurity, often leading to their displacement. Urban areas receive newly displaced people, who move into private IDP sites with poor living standards, a lack of tenured security, and inadequate access to basic services. Local integration and IDP returns are also limited, as many displaced families have lost livelihoods and are continually reliant on humanitarian services. Those displaced to informal sites, in particular, are living in precarious conditions and are not having their basic needs met due to inconsistent service provision, barriers to or exclusion from accessing humanitarian support.’

83 NRC, ‘Conflict and drought displace 300,000 in Somalia so far this year’, 22 October 2019, url
84 NRC, ‘Conflict and drought displace 300,000 in Somalia so far this year’, 22 October 2019, url
87 IDMC, ‘Internal Displacement 2020 Mid-year update’ (p.5), 23 September 2020
88 OCHA (@OCHASom), ‘In Aug 2020, 60,000 people were displaced…’, 24 September 2020
89 OCHA (@OCHASom), ‘Confronting challenges such as congested…’, 24 September 2020
90 CCCM Cluster, ‘Somalia’, undated
3.9.12 Amnesty International noted in 2019 ‘Women and children in IDP camps were particularly vulnerable to abuse, marginalization and exclusion.’\(^{91}\)

3.9.13 The Anadolu Agency noted in an article published on 23 July 2020 that ‘Thousands flee Afgoye region in southwestern Somalia following flash floods’ and ‘Flooding has caused mass displacement’.\(^{92}\)

3.9.14 In relation to IDP service provision CCCM cluster noted in its overview:

‘In 2019, the cluster reached 1.1 million IDPs across 842 sites. This represents 61 per cent of the beneficiary target (total 1.8 million) and 42 per cent of the site target (total 1,926). Meanwhile, continuing conflicts, drought and flooding have increased the total number displaced, while there haven’t been large-scale return movements home. As such, the cluster will continue to operate in the 21 districts in which it currently has a presence, as well as expand to six additional districts. In 2019, partners made significant progress towards securing government- or privately-donated land where, in 2020, the cluster will be able to invest in site planning, maintenance and development. It is hoped that these new sites will mitigate future shocks.’\(^{93}\)

3.9.15 Covering the period 1 August 2019 to 30 June 2020 the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted:

‘In 2019, the United Nations provided basic services to close to 1.2 million internally displaced persons and members of displacement-affected communities, most of whom had become displaced as a result of conflict and/or floods. While many of those displaced by the floods have returned to their homes, the impact remains widespread. Many others require support, as they have been stripped of their livelihood and social protection networks, are being forced to stay in overcrowded areas with others living in poverty and are at risk of eviction. In addition, lack of access to basic health care and inadequate access to food, water and sanitation further increase their vulnerability and exposure to water-borne diseases, malaria and COVID-19.’\(^{94}\)

3.9.16 The World Bank in ‘Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment Findings from Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey’, April 2019 noted ‘Many IDPs shift to city outskirts, causing urban sprawl and making service provision difficult and costly as new settlements are disconnected from urban infrastructure networks. Spatial fragmentation also inhibits IDPs’ access to jobs and prevents cities from reaping scale and agglomeration benefits.’\(^{95}\)

3.9.17 The IIED, Econvalue Consult, SDI Kenya, SDDirect and Tana joint summary report, September 2019 observed:

‘IDPs often reside in extremely low-quality shelter built from non-permanent materials and located in cramped spaces due to Mogadishu’s land scarcity and the constant threat of eviction. Currently, the government and the BRA (home to the Mogadishu mayor’s office) cannot provide adequate services

\(^{91}\) AI, ‘Somalia 2019’ (Armed conflict), 2019
\(^{92}\) AA, ‘Somalia allocates $500K to help flood victims’, 23 July 2020
\(^{93}\) CCCM Cluster, ‘Somalia’, undated
\(^{94}\) UNHRC, ‘Report of the Independent Expert’ (para 18 and 19), 24 August 2020
\(^{95}\) World Bank ‘Somali Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment …’, April 2019 (Executive summary)
and IDP settlements are especially likely to experience meagre water and sanitation provision.

‘In the absence of UN-managed IDP camps, IDPs must rely on an informal gatekeeper system (informal settlement managers, or ISMs) that governs Mogadishu’s more than 500 informal settlements. Reflecting the absence of formal state capacity, gatekeepers are an informal power structure seeking to provide a measure of protection and services to IDPs. However, they fundamentally lack accountability (both upwards to government and downwards to IDPs) and are considered impossible to engage without compromising state authority and IDP security. Durable solutions and government policies are therefore urgently needed to support integration of IDPs and develop inclusive solutions for shelter, infrastructure and services.’

3.9.18 Refugees International observed in December 2019 in relation to Mogadishu ‘Most IDPs in Mogadishu live in cramped settlements under unsanitary conditions and without sufficient access to basic services. The malnutrition rate is persistently high, and the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance is regularly disrupted because of three key factors.’ The source explained these 3 key factors were forced evictions, payments of aid to gate keepers and difficulty with humanitarian access due to security.

3.9.19 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview’ of December 2019 explained:

Most IDPs live in makeshift shelters (buuls) which offer limited privacy and protection from weather conditions. About one-third of the population lack NFI. The shelter and NFI needs of IDPs are higher than those of host communities, mainly due to their displacement, lack of security of tenure and lack of employment opportunities. About one-third of communities that host IDPs face increased pressure on their existing resources and thus require external assistance.

3.9.20 ACAPS (a non-profit NGO consortium) in its July 2020 section on Key Priorities on its ‘Somalia Overview’ webpage noted: ‘Shelter and non-food items (NFI) needs are high, especially in IDP sites. Many IDP households decide to live in informal structures due to overcrowding in official camps. The makeshift shelters, however, do not provide adequate privacy nor protection against bad weather conditions. Makeshift shelters are often set up on private land, putting IDPs at risk of evictions....’

3.9.21 The International Development Law Organization (IDLO) in ‘Somalia Launches First Policy On Displaced Persons, Refugee-Returnees’, 17 December 2019 stated:

‘The Government of Somalia has adopted a new national policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs), and refugee-returnees. The first of its kind, the

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96 IIED et al, ‘Summary report’ (p.36), September 2019
97 Refugees International, ‘Durable Solutions in Somalia...’ (page 4 to 5), December 2019
98 Refugees International, ‘Durable Solutions in Somalia...’ (page 4 to 5), December 2019
99 OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia’, December 2019
100 ACAPS, ‘Somalia’ (Key Priorities), 28 July 2020
policy seeks to provide rights-based solutions for the protection of all Somali citizens.

‘Adopted on November 14, 2019, the new National Policy, National Eviction Guidelines and the Interim Protocol on Land Distribution for Housing to Eligible Refugee-Returnees and IDPs… provides a framework that seeks to protect persons of concern – IDPs, and refugee-returnees – from further forced displacement, provide protection and assistance during displacement, and find a durable solution to their displacement. For the first time, it codifies the roles and responsibilities between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States.’


3.9.22 Refugees International noted in December 2019 ‘The government, at both federal and municipal levels, has made great strides in developing policies and frameworks that aim to protect the rights of internally displaced people (IDPs) and promote lasting, durable solutions for them, including through local integration in urban areas. The key now is to implement those policies in an effective way.’

See also Food security and nutrition, Accommodation and shelter and Evictions

3.10 Evictions

3.10.1 The IIED, Econvalue Consult, SDI Kenya, SDDDirect and Tana joint summary report, September 2019 observed:

‘Forced evictions are a huge threat to Mogadishu’s IDPs and urban poor. Benadir is the most affected by evictions: in 2019 so far, there have been 95,004 evictions in the region…. Most are forced, with only very few lawful evictions or evictions with dignified relocations. In most cases, evictions are enforced by a private citizen from his or her property in order to develop their land, where, as often happens, the residents had no formal (written) agreement in place with the landlord.’

3.10.2 Refugees International noted in their December 2019 report based on interviews in Mogadishu in October 2019

‘…a number of displaced people told them [the team] that eviction was their greatest concern—even those residing on public land. According to a group of women who arrived in the early 1990s after fleeing drought and conflict in the Bay region of central Somalia, west of Mogadishu, “The problem we are fearing most is that the government will come and take our land.” Even though they had arrived many years ago, they said they still considered themselves to be “displaced” and not residents of Mogadishu. Indeed they

101 IDLO, ‘Somalia Launches First Policy On Displaced Persons…’, 17 December 2019
102 Refugees International, ‘Durable Solutions in Somalia…’ (page 13), December 2019
103 IIED et al, ‘Summary report’ (p.37), September 2019
recounted that several months earlier, a group of unidentified soldiers showed up, beat up some of the residents, and threatened them with eviction.

‘So far in 2019, about 108,000 IDPs in Mogadishu were evicted from their land and shelters. This number is down from more than 200,000 in 2018, when evictions spiked, but demonstrates that much of the problem remains. In 2017, about 150,000 IDPs were evicted.’ 104

3.10.3 Global Shelter Cluster noted in April 2020, ‘Through 2019, more than 268,800 people were forcibly evicted from their homes, including 156,000 in Mogadishu alone. While these figures suggest a decrease compared to 2018, evictions remain at highly problematic levels, where 48,200 people have already been evicted through 2020, including 33,400 in Mogadishu.’ 105

3.10.4 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview’ of December 2019 explained:

‘The forced evictions of IDPs from self-established settlements destroy significant investments made by humanitarian organizations to facilitate access to basic services, including the establishment of water points and other sanitation facilities, shelter, healthcare centres and education facilities. Most evictions in Somalia are forced, without an adequate notice period given. An estimated 220,000 displaced people were forcibly evicted from January to October 2019. Of these, some 139,000 people were evicted in Mogadishu alone….prevention or mitigation efforts remain considerably limited compared to the overwhelming need. The continuing trend of forced evictions, fed by a growing population density, increasing property prices and lacking tenured security, means that even where access to services is established, it is often fragile and inconsistent. …in recent years forced evictions have increasingly targeted IDPs hosted on private land.’ 106

3.10.5 The UNSC noted in the May 2020 report more than 48,000 evictions had occurred in 2020 and that: ‘Many of the internally displaced live in over 2,000 highly congested settlements, often at risk of eviction from their homes….Evictions are among the most prevalent protection threats, now compounded by COVID-19. On 13 April, my Deputy Special Representative, in his capacity as Humanitarian Coordinator, called for a moratorium on evictions for a three-month period.’ 107

3.10.6 UN OCHA explained the consequences of evictions generally, and during the COVID-19 pandemic:

‘Evictions manifest in disastrous consequences for the people evicted, as for the broader community, which experiences a lack of stability, economic upheaval and widespread indignities as a result. As the COVID-19 pandemic takes hold in Somalia, evictions represent an even greater threat, where existing infrastructure is wasted, investments undermined and a greater number of people left without the capacity to adhere to health and hygiene guidance. Their increased exposure to the virus represents an individual

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104 Refugees International, ‘Durable Solutions in Somalia…’ (page 14), December 2019
105 GSC, ‘Constant risks, looming disaster…’, April 2020
106 OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia’, December 2019
107 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 61), 13 May 2020
injustice and a threat to the broader community, whose risk of exposure is in turn increased.'\textsuperscript{108}

3.10.7 IDMC noted in September 2020 ‘With the arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic in Somalia, a number of local authorities introduced a moratorium on evictions. This was an important development because forced evictions are the main trigger of secondary displacement in the country, and their number declined in May compared with previous months.’\textsuperscript{109}

See also \underline{Impact of COVID-19 and Displacement and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)} and the Federal Government of Somalia’s polices on eviction available on Ecoi.net ‘National Laws’.

3.11 Commercial and humanitarian access

3.11.1 OCHA in a ‘Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Somalia’ by the Assistant Secretary-General For Humanitarian Affairs And Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ursula Mueller in May 2019 noted ‘Somalia continues to be a challenging operational environment for humanitarian organizations. Conflict, insecurity, bureaucratic constraints and limited logistic infrastructure hamper our ability to reach those in need.’\textsuperscript{110}

3.11.2 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview’, December 2019 explained:

‘The volatile security situation in Somalia continues to create a challenging operating environment for humanitarian organizations. Outside of major urban centres, accessibility to some districts, particularly in southern and central regions of Somalia, remains limited due to insecurity on key supply routes. The presence of non-state armed groups across parts of Jubaland, South West, Hirshabelle and Galmudug, high incidences of violence, military operations and conflict, including airstrikes in Lower Shabelle and Juba, abduction and arrest, harassment, forcible seizure of assets, and restrictions on road movement by conflict parties, continue to affect humanitarians’ ability to reach people in need, particularly in rural areas, as well as restricting the ability of civilians to safely seek assistance.

‘Humanitarian organizations are experiencing road access challenges in 42 districts across the country.’\textsuperscript{111}

3.11.3 Covering the period 1 August 2019 to 30 June 2020 the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted with regards to humanitarian access in Somalia that ‘Significant challenges continue to exist for humanitarian access across Somalia as a result of the security situation, with reported threats and use of violence against humanitarian personnel and assets, abductions of humanitarian workers, detention of personnel and beneficiaries, entry restrictions, disruptions to humanitarian activities and looting of goods.’\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{108} OCHA, ‘\textit{Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia}’, December 2019
\item \textsuperscript{109} IDMC, ‘\textit{Internal Displacement 2020 Mid-year update}’ (p.5), 23 September 2020
\item \textsuperscript{110} OCHA, ‘\textit{Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation...}’, 22 May 2019
\item \textsuperscript{111} OCHA, ‘\textit{Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia}’, December 2019
\item \textsuperscript{112} UNHRC, ‘\textit{Report of the Independent Expert}’ (para 22), 24 August 2020
\end{itemize}
3.11.4 OCHA in ‘Somalia: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (Jan-Mar 2020) - As of 11 May 2020’ noted

‘Thirty three incidents impacting humanitarian operations were reported in the period 01 Jan – 31 Mar 2020, impacting seventeen different humanitarian organizations across Somalia...Six incidents involved restriction of movement against organizations, personnel and goods into/within the country, two involved restrictions of access to services by conflict affected population, two were incidents of interference in the implementation of humanitarian activities and four resulted from environmental occurrences....

‘Somalia’s volatile security context combined with poor infrastructure continues to create a challenging operational environment for humanitarian partners and hampers their ability to conduct assessments and deliver aid. At the same time, the ability of the affected people to access services and assistance is also restricted. During this reporting period, free movement of staff and humanitarian supplies has been constrained along the main supply routes of the country’s southern and central states. Twenty-three districts with an estimated population of 1.3 million in need are Hard to Reach areas, and five districts in Southwest, Jubaland and Hirshabelle States are inaccessible.’

3.11.5 The May 2020 UNSC report noted:

‘Security continues to be a major constraint to humanitarian operations… One third of the country is considered by humanitarian workers to be hard to reach, including 23 districts where around 1.3 million people in need reside. In February, aid agencies reached 845,000 people with humanitarian assistance. To build on that response, agencies need prompt and adequate funding. As at 4 May, the 2020 humanitarian response plan was only 18 per cent funded, at $186.6 million of the $1.05 billion requested.’

3.11.6 UNSC noted in August 2020 ‘Security remains a major constraint to humanitarian operations. From 5 May to 4 August, 76 incidents against humanitarian operations were recorded, in which 9 humanitarian workers were killed, 4 were injured, 17 were abducted and 11 were detained or temporarily arrested.’

3.11.7 The European Commission ‘Somalia Factsheet’, 1 July 2020 noted

‘Pervasive insecurity in Somalia impedes access for humanitarian organisations…’

3.11.8 Jane’s, ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia- Security’, in a section last updated 3 December 2019 noted: ‘Security [is] unlikely to improve along main supply routes in southern regions, with cargo being frequently targeted by Al-Shabaab's roadside IEDs and small-arms ambushes’. The source noted that ‘Humanitarian convoys and commercial

114 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 64), 13 May 2020
115 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 63 & 68), 13 August 2020
116 European Commission, ‘Somalia Factsheet’, 1 July 2020
ground cargo are at greatest risk along the following routes [in south central Somalia]:

- ‘Merca to Afgoye highway, particularly in Mahadey district, Lower Shabelle.
- ‘Baidoa/Buur Hakaba to Afgoye highway.
- ‘Kismayo/Jilib to Mogadishu highway, particularly near Jamaame and Junyo Barrow, Middle Juba.
- ‘Mogadishu-Balad Bridge-Jowhaar highway, which is currently being constructed by Turkish contractors…
- ‘Mogadishu and Banadir region. Private hire vehicles are often planted with IEDs in political assassination attempts.’

3.11.9 ACAPS (a non-profit NGO consortium) in its July 2020 section on humanitarian access on its ‘Somalia Overview' webpage noted:

‘Humanitarian operations in Somalia consistently face high constraints amid high levels of insecurity, due to intercommunal violence, military operations, and the presence of Al Shabaab. Conflict and climate-related events hamper the ability of people in need to access assistance. Humanitarian operations are challenged by logistical constraints, presence of improvised explosive devices, and violent incidents across the country...Some areas controlled by Al Shabaab are completely inaccessible for humanitarians, particularly in the already hard-to-reach rural areas of the south-central parts of Somalia. The 2020 Gu rainy season (April-June) caused seasonal floods, rendering large areas difficult to reach.’

See also Main actors in Somalia: Al Shabaab, Levels of violence and country policy and information note on Somalia: Al Shabaab.

3.12 Support services and humanitarian aid

3.12.1 Action Against Hunger noted their interventions reached 606,255 people throughout 2019 through their various programs covering nutrition, health, water, sanitation, hygiene, food security and livelihoods.

3.12.2 The European Commission ‘Somalia Factsheet’, 1 July 2020 noted:

‘In 2020, the EU is providing €51.2 million in funding for humanitarian projects in Somalia. Together, the EU and its Member States provide over 35% of all humanitarian aid in Somalia...

‘EU humanitarian funding supports aid organisations delivering life-saving assistance to vulnerable people, including people affected by conflict, drought or food shortages, to enable them to meet their most urgent needs. This assistance includes food, shelter, access to clean water and basic health services, protection and education.’

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118 ACAPS, ‘Somalia’ (Humanitarian Access), 14 July 2020
119 Action Against Hunger, ‘Somalia’, undated
120 European Commission, ‘Somalia Factsheet’, 1 July 2020
3.12.3 The Report of the Independent Expert on Somalia to the UN Human Rights Council ‘Situation of human rights in Somalia’ for the Forty-fifth session, 14 September–2 October 2020 noted: ‘In 2019, the United Nations provided basic services to close to 1.2 million internally displaced persons and members of displacement-affected communities, most of whom had become displaced as a result of conflict and/or floods.’

3.12.4 UNSC noted in August 2020:

‘Humanitarian partners have expanded their support to the Somali authorities to detect, prevent and interrupt transmission of COVID-19… hospitals and isolation centres have been equipped and risk communication and community engagement have reached 10.9 million people. At the same time, 279 humanitarian organizations are implementing humanitarian programmes in all 18 regions…’

3.12.5 UNSOM reported on OCHA’s ‘Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan 2020’ (HRP), and noted that: ‘The HRP will provide life-saving aid and livelihood support to three million people, including the 1.7 million people displaced by conflict, insecurity, forced evictions, droughts and floods. The aid will be in the form of monthly food assistance to 2.1 million people; support for access to education for more than 300,000 children; health assistance for 2.5 million0 [sic] people; and the delivery of safe water to more than 1.2 million people.’

3.12.6 The World Bank stated in July 2020:

‘The World Bank Group (WBG) continues to contribute to a well-coordinated international effort in Somalia, based on partnership between agencies that engage across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus…’

‘The World Bank Group’s support has focused on helping scale government health and livelihoods financing in the short and medium-term, accompanied by a proposed supplemental budgetary support operation. The current country portfolio is approximately $1.23 billion in 18 projects.’

3.12.7 There are a number of organisations who provide funding and humanitarian support in Somalia. The Somalia NGO Consortium provides a list of both international and national members working in Somalia.

3.12.8 See also Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Somalia and the UK, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), USAID and UN OCHA

See also Displacement and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Food security and nutrition, Water, sanitation and hygiene and Humanitarian workers.

For information on the economy, finance and access to funds for projects see country policy and information note Somalia: Background note

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122 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 63 & 68), 13 August 2020
123 UNSOM, ‘Somalia’s 2020 Humanitarian Response Plan Needs $1 Billion…’, 22 January 2020
124 World Bank, ‘The World Bank in Somalia’ (strategy), 17 July 2020
4. **Actors in conflict**

4.1 **Al Shabaab**

4.1.1 This section covers indiscriminate violence as a result of the ongoing conflict between AMISOM and government forces, and Al Shabaab. For background information on Al Shabaab, including life in Al Shabaab controlled areas, recruitment, defectors, law and order, vulnerable groups and targeted groups, see the country policy and information note on Somalia: Al Shabaab.

4.1.2 For information on the number of casualties as a result of Al Shabaab attacks see Levels of violence.

4.2 **Al Shabaab: tactics**

4.2.1 Jane’s profile ‘Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen Al-Shabaab’, undated but in a section updated 12 March 2020, ‘The group’s militants commonly utilise small-arms and explosives, including in suicide configurations, in assaults, ambushes, and stand-off/area attack operations. Al-Shabaab has become known for coordinating mass attacks on hard military targets through the combined use of explosives and subsequent assaults.’\(^{125}\)

4.2.2 Jane’s ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa’ published 18 September 2020 in a section last updated 2 December 2019 stated: ‘UN and Somali government officials are targeted in mortar attacks at the comparably more secure Mogadishu Airport Complex, and in vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and follow-up small-arms assaults on bars, hotels and restaurants.’\(^{126}\)

4.2.3 Jane’s provided information on the types of tactics used by Al Shabaab between 14 September 2019 and 14 September 2020\(^{127}\):

![Attacks by Tactic](image)

4.2.4 A briefing to the UN Security Council Committee by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) on improvised explosive device (IED) trends in Somalia, published in the ‘Statement by the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), concerning Somalia, MarcPecsteen de Buytswerve’, 11 June 2020 noted:

\(^{125}\) Jane’s, ‘Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen’ (Operational methods), 12 March 2020

\(^{126}\) Jane’s, ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia - Security’ 18 September 2020

\(^{127}\) Jane’s, ‘Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen’ (Operational methods), 12 March 2020
'Al-Shabaab’s increased use of homemade explosives since 2018… [and a reduction in] the group’s access to military-grade explosives, thus apparently triggering a shift away from military-grade explosives. If the current chemicals used for Al-Shabaab’s homemade explosives were to become scarce, the group would shift to other sources of explosive materials or precursors, possibly through illicit smuggling.'\(^{128}\)

4.2.5 Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) in ‘Al-Shabaab and increasing civilian harm in Somalia’, 22 April 2020 noted ‘…al-Shabaab is notorious for deploying explosive weapons in its attacks.’\(^{129}\)

4.2.6 The Institute for Politics and Society, a Czech political think tank in their policy brief ‘Terrorism in East Africa: Rise of Al-Shabaab and How to Counter It’, published August 2020, noted ‘Al-Shabaab’s tactics have been in recent years increasingly described as guerrilla-style…’ and ‘…frequent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), especially vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs). Al-Shabaab’s attacks in recent years increasingly rely on IEDs and VBIEDs, making them the weapon of choice and a modus operandi for the terrorist group.’\(^{130}\)

4.2.7 The OASC ‘Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report’ noted ‘…al-Shabaab…has demonstrated the capability to carry out attacks in government-controlled territory with particular emphasis on targeting hotels government officials frequent; government facilities; foreign delegation facilities and movements; and restaurants, coffee shops, and other commercial establishments frequented by government officials, foreign nationals, merchants, and the Somali diaspora.’\(^{131}\)

4.2.8 The Hiraal Institute in ‘Security in Somalia Q1 2020’, May 2020, noted:
‘Looking at the deadliest tactics employed by AS [Al Shabaab] in the past 15 months, it is clear that this quarter was a slow one for the group’s campaign. It briefly tried to revive its direct military campaign late last year, but was quickly forced to scale back in the face of lethal counterattacks by the allies. However, while it is still being kept in check, its urban tactics of using pistol assassinations and IED attacks appear to being set up for an increase. IED attacks dipped in January, only to start increasing in intensity in the following months.’\(^{132}\)

4.2.9 The Hiraal Insitute also noted ‘The police and civilians are targeted by pistol assassinations and sticky IEDs attached to their vehicles. While this tactic is also used in attacks against some lone SNA officers, it is the only methods used against targets in the urban areas.’\(^{133}\)

4.2.10 Garda World in ‘Somalia Country Report’, updated 26 September 2020, noted a decrease in Al Shabaab attacks in the Lower Shabelle and Banadir regions in the week ending 26 September 2020 and assessed it was likely to

\(^{128}\) UNSC, ‘Statement by the Chair of the Security Council Committee …’ (p.2), 11 June 2020

\(^{129}\) AOAV, ‘Al-Shabaab and increasing civilian harm in Somalia’, 22 April 2020

\(^{130}\) The Institute for Politics and Society, ‘Terrorism in East Africa…’ (p.3), August 2020

\(^{131}\) OSAC, ‘Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report’, (Terrorism Threat), 1 May 2020

\(^{132}\) Hiraal Institute, ‘Security in Somalia Q1 2020’ (p.2), May 2020

\(^{133}\) Hiraal Institute, ‘Security in Somalia Q1 2020’ (p.3), May 2020
be related to ‘Al Shabaab’s operational cycle of resting, re-equipping and resupplying their fighters prior to a renewed campaign.’

See also Levels of violence and country policy and information note on Somalia: Al Shabaab.

4.3 Clans

For information on clans, see the country policy and information note on Somalia: majority clans and minority groups.

4.4 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): aims and mandate

4.4.1 The UN Security Council Resolution 2372(2017) outlined AMISOM’s mandate.

4.4.2 AMISOM’s website explained that ‘The Military Component is the biggest of the three components of the AU Mission in the country. The component is mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and seeks to stabilize the situation in the country, create the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an eventual handover of the Mission to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation.’

4.4.3 Jane’s ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa, Somalia – Security’, 18 September 2020 noted ‘…AMISOM.. and the Somali National Army (SNA) are the main forces deployed to fight …Al-Shabaab… AMISOM is gradually reducing the number of deployed military personnel as part of a phased transition to SNA forces since February 2019… AMISOM’s mandate runs until 28 February 2021.’

4.4.4 AMISOM’s website provides further detail on the strategic objectives of its mandate and the priority tasks it is authorised to carry out to achieve those objectives.

4.5 AMISOM: size and composition

4.5.1 In January 2019, the Independent put AMISOM numbers at 21,000. In a July 2019 paper on Al Shabaab governance, The Zomia Center for the Study of Non-State Spaces (the Zomia Centre) estimated the number to be 17,000 plus additional troops from Kenya and Ethiopia not under AMISOM command. On 29 May 2020 The UN Security Council authorised maintaining the deployment of 19,626 uniformed AMISOM personnel, including at least 1,040 police and five formed police units until 28 February 2021.

135 AMISOM, ‘AMISOM Military Component’, undated
137 The Independent, ‘[AS]: Who are [they] and what are their goals?’, 15 January 2019
138 The Zomia Center for the Study of Non-State Spaces, ‘Al Shabaab Governance’, 10 July 2019
139 UN, ‘Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2520 (2020)…’, 29 May 2020
4.5.2 Anadolu Agency, in an interview with Turkey's ambassador Mehmet Yilmaz, published 4 August 2020 stated ‘…the number of AMISOM soldiers had recently been reduced by 2,000’. 140

4.5.3 AMISOM’s website explained that ‘Currently the military component is comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia.’ 141

4.6 AMISOM: capacity and capability

4.6.1 The Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) report ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)’, January 2018 noted:

‘AMISOM has made progress on its three current strategic objectives, namely, reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; providing security to enable Somalia’s political process and efforts at reconciliation; and handing over its security responsibilities to the Somali security forces. However, the mission continues to face difficult challenges and limitations which mean that, on its current trajectory, implementing an effective transition to Somali forces will neither be straightforward nor happen quickly.’ 142

4.6.2 Vanda Felbab-Brown’s case study ‘The problem with militias in Somalia: Almost everyone wants them despite their dangers’ published April 14 2020 in Adam Day’s report for the UN University ‘Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How militias and paramilitary groups shape post-conflict transitions’ observed:

‘Like the SNA, AMISOM has conducted almost no offensive operations against al-Shabaab since 2016. This is partially a tactical decision, given that the SNA lack the forces necessary to hold any newly captured territory. Wishing to avoid still greater responsibilities to protect larger populations, AMISOM has remained mostly hunkered in “garrison mode.”… The current AMISOM mission is authorized by the United Nations Security Council through 2021, but there is really no expectation that the AU forces could realistically be withdrawn even by then given the continued weakness of the SNA.’ 143

4.6.3 Jane’s ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa, Somalia – Security’, 18 September 2020 noted: ‘...The transition [from AMISOM] involves training 18,000 infantry, 500 'Danab' special forces, and 32,000 police officers, and restructuring the SNA to make its units representative of clans where they operate. However, progress is slowed by disputes between the regions and the failure of foreign backers to co-ordinate the provision of security

140 AA, ‘1 of 3 Somalian troops to be trained by Turkey: Envoy’, 4 August 2020
141 AMISOM, ‘AMISOM Military Component’, undated
142 EPON, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission …’ (Executive Summary), January 2020
143 Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘The problem with militias in Somalia…’ (p119) 14 April 2020
assistance. Another shortcoming is the lack of logistical support to conduct sustained military operations.’\textsuperscript{144}

4.6.4 AMISOM, in a news report on their website dated 28 April 2020, stated:

‘The Force Commander of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Lieutenant General Tigabu Yilma, says that the operational capability of his forces and their capacity to conduct offensive operations against the enemy remains high. Lieutenant General Yilma was speaking in Baidoa on Monday [27 April], where he commissioned new operational vehicles and military hardware, which will add firepower and increase the mobility of AMISOM forces in clearing main supply routes, securing population centers and degrading Al-Shabaab terrorists in the Southwest State.’\textsuperscript{145}

See also Main actors in Somalia: Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali Police Force

4.7 Somali National Army (SNA) and Somali Police Force (SPF): size

4.7.1 Jane’s ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia’ in its summary last updated 30 Oct 2018, estimated the strength of the Somali army to be 10,000\textsuperscript{146}. While the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ‘The World Factbook - Somalia’ noted on 17\textsuperscript{th} August 2020 that ‘[E]stimates of the size of Somali National Army (SNA) vary widely because of inconsistent and unreliable data, as well as the ongoing integration of various militias; as of January 2020, estimates ranged from approximately 10,500-20,000; note - in 2017, the Somali Government announced a plan for the SNA to eventually number 18,000 troops; the same plan called for 32,000 federal and regional police (2019 est.).’\textsuperscript{147}

4.7.2 A table included as part of a letter dated 1 November 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council noted the size of the Somali Police Force in differing regions, including discrepancies in differing reports\textsuperscript{148}.

\textsuperscript{144} Jane’s, ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia - Security’, 18 September 2020
\textsuperscript{145} AMISOM, ‘AMISOM troops get new operational vehicles to boost capability’, 28 April 2020
\textsuperscript{146} Jane’s, ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia - Army’, 30 August 2018
\textsuperscript{147} CIA, ‘World Factbook - Somalia’ (Military and security…), 17 August 2020
\textsuperscript{148} UNSC, ‘Letter […] to President of the Security Council’, (p129) 1 November 2019
4.7.3 The source noted ‘In a second table outlining the strength of the SPF as of 15 March 2019, the total number of personnel is given as 14,769 (see figure 2, below). Most notably, the strength of the Benadir Division is reported to be 12,032, contrasting with the first table’s figure of 4,500. The reported strengths of the other SPF divisions are also inconsistent – although the discrepancies are far less significant than for the Benadir Division – from the first table to the second.’

4.8 SNA and SPF: capacity and capability


4.8.2 The USSD Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report’, 1 May 2020 noted:

‘The Somali Police Force (SPF) service is responsible for dealing with crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of Federal Government of Somalia, including any activities in violation of the draft constitution that may endanger constitutional order, public order, hooliganism, terrorism, trafficking in

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149 UNSC, ‘Letter […] to President of the Security Council’, (p129) 1 November 2019
persons and transferring of drugs. Somali police forces are understaffed, ill-equipped, do not receive training commensurate with U.S. or EU standards, and struggle to provide consistent basic law enforcement services. Enforcement of criminal laws is haphazard to nonexistent. The consistency of enforcement and subsequent criminal penalties vary dramatically.'

4.8.3 Jane's ‘Sentinel Security Assessment- North Africa Somalia – Crime’ noted in December 2019 ‘Somalia has no effective national laws or policing measures to counter organised criminal activity.’

4.8.4 Saferworld (an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict) in a post on its website entitled ‘Overcoming tensions between communities and the police in Somalia’ and published on 24 October 2019 noted the ‘high turnover of police officials’.

4.8.5 The UNSC August 2020 report noted: ‘In June [2020], as part of continued efforts to ensure that the Somali security forces are better equipped to assume responsibility for security, 39 officers from the Somali Police Force … were provided with online training on searches, improvised explosive device component parts and the human rights due diligence policy mitigation measures under the mobile vehicle checkpoint project.’

4.8.6 The European Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) website explained that EUTM Somalia was launched on 7 April 2010 and provides advice, mentors and training to Somali National Army (SNA) General Staff and supports the Ministry of Defence through tactical, light infantry, engineering and specialized training. It also added that ‘…[The] EU… contributes to the development of coastal police and the judiciary in Somalia.’ The British Army provided training for SNA officers from Baidoa, in September 2020 and the UK has also provided equipment.

4.8.7 An April 2020 New York Times article noted the presence of a Turkish military base in Mogadishu which provides training for Somalia’s national military force. It noted ‘Turkey’s efforts to help restructure the Somali military are part of its deepening engagement in Somalia, where it has invested heavily across many areas, from education and health to infrastructure and trade.’

4.8.8 The same article cited Rashid Abdi, a Horn of Africa researcher and analyst who considered that, “Turkey is now the federal government of Somalia’s closest security partner, [and] Al Shabab sees great strategic threat in this growing power of the Somali National Forces.’ He noted Turkey were Al Shabaab’s ‘number one target’.

4.8.9 Anadolu Agency, in an interview with Turkey’s ambassador to Somalia, Mehmet Yılmaz, published 4 August 2020, noted roughly one third of Somali

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151 OSAC, ‘Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report’ (Police response) 1 May 2020
153 Saferworld, ‘Overcoming tensions between communities …’, 24 October 2019
154 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 78), 13 May 2020
155 EUTM Somalia, ‘EUTM Somalia Factsheet’ (Background, Mandate and Objectives), undated
156 EUTM Somalia, ‘EUTM Somalia Factsheet’ (EU’s approach), undated
157 FCO, ‘British Army trains Somali National Army Brigade headquarters’, 30 September 2020
158 NYT, ‘Suicide Bombing Targets Major Turkish Military Base in Somalia’, 23 June 2020
159 NYT, ‘Suicide Bombing Targets Major Turkish Military Base in Somalia’, 23 June 2020
soldiers were trained by the Turkish Armed Forces. In addition, 600 police officers had been trained to carry out special operations (out of a total of 1,000 to be trained).\textsuperscript{160}

4.8.10 The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) ‘Somalia Country Report 2020’ noted:

‘Recruitment to the security institutions are ongoing, predominantly the Somali national army (SNA), the Somalia national police force (SPF) and national intelligence and security agency (NISA), but also a number of paramilitary and localized security units. However, the recruitment lacks transparency and new recruits are often not properly registered. NISA is characterized by infighting, and there have been rumors about the infiltration of the NISA leadership by al-Shabaab.’\textsuperscript{161}

4.8.11 The United Nations Assistance Mission In Somalia (UNSOM) news report, ‘Importance Of Collaboration Highlighted As Underpinning Progress In Improving Somali Law Enforcement’ published on 29 October 2019 observed:

“Considerable progress has been achieved since the previous Executive Board meeting, in increasing Mogadishu’s security…the country’s Minister of Internal Security, Mohamed Abukar Islow Duale, said “Despite our efforts our nation faces a complex array of security challenges…”

‘At the meeting, Police Commissioner-General Hassan noted that a strong and accountable police force is critical for the country’s long-term stability and security “As a matter of top priority we must work toward a capable and well-equipped Darwish police unit capable of taking over from the Somali National Army and basic police services to counter IED (improvised explosive devices) capability…”’\textsuperscript{162}

4.8.12 Jane’s noted in 2018:

‘Soldiers [SNA] are generally poorly trained and equipped. A 2018 readiness assessment conducted by the Somali government concluded that some 30% of soldiers do not have weapons. The SNA has been reported by the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) to have systematically sold their arms, among other violations. Desertion and refusal to take orders are reported to be widespread problems across all SNA military formations, even among more senior officers. When the president visits army bases, soldiers on the base are disarmed in advance.’\textsuperscript{163}

4.8.13 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia – Armed Forces published 2 January 2020 in a section updated 9 December 2019 noted ‘Despite considerable efforts, the Somali National Army (SNA) remains little more than a collection of militias without a functioning centralised command-and-control system. Discipline is generally low and membership is fluid.’\textsuperscript{164}

4.8.14 The UNSC May 2020 report noted:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{160} AA, ‘1 of 3 Somalian troops to be trained by Turkey: Envoy’, 4 August 2020
\textsuperscript{161} BTI, ‘Somalia Country Report 2020’ (Executive summary), 2020
\textsuperscript{162} UNSOM, ‘Importance Of Collaboration Highlighted’, 29 October 2019
\textsuperscript{163} Jane’s, ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia - Army’, 30 August 2018
\textsuperscript{164} Jane’s, ‘Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia – Armed Forces’, 02 January 2020
\end{flushleft}
‘Somali National Army and AMISOM operations in Shabelle Hoose to recover the town of Jannaale from Al-Shabaab demonstrate progress on the transition. The further generation of numbers and capacities in both the Somali National Army and the police is required to secure recovered areas, facilitate stabilization activities and consolidate gains. Progressive investment in robust and community policing alongside the effective delivery of justice will be crucial in preventing the resurgence of Al-Shabaab in recovered areas…

‘Strengthening the improvised explosive device threat mitigation capabilities of Somali security forces implementing the transition plan is key to enable them to protect themselves and better prevent harm to civilians and critical infrastructure, as they gradually assume security responsibilities from AMISOM’ 165

4.8.15 The USSD Office of the Inspector General, Lead Inspector General’s quarterly report to the US Congress ‘East Africa Counterterrorism Operation and the North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation’, for the period 1 April -30 June 2020 noted:

‘USAFRICOM [the US military’s Africa Command] reported that the SNA “continues to successfully form a safety buffer around Mogadishu,” despite the continuation of al-Shabaab attacks in the capital. During the quarter, the Somali Police Force increased security patrols and established new checkpoints in districts of southwest Mogadishu during the month of Ramadan. USAFRICOM said that the Somali Police Force planned to maintain the increased security posture after Ramadan. Most details about the development of the SNA’s institutional capacity, particularly the SNA’s institutional weaknesses, are classified or not publicly releasable… USAFRICOM reported that the SNA did show an improvement in its planning capability.’ 166

4.8.16 The USSD Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs undated ‘Somalia Summary’ noted: ‘Somali security forces – including the police and military – will require significant assistance and capacity building at all levels to consistently and effectively prevent and/or respond to terrorist incidents and other crimes and provide long-term stability and security.’ 167

4.8.17 Vanda Felbab-Brown’s case study ‘The problem with militias in Somalia: Almost everyone wants them despite their dangers’ published on 14 April 2020 in Adam Day’s report for the UN University ‘Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How militias and paramilitary groups shape post-conflict transitions’ observed:

‘Despite USD $1 billion of international financial assistance and international training since 2012, the Somali National Army (SNA) continues to lack the gamut of fighting capacities, relying instead on international forces to wrest territory from alShabaab, or even to keep the group from openly retaking other large territories, including major cities. Existing efforts to strengthen the SNA and other official forces are not producing adequate numbers of

165 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 101-2), 13 May 2020
166 USSD, OIG, ‘Report to the US congress…’ (pages 21 to 22), August 2020
167 USSD, ‘Somalia Summary’ (challenges), undated
sufficiently competent Somali national soldiers. Intensified rivalries between Somalia’s federal Government and the federal member states further hamper the deployment and effectiveness of the SNA.\textsuperscript{168}

4.8.18 Vanda Felbab-Brown’s case study also noted:

‘Officially numbering 27,000 soldiers (but more likely composed of around 23,000), the SNA is riddled with ghost soldiers, old and sick soldiers incapable of effective fighting or patrolling, and untrained units. … Around 60 per cent of the army’s personnel lack any real military capacity. The SNA also lacks logistical, sustainment and medevac capacities… All these deficiencies mean that, even if it has some 23,000–27,000 soldiers, a far smaller number of SNA fighters are actually capable of military operations against al-Shabaab... At the end of 2019, the SNA’s military operations to secure the arteries out of Mogadishu ground to a halt, as nearly 40 per cent of the force tasked with that mission simply disappeared...The SNA’s poor performance points to a crucial characteristic of Somalia’s army: it is more of a conglomeration of militias than a coherent fighting force.’\textsuperscript{169}

4.8.19 The Danish Immigration Service (DIS), ‘South and Central Somalia Security situation, forced recruitment, and conditions for returnees’ of July 2020 (DIS report 2020) noted, ‘The Somali National Army (SNA) is being trained by international forces, notably the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) but is still underfunded and lack [sic] structure and discipline’\textsuperscript{170}.

4.8.20 Covering the period 1 August 2019 to 30 June 2020 the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted:

‘Somalia has made some progress towards promoting and deploying a “new police model” by increasing the number of police officers in Jubbaland, South-West State, Hirshabelle…. A draft police bill that has been submitted to the Federal Parliament is yet to be passed. Human rights vetting and gender diversity principles have been integrated into recruitment processes. General and specialized police training is being conducted. […] The Independent Expert is concerned that these efforts have yet to translate into adequate protection for civilians, that they fall short of democratic policing standards and that several challenges to effective policing remain.[…] The rates of investigations into criminal cases and of prosecutions of alleged perpetrators remain low.’\textsuperscript{171}

4.9 SNA and SPF: corruption, human rights violations and impunity

4.9.1 The GAN (business anti-corruption portal), in ‘Somalia Corruption report’ last updated in March 2020, based on some older sources summarised: ‘Corruption is rife within the security apparatus. Impunity is widespread, and authorities do not maintain effective control over the police force.... In addition, the police are ineffective... The Somali National Army is the

\textsuperscript{168} Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘The problem with militias in Somalia...’ (page 114) 14 April 2020
\textsuperscript{169} Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘The problem with militias in Somalia...’ (page 118) 14 April 2020
\textsuperscript{170} DIS, ‘South And Central Somalia Security Situation...’ (page 3) July 2020
\textsuperscript{171} UNHRC, ‘Report of the Independent Expert...’ (para 50 and 51), 24 August 2020
country’s most important security institution. It suffers rampant corruption…

4.9.2 The most recent UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020, published in December 2017 noted:

‘Security forces are often re-hatted clan militias rather than formally integrated members of the Somali National Army (SNA). The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major obstacle to the ability of the state to ensure security and protect civilians. A lack of oversight and accountability of security forces raises concerns regarding impunity for human rights violations, including against children, and undermines the people’s trust in state security institutions.’

4.9.3 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa Somalia – Armed Forces published 2 January 2020 in a section updated 30 October 2018 noted:

‘Professionalism and morale concerns remain, due in part to concerns over adequate infrastructure and funding. Lack of co-ordination between FGS institutions regarding the payment of the SNA has led to the SNA hierarchy systematically inflating troop numbers in order to secure greater funding for salaries and rations, according to the 2015 UN Monitoring Group report, which says this concern is heightened by exclusive use of cash for payments, distinct lack of accountability measures, and absence of any independent oversight, leaving the SNA leadership free to exploit government revenue.’

4.9.4 UNSOM / OHCHR in ‘Protection Of Civilians Report Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2019’ noted ‘For the reporting period, according to information received by UNSOM/OHCHR, SNA arrested and/or investigated less than half of the incidents of allegations of human rights violations attributed to it…’

‘UNSOM/OHCHR documented a decrease in the rate of arrests and/or investigations into alleged human rights violations perpetrated by members of SPF in 2019 compared to 2017 and 2018’.

4.9.5 Covering the period 1 August 2019 to 30 June 2020 the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted:

The Independent Expert is also concerned about the continued excessive use of force by the police against civilians and about the fact that officers reportedly continue to torture, beat, threaten, harass and arbitrarily arrest civilians, especially journalists, human rights defenders and persons allegedly suspected of terrorism. […] The low capacity of police officers means an inability to apply existing laws fairly, especially in cases of violations against internally displaced women and children.’

172 GAN, ‘Somalia Corruption Report’ (police), Last updated March 2020
173 UN, UN Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020 (page 15), December 2017
175 UNSOM / OHCHR ‘Protection Of Civilians Report …’ (page 19 and 22), 2020
4.9.6 The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) ‘Somalia Country Report 2020’ noted NISA [The national intelligence and security agency]…are accused of severe human rights violations."\(^{177}\)

4.9.7 The Freedom House ‘Freedom in the World 2020 – Somalia’ report stated ‘Safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention are not observed by the country’s police, intelligence, and military services, and their performances are undermined by corruption."\(^{178}\)

4.9.8 The USSD OIG’s Lead Inspector General’s quarterly report to the US Congress ‘East Africa Counterterrorism Operation and the North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation’, for the period 1 April to 30 June 2020 noted ‘Some SNA units are more loyal to specific clans than the federal government, providing opportunity for clans to exploit the SNA for their own gain.”\(^{179}\)

4.10 International actors: the United States

4.10.1 In January 2019, the Independent reported that the US had 500 troops in Somalia\(^ {180}\). In September 2019 the Washington Post reported ‘650 to 800 Defense Department personnel [are] in Somalia\(^ {181}\) and the Congressional Research Service estimated in January 2020 that 700 US forces were in Somalia in 2019\(^ {182}\).

4.10.2 A June 2020 New York Times article claimed the US had ‘… hundreds of Special Operations forces training the Somali army and conducting kill-or-capture raids of their own against ..[Al] Shabab.”\(^ {183}\)

4.10.3 In Keating and Waldman’s book ‘War and Peace in Somalia’, Somali researcher Hussein Yusuf Ali contributed a paper (‘Youth Radicalisation: Causes, Consequences and Potential Solutions’). In it he noted that ‘US drone and commando attacks [had] deprived [Al Shabaab] of its leaders and it access to ports, reducing its ability to carry out surprise assaults’\(^ {184}\).

4.10.4 An October 2019 article in the Washington Post explained how the Trump administration had increased the number of airstrikes in Somalia\(^ {185}\). The Long War Journal included the following table showing the rising number of airstrikes from 2007 to 2019 and early 2020 (the green shows Al Shabaab as the target; the grey ISIS)\(^ {186}\).

\(^{177}\) BTI, ‘Somalia Country Report 2020’ (Executive summary), 2020
\(^{178}\) Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2020- Somalia’ (Section F2), 4 March 2020
\(^{179}\) US Lead Inspector General, ‘Report to the US congress…’, (page 23) 1 April -30 June 2020
\(^{180}\) The Independent, ‘[AS]: Who are [they] and what are their goals?’, 15 January 2019
\(^{183}\) NYT, ‘Suicide Bombing Targets Major Turkish Military Base in Somalia’, 23 June 2020
\(^{184}\) Keating & Waldman, ‘War and Peace in Somalia’ (p331), Hurst (London) 2018
\(^{185}\) Washington Post, ‘In Somalia, al-Shabaab targeted U.S. and E.U. forces …’, 3 October 2019
\(^{186}\) LWJ, ‘AFRICOM hits Shabaab, Islamic State in Somalia’, 24 May 2019
4.10.5 Congressional Research Service in ‘Al Shabaab’ published on 16 January 2020 considering a variety of sources stated:

‘The U.N. Panel of Experts on Somalia reports that airstrikes have contributed to “keeping the group off-balance and preventing the massing of large numbers of fighters,” but assesses that they have little impact on the group’s ability to launch asymmetric attacks across Somalia. AFRICOM argues that strikes create “organizational confusion” and keep the group from being “a threat to the U.S. homeland.”’

4.11 Other armed groups and terrorist organisations

4.11.1 The USSD Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report’ published on 1 May 2020 noted: ‘ISIS networks in Somalia aim to replace the Federal Government of Somalia with an Islamic state, implement a strict interpretation of Sharia, and replace al-Shabaab as the dominant armed opposition to federal authority. ISIS-Somalia directs operations, recruitment, and training from Puntland, conducting sporadic attacks against AMISOM and Somali Government personnel throughout the country.’

4.11.2 The same report, without stating the specific terrorist groups, observed: ‘The terrorism situation in Somalia remains unstable and dangerous. Terrorist operatives and armed groups in Somalia continue to attack Somali authorities, forces associated with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and non-military targets. Kidnapping, bombings, murder, illegal roadblocks, banditry, use of indirect fire, and other violent incidents to foreign nationals can occur in any region of Somalia.’

4.11.3 The USSD OIG Lead Inspector General’s quarterly report covering April to June 2020 noted ‘ISIS-Somalia …claimed responsibility for an IED attack in Mogadishu, although its role in the attack has not been verified. The number of ISIS Somalia attacks during the quarter was similar to previous quarters [limited].’

4.11.4 The UNSC noted in August 2020 ‘Three attacks against government security forces were attributed to pro-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) elements: two in Mogadishu and one in Boosaaso, Bari Region. This represents a decrease compared with the previous period, when six incidents were recorded.’

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188 OSAC, ‘Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report’, (Terrorism Threat) 1 May 2020
189 OSAC, ‘Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report’, (Terrorism Threat) 1 May 2020
190 US Lead Inspector General, ‘Report to the US congress…’, (p.19) 1 April -30 June 2020
191 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 24), 13 August 2020
4.11.5 The DIS report 2020 noted, ‘There are a range of actors engaged in the Somalia’s complex and on-going conflict… However, IS has not established itself in South and Central Somalia and continues to have its geographical domicile in the northern parts of country, namely Puntland.’

5. Levels of violence
5.1 Overview

For information on Al Shabaab’s targeted groups see country policy and information note on Somalia: Al Shabaab.

5.1.1 The UN Security Council (UNSC) in the ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ dated 13 August 2020 noted, ‘The security situation remained volatile.’ This repeated its assessment from previous reports in 2018, 2019 and early 2020.

5.1.2 The USSD 2019 report noted, ‘Conflict during the year involving the government, militias, AMISOM, and al-Shabaab resulted in death, injury, and displacement of civilians’.

5.1.3 The UNSC ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ dated 13 May 2020, covering the period between 5 February to 4 May 2020 noted increased mortar attacks by Al Shabaab in Mogadishu (including at the UN compound in the Aden Adde International Airport zone) and nationwide. The source noted Al-Shabaab maintained the capability to conduct larger attacks against security forces in southern Somalia, increased its (claimed) assassinations and high-profile attacks. The report stated in the concluding observations: ‘I [the Secretary General] strongly condemn the attacks by Al-Shabaab, which disproportionately affect civilians, and note the evolving threat posed by the group.’

5.1.4 Amnesty International noted in its annual report covering 2019 that Al Shabaab ‘… regularly targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure, launching indiscriminate attacks.’ The source observed ‘All parties to the conflict violated international human rights and humanitarian law.’

5.1.5 In May 2020 ACLED noted that:

‘Al Shabaab attacks against Somali and AMISOM troops are reported daily across the country, and especially in Lower and Middle Shabelle, Banadir and Lower Juba.’

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192 DIS, ‘South And Central Somalia Security Situation…’(p.6) July 2020
193 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 18), 13 August 2020
194 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 11), 2 May 2018
195 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 12), 15 November 2019
196 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 15), 13 May 2020
197 USSD, ‘2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’ (section 1g), 11 March 2020
198 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (section 2B), 13 May 2020
199 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 103), 13 May 2020
200 AI, ‘Somalia 2019’ (Armed conflict), 2019
201 AI, ‘Somalia 2019’ (Armed conflict), 2019
5.1.6 Jane’s noted in September 2020, ‘IED attacks in Mogadishu occur at least monthly, targeting the airport, hotels, police stations, and government buildings.’

5.1.7 The Hiraal Institute in ‘Security in Somalia Q1 2020’ of May 2020, noted ‘The allies continue to maintain a shaky handle on AS [Al Shabaab] this quarter, but the group is trying to bolster its urban terrorism campaign. Its IED campaign seems to be picking up, but its direct military attacks seemed to be stalling.’ Using the data from the Hiraal Institute the DIS report noted that that ‘…al-shabaab’s main target continues to be the SNA and AMISOM. The group’s second priority is the Somali police force and civil servants working for the Federal Government and the member states.’

For information on the levels of violence and a breakdown of events by violence type, see tables 1 and 2 in Number of events and casualties. See also Al Shabaab: tactics and country policy and information note on Somalia: Al Shabaab for information on targeted groups.

5.2 Number of events and casualties

5.2.1 Data filtered by date (from 26 September 2010-26 September 2020) from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) database on Somalia shows the following trends in violence in Somalia (with annotations of the Country Guidance cases (see Consideration of issues) added by CPIT).

5.2.2 Tab 1: Number of ‘events’

5.2.3 Tab 2: Number of fatalities

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204 Hiraal Institute, ‘Security in Somalia Q1 2020’ (p.2), May 2020
205 DIS, ‘South And Central Somalia Security Situation…’ July 2020
206 ACLED, ‘Somalia Dashboard’, undated
5.2.4 Key

For definitions of the terms used by ACLED see ‘ACLED Definitions of Political Violence and Protest’ published April 2019.

5.2.5 The ACLED interactive dashboard showed figures for ‘battles’, ‘violence against civilians’ and ‘explosions/remote violence’ (not including data recorded for ‘riots’ and ‘protests’) per type of event which when added together per year gave totals for the whole of Somalia, including Puntland and Somaliland:

- In 2011 there were 1,079 events recorded and 1,968 fatalities.
- In 2014 there were 2,611 events recorded and 4,448 fatalities.
- In 2019 there were 2,282 events recorded and 4,008 fatalities.
- In 2020 (to end of September) there were 1,747 events and 2,395 fatalities.\(^{207}\)

5.2.6 The ACLED data can be broken down by region. The same datasets for Banadir, which includes Mogadishu, are:

- In 2011 there were 461 events and 964 fatalities.
- In 2014 there were 709 events and 597 fatalities.
- In 2019 there were 594 events and 734 fatalities.
- In 2020 (to 30 September) there were 388 events and 339 fatalities.\(^{208}\)

\(^{207}\) ACLED, ‘Somalia Dashboard’, no date
\(^{208}\) ACLED, ‘Somalia Dashboard’, no date
5.2.7 Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) in ‘Al-Shabaab and increasing civilian harm in Somalia’ published on 22 April 2020 noted ‘The evidence that al-Shabaab is behind the rising civilian casualty rate in Somalia is substantial. In 2018 and 2019 alone, AOAV’s explosive violence data showed that al-Shabaab were responsible for 83% of all civilian casualties in Somalia.’

5.2.8 Thomas Abi-Hanna, a Global Security Analyst at Stratfor, used the ACLED data to produce the following map showing Al Shabaab incidents from 2019 to January 2020.

5.2.9 Jane’s provided a map which detailed Al Shabaab attacks over the 12 month period from 16 September 2019 to 14 September 2020. There were 191 attacks over 17 provinces, the 5 provinces with most Al Shabaab attacks were Shabeellaha Hoose (54), Banaadir (34), Jubbada Hoose (14), Shabeellaha Dhexe (14) and Gedo (13).

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209 AOAV, ‘Al-Shabaab and increasing civilian harm in Somalia’, 22 April 2020

210 Thomas Abi-Hanna, (@thomasriddle), ‘Reupping my analysis on Al Shabaab…’, 16 January 2020

211 Jane’s, ‘Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen’ (Areas of operation), undated
5.2.10 The DIS report of July 2020 citing a variety of sources explained 'In 2019, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) stated that al-Shabaab has stepped up its military operations. Similarly, Hiraal Institute (HI) reported that the frequency and lethal attacks by alShabaab have increased in the last part of 2019. According to a report by UN Security Council of August 2019, the number and frequency of attacks by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu is a dangerous development for the country's security'.

5.2.11 Amnesty International (AI) in the Somalia 2019 report noted: ‘The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) recorded a total of 1,154 civilian casualties by mid-November [2019] 67% of which were attributed to indiscriminate and targeted attacks, mainly by the armed group Al-Shabab...’ The DIS report published in 2020 also noted these figures based on the AI report, but observed that 'Despite these numbers, al-Shabaab primarily targets high profiled government officials and law enforcers.'

5.2.12 Covering the period 1 August 2019 to 30 June 2020 the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted the 'Independent Expert is concerned about the continued volatility of the conflict in Somalia resulting in unacceptable levels of civilian casualties. During the period under review, the United Nations reported almost 800 security incidents leading to over 300 alleged unlawful killings/assassinations and almost 500 injuries during military operations.'

5.2.13 The UN country analysis 2020 report of September 2020 stated: ‘Armed conflicts between government forces and non-state armed groups and their allies and clanbased violence continue to endanger the safety of many people. In 2019, UNSOM recorded 1,459 civilian casualties (591 killed and 868 injured), of which 69 per cent were attributed to Al-Shabaab, 8 per cent

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212 DIS, ‘South And Central Somalia Security Situation...' (page 10) July 2020
213 AI, ‘Somalia 2019’ (Armed conflict), 2019
214 DIS, ‘South And Central Somalia Security Situation...' (page 3), July 2020
to clan militias, 4 per cent to the Somali National Army, 3 per cent to the Somali Police Force, and 2 per cent to AMISOM.\footnote{UN Somalia, ‘Common country analysis 2020’ (pages 13), September 2020
OSAC, Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report, (Terrorism threat), 1 May 2020
Wavell Room, ‘Stabilisation 2.0? […]’, 19 December 2019}

5.2.14 A January 2020 article by The Africa Center for Strategic Studies recorded ‘… a significant decline in al Shabaab activity (almost 14 percent) and even more so with regard to reported fatalities linked to al Shabaab (a 29-percent decline since 2018 and 40-percent since 2017).’\footnote{ACSS, ‘Threat from African Militant Islamist Groups Expanding, Diversifying’, 18 January 2020}

5.2.15 The US Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) ‘Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report’ noted:

‘Al-Shabaab-planned assassinations, suicide bombings, and indiscriminate armed attacks in civilian populated areas occur regularly in Somalia. Significant attacks in the past year [2019] include:

- ‘December 28 [2019]: A large VBIED detonated at a major road intersection in Mogadishu, killing over 80 people and injuring over 120.
- ‘December 10 [2019]: A complex attack on the SYL Hotel in Mogadishu killed several people.
- ‘October 13 [2019]: Nine mortar rounds struck the UN compound at MGQ Airport, injuring at least one.
- ‘September 30 [2019]: A complex attack including multiple VBIEDs and a ground assault element targeted a military base at Baledogle.
- ‘January 18 [2019]: A complex attack consisting of an ambush on an AMISOM convoy, followed by IEDs targeting the responding AMISOM force, killed dozens of people and injured many more.
- ‘January 1 [2019]: Seven mortar rounds struck the UN compound at MGQ Airport, injuring three people.’ \footnote{OSAC, Somalia 2020 Crime & Safety Report, (Terrorism threat), 1 May 2020}

5.2.16 According to a December 2019 piece on the British Military Thought website Wavell Room, AMISOM and its partners in the Somali National Army (SNA) had launched very few offensive operations against al-Shabaab since mid-2015.\footnote{Wavell Room, ‘Stabilisation 2.0? […]’, 19 December 2019}

5.2.17 Amnesty International’s Somalia 2019 report noted:

‘Military operations against Al-Shabaab resulted in dozens of civilian deaths and injuries [often as a consequence of indiscriminate attacks] by Somali and allied forces including the US military and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

‘Other civilians were killed when caught in crossfire during interclan violence which continued in parts of the country.’ US AFRICOM (the US military’s Africa Command, responsible for military operations including those fighting regional conflicts) continued to use drones and manned aircraft to carry out at least 63 attacks, some of which resulted in civilian casualties…Since late
2017, the US drone attacks had killed at least 17 civilians and injured eight others.\textsuperscript{220}

5.2.18 The UNSC reports provided a breakdown of the number of civilian casualties and the perpetrators. The February 2020 report noted Al-Shabaab were the main perpetrator, responsible for 83\% of civilian casualties in the November to February period\textsuperscript{221}. The UNSC May 2020 report noted clan militias were the main perpetrators, responsible for 28\% of civilian casualties, followed by Al-Shabaab with 27\% in the November 2019 to April 2020 period\textsuperscript{222}. The UNSC August 2020 report noted Al-Shabaab was the main perpetrator, responsible for 41\% of civilian casualties followed by unknown actors with 31\% in the period 5 May to 4 August 2020\textsuperscript{223}.

5.2.19 The UNSC ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ dated 13 August 2020 covering the period 5 May to 4 August 2020 noted:

‘Most …incidents were crime-related killings and shootings and Al-Shabaab attacks, including those using improvised explosive devices. Levels of crime and armed conflict-related incidents have remained steady since January, with a slight decline in June and July. The number of terrorism-related incidents remained at an average of around 75 per month in May and June, with 53 incidents in July.’\textsuperscript{224}

5.2.20 The DIS report of July 2020 summarised ‘The security situation in South and Central Somalia is still volatile …al-Shabaab is able to carry out sophisticated attacks… in areas not under their control, such as Mogadishu.’\textsuperscript{225}

5.2.21 For more information on specific conflict incidents and events and a breakdown of the figures over the previous years, see the UNSC’s reports of the Secretary-General on Somalia which are published quarterly and ACLED, ‘Somalia Dashboard’.

For detailed information on specific violent incidents see Crisis Group ‘Tracking Conflict Worldwide’ which provides monthly updates by country.

The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentations (ACCORD) published maps with casualty data for 2019 and the first quarter of 2020 available on Ecoi.net

6. Indiscriminate violence: vulnerable groups

6.1 Women and children

For information on women fearing gender-based violence generally see the relevant Somalia country policy and information note.

6.1.1 The USSD 2019 report stated:

\textsuperscript{220} AI, ‘Somalia 2019’ (Armed conflict), 2019
\textsuperscript{221} UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’, 13 February 2020
\textsuperscript{222} UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 44), 13 May 2020
\textsuperscript{223} UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 49), 13 August 2020
\textsuperscript{224} UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 18), 13 August 2020
\textsuperscript{225} DIS, ‘South And Central Somalia Security Situation…’ (p.3), July 2020
‘Government forces, allied militias, men wearing uniforms, and AMISOM troops used excessive force, including torture, and raped women and girls, including IDPs. While the army arrested some security force members accused of such abuse, impunity was the norm…

‘Women and children living in IDP settlements were particularly vulnerable to rape by armed men, including government soldiers and militia members. Gatekeepers in control of some IDP camps reportedly forced girls and women to provide sex in exchange for food and services within the settlements.’

6.1.2 The same USSD report noted ‘…the UN’s Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting recorded 222 children killed and 481 children maimed from January through December [2019], the majority at the hands of al-Shabaab.’

6.1.3 Covering the period 1 August 2019 to 30 June 2020 the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia noted:

‘Reportedly, 76 per cent of rapes occur in camps for internally displaced persons and 14 per cent in host communities… More than 270 conflict-related sexual violence cases reportedly occurred during the reporting period. Structures for implementing legal and policy frameworks and holding perpetrators accountable continue to be weak.

‘During the period under review, the United Nations recorded hundreds of sexual violence incidents against women and girls attributed to unidentified armed men, clan militiamen, Al-Shabaab elements and members of the Somali police and armed forces.’

6.1.4 The May 2020 UNSC report noted:

‘In total, from January to April [2020], 56 incidents affecting 62 victims/survivors of conflict-related sexual violence were documented. All those affected were women and girls (56 minors and 6 adults). On 12 March, UNSOM followed up with the authorities regarding the reported rape of a pregnant woman on 29 January in Baidoa. She had received no medical treatment after the assault and gave birth five days later. A police officer was found guilty of the crime and sentenced to death by the Baidoa first instance military court on 19 February.’

6.1.5 The UNSC ‘Conflict related sexual violence Report of the Secretary-General’ published on 3 June 2020 observed ‘The protracted conflict in Somalia, coupled with the de facto control of certain areas by Al-Shabaab and entrenched gender-based inequality, have heightened the risk of sexual violence faced by women and girls, and severely limited reporting… During her official visit in July, my Special Representative agreed with the Government to develop a new national action plan to end sexual violence in conflict.’

6.1.6 The UNSC ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ dated 13 August 2020 covering the period 5 May to 4 August 2020 noted:

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226 USSD, ‘2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’ (section 1g, 2e), 11 March 2020
227 USSD, ‘2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’ (section 1g), 11 March 2020
229 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 58), 13 May 2020
230 UNSC ‘Conflict related sexual violence Report of the Secretary-General’ (Somalia), 3 June 2020
‘The country task force on monitoring and reporting on grave violations against children in armed conflict verified 546 grave violations affecting 495 children (376 boys and 119 girls), one attack on schools, one attack on a hospital and three cases of denial of humanitarian assistance. A total of 143 children were abducted, 185 children were victims of killing and maiming, 165 were victims of recruitment and use and 48 were victims of conflict-related sexual violence.

‘The violations were attributed to Al-Shabaab (320, or 58.6 per cent), unknown armed elements (108, or 19.78 per cent), clan militia (31, or 5.68 per cent), federal and state armed forces (83, or 15.2 per cent), AMISOM (2, or 0.37 per cent) and unidentified aerial attacks (2, or 0.37 per cent). A total of 17 incidents of deprivation of liberty affecting 31 boys were recorded, with 26 boys detained by the Somali Police Force, 2 by Puntland state forces, 2 by Jubbaland state forces and 1 by Galmudug state forces. Reintegration programmes supported 986 children associated with armed forces or armed groups, and 299 vulnerable children continued to receive support from reintegration programmes supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund.’

6.1.7 The undated UN report ‘Confluence of famine and conflict devastating for women and children in Somalia’ noted ‘…the people of Somalia [are] facing the greatest risks resulting from armed conflict and lack of sustainable security and governance. This confluence of famine and conflict is particularly devastating for women and children. While attempting to save their children from starvation, malnutrition and disease, women in Somalia are subject to conflict-related security threats including sexual violence.’

6.1.8 Human Rights Watch in ‘World report 2020 - Somalia Events of 2019’ noted ‘Internally displaced women and girls remain at particular risk of sexual and gender-based violence by armed men and civilians’ and ‘All Somali parties to the conflict committed [sic] serious abuses against children, including killings, maiming, and the recruitment and use of child soldiers.’

6.1.9 The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) noted in ‘OHCHR in Somalia’, undated ‘…the recruitment and use of children by Al-Shabaab as well as by security forces. These violations and abuses are largely not investigated.’

6.1.10 The UN country analysis 2020 report of September 2020 noted:

‘In 2019, the UN verified cases in which 2,959 children were victims of grave violations, which was a sharp decrease from 5,656 in 2018. In 2019, children were victims of recruitment and use (1,495), abduction (1,158), killing and maiming (703), and rape and other sexual violence such as forced marriage and attempted rape (227).

‘Furthermore, it is estimated that 23 per cent of the 2,600 identified women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab were abducted and forced into marriage with its fighters. In 2018, UNSOM verified 270 cases of conflict-related sexual violence against women.’

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231 UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’ (para 18), 13 August 2020
232 UN, ‘Confluence of famine and conflict devastating for women and children in Somalia’, undated
234 OHCHR, ‘OHCHR in Somalia’, undated
related sexual violence perpetrated against women, girls and boys by nonstate armed groups, including Al-Shabaab and clan militias.\textsuperscript{235}

For information on recruitment to Al Shabaab for women and children and their treatment see country policy and information note on Somalia: Al Shabaab.\textsuperscript{235}

See also Humanitarian conditions

6.2 Humanitarian workers

6.2.1 UN OCHA in a ‘Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation in Somalia’ by the Assistant Secretary-General For Humanitarian Affairs And Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Ursula Mueller in May 2019 noted ‘Targeted violence against entities with political, development and humanitarian mandates have to stop…so far this year, 18 violent incidents have impacted humanitarian organizations, resulting in three deaths, two injuries and seven abductions.’\textsuperscript{236}

6.2.2 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview’ of December 2019 explained:

‘The safety of humanitarian operations remains a key concern due to the volatile and unpredictable security situation. In the first eight months of 2019, at least 51 humanitarian personnel were directly affected by violent incidents. Of these, two humanitarian workers were killed, two injured, 11 abducted, five arrested or temporarily detained, and two expelled by authorities for alleged infractions. Most of the incidents took place in southern and central Somalia…the security challenges across the country also directly affect people in need of assistance and protection, as several humanitarian organizations decide to scale down or suspend operations when access to contested and sieged areas is hampered by ongoing hostilities.’\textsuperscript{237}

6.2.3 The UN Security Council noted: ‘Security continues to be a major constraint to humanitarian operations. From 1 January to 4 May [2020], 54 incidents were recorded, in which two humanitarian workers were killed, six injured, six abducted and three detained or temporarily arrested.’\textsuperscript{238}

6.2.4 OCHA in ‘Somalia: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (Jan-Mar 2020) - As of 11 May 2020’ noted

‘Thirty three incidents impacting humanitarian operations were reported in the period 01 Jan – 31 Mar 2020, impacting seventeen different humanitarian organizations across Somalia. As a result of these incidents, two humanitarian staff were killed in Hirshabelle, five were injured in Banadir and Hirshabelle, four were abducted and two arrested in Jubaland…Mortar attacks were carried out against the UN compound in Mogadishu on the 17th February and 8th March 2020. Forty-six per cent of the incidents during this reporting period are attributed to government authorities, thirty-one per cent

\textsuperscript{235} UN Somalia, ‘Common country analysis 2020’ (pages 13 to 14), September 2020

\textsuperscript{236} UN OCHA, ‘Briefing to the Security Council on the humanitarian situation…’, 22 May 2019

\textsuperscript{237} OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia’, December 2019

\textsuperscript{238} UNSC, ‘Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General’, (para 15), 13 May 2020
to non-state armed actors, nineteen per cent to armed clan militias and four per cent to other nations’ forces operating in Somalia.

‘…Incidents varied in nature with eighteen cases of violence against humanitarian personnel and operations recorded… Comparing this quarter to the same period last year, in which thirty-two incidents were documented, similar levels of violence persist. 239

See also Commercial and humanitarian access

For information on Al Shabaab targets, including humanitarian workers see the country policy and information note on Somalia: Al Shabaab.

6.3 People with disabilities

6.3.1 UN OCHA in its December 2019 report explained:

‘…People with disabilities have largely been left out of humanitarian activity, or face additional barriers to accessing it. Moreover, persons with disabilities face additional risks of exploitation, abuse and discrimination by other IDPs, sch [sic] as having their assistance stolen from them. People with disabilities in Somalia are often denied access to water, food, sanitation and accommodation through a lack of inclusion in the humanitarian response.’ 240

6.3.2 The UN country analysis 2020 report of September 2020 noted:

‘People with disabilities are at heightened risk of violence and abuse, a situation that is worsened by the social stigma associated with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities.’ 241

6.3.3 The UN report also noted ‘People with disabilities of all age groups have been identified as a particularly marginalized and at-risk group within Somali society as a result of the numerous attitudinal, environmental and institutional barriers they face, and the lack of concerted efforts to include them. The number of people with disabilities in Somalia is likely to be higher than the global estimate of 15 per cent, as a result of the long period of conflict, poverty, malnutrition and lack of access to health care.’ 242

240 OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview Somalia’, December 2019
241 UN Somalia, ‘Common country analysis 2020’ (page 14), September 2020
242 UN Somalia, ‘Common country analysis 2020’ (page 49), September 2020
Terms of Reference

A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) is a broad outline of what the CPIN seeks to cover. They form the basis for the country information section. The Home Office’s Country Policy and Information Team uses some standardised ToRs, depending on the subject, and these are then adapted depending on the country concerned.

For this particular CPIN, the following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

- **Humanitarian situation**
  - Numbers of people in need
  - Food security
  - Water, sanitation and hygiene
  - Housing and shelter
  - Displacement and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
  - Commercial and humanitarian access
  - Evictions
  - Support providers

- **Security situation**
  - Actors
    - Who they are?
      - AS
      - FGS
      - AMISOM
      - Clans
      - AQ(?)
      - International Actors(?)
    - Aims
    - Capacity/capability
  - Level and nature of violence,
    - Casualty rates (by population)
    - Profile of casualties (targeted versus indiscriminate)
    - Impact on vulnerable groups (Women and children, the elderly, disabled persons, health workers, humanitarian workers, Others?).
    - Impact on daily life
    - Compare this to
      - previous CPIN
      - AMM & MOJ

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Clearance
Below is information on when this note was cleared:

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Changes from last version of this note
Update to assessment only (to reflect new Country Guidance).