journalists and editors. The hunger for news to feed an ever increasing number of press, radio and television outlets is a problem for society as a whole rather than for the police in particular. Although not strictly within the terms of reference of this report the problems of “power without responsibility” as they affect the press and news media are undoubtedly worthy of debate elsewhere. In the strict context of my review of the Ripper investigation I would merely add the contention that it is the duty of both the police and the media to act in furtherance of the public weal. The fundamental differences between the organisation, objectives and perspectives of the two groups should not be allowed to militate against this ideal and both police officers and journalists should endeavour to learn from the mistakes of the past. Neither group can escape blame for the limitations clearly exposed in the Ripper case in the sphere of police/media obligations.

(viii) Training Requirement

520. My review of the Yorkshire Ripper case has indicated a number of areas where police performance was below the level which was required and this was often due to inadequate training. Amongst the most senior officers involved in the case the deficiency manifested itself mainly as an inadequate appreciation of the controlled use of resources and of the management concepts involved in a protracted large scale inquiry. The professional expertise of these officers in the ordinarily accepted sense was perfectly adequate but their lack of understanding of broader management issues allowed them to overlook important considerations affecting the overall efficiency of the inquiry. At lower levels of operation the training inadequacy showed itself in the form of poor performance by members of outside inquiry teams and by the staff of the Major Incident Room.

521. So far as the Major Incident Room was concerned problems arose as much as anything from the assumption that any police officer or cadet can automatically work effectively in any situation with the minimum of “on the job” training. Since police officers are normally required to fulfil a variety of different roles during their service the assumption that they will perform effectively in any situation is quite commonly held. However, in practice, this is often not so and in particular the work of the Major Incident Room calls for planned training of the people who are to staff it. I previously mentioned under the heading of “Major Incident Rooms” in this part of my report that, following informal discussions I have had with the Chairman of the Steering Committee on Major Incident Rooms (under the aegis of the Computer Development Committee), I anticipate that ACPO will soon be in a position to give guidance on such training programmes.

522. The training of Major Incident Room personnel is, of course, basically a local requirement until such time as complete standardisation of systems has been achieved in line with the earlier recommendation I made. Most police forces nominate a basic team for Major Incident Room work and the officers selected often have previous experience so that additional training is often unnecessary. In some of the larger forces the fact that several Major Incident Rooms may be operating at any one time means that a considerable number of people are trained in local systems. In some small forces, however, significant periods of time elapse between crimes which call for the establishment of Major Incident Rooms so that given the ordinary turnover of staff there may be occasions when it would be impossible to raise a team for a Major Incident Room, all of whom had previous relevant experience. There is a very definite case for the nomination of primary and reserve Major Incident Room teams in all forces, with a regular training arrangement intended to maintain the motivation and commitment of nominated members of staff and to re-inforce in their minds the need for absolute accuracy and a dedication to the supervision of personnel who might be drafted into the Major Incident Room on a temporary basis. It will obviously not be possible to train in advance all the people who might at some time be required to work in a Major Incident Room. A highly trained nucleus of staff is, however, essential as is the need to select untrained staff from amongst people with clerical or administrative backgrounds. When computerisation of records becomes a reality it will obviously be essential to ensure that people who are well trained in the use of visual display units and printer terminals are used for this work. The input of information to a computer is just as prone to error as any other form of information recording. The high error rate amongst vehicle registration numbers in the “Cross and “Triple Area Sighting” inquiries during the Ripper case is an indication of the problems which are likely to occur. The effect of similar errors on a “full text retrieval” system as described earlier in this part of my report can well be imagined.
523. Some indication of the complacency which exists in some police forces in connection with Major Incident Rooms can be gained from the fact that although nominated members of staff of casualty inquiry bureaux (referred to earlier in connection with major incidents) are often required to undertake practical exercises at least once a year and sometimes more frequently, the nominated staff of Major Incident Rooms are only rarely involved in such training. This is a generalisation which will not be true of every police force in England and Wales but should certainly act as a reminder that the function of Major Incident Rooms is so crucial to the success of serious crime inquiries that staff training should be seen as a matter of high priority.

524. Turning to other police problems which manifested themselves during the Ripper investigation I recommend that training on the following lines should be implemented within the Service as soon as practicable.

525. So far as senior officers are concerned the Commandant of the Police Staff College has already intimated that he would be prepared to include "The conduct of major crime investigations" within his carousel of courses for senior officers. The carousel concept is that officers should be able to attend one or more short courses at the Staff College to improve their knowledge of some specific aspect of police work or management with which they are currently engaged. A newly appointed Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) might well, for instance, take a carousel course intended to bring him up to date on all aspects of public order and riot control. A newly appointed Assistant Chief Constable (Administration) might equally visit the College to be updated about the most recent developments in police finance and budgetary control. The proposed course on the conduct of major crime investigations fits easily into this training concept and should do a great deal to ensure that an Assistant Chief Constable or Commander (Metropolitan Police) responsible for operations generally or for crime in a larger force is better prepared to face the problems arising from a serious crime investigation in the future. The specific topics covered in the carousel course should include the following:

(a) Planning and use of resources — to include financial budgeting
(b) Multi-force control of operations — to include discussions on compatibility of systems used and overall control
(c) Command and control of investigations with emphasis placed on command structure and areas of responsibility; also the strict recording of operational and policy decisions
(d) Appreciation of modern methods of investigation and technical aids including computers. To deal with audit and control sampling as the investigation progresses
(e) Stress — strains put on management and all personnel
(f) Relationships with the media
(g) Co-ordination of resources and use of other agencies including Forensic Science Laboratories, etc.
(h) Personnel — including selection and training of key staff
(i) Conference briefings and de-briefings at force and local level
(j) Planning the prosecution of a case including control of exhibits — liaison with legal advisers

526. So far as the needs of detectives in the rank of superintendent and chief superintendent are concerned, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir David McNee, has indicated to me his willingness to mount a number of short courses at the Metropolitan Police Training School at Hendon on roughly similar lines to the carousel courses at the Police College but taking account of the lower rank level. The areas of study of these intended courses would have much in common with those at Bramshill but would also focus particular attention on the problems of personnel management and the administration and control of large scale inquiries. Other topics to be covered at Hendon would including the following:

(a) Briefing and debriefing of outside inquiry teams and other members of staff
(b) The form and content of Police Circulations and the use of advertising techniques to focus attention on the most important issues
(c) Management concepts affecting major inquiries including leadership, morale, motivation, communication and delegation

(d) The administration and control of major inquiries

(e) Systems management (both for computerised and manual record and information retrieval systems)

(f) Specialist services

(g) Personnel and welfare problems

527. Whilst a number of these topics feature in the programmes of training courses within police forces and at the Police Staff College they have, to the best of my knowledge, never been related specifically to major crime inquiries. Aspects of management, for instance, are often dealt with on special courses which fail to demonstrate the specific link between the concepts and actual police operations particularly in the crime detection sphere. Management training often involves a requirement for attitudinal change which is not always easily achieved in the absence of concrete practical examples which demonstrate unequivocally the connection between an abstract concept and the success or failure of a practical police operation. It will be important if this sort of training is to be successful for the maximum possible advantage to be taken of practical examples from the Ripper case and from other cases where similar problems have been identified. Whilst training at the Police Staff College and the Metropolitan Police Training School ought to satisfy the immediate training requirement for officers of senior rank it would obviously be helpful if Chief Constables who organise training for senior officers on a local or regional basis included in their course programmes, aspects of the management of serious crime inquiries on the lines indicated in this report.

528. Another training deficiency identified during my review relates to the interview techniques of members of outside inquiry teams. It will be recalled that one of the serious limitations identified earlier in my report was the failure of the officers who interviewed Sutcliffe and his wife to probe deeply enough so as to shake the credibility of alibis and other information which Sutcliffe and she provided. As I have described, these officers operated under a number of constraints which tended to limit their effectiveness and were also pre-conditioned to believe the letters and taped connection. In spite of that, a more positive approach and a little more determination in testing out Sutcliffe’s answers, would undoubtedly have aroused their suspicions and produced more positive results. The techniques of interviewing is a topic which deserves greater attention within police training programmes and ought to be dealt with very thoroughly during detective training courses. I do not wish to specify a training programme for this project but would suggest that the failure of Sutcliffe’s nine specific police interviews in connection with the Ripper inquiry should be borne in mind when the training objectives relating to crime investigations are being determined. Detectives who are members of outside inquiry teams will obviously be influenced by the restraints under which they work and the attitudes of supervisors. If they are to be successful, however, they need not only to be members of a well organised inquiry team; they also need the spark of individual flair and determination which will enable them to take advantage of opportunities which come their way. Several of the officers who interviewed Sutcliffe during the Ripper inquiry placed him in the “not happy about him” category. What they lacked was the determination and confidence which would have enabled them to capitalise on having been put into contact with the killer and to have turned their intuitive suspicion into evidence which would have justified an arrest.

529. I recommend therefore that the training requirements stemming from the review of the Ripper case should be included in future training programmes not merely in the short term but as a continuing process. My deliberations with both the Commandant of the Staff College and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner lead me to believe that the training of senior investigating officers on the lines suggested can be commenced within a reasonable time. Officers below the rank of superintendent will need to be catered for elsewhere either at Detective Training or Force Training Schools.

530. Apart from the training of Major Incident Room personnel which is already being examined by ACPO Computer Development Committee, I consider that the best means of achieving the desired progress in other spheres is through the ACPO Crime Committee in the first instance with appropriate liaison thereafter with the Police Staff College, the Metropolitan Police and those
Chief Constables able to provide the necessary facilities for the other training needs. I so recommend.

(ix) The Way Ahead

531. As I am about to draft this final part of my report, coincidentally I have just read the editorial in the "Yorkshire Evening Post" (6th November 1981). There has been much written in newspapers in the aftermath of the Ripper case but this latest editorial, which in my view, has the advantage of sensing the pulse of local opinion in the area of Sutcliffe's main activities, gives the balanced approach to the case which my team and I have endeavoured to follow since being appointed to conduct the review. I think I can do no better than quote the editorial in full:

"Will the results of the secret inquiry into the six year hunt for the Yorkshire Ripper be made known to the public?

Already MPs are demanding that they should. But this is not a simple issue of public accountability. The fact is that the Ripper was eventually caught, by police officers, and the internal "inquest" has not been into any failure to catch him.

Predictably, any inquiry as to flaws in the procedures which made this a long-drawn out hunt, had to wait until the killer was behind bars.

It is now being said that the four month long inquiry is critical of some mistakes made during the hunt for Sutcliffe, which was the most costly in British criminal history.

It is hardly surprising that there were mistakes, no organisation is perfect. But will anything be gained by merely publishing, for public consumption the opinions of the team which conducted the searching inquiry?

Mr. Ken Woomer, MP for Batley and Morley says the report "must not be seen as a whitewash" and of course he is absolutely right.

But more importantly, it must not be seen merely as a castigation for areas of West Yorkshire policing which are felt to have failed.

It must be seen, and must be used, as an instrument of change. And the only way this should be done is for Mr. William Whitelaw, the Home Secretary, when he makes his statement to the Commons soon on the inquiry, to give an assurance that action will be taken.

If he does not, then MPs would only be acting in the public interest, and not in any spirit of revenge, by insisting on a select Committee of Inquiry into the issue of whether or not police methods used in the Ripper hunt were inadequate."

532. It would have been easy for us to look at the protracted Ripper Investigation in the style of armchair critics and find faults. As the editorial rightly quotes "It is hardly surprising that there were mistakes; no organisation is perfect." What we have endeavoured to do throughout the review is to identify the mistakes and omissions that were made in the investigation and to view them in a balanced, objective manner from our own collective professional experience before coming to any conclusions. In doing this I feel sure that we have taken account of the very real pressures facing the police during the inquiry whilst at the same time pinpointing those major limitations which resulted from either bad management, lack of professionalism or even worse, plain carelessness.

533. In my interviews with the relatives of victims who wished to see me, I emphasised that whilst we would be looking critically at the police investigation so as to identify any important errors that were made, I firmly believed that at the end of my review the most constructive action that could be taken in the light of the findings would be to ensure that any lessons which might be learned should be made known to the police forces generally. This conclusion was of course, in line with your Parliamentary Statement at the time of my appointment to review the case.

534. Referring again to the editorial quoted above a significant passage on the same theme reads "It (the review) must be seen, and must be used, as an instrument of change." This is absolutely
right and the ‘Lessons for the future’ as detailed in this part of my report will need to be promulgated to the Service and acted upon if the limitations identified in Part III of the report are to be avoided in future similar cases.

535. I have referred from time to time to the so-called ‘Black Panther’ case which was the other notorious series homicide case within the last decade or so. Some of the limitations identified in the Ripper investigation were also clearly apparent in the ‘Black Panther’ investigation and it is with regret that I have concluded that the Police Service just did not learn some vital lessons arising from the earlier case, particularly those relating to the management and control of a multi-force murder investigation.

536. Following the conviction of Donald Nielson for the ‘Black Panther’ series of murders there was an adjournment debate in the House of Commons on the 4th August 1976 (Hansard: Volume 916 — 2 column 2095). During the course of the debate the then Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Dr. Shirley Summerskill) pointed out that the Home Secretary has no responsibility in the day-to-day conduct of a particular police investigation. She also related to the House that the case had been discussed by chief officers of police collectively and that she was quite sure that they were fully aware of the need to learn any lessons which may be learned from such an investigation.

537. Unfortunately, there is now good reason to think that whilst chief officers of police collectively might have been mindful of the need to learn lessons from the ‘Black Panther’ case, there is very little evidence emanating from the Ripper Case review to show that they did.

538. The dilemma in looking to the future is that with the operational independence of Chief Officers of Police clearly established by Statute and Common Law, any Home Secretary is in a delicate and sensitive area when endeavouring to give guidance in the way major crime investigations should be conducted in future. As the minister rightly pointed out in the adjournment debate previously referred to:

“The fact that a particular investigation is a matter for discussion by chief officers of police is a reflection of our system of policing in this country. The local control of police forces is an essential element of that system. Chief Constables in this country, unlike some continental countries, do not come under the direction of a Minister of the Interior in the enforcement of law. The responsibility of deciding how an offence should be investigated is for them and them alone.”

539. Fortunately, there is one tremendous advantage in the aftermath of the Ripper case when compared to the post-trial period of the ‘Black Panther’ case. There is now to hand the findings of an independent professional review team including a balanced consideration of the lessons for the future arising from the limitations of the past. Having regard to the discussions I have had with various chief police officers, including the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, during the period of the review, I feel sure, as I have intimated earlier, that the Service is desirous of implementing the changes that are so obviously necessary to avoid similar mistakes to those which were made in both the ‘Black Panther’ and the Ripper cases. In this regard I have taken the liberty of discussing the matter informally with the President of the Association of Chief Police Officers and he has assured me that he and his colleagues fully appreciate that there will be lessons to be learned arising from this review of the Ripper case and that the Association is anxious to do as much as possible to ensure that such lessons are adopted within the Service as quickly as possible.

540. With this potential spirit of goodwill towards the recommendations I have made, it would seem that following your Parliamentary Statement, the best approach in the first instance might be to have a joint meeting between the principal ACPO officers, the Commissioner (or a senior representative of the Metropolitan Police) and Home Office officials (including HMCIC and myself). I have put this suggested procedure to those concerned, including the President of ACPO and the Commissioner, and all are agreed that this would be the best way ahead. If you concur then it might be useful to include details of it in your Parliamentary Statement in due course so as to afford a clear indication of the prompt constructive action that is being taken following the review.
541. In any event, I think it would be appropriate in the first instance to issue a Home Office circular in general terms about the review intimating what is being done by Home Office and ACPO (including the Metropolitan Police) in the light of the review recommendations. This would include, for example, the move towards standardisation of Major Incident Room procedures together with a mark-time agreement on any computerisation of Incident Room records pending the short and long-term solutions that are being evaluated.