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Across the years, there have, nonetheless, been some significant changes for readers to be aware of:

- In 2022, for the first time, we included the agriculture, forestry and fishing sector. In previous years, we have excluded this sector on the basis that these businesses were less likely to have any IT capacity or online presence. This is a small sector, accounting for 3.6 per cent of all UK businesses. As such, we expect the inclusion of this sector to have a negligible impact on the comparability of findings across years.
- The charities sample was added in 2018, while the education institutions sample was added in 2020. The initial education institutions sample in 2020. The scope of the school and college samples were expanded to include institutions in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as England.
- We achieved fewer business interviews this year (down from 1,419 last year to 1,243 in the 2022 survey). This includes fewer medium (149, vs. 210 in 2021) and large businesses (135, vs. 203 in 2021). This is primarily a reflection of the increasingly challenging business survey environment in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.
- We also achieved fewer further education interviews this year (34, vs. 57 in 2021). This also reflected the challenging situation of surveying schools and colleges generally at the start of a new term, during the release of new COVID-19 guidance for education settings.¹
- By contrast, we increased the sample sizes for charities (from 337 to 424), primary schools (from 135 to 198), secondary schools (from 158 to 221) and higher education institutions (from 28 to 37). The higher sample sizes allow for more granular analysis by income band for charities. They also allow for more statistically reliable results for primary schools, secondary schools and higher education colleges – the latter group could not be reported in a statistically reliable way last year, since the achieved sample size was under 30. There is more discussion around the implications of the changes of sample sizes and associated margins of error in Section 2.5.
- The government's 10 Steps to Cyber Security guidance was refreshed between the 2021 and 2022 studies. The overall guidance covers much of the same ground, but the individual 10 Steps have been updated. In some cases, the themes are unchanged – for example, incident management remains one of the 10 Steps. In some cases, a theme has been refreshed or broadened, for instance with aspects of the previous “managing user privileges” step being absorbed into a new step around “identity and access management”. Finally, some of the new steps cover entirely new themes, such as supply chain security. Consequently, DCMS and Ipsos decided this year to change the way the survey questions are mapped to the 10 Steps. This is detailed in Section 2.7.
- In 2021, we substantially changed the way we collect data on the costs of breaches in the survey, as part of a reflection on findings from a separate 2020 DCMS research study on the full cost of cyber security breaches. These changes mean we cannot make direct comparisons between data from 2021 onwards and previous years. We can, however, still comment on whether the broad patterns in the data are consistent with previous years, for example the differences between smaller and larger businesses, as well as charities.

¹ See, for example, the list of government COVID-19 guidance for further education colleges in England: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/further-and-higher-education-coronavirus-covid-19>.

If you wish to use extrapolated Cyber Security Breaches Survey data as part of your analysis or reporting, then we would encourage you to contact DCMS via the evidence mailbox: evidence@dcms.gov.uk.

- whether this has been reviewed by senior management in the last 12 months (STRATINT) as well as by third parties outside the organisation (STRATEXT), and whether this review was specific to cyber security or a more general policy review (STRATREV)
- the reporting of cyber security risks in annual reports (CORPRISK), where organisations had published annual reports in the last 12 months (CORPORATE)
- whether organisations have a rule or policy to pay out in the case of ransomware attacks (RANSOM).

The questions around incident management approaches were split and expanded to cover a wider range of actions, resulting in new measures for the following actions or behaviours this year (at the existing INCIDCONTENT question and a new INCIDACTION question):

- formal incident response plans
- guidance around external reporting
- keeping internal records of incidents
- informing senior management of incidents
- informing regulators of incidents
- informing cyber insurance providers of incidents.

The entire incident management section of the questionnaire was also moved to be after the cost of breaches questions, creating a better flow to the questions.

The following questions were also significantly amended so cannot be compared to previous years:

- “invested in threat intelligence” became “used or invested in threat intelligence” (at IDENT) given that some threat intelligence may be accessed without direct payment
- “debriefs to log any lessons learnt” was significantly strengthened to “formal debriefs or discussions to log any lessons learnt” (at INCIDACTION)
- “formally logging incidents” became “keep an internal record of incidents” (at INCIDACTION) to make clearer what was meant by logging.

Furthermore, the following questions received minor amends to the specific language, phrasing or codes used, but are considered to still be broadly comparable to previous years:

- two additional job titles (partner and chair) added to the unprompted list at TITLE
- adding the UK Cyber Security Council as an unprompted information source (INFO)
- “communications and public engagement plans” became “external communications and public engagement plans” (at INCIDCONTENT) to distinguish from internal communications to staff
- “attempt to identify the source of the incident” and “make an assessment of the scale and impact of the incident” at INCIDACTION are both minor updates to previous comparable codes at INCIDCONTENT.

The following questions were removed, partly to make space for the additions:

- the use of social media accounts (ONLINE) – this activity was considered ubiquitous enough to no longer require tracking
- the use of industrial control systems (ONLINE) – DCMS felt this code tended to underrepresent the use of industrial control systems, which are more commonly found in specific industry sectors, but may not be accurately picked up in an economy-wide business survey
- questions around COVID-19 (COVPRI) and related guidance on home working, video conferencing and moving business online (at SCHEME)
- whether senior management was made aware of the most disruptive breach (BOARDREP).

Privacy Notices on processing of personal data, and the data rights of participants, following the introduction of GDPR in May 2018.

- Interviewers could send a reassurance email to prospective respondents if the respondent requested this. This included a link to the [GOV.UK page](#) to confirm the legitimacy of the survey, a link to the relevant Privacy Notice and an option to unsubscribe (by replying to the message and requesting this).
- Ipsos set up an email inbox and free (0800) phone number for respondents to be able to contact to set up appointments or, in the case of the phone number, take part there and then in interviews. Where we had email addresses on the sample for organisations, we also sent five warm-up and reminder emails across the course of fieldwork to let organisations know that an Ipsos interviewer would attempt to call them, and give them the opportunity to opt in by arranging an appointment. These emails also asked organisations to check the contact details we had for them and to send us better contact details if necessary. They were tailored to the type of organisation, with each email featuring a different subject line and key message to encourage participation.
- The survey was endorsed by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the Association of British Insurers (ABI), the Charity Commission for England and Wales and the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland and techUK. In practice, this meant that these organisations allowed their identity and logos to be used in the survey introduction and on the microsite, to encourage organisations to take part.
- As an extra encouragement, we offered to email respondents a copy of last year's infographic summaries, and a help card listing the range of government guidance on cyber security, following their interview. A copy of this help card is included as Appendix B.
- Specifically, to encourage participation from colleges and universities, DCMS and Ipsos jointly worked with Jisc and UCISA. These organisations contacted their members, which include IT and cyber security professionals in the further and higher education sectors, to proactively ask them to take part in the survey. Ipsos created a promotional PowerPoint deck explaining the survey to support this. Any opt-in requests were sent via Jisc and UCISA to Ipsos, who set up bespoke calendar appointments with each institution. In total, 2 of the further education interviews and 25 of the higher education interviews were achieved from opt-in requests via these organisations.

Fieldwork monitoring

Ipsos is a member of the interviewer Quality Control Scheme recognised by the Market Research Society. In accordance with this scheme, the field supervisor on this project listened into at least 10 per cent of the interviews and checked the data entry on screen for these interviews.

Online follow-up survey to revalidate cost data

In the 2021 study, as part of a redesigned approach to collecting cost data, we added a new online follow-up survey for businesses and charities (as education institutions did not answer the cost questions). Respondents who gave permission at the end of the telephone interview were sent a unique online link allowing them to recheck the answers they had given to the four cost of breaches questions in the survey, and change them if they wanted to. The online version of these questions had the same question wording, but the online format allowed for a clearer presentation, highlighting all the types of costs we wanted respondents to consider in their answer. Respondents were also encouraged with this follow-up survey to validate their answers with others in their organisation (e.g. finance or legal colleagues).

As well as the original invite, we sent two reminder emails during the main fieldwork period to those that had offered to fill in the survey but had not completed it.

A total of 678 respondents were sent this follow-up survey (i.e. they gave their consent), out of the total 775 respondents that were eligible (i.e. had identified breaches or attacks in the telephone survey). Of these, 123 completed the follow-up, representing a response rate of 18 per cent for this online element (vs. 22% last year). Only 6 respondents changed any of their answers, and this was usually just one of their answers across the five cost questions. This helps to provide a continuing high level of confidence in the cost estimates reported in the main [Statistical Release](#).

2.5 Fieldwork outcomes and response rate

We monitored fieldwork outcomes and response rates throughout fieldwork, and interviewers were given regular guidance on how to avoid common reasons for refusal. Table 2.3 shows the final outcomes, the response rate and the response rate adjusted for unusable or ineligible records, for businesses and charities. The approach for calculating these figures is covered later in this section.

Table 2.3: Fieldwork outcomes and response rate calculations for businesses and charities

Outcome	Businesses	Charities
Total selected from original sample frame	84,174	200,203
Sample without contact details or duplicates post-cleaning	54,251	28,670
Net: total sample with contact details	29,923	171,533
Sample with contact details left in reserve	4,908	168,232
Net: total sample used (i.e. excluding any left in reserve)	25,015	3,301
Unresponsive numbers	13,710	4,514
Refusals	4,984	589
Unusable leads with working numbers	3,758	905
Unusable numbers	1,000	159
Ineligible leads – established during screener	215	33
Incomplete interviews	105	33
Net: completed interviews	1,243	424
Expected eligibility of screened respondents	86%	93%
Response rate	5%	13%
Response rate adjusted for unusable or ineligible records	7%	20%

The fieldwork outcomes for state education institutions are shown in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Fieldwork outcomes and response rate calculations for state education institutions

Outcome	Primary schools	Secondary schools	Further education	Higher education
Total selected from original sample frame	20,809	4,066	309	175
Sample without contact details or duplicates post-cleaning	5,937	1,025	28	5
Net: total sample with contact details	14,872	3,041	281	170
Sample with contact details left in reserve	13,367	1,896	0	0
Net: total sample used (i.e. excluding any left in reserve)	1,505	1,896	281	170
Incomplete interviews	12	19	03	00
Ineligible leads – established during screener	245	136	00	00
Refusals	176	193	21	15
Unusable leads with working numbers	63	66	16	12
Unusable numbers	32	48	10	05
Unresponsive numbers	779	1,213	198	101
Net: completed interviews	198	221	33	37
Expected eligibility of screened respondents	100%	98%	100%	100%
Response rate	13%	12%	12%	22%
Response rate adjusted for unusable or ineligible records	14%	13%	13%	24%

Notes on response rate calculations

The following points explain the specific calculations and assumptions involved in coming up with these response rates:

- Response rate = completed interviews / total sample used
- Response rate adjusted for unusable or ineligible records = completed interviews / (completed interviews + incomplete interviews + refusals expected to be eligible + any remaining unresponsive numbers expected to be eligible)
- Refusals exclude excludes “soft” refusals. This is where the respondent was hesitant about taking part, so our interviewers backed away and avoided a definitive refusal.

- Unusable leads with working numbers are where there was communication difficulty making it impossible to carry out the survey (e.g. a bad line, or language difficulty), as well as numbers called 10 or more times over fieldwork without ever being picked up.
- Unusable numbers are where the number was in a valid format, so was loaded into the main survey sample batches, but which turned out to be wrong numbers, fax numbers, household numbers or disconnected.
- Unresponsive numbers account for sample that had a working telephone number, but where the respondent was unreachable or unavailable for an interview during the fieldwork period, so eligibility could not be assessed.

Original versus revised interview targets

The total achieved interviews for businesses, further education colleges and higher education institutions are under their respective targets set at the outset of the survey. The original targets are laid out in Table 2.5. The targets were intentionally ambitious, and the achieved interviews reflect what was possible in the highly challenging survey environment this year. It should be noted that the differences between the expected margins of error (MoE) at the outset (with the original targets) and the actual margins of error achieved with these sample sizes are, generally speaking, negligible outside of the further education sample.

The margin of error is calculated as the 95% confidence interval, presented here to the nearest whole percentage. That is to say, if we were to conduct this survey 100 times (each time with a different sample of the business population), we would expect the results to be within 2 to 3 percentage points of the results we achieved here in 95 out of those 100 cases.

Table 2.5: Original interview targets and achieved interviews

Sample group	Target	Target MoE ⁷	Achieved	Achieved MoE
Businesses	1,400	±2–3 % points	1,243	±2–3 % points
Charities	450	±4–6 % points	424	±4–6 % points
Primary schools	120	±5–9 % points	198	±4–7 % points
Secondary schools	130	±5–9 % points	221	±4–6 % points
Further education	90	±5–9 % points	34	±10–16 % points
Higher education	50	±7–11 % points	37	±9–14 % points

Response rates under COVID-19 and expected negligible impact on the survey reliability

The adjusted response rates for all the sampled groups, outside of higher education institutions, were lower than in the 2021 survey. This includes businesses (7%, vs. 19% in 2021), charities (20% vs. 32%), primary schools (14% vs. 37%), secondary schools (13% vs. 25%) and further education colleges (13% vs. 22%).

The lower response rates are likely to be due to a combination of unique circumstances, including:

- the shifting COVID-19 restrictions and associated guidance (particularly for education institutions beginning a new term)

⁷ The target margin of error took into account the expected sample stratifications by size and sector (for businesses) and income band (for charities).

- the end of the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme around the start of fieldwork (on 30 September 2021)
- the attempts by many organisations to move towards hybrid working, which was also disrupted by the emergence of the Omicron variant in late November 2021
- the ongoing challenge of declining response rates in survey fieldwork in general.

While the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2021 fieldwork also took place under COVID-19 restrictions, the disruption this year appears to have had a more substantial impact on survey performance:

- It was harder to reach organisations via landline numbers given the embedding of video conferencing in working practices.
- When we did get through, it was harder to reach the right individual within the organisation, who may have been working remotely rather than in an office
- Where we did reach the right person, these individuals were often substantially busier than in previous years due to the overall strain that hybrid working has placed on IT and cyber teams. These teams were consequently less willing to take part in surveys in general.

More generally, there has been an increasing awareness of cyber security, potentially making businesses more reticent to take part in surveys on this topic.

Furthermore, the increase in the survey length from c.17 minutes in 2020, to c.20 minutes in 2021 and c.22 minutes this year is also expected to have reduced the response rate – interviewers must mention the average length to respondents when they introduce the survey, and respondents are naturally less inclined to take part in longer interviews.

To a lesser extent, the existence of another DCMS organisational survey on cyber security, the Cyber Security Longitudinal Survey (CSLS), may have impacted the performance of this survey. Ipsos also undertook fieldwork for the CSLS. The CSLS fieldwork took place earlier, between March and July 2021. Organisations that took part in the CSLS were excluded from the sample for the Cyber Security Breaches Survey. However, organisations that were contacted for that survey but opted not to take part may also have been resampled and contacted anew for the Cyber Security Breaches Survey, and been less likely to take part as a result.

However, it is important to remember that response rates are not a direct measure of non-response bias in a survey, but only a measure of the potential for non-response bias to exist. Previous research into response rates, mainly with consumer surveys, has indicated that they are often poorly correlated with non-response bias.⁸

The idea of non-response bias entering the survey assumes that the organisations declining to take part are substantially different in terms of their cyber security approaches to the ones we did interview. If we believe, reasonably, that the response rates this year were mainly lower due to COVID-19 and associated impacts, then we must consider whether the businesses most negatively impacted by COVID-19 are likely to have different cyber security challenges or require different approaches to the issue – we have no strong reasons to believe this.

⁸ See, for example, Groves and Peytcheva (2008) “The Impact of Nonresponse Rates on Nonresponse Bias: A Meta-Analysis”, *Public Opinion Quarterly* (available at: <https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/72/2/167/1920564>) and Sturgis, Williams, Brunton-Smith and Moore (2016) “Fieldwork Effort, Response Rate, and the Distribution of Survey Outcomes: A Multilevel Meta-analysis”, *Public Opinion Quarterly* (available at: <https://academic.oup.com/poq/issue/81/2>).

2.6 Data processing and weighting

Editing and data validation

There were a number of logic checks in the CATI script, which checked the consistency and likely accuracy of answers estimating costs and time spent dealing with breaches. If respondents gave unusually high or low answers at these questions relative to the size of their organisation, the interviewer would read out the response they had just recorded and double-check this is what the respondent meant to say. In addition, respondents overwhelmingly revalidated their answers at the cost questions in the online follow-up survey. This meant that, typically, minimal work was needed to manually edit the data post fieldwork.

Nonetheless, individual outliers in the data can heavily affect cyber breach cost estimates. Therefore, the research team manually checked the final data for outliers and recalculated the estimates without these outliers, in order to check the impact that they were having on answers. This year, we had two business respondents who gave an approximated answer for the COST question (total cost of all breaches or attacks identified in the last 12 months) suggesting an extremely high cost. One these respondents also suggested an extremely high cost for their single most disruptive breach. In one case, we judged their estimate to be legitimate, based on this being a very large business with high revenue (according to Companies House data). The other case was a small business with a low level of net assets (again, according to Companies House data), so we opted to treat this as an outlier, changing their responses to “don’t know” at all cost-related questions.⁹ The final SPSS data uploaded to the UK Data Archive excludes outlier responses.

Coding

The verbatim responses to unprompted questions could be coded as “other” by interviewers when they did not appear to fit into the predefined code frame. These “other” responses were coded manually by Ipsos’ coding team, and where possible, were assigned to codes in the existing code frame. It was also possible for new codes to be added where enough respondents – 10 per cent or more – had given a similar answer outside of the existing code frame. The Ipsos research team verified the accuracy of the coding, by checking and approving each new code proposed.

We did not undertake SIC coding. Instead the SIC 2007 codes that were already in the IDBR sample were used to assign businesses to a sector for weighting and analysis purposes. The pilot survey in 2017 had overwhelmingly found the SIC 2007 codes in the sample to be accurate, so this practice was carried forward to subsequent surveys.

Weighting

The education institutions samples are unweighted. Since they were sampled through a simple random sample approach, there were no sample skews to be corrected through weighting.

For the business and charities samples, we applied random iterative method (rim) weighting for two reasons. Firstly, to account for non-response bias where possible. Secondly, to account for the disproportionate sampling approaches, which purposely skewed the achieved business sample by size and sector, and the charities sample by income band. The weighting makes the data representative of the actual UK business and registered charities populations.

⁹ This includes the following variables in the SPSS data: DAMAGEDIRS, DAMAGEDIRSB, DAMAGEDIRSX, DAMAGEDIRL, DAMAGEDIRLB, DAMAGEDIRLX, DAMAGESTAFF, DAMAGESTAFFB, DAMAGESTAFFX, DAMAGEIND, DAMAGEINDB, DAMAGEINDX, DAMAGE, COSTA, COSTB, COST.

Rim weighting is a standard weighting approach undertaken in business surveys of this nature, because it allows you to weight your sample to represent a wider population using multiple variables. In cases where the weighting variables are strongly correlated with each other, it is potentially less effective than other methods, such as cell weighting. However, this is not the case here.

We did not weight by region, primarily because region is not considered to be an important determining factor for attitudes and behaviours around cyber security. Moreover, the final weighted data are already closely aligned with the business population region profile. The population profile data came from the [BEIS Business Population Estimates 2021](#).

Non-interlocking rim weighting by income band and country was undertaken for charities. The population profile data for these came from the respective charity regulator databases.

For both businesses and charities, interlocking weighting was also possible, but was ruled out as it would have potentially resulted in very large weights. This would have reduced the statistical power of the survey results, without making any considerable difference to the weighted percentage scores at each question.

Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 shows the unweighted and weighted profiles of the final data. The percentages are rounded so do not always add to 100 per cent.

Table 2.6: Unweighted and weighted sample profiles for business interviews

	Unweighted %	Weighted %
Size		
Micro (1–9 staff)	56%	81%
Small (10–49 staff)	21%	15%
Medium (50–249 staff)	12%	3%
Large (250+ staff)	11%	1%
Sector		
Agriculture, forestry or fishing	3%	4%
Administration or real estate	12%	12%
Construction	9%	13%
Education	1%	1%
Entertainment, service or membership organisations	5%	7%
Finance or insurance	7%	2%
Food or hospitality	8%	10%
Health, social care or social work	10%	4%
Information or communications	11%	6%
Professional, scientific or technical	12%	14%
Retail or wholesale (including vehicle sales or repairs)	12%	17%
Transport or storage	3%	4%

	Unweighted %	Weighted %
Utilities or production (including manufacturing)	7%	7%

Table 2.7: Unweighted and weighted sample profiles for charity interviews

	Unweighted %	Weighted %
Income band		
£0 to under £10,000	22%	39%
£10,000 to under £100,000	18%	35%
£100,000 to under £500,000	23%	14%
£500,000 to under £5 million	15%	6%
£5 million or more	18%	2%
Unknown income	5%	5%
Country		
England and Wales	89%	84%
Northern Ireland	1%	3%
Scotland	9%	12%

2.7 SPSS data uploaded to UK Data Archive

A de-identified SPSS dataset from this survey is being published on the UK Data Archive to enable further analysis. The variables are consistent with those in the previously archived datasets (from 2021 to 2018), outside of new questions and deleted questions.

List of changes to old variables in the SPSS file

The following SPSS variable is no longer comparable with previous years due to significant changes in question wording (covered earlier in Section 2.1):

- IDENT5.

The following questions, which were present in the 2021 SPSS data, were removed from the survey questionnaire, but we have kept the variable with blank data in the latest SPSS file to preserve the numeric ordering of variables in the file (e.g. since there is an INCIDCONTENT2 variable, we have kept INCIDCONTENT1 rather than delete it). We have then relabelled these variables to make it clear they are no longer being used.

- ONLINE6
- SCHEME6 and SCHEME7
- INCIDCONTENT1, INCIDCONTENT4, INCIDCONTENT5, INCIDCONTENT7, INCIDCONTENT8 and INCIDCONTENT9.

As noted in Section 1.3, the government’s 10 Steps to Cyber Security guidance was refreshed between the 2021 and 2022 studies. The overall guidance covers much of the same ground, but the individual 10 Steps have been updated. Consequently, DCMS and Ipsos decided this year to change the way the survey questions are mapped to the 10 Steps. For example, the mapping of the risk management step has been enhanced while the step covering supply chain security is completely new. Given these sorts of changes, it might be considered more challenging for organisations to meet the requirements for the refreshed 10 Steps.

Therefore, the results around the 10 Steps reported in previous years of this study are no longer comparable with the latest results. The final mapping of the 10 Steps to specific survey questions versus the previous mapping is summarised in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8: New and previous mapping of the questionnaire to the 10 Steps to Cyber Security guidance

Step in SPSS	Previous step description and mapping	Current step description and mapping
Step1	Information risk management regime – organisation has formal cyber security policies, and the board are kept updated on actions taken	Risk management – organisation at least annually update senior managers on cyber security actions and have or do at least 2 of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ a cyber security policy or strategy ▪ adhere to Cyber Essentials or Cyber Essentials Plus ▪ have undertaken a cyber security risk assessment ▪ have cyber insurance (either a specific or non-specific policy) ▪ have undertaken cyber security vulnerability audits ▪ have an incident response plan ▪ have taken actions to manage the cyber risks from their immediate suppliers or wider supply chain
Step2	Secure configuration – organisation has a policy to apply software updates within 14 days	Engagement and training – staff receive cyber security training, or the organisation has undertaken mock phishing exercises
Step3	Network security – organisation has network firewalls	Asset management – organisations have a list of their critical assets
Step4	Managing user privileges – organisation restricts IT admin and access rights to specific users	Architecture and configuration – organisations have configured firewalls and at least 1 of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ secure configurations, i.e. security controls on company devices ▪ a policy around what staff are permitted to do on company devices

Step in SPSS	Previous step description and mapping	Current step description and mapping
Step5	User education and awareness – organisation has a formal policy covering what staff are permitted to do on the organisation’s IT devices, and staff receive cyber security training	Vulnerability management – organisations have a patching policy and at least 1 of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ have undertaken cyber security vulnerability audits ▪ have undertaken penetration testing ▪ updated anti-malware ▪ a cyber security policy covering Software as a Service (SaaS)
Step6	Incident management – organisation has any incident management processes	Identity and access management – organisations have or do at least 1 of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ restrict admin rights to specific users ▪ a password policy ▪ two-factor authentication (2FA)
Step7	Malware protection – organisation has up-to-date malware protection	Data security – organisations have cloud backups or other kinds of backups, and at least 1 of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ rules covering secure personal data transfers ▪ a cyber security policy covering removable storage ▪ a cyber security policy covering how to store data
Step8	Monitoring – organisation monitors user activity or uses security monitoring tools	Logging and monitoring – organisations fulfil one of the following criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ use security monitoring tools ▪ they have a log of breaches and have had a breach
Step9	Removable media controls – organisation has a formal policy covering what can be stored on removable devices	Incident management – organisations have at least 1 of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ an incident response plan ▪ formal debriefs for cyber security incidents
Step10	Home and mobile working – organisation has a formal policy covering remote or mobile working	Supply chain security – organisations have taken actions to manage the cyber risks from their immediate suppliers or wider supply chain

Organisation size variables

There are two organisation size variables, including a numeric variable (SIZEA) and a banded variable (SIZEB). The banded variable in the SPSS does not include the highest band from the questionnaire (1,000 or more employees) because there is no analysis carried out on this group (due to low sample sizes). Instead, it is merged into an overall large business (250 or more employees) size band, which is used across the published report.

Derived cost-related variables

For the questions in the survey estimating the financial costs of breaches, respondents were asked to give either an approximate numeric response or, if they did not know, then a banded response. The vast majority of those who gave a response gave numeric responses (e.g. 89% at the COST question, after excluding refusals and those saying there was no cost incurred).

We agreed with DCMS from the outset of the survey that for those who gave banded responses, a numeric response would be imputed, in line with all previous surveys in the series. This ensures that no survey data goes unused and also allows for larger sample sizes for these questions.

To impute numeric responses, syntax was applied to the SPSS dataset which:

- calculated the mean amount within a banded range for respondents who had given numeric responses (e.g. a £200 mean amount for everyone giving an answer between £100 and £500)
- applied this mean amount as the imputed value for all respondents who gave the equivalent banded response (i.e. £200 would be the imputed mean amount for everyone not giving a numeric response but saying “£100 to less than £500” as a banded response).

Often in these cases, a common alternative approach is to take the mid-point of each banded response and use that as the imputed value (i.e. £300 for everyone saying “£100 to less than £500”). It was decided against doing this for this survey given that the mean responses within a banded range tended to cluster towards the bottom of the band. This suggested that imputing values based on mid-points would slightly overestimate the true values across respondents.

Redaction of cost data

No numeric cost variables will be included in the published SPSS dataset. This was agreed with DCMS to prevent any possibility of individual organisations being identified. Instead, all variables related to spending and cost figures will be banded, including the imputed values (laid out in the previous section). These banded variables included the derived variables relating to the cost of cyber security breaches or attacks:

- the estimated direct short-term cost of the most disruptive breach or attack (damagedirsx_bands)
- the estimated direct long-term cost (damagedirlx_bands)
- the estimated staffing cost (damagestaffx_bands)
- the estimated damage or disruption cost (damagelindx_bands)
- the combination of all four preceding breach costs, for the single most disruptive breach (damage_bands)
- the estimated cost of all breaches identified in the last 12 months (cost_bands).

In addition, the following merged or derived variables will be included:

- merged region (region_comb), which includes collapsed region groupings to ensure that no individual respondent can be identified

- a merged sector variable (sector_comb2), which matches the sector groupings used in the 2020 and 2019 main reports.

No region groupings are included for the education institution data, to avoid the risk of these schools, colleges or universities being identified.

Missing data in 1 interview

ID 336572QUIR is a further education college that was mistakenly identified and interviewed as a business (from the IDBR sample). In the post-fieldwork data processing, we recoded this interview to be classified as a further education college. However, because businesses and education institutions do not receive the same questions, this means the following SPSS variables have missing data for this specific interview:

- ONLINE13
- MANAGE2
- COMPLY1
- COMPLY3
- RULES8
- RULES18
- TYPE14

This has no impact on the reported findings.

Missing values

We have treated missing values consistently each year.

- For all non-cost data, only respondents that did not answer a question are treated as missing, and allocated a value of -1. That means that all responses, including “don’t know” (a value of -98) and “refused” responses (-99) are counted in the base and in any descriptive statistics.
- For all cost data, i.e. damagedirs through to cost_bands, the “don’t know” (-98) and “refused” (-99) responses are treated as missing. Practically, this means that any analysis run on these variables systematically excludes “don’t know” and “refused” responses from the base. In other words, this kind of analysis (e.g. analysis to show the mean cost or median cost) only uses the respondents that have given a numeric or banded cost.

Rounding differences between the SPSS dataset and published data

If running analysis on weighted data in SPSS, users must be aware that the default setting of the SPSS crosstabs command does not handle non-integer weighting in the same way as typical survey data tables.¹⁰ Users may, therefore, see very minor differences in results between the SPSS dataset and the percentages in the main release and infographics, which consistently use the survey data tables. These should be differences of no more than one percentage point, and only occur on rare occasions.

¹⁰ The default SPSS setting is to round cell counts and then calculate percentages based on integers.

2.8 Points of clarification on the data

Sector grouping before the 2019 survey

In the SPSS datasets for 2016 to 2018, an alternative sector variable (sector_comb1) was included. This variable grouped some sectors together in a different way, and was less granular than the updated sector variable (sector_comb2).

- “education” and “health, social care or social work” were merged together, rather than being analysed separately
- “information or communications” and “utilities” were merged together, whereas now “utilities” and “manufacturing” are merged together.

The previous grouping reflected how we used to report on sector differences before the 2019 survey. As this legacy variable has not been used in the report for the last two years, we have stopped including it in the SPSS dataset, in favour of the updated sector variable.

Chapter 3: Qualitative approach technical details

The qualitative strand of this research focused on businesses, charities and higher education institutions. These same sample groups were included in last year's research. The inclusion of higher education institutions highlights the importance of this group to DCMS, while also acknowledging that the survey sample for this group is inevitably very low – the qualitative strand to explore cyber security approaches in higher education institutions in greater depth.

3.1 Sampling

We took the sample for the 35 in-depth interviews from the quantitative survey. We asked respondents during the survey whether they would be willing to be recontacted specifically to take part in a further 60-minute interview on the same topic. In total, 891 businesses (72%) and 313 charities (74%) agreed to be recontacted. Of the 37 higher education institutions interviewed, 35 agreed to be recontacted.

Ultimately, we carried out interviews with:

- 19 businesses
- 10 charities
- 6 higher education institutions.

3.2 Recruitment quotas and screening

We carried out recruitment for the qualitative element by email and telephone, using the contact details collected in the survey, and via a specialist business recruiter. We offered a bank transfer or charity donation of £50 made on behalf of participants to encourage participation.

We used recruitment quotas to ensure that interviews included a mix of different sizes, sectors and regions for businesses, and different charitable areas, income bands and countries for charities. We also had further quotas based on the responses in the quantitative survey, reflecting the topics to be discussed in the interviews. These ensured we spoke to a range of organisations that had:

- adopted specific cyber security standards or accreditations
- formally reviewed supply chain cyber security risks (including for immediate suppliers and their wider supply chain)
- used or invested in cyber security threat intelligence
- experienced ransomware attacks
- referenced their cyber security risks in a corporate annual report
- taken out an insurance policy specifically covering cyber security
- used Managed Service Providers.

These were all administered as soft rather than hard quotas. This meant that the recruiter aimed to recruit a minimum number of participants in each group, and could exceed these minimums, rather than having to reach a fixed number of each type of respondent.

We also briefed the recruiter to carry out a further qualitative screening process of participants, to check that they felt capable of discussing at least some of the broad topic areas covered in the topic guide (laid out in the following section). The recruiter probed participants' job titles, job roles, and gave them some further information about the topic areas over email. The intention was to screen out organisations that might have been willing to take part but would have had little to say on these topics.

3.3 Fieldwork

The Ipsos research team carried out all fieldwork in December 2021 and January 2022. We conducted the 35 interviews through a mix of telephone and Microsoft Teams calls. Interviews lasted around 60 minutes on average.

DCMS originally laid out their topics of interest for the 2022 study. Ipsos then drafted the interview topic guide around these topics, which was reviewed and approved by DCMS. The qualitative topic guide has changed each year much more substantially than the quantitative questionnaire, in order to respond to the new findings that emerge from each year’s quantitative survey. The intention is for the qualitative research to explore new topics that were not necessarily as big or salient in previous years, as well as to look more in depth at the answers that organisations gave in this year’s survey. This year, the guide covered the following broad thematic areas:

- decisions around budgeting for cyber security
- board engagement and attitudes
- how organisations aimed to influence the behaviour and culture of staff
- the use and impact of cyber security standards and accreditations
- the decision-making process around supply chain risks
- the use and impact of cyber security threat intelligence
- the approach to information seeking and the impetus to seek out cyber security information and guidance
- approaches to ransomware incidents
- the rationale for reporting cyber security risks in corporate reports
- the use and impact of cyber security insurance
- awareness and understanding around the external reporting of cyber incidents
- any cyber security risks associated with Managed Service Providers.

There was not enough time in each interview to ask about all these topics, so we used a modular topic guide design, where the researcher doing the interview would know beforehand to only focus on a selection of these areas. Across the course of fieldwork, the core research team reviewed the notes from each interview and gave the fieldwork team guidance on which topics needed further coverage in the remaining interviews. This ensured we asked about each of these areas in a wide range of interviews, with at least 4 interviews covering each topic.

A full reproduction of the topic guide is available in Appendix C.

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 shows a profile of the 19 interviewed businesses by size and sector.

Table 3.1: Sector profile of businesses in follow-up qualitative stage

SIC 2007 letter	Sector description	Total
A	Agriculture, forestry or fishing	0
B, C, D, E	Utilities or production (including manufacturing)	2
F	Construction	3
G	Retail or wholesale (including vehicle sales and repairs)	1
H	Transport or storage	0
I	Food or hospitality	3
J	Information or communications	3

SIC 2007 letter	Sector description	Total
K	Finance or insurance	1
L, N	Administration or real estate	3
M	Professional, scientific or technical	1
P	Education (excluding state education institutions)	5
Q	Health, social care or social work	1
R, S	Entertainment, service or membership organisations	2
	Total	19

Table 3.2: Size profile of businesses (by number of staff) in follow-up qualitative stage

Size band	Total
Micro or small (1–49 staff)	9
Medium (50–249 staff)	2
Large (250+ staff)	8

Table 3.3 shows a profile of the 10 interviewed charities by income band.

Table 3.3: Size profile of charities (by income band) in follow-up qualitative stage

Income band	Total
£100,000 to under £500,000	2
£500,000 to under £5 million	3
£5 million or more	5

3.4 Analysis

Throughout fieldwork, the core research team discussed interim findings and outlined areas to focus on in subsequent interviews. Specifically, we held two face-to-face analysis meetings with the entire fieldwork team – one halfway through fieldwork and one towards the end of fieldwork. In these sessions, researchers discussed the findings from individual interviews, and we drew out emerging key themes, recurring findings and other patterns across the interviews. DCMS attended a separate analysis session during the latter part of fieldwork and helped identify what they saw as the most important findings, as well as areas worth exploring further in the remaining interviews.

We also recorded all interviews and summarised them in an Excel notes template, which categorised findings by topic area and the research questions within that topic area. The research team reviewed these notes, and also listened back to recordings, to identify the examples and verbatim quotes to include in the main report.

Chapter 4: Research burden

The Government Statistical Service (GSS) has a policy of monitoring and reducing statistical survey burden to participants where possible, and the burden imposed should be proportionate to the benefits arising from the use of the statistics. As a producer of statistics, DCMS is committed to monitoring and reducing the burden on those providing their information, and on those involved in collecting, recording and supplying data.

This section calculates the research compliance cost, in terms of the time cost on respondents, imposed by both the quantitative survey and qualitative fieldwork.

- The quantitative survey had **2,157 respondents** and the average (mean) survey length was **22 minutes**. Therefore the research compliance cost for the quantitative survey this year was [2,157 × 22 minutes = **791 hours**].
- The qualitative research had **35 respondents** and the average interview length was **60 minutes**. Respondents completed the qualitative interviews in addition to the quantitative survey. The research compliance cost for the qualitative strand this year was [35 × 60 minutes = **35 hours**].

In total, the compliance cost for the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2022 was **826 hours**.

Steps taken to minimise the research burden

Across both strands of fieldwork, we took the following steps to minimise the research burden on respondents:

- making it clear that all participation was voluntary
- informing respondents of the average time it takes to complete an interview at the start of the survey call, during recruitment for the qualitative research and again at the start of the qualitative interview
- confirming that respondents were happy to continue if the interviews went over this average time
- split-sampled certain questions – that is to say they were asked to a random half of respondents – to reduce the overall interview length
- offering to carry out interviews at the times convenient for respondents, including evenings and weekends where requested.

The study also adheres to Government Social Research Professional Guidance on ethics.

Appendix A: Questionnaire

Consent

ASK ALL

Q1A.CONSENT

Before we start, I just want to clarify that participation in the survey is voluntary and you can change your mind at any time. Are you happy to proceed with the interview?

Yes

No **CLOSE SURVEY**

Business profile

Q1.DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2016

ASK ALL

Q1B.TITLE

What is your job title?

PROMPT TO CODE, INCLUDING SENIORITY AND IF RELATED DIRECTLY TO CYBER SECURITY OR NOT

SINGLE CODE PER BOLD HEADING

Job title

Directly related to cyber security

Chief Information Officer (CIO)

Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)

Director of Security

Head of Cyber Security/Information Security

Other cyber security role **WRITE IN**

Directly related to IT

Senior IT role (e.g. IT director)

Non-senior IT role (e.g. IT manager, technician, administrator)

Not related to cyber security/IT – senior management level

Business owner

Chief Executive (CEO)/Managing Director (MD)

Chief Operations Officer (COO)/Operations Director

Finance Director/Controller

Headteacher

Trustee/treasurer/on trustee board

Other senior management role (e.g. director)

Partner

Chair

Not related to cyber security/IT – non-senior management level

General/office manager (not a director/trustee)

PA/secretary/admin

Teacher (not in senior management)

Other non-senior role

Q2.DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2016

Q3.DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2016

ASK IF BUSINESS (SAMPLE S_SAMPTYPE=1)

Q5X.TYPEX

Would you classify your organisation as ... ?

READ OUT

INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF THEY HAVE A SOCIAL PURPOSE BUT STILL MAKE A PROFIT (E.G. PRIVATE PROVIDER OF HEALTH OR SOCIAL CARE) CODE AS CODE 1

SINGLE CODE

Mainly seeking to make a profit
A social enterprise
A charity or voluntary sector organisation
DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DUMMY VARIABLE NOT ASKED

Q5Y.TYPEXDUM

Would you classify your organisation as ... ?

SINGLE CODE

IF TYPEX CODES 1, 2 OR DK: Private sector
IF SAMPLE S_SAMPTYPE=2 OR TYPEX CODE 3: Charity
IF SAMPLE S_SAMPTYPE=3: State education institution

BASE [BUSINESS/CHARITY/EDUCATION] TEXT SUBSTITUTIONS ON TYPEXDUM (CHARITY IF TYPEXDUM CODE 2, EDUCATION IF TYPEXDUM CODE 3 ELSE BUSINESS). THIS IS THE DEFAULT SCRIPTING FOR ALL TEXT SUBSTITUTIONS FROM THIS POINT ONWARDS, UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED.

ASK ALL

Q4.SIZEA

Including yourself, how many [IF BUSINESS/EDUCATION: employees/IF CHARITY: employees, volunteers and trustees] work for your organisation across the UK as a whole?
ADD IF NECESSARY: [IF BUSINESS/EDUCATION: By that I mean both full-time and part-time employees on your payroll, as well as any working proprietors or owners./IF CHARITY: By that I mean both full-time and part-time employees on your payroll, as well as people who regularly volunteer for your organisation.]
PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE BEFORE CODING DK

WRITE IN RANGE 2–500,000 (SOFT CHECK IF >99,999)

SINGLE CODE

Respondent is sole trader CLOSE SURVEY
Don't know

ASK IF DON'T KNOW SIZE OF ORGANISATION (SIZEA CODE DK)

Q5.SIZEB

Which of these best represents the number of [IF BUSINESS/EDUCATION: employees/IF CHARITY: employees, volunteers and trustees] working for your organisation across the UK as a whole, including yourself?
PROBE FULLY

SINGLE CODE

Under 10
10–49
50–249
250–999
1,000 or more
DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DUMMY VARIABLE NOT ASKED

Q5X.SIZEDUM

Which of these best represents the number of employees, volunteers and trustees working in your organisation, including yourself?

SINGLE CODE; MERGE RESPONSES FROM SIZEA AND SIZEB; USE SAMPLE S_SIZEBAND IF SIZEB DK

Under 10
10–49
50–249
IF SIZEB CODES 4–5: 250 or more
Don't know

Q5A.SALESA DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q5B.SALESB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q5Z.SALESDUM DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q5C.YEARS DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

Q5D.CHARITYO DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2019

ASK ALL

Q6.ONLINE

Which of the following, if any, does your organisation currently have or use?

READ OUT

MULTICODE

ROTATE LIST

IF BUSINESS/CHARITY: The ability for customers to order, book or pay for products or services online

IF CHARITY: The ability for people to donate online

IF CHARITY: The ability for your beneficiaries or service users to access services online

An online bank account your organisation [**IF EDUCATION: pays/ELSE: or your clients pay**] into

IF BUSINESS/CHARITY: Personal information about your [**IF BUSINESS: customers/IF CHARITY: beneficiaries, service users or donors**] held electronically

HALF A IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: Network-connected devices like TVs, building controls, alarms, speakers etc., sometimes called smart devices

HALF B IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: Computers with older versions of Windows installed (e.g. Windows 7 or 8)

A Managed Service Provider, or MSP, that manages a suite of IT services like your network, cloud computing and applications

SINGLE CODE

NOT PART OF ROTATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

Q7.CORE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2019

ASK ALL

Q8.MOBILE

As far as you know, does anyone in your organisation currently use personally-owned devices, such as smartphones, tablets, or home computers to carry out regular work-related activities?

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No

Don't know

Perceived importance and preparedness

READ OUT TO ALL

For the rest of the survey, I will be talking about cyber security. By this, I mean any strategy, processes, practices or technologies that organisations have in place to secure their networks, computers, programs or the data they hold from damage, attack or unauthorised access.

ASK ALL

Q9.PRIORITY

How high or low a priority is cyber security to your organisation's [**INSERT STATEMENT**]? Is it ...

READ OUT

- [**IF BUSINESS: directors/IF CHARITY: trustees/IF EDUCATION: governors**] or senior management
- DELETED DURING FIELDWORK IN CSBS 2018**
- DELETED DURING FIELDWORK IN CSBS 2018**

SINGLE CODE

REVERSE SCALE EXCEPT FOR LAST CODE

Very high

Fairly high

Fairly low

Very low

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

Q9A.HIGH DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q9B.RELPRIORITY DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

Q9C.OUTSOURCE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q9D.COVPRI DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2022

Q9E.COVIMPACTH DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q9F.COVIMPACTL DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q10.LOW DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

Q10A.ATTITUDES DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q10B.LOWRISK REMOVED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

ASK ALL

Q11.UPDATE

Approximately how often, if at all, are your organisation's [IF BUSINESS: directors/IF CHARITY: trustees/IF EDUCATION: governors] or senior management given an update on any actions taken around cyber security? Is it

...

READ OUT

IF EDUCATION (TYPEXDUM CODE 3): INTERVIEWER NOTE: FOR EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS, "EVERY TERM" MEANS QUARTERLY

SINGLE CODE

REVERSE SCALE EXCEPT FOR LAST 2 CODES

Never

Less than once a year

Annually

Quarterly

Monthly

Weekly

Daily

DO NOT READ OUT: Each time there is a breach or attack

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

Spending

Q12.INVESTA DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q13.INVESTB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q14.INVESTC DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q15.INVESTD DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q16.INVESTE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q17.INVESTF DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q18.INVESTG DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q19.ITA DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q20.ITB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q21.REASON DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q22.EVAL DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

Q23.INSURE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

ASK ALL

Q23X.INSUREX

There are general insurance policies that provide cover for cyber security breaches or attacks, among other things. There are also specific insurance policies that are solely for this purpose. Which of the following best describes your situation?

READ OUT

SINGLE CODE

We have a specific cyber security insurance policy

We have cyber security cover as part of a broader insurance policy

We are not insured against cyber security breaches or attacks

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

Q23Y.INSUREYES DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q23A.COVERAGE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND HAVE INSURANCE ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND (INSUREX CODE 1 OR 2))

Q23B.CLAIM

Have you ever made any insurance claims for cyber security breaches under this insurance before?

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No

Don't know

Q23C.NOINSURE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Information sources

ASK ALL

Q24.INFO

In the last 12 months, from where, if anywhere, have you sought information, advice or guidance on the cyber security threats that your organisation faces?

DO NOT READ OUT

INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF "GOVERNMENT", THEN PROBE WHERE EXACTLY PROBE FULLY ("ANYWHERE ELSE?")

MULTICODE

Government/public sector

Government's 10 Steps to Cyber Security guidance

Government's Cyber Aware website/materials

Government's Cyber Essentials materials

Government intelligence services (e.g. GCHQ)

GOV.UK/Government website (excluding NCSC website)

Government – other **WRITE IN**

National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) website/offline

Police

Regulator (e.g. Financial Conduct Authority) – but excluding Charity Commission

Charity related

Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations (ACEVO)
Charity Commission (England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland)
Charity Finance Group (CFG)
Community Accountants
Community Voluntary Services (CVS)
Institute of Fundraising (IOF)
National Council For Voluntary Organisations (NCVO)
Other local infrastructure body
Other national infrastructure body

Education related

Jisc/the Janet network
Department for Education (DfE)
Ofsted
Secure Schools programme
Teachers' unions (e.g. NASUWT, NEU or NUT)

Other specific organisations

Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP)
Professional/trade/industry/volunteering association
Security bodies (e.g. ISF or IISP)
Security product vendors (e.g. AVG, Kaspersky etc)
UK Cyber Security Council

Internal

Within your organisation – senior management/board
Within your organisation – other colleagues or experts

External

Auditors/accountants
Bank/business bank/bank's IT staff
External security/IT consultants/cyber security providers
Internet Service Provider
LinkedIn
Newspapers/media
Online searching generally/Google
Specialist IT blogs/forums/websites
Other (non-government) **WRITE IN**

SINGLE CODE

Nowhere
Don't know

Q24A.FINDINF DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q24B.GOVTFINF DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

ASK ALL

Q24C.CYBERAWARE

And have you heard of or seen the Cyber Aware campaign, or not?

SINGLE CODE

Yes
No
Don't know

ASK ALL

Q24D.SCHEME

There are various Government schemes, information and guidance on cyber security. Which, if any, of the following have you heard of?

READ OUT

ASK AS A GRID
RANDOMISE LIST

- a. The Cyber Essentials scheme
- b. The 10 Steps to Cyber Security
- c. **IF MICRO OR SMALL BUSINESS (SIZEDUM CODES 1–2 AND TYPEXDUM CODE 1):** Any Small Business Guides, such as the Small Business Guide to Cyber Security, or the Small Business Guide to Response and Recovery
- d. **IF MEDIUM OR LARGE BUSINESS, CHARITY OR EDUCATION ((SIZEDUM CODES 3–4 AND TYPEXDUM CODE 1) OR TYPEXDUM CODES 2–3):** The Cyber Security Board Toolkit
- e. **IF CHARITY:** The Cyber Security Small Charity Guide
- f. **DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2022**
- g. **DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2022**

SINGLE CODE PER ROW

Yes

No

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND SEEN OR HEARD GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND (CYBERAWARE CODE 1 OR ANY SCHEMEa-e CODE 1))

Q24E.GOVTACTION

What, if anything, have you changed or implemented at your organisation after seeing or hearing any government campaigns or guidance on cyber security?

DO NOT READ OUT

PROBE FULLY ("ANYTHING ELSE?")

MULTICODE

Governance changes

Increased spending
Changed nature of the business/activities
New/updated business continuity plans
New/updated cyber policies
New checks for suppliers/contractors
New procurement processes, e.g. for devices/IT
New risk assessments
Increased senior management oversight/involvement

Technical changes

Changed/updated firewall/system configurations
Changed user admin/access rights
Increased monitoring
New/updated antivirus/anti-malware software
Other new software/tools (not antivirus/anti-malware)
Penetration testing

People/training changes

Outsourced cyber security/hired external provider
Recruited new staff
Staff training/communications
Vetting staff/extra vetting

Other **WRITE IN**

SINGLE CODE

Nothing done

Only heard about guidance, not read it

Don't know

Q25.TRAINA DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2016

Q26.TRAIN DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q26A.TRAINUSE DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q26B.TRAINWHO DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q27.DELIVER DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

Q28.COVER DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Policies and procedures

READ OUT TO ALL

Now I would like to ask some questions about your **current** cyber security processes and procedures. Just to reassure you, we are not looking for a “right” or “wrong” answer. If you don’t do or have the things we’re asking about, just say so and we’ll move on.

ASK ALL

Q29.MANAGE

Which of the following governance or risk management arrangements, if any, do you have in place?

READ OUT

MULTICODE

ROTATE LIST

HALF A IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: [IF BUSINESS: Board members/IF CHARITY: Trustees/IF EDUCATION: A governor or senior manager] with responsibility for cyber security

HALF B IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: An outsourced provider that manages your cyber security

A formal policy or policies in place covering cyber security risks

HALF A IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: A Business Continuity Plan that covers cyber security

A written list of the most critical data, systems or assets that your organisation wants to protect

SINGLE CODE

NOT PART OF ROTATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

ASK ALL

Q29A.COMPLY

((HALF A IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION) AND IF NOT HEARD OF CYBER ESSENTIALS (SCHEMEa NOT CODE 1)): Does your organisation adhere to the following standard?

(HALF B IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION) OR IF HEARD OF CYBER ESSENTIALS (SCHEMEa CODE 1): Which of the following standards or accreditations, if any, does your organisation adhere to?

READ OUT

MULTICODE

ROTATE LIST BUT KEEP CODES 4 AND 5 TOGETHER

HALF B IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: ISO 27001

HALF A IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, or PCI DSS

HALF B IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: Any National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards

IF HEARD OF CYBER ESSENTIALS (SCHEMEa CODE 1): The Cyber Essentials standard

IF HEARD OF CYBER ESSENTIALS (SCHEMEa CODE 1): The Cyber Essentials Plus standard

SINGLE CODE

NOT PART OF ROTATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

Q29B.NOPOL DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

ASK ALL

Q30.IDENT

And which of the following, if any, have you done over the last 12 months to identify cyber security risks to your organisation?

READ OUT

MULTICODE
ROTATE LIST

A cyber security vulnerability audit

A risk assessment covering cyber security risks

HALF A IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: Used or invested in threat intelligence

Used specific tools designed for security monitoring, such as Intrusion Detection Systems

Penetration testing

Testing staff awareness and response (e.g. via mock phishing exercises)

SINGLE CODE
NOT PART OF ROTATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

ASK IF CARRIED OUT AN AUDIT (IDENT CODE 1)

Q30A.AUDIT

Were any cyber security audits carried out internally by staff, by an external contractor, or both?

DO NOT READ OUT

SINGLE CODE

Only internally by staff

Only by an external contractor

Both internal and external

Don't know

ASK ALL

Q31.RULES

And which of the following rules or controls, if any, do you have in place?

READ OUT

MULTICODE
ROTATE LIST

CODE 11 MUST FOLLOW CODE 10

A policy to apply software security updates within 14 days

Up-to-date malware protection

Firewalls that cover your entire IT network, as well as individual devices

Restricting IT admin and access rights to specific users

Any monitoring of user activity

Specific rules for storing and moving personal data files securely

Security controls on company-owned devices (e.g. laptops)

HALF B IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: Only allowing access via company-owned devices

HALF A IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: Separate WiFi networks for staff and for visitors

Backing up data securely via a cloud service

Backing up data securely via other means

A password policy that ensures users set strong passwords

HALF B IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: A virtual private network, or VPN, for staff connecting remotely

HALF A IF BUSINESS/CHARITY, OR IF EDUCATION: An agreed process for staff to follow when they identify a fraudulent email or malicious website

Any requirement for two-factor authentication when people access your network, or for applications they use

SINGLE CODE
NOT PART OF ROTATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

ASK IF HAVE POLICIES (MANAGE CODE 3)

Q32.POLICY

Which of the following aspects, if any, are covered within your cyber security-related policy, or policies?

READ OUT

**MULTICODE
ROTATE LIST**

What can be stored on removable devices (e.g. USB sticks)
Remote or mobile working (e.g. from home)
What staff are permitted to do on your organisation's IT devices
Use of personally-owned devices for business activities
Use of cloud computing
Use of network-connected devices, sometimes called smart devices
Use of Software as a Service, or SaaS
How you're supposed to store data

**SINGLE CODE
NOT PART OF ROTATION**

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know
DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

Q32A.FOLLOW DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q33.DOC DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2019

ASK IF HAVE ANY POLICIES (MANAGE CODE 3)

Q33A.REVIEW

When were any of your policies or documentation for cyber security last created, updated, or reviewed to make sure they were up-to-date?

PROBE FULLY

INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF NEVER UPDATED OR REVIEWED, ANSWER IS WHEN POLICIES WERE CREATED

SINGLE CODE

Within the last 3 months
3 to under 6 months ago
6 to under 12 months ago
12 to under 24 months ago
24 months ago or earlier
DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

ASK ALL

Q33B.TRAINED

In the last 12 months, have you carried out any cyber security training or awareness raising sessions specifically for any [IF BUSINESS/EDUCATION: staff/IF CHARITY: staff or volunteers] who are not directly involved in cyber security?

SINGLE CODE

Yes
No
Don't know

Q33C.COVREVIEW DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Strategy

ASK ALL

Q33D.STRATEGY

Does your organisation have a formal cyber security strategy, i.e. a document that underpins all your policies and processes?

SINGLE CODE

Yes
No
Don't know

ASK IF HAVE A STRATEGY (STRATEGY CODE 1)

Q33E.STRATINT

In the last 12 months, has this strategy been reviewed by your organisation's [IF BUSINESS: directors/IF CHARITY: trustees/IF EDUCATION: governors] or senior management?

SINGLE CODE

REVERSE SCALE EXCEPT FOR LAST CODE

Yes

No

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

ASK IF HAVE A STRATEGY (STRATEGY CODE 1)

Q33F.STRATEXT

Has your cyber security strategy been reviewed by any third parties, such IT or cyber security consultants, or external auditors **at any point**?

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No

Don't know

ASK IF HAVE REVIEWED STRATEGY (STRATEXT CODE 1)

Q33G.STRATREV

Was this a review of your cyber security strategy specifically, or a wider review of your organisation's practices? A wider review might be, for example, when clients carry out due diligence before signing a contract with you.

DO NOT READ OUT

SINGLE CODE

Specific review of cyber security strategy

Part of a wider review of practices

Don't know

Corporate reporting of cyber risks

ASK IF BUSINESS OR CHARITY (BUSINESS/CHARITY (TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2)

Q33H.CORPORATE

This next section is about how cyber security is discussed in any publicly available annual reports of your organisation's activities.

Firstly, did your organisation publish an annual report in the last 12 months?

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No

Don't know

ASK IF HAVE AN ANNUAL REPORT (CORPORATE CODE 1)

Q33I.CORPRISK

Did your latest annual report cover any cyber security risks faced by your organisation?

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No

Don't know

Business standards

Q34.ISO DELETED DURING FIELDWORK IN CSBS 2018

Q35.IMPLEMA DELETED DURING FIELDWORK IN CSBS 2018

Q36.TENSTEPS DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q37.ESENT DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q38.IMPLEMB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q39.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q40.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q41.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q42.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2016

Q43.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2016

Supplier standards

Q44.SUPPLY DELETED PRE-PILOT FOR CSBS 2020

Q45.ADHHERE DELETED PRE-PILOT FOR CSBS 2020

READ OUT TO BUSINESSES

The next question is about suppliers. This is not just security or IT suppliers. It includes any immediate suppliers that directly provide goods or services to your organisation. We also ask about your wider supply chain, i.e. your suppliers' suppliers.

READ OUT TO CHARITIES OR EDUCATION

The next question is about third-party organisations you work with. This includes any immediate suppliers that directly provide goods or services to your organisation, or partners such as local authorities. We also ask about your wider supply chain, i.e. your suppliers' suppliers.

Q45A.SUPPLYKNOW DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

ASK ALL

Q45B.SUPPLYRISK

Has your organisation carried out any work to formally review the following?

READ OUT

ASK AS A GRID

- The potential cyber security risks presented by your immediate suppliers [IF CHARITY/EDUCATION: or partners]
- The potential cyber security risks presented by your wider supply chain, i.e. your suppliers' suppliers

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

Q45C.SUPPLYCHK DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

ASK IF BUSINESS OR CHARITY AND REVIEWED ANY SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS (BUSINESS/CHARITY (TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND CODE 1 AT SUPPLYRISKA OR SUPPLYRISKB)

Q45D.BARRIER

Which of the following, if any, have made it difficult for your organisation to manage any cyber security risks from your supply chain [IF CHARITY/EDUCATION: or partners]?

READ OUT

MULTICODE

RANDOMISE LIST

Lack of time or money to dedicate to this

Lack of skills to be able to check suppliers [IF CHARITY/EDUCATION: or partners] in this way

Not knowing what kinds of checks to carry out
Not knowing which suppliers [IF CHARITY/EDUCATION: or partners] to check
We can't get the necessary information from suppliers [IF CHARITY/EDUCATION: or partners] to carry out checks
It's not a priority when working with suppliers [IF CHARITY/EDUCATION: or partners]

SINGLE CODE

NOT PART OF RANDOMISATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

Cloud computing

Q46.CLOUD DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q47.DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2016

Q48.CRITICAL DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q49.COMMER DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

Q50.PERSON DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

Q51.VALIDA DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q52.VALIDB DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Breaches or attacks

Q53.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

ASK ALL

Q53A.TYPE

Have any of the following happened to your organisation in the last 12 months, or not?

READ OUT

REASSURE ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMISATION BEFORE CODING REF

MULTICODE

ROTATE LIST

CODE 2 MUST FOLLOW CODE 1

CODES 7, 8 AND 9 TO STAY IN ORDER

Computers becoming infected with ransomware

Computers becoming infected with other malware (e.g. viruses or spyware)

Denial of service attacks, i.e. attacks that try to slow or take down your website, applications or online services

Hacking or attempted hacking of online bank accounts

People impersonating your organisation in emails or online

Phishing attacks, i.e. staff receiving fraudulent emails, or arriving at fraudulent websites

Unauthorised accessing of files or networks by **staff**, even if accidental

IF EDUCATION: Unauthorised accessing of files or networks by **students**

Unauthorised accessing of files or networks by **people** [IF BUSINESS/CHARITY: **outside your organisation/IF EDUCATION: other than staff or students**]

Unauthorised listening into video conferences or instant messaging

Takeovers or attempts to take over your website, social media accounts or email accounts

MULTICODE

NOT PART OF ROTATION

Any other types of cyber security breaches or attacks

SINGLE CODE

NOT PART OF ROTATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

DO NOT READ OUT: Refused

ASK IF ANY BREACHES OR ATTACKS (TYPE CODES 1–12)

Q54.FREQ

Approximately, how often in the last 12 months did you experience any of the cyber security breaches or attacks you mentioned? Was it ...

READ OUT

REASSURE ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMISATION BEFORE CODING REF

SINGLE CODE

Once only

More than once but less than once a month

Roughly once a month

Roughly once a week

Roughly once a day

Several times a day

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: Refused

Q55.NUMBA DELETED PRE-PILOT 2020

Q56.NUMBB DELETED PRE-PILOT 2020

ASK IF ANY BREACHES OR ATTACKS (TYPE CODES 1–12)

Q56A.OUTCOME

Thinking of all the cyber security breaches or attacks experienced in the last 12 months, which, if any, of the following happened as a result?

READ OUT

MULTICODE

ROTATE LIST

CODE 4 MUST FOLLOW CODE 3

CODE 7 MUST FOLLOW CODE 6

Software or systems were corrupted or damaged

Personal data (e.g. on [IF BUSINESS: customers or staff/IF CHARITY: beneficiaries, donors, volunteers or staff/IF EDUCATION: students or staff]) was altered, destroyed or taken

Permanent loss of files (other than personal data)

Temporary loss of access to files or networks

Lost or stolen assets, trade secrets or intellectual property

Money was stolen

Money was paid as a ransom

Your website, applications or online services were taken down or made slower

Lost access to any third-party services you rely on

Physical devices or equipment were damaged or corrupted

Compromised accounts or systems used for illicit purposes (e.g. launching attacks)

SINGLE CODE

NOT PART OF ROTATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

ASK IF ANY BREACHES OR ATTACKS (TYPE CODES 1–12)

Q57.IMPACT

And have any of these breaches or attacks impacted your organisation in any of the following ways, or not?

READ OUT

MULTICODE

ROTATE LIST

CODE 4 MUST FOLLOW CODE 3

Stopped staff from carrying out their day-to-day work

Loss of [IF BUSINESS: revenue or share value/ELSE: income]

Additional staff time to deal with the breach or attack, or to inform [IF BUSINESS: customers/IF CHARITY: beneficiaries/IF EDUCATION: students, parents] or stakeholders

Any other repair or recovery costs
New measures needed to prevent or protect against future breaches or attacks
Fines from regulators or authorities, or associated legal costs
Reputational damage
IF BUSINESS/CHARITY: Prevented provision of goods or services to [**IF BUSINESS:** customers/**IF CHARITY:** beneficiaries or service users]
Discouraged you from carrying out a future business activity you were intending to do
Complaints from [**IF BUSINESS:** customers/**IF CHARITY:** beneficiaries or stakeholders/**IF EDUCATION:** students or parents]
IF BUSINESS/CHARITY: Goodwill compensation or discounts given to customers

SINGLE CODE

NOT PART OF ROTATION

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

Q57A.OUTIMPTYPE DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q58.MONITOR DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

Q61.DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2016

Q62.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q63.INCID DELETED PRE-PILOT 2020

Most disruptive breach or attack

READ OUT IF MORE THAN ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED (2 OR MORE TYPE CODES 1–12)

Now I would like you to think about the one cyber security breach, or related series of breaches or attacks, that caused the most disruption to your organisation in the last 12 months.

Q64.DISRUPT DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

ASK IF BUSINESS OR CHARITY AND MORE THAN ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED (BUSINESS/CHARITY (TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND 2 OR MORE TYPE CODES 1–12)

Q64A.DISRUPTA

What kind of breach was this?

PROMPT TO CODE IF NECESSARY

INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF MORE THAN ONE CODE APPLIES, ASK RESPONDENT WHICH ONE OF THESE THEY THINK STARTED OFF THE BREACH OR ATTACK

SINGLE CODE

CODES MENTIONED AT TYPE

Computers becoming infected with ransomware
Computers becoming infected with other malware (e.g. viruses or spyware)
Denial of service attacks, i.e. attacks that try to slow or take down your website, applications or online services
Hacking or attempted hacking of online bank accounts
People impersonating your organisation in emails or online
Phishing attacks, i.e. staff receiving fraudulent emails or arriving at fraudulent websites
Unauthorised accessing of files or networks by **staff**, even if accidental
Unauthorised accessing of files or networks by **students**
Unauthorised accessing of files or networks by **people** [**IF BUSINESS/CHARITY:** outside your organisation/**IF EDUCATION:** other than staff or students]
Unauthorised listening into video conferences or instant messaging
Takeovers or attempts to take over your website, social media accounts or email accounts
Any other types of cyber security breaches or attacks
DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

READ OUT IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND EXPERIENCED ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK MORE THAN ONCE ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND [ONLY 1 TYPE CODES 1–12] AND [FREQ CODES 2–6 OR DK])

You mentioned you had experienced **[INSERT RESPONSE FROM TYPE]** on more than one occasion. Now I would like you to think about the one instance of this that caused the most disruption to your organisation in the last 12 months.

Q65.IDENTB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q66.LENGTH DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q67.FACTOR DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q68.SOURCE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q69.INTENT DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q70.CONTING DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2019

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ONLY ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED OR IF CAN CONSIDER A PARTICULAR BREACH OR ATTACK ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND ([ONLY 1 TYPE CODES 1–12] OR DISRUPTA NOT DK))

Q71.RESTORE

How long, if any time at all, did it take to restore business operations back to normal after the breach or attack was identified? Was it ...

PROBE FULLY

SINGLE CODE

No time at all

Less than a day

Between a day and under a week

Between a week and under a month

One month or more

DO NOT READ OUT: Still not back to normal

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

Q72.DEALA DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q73.DEALB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q74.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q75.DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Q75A.DAMAGEDIR DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q75B.DAMAGEDIRB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q75C.DAMAGEREC DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q75D.DAMAGERECB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q75E.DAMAGELON DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q75F.DAMAGELONB DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2021

Q75G.BOARDREP DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2022

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ONLY ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED OR IF CAN CONSIDER A PARTICULAR BREACH OR ATTACK ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND ([ONLY 1 TYPE CODES 1–12] OR DISRUPTA NOT DK))

Q76.REPORTA

Was this breach or attack reported to anyone outside your organisation, or not?

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No
Don't know

ASK IF REPORTED (REPORTA CODE 1)

Q77.REPORTB

Who was this breach or attack reported to?

DO NOT READ OUT

PROBE FULLY ("ANYONE ELSE?")

MULTICODE

Action Fraud
Antivirus company
Bank, building society or credit card company
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)
CERT UK (the national computer emergency response team)
Cifas (the UK fraud prevention service)
Charity Commission
Clients/customers
Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP)
Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)
Internet/Network Service Provider
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
Outsourced cyber security provider
Police
Professional/trade/industry association
Regulator (e.g. Financial Conduct Authority)
Suppliers
Was publicly declared
Website administrator
Other government agency
Other **WRITE IN**

SINGLE CODE

Don't know

Q77A.NOREPORT DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2018

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ONLY ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED OR IF CAN CONSIDER A PARTICULAR BREACH OR ATTACK ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND ([ONLY 1 TYPE CODES 1-12] OR DISRUPTA NOT DK))

Q78.PREVENT

What, if anything, have you done since this breach or attack to prevent or protect your organisation from further breaches like this?

DO NOT READ OUT

PROBE FULLY ("ANYTHING ELSE?")

MULTICODE

Governance changes

Increased spending
Changed nature of the business/activities
New/updated business continuity plans
New/updated cyber policies
New checks for suppliers/contractors
New procurement processes, e.g. for devices/IT
New risk assessments
Increased senior management oversight/involvement

Technical changes

Changed/updated firewall/system configurations
Changed user admin/access rights
Increased monitoring
New/updated antivirus/anti-malware software
Other new software/tools (not antivirus/anti-malware)

Penetration testing

People/training changes

Outsourced cyber security/hired external provider
Recruited new staff
Staff training/communications
Vetting staff/extra vetting

Other **WRITE IN**

SINGLE CODE

Nothing done
Don't know

READ OUT IF ONLY ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED OR IF CAN CONSIDER A PARTICULAR BREACH OR ATTACK ([ONLY 1 TYPE CODES 1–12] OR DISRUPTA NOT DK)

I am now going to ask you about the approximate costs of this particular breach or attack.

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ONLY ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED OR IF CAN CONSIDER A PARTICULAR BREACH OR ATTACK ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND ([ONLY 1 TYPE CODES 1–12] OR DISRUPTA NOT DK))

Q78K.DAMAGEDIRS

What was the approximate value of any external payments made **when the incident was being dealt with?** This includes:

- any payments to external IT consultants or contractors to investigate or fix the problem
- any payments to the attackers, or money they stole.

PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE BEFORE CODING DK

REASSURE ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMISATION BEFORE CODING REF

WRITE IN RANGE £1–£999,999

SOFT CHECK IF >£9,999

SINGLE CODE

No cost of this kind incurred
Don't know
Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW DIRECT RESULT COST OF THIS CYBER SECURITY BREACH OR ATTACK (DAMAGEDIRSHO CODE DK)

Q78L.DAMAGEDIRSB

Was it approximately ... ?

PROMPT TO CODE

SINGLE CODE

Less than £100
£100 to less than £500
£500 to less than £1,000
£1,000 to less than £5,000
£5,000 to less than £10,000
£10,000 to less than £20,000
£20,000 to less than £50,000
£50,000 to less than £100,000
£100,000 to less than £500,000
£500,000 to less than £1 million
£1 million to less than £5 million
£5 million or more
DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ONLY ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED OR IF CAN CONSIDER A PARTICULAR BREACH OR ATTACK ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND ([ONLY 1 TYPE CODES 1–12] OR DISRUPTA NOT DK))

Q78M.DAMAGEDIRL

What was the approximate value of any external payments made **in the aftermath** of the incident? This includes:

- any payments to external IT consultants or contractors to run audits, risk assessments or training
- the cost of new or upgraded software or systems
- recruitment costs if you had to hire someone new
- any legal fees, insurance excess, fines, compensation or PR costs related to the incident.

PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE BEFORE CODING DK

REASSURE ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMISATION BEFORE CODING REF

WRITE IN RANGE £1–£999,999

SOFT CHECK IF >£9,999

SINGLE CODE

No cost of this kind incurred

Don't know

Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW DIRECT RESULT COST OF THIS CYBER SECURITY BREACH OR ATTACK
(DAMAGEDIRLONG CODE DK)

Q78N.DAMAGEDIRLB

Was it approximately ... ?

PROMPT TO CODE

SINGLE CODE

Less than £100

£100 to less than £500

£500 to less than £1,000

£1,000 to less than £5,000

£5,000 to less than £10,000

£10,000 to less than £20,000

£20,000 to less than £50,000

£50,000 to less than £100,000

£100,000 to less than £500,000

£500,000 to less than £1 million

£1 million to less than £5 million

£5 million or more

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ONLY ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED OR IF CAN
CONSIDER A PARTICULAR BREACH OR ATTACK ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND ([ONLY 1 TYPE CODES
1–12] OR DISRUPTA NOT DK))

Q78O.DAMAGESTAFF

What was the approximate cost of the **staff time** dealing with the incident? This is how much staff would have got paid for the time they spent investigating or fixing the problem. Please include this cost even if this was part of this staff member's job.

PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE BEFORE CODING DK

REASSURE ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMISATION BEFORE CODING REF

WRITE IN RANGE £1–£999,999

SOFT CHECK IF >£9,999

SINGLE CODE

No cost of this kind incurred

Don't know

Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW DIRECT RESULT COST OF THIS CYBER SECURITY BREACH OR ATTACK
(DAMINDIRSHO CODE DK)

Q78P.DAMAGESTAFFB

Was it approximately ... ?

PROMPT TO CODE

SINGLE CODE

Less than £100
£100 to less than £500
£500 to less than £1,000
£1,000 to less than £5,000
£5,000 to less than £10,000
£10,000 to less than £20,000
£20,000 to less than £50,000
£50,000 to less than £100,000
£100,000 to less than £500,000
£500,000 to less than £1 million
£1 million to less than £5 million
£5 million or more
DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ONLY ONE TYPE OF BREACH OR ATTACK EXPERIENCED OR IF CAN CONSIDER A PARTICULAR BREACH OR ATTACK ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND ([ONLY 1 TYPE CODES 1-12] OR DISRUPTA NOT DK))

Q78Q.DAMAGEIND

What was the approximate value of any **damage or disruption** during the incident? This includes:

- the cost of any time when staff could not do their jobs
- the value of lost files or intellectual property
- the cost of any devices or equipment that needed replacing.

PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE BEFORE CODING DK

REASSURE ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMISATION BEFORE CODING REF

WRITE IN RANGE £1-£999,999

SOFT CHECK IF >£9,999

SINGLE CODE

No cost of this kind incurred

Don't know

Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW DIRECT RESULT COST OF THIS CYBER SECURITY BREACH OR ATTACK (DAMINDIRLONG CODE DK)

Q78R.DAMAGEINDB

Was it approximately ... ?

PROMPT TO CODE

SINGLE CODE

Less than £100
£100 to less than £500
£500 to less than £1,000
£1,000 to less than £5,000
£5,000 to less than £10,000
£10,000 to less than £20,000
£20,000 to less than £50,000
£50,000 to less than £100,000
£100,000 to less than £500,000
£500,000 to less than £1 million
£1 million to less than £5 million
£5 million or more
DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ANY BREACHES OR ATTACKS ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND TYPE CODES 1-12)

Q59.COSTA

Considering all these different costs, how much do you think **all** the cyber security breaches or attacks you have experienced in the last 12 months have cost your organisation financially?

PROBE FOR BEST ESTIMATE BEFORE CODING DK

REASSURE ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMISATION BEFORE CODING REF

WRITE IN RANGE £1–£30,000,000

IF SMALL (SIZEA CODE<50 OR SIZEB CODES 1–2): SOFT CHECK IF >£9,999

IF MEDIUM (SIZEA 49<CODE<250 OR SIZEB CODE 3): SOFT CHECK IF <£100 OR >£99,999

IF LARGE (SIZEA 249<CODE OR [SIZEB CODES 4–5 OR DK]): SOFT CHECK IF <£1,000 OR >£99,999

SINGLE CODE

No cost incurred

Don't know

Refused

ASK IF DON'T KNOW TOTAL COST OF CYBER SECURITY BREACHES OR ATTACKS (COSTA CODE DK)

Q60.COSTB

Was it approximately ... ?

PROMPT TO CODE

SINGLE CODE

Less than £100

£100 to less than £500

£500 to less than £1,000

£1,000 to less than £5,000

£5,000 to less than £10,000

£10,000 to less than £20,000

£20,000 to less than £50,000

£50,000 to less than £100,000

£100,000 to less than £500,000

£500,000 to less than £1 million

£1 million to less than £5 million

£5 million or more

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

Q78B.NOACT DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2017

Incident response

ASK ALL

Q63A.INCIDCONTENT

Which of the following, if any, do you **have in place**, for when you experience a cyber security incident? By this, we mean any breach or attack that requires a response from your organisation.

READ OUT

MULTICODE

ROTATE LIST

Written guidance on who to notify

Roles or responsibilities assigned to specific individuals during or after an incident

External communications and public engagement plans

A formal incident response plan

Guidance around when to report incidents externally, e.g. to regulators or insurers

SINGLE CODE

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: None of these

ASK ALL

Q63B.INCIDACTION

IF ANY BREACHES OR ATTACKS (TYPE CODES 1–12): Which of the following, if any, do you **do** when you experience a cyber security incident?

IF NO BREACHES OR ATTACKS (TYPE NOT CODES 1–12): Which of the following, if any, do you **plan to do** if you experience a cyber security incident?

READ OUT

ASK AS A GRID

RANDOMISE LIST

- a. Keep an internal record of incidents
- b. Attempt to identify the source of the incident
- c. Make an assessment of the scale and impact of the incident
- d. Formal debriefs or discussions to log any lessons learnt
- e. Inform your [IF BUSINESS: directors/IF CHARITY: trustees/IF EDUCATION: governors] or senior management of the incident
- f. Inform a regulator of the incident when required
- g. **ASK IF HAVE CYBER INSURANCE (CODE 1 OR 2 AT INSUREX):** Inform your cyber insurance provider of the incident

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No

DO NOT READ OUT: Don't know

DO NOT READ OUT: Depends on the severity/nature of the incident

ASK ALL

Q63C.RANSOM

In the case of ransomware attacks, does your organisation make it a rule or policy to **not** pay ransomware payments?

SINGLE CODE

Yes

No

Don't know

GDPR

Q78X.GDPRFINE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78Y.GDPRREP DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78C.GDPRWARE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78D.GDPRCHANGE DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78E.GDPRCYBER DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78F.GDPRWHAT DELETED PRE-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78G.GDPRSINCE DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78H.GDPRCYBERA DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78I.GDPRMORE DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Q78J.GDPRCYBERB DELETED POST-PILOT IN CSBS 2020

Recontact and follow-up

ASK IF BUSINESS/CHARITY AND ANY BREACHES OR ATTACKS AND NOT REFUSED ALL COST QUESTIONS ((TYPEXDUM CODE 1 OR 2) AND (TYPE CODES 1–12 AND NOT [DAMAGEDIRS, DAMAGEDIRL, DAMAGESTAFF, DAMAGEIND AND COSTA ALL REF]))

Q78K.VALIDATE

We'd like to send you a quick email afterwards giving you the chance to validate the answers at those last questions, as we know you may want to check them again. It really helps us to get accurate cost data from this survey, so we can properly report the impact of these kinds of cyber attacks.

This email will also have a link to last year's report and a Government help card, showing the latest official cyber security guidance for organisations like yours.

Are you happy for us to email you?

SINGLE CODE

Yes
No

ASK ALL

Q79.RECON

DCMS expects to carry out similar research within the next year. Your input is really important to help the Government to better understand and respond to organisations' cyber security needs, including ones like yours. Would you be happy for DCMS or their appointed contractor to contact you for your views on this topic again before the end of 2022?

SINGLE CODE

Yes
No

ASK IF NO BREACHES OR ATTACKS OR REFUSED ALL COST QUESTIONS (TYPE CODES DK, NULL OR REF AND [DAMAGEDIRS, DAMAGEDIRL, DAMAGESTAFF, DAMAGEIND AND COSTA ALL REF])

Q80.REPORT

Would you like us to email you a copy of last year's report and a Government help card, with links to the latest official cyber security guidance for organisations like yours?

SINGLE CODE

Yes
No

ASK IF WANT RECONTACT OR REPORT/HELPCARD (RECON CODE 1 OR REPORT CODE 1)

Q81.EMAIL

Can I please take an email address for you?

WRITE IN EMAIL IN VALIDATED FORMAT

Refused

SEND FOLLOW-UP EMAIL IF REPORT CODE 1

SEND WEB INVITE IF VALIDATE CODE 1

READ OUT TO ALL

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study. Before you finish I need to inform you that you can access the privacy notice online at csbs.ipsos-mori.com. This explains the purposes for processing your personal data, as well as your rights under data protection regulations to:

- access your personal data
- withdraw consent
- object to processing of your personal data
- and other required information.

CLOSE SURVEY

Web follow-up

SHOW IF ELIGIBLE FOR WEB SURVEY (VALIDATE CODE 1)

Thanks for taking part. The next screens give you the chance to recheck or correct any cost information you gave us in the telephone survey.

You may want to talk to IT or finance colleagues to ensure you give accurate answers.

ASK IF ANSWERED ONE OF THE DISRUPTIVE BREACH COST QUESTIONS ((DAMAGEDIRSB NOT DK AND DAMAGEDIRS NOT REF OR NULL) OR (DAMAGEDIRLB NOT DK AND DAMAGEDIRL NOT REF OR NULL) OR (DAMAGESTAFFB NOT DK AND DAMAGESTAFF NOT REF OR NULL) OR (DAMAGEINDB NOT DK AND DAMAGEIND NOT REF OR NULL))

Q82.CHECKA

You said the most disruptive cyber security breach or attack you had in the last 12 months was: [ANSWER AT DISRUPTA].

It is important that we get accurate cost data for this breach or attack, so the Government can properly understand the impact of cyber attacks on organisations like yours. Please let us know if the responses below are correct or incorrect.

ASK AS A COLLAPSABLE GRID

- a. **IF DAMAGEDIRSB NOT DK:** You said the approximate value of any external payments made **when the incident was being dealt with** was [ANSWER AT DAMAGEDIRS OR DAMAGEDIRSB]. This includes:
 - o any payments to external IT consultants or contractors to investigate or fix the problem
 - o any payments to the attackers, or money they stole.
- b. **IF DAMAGEDIRLB NOT DK:** You said the approximate value of any external payments made **in the aftermath** of the incident was [ANSWER AT DAMAGEDIRL OR DAMAGEDIRLB]. This includes:
 - o any payments to external IT consultants or contractors to run audits, risk assessments or training
 - o the cost of new or upgraded software or systems
 - o recruitment costs if you had to hire someone new
 - o any legal fees, insurance excess, fines, compensation or PR costs related to the incident.
- c. **IF DAMAGESTAFFB NOT DK:** You said the approximate cost of the **staff time** dealing with the incident was [ANSWER AT DAMAGESTAFF OR DAMAGESTAFFB]. This is how much staff would have got paid for the time they spent investigating or fixing the problem. Please include this cost even if this was part of this staff member's job.
- d. **IF DAMAGEINDB NOT DK:** You said the approximate value of any **damage or disruption** during the incident was [ANSWER AT DAMAGEIND OR DAMAGEINDB]. This includes:
 - o the cost of any time when staff could not do their jobs
 - o the value of lost files or intellectual property
 - o the cost of any devices or equipment that needed replacing.

SINGLE CODE

Correct
Incorrect

ASK IF ANSWERED TOTAL COST QUESTION (COSTB NOT DK AND COSTA NOT REF OR NULL)

Q82.CHECKB

You said that **all** the cyber security breaches or attacks you have experienced in the last 12 months have cost your organisation [ANSWER AT COSTA OR COSTB].

Please let us know if this response is correct or incorrect.

SINGLE CODE

Correct
Incorrect

ASK IF DAMAGEDIRSB CODE DK OR CHECKAa CODE 2

CLONE OF DAMAGEDIRS
CLONE OF DAMAGEDIRSB

ASK IF DAMAGEDIRLB CODE DK OR CHECKAb CODE 2

CLONE OF DAMAGEDIRL
CLONE OF DAMAGEDIRLB

ASK IF DAMAGESTAFFB CODE DK OR CHECKAc CODE 2

CLONE OF DAMAGESTAFF
CLONE OF DAMAGESTAFFB

ASK IF DAMAGEINDB CODE DK OR CHECKAd CODE 2

CLONE OF DAMAGEIND
CLONE OF DAMAGEINDB

ASK IF COSTB CODE DK OR CHECKB CODE 2

CLONE OF COSTA
CLONE OF COSTB

SHOW IF ELIGIBLE FOR WEB SURVEY (VALIDATE CODE 1)

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study. You can access the privacy notice online at csbs.ipsos-mori.com. This explains the purposes for processing your personal data, as well as your rights under data protection regulations to:

- access your personal data
- withdraw consent
- object to processing of your personal data
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CLOSE SURVEY

Appendix B: Help card offered to survey respondents



Government guidance for organisations on cyber security



Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport



Guidance for organisations just getting started

Cyber Aware – <https://www.cyberaware.gov.uk/>

Cyber Aware is the government’s advice campaign on how to stay secure online. It covers six essential actions that organisations and their staff should take to make themselves cyber secure.

1. Use a strong and separate password for your email
2. Create strong passwords using 3 random words
3. Save your passwords in your browser
4. Turn on two-factor authentication (2FA)
5. Update your devices
6. Back up your data

You can create your own free [Cyber Action Plan](#) in under 5 minutes on the Cyber Aware website.

You can also attend a free online training module ["Top tips for staff"](#) which takes less than 30 minutes.

Cyber Security: Small Business Guide – <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/smallbusiness>

Cyber security need not be a daunting challenge for small business owners. Following the five quick and easy steps outlined in this guide could save time, money and even your business’s reputation.

Cyber Security: Small Charity Guide – <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/charity>

Charities are increasingly reliant on IT and technology and are falling victim to a range of malicious cyber activity. The five topics covered in the guidance are easy to understand and are free or cost little to implement.



Government guidance for organisations on cyber security



Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport



Guidance for established businesses and charities including micro and small organisations

Cyber Essentials – <https://www.cyberessentials.ncsc.gov.uk/>

Cyber Essentials helps you to guard against the most common cyber threats and demonstrate your commitment to cyber security. The scheme is suitable for all organisations and sets out five technical controls you can put in place today. You can also get a Cyber Essentials certificate to reassure customers you take cyber security seriously, attract new business with the promise you have cyber security measures in place, and get listed on the Cyber Essentials Directory. You can see if you are ready for [Cyber Essentials](#) certification, using IASME's [readiness tool](#).

Action Fraud – http://www.actionfraud.police.uk/report_fraud

If you think your organisation has been a victim of online crime, you can report this to the police via Action Fraud, the national fraud and cyber crime reporting centre. The Action Fraud website also has information to help you understand different types of online fraud and how to spot them before they cause any damage.

For the latest published guidance and weekly threat reports –

<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics> and <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/keep-up-to-date/threat-reports>

The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) publishes regular guidance on 46 topics. It also publishes weekly threat reports, so you can stay updated on the latest threats.



Specific guidance for larger organisations

Board toolkit: five questions for your board's agenda – <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/board-toolkit-five-questions-your-boards-agenda>

A range of questions that the NCSC recommend to generate constructive cyber security discussions between board members (or trustees) and those working in cyber security roles within the organisation.

10 Steps To Cyber Security – <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/10-steps-cyber-security>

This guidance outlines 10 steps organisations should take to put a comprehensive cyber risk management regime in place and protect against cyber threats. It is now used by a majority of FTSE 350 companies as well as many other large organisations. The 10 steps cover:

1. [Risk management](#)
2. [Staff engagement and training](#)
3. [Asset management](#)
4. [Security architecture and secure configurations](#)
5. [Vulnerability management](#)
6. [Identity and access management](#)
7. [Data security](#)
8. [Logging and monitoring](#)
9. [Incident management](#)
10. [Supply chain security](#)

Appendix C: Topic guide

Introduction (FOR ALL)

- Thank participant for taking part; introduce self and Ipsos
- **Explain the project:** we are exploring some topics about cyber security from the survey in more depth on behalf of DCMS
- All responses are confidential and anonymous
- **Recording:** get permission to digitally record
- **Length:** approximately 60 mins

GDPR added consent (once the recorder is on)

Ipsos' legal basis for processing your data is your consent to take part in this research. Your participation is voluntary. You can withdraw your consent for your data to be used at any point before, during or after the interview.

Can I check that you are happy to proceed?

Perception of cyber security risk (ASK ALL)

SKIP IF THEY ARE PRESSED FOR TIME

- Briefly, what would you say are the top 2-3 cyber security priorities for your organisation right now?

Cyber security decision-making – part A (ASK ALL)

Budget decisions

- How does your organisation budget for cyber security? Who decides the budget? How frequently is it reviewed? PROBE:
 - How proactive/reactive are spending decisions? How much is in response to incidents? How much of it is planned?
 - Is it cyber security -specific, or part of a wider team budget (e.g. IT)? How well does cyber security get prioritised within this wider budget?
 - What do you need to do to justify any spending (e.g. a business case)? How easy is it to produce this?
- Are any areas of cyber security hampered by budget constraints? If you had extra money right now for cyber security, where would it go?
- How has spending changed over the last few years? Has it trended upwards/downwards? What has driven this?

Board engagement and attitudes

Appendix D: Further information

1. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport would like to thank the following people for their work in the development and carrying out of the survey and for their work compiling this report.
 - Alice Stratton, Ipsos
 - Harry Williams, Ipsos
 - Eleanor Myles, Ipsos
 - Nick Coleman, Ipsos
 - Jayesh Navin Shah, Ipsos.
2. The Cyber Security Breaches Survey was first published in 2016 as a research report, and became an Official Statistic in 2017. The previous reports can be found at <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/cyber-security-breaches-survey>. This includes the full report, infographics and the technical and methodological information for each year.
3. The responsible DCMS analyst for this release is Maddy Ell. The responsible statistician is Robbie Galluci. For enquiries on this release, from an official statistics perspective, please contact DCMS at evidence@dcms.gov.uk.
4. For general enquiries contact:

Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
100 Parliament Street
London
SW1A 2BQ

Telephone: 020 7211 6000
5. DCMS statisticians can be followed on Twitter via [@DCMSInsight](https://twitter.com/DCMSInsight).
6. The Cyber Security Breaches Survey is an official statistics publication and has been produced to the standards set out in the Code of Practice for Official Statistics. For more information, see <https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/code-of-practice/>. Details of the pre-release access arrangements for this dataset have been published alongside this release.
7. This work was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the international quality standard for Market Research, ISO 20252, and with the Ipsos Terms and Conditions which can be found at <https://ipsos.uk/terms>.



Department for
Digital, Culture,
Media & Sport

4th Floor
100 Parliament Street
London
SW1A 2BQ



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