



Chemical Weapons

Introduction

1. The Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/618) were made under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (the Sanctions Act) and provide for the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain persons, entities or bodies involved in the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.
2. On 18 March 2022 the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List on GOV.UK. This list provides details of those designated under regulations made under the Sanctions Act. A link to the UK Sanctions List can be found below.
3. Following the publication of the UK Sanctions List, information on the Consolidated List has been updated.

Notice summary

4. The following entries have been amended and are still subject to an asset freeze:
 - Tariq YASMINA (Group ID: 13743)
 - Vladimir Stepanovich ALEXSEYEV (Group ID: 13747)
 - Alexander Yevgeniyevich MISHKIN (Group ID: 13744)
 - Andrei Veniaminovich YARIN (Group ID: 13969)
 - Sergei Ivanovich MENYAILO (Group ID: 13971)
 - Aleksei Yurievich KRIVORUCHKO (Group ID: 13974)
 - SCIENTIFIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTRE (SSRC) (Group ID: 12426)
 - STATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR ORGANIC CHEMISTRY AND

What you must do

5. You must:
 - i. check whether you maintain any accounts or hold any funds or economic resources for the persons set out in the Annex to this Notice;
 - ii. freeze such accounts, and other funds or economic resources and any funds which are owned or controlled by persons set out in the Annex to the Notice
 - iii. refrain from dealing with the funds or assets or making them available (directly or indirectly) to such persons unless licensed by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI);
 - iv. report any findings to OFSI, together with any additional information that would facilitate compliance with the Regulations;
 - v. provide any information concerning the frozen assets of designated persons that OFSI may request. Information reported to OFSI may be passed on to other regulatory authorities or law enforcement.
6. Where a relevant institution has already reported details of accounts, other funds or economic resources held frozen for designated persons, they are not required to report these details again.
7. Failure to comply with financial sanctions legislation or to seek to circumvent its provisions is a criminal offence.

Further Information

8. Copies of recent notices, UK legislation and relevant guidance can be obtained from the Chemical Weapons financial sanctions page on the Gov.UK website:
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/financial-sanctions-regime-specific-consolidated-lists-and-releases>
9. The Consolidated List can be found here:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targets/consolidated-list-of-targets>

10. The UK Sanctions List can be found here:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list>

11. For more information please see our guide to financial sanctions:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-financial-sanctions-guidance>

Enquiries

12. Non-media enquiries about the implementation of financial sanctions in the UK should be addressed to:

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation
HM Treasury
1 Horse Guards Road
London
SW1A 2HQ
ofsi@hmtreasury.gov.uk

13. Non-media enquiries about the sanctions measures themselves should be addressed to:
sanctions@fcdo.gov.uk

14. Media enquiries about how financial sanctions are implemented in the UK should be addressed to the Treasury Press Office on 020 7270 5238.

15. Media enquiries about the sanctions measures themselves should be addressed to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office Press Office on 020 7008 3100.

ANNEX TO NOTICE

FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: CHEMICAL WEAPONS

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) REGULATIONS 2019 (S.I. 2019/618)

AMENDMENTS

Deleted information appears in strikethrough. Additional information appears in italics and is underlined.

Individuals

1. YASMINA, Tariq

Name (non-Latin script): طارق ياسمينه

Title: *Brigadier General* a.k.a: (1) YASMINA, Tarq (2) YASMINA, Tareq **Nationality:** Syria **Position:** Liaison officer between the SSRC and the Presidential Palace **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0003 Employee Works at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under both the Syria and Chemical Weapons sanctions regimes) (UK Statement of Reasons): ~~Colonel Tariq Yasmina~~ *Brigadier General (previously Colonel) Tariq Yasmina* acts as the liaison officer between the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the Presidential Palace, and, as such, is involved in the use and preparations for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. As a result of his senior role at SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** ~~31/12/2020~~ 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13743.

2. ALEXSEYEV, Vladimir Stepanovich

Position: First Deputy Head of the GRU **Other Information:** *Relatives/business associates or partners/links to listed individuals: Anatoliy Vladimirovich Chepiga; Igor Olegovich Kostyukov; Alexander Yevgeniyevich Mishkin.* (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0007 (UK Statement of Reasons): Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev is the First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU). Given his senior leadership role in the GRU, Alexseyev is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent "Novichok" by officers from the GRU. **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** ~~31/12/2020~~ 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13747.

3. MISHKIN, Alexander Yevgeniyevich

Name (non-Latin script): Александр Евгеньевич МИШКИН

Title: Colonel **DOB:** 13/07/1979. **POB:** (1) Loyga (2) Kotlas, (1) Russia (2) Russia a.k.a: PETROV, Alexander **Nationality:** Russia **Address:** Russia. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0010 (UK Statement of Reasons): GRU Officer Alexander Mishkin (a.k.a. Alexander Petrov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent ("Novichok"). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Alexander Petrov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok *contrary to the Chemical Weapons Act*; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey. GRU Officer Alexander Mishkin (a.k.a. Alexander Petrov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent

("Novichok"). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Alexander Petrov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal; for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; for the use and possession of Novichok contrary to the Chemical Weapons Act; and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey. **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 01/01/2021 **Last Updated:** 01/02/2021 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13744.

4. YARIN, Andrei Veniaminovich

DOB: 13/02/1970. **POB:** Nizhny Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Russia **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0011 (UK Statement of Reasons): Andrei Veniaminovich Yarin is the Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate in the Presidential Executive Office. The Presidential Office is a state body providing support for the President's work and monitoring the implementation of the President's decisions and overall Governmental policies and most important action. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation, including the Federal Security Service (FSB). Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. As Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate in the Presidential Executive Office, Andrei Veniaminovich Yarin bears responsibility for the preparation, support for and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 01/01/2021 **Last Updated:** ~~08/01/2021~~ 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13969.

5. MENYAILO, Sergei Ivanovich

DOB: 22/08/1960. **POB:** Alagir, Russia **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Head of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (formerly Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Siberian Federal District) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0013 (UK Statement of Reasons): ~~Sergei Menyailo is the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Siberian Federal District and, therefore, responsible for ensuring the implementation of the constitutional powers of the President, including the implementation by public authorities of domestic and foreign policy of the state in the federal district of Siberia. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his recent journey to Siberia,~~

from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August, were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. The poisoning of Alexey Navalny took place at Tomsk Bogashevo airport in Siberia. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the scale of the operation involved, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Office. Given his senior leadership role in the Siberian Federal District, Sergei Menyailo bears responsibility for the providing support for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny in Tomsk, Siberia. Currently Head of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. Sergei Menyailo was until April 2021 the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Siberian Federal District and, therefore, responsible for ensuring the implementation of the constitutional powers of the President, including the implementation by public authorities of domestic and foreign policy of the state in the federal district of Siberia. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August, were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. The poisoning of Alexey Navalny took place at Tomsk Bogashevo airport in Siberia. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the scale of the operation involved, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Office. Given his senior leadership role in the Siberian Federal District, Sergei Menyailo bears responsibility for the providing support for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny in Tomsk, Siberia. (Gender): Male Listed on: 15/10/2020 UK Sanctions List Date Designated: 03/01/2021 Last Updated: 08/01/2024 18/03/2022 Group ID: 13971

6. KRIVORUCHKO, Aleksei Yurievich

a.k.a: (1) *KRIVORUCHKO, Alexey Yurievich* (2) *KRIVORUCHKO, Alexei Yurievich* **DOB:** 17/07/1975. **POB:** Stavropol, Russia **Nationality:** Russia **Position:** Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0016 (UK Statement of Reasons): Aleksei Krivoruchko is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In this capacity, he has overall responsibility for armaments. This includes the ~~oversight~~ oversight of the Ministry's stocks of weapons and military equipment. This includes the oversight of the Ministry's stocks of weapons and military equipment. The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed. The Russian Ministry of Defence has overall responsibility for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group was used. Given the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation and the evidence of the continued involvement of the Russian MoD in the Novichok programme, this could only be on account of intent by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given Aleksei Krivoruchko's senior role in the Russian military, the evidence suggests that he is responsible for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 05/01/2021 **Last Updated:** ~~08/01/2024~~ 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13974.

Entities

1. SCIENTIFIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTRE (SSRC)

a.k.a: (1) Centre de Recherche de Kaboun (2) Centre d'Etude et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS) (3) *Center for Scientific Studies and Research (SSRC)* (4) *Center for Study and Research (CERS)* (5) *Scientific Studies and Research Council* (6) *Syrian Scientific Research Council (SSRC)* (7) *Scientific Research Council (SRC)*. **Address:** (1) P.O. Box 31983, Barzeh. (2) Barzeh Street, PO Box 4470, Damascus, Syria. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0006 and SYR0286 Listed under the Chemical Weapons and Syria sanctions regimes. (UK Statement of Reasons): The Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) is the Syrian regime's principal entity for the development of chemical weapons. The SSRC is responsible for the development and production of chemical weapons, as well as the missiles and artillery to deliver them, operating at a number of sites in Syria. Provides support to the Syrian army for the acquisition of equipment used for the surveillance and repression of demonstrators. Operating in the chemical weapon proliferation sector, it is the

government entity responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons, including chemical weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. (Type of entity): Investment. Private (Subsidiaries): Bena Properties (subsidiary), Cham Holding Building, Daraa Highway, Ashrafiyat Sahnaya Rif Dimashq, Syria, P.O. Box 9525. Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology. HISAT. National Standards & Calibration Laboratory. NSCL. (Phone number): 6668114/5 (Telefax): 6620317 **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 31/12/2020 **Last Updated:** ~~14/02/2022~~ 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 12426.

2. STATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR ORGANIC CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY (GOSNIIOKHT)

a.k.a: Federal State Unitary Enterprise "State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology" (GosNIIOKhT) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0017 (UK Statement of Reasons): The Federal State Unitary Enterprise State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (Gosniokht) is a state research institute within Russia with responsibility for the destruction of chemical weapon stocks inherited from the Soviet Union. The institute in its original role, before 1994, was involved in the development and production of chemical weapons, including the toxic nerve agent now known as 'Novichok'. After 1994, the same family who owned the institute took part in the government's program for destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. The subsequent deployment of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group against Alexey Navalny would therefore only be possible because the institute had failed to carry out its responsibility to destroy the stockpiles of chemical weapons. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. As the institute responsible for the destruction of chemical weapons within the Russian Federation, Gosniokht bears responsibility for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Phone number): 7+495+2732405 (Email address): DIR@GosNIIOKhT.rmt.ru (Parent company): Russian Ministry of Defence **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **UK Sanctions List Date Designated:** 06/01/2021 **Last Updated:** ~~19/01/2021~~ 18/03/2022 **Group ID:** 13975.

Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation

HM Treasury

18/03/2022