PART IV — LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

445. It is easy to be wise with hindsight and I have been mindful of this when identifying in the previous section of my report the overall limitations of the police investigation. Where there has been little or no blame attached to the police I have made this clear. Equally, where the police have been responsible for serious errors of judgement, negligence, or indifference or carelessness then this too has been highlighted. All these conclusions have been reached by my team and me following a carefully balanced and professional consideration of all the factors involved. This last point cannot be over emphasised.

446. Not surprisingly, the limitations in the police investigation take up a greater part of my report than do the lessons for the future. This is because it was essential to make a deep probe into all the main elements of the Ripper investigation so as to arrive at the essential truth of what went wrong. Having related my conclusions in that regard, the lessons for the future come as a natural follow-up and I will now deal with each in turn giving recommendations where appropriate.

(i) Major Incident Rooms

447. The single most important lesson for the future so far as Major Incident Rooms are concerned is that standardisation of procedures must be achieved so that compatible systems, capable of being interfaced in appropriate cases, are in use in all police forces. As I described in the previous section of my report, the Major Incident Room systems of Greater Manchester, Lancashire and West Yorkshire were not compatible and, once in use, were incapable of being interfaced. Even standardisation would not allow for the amalgamation of active systems in their entirety although it would provide for the amalgamation of indexes. Had Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire used standard nominal index cards for instance, it would have been possible, even after the separate indexes had become established, to amalgamate them into one integrated index covering the whole series. The objective for the future should be that a member of any police force with experience of Major Incident Room work should be able to go to a Major Incident Room of another force and immediately know the location and contents of indexes and records and the management structure of any inquiry.

448. Standardisation is even more important when the use of computers in Major Incident Rooms is contemplated. Unless methods of indexing, recording and filing are common in forces contemplating the computerisation of records of crimes within a series, the project is likely to prove impossible to mount. As I shall explain under the next sub-heading of my report the computerisation of Major Incident Room records in series crimes is still likely to be difficult and might well involve the use of separate micro-computers each dealing with a single crime. Opportunities for the experimental development of such systems on live series crimes are thankfully rare so that future development work will often involve simulation using information from old crimes. In the absence of standardisation of Major Incident Room systems such experiments are likely to be time wasting and unnecessarily expensive so that complete standardisation is seen as an absolute prerequisite for further development work in this area.

449. I recommend that the Association of Chief Officers of Police (through the Computer Development Committee) be asked to consider the standardisation of Major Incident Room documents and procedures and to report their conclusions within a reasonable time limit. Unfortunately, previous experience in a number of areas has shown that Chief Constables are reluctant to make standardisation agreements unless pressure is exerted on them so to do. Tentative agreements in the field of police training, crime reporting and the reporting of road accidents have all failed to last for more than a few months and the current state of computer development within the Police Service is indicative of a general unwillingness to share systems not exclusively tailored to the individual force. I regard this area as so important as to justify the specification of a time limit by which standardisation ought to be achieved.

450. There is another important aspect of Major Incident Room work worthy of close scrutiny and this relates to staffing. This is a difficult area since the extent to which resources are available to staff a single Incident Room depends upon the number of commitments which an individual force has to handle at a particular time. So far as an Incident Room dealing with a major crime is concerned it will be necessary in future, especially in the light of the failings in the Ripper case, to
ensure that adequate resources are allocated. I have explained earlier how the Millgarth Major Incident Room was overwhelmed by the weight of information which it was expected to handle and how senior officers of the force failed to recognise the crisis which had arisen so as to deploy an adequate scale of manpower to clear it. I can perhaps emphasise this general point by saying that at the time when Chief Inspector Tyman reviewed the operation of the Major Incident Room, following the murder of Jacqueline Hill, only one typist was allocated to the Room to undertake all the typing work originating there. Equally, no telephonists were employed to receive information from the public so that all members of staff including the Inspector, whose duty it was to supervise the overall running of the Room, had to deal with their ordinary work during any breaks between telephone calls. I have also referred elsewhere to policy decisions which allowed major lines of inquiry, likely to lead to public response, to be started in the absence of staff to handle the consequential flow of information. This was clearly wrong and contributed to the Major Incident Room’s failure to meet operational requirements. What should have happened in these cases has a parallel in the police arrangements for major incidents such as aircraft or rail crashes. In such incidents the police open casualty inquiry bureaux so that the police stations from which the incident is being controlled are not overburdened by public inquiries. The arrangements which should have been made in the Ripper case for each new line of inquiry which was likely to generate a large public response, or as a consequence of a new murder in the series, should have had much in common with the casualty bureaux scheme which can be operated at any police station where facilities were available. Such arrangements would have enabled the work of the Incident Room to proceed in reasonable tranquility rather than against a constant background of telephone bells and conversations.

451. Following Chief Inspector Tyman’s review of the operation of the Millgarth Major Incident Room in December 1980 additional manpower was allocated to all aspects of the work and some inroad began to be made into the backlog of outstanding inquiries which had by then accumulated. This should not have needed to happen on a crisis basis but should have been identified and remedied before the problem assumed such proportions. The lesson for the future is that the Major Incident Room is a potentially decisive factor in the investigation of serious crime and that unless proper resources are allocated to it commensurate with potential workload, it will tend to degenerate into bureaucratic inefficiency.

452. Another important factor likely to affect the operational efficiency of a Major Incident Room is the extent to which the staff allocated to it are specially trained. The work of a Major Incident Room cannot be completely equated with routine police work although there may be a common element so far as the reception and recording of telephone calls from members of the public are concerned. Much of the work so far as it involves maintenance of indexes and the filing of documents may be well outside the normal experience of people allocated to the Incident Room some of whom may not have had the benefit of even working in the ordinary office situation. In the light of the importance of the tasks and their effect on the progress of an inquiry as a whole, there is a very strong case for as many as possible of the people who are to work within the complex to have had previous training in its systems and methods of operation. It is clear that on many occasions during the life of the Ripper Major Incident Room, untrained staff were deployed to quite crucial tasks. Nowhere was this more apparent than when the list of 241 people to whom the Jordan £5 note might have been paid came to be checked against the Millgarth nominal index. All the signs are that several people were involved in this process and were either police constables or cadets. Whatever the reason was it is now known that this search failed to identify Sutcliffe and 10 others who were in the list and who had had a previous connection with the inquiry. This led to inadequate briefing of inquiry officers with disastrous consequences. Had the system worked efficiently Sutcliffe would have been identified as a prime suspect amongst the 241 people. I have not been able to identify why the references on his nominal index cards were not located when the list of names was being searched but I suspect that it was because of the inexperience of people charged with the task or because the index had by that time become so ineffective that Sutcliffe’s cards were not in their correct position. There were other examples of human failure in the Incident Room but it is not necessary to quote them here in support of the basic premise that the police cannot expect to employ untrained personnel in such tasks and at the same time expect the Incident Room to function effectively in a serious or complex crime case.

453. The nominal index of the Ripper Incident Room included, at the time of Sutcliffe’s arrest, more than a quarter of a million names. Bearing in mind that this was a card index and that it was being searched frequently as actions were issued and new names came into the system, it should
have been anticipated that cards would be misplaced so that the integrity of the system would be degraded. When Chief Inspector Tyman completed his review he said that "because of its long use and its enormity there has been misfiling by people who have had access to it". It is clearly the case that there was misfiling within the index on quite a large scale, in addition to which the West Yorkshire practice of adding duplicate and triplicate index cards to an original made it possible for cards to become detached and lost in the system. It is obvious that an index system as large as this should have been subjected to a continuous process of audit on rather the same principle as the painting of the Forth Bridge. There is here a real lesson for the future which is that the misplacing of a single card in a nominal index system can jeopardise the whole inquiry. No manual system or even computerised system relying on a manual input can ever be completely free of error but system management should ensure that errors are kept to a minimum and are not allowed to escalate to the stage where the integrity of the system is jeopardised.

454. It is perhaps worth noting that in just the same way as the morale and motivation of members of outside inquiry teams deserve the constant attention of senior investigating officers, the staff of the Major Incident Room deserve equal attention. In a long running inquiry a Major Incident Room can become a centre of repetitive drudgery having much in common with production line working. Both the senior investigating officer and the officer in charge must give adequate regard to the welfare, motivation and morale of the staff so that a high level of efficiency and effectiveness is maintained. Such arrangements must involve the regular controlled turnover of personnel so as to maintain continuity without allowing individual members to become stale. In a prolonged inquiry such as the Ripper case the arrangements for staff deployment must also take account of career development and the legitimate desires of staff members for promotion or redeployment.

455. I have already had informal discussions with Mr. Bunyard, the Chief Constable of Essex and Chairman of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Steering Committee, on Major Incident Rooms and let him know of my general misgivings. I anticipate that by the time formal contact is made with the Association following your Parliamentary Statement about my review, steps will have been taken with a view to achieving standardisation of Major Incident Room procedures, computer policy and the overall training needs of personnel.

(ii) Computerisation of records

456. The Police Service has for many years recognised that computers should be able to offer the senior investigating officer in a major crime inquiry a more simple and effective means of handling the information flow generated. As has already been made clear, these problems can be enormous and become more and more difficult as the inquiry becomes protracted. Furthermore, they are always exacerbated where a series of incidents is involved and this is particularly marked when incidents take place in more than one force area. Happily such series of incidents are rare, but they are nevertheless, in my view, of sufficient magnitude and importance to justify a major effort by those Departments concerned to provide the operational policeman with the most efficient tool to do the job.

457. The research undertaken to date has identified a requirement to produce a computer application which will handle every facet of the Incident Room system. Regretably, as I described earlier, such systems do differ considerably from force to force. The approach undertaken thus far has been to meet the need by a system of "full text" retrieval which automatically indexes every word in a statement taken from a witness as it is typed or from any other relevant document. Thus the investigating officer has the facility to recall on a visual display unit any statement, part of a statement, or any number of documents which relate to a specific incident for example "man with dog" or "taxi driver". Such a system has enormous advantages to the detective who is endeavouring to identify every person who becomes the subject of his inquiries and ultimately to identify the murderer by this means. Whilst those concerned are conscious of the difference in systems utilised throughout the country these experiments have been conducted so as to take account, as far as possible, of such differences and thus produce a system which will be available to all forces who wish to avail themselves of it. However, those forces whose systems differ in a fundamental way from the package will, necessarily, have to make appropriate changes to their systems if essential progress on a national basis is to be achieved. As I have intimated previously discussions I have had with Chief Constables recently lead me to believe that the Service is ready for a lead in this direction and recommendations arising from my report will provide this.
458. The research which has taken place over the years has been confronted with considerable technological difficulty. It is hoped that such difficulty has now been overcome and a full scale experiment under the code name M.I.R.I.A.M. (Major Incident Room Indexing Actioning Management) is currently being mounted by the Police Scientific Development Branch of the Home Office in the Essex Police area. This system is currently about to go to tender with a quotation price in the region of £700,000. It must, however, be said that even if this experiment is successful it will be some years before it will produce a package which will be generally available to the police.

459. In recent months consideration has also been given to the design of a system utilising new developments in micro-computer technology which it is thought may be able to provide a computer system of sufficient capacity to handle the nominal name indexes and references normally used in a major crime inquiry. The work in this respect is at an early stage but is showing signs of promise. A micro-computer of this type costs something in the order of £20,000 and is capable of running one such nominal index, but unfortunately, problems relating to the interface of that murder index with other murder indexes which may occur in the series have not been resolved, neither have problems arising from incidents occurring in different force areas been overcome. The solution to these difficulties as currently proposed is a pyramid structure using a number of micro-computers to handle any number of incidents at the base of the pyramid and when a series is identified, utilising a larger computer to which can be transferred information from a number of micro-computers dealing with single incidents. Ultimately, and no doubt some years ahead, it is hoped that such a system could be developed which would be nationally based for those major series such as the Ripper case.

460. The gap between this two pronged approach has also been considered and what might be termed a middle course solution is being simultaneously developed under the code name M.O.S.E.S. (Miriam Operational Status Enquiry System). This system, utilising the experience gathered to date, provides something more than the simple indexing system given by the micro-computer, whilst falling short of the comprehensive system envisaged in M.I.R.I.A.M. It is based upon a total package being provided by a private sector computer bureau on a hire or purchase basis to any police force requiring it. The hire costs are estimated to be in the region of £70,000 to £80,000 per annum but it would provide a stop gap should the Police Service be faced with another series of horrific crimes such as happened in the Ripper case. I am, however, once again mindful that this technology is untried in a police environment and I am doubtful that such a system would be used in an operational context other than to meet a very dire need.

461. We have had detailed discussions with all the Home Office Departments involved in this field, and I am especially grateful to Mr. R. Bunyard, whose force is hosting these experiments and who so readily gave of his valuable time to assist me in my deliberations. Flowing from these meetings arrangements have been made to bring these matters to the urgent attention of ACPO Computer Development Committee expressing my confirmed view that police forces should not embark upon individual projects to meet their local needs, but rather agree upon common systems being developed in support of the M.I.R.I.A.M. project, and the short term micro-computer based solution. I understand that there is likely to be a Circular issued from Home Office on these lines in the near future and the general advice will be to the effect that Chief Constables should consult the Home Office, through the Inspectorate, for guidance in the use of a computer in any crime investigation. I welcome this initiative which should be reinforced when the general lessons to be learned from this review are being promulgated to the Service.

462. The discussions I have had in this particular sphere have also served to reinforce my view that the part played by the PNCU in the Ripper case has more than amply demonstrated that this unit should be drawn more closely into departmental consideration of the way ahead.

463. The major attractions of ultimately utilising a national system with an ability to interface with existing national records of vehicles and criminal names indexes are obvious. If, as I believe, we should be looking to a national system in the years ahead, I have no doubt that PNCU can and should now be providing the means by which these plans can be laid. In addition the acknowledged difficulties in mounting vehicle related inquiries and the considerable resources required to complete such operations which have been highlighted elsewhere, together with the
considerable contribution made by the PNC in the Ripper case in relation to the handling of a mass of motor vehicles numbers, persuades me that the Police Service should look carefully at this area of activity and the assistance which can be given by PNC.

464. In addition to these technical considerations I am extremely conscious of the privacy aspects involved in the police use of computers. It is essential, in my view, that all concerned realise the advantages to an investigating officer in serious crime incidents, of the value of efficient computer technology and weigh these properly against the disquiet which can arise from the fact that the information stored in a particular case about members of the public and their movements at material times which can be completely lawful and innocent. I have no doubt that by far the majority of the general public would recognise and accept that in a case such as the Yorkshire Ripper, it was perfectly proper to collate by technological means the vehicles and ultimately the owners of those vehicles being seen in "red light" areas. I would go further and suggest that in such a series of offences or in cases such as murder or rape there would be a general acceptability of the use of computer technology to assist the senior investigating officer to store and sift all the information coming to the notice of the police. Even so, it still needs to be effectively and sensitively put over to the public that, unless the use of such technology is accepted by the community, it must be prepared to tolerate that the detection of major crime will be impaired by the use of paper and pencil in preference to magnetic disc and tape.

465. Finally on this topic I believe there is also a need to put this message across effectively when the proposed legislation in this difficult area is being debated. There must be a centralised monitoring system to ensure that decided privacy rights are strictly maintained whilst at the same time ensuring that in crime investigation, especially in serious cases, computer technology is utilised to the utmost. This monitoring service in forces should be provided by the Inspectorate.

(iii) Management of Series Crimes

466. As I identified in the section of my report which deals with command, control and resources the most important prerequisite for the successful completion of a major series crime inquiry is an appropriate level and range of management skills in the senior investigating officer. It is with some reluctance that I have concluded that not all of the 43 police forces in England and Wales have senior detectives in post who could be expected to deal competently with an inquiry on the Ripper scale. It will be important in future for the Service, and in particular Chief Officers, to remedy this deficiency by improving the arrangements for selection, training and career development of people to fill these positions. Those who are earmarked for future service as senior detectives should be encouraged to develop their appreciation and understanding of management skills and be given opportunities to put them into practical effect. The aim for the future should be to ensure that in addition to having personal skill as detectives, the officers to whom major crime inquiries will be entrusted should be good managers in the widest possible sense and be conscious of the need to use a wide variety of highly developed individual skills within their inquiry teams. This is perhaps the most important aspect of all. The training which I shall prescribe later is intended to ensure that such expertise is more widely available in future.

467. I shall also deal later with the appointment of senior investigating officers for series crimes investigations, especially in multi-force areas, and with the appointment of an external Advisory Team. In the case of the senior investigating officer, when appointed to take charge of a series type investigation, he should not have any other responsibilities. This recommendation should not be seen as precluding the appointment of an individual investigating officer for each new crime in the series, whose responsibility would include the completion of all the routine inquiries which would be required for a similar crime which did not form part of a series. The senior investigating officer should not be so fully committed with routine matters arising from the overall investigation that he does not have time to apply his mind to the identification of new and profitable lines by which the detection of a suspect might be hastened.

468. During my review of the Ripper crimes the greatest single difficulty which I have encountered has been the identification of major police decisions taken during the currency of the investigation. Although I am confident that my report reflects the most accurate information which is available, interviews with senior officers of the West Yorkshire and other forces involved have clearly demonstrated a lack of common understanding of policy issues at various stages of the inquiry. For example, it has not been possible to identify beyond doubt, who was responsible
for the decision to "go public" on the "Sunderland" letters and subsequently the tape or who took the decision to mount the sponsored publicity campaign late in 1979. A further example is provided by the decision to bring various lines of inquiry to a premature conclusion or to open new lines of inquiry during the currency of an existing inquiry. The initial car "Tracking Inquiry", the "Mark II Ford Cortina Inquiry" and the "Farina" inquiry are all cases in point. There was within West Yorkshire no formal arrangement for the recording and dissemination of major policy decisions. Some decisions taken by the senior investigating officer were entered in the relevant murder log but others were never recorded. As I pointed out earlier, the fact that Superintendent Stainthorpe eliminated Sutcliffe on handwriting despite Chief Superintendent Gillman having varied the elimination criteria previously provided in the "Special Notice" of September 1979, is a pertinent illustration of the confusion which often follows improperly documented decisions. An inquiry of this magnitude called for "corporate" management, for regular meetings of the senior management team, for the recording of minutes of meetings and the documentation and circulation to relevant officers of major policy decisions. A noteworthy lesson for the future is that the senior investigating officer together with members of the external Advisory Team, when appointed, and the individual incident officers from each crime in the series, should meet on a regular basis to discuss the development of the investigation, the cancellation of any unproductive or exhausted lines of inquiry and the adoption of new investigative avenues. These meetings should also deal with the management of independent inquiries including the resources available to them and the delegation of authority to subordinate officers to carry them out to an agreed time scale. Such meetings should be minuted and circulated on a "need to know" basis.

469. A good example of independent lines of inquiry and the problems of resource allocation and time scale was provided by the "Tracking" and "Cross Area Sighting" inquiries in the Ripper case which, as described earlier, went hopelessly wrong. Before any such inquiry is mounted in future its objectives should be clearly identified and resources allocated to it on a scale which will allow it to be completed within an agreed time limit. The inquiry should be delegated in its entirety to someone other than the senior investigating officer or the incident officer for any of the independent crimes and he should only be required to report positively during the inquiry or generally at its conclusion. The line of inquiry should not be abandoned before conclusion unless it has been overtaken by a course of events (for example, the arrest of the culprit) or has become irrelevant because of new information which has become available. The decision should be taken by the senior investigating officer in consultation with his corporate management team and should be properly recorded.

470. Commander Nevill strongly recommended the formation of an intelligence unit within the West Yorkshire Major Incident Room. The need for the type of work which such a unit could do had earlier been recognised within West Yorkshire and had led to the formation of the internal Review Team under Chief Superintendent Domaille. This Team did valuable work but once its report had been submitted to the Chief Constable it was disbanded and no similar work was done until recommended by the external Advisory Team appointed in November 1980.

471. As a result of that particular recommendation a number of independent lines of research were conducted into the operation of the Major Incident Room, the production, timing and content of Police Circulations about the crimes and the validity of the "Letters and Tape Inquiry". These initiatives unfortunately came too late in the investigation for their impact to be conclusive but they were effective in revealing the way in which outstanding problems might have been tackled at an earlier stage. As I have earlier identified, the decision to mount the "Letters and Tape Inquiry" without proper analysis of their contents in relation to information which had been made available through the media, was wrong. This was the sort of task which might have been given to an intelligence unit had one been available. I do not contend that such a unit should be in post at all times throughout the course of a series inquiry, only that capable officers to staff such a unit should be made available on an ad hoc basis whenever there are independent lines of research available, the pursuit of which could assist the senior investigating officer. The content of Police Circulations in relation to series crimes is clearly an area where members of such an intelligence unit could provide valuable assistance by ensuring that the best possible information was circulated in such a way as left readers in no doubt of the relative importance of each aspect of it. An intelligence unit in the Ripper Major Incident Room might well have foreseen that not all Sutcliffe's attacks on women resulted in the death of the victim and therefore contemplated that more extensive inquiries amongst surviving victims might have given more positive leads or new
avenues of inquiry. Such an intelligence unit could clearly have included an officer or civilian employee with extensive computer experience, able to ensure that full advantage was taken of any relevant computer application.

472. It is said that the true test of police effectiveness at a major incident such as an aircraft or train crash is the length of time which elapses before the police can demonstrate that they are fully in control of the situation. In the early stages of an incident, for instance, police officers and members of other emergency services arrive in an unco-ordinated way so that it is difficult for the officer in charge of the incident to say how many members of the different organisations are present at the scene and what they are doing. One of the primary tasks is to control access to the scene, to identify and control existing resources and to deploy them to the tasks which remain to be done in a proper order of priority. Only when the senior officer can clearly identify the different aspects of the situation which exists, the outstanding tasks in order of priority, the individual members of various organisations working on the site, the length of time they have been engaged and the time when they are due to be relieved for rest and refreshment can he claim to be in control. These questions should not need to be asked in connection with a developing situation such as a series of major crimes. It ought to be possible for the officer in charge to maintain records throughout the currency of the inquiry so that he is always able to identify the current situation. This was clearly not the case during the Ripper investigation and one of the reasons for the appointment of the Domaillé Review Team was the need to identify stages which a number of subordinate lines of inquiry had reached. It should not be necessary to take this sort of action on a crisis basis. An inquiry into a serious crimes should involve a proper system of central administration through which all resources deployed to the inquiry are controlled and monitored. This is not a difficult requirement and does not involve a heavy manpower commitment. It does, however, involve senior investigating officers and incident officers observing a disciplined approach to the management of resources, all of which should be provided through the central administrative agency. Only by this means can proper control be exercised over the costs of an investigation including those of specific lines of inquiry.

473. Although many forces now make proper support and welfare arrangements for serious crime inquiries, experience with some welfare arrangements in the Ripper case lead me to emphasise that whenever an inquiry involving the deployment of manpower on a large scale is being contemplated, proper administrative support arrangements should be made. An individual officer should be given responsibility for the welfare of officers involved in the investigation in the widest sense. Included within this overall responsibility should be arrangements for accommodation, feeding, continuity of deployment, staff turnover and any other problems likely to be experienced within a large group of men and women who are almost inevitably working away from their normal operational base. The effort should be intended to maintain the motivation and morale of inquiry officers and to reduce the amount of time which they might need to spend away from the inquiry dealing with domestic or welfare issues through the ordinary channels available to them. As I have identified in the part of my report which deals with Command and Control, the promotion and maintenance of high motivation and morale is more related to the nature of the work which people are required to do than to welfare considerations. Pre-occupation with welfare issues over a protracted period can, however, dull the interest and enthusiasm of inquiry officers and prevent them applying their best efforts to their work. The apparent lack of morale and motivation amongst officers engaged in the £5 note inquiries during the Ripper investigation is a typical example. Whilst perspiration is more likely to clear up a difficult investigation than inspiration there must be regular boosts given to junior officers who are engaged on mundane duties, such as house-to-house inquiries over a lengthy period, if motivation and morale are to be kept at an efficient level. Realistic and interesting briefings on a regular basis provide an excellent means for doing this and the basic aim should be to make every officer engaged on the particular inquiry, however junior he might be, feel as though he is doing something important in the overall interests of the investigation and that he can make any suggestion or comment at a briefing in furtherance of this ideal.

474. In essence the management of series cases such as the ‘Black Panther’ or Ripper investigations calls for far more than the basic professional techniques looked for in the average senior detective who might regularly investigate individual cases of murder. In the series investigation, especially over a protracted period, he will need to marshal not only the normal force resources but also very often those from elsewhere. He will be looking for individual skills in his team leaders so as to strengthen the corporate effort. The logistics of the operation coupled
with the financial implications will need to be understood so as to enable him to persuade his chief officers and sometimes others, of the validity of his strategy in any part of the investigation. There might be occasions when perhaps an Advisory Team of senior officers from elsewhere (in line with a recommendation I shall be making later) is called in to assist him and in order to achieve maximum benefit from such an arrangement he will need to be sufficiently astute and imaginative not only to balance in the right way any advice given, but also to harness the professional expertise of the group to serve his needs to the full. To achieve all this the selection process and career development of such top flight detectives must be improved in many instances and there also needs to be a reappraisal of the training programme available. I will cover this latter point later when giving my recommendations under the “Training Requirement”.

(iv) Senior Investigating Officer in “Series Crimes”

475. A lesson which the Police Service has clearly failed to learn from the notorious “Black Panther” crimes of the mid-1970s is that where crimes within a connected series occur, and especially in different force areas, special arrangements need to be made for command of the co-ordinated inquiry. In the “Black Panther” case which involved murders being committed in Yorkshire, Lancashire and Staffordshire with a subsequent kidnapping in the West Mercia area, each of the four forces conducted its own independent inquiry into the crimes, assisted by members of the Regional Crime Squad and ultimately by a senior Scotland Yard officer. Although there were liaison meetings the inquiry was never under unified command as a result of which a number of embarrassing mistakes were made. None of the inquiries in the four police areas was successful in identifying a suspect and Neilson, the murderer, was eventually caught by a routine police patrol in Nottinghamshire, in a similar way to Sutcliffe’s arrest in Sheffield for the Ripper crimes.

476. The problems associated with a multi-force crime series investigation derive from the fact that each Chief Constable of a police force has complete operational authority within that force area. Although there is a legal framework under which one Chief Constable can provide assistance to another, there is no provision under which, in ordinary circumstances, a Chief Constable can be compelled to surrender any part of his operational authority to a senior officer from another force. Local force prestige is a likely barrier in the way of requests for assistance, especially since the advent of larger police areas, whilst history shows that there are few, if any, occasions when a Chief Constable would voluntarily allow an inquiry into a crime within his force area to be controlled by an officer from elsewhere.

477. When the Ripper case first involved the Greater Manchester Police following the murder of Jean Jordan, Greater Manchester immediately assumed complete responsibility for the investigation. This decision was taken in spite of the fact that the crime was clearly linked with others which had already occurred in West Yorkshire and in relation to which an extensive investigation was already under way. There was no voluntary move towards an immediate amalgamation of the inquiries under a single senior investigating officer and the Greater Manchester force established a Major Incident Room in Manchester from which they controlled their inquiry as if it were wholly independent of any other crime. There were, of course, consultations between senior detectives on both sides of the Pennines but although some common lines of inquiry were established there was never a suggestion that the two investigations should be fully co-ordinated under one “Supremo” investigating officer. The failure to mount a co-ordinated inquiry was a principal factor leading to the problems which I identified in Part III of my report, and particularly in relation to the work of the Major Incident Room, the £5 note inquiry and the “Letters and Tape” inquiry.

478. The other serious consequence arising from the failure to appoint a senior commander with authority in both forces was West Yorkshire’s failure to profit from independent professional advice. Senior investigating officers had the opportunity to benefit from the research work of Detective Inspector Zackrisson of Northumbria in relation to the letters and tape; of Detective Inspector Fletcher of Greater Manchester in relation to the “Tracking Inquiry”; of Messrs. Outeridge and Stockdale, the forensic scientists, in relation to the descriptions of suspects by the surviving victims and of Commander Nevill of New Scotland Yard in relation to a variety of important aspects of the investigation. All these opportunities to benefit from independent professional advice were not effectively acted upon by West Yorkshire and this might well have
been due to the fact that such advice was being offered by members of other forces. I do not imply that these opportunities were rejected without consideration; merely that the senior officers of West Yorkshire did not believe what was being offered was superior to the research done and opinions held within their own force.

479. It could be argued that an error of judgement made by a "Supremo" investigating officer might have a more catastrophic effect on a multi-force inquiry than those made by officers in charge of the separate investigations of series crimes within the independent force areas. I do not accept that this is the case. Certain errors of judgement made in West Yorkshire during the Ripper inquiry were very serious indeed and were not prevented or ameliorated by the influence of senior investigating officers from other forces. In fact West Yorkshire had a number of opportunities during the investigation to benefit from independent professional advice but more often than not chose not to do so.

480. This concept of parochial superiority must be overcome if some principal lessons from both the "Black Panther" and Ripper cases are to be effectively digested within the Service. Looking to the future, I shall refer later in my report to the "Training Requirement" which, if implemented to the full, should help overcome such outdated insularity.

481. I am firmly of the view that in the series serious crime situation there needs to be one officer in overall command of the investigation with the authority to direct the course of the investigation in all the police areas affected. His rank should be either Assistant Chief Constable or Detective Chief Superintendent depending on the size of the operation and during his appointment he should have no other responsibilities. In the case of a multi-force investigation he should be appointed following the mutual agreement of the Chief Constables concerned.

482. The choice of officer to take supreme command is obviously of vital importance. The temptation to appoint the "senior man" on age or service grounds should be resisted, unless it is clear that this candidate has all of the qualities required in an inquiry "leader". The person appointed requires not only the professional competence which will inspire confidence in those who work for him but the charisma which will ensure loyalty to him and his policies, even when there is individual doubt about their validity. These attributes were clearly not present during the Ripper inquiry and it was Assistant Chief Constable Oldfield's failure to lead effectively which paved the way for loss of confidence in and loyalty to his inquiry policies. There is evidence that loyalty to various senior inquiry officers was undermined by their contemporaries during the investigation and that the work was less effective in consequence. Perhaps the best example of the operation of old loyalties is that the first senior officer to visit Dewsbury Police Station following Sutcliffe's arrest was Mr. Oldfield, in spite of the fact that he had been removed from command of the inquiry! Assistant Chief Constable Hobson, appointed to the control of the inquiry in November 1980, found out about the arrest by accident, as did the Press Liaison officer Superintendent Morriss. Loyalties and jealousies stemming from the former constituent forces now combined in West Yorkshire will lose their impact with the passage of time. For the foreseeable future, however, I hold the view that senior officers appointed in the ranks of Assistant Chief Constable and Chief Superintendent should wherever possible, be drawn from outside the present force area so as to give a much needed cross fertilisation of the senior command team and also help overcome the obvious prejudices and misplaced loyalties as identified during my review.

483. In the light of the limitations already widely known within the Service arising from the two notorious cases previously mentioned, I believe that the Association of Chief Police Officers would be willing to adopt not only the procedure which I have outlined for the appointment of a "Supremo" investigating officer but also for the appointment of an independent Advisory Team which I shall describe later to assist the senior investigating officer when appropriate in the series crime situation. In my view, if these two particular recommendations are adopted within the Service then much of the frailty exposed in the management of the Ripper style investigation should be overcome.

(v) The Appointment of an Advisory Team

484. In one sense it was very fortunate that the Ripper crimes were committed predominantly in West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester. These two forces are amongst a comparatively small